Petition — Jack Locicero v. United States of America, 685 F.2d 1208 (1983) (No.82-5824)

SESE RBRBRES SHB He we seaw

JACK LOCICERO, Petitioner

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TERRY AMDUR

Attorney at Law

1939 Rose Villa Street

Pasadena, California 91107

(213) 449-9254

Attorney for Petitioner

ee 2 6@ © & © HB

BBERBRBASRREBREHEBSS

| Table of Authorities

| Opinion Below

| Jurisdiction

| Questions Presented

Statutes

i Statement of the Case

Statement of Facts

| QuestionPresent ed

1. Does federal jurisdiction under

the Hobbs Act [16 U.S.C. 1951]

exist where no actual or po-

tential effect on interstate

commerce can be shown 7

7. May the federal government

“manufacture” a federal nexus

by inducing the defendants

to cross @ state line?

| Conclusions

| Appendix "A"

Memorandum Opinion of the Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

| | Appendix "RB"

Order Denying Petition for

Rehearing En Banc

icCertificate of Service

Pages(s)

3

4

4

~

5

5

?

8

i5

17

19

2 err ee ee

361 U.S. 212

United States v.

486 F.2d 670

United States v.

459 F. Supp.

United States v.

418 F. Supp.

United States v.

486 F.2d 816

United States v.

$69 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1978)

United States v.

420 U.S. 670

United States v.

Stirone v. United States

(1955)

Archer

(1973)

Brooklier

476 (1978)

3 ye

818 (W.D. Okla. 1975)

DeMet

(7th Cir. 1973)

Elders

Feola

(1975)

Gupton :

459 F.2d 550 (Sth Cir. 1974)

United States v.

315 U.S. 521

United States v.

402

U.S. 146

United States v.

Local 807

(1942)

Perez

(1971)

Panno :

385 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1967)

United States v.

Si; F.26 33

United States v.

Staszcuk

(7th Cir. 1975)

Varlach

225 F.2d 665 (1955)

10, 12, 13

1S, 16, 0?

4, 6 929, 13

12

10

i

13

12

14

9, 10, 13, 146

Ll

Reins Seis

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BRR RUN SRP eR es Ese ese eee ee a

| tetera jereatiotice ied) the Hobbs

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

con Test tuum cIncuLT

Petitioner Jack LoCicero, respectfully prays that

| writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion

of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

entered in the above-entitled cause on September 3, 1982.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

appears in Appendix "A" hereto. The order denying the Petition

for Rehearing and rejecting the Suggestion for Rehearing En

Ranc appears in Appendix "B". No opinion was rendered by

‘the trial jidge, however, @ published opinion rejecting the

motion te dismiss was filed in United States v. Brooklier,

459 F. Supp. 476 (C.D. Cal. 1978), which concerned the same

factual situation in an earlier indictment which was ultimat-

ely dis@issed on other grounds.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

affirmed petitioner's conviction was entered on September 3,

1982. The order denying the Petition for Rehearing and reject -

ing the suggestion for Rehearing En Banc was entered November

1, 1982. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant

te 62 Stat. 928, 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). es

STIONS PRESENTED

-* & Dees a violation of the Hobbs Act occur where there

j exists no actual or potential effect on interstate commerce?

2. Can « “manufactured” jurisdiction suffice to confer |

ER RE aad

a U.S.C. 1962) & (d):

, fc) te shall be unlawful for any person Gai copet by

or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities

of which affect interstate commerce or foreign commerce com~

merce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in

| the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through 4 pattern of

racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.

id) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to

violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b}, or

(c) of this section.

18 U.S.C. 1951:

(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays or

affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity

in commerce by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires

so to do or commits or threatens physical violence to any

person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do

anything in violation of this section shall be fined not more

than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, oF

| both.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On February 20, 1979, a federal grand jury in Los Angeles

returned a five count indictment against petitioner LoCicero

| and codefendants Dominick Brooklier, Samuel Sciortino, Louis

BURERERS ER SEER REE ee tee ee

| Dragna, and Michael Rizzitello.

Count One alleged that each of the defendants was mapoyed

| by and were members of an “enterprise”, known as the Los

Angeles “fami ly" of the La Cosa Nostra. It was further alleg-

fed that the defendants conspired together to commit acts of

racketeering “onan the ope corel in vine of 18'U.S.C, -

I

5 Omak ‘Two alleged that each a the pre ‘Gites through

I the charged “enterprise”, committed seven upecific acts of

I racketeering as defined in 18 U.S.C. 1961 _

Count Four alleged that appellant and codefendant Rizzitello

conspired to extort $7500 from Forex Company, which was s: *

actuality an undercover operation of the F.B.I. which purported

to deal in pornographic films. Count Four specifically alleged

that the defendants attempted and conspired "to obstruct,

delay and affect commerce" in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951 (a).

Following unsuccessful motions to dismiss the indictment £/

defendant was convicted by a jury of Counts I, II, and IIl.

He was acquitted of a fourth count, which alleged an attempted

extortion of pornographer Theodore Gaswirth.

Following preparation of a presentence report, peticioner

was sentenced to the custody of the Attorney General for a

period of two (2) years pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4205(b)(2)

on each of the three counts, the sentences to run concurrently.

Petitioner has been at liberty since his indictment on

a personal recognizance bond in the amount of $50,000.

1/ Counsel for defendants moved pretrial to dismiss

Count Four of the indictment on Che grounds that it failed

to show federal jurisdiction in that there could have been

no effect on interstate commerce, as required by 18 U.S.C 1951,

as the Forex Company was not actually in business, but was

mevely an undercover operation of the F.B.1. The trial judge

relying on Judge Pregerson's opinion in U.S. v. Brocklier, 459

F. Supp. 476 (1978), which concerned the same factual situation

in a previously dismissed indictment, found that no effect

need to shown where a conspiracy to violated 18 USC 1951 is

alleged.

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iThe case also raises the question whether such affect on inter-

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The bulk of the evidence concerning petitioner involved

his participation in the attempted extortion of the Forex

purporting to deal in pornographic films, was never actually

in business, and had only props as inventory. It was not

disputed that LoCicero and codefendant Rizzitello sought and

obtained $7,500 from the “owners” of the Forex Company, who

were in actuality Special Agents of the F.B.I. The thrust of

defendants motions to dismiss and judgment of acquittal

was since Forex was never in business, the attempted extortion

could have no actual or potential effect on interstate com-

merce.

One payment, in the amount of $1,000, was made to unindict-

ed codefendant Thomas Ricciardi in Las Vegas, Nevada, by under~

cover agents of the F.B.I. They advised Ricciardi that they

had to be in Las Vegas on business, and it would be necessary

for him to come to Nevada to receive his weekly payment. The

meeting in a Las Vegas Hotel suite was recorded and the payment |

jwas Claimed to show a sufficient interstate nexus for a

iviolation of the Hobbs Act.

|

The case raises the question whether a violation of the

Hobbs Act can occur where the object of the attempted extortion

is not actually in business, and therefore cannot conceivably

have an actual or potential effect on interstate commerce.

Company. Forex, which was an undercover operation of the F.B.1.

state commerce is necessary where an attempt or conspiracy

to extort is alleged, as opposed to an actual extortion. In

the instant indictment, the government alleged both an attempt

nd a conspiracy, eventually electing to proceed on the theory

9f conspiracy. In United States v. Brooklier, supra, the

riginal trial judge ruled that no effect on commerce need be

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3

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| require any effect on interstate commerce. That ruling was

Sse&esseesas &

ishown. While conceding no specific case law supported that

extort monies from Forex.

| Harry Pregerson heard and denied the request for dismissal,

finding that an attempt to violate the Hobbs Act did not

| subsequent indictments were returned, and when the government

by Judge Pregerson.

conclusion, Judge Pregerson concluded that a reading of elked

shown where an attempt is alleged; this ruling was reaffirmed

by the new trial judge when the government eventually elected

to proceed on the theory that the defendants conspired to

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

l. DOES FEDERAL JURISDICTION UNDER THE HOBBS ACT

[18 USC 1951] EXIST WHERE NO ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL

EFFECT ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE CAN BE SHOWN?

On three separate occasions, counsel for defendants moved

to dismiss the Hobbs Act charge (Count IV) and strike the

corresponding acts of racketeering alleged in Counts I and I!

of the indictment.

The motion alleged that Count IV must be dismissed because

the attempt (or conspiracy) to extort money from Forex, the

undercover FBI operation could not have any actual or potential

effect on interstate commerce, as required by 18 U.S.C. 1951.

At the time of the original filing of the motion, Judge

published at 459 F. Supp. 476 (C.D. Cal. 1978).

The motion was thereafter renewed and denied when two

eventually determined to allege a conspiracy to extort, the

new trial Judge, Terry Hatter reaffirmed the original ruling

In his original decision, Judge Pregerson concluded that

where an inchoate crime of attempt (and arguable conspiracy)

was alleged, no actual or potential effect on commerce need be

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States v. Staszcuk, 517 F. 2d 53 (7th Cir. 1975) was per-

suasive authority for his position. 2/ tt ts submitted that

the better view is that an effect on interstate commerce is

a jurisdictional necessity, whether a choate or inchoate

crime is charged under the Hobbs Act. A review of statutory

and constitutional authority supports the position advanced

by petitioner herein.

A. Constitutional Basis of the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. 1951)

The present form of Title 18 United States Code 1951,

commonly known as the Hobbs Act, reflects a codification of a

| 1934 enactment called the “Federai Anti~-Racketering Act of

1934". The subsequent amendments in 1946 were intended to

ercompass the conduct held beyond the reach of the 1934 Act

by the Supreme Court in United States v. Local 807, 315 U.S.

$21 (1942).

This broadening amendment concerned primarily the proper

differentiation between “legitimate” Labor activity and labor

*racketeering".

The present Hobbs Act authority is bottomed on the Commerce

Clause contained in Article 1, Section 8, of the United States

| Constitution. The primary purpose of the commerce clause was

| upon commerce that the Articles of Confederation were inadequ-

f ate to control

The language of the statute, cited supra., its legislative

| history and previous judicial interpretations all confirm an

I sntenc by Congress to exercise its power under the. commerce

2/ Subsequent to United States v. Brooklier, supra,

Judge Pregerson reasoning in United States v. Bagnariol, 665

F.2d 877, 895-96 (9th Cir. 1981). :

Ff co secure freedom of trade, te break down the barriers to its |

free flow, asd to curtail the rising volume of restraints |

and the opinion at 476 F. Suup. 476, the Ninth Circuit adopted

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| sed legislative intent Co cope with the problems of labor

| racketeering, courts have consistently held the Act should

apply to a wide range of extortionate activity. In each case, |

f a nexus has been required between the extortionate conduct

| and interstate commerce in order te confer federal jurisdiction.

clause. The definition of the word “commerce” in the 1934

Act encompassed “all other trade or commerce over which

the United States has constitutional jurisdiction". The.

Senate Report approvingly quoted a Department of Justice

memorandum that the proposed statute was designed "to extend.

federal jurisdiction over all restraints of any commerce with-

in the scope of the federal government's constitutional power".

See Senate Report, No. 532, 73rd Cong. 2nd Sess. at 1 (1934).

As the Supreme Court stated in Stirone v. United States,

361 U.S. 212, the broad Language of the Hobbs Act manifests "a |

purpose to use all the constitutional power Congress has to

punish interference with interstate commerce by extortion, rob-

bery, or physical violence”. Id. at 215.

Clearly, the Hobbs Act draws its full and complete vitality

from the commerce clause and was intended to apply to those

proscribed activities which edversely affect commerce.

B. Application of the Hobbs Act

Consistent with the language of the statute and the expres-

;

That nexus may be de minimis, United States v. DeMet, 456

F.2d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 1973), but it must nonetheless exist.

Its comvection with or effect on interstate commerce must at

least present a “realistic possibility at the time of the

extortionate act". United States v. Statszuk, supra, at 59-60.

Jurisdiction is satisfied where an extortionate payment was

demanded after the event which had any possible effect on

interstate commerce. United States v. Kuta, 518 F.2d 947 (7th

Cir. 1975) |

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1 | Courts have found potential future effect on interstate

3 commerce sufficient to invoke the statute. United States v.

3 DiGregorio, 605 F.2d 1184 (ist Cir. 1979), or a showing that

oy 4 funds were diverted which might have otherwise been employed

| 5 in interstate commerce. United States v. Santoni, 585 F.2d

4 8 667 (4th Cir. 1978).

? However, where no actual or potential effect on interstate

: & commerce can be shows. a prosecution under the Act will fail.

9 United States v. Elders, 569 F2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1978.

6: C. Inchoate Offenses under the Hobbs Act

“| a The Act prohibits not only the acts of obstructing or at-

' tempting to obstruct commerce through extortion, but also

Bt e conspiracies to do so. A violation of the Act is complete

| ” when one attempts or conspires to induce a victim engaged in

we interstate commerce to part with property. United States v.

. Glynn , 627 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1980).

. The fact that the offense alleged in Count Four of the in-

C stant indictment is an naticipatory crime~-attempt and/or

3 conspiracy~-does nothing to alter the requirement that Che

" interstate nexus must be established. In discussing the juris-

“ ‘dictional nexus for inchoate erimes under the Act, the Second

” RCircuit in United States v. Varlach, 225 F.2d 665, 671 (1955)

= tated:

2 An examination of the various forms taken by Che

= legislation since the passage of the Anti- Racketeering

™ Act-of 1934 makes in clear beyond cavil, that the

2 Congress sought to apply criminal sanctions to acts

. constituting extortion or robbery or attempts or

“ conspiracies to commit such acts providing only, 45

“ow indeed the constitutional prerequisites to legislative

" jurisdiction require, that the conduct obstructed, de-

sn layed, affected, or in some way related to interstate

~11-

os commerce."

2 D. Intent Requirements under the Act

' The necessity for the interstate commerce nexus where an

° attempt or conspiracy is charged under the Act can be discerned

. y reviewing the intent requirements necessary for conviction.

. The Hobbs Act is clearly a statute requiring on general

, intent; it contains no language requiring “willful” or "know-

. ing" conduct.

Furthermore, the legislative history of the Act indicates

- that, during passage of the present law, an amendment had been

| - roposed as an alternative to the present language which did

. ontain the “knowingly” and “willfully” language, but was

™ ejected by Congress. See 91 "Congressional Record", pp. 3

= 11918-19 (1943). ;

15

The Congress was aware of the alternate language requiring

” specific intent but nevertheless did not include it in the

" present Act. Court have consistently held the Act to require |

9 only a general intent to create a violation. United States v. |

Bryson, 418 F. Supp. S18 (W.D. Okla. 1975).

” A defendant need not intend to contemplate an effect on

6 commerce. United States v. Nakaladski, 481 F.2d 289 (7th Cir.

= 968). The prosecution need only show that he agreed to embark |

a pon a course of extortionate behavior likely to have the |

™ tural effect of obstructing commerce. United States v:

ae pton, 495 F.2d 550 (Sth Cir. 1974). 4

. Congressional insistence upon a general intent statute was 2

. — to maximize constitutional power to punish actual

as e-eskies: with interstate commerce by extortion. Srirone v.

. Pnited States, supra. The intent of the defendant becomes

” mecondary to the desire of Congress to curb adverse effect of by,

*% Lommerce . It is the defendant's effect on commerce, rather than \

= is state of mind which drew greater congressional scrutiny. ie

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If the interstate commerce nexus must be satisfied "o 4

sustain a conviction for a substantive offense, no different

jurisdictional element should exist where an attempt or

In United States v. Meola, 420 U.S, 671 (1975), the

Supreme Court held that where a substantive statute has as an

element of proof some federal jurisdictional factor, such as

the interstate commerce nexus in the Hobbs Act, unless the

substantive statute requires that a defendant be aware of this

factor, the conspiracy charge will not require it.

It is undisputed that conviction for a completed extort-

fonate act under the Hobbs Act requires proof of some actual

or potential effect on commerce. United States v. Staszuk,

supra. at 53. The government need not show that the defendant

formed the specific intent to obstruct commerce; it need show

he committed an act whose necessary and natural consequence

is to affect commerce. United States v. Pranno, 385 F.2d

387, 389 (7th Cir. 1967).

The government conceded that the Forex Company had no

actual effect on commerce. It seems clear that under the

facts in the instant case, it could not have any potential

effect on commerce either. Such an effect would be necessary

before a completed extortionate act could be punishable under

the Hobbs Act.

Accordingly, mere belief by a defendant that Forex was en-

gaged in interstate commerce is insufficient to satisfy the

jurisdictional nexus under the Hobbs Act. Where that belief

would be insufficent to sustain a conviction for a substantive |

offense. it should similarly be insufficient to support 4

conviction for conspiracy or attempt.

An analysis of Judge Pregerson's opinion in United States

V. Brooklier, supra., reveals that he has misconstrued the

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intent of the Hobbs Act. in finding that no effect on inter-

state commerce need be shown where an anticipatory violation

of the Act is alleged.

Judge Pregerson cited the Supreme Court opinion in United

States v. Perez, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), a case arising under the

Consumer Credit Protection Act [18 U.S.C. 891] for the prop-

osition that Congress could punish extortionate activity under

the Hobbs Act without a specific showing in every case that

the proscribed activity affects commerce.

Perez, supra, relied on « “class of activities” concept

and concluded that Congress could properly legislate against

loan sharking on a nationwide scale without having to inquire

whether each instance of loan sharking affected interstate

commerce. S8rooklier, supra at 482, Judge Pregerson concluded

that Congress intended a similar approach where inchoate

crimes are charged under the Hobbs Act.

Such a “class of activities” approach to Hobbs Act violat-

i

‘

i

ions has been rejected by the Seventh Circuit in United Stetes |

v. Staszcuk, supra. In an en banc opinion written by Judge

Stevens, (now Mr. Justice Stevens), the Court concluded:

The language of the statute [Hobbs Act] does

not permit us to treat it as a determination

that since the class of activities giving rise

to federal concern has an adverse effect on

commerce, Congress intended any activity within

| the class to be subject to prosecution without

necessity of any showing of an actual er potential

effect on commerce in the particular case. Id at 59,

This analysis squarely rejects the conclusions upon which

this case was originally decided, and which the Niath Circuit

i/has accepted. An ascertainableinterstate nexus is a necessary

prerequisite to a prosecution under the Hobbs Act, whether the

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operators of Forex, the undercover F.B.I. operation, traveled

| sation that he and Special Agent Fisbeck had to go to Las

|} ine. Transcript, Volume XVI, pp. 4376-77.

| no business deal which required the trip to Las Vegas. Forex

[provide «1 the necessary interstate commerce nexus.

BUEUeneees eer esses ees eB kre ee ee wt ows

offense charged is a completed or inchoate offense. It is sub-

mitted that the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Bagnariol,

supra, and the instant case, has incorrectly interpreted the

Hobbs Act and wrongly affirmed the conviction herein.

Il. May a "Manufactured" Federal Nexus Satisfy the

Interstate Commerce Requirement?

On September 2, 1976, agents of the F.B.1., posing as the

to Las Vegas and arranged to meet unindicted coconspirator

Thomas Ricciardi at the MGM Grand Hotel.

Ricciardi traveled from Los Angeles to Las Vegas and met

with the agents in a hotel room for the purpose of picking up

a payment of $1,000 which was the product of the defendants’

extortionate conduct.

Special Agent Larson, one of the F.B.1. ugents masquerading

as an employee of Forex, told Ricciardi in a recorded conver-

Vegas in an effort to get financing for a video cassette mach-

That meeting was charged as an act of racketeering in

both Counts One and Two; it was alleged as both an attempt and |

; conspiracy to commit extortion under the Act. Ricciardi's |

| conversation with agents Larson and Fishbeck in the Las Vegas

[ hotel room was played for the jury during the trial. |

;

in reality, of course, there was no video cassette machine:

f was never in business.

Clearly, the trip to Las Vegas was merely: an attempt to in-

H duce one of the defendant’ s to cross a state Line | #0 as te |

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Opinion, p- 11.

486 F.2d 670 (1973), which involved a Travel Act violation

(18 U.S.C. 1952). That statute outlaws the use of any

facility in interstate commerce to perpetuate illegal activity,

In Archer, supra, the only connection with interstate

commerce were interstate phone calls initiated by a government

“agent for the express purpose of creating jurisdiction, with

the exception of one transcontinental call which the court

disregarded as a “casual and incidental occurrence". Id at 682.

The Second Circuit expressed its disapproval of the gov-

ernment's methods of uncovering illegal activities and its

attempt to create jurisdicticn. Upon rehearing, the holding

was narrowed to those instances where the interstate commerce

element is “furnished solely by the undercover agents". Id.

at 685-86,

The contrived trip to Las Vegas by F.B.I. agents can only

be construed as an obvious attempt to create a federal juris-

diction where none existed. The clear reading of the recorded

conversation [Exhibit 28, Transcript, Volume XVI p. 4382-

| 4382D! is simply an effort to get one of the defendants to

§ Cross a state line.

It can hardly be considered a coincidence that the Forex

| Operation was terminated on September 9, 1976, only seven days

| after the Las Vegas payment to Kicciardi. The interstate pay-

ment was created solely for the purpose of obtaining the

' requisite federal interstate nexus. The Ninth Circuit, in its

| opinion, sidestepped the issue, stating only that "...Here,

; both the appellants and federal agents engaged in activities

, of an interstate character. Jurisdiction had already been

| established by the nature of the activities themselves". Slip

oo ce opinion is silent as to exactly cg Pastive,

soe 48a oe ow he we

=

| attempt to create an interstate commerce nexus, the Court

imo actual or potential effect on interstate commerce need be

Se SPC Rae et eG

should be defined by this Court, for the legislative history

I simply fails to suppert the creation of ea federal offense

f solely based on a defendant's mistaken belief, where that

| belief is purposefully fostered by the government.

; the appellant-petitioner herein. Were this Court Co accept

‘rendered would be affected. Petitioner's conviction on Count

It is submitted that as Forex never engaged in any business,

there simply were no other activities which could have con-

ferred federal jurisdiction.

Where, as here, the government engaged in an obvious

should take this opportunity to define under what circumstances

the government may participate in such conduct.

CONCLUSIONS

Yhe instant case presents important questions concerning

the extent of federal jurisdiction and the degree to which

the government can “manufacture” federal offenses. The

continued viability of the First Circuit decision in United

States v. Archer, supra, is also questionable after the

opinion by the Ninth Circuit in the instant cause.

The decisisn of the Ninth Circuit also would extend

federal jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act to situations where

shown: under the rationale of the present case, federal

jurisdiction is conferred where the government puts in the

defendant's mind the possibility that his conduct may adversely

;

Hi

affect commerce. when In fact, no such effect could possibly

take place. The reach of federal power under such circumstances

i

These questions are of more than academic consideration to

the argiments advanced herein, and grant a writ of certiorari,

all counts of the indictment upon which convictions were.

«

-1?-

IV necessarily depends upon a finding of the requisite federal

jurisdiction. Should petitioner prevail on the arguments

advanced herein, the convictions on Counts One and Two--~

the RICO offenses-~must necessarily fall due to an absence

i ef the required two separate acts of racketeering. Convictiong

| were rendered on those counts only because the court below

found that the Hobbs Act alleged in Count IV could be alleged

as several acts of racketeering in the RICO counts. A reversal

on Count I[V--the Hobbs Act offense-- on the grounds asserted

| herein would require the vacating of the remaining counts as

| well.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant

| petitioner's request and issue an order reviewing the con-

victions below for the reasons assertud herein.

Dated: November 30, 1982

*

ae om A

Terry Amdur, ACtorney in

for petitioner Jack Lo

Cicero

2S ie EOS

tbe