Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Shell Oil Co. v. Pedraza
Supreme Court brief1992
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oaace OF THE CLERK
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In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1991
SHELL OIL COMPANY,
Petitioner,
CRUZ PEDRAZA, et al.,
Respondents.
Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The
United States Court Of Appeals
For The First Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Of Counsel:
James A. HENDERSON, JR.
Frank B. Ingersoll
Professor of Law
Cornell Law School
Ithaca, New York 14853
(607) 255-2303
AARON D. TWERSKI
Professor of Law
Brooklyn Law School
250 Joralemon Street
Brooklyn, New York 11201
(718) 780-7999
Burt BALLANFANT
Shell Oil Company
4856 One Shell Plaza
P. O. Box 2463
Houston, Texas 7
(713) 241-7023
Counsel of Record
Ropert L. LEONARD
Douerty, WALLACE, PILLSBURY
& Murry
One Monarch Place
1414 Main Street,
19th Floor
Springfield, Massachusetts
01144-1002
(413) 733-3111
Counsel for Petitioner
Shell Oil Company
7252-2463
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit erroneously found that the occupational
health standards promulgated by the United States Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration did not pre-
empt state juries in common law causes of action from
establishing occupational health standards that differed
from those established by the United States Occupational
Safety and Health Administration.
Whether the employer’s compliance with occupa-
tional health and safety standards established by the
Occupational Health and Safety Administration satisfies
as a matter of law a product supplier’s duty to warn of
risks associated with such compliance?
il
Il. LIST OF ALL PARTIES
Petitioner, defendant-appellee below, is Shell Oil
Company (“Shell”). Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 28.1,
a list of all of Shell’s parents, subsidiaries, and affiliates is
reproduced as Appendix 6 at App. 91.
Respondents, plaintiffs-appellants below are Cruz
Pedraza, Alejandrina Pedraza, Roberto Pedraza, and
Mary Ellen Pedraza.
VII.
VIII.
ili
Ill. TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ......
EP MP PAR, FREES. ccc c ces evccccnss ii
UE PY PE OU ED occ cece e cece rees iii
pe Be Me ee 8 ies Vv
OPINIONS BY OTHER COURTS............. l
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ............ l
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PRO-
i ES eee 2
Constitutional Provisions .................. 2
rae aa go gd oi ge aca 46 vu .0 w oev ete em HR 3
ee Se sine yh Mees 40d Se Os 4
prmtemenes OF THE CASE ................ 5
FEDERAL QUESTIONS RAISED............. 7
REASONS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE WRIT. 8
1. THE FIRST CIRCUIT’S REFUSAL TO REC-
OGNIZE THE SUPREMACY OF FEDERAL
REGULATORY STANDARDS WHEN IN
DIRECT CONFLICT WITH STATE LAW
CONSTITUTES A RADICAL AND IRRA-
TIONAL DEPARTURE FROM CONTROL-
LING AUTHORITY IN THIS COURT AND
yy Get 8: 6) 8
iv
Iti. TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
Page
N
THIS COURT MUST CONSTRUE OSHA’S
SAVINGS CLAUSE SO AS NOT TO PER-
MIT TORT ACTIONS UNDER STATE LAW
THAT SUBSTANTIALLY INTERFERE
WITH FEDERAL WORKPLACE SAFETY
RIAT EIEIO os. dines 845s VE b LOOSE ees 12
A. State Tort Actions that Substantially
Interfere with Federal Safety Stan-
dards must be Preempted ........... 12
B. Plaintiff’s Tort Action in this Case
Would Substantially Interfere with Rel-
evant OSHA Standards .............. 13
C. OSHA Workplace Safety Standards
Conform to Criteria that Make Federal
Preemption Especially Justified ...... 15
D. The OSHA Savings Clause Can and
Must be Construed so as not to Permit
the Tort Action in this Case...... 2a
E. The First Circuit's Wooden Construc-
tion of the OSHA Savings Clause is so
Patently in Error that Wasteful Confu-
sion is Certain to Reign without Clari-
fication from this Court.............. 26
3. FEDERAL PREEMPTION IN THE AREA
OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY PRESENTS
ISSUES OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE
WHICH, WITHOUT GUIDANCE FROM
THIS COURT, ARE CREATING WASTE-
FUL CONFUSION BOTH IN COURTS
AND IN PRODUCTS MARKETS......... 28
RRS HAE 8 | eer ie Tae eee
IV. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Associated Industries of Massachusetts v. Snow, 898
ee ere ROMS GK -Sie o ear vecns cas cues ceenes 2, 12
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 108
S.Ct. 2510, 101 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988) ......... 22, 23, 24
Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3rd
Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S.Ct. 1386 (1991)....... 9
Dalehite v. United States, 344 U.S. 873, 73 S.Ct. 166,
SF Li Re GRE 5-5 osasn ss ot cb gneseinaneanees 25
Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. New York, 855
Fine Ge CR Ca FONE oincncccccince ceareeereeres 12
Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. de la Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141, 73 L.Ed.2d 664, 102 S.Ct. 3014
CPOE cen ys 0 bc 4.5 duu RN eee eae eee eee 12
G&T Terminal Packaging v. Consolidated Rail, 830
F.2d 1230 (3rd Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct.
1291, 99 L.Ed.2d 501, 485 U.S. 988 (1988) ......... 10
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (9 Wheat), 6 L.E.23
CTIIIOD w o0'6i vo ule s:A-c6 a ca 14
lidustrial Union v. American Petroleum Institute, 448
U.S. 607, 100 S.Ct. 2844, 65 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1988) .... 17
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 93
L.Ed.2d 883, 107 S.Ct. 805 (1987)............ 2, 10, 13
Kitts v. General Motors, 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 108 L.Ed.2d 783, 110 S.Ct.
ys |)... | Cnr Fee FEE ame OS Da 10
vi
IV. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
National Solid Wastes Management, Assn. v. Killian,
SIS FAG G74 Ge Ga eee ckcccacscevessescesses 26
New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey,
774 Fae Sie Coe CO, Tie awe da cee icceexesss: 12
Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir.
WOOT) 6s i.ven caceud esos tee ee 13
Pedraza v. Shell Oil Company, 724 F.Supp. 1 (D.
EONS, THOSE cc cccuerc era gaetepeeene aera aa wess l
Pedraza, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48 (ist Cir.
SUPE i cccccevcueenbeasbeauenl etna ee eee ae l
Pedraza, et al. v. Shell Oil Company, 729 F.Supp. 187
CED. Dlnae. DOs is ck eas ove ndee er eres eee esee eee |
People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 534 N.E.2d 962
CGS... ERs cos dace tema eke re eer 27
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 95
L.66.260 39; 167 SACU TSRP CII vs ov ccsiaetesedy BO
Puffer’s Hardware Inc. v. Donovan, 742 F.2d 12 (1st
Cle. T9GGR os vccvigenvdes ieee ee 12
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 55
LB. Se 179, SE GAR, DO CR ck tke we ep eanceees 14
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236, 3 L.Ed.2d 775, 79 S.Ct. 773 (1959).......... 2, 33
Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816 (11th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 108 L.Ed.2d 783, 110 S.Ct.
C7GR CUSED «0nd cc cnkc Se Panes peer iLaaees 10
Texas and Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil
Co. (Abilene), 204 U.S. 426, 27 S.Ct. 350, 51 L.Ed.
SSS (UGG) or cece sessavedederd eit eee 10
vii
IV. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
Wood v. General Motors, Inc., 865 F.2d 395, (1st Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 108 L.Ed.2d 782, 110 S.Ct.
A. RRR RAI EIR is Biro 2 ra ey eR A aD Testes passim
CONSTITUTION
Sh ae ee Ba! ee ee eer er rere re 2
STATUTES
Se, PE 4 ox bo as ho Av db ea rate nueneeeres 10, 25
ee RE a ee Cpe Seen ce ee vere eM ened l
er ee oe Ul Ae ice he ce RUN od eats l
Says nv os evn ea vv ewes ee on ekee seas 3
Be re I So .a'c os ves cease eckveseseacaes ae
Se Sc eos. Wars x ck Pek ee oe eae RS 3
i ae Coe eee base
ee gr ee bine 5 Cate ee eee Ree Renn 20
PA a ee ee eer eee eee
ee IO eh occ neh es cha cais ee eee eee 10
cde iG ac avces ones hcaeeesccneeetau 10
Ee ee renee arn ers een ere: 10
REGULATIONS
a | i ners: 14,9
29 C.F.R. §1910.134 . Re ee OPER Fe
Vili
{'V. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
Be Ge ERIE ok csv a neensctusesnes ee
ae ee 4, 6, 13
SECONDARY AUTHORITIES
C. Bowen, Miracle at Philadelphia (1966) ............. 14
Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market,
ee ge a re 28
The Federalist No. 22 (A. Hamilton) (R. Fairfield,
pe BR ee a ne ee ... 14
15 Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers’
Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudica-
tion, 73 Colum. L.Rev. 1531 (1973) ............. 25, 28
Henderson & Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Prod-
ucts Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn,
Re Fee sR NY GUUPIIIs 6 6c c cc cea wwsececswas 28, 29
Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and !ts Conse-
ae CSUN Net can ye pets SEM ee eee ees 4-4 28
Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort
Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1521 (1987)............... ee
S. Rep. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970),
reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
oo, |. eerie A 14
Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules
and Standards in Design Defect Litigation: Advanc-
ing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 521 (1982) 29
Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability (1991) 29
V. OPINIONS BY OTHER COURTS
The unpublished Report and Recommendation
Regarding Defendant Shell Oil Company’s Motion for
Summary Judgment dated March 15, 1989 is reproduced
as Appendix 4 at App. 45.
The decision of the United States District Court
styled Pedraza v. Shell Oil Company, 724 F.Supp. 1 (D.
Mass. 1989) adopted the Magistrate’s Recommendation
by denying Shell's initial motion for summary judgment
and is reproduced as Appendix 3 at App. 24.
The subsequent decision of the District Court gran-
ting Shell’s motion for dismissal based on preemption is
styled Pedraza, et al. v. Shell Oil Company, 729 F.Supp. 187
(D. Mass. 1990), and is reproduced as Appendix 2 at App.
18.
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit reversing the decision of the district
court is styled Pedraza, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48
(Ist Cir. 1991), and is reproduced as Appendix 1 at App
l.
VI. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit was rendered on August 13, 1991
Petitioner's motion for rehearing was denied by that
court on September 6, 1991 and is reproduced as Appen-
dix 5 at App. 84.
This Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1254(1) because the preemptive
effect of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA),
29 U.S.C. §651 et seq. as specified in 29 C.F.R. §1901.2 and
the regulations promulgated under its authority, 29 C.F.R
§1910.134 represents construction of one of the most
important federal statutes of recent years. Additionally,
the holding of the United States Court of Appeals that
OSHA did not preempt efforts by the state to establish
a
2
common law occupational standards through jury ver-
dicts conflicts with the holding by the same court of
appeals that states could not administratively promulgate
an occupational safety and health standard protecting
workers where a federal standard was in effect. Associated
Industries of Massachusetts v. Snow, 898 F.2d 274 (1st Cir.
1990). The finding that state administration regulations
are preempted by specific OSHA regulations but that
common law causes of action are not conflicts with this
Court’s holdings in San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 3 L.Ed.2d 775, 79 S.Ct. 773 (1959);
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 95 L.Ed.2d 39,
107 S.Ct. 1549; International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S.
481, 93 L.Ed.2d 883, 107 S.Ct. 805 (1987). The pervasive-
ness of OSHA regulation underscores the necessity of
having uniform national standards and implementing the
Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the United States Con-
stitution.
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Article VI, Clause 2 to the United States Constitution
provides:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United
States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme law of the land, and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any thing in the Constitution or laws of any
State to the contrary notwithstanding.
*
3
STATUTES
Title 29 U.S.C. §652(8) provides as follows:
The term “occupational safety and health stan-
dard” means a standard which requires condi-
tions, or the adoption or use of one or more
practices, means, methods, operations, or pro-
cesses, reasonably necessary or appropriate, to
provide safe or healthful employment and
places of employment.
Title 29 U.S.C. §653(b)(4) provides as follows:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to super-
sede or in any manner affect any workmen’s
compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or
affect in any other manner the commonlaw or
Statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of
employers or employees under any law with
respect to injuries, diseases or death of
employees arising out of, or in the course of,
employment
Title 29 U.S.C. §654(a) provides as follows:
Each employer -
(1) shall furnish to each of his employees
employment and a place of employment which
are free from recognized hazards that are caus-
ing or are likely to cause death or serious physi-
cal harm to his employees.
(2) shall comply with occupational safety
and health standards promulgated under’ this
chapter.
Title 29 U.S.C. §667(a) provides as follows:
(a) Assertion of State standards in absence of
applicable Federal standards.
Nothing in this chapter shall prevent any State
agency or court from asserting jurisdiction
under State law over any occupational safety or
+
health issue with respect to which no standard
is in effect under section 655 of this title.
¢
REGULATIONS
29 C.F.R. §1901.2 provides in part as follows:
§1901.2 Alternative to Federal preemption
Section 18(a) of the Act is read as preventing
any State agency or court from asserting juris-
diction under State law over any occupational
safety or health issue with respect to which a
Federal standard has been issued under section _
6 of the Act.
* * *
29 C.F.R. §1910.1000 Table Z-1 provides as follows:
An employee’s exposure to any material listed
in Table Z-1, Z-2, or Z-3 of this section shall be
limited in accordance with the requirements of
the following paragraphs of this section.
(a) Table Z-1:
(i) Materials with names preceded by “C
Ceiling Values. An employee’s exposure to any
material in table Z-1, the name of which is pre-
ceded by a “C” (e.g., C Boron trifluoride), shall
at no time exceed the ceiling value given for that
material in the table.
”
* * *
(e) To achieve compliance with paragraph (a)
through (d) of this section, administrative or
engineering controls must first be determined
and implemented whenever feasible. When such
controls are not feasible to achieve full compli-
ance, protective equipment or any other protec-
tive measures shall be used to keep the exposure
of employees to air contaminants within the
5
limits prescribed in this section. Any equipment
and/or technical measures used for this purpose
must be approved for each particular use by a
competent industrial hygienist or other techni-
cally qualified person. Whenever respirators are
used, their use shall comply with §1910.134.
TABLE Z-1
Substance p-p.m. mg./M
Epichlorohydrin — Skin 5 19
29 C.FE.R. §1910.134(a)(1) provides as follows:
(a) Permissible practice. (1) In the control of those
occupational diseases caused by breathing air
contaminated with harmful dusts, fogs, fumes,
mists, gases, smokes, sprays, or vapors, the pri-
mary objective shall be to prevent atmospheric
contamination. This shall be accomplished as far
as feasible by accepted engineering control mea-
sures (for example, enclosure or confinement of
the operation, general and local ventilation, and
substitution of less toxic materials). When effec-
tive engineering controls are not feasible, or
while they are being instituted, appropriate res-
pirators shall be used pursuant to the following
requirements.
VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a products liability personal injury case. Plain-
tiffs allege that Mr. Cruz Pedraza became asthmatic as a
result of exposure to epichlorohydrin present as a trace
impurity in Shell’s epoxy resin sold through a distributor
:
a
6
to Mr. Pedraza’s employer, United Technologies Corpora-
tion (Pratt and Whitney). The plaintiffs’ allegation is that
Shell did not provide a warning about the dangers of
epichlorohydrin to his employer. The plaintiff in answers
to interrogatories stated alternatively: either (1) that the
warning that should have been given was that an
enclosed hood should have been provided, or (2) that the
workers should have worn respirators and that the basis
of the warning that should been provided were 29 C.F.R.
§1910.134 and 29 C.F.R. §1910.1000, the NIOSH Criteria
for a Recommended Standard. . . . Occupational Exposure
to Epichlorohydrin, HEW Publication No. (NIOSH)
76-206 (Sept. 1976), reproduced here in part as Appendix
15 at App. 173; and the ACGIH Standard for Exposure to
Epichlorohydrin.
Mr. Pedraza’s employer, United Technologies,
through its employees responsible for occupational safety
— Mr. Owen, a certified industrial hygienist, and Mr.
Schibi, a certified industrial hygienist, testified: (1) that
Pratt & Whitney had received the Shell Material Safety
Data Sheet (MSDS) for epoxy resin, Appendix 9 at App.
114, 122-123 and Appendix 8 at App. 108, (2) that the
Shell MSDS disclosed the presence of epichlorohydrin,
the amount of epichlorohydrin in the product and the fact
that an OSHA limit on epichlorohydrin existed, Appen-
dix 10 at App. 135-139, (3) that Pratt & Whitney read the
Shell MSDS, Appendix 9 at App. 122, 123, (4) that Pratt &
Whitney had the current NIOSH documents in their
library, Appendix 10 at App. 138, and (5) that Pratt &
Whitney, Mr. Pedraza’s employer, recognized their duty
to follow OSHA regulations and installed the local
exhaust engineering equipment required by OSHA regu-
lations, 29 C.F.R. §1910.134(a)(1), at Mr. Pedraza’s work
station, Appendix 9 at App. 116-120 and Appendix 8 at
App. 110, 111. Available industrial hygiene monitoring
reflected that the OSHA limits were met. Appendix 10 at
App. 137, 138. The plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Schrager, agreed
that local exhaust ventilation met the OSHA ventilation
camitiaaaamcmaiaiainaaasiicceiaiaiiemaiiaiiniieile
7
standard. Appendix 10 at App. 127-133. In light of plain-
tiffs’ theory of the case, the only failure to warn claim
remaining was for Shell to have warned Pratt & Whitney
of procedures or exposure standards as to epi-
chlorohydrin different from those of OSHA.
The trial court having before it Shell’s first motion for
summary judgment which it had denied entered a judg-
ment dismissing plaintiffs’ claims based on OSHA pre-
emption holding that there were specific OSHA
regulations as to epichlorohydrin. Pedraza, et al. v. Shell
Oil Co., supra (Reproduced as Appendix 2 at App. 18).
The district court’s finding was based on the extensive
record which had established the undisputed facts that
United Technologies had notice through Shell’s hazard
communication materials of the presence of epi-
chlorohydrin in Shell’s epoxy resin product, recognized
its duty to comply with OSHA, and implemented one of
the exposure control measures which met the OSHA
requirements, i.e., local exhaust ventilation. 29 C.F.R.
§1910.134(a)(1).
Mr. Pedraza appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit. That court reversed the trial
court. Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., supra (Reproduced as
Appendix 1 at App. 1). Shell filed a motion for rehearing
which also included a request that the court of appeals’
opinion be clarified to state that the OSHA regulations
were the duty of care owed to an employee. The motion
for rehearing was denied (Reproduced as Appendix 5 at
App. 84).
IX. FEDERAL QUESTIONS RAISED
This petition raises the issue of whether OSHA pre-
empts common law causes of action when a supplier
warns of the presence of a chemical, the employer
acknowledges receipt of that warning, and the employer
implements one of the alternative safety measures pro-
vided by OSHA regulations. This preemption issue was
presented twice to the district court. Relevant portions of
8
Shell’s briefs are reproduced as Appendix 13 at App. 148
and Appendix 14 at App. 157. The statutory preemption
issue was presented to and decided by the court of
appeals. Relevant portions of Shell’s brie. to the United
States Court of Appeals are reproduced as Appendix 7 at
App. 97. This issue was raised again in petitioner’s
motion for rehearing before the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit. Relevant portions of this
motion are reproduced as Appendix 5 at App. 84.
X. REASONS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE WRIT
1. THE FIRST CIRCUIT’S REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE
THE SUPREMACY OF FEDERAL REGULATORY
STANDARDS THAT DIRECTLY CONFLICTS
WITH STATE LAW CONSTITUTES A RADICAL
AND IRRATIONAL DEPARTURE FROM CON-
TROLLING AUTHORITY IN THIS COURT AND
OTHER CIRCUITS
This case presents an issue whose ultimate resolution
by this Court will profoundly affect a host of federal
safety statutes that contain both preemption provisions
and savings clauses. Savings clauses, by allowing state
tort actions based on standards of conduct that may
conflict with existing federal standards, threaten the
integrity of federal regulatory systems. Savings clauses
must be construed carefully, in light of the protection
afforded federal regulations by preemption holdings
under the Supremacy Clause. The First Circuit construed
the OSHA savings clause in a wooden and extremist
manner that will allow state tort actions to compromise
the integrity of the workplace safety standards set by a
vital federal agency. This decision cannot remain uncor-
rected. Without giving any consideration to the important
federal interests that were being set aside, the First Cir-
cuit placed itself in direct conflict with other federal
circuits that have sought to adopt functional approaches
to savings clause provisions in various federal safety
statutes. Ironically, the decision by the First Circuit is in
—————————S—”—“ST SC‘
9
direct conflict with a previous savings clause decision by
the First Circuit as well as a previous First Circuit deci-
sion on OSHA preemption.
It is no exaggeration that should this decision stand,
one of the broadest and most important federal safety
schemes will be seriously compromised. In addition,
great confusion will be introduced into an area of the law
which desperately needs stability and predictability.
When bad law, confusion and serious inter-circuit and
intra-circ ‘it conflict coalesce this court should grant cer-
tiorari.
We note that Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d
541 (3rd Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S.Ct. 1386 (1991),
currently before this Court, does not raise the issue of the
internal statutory conflict of a savings clause and a pre-
emption provision. The relevant statute in that case does
not contain a savings provision. There are some areas of
overlap between Cipollone and this case; however, the
issue which lies at the heart of the instant litigation raises
a question of statutory interpretation which is not found
in Cippolone.
Section 18(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act, 29 U.S.C. §667(a), provides that state agencies or
courts can only assert jurisdiction over occupational
health issues where no OSHA standard has been adopted.
This statute has been interpreted by the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration as preemptive. 29
C.F.R. §1901.2. However, 29 U.S.C. §653(b)(4) contains a
clearly expressed savings clause.
This case presents the issue of how to reconcile these
two seemingly contradictory provisions. This Court has
interpreted at least three analogous federal safety statutes
with substantially similar language in their savings
clauses and held them preemptive of tort actions. The
Savings clause in the Interstate Commerce Act provided:
Nothing in this Act contained shall in any way
abridge or alter the remedies now existing at
common law or by statute, but the provisions of
10
this Act are in addition to such remedies. 49
U.S.C. §22 (subsequently revised and now 49
U.S.C. §1010).
This Court determined that such language did not avoid
preemption of common law causes of action. Texas and
Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. (Abilene), 204
U.S. 426, 27 S.Ct. 350, 51 L.Ed. 553 (1907); see also, G&T
Terminal Packaging v. Consolidated Rail, 830 F.2d 1230, 1231
(3rd Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1291, 99 L.Ed.2d 501,
485 U.S. 988 (1988).
The Federal Clean Water Act contains equally broad
savings clause language:
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right
which any person (or class of persons) may have
under any statute or common law to seek
enforcement of any effluent standard or limita-
tion or to seek any other relief... . 33 U.S.C.
§1365(e).
This Court nevertheless held the Clean Water Act pre-
emptive of common law nuisance suit. See, /nternational
Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 93 L.Ed.2d 883, 107
S.Ct. 805 (1987).
The savings clause of the Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standards Act (FMVSSA) provides:
Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle
safety standard issued under this subchapter
does not exempt any person from any liability
under common law. 15 U.S.C. §1397(c).
Several appeals courts held the FMVSSA preemptive of
common law causes of action and this Court denied cer-
tiorari. See, Wood v. General Motors, Inc., 865 F.2d 395, 408
(1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 108 L.Ed.2d 782, 110 S.Ct. 1781
(1990); Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816 (11th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 108 L.Ed.2d 783, 110 S.Ct. 1781
(1990); and Kitts v. General Motors, 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 108 L.Ed.2d 783, 110 S.Ct. 1781 (1990).
Each of the above-enumerated statutes is every bit as
broad as the language contained in OSHA; yet this Court
a
11
and other courts held that such savings clauses had to
give way to preemption. We shall demonstrate that the
tensions between pre-emption and these savings clauses
are fully resolvable. Existing case law, both in this Court
and in the various circuits, provides the direction for
resolving this dilemma.
In sharp contrast to this caselaw, the First Circuit's
opinion in the instant case does not simply exacerbate the
internal tension between the savings and preemption; the
court totally ignores the tension. The First Circuit’s opin-
ion focuses exclusively on the language of the savings
clause and with wooden rigidity construes that language
in a way that allows for the widest incursion into the core
of OSHA regulation. Unlike other courts that have sought
a functional approach to what must have been intended
by Congress in allowing for savings clauses in the teeth
of a pervasive federal regulatory scheme, the First Circuit
paid no attention to the compromising of federal inter-
ests. Thus, the First Circuit’s opinion is not merely a
judgment call favoring savings over preemption in a
given fact pattern. It is a blatant rejection of the view that
federal interests need to be considered carefully in mak-
ing the decision.
The error of the First Circuit goes yet further. To
justify its sweeping reading of the savings clause the
court relies upon a set of cases involving OSHA regula-
tion and the savings clause. It is fair to say that not a
single case relied upon supports the position taken. The
decisions are at best irrelevant. At worst, they actually
support the Petitioner’s position as to preemption.
This, then, is a case of gross appellate error. It mis-
uses authority in an almost shocking fashion. It evisce-
rates a significant part of a major federal regulatory
scheme without examining the ramifications of doing so.
It is in direct conflict with decisions of several circuits
and those of this Court. Worst of all it creates a black
letter rule that makes no sense whatsoever. To adopt the
First Circuit opinion would be to declare the history of
12
OSHA and the goals set out by its founders to be a
nullity.
2. THIS COURT MUST CONSTRUE OSHA’S SAV-
INGS CLAUSE SO AS NOT TO PERMIT TORT
ACTIONS UNDER STATE LAW THAT SUBSTAN-
TIALLY INTERFERE WITH FEDERAL WORK-
PLACE SAFETY REGULATIONS
A. State Tort Actions that Substantially Interfere
with Federal Safety Standards must be Pre-
empted
Federal safety regulations must be held to preempt
state tort actions whenever the intended purpose and
effect of tort actions is to force defendants to adopt pre-
cautionary measures that are flatly inconsistent with the
federal standards. The fact that federal regulatory stan-
dards, rather than the Act itself, are threatened by state
regulation is not significant. Federal regulations such as
the workplace safety regulations involved in this case are
no less preemptive of state law than are federal statutes.
Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141, 153-154, 73 L.Ed.2d 664, 675, 102 S.Ct. 3014 (1982).
Moreover, OSHA standards specifically have been held to
preempt state regulation of workplace safety. Several
courts, including the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit, have held that state administrative regu-
lations that regulate an area governed by specific OSHA
regulations were preempted. Associated Industries of Mas-
sachusetts v. Snow, 898 F.2d 274 (1st Cir. 1990); Puffer’s
Hardware Inc. v. Donovan, 742 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1984);
Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. New York, 855 F.2d 48
(2nd Cir. 1988); and New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce
v. Hughey, 774 F.2d 587 (3rd Cir. 1985). These cases are in
direct conflict with this case. In determining if a state law
is preempted by implication, “one must look to interfer-
ence with Congress’ chosen method as well as to the
ultimate goal of the Statute.” Wood v. General Motors
Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 408 (Ist Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 108
SS
13
L.Ed.2d 782, 110 S.Ct. 1781 (1990). See also, International
Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 93 L.Ed.2d 883, 107
S.Ct. 805 (1987).
This case involves state tort law, not state administra-
tive regulation, but decisions of this Court and the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit have held
that common law tort actions are preempted to the same
extent as state regulatory action whenever those tort
actions are in conflict with federal safety standards. See,
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 95 L.Ed.2d 39,
107 S.Ct. 1549 (1987); International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
supra; San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S
236, 3 L.Ed.2d 775, 79 S.Ct. 773 (1959); Wood v. General
Motors Co., supra; and Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825
F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987). It follows that preemption occurs
if the OSHA workplace standards in this case are threat
ened or compromised by state tort actions setting incon
sistent standards.
B. Plaintiff’s Tort Action in this Case Would Sub-
stantially Interfere with Relevant OSHA Stan-
dards
The interference that would result from allowing the
Plaintiffs’ tort claim to proceed is apparent from the
testimony of the Plaintiffs’ own expert on the method
used to control exposure. Dr. Schrager testified it was his
opinion that Shell’s warning should have specified the
use Of a personal respirator as an alternative to engineer-
ing control. Appendix 10 at App. 125. Clearly the purpose
behind this claim of failure to warn is to induce
employers to use personal respirators instead of engi-
neering controls. This objective flatly contradicts the
specific language of 29 C.F.R. §§1910.134 and 1910.1000
which only allows use of personal respirators when engi-
neering controls are not feasible.
The permissible exposure levels established by 29
C.F.R. §1910.1000 cannot be lowered by state law. A fed-
eral agency acting within the scope of its congressionally
Sf
14
mandated authority has established a specific level for
exposure to epichlorohydrin in the workplace and the
specificity of its terms establish that it is not subject to
alteration by state law. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435
U.S. 151, 55 L.Ed.2d 179, 98 S.Ct. 988 (1978). Uniform
application of occupational health and safety standards
was the articulated rationale for the passage of OSHA, in
order to insure that states which vigorously adopted and
implemented safety legislation would not be put at a
competitive disadvantage with those which did not. S.
Rep. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970), reprinted in
1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1852, reproduced
as Appendix 12 at App. 146. Wood, supra at 414. Unifor-
mity of commercial regulation was at the heart of the
issue which led to the Constitution. See, Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. 1 (9 Wheat), 6 L.E.23 (1824); C. Bowen, Miracle at
Philadelphia (1966); The Federalist, No. 22, at 50-58 (A.
Hamilton) (R. Fairfield 2nd Ed. 1966). When the plaintiff
in this case insists that the defendant should have warned
the plaintiff's employer that the levels of exposure to
epichlorohydrin set by OSHA are not safe and by impli-
cation should be lower or that something other than an
approved control measure is insufficient under tort law,
the plaintiff is asking the court to use state tort law to
second-guess the OSHA standard. Indeed, the plaintiff
would have not a state regulatory agency but a jury of
laypersons do the second-guessing.
When plaintiff demands that the defendant-manufac-
turer should have warned the employer that OSHA regu-
lations approving levels of exposure to a substance are
unsafe there is little question that the common law is in
direct conflict with federal standards. Plaintiff's demand
that the manufacturer should have warned the employer
to utilize one, and not the other of two OSHA-approved
methods to control exposure might appear at first blush
not to create a direct conflict between state tort law and
federal regulatory authority, since what is being urged on
the employer has, after all received OSHA approval.
However, properly understood this demand is equally in
hteneeneeeeeineamaaaas alee
15
conflict with OSHA’s regulatory scheme. By allowing the
employer to choose among two acceptable methods of
controlling exposure to an environmental agent, OSHA
has consciously decided to allow the employer to exercise
discretion in a manner that better suits that employer’s
specific workplace environment. By demanding that the
manufacturer urge the method which plaintiff prefers as
the sole engineering response to the risk, state tort law
flatly contradicts the goal of OSHA to allow unques-
tioned choice between two fully acceptable alternatives.
C. OSHA Workplace Safety Standards Conform to
Criteria that Make Federal Preemption Espe-
cially Justified.
Petitioner does not contend that every federal safety
standard that touches upon conduct normally subject to
state tort law is ipso facto entitled to preemptive effect
Relatively few areas of the law create the kind of irrecon-
cilable tension between federal standards and state tort
law determinations that demand preemption. For reasons
which we shall detail, the OSHA standards involved in
this litigation belong to a narrow class of federal stan-
dards that must not be required to compete with state tort
law. To recognize one is to damn the other. And when
federal standards clash with state standards, the latter
must give way.
Litigants favoring federal preemption typically argue
that federal standards seek consistency and uniformity,
and that state tort regulation disturbs that goal. Ulti
mately, the party asserting preemption must convince a
court that comprehensive across-the-board uniformity is
the desideratum of the federal statute. Four functional
criteria identify those federal regulatory schemes that
deserve to preempt conflicting state tort law. No single
criterion provides a litmus test as to whether preemption
is required. We articulate a functional analysis that sheds
light on the question of how broad and encompassing a
16
federal scheme the Congress actually intended to estab-
lish and which are met in this case.
The First Criterion for Federal Preemption: A
Rigorous and Full-Blown Federal Administra-
tive Process Leading to Adoption of the Safety
Standard
The safety standard adopted by OSHA was preceded
by a thoroughgoing and exhaustive process designed to
bring to light all plausible health risks and to address
them responsibly. Before any attempt at standard setting
was undertaken, an independent arm of the Department
of Health and Human Services — the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) - undertook a
massive study of Epichlorohydrin in the workplace. The
results of the initial analysis and research were reviewed
by a host of divisions within NIOSH and by outside
consultants from labor, management, academia and state
health agencies. An exhaustive 151-page report recom-
mended a standard for Epichlorohydrin. NIOSH Criteria
for a Recommended Standard. . . . Occupational Exposure
to Epichlorohydrin, reproduced in part as Appendix 15 at
App. 173.
After submission of the NIOSH Report, a standard
for Epichlorohydrin was promulgated by the Secretary of
Labor and was subject to a rigorous process which
opened the standard to comment and commentary by all
interested segments of society. Section 6(b)(5) mandates
that the standard should accomplish “the highest degree
of health and safety for the employee... . ”
The federal epichlorohydrin standard in this case was
the product of an intense and wide ranging regulatory
inquiry that called for input and evaluation by many
disciplines and a wide spectrum of political opinion. The
objective against which the safety standard was to be
measured by both the agency and courts in reviewing its
efficacy was that it provide “the highest degree of health
and safety for the employee. ... ” The standard estab-
lished is subject to judicial review including review by
17
this Court. See, Industrial Union v. American Petroleum
Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 100 S.Ct. 2844, 65 L.Ed.2d 1010
(1988). It would be fatuous to believe that a process so
exhaustive was designed by the Congress to be over-
turned by the whim of a single jury applying retrospec-
tively vague principles of state tort law. Yet this is
precisely the result that the First Circuit’s ruling below
achieves.
The Second Criterion for Federal Preemption:
The Specificity of the Federal Safety Standard
Some federal regulation allows for a broad range of
discretion by setting general goals that regulated parties
are to meet. OSHA regulations are a more exacting breed.
They speak in exquisite detail and leave nothing to the
imagination. Not only does the regulation set forth the
accepted levels of exposure to epichlorohydrin with exac-
titude (5 p.p.m.), but the specific engineering alternatives
on how to accomplish the desired level of safety are
mandated by regulation. As we noted earlier, OSHA
specifically approved the local exhaust ventilation system
utilized by the employer in this case. Plaintiff urges that
the manufacturer should have warned them against the
use of this specifically approved system. That the alter-
nate control system to which plaintiff points was also
approved by OSHA does not alter the fact that plaintiff is
using the state tort law system to declare inadequate an
environmental control system which OSHA fully
approved. Thus, unlike claims in other areas of federal
reguiation where the charge is that alternate behavior by
the regulated party is equally consistent with the general
agency standard, here the regulation unmistakably sets
forth approved responses to the risk. The plaintiff’s claim
in this case insists on one rather than the other of two
engineering responses approved by OSHA. Regulatory
specificity dictates preemption where a specific OSHA
approved alternative regulation exists. Neither the
18
employer or the manufacturer could ever choose cor-
rectly under plaintiffs’ theory even though the OSHA
regulation was met.
The Third Criterion for Federal Preemption: The
Integrated Nature of the Federal Regulations
In determining whether a federal safety regulation or
standard should be given preemptive effect, it is neces-
sary to examine the feasibility of allowing competing
state and federal standards to exist side by side. Admit-
tedly, whenever differing standards are given approval
by law, there is a loss of uniformity. But on rare occasion,
far more than uniformity is at stake. Sometimes the entire
regulatory effort is placed in danger. OSHA is charged
not with the management of a single risk, but with gov-
erning the overall safety of the workplace environment
by comprehensive regulation. Managing the workplace
environment cannot be accomplished by examining one
single risk to a single worker. The agency must consider a
host of possible risks and must evaluate their import and
interrelation to each other. It cannot (as the individual
torts litigant can) afford to focus on a single risk and
demand an engineering response that either compromises
safety in other sectors of the workplace or makes it eco-
nomically unfeasible for the employer to respond fairly to
a broad range of risks. OSHA regulation is organic in
nature. It seeks to accomplish a balanced, integrated
approach to safety in the workplace. In sharp contrast,
individual tort litigaton need not concern itself with the
organic nature of regulation. As its primary focus, tort
has an injured plaintiff and what might have been done
differently to rescue him from injury. Broader inquiry into
the whole is the task of regulators, not the tort system.
Comprehensive and detailed federal regulation can-
not tolerate inconsistent, idiosyncratic rulings from juries
who pay no allegiance whatever to the federal goal of
integrated planning for safety. The two very different
systems of safety regulation cannot co-exist because they
19
speak to fundamentally different goals. Only preemption
assures that the broad-based goal of the OSHA scheme is
given supremacy.
The Fourth Criterion for Federal Preemption:
Express Federal Statutory Limitations on State
Regulation
It is not always clear from the structure of a federal
statute how pervasive the control of the federal regula-
tory agency is to be in the face of state attempts to
regulate. Ultimately, the question that must be confronted
is whether the statutory scheme gives evidence of some
accommodation of state efforts to provide alternate regu-
lation. OSHA is quite explicit regarding to the degree of
accommodation that the Act contemplates. Sec. 18(b) and
(c) of the Act provide:
(b) Any State which, at any time, desires
to assume responsibility for development and
enforcement therein of occupational safety and
health standards relating to any occupational
safety or health issue with respect to which a
Federal standard has been promulgated under
section 6 shall submit a State plan for the devel-
opment of such standards and their enforce-
ment.
(c) The Secretary shall approve the plan
submitted by a State under subsection (b), or
any modification thereof, if such plan in his
judgment -
(1) designates a State agency or agencies
as the agency or agencies responsible for
administering the plan throughout the
State,
(2) provides for the development and
enforcement of safety and health standards
relating to one or more safety or health
issues, which standards (and the enforce-
ment of which standards) are or will be at
20
least as effective in providing safe and
healthful employment and places of
employment as the standards promulgated
under section 6 which relate to the same
issues, and which standards, when applica-
ble to products which are distributed or
used in interstate commerce, are required
by compelling local conditions and do not
unduly burden interstate commerce,
(3) provides for a right of entry and
inspection of all workplaces subject to the
Act which is at least as effective as that
provided in section 8, and includes a prohi-
bition on advance notice of inspections,
(4) contains satisfactory assurances that
such agency or agencies have or will have
the legal authority and qualified personnel
necessary for the enforcement of such stan-
dards,
(5) gives satisfactory assurances that such
State will devote adequate funds to the
administration and enforcement of such
stands, .. . 29 U.S.C. §667(b) and (c).
Nothing could be clearer. If a state were to directly seek
to provide alternative standards, indeed even more rig-
orous standards, it would not be permitted to do so
unless the Secretary of Labor determined that the admin-
istrative mechanism to monitor compliance and enforce
such alternative standards were available at the state
level. The irony is that when a court allows a tort system
of regulation to induce employer changes of occupational
health and safety standards, such misguided deference to
state tort standards are not subject to any federal monitor-
ing or control. State tort law simply esmasculates the
clear OSHA statutory scheme.
21
a
D. The OSHA Savings Clause Can and Must be
Construed so as not to Permit the Tort Action in
this Case
Given the strength of the foregoing arguments
applied to the facts of this case, it is hardly surprising
that the opinion of the Court of Appeals rejecting pre-
emption relies almost exclusively on the explicit language
of the savings clause in the OSHA Act. 29 U.S.C.
§653(b)(4) provides:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to super-
sede or in any manner affect any workmen’s
compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or
affect in any other manner the common law or
Statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of
employers and employees under any law with
respect to injuries, diseases, or death of
employees arising out of, or in the course of,
employment.
As previously discussed, Courts of Appeals have
construed similar language in other federal safety stat-
utes so as not to permit tort actions of the sort involved in
this case. What did the Congress intend to include in this
savings clause? Clearly workers’ compensation rights are
preserved. But what meaning should attach to “the com-
mon law ... rights . . . of employers and employees
under any law with respect to injuries . . . arising out
of ... employment.”? Consistent with Petitioner’s anal-
ysis of the only sensible interface between OSHA stan-
dards and state regulation via tort, the drafters must have
intended to preserve any and all rights the preservation
of which would not interfere with OSHA’s charge to
establish national workplace safety standards. Being a no-
fault compensation system, worker compensation does
not interfere with OSHA standards. Indeed, worker com-
pensation actually assists OSHA as it bars the sorts of
negligence-based tort claims by employees against
employers that would interfere with OSHA’s objectives
22
What about tort actions against third persons? Again,
it should depend on the extent to which recognizing such
claims would compromise the integrity of OSHA stan-
dards. If a third person entered the workplace and
attacked an employee with a knife, the savings clause in
OSHA would preserve the ensuing tort claim against the
attacker because that tort claim would not implicate
OSHA standards. What about products liability actions
against manufacturers and distributors for injuries con-
nected with workplace use and consumption of allegedly
defective products? Here, too, the answer depends on the
extent to which such actions interfere with OSHA regula-
tions. Actions based on manufacturing defects would not
interfere, and therefore should be saved by the savings
clause. Recovery for manufacturing defects in no way
implicates the sorts of design and warnings issues that
OSHA standards address. As earlier portions of this Peti-
tion have explained, the tort action in this case directly
conflicts with federal standards. Congress could not have
intended the prosecution of such tort actions.
Decisions by this Court and the Courts of Appeals
make clear that the foregoing approach to OSHA’s
broadly drafted savings clause - an approach that
allowed manufacturing defect actions but bars actions for
defective design and failure to warn when such actions
contradict OSHA safety standards - is the only approach
consistent with the intent of Congress. See, Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 108 S.Ct. 2510, 101
L.Ed.2d 442 (1988). The issue in Boyle was whether a
contractor who builds military equipment to special gov-
ernment specifications and sells such equipment to the
Federal Government can be held liable under state tort
law for injury caused to military personnel by an alleged
design defect in the equipment. The Court of Appeals in
Boyle had denied the contractor’s liability because it
would eventually cause the liability costs to be passed on
23
to the federal government in the form of higher equip-
ment prices, in violation of a long line of decisions under
the Federal Tort Claims Act preventing military person-
nel from directly imposing such costs on the government
via direct tort actions for service-related injuries.
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Boyle rejected this
reasoning because it was both too broad - it would deny
liability even when the equipment was not tailor-made to
the government’s specifications — and also too narrow - it
would allow private citizens to sue contractors in tort
even when the product that caused their injuries was
tailor-made for the government. The majority opinion
explained (487 U.S. at 511-512):
There is, however, a statutory provision that
demonstrates the potential for, and suggests the
outlines of, “significant conflict” between fed-
eral interests and state law in the context of
government procurement. In the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), Congress authorized dam-
ages to be recovered against the United States
for harm caused by negligent or wrongful con-
duct of Government employees, to the extent
that a private person would be liable under the
law of the place where the conduct occurred. 28
U.S.C. §1346(b). It excepted from this consent to
suit, however,
[aJny claim . . . based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on
the part of a federal agency or an employee
of the Government, whether or not the dis-
cretion involved be abused.
28 U.S.C. §2680(a).
We think that the selection of the appropriate
design for military equipment to be used by our
Armed forces is assuredly a discretionary func-
tion within the meaning of this provision. It
24
often involves not merely engineering analysis
but judgment as to the balancing of many tech-
nical, military, and even sociai considerations,
including specifically the trade-off between
greater safety and greater combat effectiveness.
* * *
In sum, we are of the view that state law which
holds Government contractors liable for design
defects in military equipment does in some cir-
cumstances present a “significant conflict” with
federal policy and must be displaced.
The parallel between this Court’s reasoning in Boyle
and Petitioner’s suggested approach to the OSHA savings
clause could not be closer. To be sure, Boyle involved the
government contractor defense and this case involves the
savings clause in OSHA. But both cases present the iden-
tical issue: whether state tort actions that interfere with
the exercise of discretion by a federal agency should be
allowed to be brought.
Moreover, Boyle involved allegations under state law
of defective product design whereas this case involves
allegations of failure to warn. But once again this is a
difference of no relevance. OSHA exercises discretion to
no less extent when it mandates specific warnings than
when it mandates designs. Moreover, the tort claim in
this case would pressure the employer to reject safety
equipment approved under relevant OSHA regulations.
The implications of this Court's decision in Boyle are
inescapable. To allow tort actions to be brought under
state law against product manufacturers and distributors
on the basis that the product designs and modes of mar-
keting are defective, notwithstanding that they conforin
to detailed, precise OSHA standards would, in the words
of this Court’s majority opinion in Boyle, interfere with
the “discretionary function” of OSHA in selecting the
appropriate product designs and warnings in the work-
place. Clearly OSHA could not be sued for its exercise of
25
its governmental authority. See, Dalehite v. United States,
344 U.S. 873, 73 S.Ct. 166, 97 L.Ed. 676 (1952). It follows
that the savings clause must not be construed to allow a
suit against a manufacturer whose customer complied
with that governmental decision.
Ironically, another decision supporting this sensible,
functional interpretation of the OSHA savings clause is
Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1988).
In Wood, the issue was whether federal auto safety regu-
lations preempted state law tort claims that a motor vehi-
cle design was defective because it lacked airbags. The
savings clause in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966 is broader and more all-encompassing
than the OSHA savings clause involved in the instant
case:
Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle
safety standard issued under this subchapter
does not exempt any person from any liability
under common law. 15 U.S.C. §1397(c).
Notwithstanding the breadth of this savings clause lan-
guage, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that
— in light of the fact that product design claims were not
so frequently brought in 1966 when the Safety Act was
enacted, and given the degree to which a design claim
under state law would interfere with federal safety regu-
lation of auto designs, Congress could not have intended
to allow design-based state tort actions that conflict with
federal safety standards.
The very same conclusion is required in the instant
case involving the OSHA savings clause. When OSHA
was enacted into law in 1970, product design and warn-
ing litigation was in its infancy. See Henderson, Judicial
Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design Choices: The
Limits of Adjudication, 73 Colum. L.Rev. 1531, 1546 (1973).
Congress could not have consciously intended to pre-
serve state design and warning claims directly interfering
with OSHA design and warnings standards. Claims
26
based on manufacturing defects are saved, as they are
under the auto design Safety Act, because they were
common (and thus presumably well understood by Con-
gress) in the 1960's and early 1970’s and do not interfere
with relevant federal design and warning regulations. But
state tort actions based on design and warning drastically
interfere with federal design and warning regulations.
Savings clauses must be construed to protect such federal
design and warning regulations against the potentially
devastating effects of inconsistent tort litigation under
state law. The Petitioner finds it nothing short of incredi-
ble that the First Circuit, which decided Wood in such a
functionally sensible manner, could have decided the
instant case so woodenly and nonsensibly. The Court
must grant this Petition and set things right.
E. The First Circuit’s Wooden Construction of the
OSHA Savings Clause is so Patently in Error
that Wasteful Confusion is Certain to Reign
without Clarification from this Court
How could the First Circuit, which decided Wood so
sensibly, have gotten this case so wrong? Careful exam-
ination of the opinion reveals that the First Circuit looked
at decisions recognizing an employee’s rights to bring
tort actions against his employer on legal bases that in no
way implicated the efficacy of OSHA safety standards,
and then leaped all the way to the conclusion that any
and all tort actions against any and all defendants - even
actions that grossly interfere with OSHA standards - are
explicitly saved by the OSHA savings clause. The Court
of Appeals made this leap without engaging in any func-
tional analysis whatever, relying on misinterpretations
and misapplications of caselaw.
The First Circuit relies heavily on National Solid
Wastes Management, Assn. v. Killian, 918 F.2d 671, 680 n.9
(collecting cases) (7th Cir. 1990) for the proposition that
all rights in tort are saved from preemption; but that case
—
27
and all of the other cases collected in its note 9 were
actions against employers, either regulatory, criminal or
in tort; or by ex-employees, for wrongful discharge. Not a
single decision relied on by the First Circuit carried the
slightest negative implication for OSHA safety regula-
tions. The First Circuit also relies on a quote out of
context from People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 534
N.E.2d 962, 968 (Ill. 1989), to the effect that tort claims are
preserved by the OSHA savings clause. But that case
involved a criminal action against an employer on
grounds having nothing to do with OSHA standards.
Moreover, the court in Chicago Magnet clearly intended its
use of “tort law” to be synonymous with “tort claims
against the employer;” it justified the employer’s criminal
liability by analogizing to the employer’s liability for
punitive damages in tort, which liability the court
assumed was preserved by the savings clause.
Notwithstanding the First Circuit’s attempt in its
opinion, below, to create an impression to the contrary,
not one single court or commentator agrees with its
bizarre conclusion that the savings clause in OSHA pre
serves an employee’s right to sue for a manufacturer’s
failure to warn even when the state tort standard is flatly
inconsistent with an existing OSHA standard. The court
below has taken an enormous leap from decisions con
doning state wrongful discharge actions by ex:
employees, which do not implicate federal workplace
standards, to condoning state products liability actions
for design and warning, which do most drastically under
mine federal efforts to regulate safety in the workplace
We have demonstrated that such products liability
actions clearly undermine the intended uniformity of
OSHA’s workplace safety standards, and cannot have
been intended by Congress to be preserved in OSHA’s
savings clause.
28
3. FEDERAL PREEMPTION IN THE AREA OF PROD-
UCTS LIABILITY PRESENTS ISSUES OF
NATIONAL IMPORTANCE WHICH, WITHOUT
GUIDANCE FROM THIS COURT, ARE CREATING
WASTEFUL CONFUSION BOTH IN COURTS AND
IN PRODUCTS MARKETS
The Court must understand the enormous moment of
this decision and why it is imperative that certiorari be
granted. One cannot fully estimate the impact of a find-
ing of non-preemption without understanding how open-
ended and unstructured the world of common law prod-
ucts liability has come to be. See Huber, Liability: The
Legal Revolution and Its Consequences (1988); Henderson &
Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty
Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 265 (1990).
It is by now abundantly obvious to most observers
that expansionary trends in American products liability
law have gone beyond the point where they serve useful
social purposes and are, instead, threatening the contin-
ued viability of markets not only for products but for
insurance as well. See Epstein, Products Liability as an
Insurance Market, 14 J.Legal Stud. 645 (1985); Priest, The
Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L.].
1521 (1987). In its infancy, products liability focused
almost exclusively on injuries caused by manufacturing
defects — the few individual units among the many ina
product line that deviate dangerously from the manufac-
turer’s intended design specifications. See Henderson,
Judicial Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design Choices:
The Limits of Adjudication, 73 Colum.L.Rev. 1531,
1544-1546 (1973). Manufacturing defects and the harms
they cause are predictable and insurable.
Moreover, it is difficult to criticize the development
in the 1970’s and early 1980's of judicial review of the
reasonableness of manufacturers’ decisions regarding
how to design and market their products. But somewhere
along the way judicial review of product designs and
29
failures to warn got out of hand. See Henderson &
Twerski, Docirinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty
Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 265 (1990);
Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and Stan-
dards in Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict
Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 521 (1982).
Various states have imposed different standards for prod-
uct design liability, confronting manufacturers with a
patchwork quilt of state regulation via tort with which no
manufacturer could hope to manage except by large
investments in liability insurance which, under the cur-
rent conditions of chaos, is frequently unavailable. See
Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability (1991).
Petitioner has explained in earlier portions of its
argument how preemption insulates federal safety regu
lation from the erosive effects of state tort law sending
inconsistent, contradictory signals to regulated busi
nesses. It gives federal regulations breathing room to
achieve the consistency and nat’on-wide uniformity
sought by federal safety regulation. Petitioner now
emphasizes another salutory effect of preemption: it
replaces haphazard, herky-jerky retrospective state tort
law with coherent, uniform, stable and prospective fed-
eral standards by which to regulate the design and mar
keting of products. In large measure, the problems
associated with excessive, Overexpanded products lia
bility law are national problems, solvable only at the
federal level. When justified, a judicial holding that fed
eral safety regulations preempt state tort law supplies a
meaningful solution to an otherwise intractable national
problem.
30
XI. CONCLUSION
Petitioner believes that this court should issue a writ
of certiorari to review this decision of the First Circuit.
Petitioner reiterates that this decision conflicts with pre-
emption rulings of this Court, other Courts of Appeal,
and previous decisions of the First Circuit. Moreover, this
is a statutory interpretation issue of significant national
importance which needs clarification by this Court.
James A. HENDERSON, JR.
Frank B. Ingersoll
Professor of Law
Cornell Law School
Ithaca, New York 14853
(607) 255-2303
AARON D. TWwerski
Professor of Law
Brooklyn Law School
250 Joralemon Street
Brooklyn, New York 11201
(718) 780-7999
Counsel for Petitioner
Shell Oil Company
Respectfully submitted,
Burt BALLANFANT
Shell Oil Company
4856 One Shell Plaza
P. O. Box 2463
Houston, Texas 77252-2463
(713) 241-7023
Ropert L. LEONARD
Donirty, WALLACE,
Pitispury & Murpny
One Monarch Place
1414 Main Street,
Floor
Springfield, MA 01144-1002
(413) 733-3111
19th
App. 1
APPENDIX 1
Cruz PEDRAZA, Alejandrina Pedraza, Roberto Pedraza
and Mary Ellen Pedraza, Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
SHELL OIL COMPANY, Defendant, Appellant.
Cruz PEDRAZA, Alejandrina Pedraza, Roberto
Pedraza and Mary Ellen Pedraza, Plaintiffs,
Appellants,
v.
SHELL OIL CO., Defendant, Appellee.
Nos. 90-1291, 90-1402.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit
Heard Sept. 14, 1990
Decided Aug. 13, 1991
Worker filed action against chemical manufacturer to
recover damages for injuries arising from respiratory ail
ments he allegedly developed from workplace exposure
to Epichiorohydrin (ECH), a toxic chemical. The United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, 729
F.Supp. 187, Frank H. Freedman, Chief Judge, dismissed
on preemption grounds, and worker appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Cyr, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA) did not preempt state law
tort provisions like those invoked by the plaintiff, and (2)
court would not exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction
over otherwise nonappealable orders.
Vacated and remanded
App. 2
John B. Stewart, with whom Edward V. Leja and
Moriarty, Donoghue & Leja, P.A., Springfield, Mass., were
on brief, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Burt Ballanfant, Houston, Tex., with whom Robert L.
Leonard and Doherty, Wallace, Pillsbury & Murphy,
Springfield, Mass., were on brief, for defendant-appel-
lant.
Before TORRUELLA and CYR, Circuit Judges, and
BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.
CYR, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Cruz Pedraza commenced a civil action in
the United States District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts, alleging that he developed respiratory ailments
from workplace exposure to Epichlorohydrin (“ECH”), a
toxic chemical manufactured by defendant Shell Oil Co.
(“Shell”). The district court dismissed the action on the
ground that the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29
U.S.C. § 655 et seq. (“OSHA”), preempts state law. Ped-
raza appeals. Shell cross-appeals a district court order
disallowing Shell’s motion for summary judgment under
the applicable statute of limitations. We vacate the order
of dismissal, dismiss the cross-appeal, and remand for
further proceedings.
I
BACKGROUND
The material facts are not in dispute. From 1972
through 1981, Pedraza was employed by United Technol-
ogies Corporation in Rocky Hill, Connecticut. During
1977, he was assigned to a chemical mixing operation
App. 3
which exposed him to ECH. Within a few weeks Pedraza
experienced asthma symptoms for the first time.
Although Pedraza was reassigned in late 1977 to work
duties which did not entail ECH exposure, over the
course of the next several years he continued to experi-
ence acute asthma symptoms.
On November 4, 1985, Pedraza brought the present
diversity action, asserting an assortment of tort and war-
ranty claims predicated on Connecticut law. Following
discovery, defendant Shell moved for summary judgment
on the ground that Pedraza’s claims were time-barred
and, alternatively, that Shell had discharged its duty to
warn under the so-called “sophisticated user” defense. A
United States magistrate judge recommended denial of
summary judgment. Shell objected to the recommended
disposition and argued, additionally, that OSHA and the
reiated regulations promulgated by the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration preempt Connecticut
law. The district court directed entry of summary judg-
ment for Shell on the preemption ground.
I]
DISCUSSION
A. Pedraza’s Appeal
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo,
employing the same standards utilized by the trial court.
See Siegal v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 921 F.2d 15, 17
(Ist Cir. 1990); Petitti v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 909
F.2d 28, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1990). Thus, in the present appeal
we consider a pure issue of law: whether OSHA preempts
State law.
App. 4
The district court correctly observed that OSHA reg-
ulations establish federal restrictions on workplace expo-
sure to ECH! and require employers to provide protective
equipment for employees who work with hazardous sub-
stances.2 The court concluded that the provisions of Con-
necticut common law and statutory law on which
Pedraza’s causes of action against Shell are predicated
constitute state regulation in the field of occupational
safety and health which must yield to OSHA. Pedraza v.
Shell Oil Co., 729 F.Supp. 187, 188-89 (D.Mass.1990).3
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion operates to preempt state laws which unduly inter-
fere with federal law or policy. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211, 6 L.Ed.
23, 73 (1824); Securities Industry Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d
1114 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 110 S.Ct.
2559, 109 L.Ed.2d 742 (1990). As we were reminded again
recently, however, our preemption analysis begins with
“ “the assumption that the historic police powers of the
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress.’ ” Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, ___ U.S. __,
111 S.Ct. 2476, 115 L.Ed.2d 532 (1991) (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Co., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152,
91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947)). The tort rules and kindred state law
1 See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000, Table Z-1.
2 See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.132, 1910.133, 1910.134.
3 The court did not address 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4), the
“savings clause.” See text at p. 53 infra.
x App. 5
provisions invoked by Pedraza are well within Connecti-
cut’s “traditional authority to provide tort remedies to
[its] citizens. ... ” Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S.
238, 248, 104 S.Ct. 615, 621, 78 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984); see also
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 503, 107
S.Ct. 805, 817, 93 L.Ed.2d 883 (1987). Consequently, we
will not find federal preemption in the present case
unless there is “an unambiguous congressional mandate
to that effect.” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 146, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1219, 10 L.Ed.2d 248
(1963). See also Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical
Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 2376, 85
L.Ed.2d 714 (1985); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,
525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977).
Preemption “always boils down to a matter of con-
gressional intent.” Connolly, 883 F.2d at 1115. See also
Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369,
106 S.Ct. 1890, 1899, 90 L.Ed.2d 369 (1986) (“The critical
question in any preemption analysis is always whether
Congress intended that federal regulation supersede state
law.”); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S.
724, 747, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 2393, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985) (“in
any pre-emption analysis, ‘[t]he purpose of Congress is
the ultimate touchstone.’ ”) (citations omitted); Associated
Industries of Massachusetts v. Snow, 898 F.2d 274, 278 (1st
Cir.1990) (same). The task of interpretation is simplified
substantially, of course, whenever “Congress has made its
intent known through explicit statutory language.”
English v. General Electric Co., _. U.S. __, 110 S.Ct. 2270,
2275, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990).
App. 6
Absent express preemption, the challenged state law
must yield when it
regulates conduct in a field that Congress
intended the Federal Government to occupy
exclusively. Such an intent may be inferred from
a ‘scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive
as to make reasonable the inference that Con-
gress left no room for the States to supplement
it,, or where an Act of Congress ‘touch[es] a
field in which the federal interest is so dominant
that the federal system will be assumed to pre-
clude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject.’
English, 110 S.Ct. at 2275 (citations omitted). Finally, pre-
emption will be inferred where the state law “actually
conflicts with federal law.” Id. Such a conflict arises
where it is physically impossible to comply with both the
federal and the state law or where “state law ‘stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ” Id. (citation
omitted). See also International Paper Co., 479 U.S. at
491-92, 107 S.Ct. at 811; Louisiana Public Service Comm'n,
476 US. at 368-69, 106 S.Ct. at 1898-99; Hillsborough
County, 471 U.S. at 713, 105 S.Ct. at 2375.
Shell contends that OSHA preempts all the state-
created rights and remedies underpinning Pedraza’s
claims, since the adjudication of private rights arising
under state law would result in the imposition of pro-
spective normative constraints on the manufacture and
distribution of ECH. We address Shell’s preemption claim
by first examining in context the language of the OSHA
preemption provisions. A sound statutory interpretation
must encompass the relevant text as well as the structure
App. 7
444
and context of the enactment. We will ” ‘not be guided by
a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the
provisions of the whole law. ...’” Philbrook v. Glodgett,
421 U.S. 707, 713, 95 S.Ct. 1893, 1898, 44 L.Ed.2d 525
(1975) (quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. (8
How.) 113, 122, 12 L.Ed. 1009 (1849)). See also Richards v.
United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11, 82 S.Ct. 585, 591-92, 7 L.Ed.2d
492 (1962) (“a section of a statute should not be read in
isolation from the context of the whole Act.”).
The scope of OSHA preemption is outlined in two
sections: (i) section 18,4 which represents a general state-
ment of preemptive intent, and (ii) section 4(b)(4), the
a7
“savings clause,” which excepts from preemption a spec-
trum of state laws
4 OSHA § 18 provides as follows:
(a) Nothing in this Act shall prevent any State
agency or court from asserting jurisdiction under
State law over any occupational safety or health
issue with respect to which no standard is in effect
under section 655 of this title. (b) Any State which, at
any time, desires to assume responsibility for devel-
opment and enforcement therein of occupational
safety and health standards relating to any occupa-
tional safety or health issue with respect to which a
Federal standard has been promulgated under sec-
tion 655 of this title shall submit a State plan for the
development of such standards and their enforce-
ment.
29 U.S.C. § 667(a), (b) (1982).
App. 8
(i) Section 18
At its outer reaches section 18 preemption does not
obtain unless there is an unapproved assertion of “juris-
diction under State law over any occupational safety or
health issue” as to which a federal “standard” is already
in place. See 29 C.F.R. 1901.2 (“Section 18(a) of the Act is
read as preventing any State agency or court from assert-
ing jurisdiction under State law over any occupational
safety or health issue with respect to which a Federal
standard has been issued under section 6 of the Act.”)
(emphasis added); Associated Industries of Massachusetts,
898 F.2d at 278 (Section 18 “provides that if a federal
standard on an occupational safety or health issue is in
effect, a state cannot promulgate an occupational safety
or health standard relating to that issue, unless it first
submits the state plan to OSHA for approval.”). See also
Puffer’s Hardware Inc. v. Donovan, 742 F.2d 12, 16 (1st
Cir.1984); National Solid Wastes Management Ass‘n v.
Killian, 918 F.2d 671, 677-78 (7th Cir.1990).
Section 3 in turn defines an occupational safety and
health “standard” as one which “requires conditions, or
the adoption or use of one or more practices, means
methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary
Or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment
and places of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1982); see
also People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 126 Ill.2d 356, 128
Ill.Dec. 517, 520, 534 N.E.2d 962, 965 (§ 18 precludes “a
State’s development and enforcement of ‘occupational
health and safety standards.’ ”) (discussing OSHA pre-
emption of State criminal laws) (citations omitted), cert.
denied, __ U.S. __, 110 S.Ct. 52, 107 L.Ed.2d 21 (1989).
Thus, it is not surprising that substantial authority exists
App. 9
for the view that section 18 preempts the unapproved
establishment of state standards and regulatory schemes
in competition with OSHA, see, e.g., Environmental Encap-
sulating Corp. v. City of New York, 855 F.2d 48, 55 (2d
Cir.1988); New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey,
774 F.2d 587, 592-93 (3d Cir.1985), appeal after remand, 868
F.2d 621 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 920, 109 S.Ct. 3246,
106 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989), but that there is no authority for
the view that OSHA preempts provisions of state law of
the sort relied on by Pedraza.
We are aware of no case which holds that OSHA
preempts state tort law. Rather, most courts have been
concerned with how OSHA affects tort actions, not with
whether it preempts state tort law. Thus, every court
faced with the issue has held that OSHA creates no
private right of action. See, e.g., Pratico v. Portland Terminal
Co., 783 F.2d 255, 266 (1st Cir.1985) (“The legislative his-
tory of § 653(b)(4) shows that the intent of the provision
was merely to ensure that OSHA was not read to create a
private right of action for injured workers which would
allow them to bypass the otherwise exclusive remedy of
workers’ compensation.”). We have embraced the major
ity view that the regulations promulgated under OSHA
prescribe standards of care relevant in common law negli-
gence actions. Id. at 263-65; see also Albrecht v. Baltimore &
Ohio R.R. Co., 808 F.2d 329, 332 (4th Cir.1987); but see
Minichello v. U.S. Industries, Inc., 756 F.2d 26, 29 (6th
Cir.1985) (“To use OSHA regulations to establish whether
a product is unreasonably dangerous is . . . improper.”)
(product liability action brought by employer against
product supplier)
App. 10
While we discern in OSHA’s language, structure and
context a clear congressional signal that section 18 pre-
empts unapproved assertions of state jurisdiction in the
development and enforcement of standards relating to
occupation health and safety issues in competition with
federal standards, we find no warrant whatever for an
interpretation which would preempt enforcement in the
workplace of private rights and remedies traditionally
afforded by state laws of general application.> Connecti-
cut’s accustomed maintenance of judicial fora for the
enforcement of private rights in the workplace, under
State laws of general application, seems to us a function
> The great majority of courts which have considered the
issue holds that state criminal laws of general application are
not preempted by OSHA, despite their normative impact. See
National Solid Wastes Management Ass’n, 918 F.2d at 680 n. 9
(collecting cases). The New York Court of Appeals, for
instance, recently ruled that OSHA does not so occupy the
occupational health and safety field as to preempt by implica-
tion enforcement in the workplace of State criminal laws of
general application. People v. Pymm, 76 N.Y.2d 511, 561
N.Y.S.2d 687, 691, 563 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1990) (relying on OSHA
§§ 4(b)(4) and 18), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 111 S.Ct. 958, 112
L.Ed.2d 1046 (1991). The court reasoned that State criminal
laws of general application are “expost, reactive measures,
focusing on conduct after an injury has occurred,” and do not
fit within the definition of “standard” (viz, “ex ante, prophylac-
tic measures prescribing or proscribing specific practices”). Id.
Likewise, the private rights and remedies implicated by Ped-
raza’s claims against Shell hardly qualify as “standards,”
within the meaning of section 3, since they too are more “ex
post, reactive” than prescriptive or normative. See also National
Solid Wastes Management Ass‘n, 918 F.2d at 680 n. 9 (tort laws
“are not ‘standards’ within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. section
652(8).”).
App. 11
far less prophylactic than reactive; less normative than
compensatory; and less an arrogation of regulatory juris-
diction over an “occupational safety or health issue” than
a neutral forum for the orderly adjustment of private
disputes between, among others, the users and suppliers
of toxic substances.
(ii) Section 4(b)(4)
We are persuaded that Congress, by its enactment of
the “savings clause,” further evinced its intention to
spare these provisions of State law from preemption.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to super-
sede or in any manner affect any workmen’s
compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or
affect in any other manner the common law or
Statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of
employers and employees under any law with
respect to injuries, diseases, or death of
employees arising out of, or in the course of,
employment.
29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1982) (emphasis added).*There is a
solid consensus that section 4(b)(4) operates to save state
6 We are unpersuaded by Shell’s ejusdem generis argument,
which would render § 4(b)(4) inapposite to the provisions of
Connecticut law on which Pedraza relies. Shell argues that
only those state laws which are in the nature of workers’
compensation laws come within the scope of the savings
clause. Its argument implicitly assumes that though traditional
private rights and remedies between employer and employee
arising under state law are expressly saved from preemption
by § 4(b)(4), those private rights and remedies which have a
much less direct connection with the workplace were meant,
(Continued on following page)
App. 12
tort rules from preemption. See, e.g., National Solid Wastes
Management Ass‘n, 918 F.2d at 680 n.9 (collecting cases).
See also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety Comm'n,
430 U.S. 442, 445, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 1264, 51 L.Ed.2d 464
(1976) (noting that OSHA establishes a new statutory
duty on the part of employers and creates new remedies;
and stating: “Each remedy exists whether or not an
(Continued from previous page)
for some unarticulated reason, to be preempted. We are unable
either to ascribe a plausible reason for such a result or to
discern such a congressional intent. Having seen no reason to
preempt existing state law rights and remedies between
employer and employee — the principal participants in the
workplace, and the only parties whose relationship is regulated
by OSHA, McKinnon v. Skil Corp., 638 F.2d 270, 275 (1st
Cir.1981) (OSHA's “terms apply only to employers”) (citation
omitted) —~ Congress almost certainly did not intend to pre-
empt, sub silentio, the right of an employee to bring an action
for damages against a third-party supplier of products used in
the workplace. See infra note 7. We would be very reluctant to
infer preemptive intent absent some indication that the state
law could have a significant adverse regulatory impact on
OSHA’s mission in the workplace.
Section 4(b)(4) plainly expresses Congress’ intention to
preserve workers’ compensation laws and the rights and
duties of employers and employees under state laws relating to
injuries, disease or death arising in the course of employment.
Nevertheless, notwithstanding that Connecticut statutory law
preserves Pedraza’s right to sue Shell in these circumstances,
see Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 31-2939(a), under Shell’s view Ped-
raza’s right to seek private redress for workplace injury or
disease allegedly caused by the employer’s ECH supplier
would be preempted. Shell cannot insist simultaneously that
§ 4(b)(4)'s reference to workers’ compensation laws modifies
the scope of the savings clause and does so more restrictively
than the workers’ compensation law itself.
App. 1 3
employee is actually injured or killed as a result of the
[unsafe or unhealthful] condition, and existing state stat
utory and common-law remedies for actual injury and
death remain unaffected.” (dictum)); Chicago Magnet Wire
Corp., 128 Ill.Dec. at 523, 534 N.E.2d at 968 (“Congress
expressly stated that OSHA was not intended to preempt
two bases of liability that, like criminal law, operate to
regulate workplace conduct and implicitly set safety stan
dards-State worker’s compensation and tort law.”) (crimi
nal laws).” See generally, Note, The Extent of OSHA
Preemption of State Hazard Reporting Requirements, 88
Colum.L.Rev. 630, 641 (1988)(§ 4(b)(4) reveals “Congress’
explicit recognition of the continued validity of state
Although OSHA prescribes various criminal and civil
penalties against employers who violate either the regulations
or the genera! duty to provide a safe workplace, see id. § 6664
(1982), the overriding purpose of OSHA 1s to prevent workplace
injuries, not to impose penalties on employers who fail to
provide their employees with safe working conditions. See
Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 12, 100 S.Ct. 883, 890, 63
L.Ed.2d 154 (1980) (OSHA “is prophylactic in nature. The Act
does not wait for an employee to die or become injured. It
authorized the promulgation of health and safety stan
dards in the hope that these will act to prevent deaths or
Injuries from ever occurring.”) (citations omitted)
[t lS noteworthy asd wel] that OSHA provides no replace
ment remedy for workplace injuries, disease or death caused to
employees by suppliers of products used in the workplace
the Supreme Court has noted, “[ilt is difficult to believe that
4
ongress would, without comment, remove all means of judi
cla! recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.” Stlkwood, 464
at 251, 104 S.Ct. at 623
[
App. 14
worker compensation and tort remedies. . . . ”); Note,
Getting away with Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption of
State Criminal Prosecutions for Industrial Accidents, 101
Harv.L.Rev. 535, 543 (1987) (Indeed, section 4(b)(4) saves
from preemption two forms of liability that, like criminal
law, regulate workplace conduct and set implicit stan-
dards-state workers’ compensation and tort law.”).®
Thus, we are unpersuaded that the provisions of
Connecticut law undergirding Pedraza’s claims against
Shell are eclipsed by OSHA.
B. Shell’s Cross-Appeal
Shell cross-appeals the district court order denying
its motion for summary judgment on the ground that
Pedraza’s claims are time-barred and, alternatively, that it
discharged its duty to warn under the so-called “sophisti-
cated user” defense. An order denying summary judg-
ment is not immediately appealable unless it comes
within an exception to the “final judgment” rule. The
United States Supreme Court puts it plainly:
5’ What little legislative history we have discovered leaves
even less doubt that § 4(b)(4) evinces a congressional intent to
preserve state tort law from preemption. In a letter to the
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Labor, the Solicitor of
Labor explained that OSHA “would in no way affect the pre-
sent status of the law with regard to workmen’s compensation
legislation or private tort actions.” Pratico, 783 F.2d at 266 (quot-
ing Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1969: Hearings on
H.R. 843, H.R. 3809, H.R. 4294, and H.R. 13373 before Select
Subcomm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., Pt. 2,
at 1592-93 (letter of L.H. Silberman, Solicitor of Labor)
(emphasis added)).
App. 15
We hold that a district court’s order denying a
motion to disqualify counsel is not appealable
under § 1291 prior to final judgment in the
underlying litigation. Insofar as the Eighth Cir-
cuit reached this conclusion, its decision is cor-
rect. But because its decision was contrary to
precedent in the Circuit the court went further
and reached the merits of the order appealed
from. This approach, however, overlooks the
fact that the finality requirement embodied in §
1291 is jurisdictional in nature. If the appellate
court finds that the order from which a party
seeks to appeal does not fall within the statute,
its inquiry is over. A court lacks discretion to
consider the merits of a case over which it is
without jurisdiction, and thus, by definition, a
jurisdictional ruling may never be made pro-
spective only. We therefore hold that because
the Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction to
hear the appeal, it was without jurisdiction to
decide the merits.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379, 101
5.Ct. 669, 676, 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981) (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted).
* The Seventh Circuit has dealt in similar fashion with an
order denying a motion for summary judgment based on an
affirmative defense.
As to appellant’s contention that the denial of its
motion for summary judgment should be presently
appealable as it constituted a denial of a ‘claim of
right’ founded on the statutory immunity from
indemnification, the obvious reply is that denials of
(Continued on following page)
App. 16
The interlocutory orders challenged on Shell’s cross-
appeal are not within any exception to the final judgment
rule and implicate no issue related to the resolution of the
appeal from the final order granting Shell’s motion for
summary judgment on the preemption ground.!° We
therefore conclude that Shell’s cross-appeal must be dis-
missed.
(Continued from previous page)
summary judgment are interlocutory decrees, not appeal-
able, irrespective of the burden of having to go to
trial. Pacific U. Conference, Etc. v. Marshall, 434 U.S.
1305, 98 S.Ct. 2, 54 L.Ed.2d 17 (1977); United States v.
Florian, 312 U.S. 656, 61 S.Ct. 713, 85 L.Ed. 1105, reh.
denied, 312 U.S. 715, 61 S.Ct. 738, 85 L.Ed. 1145
(1941). There is nothing peculiar in the asserted
‘claim of right’ as compared to every other right
where the denial of summary judgment is not
appealable. Appellant's assertion of the applicability
of the Georgia statute is nothing more than an asser-
tion of an affirmative defense whose denial is also
not appealable. Smith v. Benedict, 279 F.2d 211 (7th
Cir.1960); County of Hennepin v. Aetna Gas & Sur. Co.,
587 F.2d 945 (8th Cir.1978).
Freeman v. Kohl & Vick Machine Works, Inc., 673 F.2d 196, 200
(7th Cir.1982) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
'0 Thus, even when presented with an interlocutory
appeal from an order denying summary judgment on the
ground of qualified immunity, we have so far refrained from
endorsing any form of pendent appellate jurisdiction over
otherwise nonappealable interlocutory orders. Roque-Rodriguez
v. Lema Moya, 926 F.2d 103, 105 n.2 (1st Cir. 1991) (“To date, this
circuit has refrained from attempting to exercise ‘pendent
appellate jurisdiction over matters beyond those bound up in
the qualified immunity inquiry.’ See Morales v. Ramirez, 906 F.2d
(Continued on following page)
——_
App. 17
The judgment of the district court is vacated and the case
is remanded for further proceedings. Costs are awarded to
plaintiffs-appellants.
(Continued from previous page)
784, 787 n.2 (Ist Cir.1990).”). The “policy against piecemeal
review is preserved” by careful adherence to the “final judg-
ment” rule. See, e.g., Makuc v. American Honda Motor Co., 692
F.2d 172, 173-74 (1st Cir.1982) (per curiam) (declining to review
district court's denial of the rule 54(b) certification of interlocu-
tory order); Roque-Rodriguez, 926 F.2d at 105 (“ ‘Notwithstand-
ing that we have jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified
immunity midstream, [a]ny additional claim presented to and
rejected by the district court must independently satisfy the
collateral-order exception to the final-judgment rule in order
for us to address it on an interlocutory appeal.’ ” Domegan [v.
Fair], 859 F.2d [1059,] 1061-62 [(1st Cir.1988)] quoting Bonitz v.
Fair, 804 F.2d 164, 173 (1st Cir.1986).”); Morales v. Ramirez, 906
F.2d 784, 787 (ist Cir. 1990) (“We have recognized before that,
in certain cases, some aspect of the merits may be ‘inexorably
intertwined with the issue of qualified immunity. Unwin [v.
Campbell], 863 F.2d [124,] 133 n.9 [(ist Cir.1988)].”).
ieee aaa is i
App. 18
APPENDIX 2
Cruz PEDRAZA, et al., Plaintiffs,
Vv.
SHELL OIL COMPANY, Defendant.
Civ. A. No. 85-0421-F.
United States District Court,
D. Massachusetts.
Jan. 25, 1990.
Worker who was injured as alleged result of exposure
to epichlorohydrin (ECH) brought products liability
action against defendant on “failure to warn” theory. On
defendant’s motion to dismiss, the District Court, Freed-
man, Chief Judge, held that “failure to warn” claim aris-
ing out of worker’s exposure to ECH was preempted by
federal standards regarding exposure to ECH pro-
mulgated under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA).
Motion granted.
Frank R. Saia and Edward V. Leja, Springfield, Mass.,
for plaintiffs.
Burt Ballanfant, Shell Oil Co., Houston, Tex., Robert
Leonard and Barry Ryan, Springfield, Mass., for defen-
dant.
App. 19
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
FREEDMAN, Chief Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is defendant Shell Oil Company’s
(“Shell”) motion that this Court certify an interlocutory
appeal to the First Circuit Court of Appeals on Shell's
argument that plaintiff Cruz Pedraza’s (“Pedraza”) claim
is barred by the statute of limitations. Pedraza has filed
an opposition to Shell’s motion.
Also before the Court is Shell’s motion to dismiss this
lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that any state
law claims of the plaintiff are preempted by explicit fed-
eral health standards. Pedraza opposes the motion to
dismiss, and has asked this Court to either strike Shell’s
motion or defer judgment until trial. As Shell’s motion to
dismiss based on preemption is dispositive, the Court
will turn its attention in that direction first.
Il. PREEMPTION
A. Procedural Background
The first mention of the defendant’s preemption
argument was made in Shell’s objections to United States
Magistrate Ponsor’s recommendation that Shell's earlier
motion for summary judgment be denied. Pedraza v. Shell
Oil Co., C.A. No. 85-0421-F (D.Mass. March 15, 1989).
Before the Magistrate, Shell argued that summary judg-
ment was appropriate because the statute of limitations
had run on the plaintiff, and also that Shell was entitled
to use the “sophisticated user” defense under Connecti-
cut law. In objections subsequently filed in this Court,
eel |
App. 20
Shell claimed that it had also argued that Pedraza’s state
law claims were preempted by specific Occupational
Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”) standards regarding
exposure to epichlorohydrin (“ECH”).
After carefully reviewing Shell’s briefs before the
Magistrate, this Court concluded that preemption had not
been argued below, and held that Shell had waived the
preemption argument by failing to raise it earlier. Pedraza
v. Shell Oil Co., 724 FSupp. 1, 3-4 (D.Mass.1989).
In a separate motion filed December 15, 1989, Shell
agrees that it did not raise the preemption argument
before the Magistrate, and that this Court, sitting in an
appellate capacity, was justified in not addressing it at the
time. However, Shell disputes this Court's ruling that the
preemption argument is waived, arguing instead that
preemption is a question of subject matter jurisdiction,
which cannot be waived. As the plaintiff himself con-
cedes, Shell’s view is accurate. See International Longshore-
men’s Association, AFL-CIO v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 398-399,
106 S.Ct. 1904, 1016, 90 L.Ed.2d 389 (1986) (Alabama
Supreme Court erred in holding that ILA had waived
preemption claim through non-compliance with state
procedural rules). The Court now turns to the substance
of Shell’s preemption argument.
B. OSHA Standards
The gist of Shell’s argument is that the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq., expressly
divests this Court of jurisdiction over state law “failure to
warn” claims by establishing federal standards which
serve to preempt state authority. Upon review of the
App. 21
material submitted by Shell, the Court finds that this
position is well supported.
Article I, § 8, cl. 3 of the United States Constitution
states that “[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o
regulate commerce . ... among the several states.” Where
Congress chooses to exercise its power to regulate com-
merce, conflicting state laws must give way. As the
Supreme Court wrote in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464
U.S. 238, 104 S.Ct. 615, 78 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984),
If Congress evidences an intent to occupy a
given field, any state law falling within that
field is preempted. If Congress has not entirely
displaced state regulation over the matter in
question, state law is still preempted to the
extent that it actually conflicts with federal law,
that is, when it is impossible to comply with
both state and federal law ..., or where state
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
ld. at 248, 104 S.Ct. at 621 (citations omitted)
In this case, it is clear that Congress did intend to
occupy a significant portion of the occupational health
and safety field. This intent can be derived from the
words of the Act itself; 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) provides in
relevant part:
(a) Assertion of State standards in absence of
applicable Federal standards. Nothing in this
chapter shall prevent any State agency or court
from asserting jurisdiction under State law over
any occupational safety or health issue with
respect to which no standard is in effect under
section 6 [29 U.S.C. § 655].
App. 22
See also 29 C.F.R. § 1901.2 (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 667(a)
as preventing State court jurisdiction in the presence of
applicable federal standards). As one court has noted,
section 667(a) “has consistently been interpreted by
OSHA and the courts to bar the exercise of state jurisdic-
tion over issues addressed by the OSHA standard... . ”
N.J. State Chamber of Commerce v. State of N.J., 653 F.Supp.
1453, 1464 (D.N.J.1987).
However, as is also evident from the language of 29
U.S.C. § 667(a), Congress did not intend to wholly sup-
plant state regulation, since allowance is made for any
state law or regulation pertaining to areas for which no
federal standard has been promulgated. See, e.g., Puffer’s
Hardware, Inc. v. Donovan, 742 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir.1984)
(OSHA did not preempt Massachusetts law exempting
certain elevators from state regulation in the absence of
applicable OSHA standard).
Since OSHA only preempts state law to the extent
that there is an applicable federal standard, the question
now before the Court is whether or not the federal gov-
ernment had promulgated standards regarding exposure
to ECH prior to the time of the plaintiff’s exposure.
C. The Federal Government Has Promulgated Epi-
chlorohydrin Exposure Standards
In a table promulgated on June 27, 1974, and
amended on May 28, 1975, the Secretary for the Depart-
ment of Labor set the following exposure limits for ECH;
five (5) parts per million parts of contaminated air, or
nineteen (19) milligrams of particulate per cubic meter of
air. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000, Table Z-1. The Secretary has
App. 23
also laid out comprehensive regulations regarding per-
sonal protective equipment which should be used when
handling hazardous materials. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.132,
1910.133, 1910.134.
The facts illustrate that Pedraza’s exposure to ECH
began at some time during 1977,' by which time the
Secretary had already promulgated the federal standards
regarding exposure to that chemical. As a result, this
Court must now conclude that the plaintiff’s Connecticut
common law claims with respect to Shell’s “failure to
warn” are preempted by the federal action in this area.
Since this Court is sitting solely in diversity as a Connect-
icut state court, it must now conclude that it lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to hear this suit.
Hl. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the defendant Shell’s
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is
ALLOWED. Having determined that it lacks subject mat-
ter jurisdiction to act in this matter, the Court hereby
concludes that it has no authority to rule on any pending
motions before it. The Clerk of Court is ordered to enter
judgment for the defendant.
It is So Ordered.
' For a full explication of the facts, see this Court’s prior
order. Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 724 F.Supp. 1, 5-6 (D.Mass.1989).
App. 24
APPENDIX 3
‘Cruz PEDRAZA, et al., Plaintiffs,
Vv.
SHELL OIL COMPANY, Defendant.
Civ. A. No. 85-0421-F,
United States District Court,
D. Massachusetts.
Nov. 13, 1989.
Chemical manufacturer that had been sued by
worker who claimed that his lungs were permanently
damaged as result of inhaling chemical filed objections to
recommendation of magistrate that its motion for sum-
mary judgment be denied. The District Court, Freedman,
Chief Judge, held that: (1) material fact issue existed with
respect to Massachusetts discovery rule as it related to
statute of limitations defense, and (2) sophisticated user
defense was not available in toxic tort suit governed by
Connecticut law.
Magistrate’s report and recommendation adopted;
motion for summary judgment denied.
Frank R. Saia, Edward V. Leja, Springfield, Mass., for
plaintiffs.
Burt Ballanfant, Shell Oil Co., Houston, Tex., Robert
Leonard, Barry Ryan, Springfield, Mass., for Shell Oil Co.
App. 25
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
FREEDMAN, Chief Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is defendant Shell Oil Company’s
(“Shell”) objections to Magistrate Michael Ponsor’s March 15,
1989 Report and Recommendation that Shell’s motion for
summary judgment be denied. The plaintiff! Cruz Pedraza
(“Pedraza”) disagrees with Shell’s objections, and urges this
Court to adopt the Magistrate’s recommendation. Shell has
filed a response to the plaintiff’s memorandum.
I. BACKGROUND
This is a diversity action, in which Pedraza is claiming
that “his lungs were permanently damaged as a result of
inhaling the chemical epichlorohydrin (‘ECH’) while
employed by defendant United Technologies Corporation,
Power Systems Division (‘U.T.C.’).” Magistrate’s Report and
Recommendation Regarding Defendant Shell Oil Company’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (“Magistrate’s Report”) at 1.
The plaintiff originally filed suit on November 4, 1985
against his employer and two chemical manufacturers, Shell
and Dow Chemical (“Dow”), alleging assorted theories of
negligence, including negligent design, manufacture, and
distribution, as well as strict liability and breach of implied
warranties. Magistrate’s Report at 2. On March 2, 1987, this
Court accepted the Magistrate’s recommendation that U.T.C
' Also plaintiffs in this case are Cruz Pedraza’s wife, Ale-
jandrina, and his two children, Roberto and Mary Ellen. The
Court’s discussion focuses on Mr. Pedraza alone, as the other
plaintiffs’ claims rise and fall on the strength of his cause of action.
App. 26
be dismissed from the case and, on October 5, 1987, that
Dow be dismissed as well, leaving Shell the only defen-
dant in this suit. Magistrate’s Report at 2-3.
Shell’s current motion for summary judgment is in
fact its second attempt to extricate itself from this lawsuit.
The company’s original motion for summary judgment
was dismissed without prejudice by this Court on March
2, 1987. The parties then engaged in extensive further
discovery. Alleging new evidence and new Massachusetts
case law, Shell moved again for summary judgment on
June 24, 1988. As grounds for its motion, Shell made two
separate arguments: 1) that the statute of limitations bars
the plaintiff’s action, and 2) that Pratt and Whitney, the
owner of U.T.C., should be considered a “sophisticated
user” of ECH, thereby relieving Shell of any liability.
Based in part on the facts as he found them in his
February 13, 1987 Report and Recommendation that
Shell’s initial motion be denied, and in part on the addi-
tional facts uncovered during discovery, the Magistrate
again recommends to this Court that Shell’s motion for
summary judgment be denied. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court hereby adopts the Magistrate’s recom-
mendation.
I]. DISCUSSION.
A. Applicable Legal Standards
1. Review of Magistrate Ponsor’s Report and Rec-
ommendation
This matter was referred to the Magistrate for a
report and recommendation pursuant to the provisions of
App. 27
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).2 That section further provides
that “[a] judge of the court shall make a de novo deter-
mination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objec-
tion is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
In construing the terms of section 636(b)(1), the
Supreme Court has held that a district court need not
hold a de novo hearing in order to satisfy the requirement
of a “de novo determination.” United States v. Raddatz, 447
U.S. 667, 674, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 2411, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980);
see also Giotosa v. United States, 684 F.2d 176, 178-79 (1st
Cir.1982) (a district court need not hold a brand new
hearing to satisfy the de novo standard of review). To
require a brand new hearing, the Supreme Court said,
“would largely frustrate the plain objective of Congress
to alleviate the increasing congestion of litigation in the
district courts. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 676 n. 3, 100 S.Ct. at
2412 n. 3.
Instead, it is sufficient that the district court review
the transcript or tape of the Magistrate’s hearing in suffi-
cient detail to make its own determination with regard to
2 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) provides in relevant part as
follows:
(b)(1) Notwithstanding any provisions of law to the
contrary -
(B) a judge may also designate a magistrate to
conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings,
and to submit to a judge of the court proposed
findings of fact and recommendations for the dispo-
sition, by a judge of the court, of any motion excep-
ted in subparagraph (A)... .
App. 28
each disputed factual finding. See generally Gioiosa, 684
F.2d at 178 and cases cited; see also LoConte v. Dugger, 847
F.2d 745, 750 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, US. __, 109 5.Ct.
397, 102 L.Ed.2d 386 (1988) (“To the extent that the magis-
trate has made findings of fact based upon the testimony
of the witnesses heard before the magistrate, the district
court is obligated to review the transcript or listen to the
tape-recording of those proceedings”).
Shell does not challenge the Magistrate’s findings of
fact per se. Instead, Shell questions the conclusion that the
Magistrate reached based on those facts, in light of the
relevant legal standards discussed below. The First Cir-
cuit has held that the requirement of a “de novo deter-
mination” only applies to the Magistrate’s factual
findings; “issues of a ‘technical, legal’ nature presented to
a magistrate are ‘certainly ... amenable to disposition [by
the district court] by appellate type briefing and argu-
ment.’ ” Giotosa, 684 F.2d at 179, quoting United States v.
Southern Tanks, Inc., 619 F.2d 54, 56 (10th Cir.1980). In
light of the fact that the Magistrate’s purely factual find-
ings are largely unassailed, this Court’s obligation to
review the tape of the hearing is substantially reduced.
Where necessary, however, the Court has independently
examined the documentary evidence in the record upon
which Shell relies.
2. Summary Judgment Standard
Pursuant to the provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), this
Court has an obligation to grant a motion for summary
’
App. 29
judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to inter-
rogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affi-
davits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
material fact... . ”
In order to avoid the imposition of summary judg-
ment, Pedraza must persuade this Court that there is a
dispute about “facts that might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law. .. . ” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In addition, Pedraza must also show
that the dispute about the facts is genuine, that is, that “a
fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on
-the evidence presented.” Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.
in weighing the evidence before it to determine if it is
more than a “scintilla,” id., or “mere allegations,”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), this Court has a duty to ” ‘look at the
record in... the light most favorable to. . . the party
opposing ...the motion’... [and] indulge all inferences
favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Hahn v.
Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir.1975), quoting Poller v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7
L.Ed.2d 458 (1962). “If, after this canvassing of the mate-
rial presented, the district court finds that some genuine
factual issue remains in the case, whose resolution one
way or another could affect its outcome, the court must
deny the motion.” Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864
F.2d 881, 895 (1st Cir.1988) (emphasis in the original).
The standard for granting summary judgment is even
stricter in instances where, as is the case here, the mate-
rial fact in question involves a party’s state of mind.
App. 30
“State of mind is difficult to prove and great circumspec-
tion is required where summary judgment is sought on
an issue involving state of mind.” Hahn, 523 F.2d at 468.
*—B- The Defendant’s Preemption Argument Has Been Waived
As a preliminary matter, the Court addresses Shell's
contention that Occupation Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (“OSHA”) standards for the inhalation exposure
to ECH preempt Connecticut standards, and that accord-
ingly, Pedraza’s common law claims against Shell for
failure to warn are barred. See Shell’s Notice of Appeal
From and Objection to the Report and Recommendation
of the Magistrate at 10-13, and Defendant Shell Oil Com-
pany’s Response to Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum at 1-6.
The plaintiff argues that Shell has waived any preemp-
tion argument, since it did not raise it before the Magis-
trate. Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum to Defendant, Shell
Oil Company’s Objection to Report and Recommendation
of Magistrate Ponsor Re: Shell’s Motion for Summary
Judgment at 1. |
As the First Circuit has said, “[pJarties must take
before the magistrate, ‘not only their “best shot” but all of
their shots.’ ” Borden v. Secretary of Health and Human
Services, 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir.1987), quoting Singh v. Suner-
intending School Committee of the City of Portland, 593
F.Supp. 1315, 1318 (D.Me.1984) (“[flailure to make an
App. 31
argument . . . constitutes its waiver for purposes of fur-
ther appellate review of the Magistrate’s action”).*
The Court has carefully reviewed both of Shell’s
motions for summary judgment, and concludes that the
plaintiff is correct. The Court finds that the defendant did
not raise the issue of preemption before the Magistrate,
and accordingly, has waived the defense. To the extent
that Shell has raised the issue of the impact of various
OSHA standards on this litigation, it has done so in the
context of whether or not Pratt and Whitney had or
should have had express or implied knowledge of the
potential effects of ECH, and not in terms of the preemp-
tive effect such standards might have on the plaintiff's
common law claims.
C. The Statute of Limitations Does Not Bar This Action
1. Statute of Limitations in Product Liability Cases
The crux of Shell’s summary judgment motion is that
Pedraza’s claim is barred by the Massachusetts statute of
limitations, which is made applicable to this dispute by
the principles of diversity jurisdiction. See Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079,
rehearing denied, 326 U.S. 806, 66 S.Ct. 7, 90 L.Ed. 491
3 Shell attempts to evade waiver of this argument by stat-
ing that the First Circuit decision in Wood v. General Motors
Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st Cir.1988), represents “significant mod-
ern analysis” of the effect of the preemption doctrine on com-
mon law tort claims. Regardless of how recently the First
Circuit has visited the issue, however, Shell is still not excused
from its failure to raise the issue in some coherent form before
the Magistrate.
ae
App. 32
(1945); Buckley v. American Honda Motor Company, Inc., 780
F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1985); Hemric v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 739
F.2d 1, 2 (Ist Cir.1984) (regardless of the choice of sub-
stantive law, the court must apply the procedural statute
of limitations of the forum state).
For both Pedraza’s negligence and breach of war-
ranty claims, the statute of limitations is three years. See
Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 260, § 2A4 and Mass.Gen.Laws
Ann. ch. 106, § 2-318,5 respectively. The more difficult
question, and the salient issue in this case, is exactly
when the statute of limitations began to run with respect
to the plaintiff’s claim. Since the statutes themselves do
not state the point at which they begin to run, the fixing
of the inception of the statute of limitations in a given
case is a determination for the Court to make. Olsen v. Bell
Telephone Laboratories, Inc., 388 Mass. 171, 445 N.E.2d 609,
611 (Mass.1983).
4 Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 260, § 2A (1988 supp.) provides
as follows:
Except as otherwise provided, actions of tort, actions
of contract to recover for personal injuries, and
actions of replevin, shall be commenced only within
three years next after the cause of action accrues.
> Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 106, § 2-318 (1988 supp.) pro-
vides in relevant part as follows:
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall
be no defense in any action brought against the
manufacturer, seller, lessor or supplier of goods to
recover damages for breach of warranty. . . . All
actions under this section shall be commenced with
three years next after the date the injury and damage
occurs.
App. 33
The job of determining when the statute of limita-
tions begins to run is hampered in the case of an “insid-
ious disease” like the one suffered by Pedraza, since the
cause of action against the defendant could be said to
occur on a number of different dates. To resolve the
difficulty, the Massachusetts courts have adopted the
“discovery rule,” under which a cause of action for the
negligent infliction of an insidious disease does not
accrue (and the statute of limitations does not begin to
run) until the plaintiff “knew or should reasonable have
known that he had contracted [the disease] as a result of
the conduct of the defendants.” Id. 445 N.E.2d at 612.
In order to find that the “discovery rule” is applica-
ble to the plaintiff, this Court must be satisfied that the
plaintiff (1) had knowledge of his injury, and (2) that he
had knowledge of its cause - specifically, that he had
knowledge he was harmed as a result of the defendant's
conduct. Fidler v. Eastman Kodak Company, 714 F.2d 192,
In Olsen, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
(“SJC”) suggested the following possibilities:
the date of the defendant's negligent act; the date of
the plaintiff’s first exposure to the product; the date
of the plaintiff’s last exposure to the product; the
date of the first physiological effect on the plaintiff,
whether recognized by the plaintiff or not; the date
of discovery of injury; and the date on which the
plaintiff discovered, or reasonably should have dis-
covered, that he has been harmed as a result of the
defendant’s conduct.
Olsen, 445 N.E.2d at 611. In the same opinion, the SJC rejected
plaintiff's suggestion that a cause of action does not accrue
until such time as the injured party discovers that the injury is
permanent. Id. 445 N.E.2d at 612.
ne
App. 34
198 (1st Cir.1983). However, as the Massachusetts
Appeals Court has noted, “notice of likely cause is ordi-
narily enough to start the statute running.” Lear-Heflich v.
Schwartz, 21 Mass.App.Ct. 928, 930, 485 N.E.2d 692 (1985),
review denied, 396 Mass. 1106, 488 N.E.2d 1179 (1986)
(Table) (quoting Fidler, supra at 199).
Since this suit was filed on November 4, 1985, the
question before this Court is whether or not a reasonable
jury could find that the plaintiff did not know or have
reason to know prior to November 4, 1982 that Shell’s
conduct was the likely cause of his injury.
2. Relevant Facts
A reasonable jury could find the following facts:
In 1969, prior to this employment at U.T.C., Pedraza
underwent chest surgery. Following the surgery itself,
Pedraza also received radiation therapy. Magistrate’s
Report at 5.
The plaintiff began working for U.T.C. sometime in
1972. He suffered no symptoms ef asthma until approx-
imately June 1977, roughly one month after he was
assigned to a new chemical mixing operation at work. Id.
Shortly thereafter, however, the plaintiff began experienc-
ing “symptoms of fatigue, shortness of breach, dizziness,
loss of consciousness, tearing eyes, burning eyelids and
the spitting up of blood.” Id. at 6. It seems clear from the
evidence on the record that Pedraza was aware of the
onset of the symptoms, and noticed that they were exac-
erbated on those days when he was assigned to the
chemical mixing operation. Id.
App. 35
A number of serious asthma attacks culminated in
the plaintiff’s transfer to another work environment in
November 1977. Id. at 7. A workman’s compensation
claim filed by Pedraza’s employer states that the plaintiff
felt that working with chemicals and gases was causing
his asthma. Id.
Following a physical examination of the plaintiff in
January 1978, Dr. Arthur C. DeGraff, Jr., reached the
‘
conclusion that Pedraza’s condition was ” ‘consistent
with hypersensitivity reaction to Epichlorohydrin.’ ” Id.
at 8. DeGraff’s statement was made in a letter to John M.
Young at Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.; however, there is
no indication in the record that DeGraff informed Ped-
raza of his suspicions at that time. Pedraza himself stated
in an affidavit that “I [Pedraza] was not aware until May
of 1983 when Dr. DeGraff sent a letter to my Attorney,
Frank R. Saia, J.D., [sic] that sorted out the causes of my
various complaints.” Affidavit of Cruz Pedraza in Oppo-
sition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on
the Issue of Statute of Limitations, attached as Exhibit 1
to Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment.
The plaintiff’s medical condition was further compli-
cated in 1980 by the development of “mediastinal
lymphadenitis and pericarditis.” Magistrate’s Report at 9.
Pedraza was released from his employment by U.T.C. on
July 6, 1981. Id.
Following his discharge, Pedraza filed a complaint
against U.T.C. with the Connecticut Commission on
Human Rights and Opportunities (“Commission”). Id. In
his complaint, Pedraza alleges that his asthma developed
App. 36
as a result of working with fiberglass materials at U.T.C.,
and noted that he suffered an asthma attack after being
assigned to a chemical mixing station in the plant. Id. The
gist of his complaint against U.T.C. was that the company
failed to accommodate him and his disability. Id. How-
ever, none of the materials submitted by the plaintiff
mention ECH or any product specifically produced by
Shell.
The Commission’s Report, which Pedraza received
by certified mail in May 1982, stated that “[t]here is no
medical proof to substantiate [Pedraza’s] allegation that
his asthma was work connected or responsible for the
continued poor attendance.” Magistrate’s Report at 10.
The plaintiff was hospitalized twice in 1982 due to
his asthma, once in June and once in October. Magis-
trate’s Report at 11. None of the material in the record
indicates that the plaintiff was informed on either occa-
sion of the role that ECH played in his impaired lung
function.
As noted above, Dr. DeGraff wrote to Attorney Saia,
~ plaintiff’s counsel, in the spring of 1983, and outlined his
understanding of the various causes of the plaintiff's
condition. In a letter the following November, Dr.
DeGraff again reviewed the plaintiff’s condition, and
stated that the plaintiff had suffered a thirty percent loss
of lung function over and above the lung damage caused
by his mediastinal fibrosis. Magistrate’s Report at 11-12.
App. 37
3. Application of the Discovery Rule to the Case at
Bar
In its motion for summary judgment, Shell argues
that the First Circuit’s decision in Cornell v. E.]. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., Inc., 841 F.2d 23 (1st Cir.1988), imposes a
duty on the plaintiff to “seek out the cause of his illness
from the appropriate professionals.” Shell Oil Company’s
Motion for Summary Judgment at 8. In Shell’s view,
Pedraza, who experienced the onset of his symptoms as
early as 1977, totally failed to meet that burden.
However, Cornell is of no help to Shell, as that deci-
sion turned on particular facts not present in the current
case. Cornell, a spray painter, used Imron, a Dupont paint
containing Desmodur N-75, from 1980 to 1982. Id. at 23.
Cornell was aware, based on his own experience and
from reading the labels of the products he used, that the
polyurethanes could cause damage to the lungs. Id. at
23-24. While noting that Cornell had smoked heavily for a
number of years, the First Circuit also concluded that
Cornell experienced specific symptoms which could only
result from exposure to Imron, among them the spitting
up of paint. The First Circuit found that it was undis-
puted that Cornell associated his physical condition with
his use of the Imron paint by the end of 1980; however, he
did not initiate his lawsuit until the spring of 1984. Id.
Accordingly, the First Circuit affirmed the granting of
summary judgment against Cornell. Id.
In the present case, there is no evidence Pedraza
knew or should have known from his own experience
that inhalation of epoxy resin (or ECH in particular)
could cause lung damage. Although it is not clear on the
App. 38
record, it is at least inferable that Pedraza was working
with a larger number of chemicals than was Cornell, and
thus could less reasonably have been expected to know
which product was causing the harm. Finally, it is cer-
tainly true that Pedraza himself experience a wider range
of systemic disorders which could conceivably have been
the cause of his asthma. Under the circumstances, a jury
could find that this plaintiff acted reasonably with respect
to discovering the source of his injury.
Of greater similarity to the case at bar is Errichiello v.
Eli Lilly and Co., 618 F.Supp. 484 (D.Mass.1985).
Errichiello was diagnosed as having vaginal cancer in
1973. Id. at 485. Her doctors and various family members
made a connection between Errichiello’s cancer and her
mother’s ingestion of diethylstilbestrol (“DES”) during
pregnancy, but Errichiello testified that she was not told
of the possible link until July 1980. Id. at 485-86. She
brought suit against Lilly and five other manufactures of
DES on July 22, 1982. Lilly argues that under the “discov-
ery rule,” Errichiello had a duty to exercise reasonable
diligence to discover the cause of her cancer in 1973,
when she was first diagnosed. Id. at 486. However, the
district court ruled that the “discovery rule” does not
compel such diligence until such time as a plaintiff has
notice not only of an injury but of its likely cause as well.
ld. Given the favorable light in which the non-moving
party’s testimony should be regarded, the district court
concluded that a question of material fact did exist as to
whether or not Errichiello was informed of the possible
connection between her cancer and DES prior to July 22,
1979. Id. at 486-87.
App. 39
The facts in Vigeant v. Zimmer, Inc., 612 F.Supp. 1043
(D.Mass.1985) also provide strong support for the plain-
tiff. Vigeant had her left knee replaced with a Zimmer
prosthetic device in 1977. Id. at 1044. She was hospi-
talized again for severe knee pain in December 1978. At
that time, her doctor told her that “the pin had loosened,”
and surgery was performed. The doctor’s notes from that
operation indicate that the prosthetic device had broken.
ld. Although the doctor stated that he informed Vigeant
of that fact, she claimed that she did not learn that the
prosthesis was defective until she was hospitalized for
subsequent operation in February 1980. Id. at 1044-45.
Vigeant filed suit against Zimmer on November 15, 1982.
The district court concluded that Zimmer had failed to
show that there was no question of material fact as to
when Vigeant should reasonably have been expected to
have learned that their product was defective. Id. at 1445.
Finally, the case at bar may be favorably contrasted
with Shea v. Keuffel & Esser of New Jersey, Inc., 668 F.Supp.
41 (D.Mass.1986), affirmed without opinion, 823 F.2d 543
(Ist Cir.1987). Shea, an architect, developed a severe skin
disorder in 1974. Id. at 42. During the next seven years,
Shea underwent numerous tests in an effort to determine
what was causing his malady. /d. at 42-43. The first break-
through did not occur until April 1981, when Shea reac-
ted positively to a test involving a brand of sepia paper
used at his workplace. Id. at 43. The treating physician,
Dr. Ernesto Gonzalez, informed Shea at the time of the
test’s results. Id
Dr. Gonzalez then contacted the defendant, the man
ufacturer of the paper, and requested a list of the chemi
cals used in making the paper. On October 23, 1981, Shea
App. 40
reacted positively to diazonium, one [sic] the component
parts of the sepia paper. /d. Dr. Gonzalez testified that he
was certain of the connection between diazonium and
Shea’s condition, and further, that he discussed the
results of the tests with Shea at the time. Id. The district
court concluded that Shea was on notice as early as April
1981, and definitely by October 1981, that the sepia paper
produced by the defendant was the likely cause of his
skin condition.” Since Shea did not file suit until January
4, 1985, the court concluded that the suit was barred by
the statute of limitations. Id. at 49.
? As its first objection to the Magistrate’s Report, Shell
claims that throughout his report and recommendation, the
Magistrate fails to distinguish between “epoxy resin,” a prod-
uct made by Shell, and “ECH,” one of the resin’s component
parts. Shell argues that the statute of limitations should begin
to run at the time Pedraza first linked his injury to his expo-
sure to Shell's epoxy resin, and not at the time when Pedraza
finally learned which component (i.e., ECH) was actually
responsible for his injury. To a limited extent, the language of
Shea supports that argument, although the district court was
not called upon to make a ruling as to which date controlled
the start of the statute of limitations period.
In the instant case, however, there is at least one compel-
ling reason for holding that the later date is controlling. In
light of the number of chemicals to which he was exposed,
there is a serious question of fact as to whether or not Pedraza
had reason to know that Shell’s epoxy resin was the likely
cause of his injury until such time as he learned which specific
chemical! agent was responsible. The numerous citations listed
by the defendant merely reflect Pedraza’s sense that Shell's
epoxy resin was among the potential causes; they do not
convince this Court that he knew or should have known that
the resin was the likely source.
App. 41
In light of the above authorities, and mindful of the
inferences which this Court is obligated to make on
behalf of the plaintiff, the Court concludes that the defen-
dant has not succeeded in demonstrating that there is no
issue of material fact with respect to the plaintiff’s knowl-
edge of the likely cause of his injury prior to November
1982. Accordingly, summary judgment is not appropriate.
D. Sophisticated User Defense
1. Additional Relevant Facts
In support of its argument that Pratt & Whitney was
a “sophisticated user” of ECH and therefore responsible
for the plaintiff's injuries, Shell relies heavily on the
deposition testimony of Richard Owen, who during the
relevant period of time was a board certified industrial
hygienist for Pratt & Whitney. As did the Magistrate, this
Court accepts as true the allegations of fact contained in
Owen’s testimony for the purpose of discussing Shell's
claim.
Of particular relevance to Shell’s sophisticated user
defense is Owen's testimony that Pratt & Whitney ” ‘rec-
ognized [its] duty as an employer to provide a workplace
free from recognized hazards under OSHA.’” Magis-
trate’s Report at 13, citing Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff's
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 13
Owen also stated that Pratt & Whitney had access to a
variety of documents detailing the toxicity of the prod-
ucts it used, including: “ACGIH criterion documents, an
extensive library on toxicology, and the Shell MSDS
(Material Safety Data Sheets) Sheets for Epoxy Resin.”
Magistrate’s Report at 13-14. There is evidence on the
App. 42
record that Shell’s MSDS sheets were available at the
plant where Pedraza worked.
However, plaintiffs expert toxicologist, Thomas F.
Schrager, testified at deposition that Shell had failed to
give proper warnings regarding its product to Pratt &
Whitney. Magistrate’s Report at 14. Specifically, Schrager
alleged that Shell failed to provide specific instructions
that enclosed hood ventilation be used in work areas, and
that the workers wear respirators while working with the
epoxy resin.
2. The Sophisticated User Defense
In Shell’s view, its duty to provide such warnings
with respect to ECH were discharged because Pratt and
Whitney should be considered a “sophisticated user” of
ECH. Specifically, Shell argues that Pratt and Whitney (1)
had knowledge of certain federal statutes and regulations
pertaining to respiratory protection; (2) had adequate
warning of ECH’s hazards as evidenced by Pratt and
Whitney’s implementation of safety measures; (3) should
be charged with the knowledge of relevant safety stan-
dards (which Shell asserts operate as a discharge of
Shell’s duty to warn); and (4) should be charged with
knowledge of the hazards of ECH.
As the Magistrate correctly points out, the substan-
tive law which governs the plaintiff’s claims is the law of
the state of Connecticut, where the alleged tort occurred.
To date, the Connecticut state courts have not considered
or adopted the sophisticated user defense in the toxic tort
context. Indeed, it would be contradictory for them to do
so in light of Connecticut’s recognition of strict liability
App. 43
and explicit adoption of section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. See Hall v. Ashland Oil Co., 625 F.Supp.
1515, 1521 n. 1 (D.Conn.1986), citing Garthwait v. Burgio,
153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965) and Rossignol v. Danb-
ury School of Aeronautics, Inc., 154 Conn. 549, 227 A.2d 418
(1967).
Shell suggests to this Court that an “interpretation of
federal statutes and regulations are at the heart of the
legal issues in this case,” Shell’s Memorandum at 17, and
that therefore, this Court should not be concerned about
the possibility of blazing new trails in Connecticut tort
law. That is simply not correct. A common law tort is at
the heart of the legal issues in this case, a tort to which
the State of Connecticut has expressed its willingness to
apply the doctrine of strict liability. Whether or not var-
ious federal statutes make Pratt and Whitney a “sophisti-
cated user,” thereby shielding Shell from tort liability, is
very much a state law question.’ As the Connecticut
courts have not as yet addressed this question, it is
incumbent upon this Court to refrain from imposing its
own view upon them.
There being no indication that the Connecticut state
courts would recognize the “sophisticated user” defense,
this Court concludes that it is not available to Shell in this
case, and accordingly declines to examine the issue fur-
ther.
5 By contrast, whether or not various federal statutes and
regulations preempt state common law claims ts a question of
federal law. However, as was discussed supra, that question is
not properly before the Court.
App. 44
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the defendant Shell's
objections are hereby OVERRULED, and the Magistrate’s
Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED. Accordingly,
defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
It is So Ordered.
App. 45
APPENDIX 4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CRUZ PEDRAZA, ET AL
Vv.
SHELL OIL COMPANY
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 85-0421-F
}
— SO
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING
DEFENDANT SHELL OIL COMPANY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT!
March 15, 1989
PONSOR, U.S.M.
1. Introduction
In this diversity actio.. plaintiff Cruz Pedraza (hereaf-_
ter “Pedraza” or “plaintiff”) claims his lungs were perma-
nently damaged as a result of inhaling the chemical
epichlorohydrin (“ECH”) while employed by United
Technologies Corporation, Power Systems Division
(“U.T.C."). He is proceeding against Shell Oil Company
(“Shell”), the manufacturer of the chemical, under theo-
ries of negligence — including negligent design, manufac-
ture, and distribution — strict liability, and breach of
implied warranties. Plaintiff's spouse, Alejandrina Ped-
raza, Claims loss of consortium against the defendant, and
' This matter has been referred to the court for report and
recommendation pursuant to Rule 3 of the Rules for United
States Magistrates in the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, 28 U.S.C. section 636(b) (1) (B).
App. 46
plaintiff's children, Roberto and Mary Ellen Pedraza,
claim loss of parental society.
Shell has filed a motion for summary judgment. For
the reasons stated below, the court will recommend that
Shell’s motion be denied.?
I]. Procedural and Factual Background
A. Procedural Background
On November 4, 1985, plaintiff brought suit against
three defendants: his employer, U.T.C., and two chemical
manufacturers, Shell and Dow Chemical Company
(“Dow”). U.T.C. filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that
under Connecticut law, the Connecticut Worker’s Com-
pensation Act provided the exclusive remedy against an
employer for injuries allegedly arising out of plaintiff’s
employment. This motion was treated as a motion for
summary judgment pursuant to Federal R. Civ. P. 12(b).
Shell and Dow filed motions for summary judgment
on March 17, 1986 and October 10, 1986, Respectively.
Dow raised a statute of limitations defense, arguing that
plaintiff's cause of action was time barred as a matter of
law under the applicable Massachusetts statutes. Shell’s
motion contended that plaintiff had failed to present
sufficient evidence that it had made sales of ECH to
U.T.C. during the relevant time period. On March 2, 1987,
2 This case contains class action allegations. Class certi-
fication has not yet been entertained by the court. The exis-
tence of class claims does not affect disposition of this motion.
| cee eee
App. 47
Chief Judge Freedman adopted the Magistrate’s recom-
mendation that U.T.C. be dismissed from the case and
that the two remaining motions for summary judgment
be denied.
After discovery, Dow filed a second motion for sum-
mary judgment. Dow argued that there was not sufficient
evidence upon which it could be found that the plaintiff
was exposed to and damaged by chemicals manufactured
by it. This motion was granted on October 5, 1987, leav-
ing only Shell as a defendant.
Both of the remaining parties conducted additional
discovery, prompting Shell to file this second motion for
summary judgment on June 24, 1988. As grounds for the
motion, Shell offers new evidence and recent case law
construing the Massachusetts discovery rule to contend
that the plaintiff’s claims are time barred by the Massa-
chusetts statutes of limitation. The defendant also argues
in the alternative that under the applicable law, Shell has
discharged its duty to warn.
The facts have been previously set forth in this
court’s Report and Recommendation of February 13, 1987
(hereafter “R & R”), a copy of which is appended. How-
ever, defendant now asserts that additional facts have
come to light during discovery that should persuade this
court to reconsider its rejection of the statute of limita-
tions defense originally advanced by Dow. These addi-
tional facts have been incorporated into the factual
summary below.
The First Circuit has stated:
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
the court must look at the record in the light
App. 48
most favorable to the party opposing the motion
and must indulge all inferences favorable to that
party. 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
Stepanischen v. Merchants Dispatch Trans. Corp., 722 F.2d
922 (Ist Cir. 1983).
B. Factual Background
Plaintiff was born in Puerto Rico and came to the
mainland in 1967. Letter of Dr. Godar of May 2, 1984 at 1.
He appears to have a limited competency in English, his
second language. On March 23, 1986, plaintiff’s brother,
Pedro Pedraza - a bilingual Spanish/English speaking
person — assisted him in responding to Shell’s written
interrogatories. Plaintiff's Answers to Defendant's Inter-
rogatories at 1. Similarly, an interpreter, Laura Eastment,
was called upon to assist the plaintiff during his deposi-
tion by Shell's attorneys. See Shell’s Notice of Deposition
of Cruz Pedraza, May 27, 1987.
At least two of the doctors who examined the plain-
tiff in connection with this action experienced difficulty
obtaining an accurate medical history because of a combi-
nation of language and speech problems. One physician
reported a “language barrier that impedes careful accu-
mulation of historical data.” Dr. Godar’s letter of 5/2/84
at 6 paragraph 1. Defendant’s Exhibit F. Another doctor
wrote to U.T.C.’s insurance carrier: “History was
obtained from Pedraza with some difficulty because of a
stuttering defect which I am sure was aggravated by the
need to speak in English rather than his native Spanish.”
App. 49
Dr. DeGraff’s letter to John Young of 1/25/78 at 1. Defen-
dant’s Exhibit I.
In 1969, before he was employed by U.T.C., Pedraza
underwent surgery. The procedure is variously described
as the removal of a “tumor on right side of chest,” /d.,
“thymus was resected,” Letter of Dr. DeGraff of 1/25/78
at 1, Shell’s Exhibit I, and as a thoracotomy and resection
of a well localized mediastinal right mass with a patho-
logic diagnosis of mediastinal thymoma. Letter of Dr.
Godar of 5/2/84 at 3, Shell’s Exhibit F. Following the
surgery plaintiff received radiation therapy. R & R at 3.
Pedraza was employed by U.T.C., Power Systems
Division? from 1972 through 1981. Until sometime in 1978
he worked ina plastics molding department. R & Rat 2-3.
Plaintiff had no symptoms of asthma until around
June, 1977, about a month after he was assigned to a new
chemical mixing operation at work. Dr. DeGraff’s letter of
1/25/78 at 1.° The mixing operation employed substances
3 As the court’s original Report and Recommendation
notes:
Dr. DeGraff’s letter refers to plaintiff's surgery as having been
performed in 1973, but several sources, including plaintiff’s
answers to [Dow’s] Interrogatories, indicate 1969 is correct.
Regardless, the surgery was clearly performed well before the
conduct complained of beginning in 1977. R & R at 3.
4 Plaintiff's employer is also referred to as Pratt &
Whitney throughout the record. R & R at 2.
> Although the letter itself could be taken to imply that plain-
tiff mentioned the use of ECH to Dr. DeGraff, it is just as reason-
able to infer that the doctor’s knowledge of the use of ECH in the
mixing Operation came from the employer’s health and safety
report of 6/16/77. See, Exhibit B to Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to
[ yi WwW
,
App. 50
containing the chemical epichlorohydrin (“ECH”). Inter-
nal Pratt & Whitney Memo from R. J. Owen to D. B.
Schibi of 6/16/77, Exhibit B to Plaintiff's Memorandum
in Opposition to Dow’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff inhaled fumes produced during the mixing pro-
cess which irritated his lungs. R & R at 3. He began
experiencing symptoms of fatigue, shortness of breath,
dizziness, loss of consciousness, tearing eyes, burning
eyelids and the spitting up of blood. Dr. Godar’s letter of
5/2/84 at 1. Pedraza complained to his foreman and to
doctors, but each time he was sent back to work. Id. He
continued to work despite the fact that his asthma symp-
toms were aggravated on days he was assigned to the
chemical mixing operation. Dr. DeGraff’s letter of
1/25/78 at 1
On June 16, 1977 R. J. Owen of U.T.C.’s Health and
Safety Engineering Department issued an internal memo
concerning plaintiff's complaints of respiratory diffi-
culties. The report included the information that ECH
was involved in the chemical mixing operation, but
stated that adequate ventilation existed and concluded
that “Mr. Pedroza [sic] should not have breathing diffi-
culties from his job at Pratt & Whitney.” Memo of R. J.
Owen, Plaintiff's Memorandum, Exhibit 2. As the original
Report and Recommendation observed: “There is no indi-
cation in the record whether Pedraza was informed about
the report or specifically the presence of ECH in the
mixing process.” R & R at 4.
Plaintiff’s asthma symptoms continued and on June
29, 1977, they became serious enough to warrant emer-
gency room treatment at Saint Francis Hospital. After this
eee
App. 51
incident, Pratt & Whitney returned plaintiff to his pre-
vious job. Dr. Godar’s letter of 5/2/84 at 2. Subsequent
asthma attacks caused the plaintiff to leave the job site on
several occasions. Id. On October 27, 1977, plaintiff was
again sent to the Saint Francis Emergency Room for treat-
ment of an asthma attack. Not until November of 1977
was plaintiff “moved to a lathe operation and away from
the previous environment after discussions by the plant
medical department.” Id.
Pratt & Whitney filed a report of this October inci-
dent with its workmen’s compensation carrier, Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company, on December 6, 1977. The
claim form linked plaintiff’s asthma attack with chemi-
cals in the work environment, stating: “Employee works
with chemicals (volatile) & gases. [H]e feels this is caus-
ing the asthma.” Shell’s Exhibit C. Later in December a
check for $572.58 was issued to plaintiff by Liberty
Mutual. This check constituted a form of worker’s com-
pensation benefits. R & R at 4.
Sometime during this period, John M. Young of Lib-
erty Mutual apparently referred Mr. Pedraza to Dr.
Arthur C. DeGraff, Jr., of Hartford Lung Physicians for a
medical exam. Dr. DeGraff’s letter of 1/25/78. On Janu-
ary 17, 1978, Dr. DeGraff examined the plaintiff and took
his medical history. Dr. Godar’s letter of 5/2/84 at 2. On
the basis of this examination, the patient’s medical his-
tory, the Pratt & Whitney “investigation of work condi-
tions,” and company medical records, Dr. DeGraff began
to suspect that ECH was the cause of plaintiff's recent
medical problems. He cited all of these sources of infor-
mation as contributing to his “Impression” that Pedraza
was suffering from asthma that was “most likely work
App. 52
related and did not exist prior to his employment at Pratt
& Whitney.” Dr. DeGraff’s letter of 1/25/78 at 1,2.
In this report, which was written eight days after the
physical examination and addressed exclusively to Young
at Liberty Mutual, the doctor enclosed a copy of a
description of the respiratory effects associated with
exposure to ECH resin. He also revealed that plaintiff’s
history was “consistent with hypersensitivity reaction to
the Epichlorohydrin.” Id. at 2.
The contents of Dr. DeGraff’s report were not dis-
closed to the plaintiff during this time period. R & R at 5.
Indeed, plaintiff reported that he did not learn of the
doctor’s opinion until November, 1983 when Dr. DeGraff
wrote to plaintiff's attorney, apparently enclosing a copy
of the January 25, 1978 letter. Jd. and Plaintiff's Affidavit
in Opposition to Shell’s Motion for Summary Judgment
on Statute of Limitations, November 12, 1986.
In 1978 plaintiff was transferred to another depart-
ment at U.T.C. where he worked as a machine operator. R
& R at 5. Sometime in 1980 plaintiff was diagnosed as
having mediastinal lymphadenitis and pericarditis. Id.
U.T.C. terminated plaintiff on July 6, 1981. Shell’s Exhibit
5 at.
On August 7, 1981 plaintiff filed a complaint against
U.T.C. with the Connecticut Commission on Human
6’ As the court’s original Report and Recommendation
stated, plaintiff obviously intended this date, although his
affidavit specifies May, 1983. There is no May, 1983 letter from
DeGraff anywhere in the record, only the letter of November
15, 1983 to plaintiff's counsel. R & R at 5, n. 7.
App. 53
Rights and Opportunities. Shell’s Exhibit J. Plaintiff
charged that his employer had discriminated against him
because of his physical disability (asthma) and his
national origin (Puerto Rican ancestry) when it fired him.
Id. at 1, 2. In this sworn affadavit [sic], filed without the
assistance of an attorney, Shell’s Exhibit L at 1, Pedraza
specifically alleged that he developed an asthmatic condi-
tion after working with fiberglass materials at U.T.C. for
about five years. Shell’s Exhibit J at 2. He stated further
that he had suffered an asthma attack after being trans-
ferred to a position mixing chemicals and noted that this
condition worsened over time, despite the fact that he
was transferred to a different position mixing chemicals.
Id. Plaintiff also noted other symptoms he experienced
while working with chemicals. Id. The gravamen of his
complaint was that U.T.C. had failed to accommodate his
disability: “Rather than transfer to another position
which would minismize [sic] condition they fired me.
Denying me equal accommodation.” Id. at 2.
On April 15, 1982 the Connecticut Commission On
Human Rights and Opportunities issued a Finding of No
Cause and Summary in which it accepted U.T.C.’s version
of the facts surrounding its decision to terminate plaintiff.
Shell’s Exhibit K. In its answer to plaintiff’s complaint,
U.T.C. had stated that “their medical facility found that
there is evidence that the asthmatic condition existed
prior to Complainant’s working with fiberglass and
resins.” During the investigation that ensued, the com-
pany attributed plaintiff’s firing to poor attendance. Id. at
22.
App. 54
The Commission’s report stated that its investigator
had access to “all memos and correspondence, complain-
ant’s attendance records, and complainant’s personnel
file.” Id. On the basis of this evidence, the investigator
concluded that “[t]here is no medical proof to substanti-
ate his [plaintiff's] allegation that his asthma was work
connected or responsible for the continued poor atten-
dance.” Id. at 24. As one of its specific findings of fact, the
Commission noted that “Respondent’s Medical Depart-
ment evaluated Complainant and reported that Com-
plainant’s asthma was not work connected.” Id. at 23.
Pedraza was notified of the results of this investiga-
tion and the reasons for the dismissal of his complaint by
certified mail on 5/16/82.” Id. at 3, Shell’s Exhibit L.
Plaintiff was hospitalized twice in 1982 with a diag-
nosis of asthma. Dr. Godar’s letter of 5/2/84 at 3. On
June 17, 1983 Dr. DeGraff wrote to James Parent, a labor
representative for the International Association of Machi-
nists and Aerospace Workers, regarding his consultation
with Pedraza the day before’ R & R at 5. Plaintiff had told
the physician he was easily fatigued. Id. Dr. DeGraff
stated, “[a]lthough Mr. Pedraza clearly has asthma, much
of his syniptoms undoubtedly relate to . . . impaired
cardiac function. ...” Id. Dr. DeGraff wrote to James
Parent again on October 3, 1983, stating both that plain-
tiff’s mediastinal fibrosis was undoubtedly a result of the
radiation therapy he received following the removal of
’ Exhibit K mistakenly identifies the netification date as
3/16/82, but all of the other documents indicate May, not
March. See Shell’s Exhibit L at 2 and Shell’s Memorandum at 5.
App. 55
the thymic tumor in 1969, and that the mediastinal
fibrosis had affected plaintiff’s heart. Id. at 6.
In his November 15, 1983 letter to plaintiff’s counsel,
Dr. DeGraff clearly offered the opinion that Pedraza had
asthma, the probable cause being industrial fume expo-
sure. Exhibit C to Plaintiff's Opposition to Dow. Dr.
DeGraff also stated that Pedraza suffered from mediasti-
nal fibrosis and pericarditis as a result of the radiation
therapy he received in 1969. Referring to the latter condi-
tions, Dr. DeGraff went on to say:
This is not related to his asthma, however much
of Mr. Pedraza’s symptoms of exercise limitation
results from the pericarditis and mediastinal
fibrosis. . . . With dust or fume exposure, his
asthma symptoms increase, and [his] exercise
[is] limited by his asthma. Mr. Pedraza’s asthma
is sufficient to cause an approximate 30% loss in
function of both lungs, this loss in function is
over and above the loss of lung function due to
the mediastinal fibrosis. R & R at 6.
Dr. Godar examined Pedraza on January 27, 1984.
Referring to the fact that plaintiff's asthma symptoms
might continue even after removal from exposure to
ECH, Dr. Godar stated:
However, even at its onset the condition was
partly affected by restrictive disorder resulting
from treatment for the thymoma, including both
thoracotomy and radiation treatment. It is also
clear that since 1980 there has been a progres-
sive cardiomegaly, suggesting a cardiac disorder
that requires more evaluations since it may play
a significant role in the patient’s respiratory
App. 56
impairment. I do not believe his cardiac condi-
tion is the major factor since on his best days he
is able to climb two flights of stairs and walk up
to one mile. In other respects, his pattern of
symptoms is consistent with that of a chronic
asthmatic bronchitis. ... Id. at 6-7.
On January 29, 1985 the Connecticut Workers’ Com-
pensation Commission approved disability benefits for
plaintiff based upon his employment with U.T.C. R & Rat
7. The injury noted on the workers’ compensation form is
“acute asthma attack” with a 30% loss in function of
lungs. Id. Date of injury is listed as October 28, 1977 and
plaintiff signed this claim form on January 28, 1985. Id.
Plaintiffs filed this action on November 4, 1985.
C. Additional Facts Relating to the Sophisticated
User Defense
At the time Pedraza’s alleged exposure occurred,
Richard Owen, a Senior Industrial Hygienist, was a board
certified hygienist for plaintiff's employer, Pratt &
Whitney. Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment at 12. Defendant’s cita-
tion is to the deposition testimony of Owen at pp. 9-10,
which it identifies as Exhibit P to its Memorandum. Yet in
the previous paragraph on the same page of its Mem-
orandum, defendant correctly identifies its Exhibit P as
the Deposition of Samuel W. Oakes. Id. In Shell’s subse-
quent Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, defendant acknowledges that it failed to
attach this exhibit to its original motion and states that it
is curing this omission by inserting the missing excerpts
App. 57
as Substitute Exhibit P to its Reply. Shell’s Reply at 6-7.
Despite the fact that defendant cites to the Owen deposi-
tion at 8-10, 35, 39, and 48-50, this court has been able to
locate only pages 1 and 8-10 in defendant’s combined
pleadings. Id. at Substitute Exhibit P. Since the testimony
by Mr. Owen as summarized by defendant in its Mem-
orandum consists of facts which, even if true, would not
affect this court’s disposition below of Shell’s sophisti-
cated user defense, the court will assume for the pur-
poses of this argument that the defendant’s statement of
these facts is accurate.
Owen apparently stated in his deposition that Pratt &
Whitney “recognized their duty as an employer to pro-
vide a workplace free from recognized hazards under
OSHA.” Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to
Motion for Summary Judgment at 13. Owen further testi-
fied that Pratt & Whitney had available to it the following
sets of documents regarding the toxicology of the prod-
ucts it used: ACGIH criterion documents, an extensive
library on toxicology, and the Shell MSDS (Material
Safety Data Sheets) Sheets for Epoxy Resin. Id. at 12-13.
Owen also stated that “[h]e would expect that the local
exhaust ventilation system met the requirements of the
Shell MSDS sheet.” Id.
According to the deposition of Schibi, the MSDS
sheets were available at the Rocky Hill Plant where Ped-
raza worked. /d. at 13, citing Exhibit Q at 22. Defendant
also asserts that engrneering controls were implemented
at plaintiff's workbench to meet OSHA regulations.
Plaintiff's expert toxicologist, Thomas F. Schrager,
testified in his deposition that Shell “failed to provide
App. 58
adequate warnings and instructions” to plaintiff's
employer. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 11. Speci-
fically, Schrager found defendant’s warning to be inade-
quate in that Shell’s MSDS Sheets failed to provide: “(1)
specific instructions that enclosed hood ventilation be
used in work areas,” and lacked “(2) instructions that
respirators should be used by workers.” /d., citing Exhibit
3 at 6-7.
Ill. Discussion
On June 24, 1988 Shell filed this motio: e
judgment. As grounds for the motion, She gues tl
additional evidence made available through Giscovery as
well as recent case law construing the Massachusetts
discovery rule compel this court to find that plaintift
knew or should have known before November 5, 1982
(.e., three years prior to filing the complaint) of the
alleged causal relation between Shell’s product and his
condition. Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Sum-
mary Judgment at 3, 12. In the alternative, Shell contends
that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law
because it has “the legal right to rely on a sophisticated
user defense.” Id. at 18.
As this court previously stated in its original Report
and Recommendation, in opposing a properly supported
motion for summary judgment the non-moving party,
here the plaintiff,5 has the obligation of bringing forward
5 Although summary judgment is sought here against all
plaintiffs, both parties have confined their arguments to Cruz
Pedraza. The other plaintiffs rise or fall with Cruz Pedraza.
App. 59
“significant probative evidence” tending to show a genu-
ine issue of material fact which, if decided in his favor,
would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict in his
favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 244
(1986); Narcisco Rafael Perez de la Cruz v. Crowley Towing
and Transportation Company, 807 F.2d 1084, 1086 (1st Cir.
1986). Applying this standard, the court will address
defendant’s two grounds for summary judgment.
A. The Statute of Limitations
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Shell
states that this is its first and only motion for summary
judgment as to statute of limitations and that additional
facts and new case law demonstrate that plaintiff has
failed to carry his burden of proof of showing that he has
met the applicable statutes of limitations. Defendant’s
Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment at 1, 6.
Regardless of the choice of substantive law in this
case, the court must apply the procedural statutes of
limitations of this forum. Hemric v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co.,
739 F.2d 1,2 (ist Cir. 1984). There is no dispute that the
applicable limitations period is the three years provided
for both negligence and warranty claims under Mass.
Gen. L. ch. 260, section 2A and ch. 106, section 2-318,
respectively.
The issue presented is when did the plaintiff’s causes
of action accrue. In order for this lawsuit to have been
timely when filed on November 4, 1985, plaintiff’s cause
of action must not have accrued earlier than November 4,
1982. Although plaintiff claims his injury occurred in
|
App. 60
1977,9 that does not necessarily establish the date of
accrual. Guided by the principle that “a plaintiff should
be put on notice before his or her claim is barred by the
passage of time,” in the area of tort law, Massachusetts
has applied a discovery rule to causes of action based on
inherently unknowable wrongs. Olsen v. Bell Laboratories,
Inc., 388 Mass. 171, 175 (1985).
Olsen teaches that, in a claim of negligence resulting
in an insidious occupational disease, the cause of action
does not accrue before the plaintiff “knew or should
reasonably have known that he had contracted [the dis-
ease] as a result of the conduct of the defendants.” Id.
As the First Circuit has observed, this requirement
has two components: first, that the plaintiff have knowl-
edge of his injury and, second, that he have knowledge of
its cause — that is, that he has been harmed as a result of
the defendant’s conduct. Fidler v. Eastman Kodak Company,
714 F.2d 192, 198 (1st Cir. 1983). The court agrees with
defendant that “the plaintiff bears the burden of proving
facts taking this case outside the impact of the three-year
statute of limitations.” Franklin v. Albert, 381 Mass. 611,
612 (1980), and “notice of likely cause is ordinarily
enough to start the statute running.” Lear-Heflich v.
Schwartz, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 928, 930 (1985) (rescript opin-
ion) (quoting Fidler, supra at 199).
* On the worker’s compensation claim form plaintiff states
October 27, 1977, as the date of injury. Exhibit C to Defendant's
Memorandum. Everything else in the record points to around
June, 1977. R & R at 13.
App. 61
In applying the discovery rule to this case, Shel! puts
forth two arguments, one based upon additional facts and
one based upon recent case law, in an effort to establish
that plaintiff either actually knew or should have known
that ECH was the likely cause of his asthma. The Court
will address defendant’s new evidence first.
1. Evidence of Alleged Actual Knowledge
Although this court recognizes that the application of
the Massachusetts discovery rule to this record presents a
very close question, it finds that there is evidence from
which a jury could reasonably conclude that plaintiff did
not actually know that defendant’s conduct was the likely
cause of his injury prior to November 4, 1982.
As noted in the original Report and Recommenda-
tion, Dr. DeGraff’s letter of January 25, 1978 linking
plaintiff's symptoms with exposure to ECH would be
fatal to plaintiff’s case except that - according to plain-
tiff’s affidavit, which must be taken as true — Dr. DeGraff
did not share his opinion with Mr. Pedraza until 1983.
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 1 at paragraph 3.
Significantly, that letter was addressed exclusively to
Young of Liberty Mutual, U.T.C.’s insurance carrier.
Moreover, Dr. DeGraff’s “Impression” that plaintiff was
suffering from asthma which was mos
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