Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Shell Oil Co. v. Pedraza

Supreme Court brief1992

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oaace OF THE CLERK

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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1991

SHELL OIL COMPANY,

Petitioner,

CRUZ PEDRAZA, et al.,

Respondents.

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The

United States Court Of Appeals

For The First Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Of Counsel:

James A. HENDERSON, JR.

Frank B. Ingersoll

Professor of Law

Cornell Law School

Ithaca, New York 14853

(607) 255-2303

AARON D. TWERSKI

Professor of Law

Brooklyn Law School

250 Joralemon Street

Brooklyn, New York 11201

(718) 780-7999

Burt BALLANFANT

Shell Oil Company

4856 One Shell Plaza

P. O. Box 2463

Houston, Texas 7

(713) 241-7023

Counsel of Record

Ropert L. LEONARD

Douerty, WALLACE, PILLSBURY

& Murry

One Monarch Place

1414 Main Street,

19th Floor

Springfield, Massachusetts

01144-1002

(413) 733-3111

Counsel for Petitioner

Shell Oil Company

7252-2463

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the United States Court of Appeals for the

First Circuit erroneously found that the occupational

health standards promulgated by the United States Occu-

pational Safety and Health Administration did not pre-

empt state juries in common law causes of action from

establishing occupational health standards that differed

from those established by the United States Occupational

Safety and Health Administration.

Whether the employer’s compliance with occupa-

tional health and safety standards established by the

Occupational Health and Safety Administration satisfies

as a matter of law a product supplier’s duty to warn of

risks associated with such compliance?

il

Il. LIST OF ALL PARTIES

Petitioner, defendant-appellee below, is Shell Oil

Company (“Shell”). Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 28.1,

a list of all of Shell’s parents, subsidiaries, and affiliates is

reproduced as Appendix 6 at App. 91.

Respondents, plaintiffs-appellants below are Cruz

Pedraza, Alejandrina Pedraza, Roberto Pedraza, and

Mary Ellen Pedraza.

VII.

VIII.

ili

Ill. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ......

EP MP PAR, FREES. ccc c ces evccccnss ii

UE PY PE OU ED occ cece e cece rees iii

pe Be Me ee 8 ies Vv

OPINIONS BY OTHER COURTS............. l

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ............ l

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PRO-

i ES eee 2

Constitutional Provisions .................. 2

rae aa go gd oi ge aca 46 vu .0 w oev ete em HR 3

ee Se sine yh Mees 40d Se Os 4

prmtemenes OF THE CASE ................ 5

FEDERAL QUESTIONS RAISED............. 7

REASONS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE WRIT. 8

1. THE FIRST CIRCUIT’S REFUSAL TO REC-

OGNIZE THE SUPREMACY OF FEDERAL

REGULATORY STANDARDS WHEN IN

DIRECT CONFLICT WITH STATE LAW

CONSTITUTES A RADICAL AND IRRA-

TIONAL DEPARTURE FROM CONTROL-

LING AUTHORITY IN THIS COURT AND

yy Get 8: 6) 8

iv

Iti. TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

N

THIS COURT MUST CONSTRUE OSHA’S

SAVINGS CLAUSE SO AS NOT TO PER-

MIT TORT ACTIONS UNDER STATE LAW

THAT SUBSTANTIALLY INTERFERE

WITH FEDERAL WORKPLACE SAFETY

RIAT EIEIO os. dines 845s VE b LOOSE ees 12

A. State Tort Actions that Substantially

Interfere with Federal Safety Stan-

dards must be Preempted ........... 12

B. Plaintiff’s Tort Action in this Case

Would Substantially Interfere with Rel-

evant OSHA Standards .............. 13

C. OSHA Workplace Safety Standards

Conform to Criteria that Make Federal

Preemption Especially Justified ...... 15

D. The OSHA Savings Clause Can and

Must be Construed so as not to Permit

the Tort Action in this Case...... 2a

E. The First Circuit's Wooden Construc-

tion of the OSHA Savings Clause is so

Patently in Error that Wasteful Confu-

sion is Certain to Reign without Clari-

fication from this Court.............. 26

3. FEDERAL PREEMPTION IN THE AREA

OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY PRESENTS

ISSUES OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE

WHICH, WITHOUT GUIDANCE FROM

THIS COURT, ARE CREATING WASTE-

FUL CONFUSION BOTH IN COURTS

AND IN PRODUCTS MARKETS......... 28

RRS HAE 8 | eer ie Tae eee

IV. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Associated Industries of Massachusetts v. Snow, 898

ee ere ROMS GK -Sie o ear vecns cas cues ceenes 2, 12

Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 108

S.Ct. 2510, 101 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988) ......... 22, 23, 24

Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3rd

Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S.Ct. 1386 (1991)....... 9

Dalehite v. United States, 344 U.S. 873, 73 S.Ct. 166,

SF Li Re GRE 5-5 osasn ss ot cb gneseinaneanees 25

Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. New York, 855

Fine Ge CR Ca FONE oincncccccince ceareeereeres 12

Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. de la Cuesta,

458 U.S. 141, 73 L.Ed.2d 664, 102 S.Ct. 3014

CPOE cen ys 0 bc 4.5 duu RN eee eae eee eee 12

G&T Terminal Packaging v. Consolidated Rail, 830

F.2d 1230 (3rd Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct.

1291, 99 L.Ed.2d 501, 485 U.S. 988 (1988) ......... 10

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (9 Wheat), 6 L.E.23

CTIIIOD w o0'6i vo ule s:A-c6 a ca 14

lidustrial Union v. American Petroleum Institute, 448

U.S. 607, 100 S.Ct. 2844, 65 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1988) .... 17

International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 93

L.Ed.2d 883, 107 S.Ct. 805 (1987)............ 2, 10, 13

Kitts v. General Motors, 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir.

1989), cert. denied, 108 L.Ed.2d 783, 110 S.Ct.

ys |)... | Cnr Fee FEE ame OS Da 10

vi

IV. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

National Solid Wastes Management, Assn. v. Killian,

SIS FAG G74 Ge Ga eee ckcccacscevessescesses 26

New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey,

774 Fae Sie Coe CO, Tie awe da cee icceexesss: 12

Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir.

WOOT) 6s i.ven caceud esos tee ee 13

Pedraza v. Shell Oil Company, 724 F.Supp. 1 (D.

EONS, THOSE cc cccuerc era gaetepeeene aera aa wess l

Pedraza, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48 (ist Cir.

SUPE i cccccevcueenbeasbeauenl etna ee eee ae l

Pedraza, et al. v. Shell Oil Company, 729 F.Supp. 187

CED. Dlnae. DOs is ck eas ove ndee er eres eee esee eee |

People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 534 N.E.2d 962

CGS... ERs cos dace tema eke re eer 27

Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 95

L.66.260 39; 167 SACU TSRP CII vs ov ccsiaetesedy BO

Puffer’s Hardware Inc. v. Donovan, 742 F.2d 12 (1st

Cle. T9GGR os vccvigenvdes ieee ee 12

Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 55

LB. Se 179, SE GAR, DO CR ck tke we ep eanceees 14

San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.

236, 3 L.Ed.2d 775, 79 S.Ct. 773 (1959).......... 2, 33

Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816 (11th

Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 108 L.Ed.2d 783, 110 S.Ct.

C7GR CUSED «0nd cc cnkc Se Panes peer iLaaees 10

Texas and Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil

Co. (Abilene), 204 U.S. 426, 27 S.Ct. 350, 51 L.Ed.

SSS (UGG) or cece sessavedederd eit eee 10

vii

IV. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Wood v. General Motors, Inc., 865 F.2d 395, (1st Cir.

1988), cert. denied, 108 L.Ed.2d 782, 110 S.Ct.

A. RRR RAI EIR is Biro 2 ra ey eR A aD Testes passim

CONSTITUTION

Sh ae ee Ba! ee ee eer er rere re 2

STATUTES

Se, PE 4 ox bo as ho Av db ea rate nueneeeres 10, 25

ee RE a ee Cpe Seen ce ee vere eM ened l

er ee oe Ul Ae ice he ce RUN od eats l

Says nv os evn ea vv ewes ee on ekee seas 3

Be re I So .a'c os ves cease eckveseseacaes ae

Se Sc eos. Wars x ck Pek ee oe eae RS 3

i ae Coe eee base

ee gr ee bine 5 Cate ee eee Ree Renn 20

PA a ee ee eer eee eee

ee IO eh occ neh es cha cais ee eee eee 10

cde iG ac avces ones hcaeeesccneeetau 10

Ee ee renee arn ers een ere: 10

REGULATIONS

a | i ners: 14,9

29 C.F.R. §1910.134 . Re ee OPER Fe

Vili

{'V. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Be Ge ERIE ok csv a neensctusesnes ee

ae ee 4, 6, 13

SECONDARY AUTHORITIES

C. Bowen, Miracle at Philadelphia (1966) ............. 14

Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market,

ee ge a re 28

The Federalist No. 22 (A. Hamilton) (R. Fairfield,

pe BR ee a ne ee ... 14

15 Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers’

Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudica-

tion, 73 Colum. L.Rev. 1531 (1973) ............. 25, 28

Henderson & Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Prod-

ucts Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn,

Re Fee sR NY GUUPIIIs 6 6c c cc cea wwsececswas 28, 29

Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and !ts Conse-

ae CSUN Net can ye pets SEM ee eee ees 4-4 28

Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort

Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1521 (1987)............... ee

S. Rep. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970),

reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

oo, |. eerie A 14

Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules

and Standards in Design Defect Litigation: Advanc-

ing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57

N.Y.U.L.Rev. 521 (1982) 29

Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability (1991) 29

V. OPINIONS BY OTHER COURTS

The unpublished Report and Recommendation

Regarding Defendant Shell Oil Company’s Motion for

Summary Judgment dated March 15, 1989 is reproduced

as Appendix 4 at App. 45.

The decision of the United States District Court

styled Pedraza v. Shell Oil Company, 724 F.Supp. 1 (D.

Mass. 1989) adopted the Magistrate’s Recommendation

by denying Shell's initial motion for summary judgment

and is reproduced as Appendix 3 at App. 24.

The subsequent decision of the District Court gran-

ting Shell’s motion for dismissal based on preemption is

styled Pedraza, et al. v. Shell Oil Company, 729 F.Supp. 187

(D. Mass. 1990), and is reproduced as Appendix 2 at App.

18.

The decision of the United States Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit reversing the decision of the district

court is styled Pedraza, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48

(Ist Cir. 1991), and is reproduced as Appendix 1 at App

l.

VI. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit was rendered on August 13, 1991

Petitioner's motion for rehearing was denied by that

court on September 6, 1991 and is reproduced as Appen-

dix 5 at App. 84.

This Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment of

the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1254(1) because the preemptive

effect of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA),

29 U.S.C. §651 et seq. as specified in 29 C.F.R. §1901.2 and

the regulations promulgated under its authority, 29 C.F.R

§1910.134 represents construction of one of the most

important federal statutes of recent years. Additionally,

the holding of the United States Court of Appeals that

OSHA did not preempt efforts by the state to establish

a

2

common law occupational standards through jury ver-

dicts conflicts with the holding by the same court of

appeals that states could not administratively promulgate

an occupational safety and health standard protecting

workers where a federal standard was in effect. Associated

Industries of Massachusetts v. Snow, 898 F.2d 274 (1st Cir.

1990). The finding that state administration regulations

are preempted by specific OSHA regulations but that

common law causes of action are not conflicts with this

Court’s holdings in San Diego Building Trades Council v.

Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 3 L.Ed.2d 775, 79 S.Ct. 773 (1959);

Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 95 L.Ed.2d 39,

107 S.Ct. 1549; International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S.

481, 93 L.Ed.2d 883, 107 S.Ct. 805 (1987). The pervasive-

ness of OSHA regulation underscores the necessity of

having uniform national standards and implementing the

Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the United States Con-

stitution.

VII. CONSTITUTIONAL AND

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Article VI, Clause 2 to the United States Constitution

provides:

This Constitution, and the laws of the United

States which shall be made in pursuance

thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be

made, under the Authority of the United States,

shall be the supreme law of the land, and the

Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,

any thing in the Constitution or laws of any

State to the contrary notwithstanding.

*

3

STATUTES

Title 29 U.S.C. §652(8) provides as follows:

The term “occupational safety and health stan-

dard” means a standard which requires condi-

tions, or the adoption or use of one or more

practices, means, methods, operations, or pro-

cesses, reasonably necessary or appropriate, to

provide safe or healthful employment and

places of employment.

Title 29 U.S.C. §653(b)(4) provides as follows:

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to super-

sede or in any manner affect any workmen’s

compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or

affect in any other manner the commonlaw or

Statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of

employers or employees under any law with

respect to injuries, diseases or death of

employees arising out of, or in the course of,

employment

Title 29 U.S.C. §654(a) provides as follows:

Each employer -

(1) shall furnish to each of his employees

employment and a place of employment which

are free from recognized hazards that are caus-

ing or are likely to cause death or serious physi-

cal harm to his employees.

(2) shall comply with occupational safety

and health standards promulgated under’ this

chapter.

Title 29 U.S.C. §667(a) provides as follows:

(a) Assertion of State standards in absence of

applicable Federal standards.

Nothing in this chapter shall prevent any State

agency or court from asserting jurisdiction

under State law over any occupational safety or

+

health issue with respect to which no standard

is in effect under section 655 of this title.

¢

REGULATIONS

29 C.F.R. §1901.2 provides in part as follows:

§1901.2 Alternative to Federal preemption

Section 18(a) of the Act is read as preventing

any State agency or court from asserting juris-

diction under State law over any occupational

safety or health issue with respect to which a

Federal standard has been issued under section _

6 of the Act.

* * *

29 C.F.R. §1910.1000 Table Z-1 provides as follows:

An employee’s exposure to any material listed

in Table Z-1, Z-2, or Z-3 of this section shall be

limited in accordance with the requirements of

the following paragraphs of this section.

(a) Table Z-1:

(i) Materials with names preceded by “C

Ceiling Values. An employee’s exposure to any

material in table Z-1, the name of which is pre-

ceded by a “C” (e.g., C Boron trifluoride), shall

at no time exceed the ceiling value given for that

material in the table.

”

* * *

(e) To achieve compliance with paragraph (a)

through (d) of this section, administrative or

engineering controls must first be determined

and implemented whenever feasible. When such

controls are not feasible to achieve full compli-

ance, protective equipment or any other protec-

tive measures shall be used to keep the exposure

of employees to air contaminants within the

5

limits prescribed in this section. Any equipment

and/or technical measures used for this purpose

must be approved for each particular use by a

competent industrial hygienist or other techni-

cally qualified person. Whenever respirators are

used, their use shall comply with §1910.134.

TABLE Z-1

Substance p-p.m. mg./M

Epichlorohydrin — Skin 5 19

29 C.FE.R. §1910.134(a)(1) provides as follows:

(a) Permissible practice. (1) In the control of those

occupational diseases caused by breathing air

contaminated with harmful dusts, fogs, fumes,

mists, gases, smokes, sprays, or vapors, the pri-

mary objective shall be to prevent atmospheric

contamination. This shall be accomplished as far

as feasible by accepted engineering control mea-

sures (for example, enclosure or confinement of

the operation, general and local ventilation, and

substitution of less toxic materials). When effec-

tive engineering controls are not feasible, or

while they are being instituted, appropriate res-

pirators shall be used pursuant to the following

requirements.

VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a products liability personal injury case. Plain-

tiffs allege that Mr. Cruz Pedraza became asthmatic as a

result of exposure to epichlorohydrin present as a trace

impurity in Shell’s epoxy resin sold through a distributor

:

a

6

to Mr. Pedraza’s employer, United Technologies Corpora-

tion (Pratt and Whitney). The plaintiffs’ allegation is that

Shell did not provide a warning about the dangers of

epichlorohydrin to his employer. The plaintiff in answers

to interrogatories stated alternatively: either (1) that the

warning that should have been given was that an

enclosed hood should have been provided, or (2) that the

workers should have worn respirators and that the basis

of the warning that should been provided were 29 C.F.R.

§1910.134 and 29 C.F.R. §1910.1000, the NIOSH Criteria

for a Recommended Standard. . . . Occupational Exposure

to Epichlorohydrin, HEW Publication No. (NIOSH)

76-206 (Sept. 1976), reproduced here in part as Appendix

15 at App. 173; and the ACGIH Standard for Exposure to

Epichlorohydrin.

Mr. Pedraza’s employer, United Technologies,

through its employees responsible for occupational safety

— Mr. Owen, a certified industrial hygienist, and Mr.

Schibi, a certified industrial hygienist, testified: (1) that

Pratt & Whitney had received the Shell Material Safety

Data Sheet (MSDS) for epoxy resin, Appendix 9 at App.

114, 122-123 and Appendix 8 at App. 108, (2) that the

Shell MSDS disclosed the presence of epichlorohydrin,

the amount of epichlorohydrin in the product and the fact

that an OSHA limit on epichlorohydrin existed, Appen-

dix 10 at App. 135-139, (3) that Pratt & Whitney read the

Shell MSDS, Appendix 9 at App. 122, 123, (4) that Pratt &

Whitney had the current NIOSH documents in their

library, Appendix 10 at App. 138, and (5) that Pratt &

Whitney, Mr. Pedraza’s employer, recognized their duty

to follow OSHA regulations and installed the local

exhaust engineering equipment required by OSHA regu-

lations, 29 C.F.R. §1910.134(a)(1), at Mr. Pedraza’s work

station, Appendix 9 at App. 116-120 and Appendix 8 at

App. 110, 111. Available industrial hygiene monitoring

reflected that the OSHA limits were met. Appendix 10 at

App. 137, 138. The plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Schrager, agreed

that local exhaust ventilation met the OSHA ventilation

camitiaaaamcmaiaiainaaasiicceiaiaiiemaiiaiiniieile

7

standard. Appendix 10 at App. 127-133. In light of plain-

tiffs’ theory of the case, the only failure to warn claim

remaining was for Shell to have warned Pratt & Whitney

of procedures or exposure standards as to epi-

chlorohydrin different from those of OSHA.

The trial court having before it Shell’s first motion for

summary judgment which it had denied entered a judg-

ment dismissing plaintiffs’ claims based on OSHA pre-

emption holding that there were specific OSHA

regulations as to epichlorohydrin. Pedraza, et al. v. Shell

Oil Co., supra (Reproduced as Appendix 2 at App. 18).

The district court’s finding was based on the extensive

record which had established the undisputed facts that

United Technologies had notice through Shell’s hazard

communication materials of the presence of epi-

chlorohydrin in Shell’s epoxy resin product, recognized

its duty to comply with OSHA, and implemented one of

the exposure control measures which met the OSHA

requirements, i.e., local exhaust ventilation. 29 C.F.R.

§1910.134(a)(1).

Mr. Pedraza appealed to the United States Court of

Appeals for the First Circuit. That court reversed the trial

court. Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., supra (Reproduced as

Appendix 1 at App. 1). Shell filed a motion for rehearing

which also included a request that the court of appeals’

opinion be clarified to state that the OSHA regulations

were the duty of care owed to an employee. The motion

for rehearing was denied (Reproduced as Appendix 5 at

App. 84).

IX. FEDERAL QUESTIONS RAISED

This petition raises the issue of whether OSHA pre-

empts common law causes of action when a supplier

warns of the presence of a chemical, the employer

acknowledges receipt of that warning, and the employer

implements one of the alternative safety measures pro-

vided by OSHA regulations. This preemption issue was

presented twice to the district court. Relevant portions of

8

Shell’s briefs are reproduced as Appendix 13 at App. 148

and Appendix 14 at App. 157. The statutory preemption

issue was presented to and decided by the court of

appeals. Relevant portions of Shell’s brie. to the United

States Court of Appeals are reproduced as Appendix 7 at

App. 97. This issue was raised again in petitioner’s

motion for rehearing before the United States Court of

Appeals for the First Circuit. Relevant portions of this

motion are reproduced as Appendix 5 at App. 84.

X. REASONS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE WRIT

1. THE FIRST CIRCUIT’S REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE

THE SUPREMACY OF FEDERAL REGULATORY

STANDARDS THAT DIRECTLY CONFLICTS

WITH STATE LAW CONSTITUTES A RADICAL

AND IRRATIONAL DEPARTURE FROM CON-

TROLLING AUTHORITY IN THIS COURT AND

OTHER CIRCUITS

This case presents an issue whose ultimate resolution

by this Court will profoundly affect a host of federal

safety statutes that contain both preemption provisions

and savings clauses. Savings clauses, by allowing state

tort actions based on standards of conduct that may

conflict with existing federal standards, threaten the

integrity of federal regulatory systems. Savings clauses

must be construed carefully, in light of the protection

afforded federal regulations by preemption holdings

under the Supremacy Clause. The First Circuit construed

the OSHA savings clause in a wooden and extremist

manner that will allow state tort actions to compromise

the integrity of the workplace safety standards set by a

vital federal agency. This decision cannot remain uncor-

rected. Without giving any consideration to the important

federal interests that were being set aside, the First Cir-

cuit placed itself in direct conflict with other federal

circuits that have sought to adopt functional approaches

to savings clause provisions in various federal safety

statutes. Ironically, the decision by the First Circuit is in

—————————S—”—“ST SC‘

9

direct conflict with a previous savings clause decision by

the First Circuit as well as a previous First Circuit deci-

sion on OSHA preemption.

It is no exaggeration that should this decision stand,

one of the broadest and most important federal safety

schemes will be seriously compromised. In addition,

great confusion will be introduced into an area of the law

which desperately needs stability and predictability.

When bad law, confusion and serious inter-circuit and

intra-circ ‘it conflict coalesce this court should grant cer-

tiorari.

We note that Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d

541 (3rd Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S.Ct. 1386 (1991),

currently before this Court, does not raise the issue of the

internal statutory conflict of a savings clause and a pre-

emption provision. The relevant statute in that case does

not contain a savings provision. There are some areas of

overlap between Cipollone and this case; however, the

issue which lies at the heart of the instant litigation raises

a question of statutory interpretation which is not found

in Cippolone.

Section 18(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health

Act, 29 U.S.C. §667(a), provides that state agencies or

courts can only assert jurisdiction over occupational

health issues where no OSHA standard has been adopted.

This statute has been interpreted by the Occupational

Safety and Health Administration as preemptive. 29

C.F.R. §1901.2. However, 29 U.S.C. §653(b)(4) contains a

clearly expressed savings clause.

This case presents the issue of how to reconcile these

two seemingly contradictory provisions. This Court has

interpreted at least three analogous federal safety statutes

with substantially similar language in their savings

clauses and held them preemptive of tort actions. The

Savings clause in the Interstate Commerce Act provided:

Nothing in this Act contained shall in any way

abridge or alter the remedies now existing at

common law or by statute, but the provisions of

10

this Act are in addition to such remedies. 49

U.S.C. §22 (subsequently revised and now 49

U.S.C. §1010).

This Court determined that such language did not avoid

preemption of common law causes of action. Texas and

Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. (Abilene), 204

U.S. 426, 27 S.Ct. 350, 51 L.Ed. 553 (1907); see also, G&T

Terminal Packaging v. Consolidated Rail, 830 F.2d 1230, 1231

(3rd Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1291, 99 L.Ed.2d 501,

485 U.S. 988 (1988).

The Federal Clean Water Act contains equally broad

savings clause language:

Nothing in this section shall restrict any right

which any person (or class of persons) may have

under any statute or common law to seek

enforcement of any effluent standard or limita-

tion or to seek any other relief... . 33 U.S.C.

§1365(e).

This Court nevertheless held the Clean Water Act pre-

emptive of common law nuisance suit. See, /nternational

Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 93 L.Ed.2d 883, 107

S.Ct. 805 (1987).

The savings clause of the Federal Motor Vehicle

Safety Standards Act (FMVSSA) provides:

Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle

safety standard issued under this subchapter

does not exempt any person from any liability

under common law. 15 U.S.C. §1397(c).

Several appeals courts held the FMVSSA preemptive of

common law causes of action and this Court denied cer-

tiorari. See, Wood v. General Motors, Inc., 865 F.2d 395, 408

(1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 108 L.Ed.2d 782, 110 S.Ct. 1781

(1990); Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816 (11th

Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 108 L.Ed.2d 783, 110 S.Ct. 1781

(1990); and Kitts v. General Motors, 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir.

1989), cert. denied, 108 L.Ed.2d 783, 110 S.Ct. 1781 (1990).

Each of the above-enumerated statutes is every bit as

broad as the language contained in OSHA; yet this Court

a

11

and other courts held that such savings clauses had to

give way to preemption. We shall demonstrate that the

tensions between pre-emption and these savings clauses

are fully resolvable. Existing case law, both in this Court

and in the various circuits, provides the direction for

resolving this dilemma.

In sharp contrast to this caselaw, the First Circuit's

opinion in the instant case does not simply exacerbate the

internal tension between the savings and preemption; the

court totally ignores the tension. The First Circuit’s opin-

ion focuses exclusively on the language of the savings

clause and with wooden rigidity construes that language

in a way that allows for the widest incursion into the core

of OSHA regulation. Unlike other courts that have sought

a functional approach to what must have been intended

by Congress in allowing for savings clauses in the teeth

of a pervasive federal regulatory scheme, the First Circuit

paid no attention to the compromising of federal inter-

ests. Thus, the First Circuit’s opinion is not merely a

judgment call favoring savings over preemption in a

given fact pattern. It is a blatant rejection of the view that

federal interests need to be considered carefully in mak-

ing the decision.

The error of the First Circuit goes yet further. To

justify its sweeping reading of the savings clause the

court relies upon a set of cases involving OSHA regula-

tion and the savings clause. It is fair to say that not a

single case relied upon supports the position taken. The

decisions are at best irrelevant. At worst, they actually

support the Petitioner’s position as to preemption.

This, then, is a case of gross appellate error. It mis-

uses authority in an almost shocking fashion. It evisce-

rates a significant part of a major federal regulatory

scheme without examining the ramifications of doing so.

It is in direct conflict with decisions of several circuits

and those of this Court. Worst of all it creates a black

letter rule that makes no sense whatsoever. To adopt the

First Circuit opinion would be to declare the history of

12

OSHA and the goals set out by its founders to be a

nullity.

2. THIS COURT MUST CONSTRUE OSHA’S SAV-

INGS CLAUSE SO AS NOT TO PERMIT TORT

ACTIONS UNDER STATE LAW THAT SUBSTAN-

TIALLY INTERFERE WITH FEDERAL WORK-

PLACE SAFETY REGULATIONS

A. State Tort Actions that Substantially Interfere

with Federal Safety Standards must be Pre-

empted

Federal safety regulations must be held to preempt

state tort actions whenever the intended purpose and

effect of tort actions is to force defendants to adopt pre-

cautionary measures that are flatly inconsistent with the

federal standards. The fact that federal regulatory stan-

dards, rather than the Act itself, are threatened by state

regulation is not significant. Federal regulations such as

the workplace safety regulations involved in this case are

no less preemptive of state law than are federal statutes.

Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S.

141, 153-154, 73 L.Ed.2d 664, 675, 102 S.Ct. 3014 (1982).

Moreover, OSHA standards specifically have been held to

preempt state regulation of workplace safety. Several

courts, including the United States Court of Appeals for

the First Circuit, have held that state administrative regu-

lations that regulate an area governed by specific OSHA

regulations were preempted. Associated Industries of Mas-

sachusetts v. Snow, 898 F.2d 274 (1st Cir. 1990); Puffer’s

Hardware Inc. v. Donovan, 742 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1984);

Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. New York, 855 F.2d 48

(2nd Cir. 1988); and New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce

v. Hughey, 774 F.2d 587 (3rd Cir. 1985). These cases are in

direct conflict with this case. In determining if a state law

is preempted by implication, “one must look to interfer-

ence with Congress’ chosen method as well as to the

ultimate goal of the Statute.” Wood v. General Motors

Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 408 (Ist Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 108

SS

13

L.Ed.2d 782, 110 S.Ct. 1781 (1990). See also, International

Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 93 L.Ed.2d 883, 107

S.Ct. 805 (1987).

This case involves state tort law, not state administra-

tive regulation, but decisions of this Court and the United

States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit have held

that common law tort actions are preempted to the same

extent as state regulatory action whenever those tort

actions are in conflict with federal safety standards. See,

Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 95 L.Ed.2d 39,

107 S.Ct. 1549 (1987); International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,

supra; San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S

236, 3 L.Ed.2d 775, 79 S.Ct. 773 (1959); Wood v. General

Motors Co., supra; and Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825

F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987). It follows that preemption occurs

if the OSHA workplace standards in this case are threat

ened or compromised by state tort actions setting incon

sistent standards.

B. Plaintiff’s Tort Action in this Case Would Sub-

stantially Interfere with Relevant OSHA Stan-

dards

The interference that would result from allowing the

Plaintiffs’ tort claim to proceed is apparent from the

testimony of the Plaintiffs’ own expert on the method

used to control exposure. Dr. Schrager testified it was his

opinion that Shell’s warning should have specified the

use Of a personal respirator as an alternative to engineer-

ing control. Appendix 10 at App. 125. Clearly the purpose

behind this claim of failure to warn is to induce

employers to use personal respirators instead of engi-

neering controls. This objective flatly contradicts the

specific language of 29 C.F.R. §§1910.134 and 1910.1000

which only allows use of personal respirators when engi-

neering controls are not feasible.

The permissible exposure levels established by 29

C.F.R. §1910.1000 cannot be lowered by state law. A fed-

eral agency acting within the scope of its congressionally

Sf

14

mandated authority has established a specific level for

exposure to epichlorohydrin in the workplace and the

specificity of its terms establish that it is not subject to

alteration by state law. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435

U.S. 151, 55 L.Ed.2d 179, 98 S.Ct. 988 (1978). Uniform

application of occupational health and safety standards

was the articulated rationale for the passage of OSHA, in

order to insure that states which vigorously adopted and

implemented safety legislation would not be put at a

competitive disadvantage with those which did not. S.

Rep. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970), reprinted in

1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1852, reproduced

as Appendix 12 at App. 146. Wood, supra at 414. Unifor-

mity of commercial regulation was at the heart of the

issue which led to the Constitution. See, Gibbons v. Ogden,

22 U.S. 1 (9 Wheat), 6 L.E.23 (1824); C. Bowen, Miracle at

Philadelphia (1966); The Federalist, No. 22, at 50-58 (A.

Hamilton) (R. Fairfield 2nd Ed. 1966). When the plaintiff

in this case insists that the defendant should have warned

the plaintiff's employer that the levels of exposure to

epichlorohydrin set by OSHA are not safe and by impli-

cation should be lower or that something other than an

approved control measure is insufficient under tort law,

the plaintiff is asking the court to use state tort law to

second-guess the OSHA standard. Indeed, the plaintiff

would have not a state regulatory agency but a jury of

laypersons do the second-guessing.

When plaintiff demands that the defendant-manufac-

turer should have warned the employer that OSHA regu-

lations approving levels of exposure to a substance are

unsafe there is little question that the common law is in

direct conflict with federal standards. Plaintiff's demand

that the manufacturer should have warned the employer

to utilize one, and not the other of two OSHA-approved

methods to control exposure might appear at first blush

not to create a direct conflict between state tort law and

federal regulatory authority, since what is being urged on

the employer has, after all received OSHA approval.

However, properly understood this demand is equally in

hteneeneeeeeineamaaaas alee

15

conflict with OSHA’s regulatory scheme. By allowing the

employer to choose among two acceptable methods of

controlling exposure to an environmental agent, OSHA

has consciously decided to allow the employer to exercise

discretion in a manner that better suits that employer’s

specific workplace environment. By demanding that the

manufacturer urge the method which plaintiff prefers as

the sole engineering response to the risk, state tort law

flatly contradicts the goal of OSHA to allow unques-

tioned choice between two fully acceptable alternatives.

C. OSHA Workplace Safety Standards Conform to

Criteria that Make Federal Preemption Espe-

cially Justified.

Petitioner does not contend that every federal safety

standard that touches upon conduct normally subject to

state tort law is ipso facto entitled to preemptive effect

Relatively few areas of the law create the kind of irrecon-

cilable tension between federal standards and state tort

law determinations that demand preemption. For reasons

which we shall detail, the OSHA standards involved in

this litigation belong to a narrow class of federal stan-

dards that must not be required to compete with state tort

law. To recognize one is to damn the other. And when

federal standards clash with state standards, the latter

must give way.

Litigants favoring federal preemption typically argue

that federal standards seek consistency and uniformity,

and that state tort regulation disturbs that goal. Ulti

mately, the party asserting preemption must convince a

court that comprehensive across-the-board uniformity is

the desideratum of the federal statute. Four functional

criteria identify those federal regulatory schemes that

deserve to preempt conflicting state tort law. No single

criterion provides a litmus test as to whether preemption

is required. We articulate a functional analysis that sheds

light on the question of how broad and encompassing a

16

federal scheme the Congress actually intended to estab-

lish and which are met in this case.

The First Criterion for Federal Preemption: A

Rigorous and Full-Blown Federal Administra-

tive Process Leading to Adoption of the Safety

Standard

The safety standard adopted by OSHA was preceded

by a thoroughgoing and exhaustive process designed to

bring to light all plausible health risks and to address

them responsibly. Before any attempt at standard setting

was undertaken, an independent arm of the Department

of Health and Human Services — the National Institute for

Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) - undertook a

massive study of Epichlorohydrin in the workplace. The

results of the initial analysis and research were reviewed

by a host of divisions within NIOSH and by outside

consultants from labor, management, academia and state

health agencies. An exhaustive 151-page report recom-

mended a standard for Epichlorohydrin. NIOSH Criteria

for a Recommended Standard. . . . Occupational Exposure

to Epichlorohydrin, reproduced in part as Appendix 15 at

App. 173.

After submission of the NIOSH Report, a standard

for Epichlorohydrin was promulgated by the Secretary of

Labor and was subject to a rigorous process which

opened the standard to comment and commentary by all

interested segments of society. Section 6(b)(5) mandates

that the standard should accomplish “the highest degree

of health and safety for the employee... . ”

The federal epichlorohydrin standard in this case was

the product of an intense and wide ranging regulatory

inquiry that called for input and evaluation by many

disciplines and a wide spectrum of political opinion. The

objective against which the safety standard was to be

measured by both the agency and courts in reviewing its

efficacy was that it provide “the highest degree of health

and safety for the employee. ... ” The standard estab-

lished is subject to judicial review including review by

17

this Court. See, Industrial Union v. American Petroleum

Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 100 S.Ct. 2844, 65 L.Ed.2d 1010

(1988). It would be fatuous to believe that a process so

exhaustive was designed by the Congress to be over-

turned by the whim of a single jury applying retrospec-

tively vague principles of state tort law. Yet this is

precisely the result that the First Circuit’s ruling below

achieves.

The Second Criterion for Federal Preemption:

The Specificity of the Federal Safety Standard

Some federal regulation allows for a broad range of

discretion by setting general goals that regulated parties

are to meet. OSHA regulations are a more exacting breed.

They speak in exquisite detail and leave nothing to the

imagination. Not only does the regulation set forth the

accepted levels of exposure to epichlorohydrin with exac-

titude (5 p.p.m.), but the specific engineering alternatives

on how to accomplish the desired level of safety are

mandated by regulation. As we noted earlier, OSHA

specifically approved the local exhaust ventilation system

utilized by the employer in this case. Plaintiff urges that

the manufacturer should have warned them against the

use of this specifically approved system. That the alter-

nate control system to which plaintiff points was also

approved by OSHA does not alter the fact that plaintiff is

using the state tort law system to declare inadequate an

environmental control system which OSHA fully

approved. Thus, unlike claims in other areas of federal

reguiation where the charge is that alternate behavior by

the regulated party is equally consistent with the general

agency standard, here the regulation unmistakably sets

forth approved responses to the risk. The plaintiff’s claim

in this case insists on one rather than the other of two

engineering responses approved by OSHA. Regulatory

specificity dictates preemption where a specific OSHA

approved alternative regulation exists. Neither the

18

employer or the manufacturer could ever choose cor-

rectly under plaintiffs’ theory even though the OSHA

regulation was met.

The Third Criterion for Federal Preemption: The

Integrated Nature of the Federal Regulations

In determining whether a federal safety regulation or

standard should be given preemptive effect, it is neces-

sary to examine the feasibility of allowing competing

state and federal standards to exist side by side. Admit-

tedly, whenever differing standards are given approval

by law, there is a loss of uniformity. But on rare occasion,

far more than uniformity is at stake. Sometimes the entire

regulatory effort is placed in danger. OSHA is charged

not with the management of a single risk, but with gov-

erning the overall safety of the workplace environment

by comprehensive regulation. Managing the workplace

environment cannot be accomplished by examining one

single risk to a single worker. The agency must consider a

host of possible risks and must evaluate their import and

interrelation to each other. It cannot (as the individual

torts litigant can) afford to focus on a single risk and

demand an engineering response that either compromises

safety in other sectors of the workplace or makes it eco-

nomically unfeasible for the employer to respond fairly to

a broad range of risks. OSHA regulation is organic in

nature. It seeks to accomplish a balanced, integrated

approach to safety in the workplace. In sharp contrast,

individual tort litigaton need not concern itself with the

organic nature of regulation. As its primary focus, tort

has an injured plaintiff and what might have been done

differently to rescue him from injury. Broader inquiry into

the whole is the task of regulators, not the tort system.

Comprehensive and detailed federal regulation can-

not tolerate inconsistent, idiosyncratic rulings from juries

who pay no allegiance whatever to the federal goal of

integrated planning for safety. The two very different

systems of safety regulation cannot co-exist because they

19

speak to fundamentally different goals. Only preemption

assures that the broad-based goal of the OSHA scheme is

given supremacy.

The Fourth Criterion for Federal Preemption:

Express Federal Statutory Limitations on State

Regulation

It is not always clear from the structure of a federal

statute how pervasive the control of the federal regula-

tory agency is to be in the face of state attempts to

regulate. Ultimately, the question that must be confronted

is whether the statutory scheme gives evidence of some

accommodation of state efforts to provide alternate regu-

lation. OSHA is quite explicit regarding to the degree of

accommodation that the Act contemplates. Sec. 18(b) and

(c) of the Act provide:

(b) Any State which, at any time, desires

to assume responsibility for development and

enforcement therein of occupational safety and

health standards relating to any occupational

safety or health issue with respect to which a

Federal standard has been promulgated under

section 6 shall submit a State plan for the devel-

opment of such standards and their enforce-

ment.

(c) The Secretary shall approve the plan

submitted by a State under subsection (b), or

any modification thereof, if such plan in his

judgment -

(1) designates a State agency or agencies

as the agency or agencies responsible for

administering the plan throughout the

State,

(2) provides for the development and

enforcement of safety and health standards

relating to one or more safety or health

issues, which standards (and the enforce-

ment of which standards) are or will be at

20

least as effective in providing safe and

healthful employment and places of

employment as the standards promulgated

under section 6 which relate to the same

issues, and which standards, when applica-

ble to products which are distributed or

used in interstate commerce, are required

by compelling local conditions and do not

unduly burden interstate commerce,

(3) provides for a right of entry and

inspection of all workplaces subject to the

Act which is at least as effective as that

provided in section 8, and includes a prohi-

bition on advance notice of inspections,

(4) contains satisfactory assurances that

such agency or agencies have or will have

the legal authority and qualified personnel

necessary for the enforcement of such stan-

dards,

(5) gives satisfactory assurances that such

State will devote adequate funds to the

administration and enforcement of such

stands, .. . 29 U.S.C. §667(b) and (c).

Nothing could be clearer. If a state were to directly seek

to provide alternative standards, indeed even more rig-

orous standards, it would not be permitted to do so

unless the Secretary of Labor determined that the admin-

istrative mechanism to monitor compliance and enforce

such alternative standards were available at the state

level. The irony is that when a court allows a tort system

of regulation to induce employer changes of occupational

health and safety standards, such misguided deference to

state tort standards are not subject to any federal monitor-

ing or control. State tort law simply esmasculates the

clear OSHA statutory scheme.

21

a

D. The OSHA Savings Clause Can and Must be

Construed so as not to Permit the Tort Action in

this Case

Given the strength of the foregoing arguments

applied to the facts of this case, it is hardly surprising

that the opinion of the Court of Appeals rejecting pre-

emption relies almost exclusively on the explicit language

of the savings clause in the OSHA Act. 29 U.S.C.

§653(b)(4) provides:

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to super-

sede or in any manner affect any workmen’s

compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or

affect in any other manner the common law or

Statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of

employers and employees under any law with

respect to injuries, diseases, or death of

employees arising out of, or in the course of,

employment.

As previously discussed, Courts of Appeals have

construed similar language in other federal safety stat-

utes so as not to permit tort actions of the sort involved in

this case. What did the Congress intend to include in this

savings clause? Clearly workers’ compensation rights are

preserved. But what meaning should attach to “the com-

mon law ... rights . . . of employers and employees

under any law with respect to injuries . . . arising out

of ... employment.”? Consistent with Petitioner’s anal-

ysis of the only sensible interface between OSHA stan-

dards and state regulation via tort, the drafters must have

intended to preserve any and all rights the preservation

of which would not interfere with OSHA’s charge to

establish national workplace safety standards. Being a no-

fault compensation system, worker compensation does

not interfere with OSHA standards. Indeed, worker com-

pensation actually assists OSHA as it bars the sorts of

negligence-based tort claims by employees against

employers that would interfere with OSHA’s objectives

22

What about tort actions against third persons? Again,

it should depend on the extent to which recognizing such

claims would compromise the integrity of OSHA stan-

dards. If a third person entered the workplace and

attacked an employee with a knife, the savings clause in

OSHA would preserve the ensuing tort claim against the

attacker because that tort claim would not implicate

OSHA standards. What about products liability actions

against manufacturers and distributors for injuries con-

nected with workplace use and consumption of allegedly

defective products? Here, too, the answer depends on the

extent to which such actions interfere with OSHA regula-

tions. Actions based on manufacturing defects would not

interfere, and therefore should be saved by the savings

clause. Recovery for manufacturing defects in no way

implicates the sorts of design and warnings issues that

OSHA standards address. As earlier portions of this Peti-

tion have explained, the tort action in this case directly

conflicts with federal standards. Congress could not have

intended the prosecution of such tort actions.

Decisions by this Court and the Courts of Appeals

make clear that the foregoing approach to OSHA’s

broadly drafted savings clause - an approach that

allowed manufacturing defect actions but bars actions for

defective design and failure to warn when such actions

contradict OSHA safety standards - is the only approach

consistent with the intent of Congress. See, Boyle v. United

Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 108 S.Ct. 2510, 101

L.Ed.2d 442 (1988). The issue in Boyle was whether a

contractor who builds military equipment to special gov-

ernment specifications and sells such equipment to the

Federal Government can be held liable under state tort

law for injury caused to military personnel by an alleged

design defect in the equipment. The Court of Appeals in

Boyle had denied the contractor’s liability because it

would eventually cause the liability costs to be passed on

23

to the federal government in the form of higher equip-

ment prices, in violation of a long line of decisions under

the Federal Tort Claims Act preventing military person-

nel from directly imposing such costs on the government

via direct tort actions for service-related injuries.

Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Boyle rejected this

reasoning because it was both too broad - it would deny

liability even when the equipment was not tailor-made to

the government’s specifications — and also too narrow - it

would allow private citizens to sue contractors in tort

even when the product that caused their injuries was

tailor-made for the government. The majority opinion

explained (487 U.S. at 511-512):

There is, however, a statutory provision that

demonstrates the potential for, and suggests the

outlines of, “significant conflict” between fed-

eral interests and state law in the context of

government procurement. In the Federal Tort

Claims Act (FTCA), Congress authorized dam-

ages to be recovered against the United States

for harm caused by negligent or wrongful con-

duct of Government employees, to the extent

that a private person would be liable under the

law of the place where the conduct occurred. 28

U.S.C. §1346(b). It excepted from this consent to

suit, however,

[aJny claim . . . based upon the exercise or

performance or the failure to exercise or

perform a discretionary function or duty on

the part of a federal agency or an employee

of the Government, whether or not the dis-

cretion involved be abused.

28 U.S.C. §2680(a).

We think that the selection of the appropriate

design for military equipment to be used by our

Armed forces is assuredly a discretionary func-

tion within the meaning of this provision. It

24

often involves not merely engineering analysis

but judgment as to the balancing of many tech-

nical, military, and even sociai considerations,

including specifically the trade-off between

greater safety and greater combat effectiveness.

* * *

In sum, we are of the view that state law which

holds Government contractors liable for design

defects in military equipment does in some cir-

cumstances present a “significant conflict” with

federal policy and must be displaced.

The parallel between this Court’s reasoning in Boyle

and Petitioner’s suggested approach to the OSHA savings

clause could not be closer. To be sure, Boyle involved the

government contractor defense and this case involves the

savings clause in OSHA. But both cases present the iden-

tical issue: whether state tort actions that interfere with

the exercise of discretion by a federal agency should be

allowed to be brought.

Moreover, Boyle involved allegations under state law

of defective product design whereas this case involves

allegations of failure to warn. But once again this is a

difference of no relevance. OSHA exercises discretion to

no less extent when it mandates specific warnings than

when it mandates designs. Moreover, the tort claim in

this case would pressure the employer to reject safety

equipment approved under relevant OSHA regulations.

The implications of this Court's decision in Boyle are

inescapable. To allow tort actions to be brought under

state law against product manufacturers and distributors

on the basis that the product designs and modes of mar-

keting are defective, notwithstanding that they conforin

to detailed, precise OSHA standards would, in the words

of this Court’s majority opinion in Boyle, interfere with

the “discretionary function” of OSHA in selecting the

appropriate product designs and warnings in the work-

place. Clearly OSHA could not be sued for its exercise of

25

its governmental authority. See, Dalehite v. United States,

344 U.S. 873, 73 S.Ct. 166, 97 L.Ed. 676 (1952). It follows

that the savings clause must not be construed to allow a

suit against a manufacturer whose customer complied

with that governmental decision.

Ironically, another decision supporting this sensible,

functional interpretation of the OSHA savings clause is

Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1988).

In Wood, the issue was whether federal auto safety regu-

lations preempted state law tort claims that a motor vehi-

cle design was defective because it lacked airbags. The

savings clause in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle

Safety Act of 1966 is broader and more all-encompassing

than the OSHA savings clause involved in the instant

case:

Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle

safety standard issued under this subchapter

does not exempt any person from any liability

under common law. 15 U.S.C. §1397(c).

Notwithstanding the breadth of this savings clause lan-

guage, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that

— in light of the fact that product design claims were not

so frequently brought in 1966 when the Safety Act was

enacted, and given the degree to which a design claim

under state law would interfere with federal safety regu-

lation of auto designs, Congress could not have intended

to allow design-based state tort actions that conflict with

federal safety standards.

The very same conclusion is required in the instant

case involving the OSHA savings clause. When OSHA

was enacted into law in 1970, product design and warn-

ing litigation was in its infancy. See Henderson, Judicial

Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design Choices: The

Limits of Adjudication, 73 Colum. L.Rev. 1531, 1546 (1973).

Congress could not have consciously intended to pre-

serve state design and warning claims directly interfering

with OSHA design and warnings standards. Claims

26

based on manufacturing defects are saved, as they are

under the auto design Safety Act, because they were

common (and thus presumably well understood by Con-

gress) in the 1960's and early 1970’s and do not interfere

with relevant federal design and warning regulations. But

state tort actions based on design and warning drastically

interfere with federal design and warning regulations.

Savings clauses must be construed to protect such federal

design and warning regulations against the potentially

devastating effects of inconsistent tort litigation under

state law. The Petitioner finds it nothing short of incredi-

ble that the First Circuit, which decided Wood in such a

functionally sensible manner, could have decided the

instant case so woodenly and nonsensibly. The Court

must grant this Petition and set things right.

E. The First Circuit’s Wooden Construction of the

OSHA Savings Clause is so Patently in Error

that Wasteful Confusion is Certain to Reign

without Clarification from this Court

How could the First Circuit, which decided Wood so

sensibly, have gotten this case so wrong? Careful exam-

ination of the opinion reveals that the First Circuit looked

at decisions recognizing an employee’s rights to bring

tort actions against his employer on legal bases that in no

way implicated the efficacy of OSHA safety standards,

and then leaped all the way to the conclusion that any

and all tort actions against any and all defendants - even

actions that grossly interfere with OSHA standards - are

explicitly saved by the OSHA savings clause. The Court

of Appeals made this leap without engaging in any func-

tional analysis whatever, relying on misinterpretations

and misapplications of caselaw.

The First Circuit relies heavily on National Solid

Wastes Management, Assn. v. Killian, 918 F.2d 671, 680 n.9

(collecting cases) (7th Cir. 1990) for the proposition that

all rights in tort are saved from preemption; but that case

—

27

and all of the other cases collected in its note 9 were

actions against employers, either regulatory, criminal or

in tort; or by ex-employees, for wrongful discharge. Not a

single decision relied on by the First Circuit carried the

slightest negative implication for OSHA safety regula-

tions. The First Circuit also relies on a quote out of

context from People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 534

N.E.2d 962, 968 (Ill. 1989), to the effect that tort claims are

preserved by the OSHA savings clause. But that case

involved a criminal action against an employer on

grounds having nothing to do with OSHA standards.

Moreover, the court in Chicago Magnet clearly intended its

use of “tort law” to be synonymous with “tort claims

against the employer;” it justified the employer’s criminal

liability by analogizing to the employer’s liability for

punitive damages in tort, which liability the court

assumed was preserved by the savings clause.

Notwithstanding the First Circuit’s attempt in its

opinion, below, to create an impression to the contrary,

not one single court or commentator agrees with its

bizarre conclusion that the savings clause in OSHA pre

serves an employee’s right to sue for a manufacturer’s

failure to warn even when the state tort standard is flatly

inconsistent with an existing OSHA standard. The court

below has taken an enormous leap from decisions con

doning state wrongful discharge actions by ex:

employees, which do not implicate federal workplace

standards, to condoning state products liability actions

for design and warning, which do most drastically under

mine federal efforts to regulate safety in the workplace

We have demonstrated that such products liability

actions clearly undermine the intended uniformity of

OSHA’s workplace safety standards, and cannot have

been intended by Congress to be preserved in OSHA’s

savings clause.

28

3. FEDERAL PREEMPTION IN THE AREA OF PROD-

UCTS LIABILITY PRESENTS ISSUES OF

NATIONAL IMPORTANCE WHICH, WITHOUT

GUIDANCE FROM THIS COURT, ARE CREATING

WASTEFUL CONFUSION BOTH IN COURTS AND

IN PRODUCTS MARKETS

The Court must understand the enormous moment of

this decision and why it is imperative that certiorari be

granted. One cannot fully estimate the impact of a find-

ing of non-preemption without understanding how open-

ended and unstructured the world of common law prod-

ucts liability has come to be. See Huber, Liability: The

Legal Revolution and Its Consequences (1988); Henderson &

Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty

Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 265 (1990).

It is by now abundantly obvious to most observers

that expansionary trends in American products liability

law have gone beyond the point where they serve useful

social purposes and are, instead, threatening the contin-

ued viability of markets not only for products but for

insurance as well. See Epstein, Products Liability as an

Insurance Market, 14 J.Legal Stud. 645 (1985); Priest, The

Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L.].

1521 (1987). In its infancy, products liability focused

almost exclusively on injuries caused by manufacturing

defects — the few individual units among the many ina

product line that deviate dangerously from the manufac-

turer’s intended design specifications. See Henderson,

Judicial Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design Choices:

The Limits of Adjudication, 73 Colum.L.Rev. 1531,

1544-1546 (1973). Manufacturing defects and the harms

they cause are predictable and insurable.

Moreover, it is difficult to criticize the development

in the 1970’s and early 1980's of judicial review of the

reasonableness of manufacturers’ decisions regarding

how to design and market their products. But somewhere

along the way judicial review of product designs and

29

failures to warn got out of hand. See Henderson &

Twerski, Docirinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty

Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 265 (1990);

Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and Stan-

dards in Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict

Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 521 (1982).

Various states have imposed different standards for prod-

uct design liability, confronting manufacturers with a

patchwork quilt of state regulation via tort with which no

manufacturer could hope to manage except by large

investments in liability insurance which, under the cur-

rent conditions of chaos, is frequently unavailable. See

Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability (1991).

Petitioner has explained in earlier portions of its

argument how preemption insulates federal safety regu

lation from the erosive effects of state tort law sending

inconsistent, contradictory signals to regulated busi

nesses. It gives federal regulations breathing room to

achieve the consistency and nat’on-wide uniformity

sought by federal safety regulation. Petitioner now

emphasizes another salutory effect of preemption: it

replaces haphazard, herky-jerky retrospective state tort

law with coherent, uniform, stable and prospective fed-

eral standards by which to regulate the design and mar

keting of products. In large measure, the problems

associated with excessive, Overexpanded products lia

bility law are national problems, solvable only at the

federal level. When justified, a judicial holding that fed

eral safety regulations preempt state tort law supplies a

meaningful solution to an otherwise intractable national

problem.

30

XI. CONCLUSION

Petitioner believes that this court should issue a writ

of certiorari to review this decision of the First Circuit.

Petitioner reiterates that this decision conflicts with pre-

emption rulings of this Court, other Courts of Appeal,

and previous decisions of the First Circuit. Moreover, this

is a statutory interpretation issue of significant national

importance which needs clarification by this Court.

James A. HENDERSON, JR.

Frank B. Ingersoll

Professor of Law

Cornell Law School

Ithaca, New York 14853

(607) 255-2303

AARON D. TWwerski

Professor of Law

Brooklyn Law School

250 Joralemon Street

Brooklyn, New York 11201

(718) 780-7999

Counsel for Petitioner

Shell Oil Company

Respectfully submitted,

Burt BALLANFANT

Shell Oil Company

4856 One Shell Plaza

P. O. Box 2463

Houston, Texas 77252-2463

(713) 241-7023

Ropert L. LEONARD

Donirty, WALLACE,

Pitispury & Murpny

One Monarch Place

1414 Main Street,

Floor

Springfield, MA 01144-1002

(413) 733-3111

19th

App. 1

APPENDIX 1

Cruz PEDRAZA, Alejandrina Pedraza, Roberto Pedraza

and Mary Ellen Pedraza, Plaintiffs, Appellees,

v.

SHELL OIL COMPANY, Defendant, Appellant.

Cruz PEDRAZA, Alejandrina Pedraza, Roberto

Pedraza and Mary Ellen Pedraza, Plaintiffs,

Appellants,

v.

SHELL OIL CO., Defendant, Appellee.

Nos. 90-1291, 90-1402.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit

Heard Sept. 14, 1990

Decided Aug. 13, 1991

Worker filed action against chemical manufacturer to

recover damages for injuries arising from respiratory ail

ments he allegedly developed from workplace exposure

to Epichiorohydrin (ECH), a toxic chemical. The United

States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, 729

F.Supp. 187, Frank H. Freedman, Chief Judge, dismissed

on preemption grounds, and worker appealed. The Court

of Appeals, Cyr, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) Occupational

Safety and Health Act (OSHA) did not preempt state law

tort provisions like those invoked by the plaintiff, and (2)

court would not exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction

over otherwise nonappealable orders.

Vacated and remanded

App. 2

John B. Stewart, with whom Edward V. Leja and

Moriarty, Donoghue & Leja, P.A., Springfield, Mass., were

on brief, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Burt Ballanfant, Houston, Tex., with whom Robert L.

Leonard and Doherty, Wallace, Pillsbury & Murphy,

Springfield, Mass., were on brief, for defendant-appel-

lant.

Before TORRUELLA and CYR, Circuit Judges, and

BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.

CYR, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Cruz Pedraza commenced a civil action in

the United States District Court for the District of Massa-

chusetts, alleging that he developed respiratory ailments

from workplace exposure to Epichlorohydrin (“ECH”), a

toxic chemical manufactured by defendant Shell Oil Co.

(“Shell”). The district court dismissed the action on the

ground that the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29

U.S.C. § 655 et seq. (“OSHA”), preempts state law. Ped-

raza appeals. Shell cross-appeals a district court order

disallowing Shell’s motion for summary judgment under

the applicable statute of limitations. We vacate the order

of dismissal, dismiss the cross-appeal, and remand for

further proceedings.

I

BACKGROUND

The material facts are not in dispute. From 1972

through 1981, Pedraza was employed by United Technol-

ogies Corporation in Rocky Hill, Connecticut. During

1977, he was assigned to a chemical mixing operation

App. 3

which exposed him to ECH. Within a few weeks Pedraza

experienced asthma symptoms for the first time.

Although Pedraza was reassigned in late 1977 to work

duties which did not entail ECH exposure, over the

course of the next several years he continued to experi-

ence acute asthma symptoms.

On November 4, 1985, Pedraza brought the present

diversity action, asserting an assortment of tort and war-

ranty claims predicated on Connecticut law. Following

discovery, defendant Shell moved for summary judgment

on the ground that Pedraza’s claims were time-barred

and, alternatively, that Shell had discharged its duty to

warn under the so-called “sophisticated user” defense. A

United States magistrate judge recommended denial of

summary judgment. Shell objected to the recommended

disposition and argued, additionally, that OSHA and the

reiated regulations promulgated by the Occupational

Safety and Health Administration preempt Connecticut

law. The district court directed entry of summary judg-

ment for Shell on the preemption ground.

I]

DISCUSSION

A. Pedraza’s Appeal

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo,

employing the same standards utilized by the trial court.

See Siegal v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 921 F.2d 15, 17

(Ist Cir. 1990); Petitti v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 909

F.2d 28, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1990). Thus, in the present appeal

we consider a pure issue of law: whether OSHA preempts

State law.

App. 4

The district court correctly observed that OSHA reg-

ulations establish federal restrictions on workplace expo-

sure to ECH! and require employers to provide protective

equipment for employees who work with hazardous sub-

stances.2 The court concluded that the provisions of Con-

necticut common law and statutory law on which

Pedraza’s causes of action against Shell are predicated

constitute state regulation in the field of occupational

safety and health which must yield to OSHA. Pedraza v.

Shell Oil Co., 729 F.Supp. 187, 188-89 (D.Mass.1990).3

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitu-

tion operates to preempt state laws which unduly inter-

fere with federal law or policy. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.

See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211, 6 L.Ed.

23, 73 (1824); Securities Industry Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d

1114 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 110 S.Ct.

2559, 109 L.Ed.2d 742 (1990). As we were reminded again

recently, however, our preemption analysis begins with

“ “the assumption that the historic police powers of the

States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act

unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Con-

gress.’ ” Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, ___ U.S. __,

111 S.Ct. 2476, 115 L.Ed.2d 532 (1991) (quoting Rice v.

Santa Fe Elevator Co., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152,

91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947)). The tort rules and kindred state law

1 See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000, Table Z-1.

2 See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.132, 1910.133, 1910.134.

3 The court did not address 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4), the

“savings clause.” See text at p. 53 infra.

x App. 5

provisions invoked by Pedraza are well within Connecti-

cut’s “traditional authority to provide tort remedies to

[its] citizens. ... ” Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S.

238, 248, 104 S.Ct. 615, 621, 78 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984); see also

International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 503, 107

S.Ct. 805, 817, 93 L.Ed.2d 883 (1987). Consequently, we

will not find federal preemption in the present case

unless there is “an unambiguous congressional mandate

to that effect.” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,

373 U.S. 132, 146, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1219, 10 L.Ed.2d 248

(1963). See also Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical

Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 2376, 85

L.Ed.2d 714 (1985); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,

525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977).

Preemption “always boils down to a matter of con-

gressional intent.” Connolly, 883 F.2d at 1115. See also

Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369,

106 S.Ct. 1890, 1899, 90 L.Ed.2d 369 (1986) (“The critical

question in any preemption analysis is always whether

Congress intended that federal regulation supersede state

law.”); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S.

724, 747, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 2393, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985) (“in

any pre-emption analysis, ‘[t]he purpose of Congress is

the ultimate touchstone.’ ”) (citations omitted); Associated

Industries of Massachusetts v. Snow, 898 F.2d 274, 278 (1st

Cir.1990) (same). The task of interpretation is simplified

substantially, of course, whenever “Congress has made its

intent known through explicit statutory language.”

English v. General Electric Co., _. U.S. __, 110 S.Ct. 2270,

2275, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990).

App. 6

Absent express preemption, the challenged state law

must yield when it

regulates conduct in a field that Congress

intended the Federal Government to occupy

exclusively. Such an intent may be inferred from

a ‘scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive

as to make reasonable the inference that Con-

gress left no room for the States to supplement

it,, or where an Act of Congress ‘touch[es] a

field in which the federal interest is so dominant

that the federal system will be assumed to pre-

clude enforcement of state laws on the same

subject.’

English, 110 S.Ct. at 2275 (citations omitted). Finally, pre-

emption will be inferred where the state law “actually

conflicts with federal law.” Id. Such a conflict arises

where it is physically impossible to comply with both the

federal and the state law or where “state law ‘stands as

an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the

full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ” Id. (citation

omitted). See also International Paper Co., 479 U.S. at

491-92, 107 S.Ct. at 811; Louisiana Public Service Comm'n,

476 US. at 368-69, 106 S.Ct. at 1898-99; Hillsborough

County, 471 U.S. at 713, 105 S.Ct. at 2375.

Shell contends that OSHA preempts all the state-

created rights and remedies underpinning Pedraza’s

claims, since the adjudication of private rights arising

under state law would result in the imposition of pro-

spective normative constraints on the manufacture and

distribution of ECH. We address Shell’s preemption claim

by first examining in context the language of the OSHA

preemption provisions. A sound statutory interpretation

must encompass the relevant text as well as the structure

App. 7

444

and context of the enactment. We will ” ‘not be guided by

a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the

provisions of the whole law. ...’” Philbrook v. Glodgett,

421 U.S. 707, 713, 95 S.Ct. 1893, 1898, 44 L.Ed.2d 525

(1975) (quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. (8

How.) 113, 122, 12 L.Ed. 1009 (1849)). See also Richards v.

United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11, 82 S.Ct. 585, 591-92, 7 L.Ed.2d

492 (1962) (“a section of a statute should not be read in

isolation from the context of the whole Act.”).

The scope of OSHA preemption is outlined in two

sections: (i) section 18,4 which represents a general state-

ment of preemptive intent, and (ii) section 4(b)(4), the

a7

“savings clause,” which excepts from preemption a spec-

trum of state laws

4 OSHA § 18 provides as follows:

(a) Nothing in this Act shall prevent any State

agency or court from asserting jurisdiction under

State law over any occupational safety or health

issue with respect to which no standard is in effect

under section 655 of this title. (b) Any State which, at

any time, desires to assume responsibility for devel-

opment and enforcement therein of occupational

safety and health standards relating to any occupa-

tional safety or health issue with respect to which a

Federal standard has been promulgated under sec-

tion 655 of this title shall submit a State plan for the

development of such standards and their enforce-

ment.

29 U.S.C. § 667(a), (b) (1982).

App. 8

(i) Section 18

At its outer reaches section 18 preemption does not

obtain unless there is an unapproved assertion of “juris-

diction under State law over any occupational safety or

health issue” as to which a federal “standard” is already

in place. See 29 C.F.R. 1901.2 (“Section 18(a) of the Act is

read as preventing any State agency or court from assert-

ing jurisdiction under State law over any occupational

safety or health issue with respect to which a Federal

standard has been issued under section 6 of the Act.”)

(emphasis added); Associated Industries of Massachusetts,

898 F.2d at 278 (Section 18 “provides that if a federal

standard on an occupational safety or health issue is in

effect, a state cannot promulgate an occupational safety

or health standard relating to that issue, unless it first

submits the state plan to OSHA for approval.”). See also

Puffer’s Hardware Inc. v. Donovan, 742 F.2d 12, 16 (1st

Cir.1984); National Solid Wastes Management Ass‘n v.

Killian, 918 F.2d 671, 677-78 (7th Cir.1990).

Section 3 in turn defines an occupational safety and

health “standard” as one which “requires conditions, or

the adoption or use of one or more practices, means

methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary

Or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment

and places of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1982); see

also People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 126 Ill.2d 356, 128

Ill.Dec. 517, 520, 534 N.E.2d 962, 965 (§ 18 precludes “a

State’s development and enforcement of ‘occupational

health and safety standards.’ ”) (discussing OSHA pre-

emption of State criminal laws) (citations omitted), cert.

denied, __ U.S. __, 110 S.Ct. 52, 107 L.Ed.2d 21 (1989).

Thus, it is not surprising that substantial authority exists

App. 9

for the view that section 18 preempts the unapproved

establishment of state standards and regulatory schemes

in competition with OSHA, see, e.g., Environmental Encap-

sulating Corp. v. City of New York, 855 F.2d 48, 55 (2d

Cir.1988); New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey,

774 F.2d 587, 592-93 (3d Cir.1985), appeal after remand, 868

F.2d 621 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 920, 109 S.Ct. 3246,

106 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989), but that there is no authority for

the view that OSHA preempts provisions of state law of

the sort relied on by Pedraza.

We are aware of no case which holds that OSHA

preempts state tort law. Rather, most courts have been

concerned with how OSHA affects tort actions, not with

whether it preempts state tort law. Thus, every court

faced with the issue has held that OSHA creates no

private right of action. See, e.g., Pratico v. Portland Terminal

Co., 783 F.2d 255, 266 (1st Cir.1985) (“The legislative his-

tory of § 653(b)(4) shows that the intent of the provision

was merely to ensure that OSHA was not read to create a

private right of action for injured workers which would

allow them to bypass the otherwise exclusive remedy of

workers’ compensation.”). We have embraced the major

ity view that the regulations promulgated under OSHA

prescribe standards of care relevant in common law negli-

gence actions. Id. at 263-65; see also Albrecht v. Baltimore &

Ohio R.R. Co., 808 F.2d 329, 332 (4th Cir.1987); but see

Minichello v. U.S. Industries, Inc., 756 F.2d 26, 29 (6th

Cir.1985) (“To use OSHA regulations to establish whether

a product is unreasonably dangerous is . . . improper.”)

(product liability action brought by employer against

product supplier)

App. 10

While we discern in OSHA’s language, structure and

context a clear congressional signal that section 18 pre-

empts unapproved assertions of state jurisdiction in the

development and enforcement of standards relating to

occupation health and safety issues in competition with

federal standards, we find no warrant whatever for an

interpretation which would preempt enforcement in the

workplace of private rights and remedies traditionally

afforded by state laws of general application.> Connecti-

cut’s accustomed maintenance of judicial fora for the

enforcement of private rights in the workplace, under

State laws of general application, seems to us a function

> The great majority of courts which have considered the

issue holds that state criminal laws of general application are

not preempted by OSHA, despite their normative impact. See

National Solid Wastes Management Ass’n, 918 F.2d at 680 n. 9

(collecting cases). The New York Court of Appeals, for

instance, recently ruled that OSHA does not so occupy the

occupational health and safety field as to preempt by implica-

tion enforcement in the workplace of State criminal laws of

general application. People v. Pymm, 76 N.Y.2d 511, 561

N.Y.S.2d 687, 691, 563 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1990) (relying on OSHA

§§ 4(b)(4) and 18), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 111 S.Ct. 958, 112

L.Ed.2d 1046 (1991). The court reasoned that State criminal

laws of general application are “expost, reactive measures,

focusing on conduct after an injury has occurred,” and do not

fit within the definition of “standard” (viz, “ex ante, prophylac-

tic measures prescribing or proscribing specific practices”). Id.

Likewise, the private rights and remedies implicated by Ped-

raza’s claims against Shell hardly qualify as “standards,”

within the meaning of section 3, since they too are more “ex

post, reactive” than prescriptive or normative. See also National

Solid Wastes Management Ass‘n, 918 F.2d at 680 n. 9 (tort laws

“are not ‘standards’ within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. section

652(8).”).

App. 11

far less prophylactic than reactive; less normative than

compensatory; and less an arrogation of regulatory juris-

diction over an “occupational safety or health issue” than

a neutral forum for the orderly adjustment of private

disputes between, among others, the users and suppliers

of toxic substances.

(ii) Section 4(b)(4)

We are persuaded that Congress, by its enactment of

the “savings clause,” further evinced its intention to

spare these provisions of State law from preemption.

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to super-

sede or in any manner affect any workmen’s

compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or

affect in any other manner the common law or

Statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of

employers and employees under any law with

respect to injuries, diseases, or death of

employees arising out of, or in the course of,

employment.

29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1982) (emphasis added).*There is a

solid consensus that section 4(b)(4) operates to save state

6 We are unpersuaded by Shell’s ejusdem generis argument,

which would render § 4(b)(4) inapposite to the provisions of

Connecticut law on which Pedraza relies. Shell argues that

only those state laws which are in the nature of workers’

compensation laws come within the scope of the savings

clause. Its argument implicitly assumes that though traditional

private rights and remedies between employer and employee

arising under state law are expressly saved from preemption

by § 4(b)(4), those private rights and remedies which have a

much less direct connection with the workplace were meant,

(Continued on following page)

App. 12

tort rules from preemption. See, e.g., National Solid Wastes

Management Ass‘n, 918 F.2d at 680 n.9 (collecting cases).

See also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety Comm'n,

430 U.S. 442, 445, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 1264, 51 L.Ed.2d 464

(1976) (noting that OSHA establishes a new statutory

duty on the part of employers and creates new remedies;

and stating: “Each remedy exists whether or not an

(Continued from previous page)

for some unarticulated reason, to be preempted. We are unable

either to ascribe a plausible reason for such a result or to

discern such a congressional intent. Having seen no reason to

preempt existing state law rights and remedies between

employer and employee — the principal participants in the

workplace, and the only parties whose relationship is regulated

by OSHA, McKinnon v. Skil Corp., 638 F.2d 270, 275 (1st

Cir.1981) (OSHA's “terms apply only to employers”) (citation

omitted) —~ Congress almost certainly did not intend to pre-

empt, sub silentio, the right of an employee to bring an action

for damages against a third-party supplier of products used in

the workplace. See infra note 7. We would be very reluctant to

infer preemptive intent absent some indication that the state

law could have a significant adverse regulatory impact on

OSHA’s mission in the workplace.

Section 4(b)(4) plainly expresses Congress’ intention to

preserve workers’ compensation laws and the rights and

duties of employers and employees under state laws relating to

injuries, disease or death arising in the course of employment.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding that Connecticut statutory law

preserves Pedraza’s right to sue Shell in these circumstances,

see Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 31-2939(a), under Shell’s view Ped-

raza’s right to seek private redress for workplace injury or

disease allegedly caused by the employer’s ECH supplier

would be preempted. Shell cannot insist simultaneously that

§ 4(b)(4)'s reference to workers’ compensation laws modifies

the scope of the savings clause and does so more restrictively

than the workers’ compensation law itself.

App. 1 3

employee is actually injured or killed as a result of the

[unsafe or unhealthful] condition, and existing state stat

utory and common-law remedies for actual injury and

death remain unaffected.” (dictum)); Chicago Magnet Wire

Corp., 128 Ill.Dec. at 523, 534 N.E.2d at 968 (“Congress

expressly stated that OSHA was not intended to preempt

two bases of liability that, like criminal law, operate to

regulate workplace conduct and implicitly set safety stan

dards-State worker’s compensation and tort law.”) (crimi

nal laws).” See generally, Note, The Extent of OSHA

Preemption of State Hazard Reporting Requirements, 88

Colum.L.Rev. 630, 641 (1988)(§ 4(b)(4) reveals “Congress’

explicit recognition of the continued validity of state

Although OSHA prescribes various criminal and civil

penalties against employers who violate either the regulations

or the genera! duty to provide a safe workplace, see id. § 6664

(1982), the overriding purpose of OSHA 1s to prevent workplace

injuries, not to impose penalties on employers who fail to

provide their employees with safe working conditions. See

Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 12, 100 S.Ct. 883, 890, 63

L.Ed.2d 154 (1980) (OSHA “is prophylactic in nature. The Act

does not wait for an employee to die or become injured. It

authorized the promulgation of health and safety stan

dards in the hope that these will act to prevent deaths or

Injuries from ever occurring.”) (citations omitted)

[t lS noteworthy asd wel] that OSHA provides no replace

ment remedy for workplace injuries, disease or death caused to

employees by suppliers of products used in the workplace

the Supreme Court has noted, “[ilt is difficult to believe that

4

ongress would, without comment, remove all means of judi

cla! recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.” Stlkwood, 464

at 251, 104 S.Ct. at 623

[

App. 14

worker compensation and tort remedies. . . . ”); Note,

Getting away with Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption of

State Criminal Prosecutions for Industrial Accidents, 101

Harv.L.Rev. 535, 543 (1987) (Indeed, section 4(b)(4) saves

from preemption two forms of liability that, like criminal

law, regulate workplace conduct and set implicit stan-

dards-state workers’ compensation and tort law.”).®

Thus, we are unpersuaded that the provisions of

Connecticut law undergirding Pedraza’s claims against

Shell are eclipsed by OSHA.

B. Shell’s Cross-Appeal

Shell cross-appeals the district court order denying

its motion for summary judgment on the ground that

Pedraza’s claims are time-barred and, alternatively, that it

discharged its duty to warn under the so-called “sophisti-

cated user” defense. An order denying summary judg-

ment is not immediately appealable unless it comes

within an exception to the “final judgment” rule. The

United States Supreme Court puts it plainly:

5’ What little legislative history we have discovered leaves

even less doubt that § 4(b)(4) evinces a congressional intent to

preserve state tort law from preemption. In a letter to the

Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Labor, the Solicitor of

Labor explained that OSHA “would in no way affect the pre-

sent status of the law with regard to workmen’s compensation

legislation or private tort actions.” Pratico, 783 F.2d at 266 (quot-

ing Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1969: Hearings on

H.R. 843, H.R. 3809, H.R. 4294, and H.R. 13373 before Select

Subcomm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., Pt. 2,

at 1592-93 (letter of L.H. Silberman, Solicitor of Labor)

(emphasis added)).

App. 15

We hold that a district court’s order denying a

motion to disqualify counsel is not appealable

under § 1291 prior to final judgment in the

underlying litigation. Insofar as the Eighth Cir-

cuit reached this conclusion, its decision is cor-

rect. But because its decision was contrary to

precedent in the Circuit the court went further

and reached the merits of the order appealed

from. This approach, however, overlooks the

fact that the finality requirement embodied in §

1291 is jurisdictional in nature. If the appellate

court finds that the order from which a party

seeks to appeal does not fall within the statute,

its inquiry is over. A court lacks discretion to

consider the merits of a case over which it is

without jurisdiction, and thus, by definition, a

jurisdictional ruling may never be made pro-

spective only. We therefore hold that because

the Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction to

hear the appeal, it was without jurisdiction to

decide the merits.

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379, 101

5.Ct. 669, 676, 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981) (emphasis added)

(footnotes omitted).

* The Seventh Circuit has dealt in similar fashion with an

order denying a motion for summary judgment based on an

affirmative defense.

As to appellant’s contention that the denial of its

motion for summary judgment should be presently

appealable as it constituted a denial of a ‘claim of

right’ founded on the statutory immunity from

indemnification, the obvious reply is that denials of

(Continued on following page)

App. 16

The interlocutory orders challenged on Shell’s cross-

appeal are not within any exception to the final judgment

rule and implicate no issue related to the resolution of the

appeal from the final order granting Shell’s motion for

summary judgment on the preemption ground.!° We

therefore conclude that Shell’s cross-appeal must be dis-

missed.

(Continued from previous page)

summary judgment are interlocutory decrees, not appeal-

able, irrespective of the burden of having to go to

trial. Pacific U. Conference, Etc. v. Marshall, 434 U.S.

1305, 98 S.Ct. 2, 54 L.Ed.2d 17 (1977); United States v.

Florian, 312 U.S. 656, 61 S.Ct. 713, 85 L.Ed. 1105, reh.

denied, 312 U.S. 715, 61 S.Ct. 738, 85 L.Ed. 1145

(1941). There is nothing peculiar in the asserted

‘claim of right’ as compared to every other right

where the denial of summary judgment is not

appealable. Appellant's assertion of the applicability

of the Georgia statute is nothing more than an asser-

tion of an affirmative defense whose denial is also

not appealable. Smith v. Benedict, 279 F.2d 211 (7th

Cir.1960); County of Hennepin v. Aetna Gas & Sur. Co.,

587 F.2d 945 (8th Cir.1978).

Freeman v. Kohl & Vick Machine Works, Inc., 673 F.2d 196, 200

(7th Cir.1982) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).

'0 Thus, even when presented with an interlocutory

appeal from an order denying summary judgment on the

ground of qualified immunity, we have so far refrained from

endorsing any form of pendent appellate jurisdiction over

otherwise nonappealable interlocutory orders. Roque-Rodriguez

v. Lema Moya, 926 F.2d 103, 105 n.2 (1st Cir. 1991) (“To date, this

circuit has refrained from attempting to exercise ‘pendent

appellate jurisdiction over matters beyond those bound up in

the qualified immunity inquiry.’ See Morales v. Ramirez, 906 F.2d

(Continued on following page)

——_

App. 17

The judgment of the district court is vacated and the case

is remanded for further proceedings. Costs are awarded to

plaintiffs-appellants.

(Continued from previous page)

784, 787 n.2 (Ist Cir.1990).”). The “policy against piecemeal

review is preserved” by careful adherence to the “final judg-

ment” rule. See, e.g., Makuc v. American Honda Motor Co., 692

F.2d 172, 173-74 (1st Cir.1982) (per curiam) (declining to review

district court's denial of the rule 54(b) certification of interlocu-

tory order); Roque-Rodriguez, 926 F.2d at 105 (“ ‘Notwithstand-

ing that we have jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified

immunity midstream, [a]ny additional claim presented to and

rejected by the district court must independently satisfy the

collateral-order exception to the final-judgment rule in order

for us to address it on an interlocutory appeal.’ ” Domegan [v.

Fair], 859 F.2d [1059,] 1061-62 [(1st Cir.1988)] quoting Bonitz v.

Fair, 804 F.2d 164, 173 (1st Cir.1986).”); Morales v. Ramirez, 906

F.2d 784, 787 (ist Cir. 1990) (“We have recognized before that,

in certain cases, some aspect of the merits may be ‘inexorably

intertwined with the issue of qualified immunity. Unwin [v.

Campbell], 863 F.2d [124,] 133 n.9 [(ist Cir.1988)].”).

ieee aaa is i

App. 18

APPENDIX 2

Cruz PEDRAZA, et al., Plaintiffs,

Vv.

SHELL OIL COMPANY, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 85-0421-F.

United States District Court,

D. Massachusetts.

Jan. 25, 1990.

Worker who was injured as alleged result of exposure

to epichlorohydrin (ECH) brought products liability

action against defendant on “failure to warn” theory. On

defendant’s motion to dismiss, the District Court, Freed-

man, Chief Judge, held that “failure to warn” claim aris-

ing out of worker’s exposure to ECH was preempted by

federal standards regarding exposure to ECH pro-

mulgated under the Occupational Safety and Health Act

(OSHA).

Motion granted.

Frank R. Saia and Edward V. Leja, Springfield, Mass.,

for plaintiffs.

Burt Ballanfant, Shell Oil Co., Houston, Tex., Robert

Leonard and Barry Ryan, Springfield, Mass., for defen-

dant.

App. 19

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

FREEDMAN, Chief Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is defendant Shell Oil Company’s

(“Shell”) motion that this Court certify an interlocutory

appeal to the First Circuit Court of Appeals on Shell's

argument that plaintiff Cruz Pedraza’s (“Pedraza”) claim

is barred by the statute of limitations. Pedraza has filed

an opposition to Shell’s motion.

Also before the Court is Shell’s motion to dismiss this

lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that any state

law claims of the plaintiff are preempted by explicit fed-

eral health standards. Pedraza opposes the motion to

dismiss, and has asked this Court to either strike Shell’s

motion or defer judgment until trial. As Shell’s motion to

dismiss based on preemption is dispositive, the Court

will turn its attention in that direction first.

Il. PREEMPTION

A. Procedural Background

The first mention of the defendant’s preemption

argument was made in Shell’s objections to United States

Magistrate Ponsor’s recommendation that Shell's earlier

motion for summary judgment be denied. Pedraza v. Shell

Oil Co., C.A. No. 85-0421-F (D.Mass. March 15, 1989).

Before the Magistrate, Shell argued that summary judg-

ment was appropriate because the statute of limitations

had run on the plaintiff, and also that Shell was entitled

to use the “sophisticated user” defense under Connecti-

cut law. In objections subsequently filed in this Court,

eel |

App. 20

Shell claimed that it had also argued that Pedraza’s state

law claims were preempted by specific Occupational

Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”) standards regarding

exposure to epichlorohydrin (“ECH”).

After carefully reviewing Shell’s briefs before the

Magistrate, this Court concluded that preemption had not

been argued below, and held that Shell had waived the

preemption argument by failing to raise it earlier. Pedraza

v. Shell Oil Co., 724 FSupp. 1, 3-4 (D.Mass.1989).

In a separate motion filed December 15, 1989, Shell

agrees that it did not raise the preemption argument

before the Magistrate, and that this Court, sitting in an

appellate capacity, was justified in not addressing it at the

time. However, Shell disputes this Court's ruling that the

preemption argument is waived, arguing instead that

preemption is a question of subject matter jurisdiction,

which cannot be waived. As the plaintiff himself con-

cedes, Shell’s view is accurate. See International Longshore-

men’s Association, AFL-CIO v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 398-399,

106 S.Ct. 1904, 1016, 90 L.Ed.2d 389 (1986) (Alabama

Supreme Court erred in holding that ILA had waived

preemption claim through non-compliance with state

procedural rules). The Court now turns to the substance

of Shell’s preemption argument.

B. OSHA Standards

The gist of Shell’s argument is that the Occupational

Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq., expressly

divests this Court of jurisdiction over state law “failure to

warn” claims by establishing federal standards which

serve to preempt state authority. Upon review of the

App. 21

material submitted by Shell, the Court finds that this

position is well supported.

Article I, § 8, cl. 3 of the United States Constitution

states that “[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o

regulate commerce . ... among the several states.” Where

Congress chooses to exercise its power to regulate com-

merce, conflicting state laws must give way. As the

Supreme Court wrote in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464

U.S. 238, 104 S.Ct. 615, 78 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984),

If Congress evidences an intent to occupy a

given field, any state law falling within that

field is preempted. If Congress has not entirely

displaced state regulation over the matter in

question, state law is still preempted to the

extent that it actually conflicts with federal law,

that is, when it is impossible to comply with

both state and federal law ..., or where state

law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment

of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.

ld. at 248, 104 S.Ct. at 621 (citations omitted)

In this case, it is clear that Congress did intend to

occupy a significant portion of the occupational health

and safety field. This intent can be derived from the

words of the Act itself; 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) provides in

relevant part:

(a) Assertion of State standards in absence of

applicable Federal standards. Nothing in this

chapter shall prevent any State agency or court

from asserting jurisdiction under State law over

any occupational safety or health issue with

respect to which no standard is in effect under

section 6 [29 U.S.C. § 655].

App. 22

See also 29 C.F.R. § 1901.2 (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 667(a)

as preventing State court jurisdiction in the presence of

applicable federal standards). As one court has noted,

section 667(a) “has consistently been interpreted by

OSHA and the courts to bar the exercise of state jurisdic-

tion over issues addressed by the OSHA standard... . ”

N.J. State Chamber of Commerce v. State of N.J., 653 F.Supp.

1453, 1464 (D.N.J.1987).

However, as is also evident from the language of 29

U.S.C. § 667(a), Congress did not intend to wholly sup-

plant state regulation, since allowance is made for any

state law or regulation pertaining to areas for which no

federal standard has been promulgated. See, e.g., Puffer’s

Hardware, Inc. v. Donovan, 742 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir.1984)

(OSHA did not preempt Massachusetts law exempting

certain elevators from state regulation in the absence of

applicable OSHA standard).

Since OSHA only preempts state law to the extent

that there is an applicable federal standard, the question

now before the Court is whether or not the federal gov-

ernment had promulgated standards regarding exposure

to ECH prior to the time of the plaintiff’s exposure.

C. The Federal Government Has Promulgated Epi-

chlorohydrin Exposure Standards

In a table promulgated on June 27, 1974, and

amended on May 28, 1975, the Secretary for the Depart-

ment of Labor set the following exposure limits for ECH;

five (5) parts per million parts of contaminated air, or

nineteen (19) milligrams of particulate per cubic meter of

air. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000, Table Z-1. The Secretary has

App. 23

also laid out comprehensive regulations regarding per-

sonal protective equipment which should be used when

handling hazardous materials. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.132,

1910.133, 1910.134.

The facts illustrate that Pedraza’s exposure to ECH

began at some time during 1977,' by which time the

Secretary had already promulgated the federal standards

regarding exposure to that chemical. As a result, this

Court must now conclude that the plaintiff’s Connecticut

common law claims with respect to Shell’s “failure to

warn” are preempted by the federal action in this area.

Since this Court is sitting solely in diversity as a Connect-

icut state court, it must now conclude that it lacks subject

matter jurisdiction to hear this suit.

Hl. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the defendant Shell’s

motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is

ALLOWED. Having determined that it lacks subject mat-

ter jurisdiction to act in this matter, the Court hereby

concludes that it has no authority to rule on any pending

motions before it. The Clerk of Court is ordered to enter

judgment for the defendant.

It is So Ordered.

' For a full explication of the facts, see this Court’s prior

order. Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 724 F.Supp. 1, 5-6 (D.Mass.1989).

App. 24

APPENDIX 3

‘Cruz PEDRAZA, et al., Plaintiffs,

Vv.

SHELL OIL COMPANY, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 85-0421-F,

United States District Court,

D. Massachusetts.

Nov. 13, 1989.

Chemical manufacturer that had been sued by

worker who claimed that his lungs were permanently

damaged as result of inhaling chemical filed objections to

recommendation of magistrate that its motion for sum-

mary judgment be denied. The District Court, Freedman,

Chief Judge, held that: (1) material fact issue existed with

respect to Massachusetts discovery rule as it related to

statute of limitations defense, and (2) sophisticated user

defense was not available in toxic tort suit governed by

Connecticut law.

Magistrate’s report and recommendation adopted;

motion for summary judgment denied.

Frank R. Saia, Edward V. Leja, Springfield, Mass., for

plaintiffs.

Burt Ballanfant, Shell Oil Co., Houston, Tex., Robert

Leonard, Barry Ryan, Springfield, Mass., for Shell Oil Co.

App. 25

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

FREEDMAN, Chief Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is defendant Shell Oil Company’s

(“Shell”) objections to Magistrate Michael Ponsor’s March 15,

1989 Report and Recommendation that Shell’s motion for

summary judgment be denied. The plaintiff! Cruz Pedraza

(“Pedraza”) disagrees with Shell’s objections, and urges this

Court to adopt the Magistrate’s recommendation. Shell has

filed a response to the plaintiff’s memorandum.

I. BACKGROUND

This is a diversity action, in which Pedraza is claiming

that “his lungs were permanently damaged as a result of

inhaling the chemical epichlorohydrin (‘ECH’) while

employed by defendant United Technologies Corporation,

Power Systems Division (‘U.T.C.’).” Magistrate’s Report and

Recommendation Regarding Defendant Shell Oil Company’s

Motion for Summary Judgment (“Magistrate’s Report”) at 1.

The plaintiff originally filed suit on November 4, 1985

against his employer and two chemical manufacturers, Shell

and Dow Chemical (“Dow”), alleging assorted theories of

negligence, including negligent design, manufacture, and

distribution, as well as strict liability and breach of implied

warranties. Magistrate’s Report at 2. On March 2, 1987, this

Court accepted the Magistrate’s recommendation that U.T.C

' Also plaintiffs in this case are Cruz Pedraza’s wife, Ale-

jandrina, and his two children, Roberto and Mary Ellen. The

Court’s discussion focuses on Mr. Pedraza alone, as the other

plaintiffs’ claims rise and fall on the strength of his cause of action.

App. 26

be dismissed from the case and, on October 5, 1987, that

Dow be dismissed as well, leaving Shell the only defen-

dant in this suit. Magistrate’s Report at 2-3.

Shell’s current motion for summary judgment is in

fact its second attempt to extricate itself from this lawsuit.

The company’s original motion for summary judgment

was dismissed without prejudice by this Court on March

2, 1987. The parties then engaged in extensive further

discovery. Alleging new evidence and new Massachusetts

case law, Shell moved again for summary judgment on

June 24, 1988. As grounds for its motion, Shell made two

separate arguments: 1) that the statute of limitations bars

the plaintiff’s action, and 2) that Pratt and Whitney, the

owner of U.T.C., should be considered a “sophisticated

user” of ECH, thereby relieving Shell of any liability.

Based in part on the facts as he found them in his

February 13, 1987 Report and Recommendation that

Shell’s initial motion be denied, and in part on the addi-

tional facts uncovered during discovery, the Magistrate

again recommends to this Court that Shell’s motion for

summary judgment be denied. For the reasons set forth

below, the Court hereby adopts the Magistrate’s recom-

mendation.

I]. DISCUSSION.

A. Applicable Legal Standards

1. Review of Magistrate Ponsor’s Report and Rec-

ommendation

This matter was referred to the Magistrate for a

report and recommendation pursuant to the provisions of

App. 27

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).2 That section further provides

that “[a] judge of the court shall make a de novo deter-

mination of those portions of the report or specified

proposed findings or recommendations to which objec-

tion is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

In construing the terms of section 636(b)(1), the

Supreme Court has held that a district court need not

hold a de novo hearing in order to satisfy the requirement

of a “de novo determination.” United States v. Raddatz, 447

U.S. 667, 674, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 2411, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980);

see also Giotosa v. United States, 684 F.2d 176, 178-79 (1st

Cir.1982) (a district court need not hold a brand new

hearing to satisfy the de novo standard of review). To

require a brand new hearing, the Supreme Court said,

“would largely frustrate the plain objective of Congress

to alleviate the increasing congestion of litigation in the

district courts. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 676 n. 3, 100 S.Ct. at

2412 n. 3.

Instead, it is sufficient that the district court review

the transcript or tape of the Magistrate’s hearing in suffi-

cient detail to make its own determination with regard to

2 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) provides in relevant part as

follows:

(b)(1) Notwithstanding any provisions of law to the

contrary -

(B) a judge may also designate a magistrate to

conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings,

and to submit to a judge of the court proposed

findings of fact and recommendations for the dispo-

sition, by a judge of the court, of any motion excep-

ted in subparagraph (A)... .

App. 28

each disputed factual finding. See generally Gioiosa, 684

F.2d at 178 and cases cited; see also LoConte v. Dugger, 847

F.2d 745, 750 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, US. __, 109 5.Ct.

397, 102 L.Ed.2d 386 (1988) (“To the extent that the magis-

trate has made findings of fact based upon the testimony

of the witnesses heard before the magistrate, the district

court is obligated to review the transcript or listen to the

tape-recording of those proceedings”).

Shell does not challenge the Magistrate’s findings of

fact per se. Instead, Shell questions the conclusion that the

Magistrate reached based on those facts, in light of the

relevant legal standards discussed below. The First Cir-

cuit has held that the requirement of a “de novo deter-

mination” only applies to the Magistrate’s factual

findings; “issues of a ‘technical, legal’ nature presented to

a magistrate are ‘certainly ... amenable to disposition [by

the district court] by appellate type briefing and argu-

ment.’ ” Giotosa, 684 F.2d at 179, quoting United States v.

Southern Tanks, Inc., 619 F.2d 54, 56 (10th Cir.1980). In

light of the fact that the Magistrate’s purely factual find-

ings are largely unassailed, this Court’s obligation to

review the tape of the hearing is substantially reduced.

Where necessary, however, the Court has independently

examined the documentary evidence in the record upon

which Shell relies.

2. Summary Judgment Standard

Pursuant to the provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), this

Court has an obligation to grant a motion for summary

’

App. 29

judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to inter-

rogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affi-

davits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

material fact... . ”

In order to avoid the imposition of summary judg-

ment, Pedraza must persuade this Court that there is a

dispute about “facts that might affect the outcome of the

suit under the governing law. .. . ” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91

L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In addition, Pedraza must also show

that the dispute about the facts is genuine, that is, that “a

fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on

-the evidence presented.” Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.

in weighing the evidence before it to determine if it is

more than a “scintilla,” id., or “mere allegations,”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), this Court has a duty to ” ‘look at the

record in... the light most favorable to. . . the party

opposing ...the motion’... [and] indulge all inferences

favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Hahn v.

Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir.1975), quoting Poller v.

Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7

L.Ed.2d 458 (1962). “If, after this canvassing of the mate-

rial presented, the district court finds that some genuine

factual issue remains in the case, whose resolution one

way or another could affect its outcome, the court must

deny the motion.” Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864

F.2d 881, 895 (1st Cir.1988) (emphasis in the original).

The standard for granting summary judgment is even

stricter in instances where, as is the case here, the mate-

rial fact in question involves a party’s state of mind.

App. 30

“State of mind is difficult to prove and great circumspec-

tion is required where summary judgment is sought on

an issue involving state of mind.” Hahn, 523 F.2d at 468.

*—B- The Defendant’s Preemption Argument Has Been Waived

As a preliminary matter, the Court addresses Shell's

contention that Occupation Safety and Health Adminis-

tration (“OSHA”) standards for the inhalation exposure

to ECH preempt Connecticut standards, and that accord-

ingly, Pedraza’s common law claims against Shell for

failure to warn are barred. See Shell’s Notice of Appeal

From and Objection to the Report and Recommendation

of the Magistrate at 10-13, and Defendant Shell Oil Com-

pany’s Response to Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum at 1-6.

The plaintiff argues that Shell has waived any preemp-

tion argument, since it did not raise it before the Magis-

trate. Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum to Defendant, Shell

Oil Company’s Objection to Report and Recommendation

of Magistrate Ponsor Re: Shell’s Motion for Summary

Judgment at 1. |

As the First Circuit has said, “[pJarties must take

before the magistrate, ‘not only their “best shot” but all of

their shots.’ ” Borden v. Secretary of Health and Human

Services, 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir.1987), quoting Singh v. Suner-

intending School Committee of the City of Portland, 593

F.Supp. 1315, 1318 (D.Me.1984) (“[flailure to make an

App. 31

argument . . . constitutes its waiver for purposes of fur-

ther appellate review of the Magistrate’s action”).*

The Court has carefully reviewed both of Shell’s

motions for summary judgment, and concludes that the

plaintiff is correct. The Court finds that the defendant did

not raise the issue of preemption before the Magistrate,

and accordingly, has waived the defense. To the extent

that Shell has raised the issue of the impact of various

OSHA standards on this litigation, it has done so in the

context of whether or not Pratt and Whitney had or

should have had express or implied knowledge of the

potential effects of ECH, and not in terms of the preemp-

tive effect such standards might have on the plaintiff's

common law claims.

C. The Statute of Limitations Does Not Bar This Action

1. Statute of Limitations in Product Liability Cases

The crux of Shell’s summary judgment motion is that

Pedraza’s claim is barred by the Massachusetts statute of

limitations, which is made applicable to this dispute by

the principles of diversity jurisdiction. See Guaranty Trust

Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079,

rehearing denied, 326 U.S. 806, 66 S.Ct. 7, 90 L.Ed. 491

3 Shell attempts to evade waiver of this argument by stat-

ing that the First Circuit decision in Wood v. General Motors

Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st Cir.1988), represents “significant mod-

ern analysis” of the effect of the preemption doctrine on com-

mon law tort claims. Regardless of how recently the First

Circuit has visited the issue, however, Shell is still not excused

from its failure to raise the issue in some coherent form before

the Magistrate.

ae

App. 32

(1945); Buckley v. American Honda Motor Company, Inc., 780

F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1985); Hemric v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 739

F.2d 1, 2 (Ist Cir.1984) (regardless of the choice of sub-

stantive law, the court must apply the procedural statute

of limitations of the forum state).

For both Pedraza’s negligence and breach of war-

ranty claims, the statute of limitations is three years. See

Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 260, § 2A4 and Mass.Gen.Laws

Ann. ch. 106, § 2-318,5 respectively. The more difficult

question, and the salient issue in this case, is exactly

when the statute of limitations began to run with respect

to the plaintiff’s claim. Since the statutes themselves do

not state the point at which they begin to run, the fixing

of the inception of the statute of limitations in a given

case is a determination for the Court to make. Olsen v. Bell

Telephone Laboratories, Inc., 388 Mass. 171, 445 N.E.2d 609,

611 (Mass.1983).

4 Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 260, § 2A (1988 supp.) provides

as follows:

Except as otherwise provided, actions of tort, actions

of contract to recover for personal injuries, and

actions of replevin, shall be commenced only within

three years next after the cause of action accrues.

> Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 106, § 2-318 (1988 supp.) pro-

vides in relevant part as follows:

Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall

be no defense in any action brought against the

manufacturer, seller, lessor or supplier of goods to

recover damages for breach of warranty. . . . All

actions under this section shall be commenced with

three years next after the date the injury and damage

occurs.

App. 33

The job of determining when the statute of limita-

tions begins to run is hampered in the case of an “insid-

ious disease” like the one suffered by Pedraza, since the

cause of action against the defendant could be said to

occur on a number of different dates. To resolve the

difficulty, the Massachusetts courts have adopted the

“discovery rule,” under which a cause of action for the

negligent infliction of an insidious disease does not

accrue (and the statute of limitations does not begin to

run) until the plaintiff “knew or should reasonable have

known that he had contracted [the disease] as a result of

the conduct of the defendants.” Id. 445 N.E.2d at 612.

In order to find that the “discovery rule” is applica-

ble to the plaintiff, this Court must be satisfied that the

plaintiff (1) had knowledge of his injury, and (2) that he

had knowledge of its cause - specifically, that he had

knowledge he was harmed as a result of the defendant's

conduct. Fidler v. Eastman Kodak Company, 714 F.2d 192,

In Olsen, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

(“SJC”) suggested the following possibilities:

the date of the defendant's negligent act; the date of

the plaintiff’s first exposure to the product; the date

of the plaintiff’s last exposure to the product; the

date of the first physiological effect on the plaintiff,

whether recognized by the plaintiff or not; the date

of discovery of injury; and the date on which the

plaintiff discovered, or reasonably should have dis-

covered, that he has been harmed as a result of the

defendant’s conduct.

Olsen, 445 N.E.2d at 611. In the same opinion, the SJC rejected

plaintiff's suggestion that a cause of action does not accrue

until such time as the injured party discovers that the injury is

permanent. Id. 445 N.E.2d at 612.

ne

App. 34

198 (1st Cir.1983). However, as the Massachusetts

Appeals Court has noted, “notice of likely cause is ordi-

narily enough to start the statute running.” Lear-Heflich v.

Schwartz, 21 Mass.App.Ct. 928, 930, 485 N.E.2d 692 (1985),

review denied, 396 Mass. 1106, 488 N.E.2d 1179 (1986)

(Table) (quoting Fidler, supra at 199).

Since this suit was filed on November 4, 1985, the

question before this Court is whether or not a reasonable

jury could find that the plaintiff did not know or have

reason to know prior to November 4, 1982 that Shell’s

conduct was the likely cause of his injury.

2. Relevant Facts

A reasonable jury could find the following facts:

In 1969, prior to this employment at U.T.C., Pedraza

underwent chest surgery. Following the surgery itself,

Pedraza also received radiation therapy. Magistrate’s

Report at 5.

The plaintiff began working for U.T.C. sometime in

1972. He suffered no symptoms ef asthma until approx-

imately June 1977, roughly one month after he was

assigned to a new chemical mixing operation at work. Id.

Shortly thereafter, however, the plaintiff began experienc-

ing “symptoms of fatigue, shortness of breach, dizziness,

loss of consciousness, tearing eyes, burning eyelids and

the spitting up of blood.” Id. at 6. It seems clear from the

evidence on the record that Pedraza was aware of the

onset of the symptoms, and noticed that they were exac-

erbated on those days when he was assigned to the

chemical mixing operation. Id.

App. 35

A number of serious asthma attacks culminated in

the plaintiff’s transfer to another work environment in

November 1977. Id. at 7. A workman’s compensation

claim filed by Pedraza’s employer states that the plaintiff

felt that working with chemicals and gases was causing

his asthma. Id.

Following a physical examination of the plaintiff in

January 1978, Dr. Arthur C. DeGraff, Jr., reached the

‘

conclusion that Pedraza’s condition was ” ‘consistent

with hypersensitivity reaction to Epichlorohydrin.’ ” Id.

at 8. DeGraff’s statement was made in a letter to John M.

Young at Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.; however, there is

no indication in the record that DeGraff informed Ped-

raza of his suspicions at that time. Pedraza himself stated

in an affidavit that “I [Pedraza] was not aware until May

of 1983 when Dr. DeGraff sent a letter to my Attorney,

Frank R. Saia, J.D., [sic] that sorted out the causes of my

various complaints.” Affidavit of Cruz Pedraza in Oppo-

sition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on

the Issue of Statute of Limitations, attached as Exhibit 1

to Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment.

The plaintiff’s medical condition was further compli-

cated in 1980 by the development of “mediastinal

lymphadenitis and pericarditis.” Magistrate’s Report at 9.

Pedraza was released from his employment by U.T.C. on

July 6, 1981. Id.

Following his discharge, Pedraza filed a complaint

against U.T.C. with the Connecticut Commission on

Human Rights and Opportunities (“Commission”). Id. In

his complaint, Pedraza alleges that his asthma developed

App. 36

as a result of working with fiberglass materials at U.T.C.,

and noted that he suffered an asthma attack after being

assigned to a chemical mixing station in the plant. Id. The

gist of his complaint against U.T.C. was that the company

failed to accommodate him and his disability. Id. How-

ever, none of the materials submitted by the plaintiff

mention ECH or any product specifically produced by

Shell.

The Commission’s Report, which Pedraza received

by certified mail in May 1982, stated that “[t]here is no

medical proof to substantiate [Pedraza’s] allegation that

his asthma was work connected or responsible for the

continued poor attendance.” Magistrate’s Report at 10.

The plaintiff was hospitalized twice in 1982 due to

his asthma, once in June and once in October. Magis-

trate’s Report at 11. None of the material in the record

indicates that the plaintiff was informed on either occa-

sion of the role that ECH played in his impaired lung

function.

As noted above, Dr. DeGraff wrote to Attorney Saia,

~ plaintiff’s counsel, in the spring of 1983, and outlined his

understanding of the various causes of the plaintiff's

condition. In a letter the following November, Dr.

DeGraff again reviewed the plaintiff’s condition, and

stated that the plaintiff had suffered a thirty percent loss

of lung function over and above the lung damage caused

by his mediastinal fibrosis. Magistrate’s Report at 11-12.

App. 37

3. Application of the Discovery Rule to the Case at

Bar

In its motion for summary judgment, Shell argues

that the First Circuit’s decision in Cornell v. E.]. DuPont de

Nemours & Co., Inc., 841 F.2d 23 (1st Cir.1988), imposes a

duty on the plaintiff to “seek out the cause of his illness

from the appropriate professionals.” Shell Oil Company’s

Motion for Summary Judgment at 8. In Shell’s view,

Pedraza, who experienced the onset of his symptoms as

early as 1977, totally failed to meet that burden.

However, Cornell is of no help to Shell, as that deci-

sion turned on particular facts not present in the current

case. Cornell, a spray painter, used Imron, a Dupont paint

containing Desmodur N-75, from 1980 to 1982. Id. at 23.

Cornell was aware, based on his own experience and

from reading the labels of the products he used, that the

polyurethanes could cause damage to the lungs. Id. at

23-24. While noting that Cornell had smoked heavily for a

number of years, the First Circuit also concluded that

Cornell experienced specific symptoms which could only

result from exposure to Imron, among them the spitting

up of paint. The First Circuit found that it was undis-

puted that Cornell associated his physical condition with

his use of the Imron paint by the end of 1980; however, he

did not initiate his lawsuit until the spring of 1984. Id.

Accordingly, the First Circuit affirmed the granting of

summary judgment against Cornell. Id.

In the present case, there is no evidence Pedraza

knew or should have known from his own experience

that inhalation of epoxy resin (or ECH in particular)

could cause lung damage. Although it is not clear on the

App. 38

record, it is at least inferable that Pedraza was working

with a larger number of chemicals than was Cornell, and

thus could less reasonably have been expected to know

which product was causing the harm. Finally, it is cer-

tainly true that Pedraza himself experience a wider range

of systemic disorders which could conceivably have been

the cause of his asthma. Under the circumstances, a jury

could find that this plaintiff acted reasonably with respect

to discovering the source of his injury.

Of greater similarity to the case at bar is Errichiello v.

Eli Lilly and Co., 618 F.Supp. 484 (D.Mass.1985).

Errichiello was diagnosed as having vaginal cancer in

1973. Id. at 485. Her doctors and various family members

made a connection between Errichiello’s cancer and her

mother’s ingestion of diethylstilbestrol (“DES”) during

pregnancy, but Errichiello testified that she was not told

of the possible link until July 1980. Id. at 485-86. She

brought suit against Lilly and five other manufactures of

DES on July 22, 1982. Lilly argues that under the “discov-

ery rule,” Errichiello had a duty to exercise reasonable

diligence to discover the cause of her cancer in 1973,

when she was first diagnosed. Id. at 486. However, the

district court ruled that the “discovery rule” does not

compel such diligence until such time as a plaintiff has

notice not only of an injury but of its likely cause as well.

ld. Given the favorable light in which the non-moving

party’s testimony should be regarded, the district court

concluded that a question of material fact did exist as to

whether or not Errichiello was informed of the possible

connection between her cancer and DES prior to July 22,

1979. Id. at 486-87.

App. 39

The facts in Vigeant v. Zimmer, Inc., 612 F.Supp. 1043

(D.Mass.1985) also provide strong support for the plain-

tiff. Vigeant had her left knee replaced with a Zimmer

prosthetic device in 1977. Id. at 1044. She was hospi-

talized again for severe knee pain in December 1978. At

that time, her doctor told her that “the pin had loosened,”

and surgery was performed. The doctor’s notes from that

operation indicate that the prosthetic device had broken.

ld. Although the doctor stated that he informed Vigeant

of that fact, she claimed that she did not learn that the

prosthesis was defective until she was hospitalized for

subsequent operation in February 1980. Id. at 1044-45.

Vigeant filed suit against Zimmer on November 15, 1982.

The district court concluded that Zimmer had failed to

show that there was no question of material fact as to

when Vigeant should reasonably have been expected to

have learned that their product was defective. Id. at 1445.

Finally, the case at bar may be favorably contrasted

with Shea v. Keuffel & Esser of New Jersey, Inc., 668 F.Supp.

41 (D.Mass.1986), affirmed without opinion, 823 F.2d 543

(Ist Cir.1987). Shea, an architect, developed a severe skin

disorder in 1974. Id. at 42. During the next seven years,

Shea underwent numerous tests in an effort to determine

what was causing his malady. /d. at 42-43. The first break-

through did not occur until April 1981, when Shea reac-

ted positively to a test involving a brand of sepia paper

used at his workplace. Id. at 43. The treating physician,

Dr. Ernesto Gonzalez, informed Shea at the time of the

test’s results. Id

Dr. Gonzalez then contacted the defendant, the man

ufacturer of the paper, and requested a list of the chemi

cals used in making the paper. On October 23, 1981, Shea

App. 40

reacted positively to diazonium, one [sic] the component

parts of the sepia paper. /d. Dr. Gonzalez testified that he

was certain of the connection between diazonium and

Shea’s condition, and further, that he discussed the

results of the tests with Shea at the time. Id. The district

court concluded that Shea was on notice as early as April

1981, and definitely by October 1981, that the sepia paper

produced by the defendant was the likely cause of his

skin condition.” Since Shea did not file suit until January

4, 1985, the court concluded that the suit was barred by

the statute of limitations. Id. at 49.

? As its first objection to the Magistrate’s Report, Shell

claims that throughout his report and recommendation, the

Magistrate fails to distinguish between “epoxy resin,” a prod-

uct made by Shell, and “ECH,” one of the resin’s component

parts. Shell argues that the statute of limitations should begin

to run at the time Pedraza first linked his injury to his expo-

sure to Shell's epoxy resin, and not at the time when Pedraza

finally learned which component (i.e., ECH) was actually

responsible for his injury. To a limited extent, the language of

Shea supports that argument, although the district court was

not called upon to make a ruling as to which date controlled

the start of the statute of limitations period.

In the instant case, however, there is at least one compel-

ling reason for holding that the later date is controlling. In

light of the number of chemicals to which he was exposed,

there is a serious question of fact as to whether or not Pedraza

had reason to know that Shell’s epoxy resin was the likely

cause of his injury until such time as he learned which specific

chemical! agent was responsible. The numerous citations listed

by the defendant merely reflect Pedraza’s sense that Shell's

epoxy resin was among the potential causes; they do not

convince this Court that he knew or should have known that

the resin was the likely source.

App. 41

In light of the above authorities, and mindful of the

inferences which this Court is obligated to make on

behalf of the plaintiff, the Court concludes that the defen-

dant has not succeeded in demonstrating that there is no

issue of material fact with respect to the plaintiff’s knowl-

edge of the likely cause of his injury prior to November

1982. Accordingly, summary judgment is not appropriate.

D. Sophisticated User Defense

1. Additional Relevant Facts

In support of its argument that Pratt & Whitney was

a “sophisticated user” of ECH and therefore responsible

for the plaintiff's injuries, Shell relies heavily on the

deposition testimony of Richard Owen, who during the

relevant period of time was a board certified industrial

hygienist for Pratt & Whitney. As did the Magistrate, this

Court accepts as true the allegations of fact contained in

Owen’s testimony for the purpose of discussing Shell's

claim.

Of particular relevance to Shell’s sophisticated user

defense is Owen's testimony that Pratt & Whitney ” ‘rec-

ognized [its] duty as an employer to provide a workplace

free from recognized hazards under OSHA.’” Magis-

trate’s Report at 13, citing Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff's

Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 13

Owen also stated that Pratt & Whitney had access to a

variety of documents detailing the toxicity of the prod-

ucts it used, including: “ACGIH criterion documents, an

extensive library on toxicology, and the Shell MSDS

(Material Safety Data Sheets) Sheets for Epoxy Resin.”

Magistrate’s Report at 13-14. There is evidence on the

App. 42

record that Shell’s MSDS sheets were available at the

plant where Pedraza worked.

However, plaintiffs expert toxicologist, Thomas F.

Schrager, testified at deposition that Shell had failed to

give proper warnings regarding its product to Pratt &

Whitney. Magistrate’s Report at 14. Specifically, Schrager

alleged that Shell failed to provide specific instructions

that enclosed hood ventilation be used in work areas, and

that the workers wear respirators while working with the

epoxy resin.

2. The Sophisticated User Defense

In Shell’s view, its duty to provide such warnings

with respect to ECH were discharged because Pratt and

Whitney should be considered a “sophisticated user” of

ECH. Specifically, Shell argues that Pratt and Whitney (1)

had knowledge of certain federal statutes and regulations

pertaining to respiratory protection; (2) had adequate

warning of ECH’s hazards as evidenced by Pratt and

Whitney’s implementation of safety measures; (3) should

be charged with the knowledge of relevant safety stan-

dards (which Shell asserts operate as a discharge of

Shell’s duty to warn); and (4) should be charged with

knowledge of the hazards of ECH.

As the Magistrate correctly points out, the substan-

tive law which governs the plaintiff’s claims is the law of

the state of Connecticut, where the alleged tort occurred.

To date, the Connecticut state courts have not considered

or adopted the sophisticated user defense in the toxic tort

context. Indeed, it would be contradictory for them to do

so in light of Connecticut’s recognition of strict liability

App. 43

and explicit adoption of section 402A of the Restatement

(Second) of Torts. See Hall v. Ashland Oil Co., 625 F.Supp.

1515, 1521 n. 1 (D.Conn.1986), citing Garthwait v. Burgio,

153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965) and Rossignol v. Danb-

ury School of Aeronautics, Inc., 154 Conn. 549, 227 A.2d 418

(1967).

Shell suggests to this Court that an “interpretation of

federal statutes and regulations are at the heart of the

legal issues in this case,” Shell’s Memorandum at 17, and

that therefore, this Court should not be concerned about

the possibility of blazing new trails in Connecticut tort

law. That is simply not correct. A common law tort is at

the heart of the legal issues in this case, a tort to which

the State of Connecticut has expressed its willingness to

apply the doctrine of strict liability. Whether or not var-

ious federal statutes make Pratt and Whitney a “sophisti-

cated user,” thereby shielding Shell from tort liability, is

very much a state law question.’ As the Connecticut

courts have not as yet addressed this question, it is

incumbent upon this Court to refrain from imposing its

own view upon them.

There being no indication that the Connecticut state

courts would recognize the “sophisticated user” defense,

this Court concludes that it is not available to Shell in this

case, and accordingly declines to examine the issue fur-

ther.

5 By contrast, whether or not various federal statutes and

regulations preempt state common law claims ts a question of

federal law. However, as was discussed supra, that question is

not properly before the Court.

App. 44

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the defendant Shell's

objections are hereby OVERRULED, and the Magistrate’s

Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED. Accordingly,

defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

It is So Ordered.

App. 45

APPENDIX 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

CRUZ PEDRAZA, ET AL

Vv.

SHELL OIL COMPANY

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 85-0421-F

}

— SO

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING

DEFENDANT SHELL OIL COMPANY’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT!

March 15, 1989

PONSOR, U.S.M.

1. Introduction

In this diversity actio.. plaintiff Cruz Pedraza (hereaf-_

ter “Pedraza” or “plaintiff”) claims his lungs were perma-

nently damaged as a result of inhaling the chemical

epichlorohydrin (“ECH”) while employed by United

Technologies Corporation, Power Systems Division

(“U.T.C."). He is proceeding against Shell Oil Company

(“Shell”), the manufacturer of the chemical, under theo-

ries of negligence — including negligent design, manufac-

ture, and distribution — strict liability, and breach of

implied warranties. Plaintiff's spouse, Alejandrina Ped-

raza, Claims loss of consortium against the defendant, and

' This matter has been referred to the court for report and

recommendation pursuant to Rule 3 of the Rules for United

States Magistrates in the United States District Court for the

District of Massachusetts, 28 U.S.C. section 636(b) (1) (B).

App. 46

plaintiff's children, Roberto and Mary Ellen Pedraza,

claim loss of parental society.

Shell has filed a motion for summary judgment. For

the reasons stated below, the court will recommend that

Shell’s motion be denied.?

I]. Procedural and Factual Background

A. Procedural Background

On November 4, 1985, plaintiff brought suit against

three defendants: his employer, U.T.C., and two chemical

manufacturers, Shell and Dow Chemical Company

(“Dow”). U.T.C. filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that

under Connecticut law, the Connecticut Worker’s Com-

pensation Act provided the exclusive remedy against an

employer for injuries allegedly arising out of plaintiff’s

employment. This motion was treated as a motion for

summary judgment pursuant to Federal R. Civ. P. 12(b).

Shell and Dow filed motions for summary judgment

on March 17, 1986 and October 10, 1986, Respectively.

Dow raised a statute of limitations defense, arguing that

plaintiff's cause of action was time barred as a matter of

law under the applicable Massachusetts statutes. Shell’s

motion contended that plaintiff had failed to present

sufficient evidence that it had made sales of ECH to

U.T.C. during the relevant time period. On March 2, 1987,

2 This case contains class action allegations. Class certi-

fication has not yet been entertained by the court. The exis-

tence of class claims does not affect disposition of this motion.

| cee eee

App. 47

Chief Judge Freedman adopted the Magistrate’s recom-

mendation that U.T.C. be dismissed from the case and

that the two remaining motions for summary judgment

be denied.

After discovery, Dow filed a second motion for sum-

mary judgment. Dow argued that there was not sufficient

evidence upon which it could be found that the plaintiff

was exposed to and damaged by chemicals manufactured

by it. This motion was granted on October 5, 1987, leav-

ing only Shell as a defendant.

Both of the remaining parties conducted additional

discovery, prompting Shell to file this second motion for

summary judgment on June 24, 1988. As grounds for the

motion, Shell offers new evidence and recent case law

construing the Massachusetts discovery rule to contend

that the plaintiff’s claims are time barred by the Massa-

chusetts statutes of limitation. The defendant also argues

in the alternative that under the applicable law, Shell has

discharged its duty to warn.

The facts have been previously set forth in this

court’s Report and Recommendation of February 13, 1987

(hereafter “R & R”), a copy of which is appended. How-

ever, defendant now asserts that additional facts have

come to light during discovery that should persuade this

court to reconsider its rejection of the statute of limita-

tions defense originally advanced by Dow. These addi-

tional facts have been incorporated into the factual

summary below.

The First Circuit has stated:

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

the court must look at the record in the light

App. 48

most favorable to the party opposing the motion

and must indulge all inferences favorable to that

party. 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir. 1975), cert.

denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).

Stepanischen v. Merchants Dispatch Trans. Corp., 722 F.2d

922 (Ist Cir. 1983).

B. Factual Background

Plaintiff was born in Puerto Rico and came to the

mainland in 1967. Letter of Dr. Godar of May 2, 1984 at 1.

He appears to have a limited competency in English, his

second language. On March 23, 1986, plaintiff’s brother,

Pedro Pedraza - a bilingual Spanish/English speaking

person — assisted him in responding to Shell’s written

interrogatories. Plaintiff's Answers to Defendant's Inter-

rogatories at 1. Similarly, an interpreter, Laura Eastment,

was called upon to assist the plaintiff during his deposi-

tion by Shell's attorneys. See Shell’s Notice of Deposition

of Cruz Pedraza, May 27, 1987.

At least two of the doctors who examined the plain-

tiff in connection with this action experienced difficulty

obtaining an accurate medical history because of a combi-

nation of language and speech problems. One physician

reported a “language barrier that impedes careful accu-

mulation of historical data.” Dr. Godar’s letter of 5/2/84

at 6 paragraph 1. Defendant’s Exhibit F. Another doctor

wrote to U.T.C.’s insurance carrier: “History was

obtained from Pedraza with some difficulty because of a

stuttering defect which I am sure was aggravated by the

need to speak in English rather than his native Spanish.”

App. 49

Dr. DeGraff’s letter to John Young of 1/25/78 at 1. Defen-

dant’s Exhibit I.

In 1969, before he was employed by U.T.C., Pedraza

underwent surgery. The procedure is variously described

as the removal of a “tumor on right side of chest,” /d.,

“thymus was resected,” Letter of Dr. DeGraff of 1/25/78

at 1, Shell’s Exhibit I, and as a thoracotomy and resection

of a well localized mediastinal right mass with a patho-

logic diagnosis of mediastinal thymoma. Letter of Dr.

Godar of 5/2/84 at 3, Shell’s Exhibit F. Following the

surgery plaintiff received radiation therapy. R & R at 3.

Pedraza was employed by U.T.C., Power Systems

Division? from 1972 through 1981. Until sometime in 1978

he worked ina plastics molding department. R & Rat 2-3.

Plaintiff had no symptoms of asthma until around

June, 1977, about a month after he was assigned to a new

chemical mixing operation at work. Dr. DeGraff’s letter of

1/25/78 at 1.° The mixing operation employed substances

3 As the court’s original Report and Recommendation

notes:

Dr. DeGraff’s letter refers to plaintiff's surgery as having been

performed in 1973, but several sources, including plaintiff’s

answers to [Dow’s] Interrogatories, indicate 1969 is correct.

Regardless, the surgery was clearly performed well before the

conduct complained of beginning in 1977. R & R at 3.

4 Plaintiff's employer is also referred to as Pratt &

Whitney throughout the record. R & R at 2.

> Although the letter itself could be taken to imply that plain-

tiff mentioned the use of ECH to Dr. DeGraff, it is just as reason-

able to infer that the doctor’s knowledge of the use of ECH in the

mixing Operation came from the employer’s health and safety

report of 6/16/77. See, Exhibit B to Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to

[ yi WwW

,

App. 50

containing the chemical epichlorohydrin (“ECH”). Inter-

nal Pratt & Whitney Memo from R. J. Owen to D. B.

Schibi of 6/16/77, Exhibit B to Plaintiff's Memorandum

in Opposition to Dow’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Plaintiff inhaled fumes produced during the mixing pro-

cess which irritated his lungs. R & R at 3. He began

experiencing symptoms of fatigue, shortness of breath,

dizziness, loss of consciousness, tearing eyes, burning

eyelids and the spitting up of blood. Dr. Godar’s letter of

5/2/84 at 1. Pedraza complained to his foreman and to

doctors, but each time he was sent back to work. Id. He

continued to work despite the fact that his asthma symp-

toms were aggravated on days he was assigned to the

chemical mixing operation. Dr. DeGraff’s letter of

1/25/78 at 1

On June 16, 1977 R. J. Owen of U.T.C.’s Health and

Safety Engineering Department issued an internal memo

concerning plaintiff's complaints of respiratory diffi-

culties. The report included the information that ECH

was involved in the chemical mixing operation, but

stated that adequate ventilation existed and concluded

that “Mr. Pedroza [sic] should not have breathing diffi-

culties from his job at Pratt & Whitney.” Memo of R. J.

Owen, Plaintiff's Memorandum, Exhibit 2. As the original

Report and Recommendation observed: “There is no indi-

cation in the record whether Pedraza was informed about

the report or specifically the presence of ECH in the

mixing process.” R & R at 4.

Plaintiff’s asthma symptoms continued and on June

29, 1977, they became serious enough to warrant emer-

gency room treatment at Saint Francis Hospital. After this

eee

App. 51

incident, Pratt & Whitney returned plaintiff to his pre-

vious job. Dr. Godar’s letter of 5/2/84 at 2. Subsequent

asthma attacks caused the plaintiff to leave the job site on

several occasions. Id. On October 27, 1977, plaintiff was

again sent to the Saint Francis Emergency Room for treat-

ment of an asthma attack. Not until November of 1977

was plaintiff “moved to a lathe operation and away from

the previous environment after discussions by the plant

medical department.” Id.

Pratt & Whitney filed a report of this October inci-

dent with its workmen’s compensation carrier, Liberty

Mutual Insurance Company, on December 6, 1977. The

claim form linked plaintiff’s asthma attack with chemi-

cals in the work environment, stating: “Employee works

with chemicals (volatile) & gases. [H]e feels this is caus-

ing the asthma.” Shell’s Exhibit C. Later in December a

check for $572.58 was issued to plaintiff by Liberty

Mutual. This check constituted a form of worker’s com-

pensation benefits. R & R at 4.

Sometime during this period, John M. Young of Lib-

erty Mutual apparently referred Mr. Pedraza to Dr.

Arthur C. DeGraff, Jr., of Hartford Lung Physicians for a

medical exam. Dr. DeGraff’s letter of 1/25/78. On Janu-

ary 17, 1978, Dr. DeGraff examined the plaintiff and took

his medical history. Dr. Godar’s letter of 5/2/84 at 2. On

the basis of this examination, the patient’s medical his-

tory, the Pratt & Whitney “investigation of work condi-

tions,” and company medical records, Dr. DeGraff began

to suspect that ECH was the cause of plaintiff's recent

medical problems. He cited all of these sources of infor-

mation as contributing to his “Impression” that Pedraza

was suffering from asthma that was “most likely work

App. 52

related and did not exist prior to his employment at Pratt

& Whitney.” Dr. DeGraff’s letter of 1/25/78 at 1,2.

In this report, which was written eight days after the

physical examination and addressed exclusively to Young

at Liberty Mutual, the doctor enclosed a copy of a

description of the respiratory effects associated with

exposure to ECH resin. He also revealed that plaintiff’s

history was “consistent with hypersensitivity reaction to

the Epichlorohydrin.” Id. at 2.

The contents of Dr. DeGraff’s report were not dis-

closed to the plaintiff during this time period. R & R at 5.

Indeed, plaintiff reported that he did not learn of the

doctor’s opinion until November, 1983 when Dr. DeGraff

wrote to plaintiff's attorney, apparently enclosing a copy

of the January 25, 1978 letter. Jd. and Plaintiff's Affidavit

in Opposition to Shell’s Motion for Summary Judgment

on Statute of Limitations, November 12, 1986.

In 1978 plaintiff was transferred to another depart-

ment at U.T.C. where he worked as a machine operator. R

& R at 5. Sometime in 1980 plaintiff was diagnosed as

having mediastinal lymphadenitis and pericarditis. Id.

U.T.C. terminated plaintiff on July 6, 1981. Shell’s Exhibit

5 at.

On August 7, 1981 plaintiff filed a complaint against

U.T.C. with the Connecticut Commission on Human

6’ As the court’s original Report and Recommendation

stated, plaintiff obviously intended this date, although his

affidavit specifies May, 1983. There is no May, 1983 letter from

DeGraff anywhere in the record, only the letter of November

15, 1983 to plaintiff's counsel. R & R at 5, n. 7.

App. 53

Rights and Opportunities. Shell’s Exhibit J. Plaintiff

charged that his employer had discriminated against him

because of his physical disability (asthma) and his

national origin (Puerto Rican ancestry) when it fired him.

Id. at 1, 2. In this sworn affadavit [sic], filed without the

assistance of an attorney, Shell’s Exhibit L at 1, Pedraza

specifically alleged that he developed an asthmatic condi-

tion after working with fiberglass materials at U.T.C. for

about five years. Shell’s Exhibit J at 2. He stated further

that he had suffered an asthma attack after being trans-

ferred to a position mixing chemicals and noted that this

condition worsened over time, despite the fact that he

was transferred to a different position mixing chemicals.

Id. Plaintiff also noted other symptoms he experienced

while working with chemicals. Id. The gravamen of his

complaint was that U.T.C. had failed to accommodate his

disability: “Rather than transfer to another position

which would minismize [sic] condition they fired me.

Denying me equal accommodation.” Id. at 2.

On April 15, 1982 the Connecticut Commission On

Human Rights and Opportunities issued a Finding of No

Cause and Summary in which it accepted U.T.C.’s version

of the facts surrounding its decision to terminate plaintiff.

Shell’s Exhibit K. In its answer to plaintiff’s complaint,

U.T.C. had stated that “their medical facility found that

there is evidence that the asthmatic condition existed

prior to Complainant’s working with fiberglass and

resins.” During the investigation that ensued, the com-

pany attributed plaintiff’s firing to poor attendance. Id. at

22.

App. 54

The Commission’s report stated that its investigator

had access to “all memos and correspondence, complain-

ant’s attendance records, and complainant’s personnel

file.” Id. On the basis of this evidence, the investigator

concluded that “[t]here is no medical proof to substanti-

ate his [plaintiff's] allegation that his asthma was work

connected or responsible for the continued poor atten-

dance.” Id. at 24. As one of its specific findings of fact, the

Commission noted that “Respondent’s Medical Depart-

ment evaluated Complainant and reported that Com-

plainant’s asthma was not work connected.” Id. at 23.

Pedraza was notified of the results of this investiga-

tion and the reasons for the dismissal of his complaint by

certified mail on 5/16/82.” Id. at 3, Shell’s Exhibit L.

Plaintiff was hospitalized twice in 1982 with a diag-

nosis of asthma. Dr. Godar’s letter of 5/2/84 at 3. On

June 17, 1983 Dr. DeGraff wrote to James Parent, a labor

representative for the International Association of Machi-

nists and Aerospace Workers, regarding his consultation

with Pedraza the day before’ R & R at 5. Plaintiff had told

the physician he was easily fatigued. Id. Dr. DeGraff

stated, “[a]lthough Mr. Pedraza clearly has asthma, much

of his syniptoms undoubtedly relate to . . . impaired

cardiac function. ...” Id. Dr. DeGraff wrote to James

Parent again on October 3, 1983, stating both that plain-

tiff’s mediastinal fibrosis was undoubtedly a result of the

radiation therapy he received following the removal of

’ Exhibit K mistakenly identifies the netification date as

3/16/82, but all of the other documents indicate May, not

March. See Shell’s Exhibit L at 2 and Shell’s Memorandum at 5.

App. 55

the thymic tumor in 1969, and that the mediastinal

fibrosis had affected plaintiff’s heart. Id. at 6.

In his November 15, 1983 letter to plaintiff’s counsel,

Dr. DeGraff clearly offered the opinion that Pedraza had

asthma, the probable cause being industrial fume expo-

sure. Exhibit C to Plaintiff's Opposition to Dow. Dr.

DeGraff also stated that Pedraza suffered from mediasti-

nal fibrosis and pericarditis as a result of the radiation

therapy he received in 1969. Referring to the latter condi-

tions, Dr. DeGraff went on to say:

This is not related to his asthma, however much

of Mr. Pedraza’s symptoms of exercise limitation

results from the pericarditis and mediastinal

fibrosis. . . . With dust or fume exposure, his

asthma symptoms increase, and [his] exercise

[is] limited by his asthma. Mr. Pedraza’s asthma

is sufficient to cause an approximate 30% loss in

function of both lungs, this loss in function is

over and above the loss of lung function due to

the mediastinal fibrosis. R & R at 6.

Dr. Godar examined Pedraza on January 27, 1984.

Referring to the fact that plaintiff's asthma symptoms

might continue even after removal from exposure to

ECH, Dr. Godar stated:

However, even at its onset the condition was

partly affected by restrictive disorder resulting

from treatment for the thymoma, including both

thoracotomy and radiation treatment. It is also

clear that since 1980 there has been a progres-

sive cardiomegaly, suggesting a cardiac disorder

that requires more evaluations since it may play

a significant role in the patient’s respiratory

App. 56

impairment. I do not believe his cardiac condi-

tion is the major factor since on his best days he

is able to climb two flights of stairs and walk up

to one mile. In other respects, his pattern of

symptoms is consistent with that of a chronic

asthmatic bronchitis. ... Id. at 6-7.

On January 29, 1985 the Connecticut Workers’ Com-

pensation Commission approved disability benefits for

plaintiff based upon his employment with U.T.C. R & Rat

7. The injury noted on the workers’ compensation form is

“acute asthma attack” with a 30% loss in function of

lungs. Id. Date of injury is listed as October 28, 1977 and

plaintiff signed this claim form on January 28, 1985. Id.

Plaintiffs filed this action on November 4, 1985.

C. Additional Facts Relating to the Sophisticated

User Defense

At the time Pedraza’s alleged exposure occurred,

Richard Owen, a Senior Industrial Hygienist, was a board

certified hygienist for plaintiff's employer, Pratt &

Whitney. Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of

Motion for Summary Judgment at 12. Defendant’s cita-

tion is to the deposition testimony of Owen at pp. 9-10,

which it identifies as Exhibit P to its Memorandum. Yet in

the previous paragraph on the same page of its Mem-

orandum, defendant correctly identifies its Exhibit P as

the Deposition of Samuel W. Oakes. Id. In Shell’s subse-

quent Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Sum-

mary Judgment, defendant acknowledges that it failed to

attach this exhibit to its original motion and states that it

is curing this omission by inserting the missing excerpts

App. 57

as Substitute Exhibit P to its Reply. Shell’s Reply at 6-7.

Despite the fact that defendant cites to the Owen deposi-

tion at 8-10, 35, 39, and 48-50, this court has been able to

locate only pages 1 and 8-10 in defendant’s combined

pleadings. Id. at Substitute Exhibit P. Since the testimony

by Mr. Owen as summarized by defendant in its Mem-

orandum consists of facts which, even if true, would not

affect this court’s disposition below of Shell’s sophisti-

cated user defense, the court will assume for the pur-

poses of this argument that the defendant’s statement of

these facts is accurate.

Owen apparently stated in his deposition that Pratt &

Whitney “recognized their duty as an employer to pro-

vide a workplace free from recognized hazards under

OSHA.” Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to

Motion for Summary Judgment at 13. Owen further testi-

fied that Pratt & Whitney had available to it the following

sets of documents regarding the toxicology of the prod-

ucts it used: ACGIH criterion documents, an extensive

library on toxicology, and the Shell MSDS (Material

Safety Data Sheets) Sheets for Epoxy Resin. Id. at 12-13.

Owen also stated that “[h]e would expect that the local

exhaust ventilation system met the requirements of the

Shell MSDS sheet.” Id.

According to the deposition of Schibi, the MSDS

sheets were available at the Rocky Hill Plant where Ped-

raza worked. /d. at 13, citing Exhibit Q at 22. Defendant

also asserts that engrneering controls were implemented

at plaintiff's workbench to meet OSHA regulations.

Plaintiff's expert toxicologist, Thomas F. Schrager,

testified in his deposition that Shell “failed to provide

App. 58

adequate warnings and instructions” to plaintiff's

employer. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 11. Speci-

fically, Schrager found defendant’s warning to be inade-

quate in that Shell’s MSDS Sheets failed to provide: “(1)

specific instructions that enclosed hood ventilation be

used in work areas,” and lacked “(2) instructions that

respirators should be used by workers.” /d., citing Exhibit

3 at 6-7.

Ill. Discussion

On June 24, 1988 Shell filed this motio: e

judgment. As grounds for the motion, She gues tl

additional evidence made available through Giscovery as

well as recent case law construing the Massachusetts

discovery rule compel this court to find that plaintift

knew or should have known before November 5, 1982

(.e., three years prior to filing the complaint) of the

alleged causal relation between Shell’s product and his

condition. Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Sum-

mary Judgment at 3, 12. In the alternative, Shell contends

that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law

because it has “the legal right to rely on a sophisticated

user defense.” Id. at 18.

As this court previously stated in its original Report

and Recommendation, in opposing a properly supported

motion for summary judgment the non-moving party,

here the plaintiff,5 has the obligation of bringing forward

5 Although summary judgment is sought here against all

plaintiffs, both parties have confined their arguments to Cruz

Pedraza. The other plaintiffs rise or fall with Cruz Pedraza.

App. 59

“significant probative evidence” tending to show a genu-

ine issue of material fact which, if decided in his favor,

would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict in his

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 244

(1986); Narcisco Rafael Perez de la Cruz v. Crowley Towing

and Transportation Company, 807 F.2d 1084, 1086 (1st Cir.

1986). Applying this standard, the court will address

defendant’s two grounds for summary judgment.

A. The Statute of Limitations

In support of its motion for summary judgment, Shell

states that this is its first and only motion for summary

judgment as to statute of limitations and that additional

facts and new case law demonstrate that plaintiff has

failed to carry his burden of proof of showing that he has

met the applicable statutes of limitations. Defendant’s

Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion for Summary

Judgment at 1, 6.

Regardless of the choice of substantive law in this

case, the court must apply the procedural statutes of

limitations of this forum. Hemric v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co.,

739 F.2d 1,2 (ist Cir. 1984). There is no dispute that the

applicable limitations period is the three years provided

for both negligence and warranty claims under Mass.

Gen. L. ch. 260, section 2A and ch. 106, section 2-318,

respectively.

The issue presented is when did the plaintiff’s causes

of action accrue. In order for this lawsuit to have been

timely when filed on November 4, 1985, plaintiff’s cause

of action must not have accrued earlier than November 4,

1982. Although plaintiff claims his injury occurred in

|

App. 60

1977,9 that does not necessarily establish the date of

accrual. Guided by the principle that “a plaintiff should

be put on notice before his or her claim is barred by the

passage of time,” in the area of tort law, Massachusetts

has applied a discovery rule to causes of action based on

inherently unknowable wrongs. Olsen v. Bell Laboratories,

Inc., 388 Mass. 171, 175 (1985).

Olsen teaches that, in a claim of negligence resulting

in an insidious occupational disease, the cause of action

does not accrue before the plaintiff “knew or should

reasonably have known that he had contracted [the dis-

ease] as a result of the conduct of the defendants.” Id.

As the First Circuit has observed, this requirement

has two components: first, that the plaintiff have knowl-

edge of his injury and, second, that he have knowledge of

its cause — that is, that he has been harmed as a result of

the defendant’s conduct. Fidler v. Eastman Kodak Company,

714 F.2d 192, 198 (1st Cir. 1983). The court agrees with

defendant that “the plaintiff bears the burden of proving

facts taking this case outside the impact of the three-year

statute of limitations.” Franklin v. Albert, 381 Mass. 611,

612 (1980), and “notice of likely cause is ordinarily

enough to start the statute running.” Lear-Heflich v.

Schwartz, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 928, 930 (1985) (rescript opin-

ion) (quoting Fidler, supra at 199).

* On the worker’s compensation claim form plaintiff states

October 27, 1977, as the date of injury. Exhibit C to Defendant's

Memorandum. Everything else in the record points to around

June, 1977. R & R at 13.

App. 61

In applying the discovery rule to this case, Shel! puts

forth two arguments, one based upon additional facts and

one based upon recent case law, in an effort to establish

that plaintiff either actually knew or should have known

that ECH was the likely cause of his asthma. The Court

will address defendant’s new evidence first.

1. Evidence of Alleged Actual Knowledge

Although this court recognizes that the application of

the Massachusetts discovery rule to this record presents a

very close question, it finds that there is evidence from

which a jury could reasonably conclude that plaintiff did

not actually know that defendant’s conduct was the likely

cause of his injury prior to November 4, 1982.

As noted in the original Report and Recommenda-

tion, Dr. DeGraff’s letter of January 25, 1978 linking

plaintiff's symptoms with exposure to ECH would be

fatal to plaintiff’s case except that - according to plain-

tiff’s affidavit, which must be taken as true — Dr. DeGraff

did not share his opinion with Mr. Pedraza until 1983.

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 1 at paragraph 3.

Significantly, that letter was addressed exclusively to

Young of Liberty Mutual, U.T.C.’s insurance carrier.

Moreover, Dr. DeGraff’s “Impression” that plaintiff was

suffering from asthma which was mos

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