Appendix — Douglas R. Meeks v. Florida, 418 So. 2d 987 (1982) (No. 82-5744)

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SUPREME COURT, U.S.

TS ~ S&S TAY Lee >

APPENDIX

Apperxiix A:

Meeks v. State, (Fla.S.Ct.No.59,958,.une 17, 1982)

Appendix B:

Meeks v. Florida,382 So.2d 673(Fla.1980).

Agprerdix C:

tition For Post-Comviction Relief

Supplement to Motion For Post-Conviction Relief

Statement of Judicial Acts to be Reviewed

Appendix D:

Fla. Stat. §921.14)

Apperxiix FE:

Written Findings Upon Which Sentence of Death Is Based

157

6/18/82

1952)

413 S24 ely COURT OPINIONS

281

Criminal Law—Post Conviction Relief—Ineffective

Assistance of Counse}—Denial of Relief Proper Where

Defendant Fails to Show Specific Serious Deficiency

Substantial Enough to Prejudice Defendant and Affect

Outcome of Trial

Rh. Deri 4-/9-FU

DOUGLAS TEKS ©. STATE. Supreme Coun of | onda Cax No

$9,938. Ju 982. An appeal from the Circuit Court in and for

Taylor Coun net, Judge. Stephen D. Stitt and June Rice, Gainewilk.

Twrda, for appellant. Jim Smith, Attormey General. and Wallace L. Alb

britton, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, | londa. for appeliec.

(PER CURIAM.) This is an appeal from a denial, after evdentiary

hearing, of appellant's post-connction rebel motion under Flonda

Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, asserting ineffective assistance

of trial counsel. Appellant was convicted of a convemence store

armed robbery, at which he and an acconsplice forced a store

clerk and customer to he on the floor. Appellant then fired five

exccution-ty pe shots, killing the customer but, fortunately, only

wounding the clerk, who later testified that appeliant was the one |

with the gun.

This is the fourth occasion that this case has appeared before

this Court. The initial tral, in March, 1975, was one of the first

death cases tried under the newly approved death sentence pro-

cedures. We have detailed the facts of this case in our three prior

rewews. In Meeks v. State, 339 So 2d 186 (Fla. 1976), cert

dened, 439 US. 991 (1978), we reviewed appellant's trial on

the merits and affismed his conviction and sentence of death. In

Mecks v. State, 364 So 2d 461 (Fla. 1978). this Court reaffirmed

the imposition of the death sentence, after a remand for resen

;

tencing in order to comply with the dictates of Gardner v. I horiday

430 US. 339(1977). The Gardner niolation was discovered aiter

the onginal opinion issued In Mecks v. State, 382 So 2d 673 (Fis |

1980), we found the silegations contamed in that part of appet

tant’s 3. 850 motion relating to ineffective assistance of counse!

required an evidentiary hearing, and we remanded fur that pur

pose It is the review of that proceeding which is now before us.°

Appellant contends that his tna! couns | was ineffective, claim.

ing (1) that counsel conducted inadequate jury vorr dire and failed

to seek and obtain additional peremptory challenges, (2) that

counsel improperly allowed the prosecutor to present evidence

relating to appellant's codefendant and failed to properly pursuc

a strategy of establistung the codefendant's greater culpadiisty,

and (3) that appellant's orginal trial counse! was unprepared for

the sentencing phase of the proceeding

The trial court, in denying the rehef requested, made the fol-

lowing findings

From the vantage point of hindught of five years, defen-

dant, through his present counse!, assaults the conduct of

hus defense by his former counse!. Altlwugh told that his

former counsel was present for testimony, defendant did

not choose to cali him to explain hus conduct of the tnal

and appeal. The State did not call former counsel. Nor did

the Court. Thus, counse! whose conduct of the trial and

appeal is in question did not testify

Both defendant and the State did call attomeys to testify

as expert witnesses Opinions were expressed by them as to

trial counsel's effectiveness. Defendant also made proffers as

to racial attitudes in Taylor County as they existed at tral

time and at the present as well as concerning defendant's back-

ground. Upon cunsideration, the court finds that the greater

weight of the evidence does not support defendant's conten-

tion that he did not receive reasonably effective assistance of

counsel

Tactics and strategy of counsel at tral, just as tactics and

strategy of counsel ut the instant evidentiary hearing, are ares

that the trial judge could frequently be tempted to question

The court attempts to refrain from doing so lest it usurp

counsel's role

Upon consideration of the evidence, the court finds that

defendant reerived reasonably effective assistance of counsel

at tral and upon appeal based upon the totality uf the cir-

cumstances of these cases.

We affirm the ruling of the trial judge

With reference te the aserted criticiars of (sia! counsel's cor

duct at jury selection, it must be recognized that the method:

of pury voir dire are subjective and individualist. Many cx;

nenced tral lawyers have a strong belief in short voir dis

cxamunations. Conversely, others conduct as extensive an

examination as the trial judge will allow. The views of what

constitutes the best tactical approach are divergent. and the man

ner of the examination varics from community fo community

What mught be appropriate in Palm Beach of Fort Lauderdale

may be unacceptable in Pensacola or Marianna We find this

record does not establish any identifiable de faencies in appel

lant’s trial counsel's voir dire examination, nor do we find

tus asserted failure to ask for additional peremptory cha!

lenges an erroneous omission by counsel necessitating a con

cluwon of ineffectiveness

We alse reject the second contention that appellant's tra!

counsel was deficient by allowing evidence of the codeten

dant’s participation in the cnme. It clearly appears that de

tense counsel attempted to make the codefendant the morc

dominant participant. In fact, appetiant's next assertion of

deficiency is that defense counsel did not do enough to

establish the dominance of his codefendant, both in the tna!

on the merits and in the penalty phase. This argument, vo b«

valid. must as a predicate establish the codefendant as the

undisputed dominant individual. That fact has not been estab

lished in the instant case. We recognize that the dominant

individual in a multi-party murder constitutes an important

clement, particularly where one participant receives the death

sentence and the other, as in the instant case, receives only a

fe sentence. However, we have examined the total rerord in

this cause and conclude that it reflects the codefendant was

not the dormanant force. We conclude that appellant's trial

counsel provided reasonably effective assistance of counse!

under the instant circumstances.

We rcject the thied assertion that defense counse! did not

properly represent appellant in the sentencing phase of these

proceedings Appellant argues that trial counsel six years ago

should have known what the law would be at this time. This

is clearly without merit. See Parker v. North Carobna, 397

US. 790 (1970); Knight v. State, 394 So.2d 997 (Fla. 1981)

We find that appellant has failed to show that the asserted

deficiencies of hus trial counsel meet the requirements se!

forth in Knight v. State. As we said in Knight “the defendant

has the burden to show that this specific, serfees deficiency.

when considered under the ciscumstances of the individual

case, was substantial enough to demonstrate a prejudice to

the defendant to the extent that there is a likelihood thot

the deficient conduct affected the outcome of the court

proceedings.) Id. at 1001. This, appellant has not done. The

trial judge pfoperly denied the mation for post-conviction

relief, and we, accordingly, affirm. _It is so ordered.

(Sundberg, CJ, Adlazs, Boyd, Overton, Akderman & McDonald,

JJ, Concur,

*This decision should not be confused with Meeks v. State, 36 So.2d

1142 (fa. 1976), which concerns a review of an entirely independent

murder conviction and sentence of death.

THE FLORIDA LAW WEEKLY & 3 puliqanen of fadicul amd Adewnstratiwe Research Avewiates. Incorporates!

E327 Neth Adams Sercet, Bot Offiwe eve 4284. Taliahamwee, Morais 3230) Phone (904) 222.147)

Appendix B

Supreme Court of Florida

No. $8,618

DOUGLAS RAY MEEKS, Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

{March 20, 1980]

PER CURIAM

This is an eppeal from an order denying Douglas Meeks’

motions for post-conviction relief under Plorida Rule of Criminal

Procedure 2.850. Appellant requested an evidentiary hearing on

his motions and a stay of execution pending disposition thereof.

Having reviewed the record and having heard oral argument, we

concluded that sppellant was entitled to a stay of execution

pending disposition of this appeal. The stay of execution was

entered on February 11, 1980, after oral argument on that date.

Appellant has been convicted of first-degree murder and

sentenced to death on two separate occasions. On March 12, 1975,

appellant was convicted and sentenced to death for the surder of

Licyd Walker (lower court No. 74-299 CF). This Court affirmed

the conviction and sentence on October 28, 1976, reported at 339

So.24 186 (Pla. 1976). On May 6, 1977, we issued a Gardner*

order directing the trial judge to state whether his sentence was

based on any information not known to appellant. On May 18,

1977, the judge responded that he had relied in part on a psychi-

“ atric report which had not been furnished to sppellant. This

1. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).

Court remanded the cause to the trial court for an evidentiary

hearing on the issue, at which time it was learned that appel-

lant’s trial counsel had been present during the examination upon

which the report was based. Appells:. was afforded an opportunity

to rebut the contents of the psychiatric report, but his testimony

at the hearing only confirmed the report's accuracy. On November 2,

1978, we reaffirmed the death sentence, 3164 $0.24 461 (Pla.

1978). Appellant sought review of his original conviction and

sentence as well as the Gardner proceeding by petition for writ

of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, which was

denied, 439 U.S. 991 (1978).

On June 4, 1975, appellant was convicted and sentenced to

death for the surder of Chevis Thompson (lower court No. 74-300 CF).

We affirmed the conviction and sentence on July 21, 1976, 336

So.24 1142 (Fla. 1976). In response to this Court's Gardner

order of May 6, 1977, the trial judge stated that his sentence had

been based exclusively on information known to appellant. On

January 11, 1979, we issued an order declaring this case final.

Appellant filed motions for post-conviction relief pursu-

ant to rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure on

December 11, 1979 (directed to case No. 74-299), and on December }1,

1979 (directed to case Wo. 74-300). Om January 31, 1980, a hearing

was held in the trial court to determine whether an evidentiary

hearing should be granted. The trial judge denied the sotion for

2. Rule 3.850 provides in pertinent part:

If the motion and the files end records in the case

conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no

relief, the motion shall be denied without « hearing.

In those instances when such denial is not predicated

upon the legal insufficiency of the motion on its face,

a copy of that portion of the files and records which

conclusively shows that the prisoner is entitied to no

relief shall be attached to the orter. Unless the motion

and the files and records of the case conclusively show

that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court

shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the

prosecuting attorney of the court, grant « prompt hearing

thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact

and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the

court finds that the judgment was rendered without

jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not

@2-

evidentiary hearine h second Searing wat belt on Pebruary *

Le82. to Setermizre whether «a stay of ewecation should be crerted

ant whether appellant wes entitieéd te the reiief reqeested in

has cule 3.850 mrtions Pre forme orders Genwine reiiefr

were filed om Pebrwary 5. 198¢ Ta an amended orger dated Tebery

ary 8. 1980. the trial ‘utce Senied apreliant'® motion for post-

comriction relief in case Bo. “4-2%

Appellant alleces the following six eroands for relief in

his rele 2.882 mction with respect to his surcer conviction in

case Wo. 74-29% CF Ll) that court-appointed counsel C14 not

render effective aesistance of cowneel at trial. at the sentence

hearing. OF GR aprea., Ps that Sefendart @ Seat? sertence wes

imposed in violation of the Sixth, Sightr amit fourteenth apend~

gents to the Caited States Comstitetion Beceure it was Lagweedt

epon the recommendation of a ‘tary that wes not required te be

eran gous 3) that the ‘ary was selected throwgh procedures

that systematically excleded from jury service pertons Raving

scruples against the death pene.rty is violation of B84 toerspoonr

Tihinois. 391 C.8. $id 11966 4) that defendant's death

sentence vislates the equal protection clause of the state ard

federal comstitutions Ddecause it was imposed pursuant te 4 pat~

tern and practice of racial discrimination in capital sentencing

S) that there was no evidence of preweditation in the charge of

wurder end that, therefore, defendant ceuld not be convicted of

felony-surder and the underlying felony upon which the murder

comviction was based: and (6) that defendant is entitied te «

resentencing hearing on his first-degree surder conviction becayvee

2. (continued)

authorized by law or ie otherwise open to collateral

attack, or that there hae been such « denial or

infringement of the constitutional rights of the

prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerabie to

collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the

judgment aside and shall discharge the priesover or

resentence his or grant him a new trial of correct

the sentence a8 may appear appropriate.

statutory mandates were not followed and the prosecutor was

allowed to make improper argument to the jury in contravention of

due process'of law. Except for ground 5, appellant alleges the

same grounds for relief with respect to his surder convicticn

in case No. 74-300 CF and, in addition, alleges (6) that the

defendant is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor was

@llowedt to make improper and inflammatory comments at closing

argument: (7) that the sentencing judge's use of a court-ordered

psychiatric examination violated defendant's rights under the

fifth, sixth, eighth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution

because defendant abandoned his insanity defense before trial; and

(8) that defendant’s death sentence is unconstitutional as applied

under the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution

because it is part cf a wanton and freakish pattern of imposition

in the State of Florida. All except two of the foregoing issues

were or could have been raised on direct appeal and therefore sre

foreclosed in this proceeding for collateral review. Adams v.

State, No. $8,576 (Pla. Feb. 8, 1980). Senry v. State, 377 80.24

692 (Pie. 1979); Sullivan v. State, 372 $o.24 938 (Fla. 1979). The

two grounds cognizable for collateral ettack here sre the aliega-

tions of ineffective assistance of counsel and racial discrinination

in cepitel sentencing (grounds 1 and 4 in both rule }.850 motions).

in support of ground 1, appellant cites a number of specific

instances in which counsel's failure to ect allegedly amounted to

ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial, sentencing and

appeal stages of both proceedings. Predicated or these specific

allegations, appellant contends that counsel's overall performance

Gemonstrates that appellant was given only pro forma representation.

We note first of all that @ conviction is presumed to be valid.

Therefore, when ineffective assistance of counsel is asserted,

the burden is on the person seeking collateral relief to specifically

allege and establish the grounds for relief and to establish whether

these grounds resulted in prejudice to that person. foxworth v,.

State, 267 $0.24 647 (Pla. 1972), cert. denied, 411 0.S. 987 (1973).

Second, the appropriate test to be applied in determining whether

defendant was afforded effective assistance of cownsel is not

“sham and mockery,” but whether counsel was reasonably likely

to render and did render reasonably effective counsel based on

the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Gray, 565

F.2¢ 881 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978). This

does not mean, however. that defendant sust be afforded errorless

counsel or that counsel will be judged ineffective by a standard

based on hindsight. United States v. Pessell, $31 F.2d 1275

(Sth Cir. 1976). Wor does this standard mean that counsel is

to be judged ineffective by virtue of his failure to anticipate

future developments in the law. Parker v. North Caroling, 397

U.S. 790 (1970); Davis v. Wainwright, 547 F.24 261 (Sth Cir. 1977).

Pursuant to a rule 3.850 motion, a prisoner is entitled

to an evidentiary hearing unless the motion and the files and

records in the case conclusively show that he is entitled to no

relief. If the prisoner raises a matter that may properly be

considered in a rule 3.850 motion, the trial judge reviewing

the motion sust either attach that portion of the case file or

record which conclusively shows that the prisoner is entitled

to no relief or grant an evidentiary hearing. Gunn v. State,

Mo. 78-211/T4-5) (Fla. Sth OCA Jan. 2, 1980); Giles v. State,

363 So.24 164 (Pla. 3d OCA 1978): Payne v. State, 362 So.24 668

(Pla. 2d OCA 1978). Based on our review of the record presented

to this Court, we cannot say that appellant's specific allegations

of ineffective evaistance of counsel, considered collectively,

conclusively show a lack of merit so as to obviate the need for

an evidentiary hearing into the matter.

With regard to ground 4, the Court is not persuaded that

appellant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing respecting his

contention that Florida's death penalty statute is imposed in an

unconstitutionally discriminatory fashion.

Accordingly, to the extent that the trial court's orders

and amended order deny relief under rule 3.850 with respect to

the ground of ineffective essistance of counsel, they are hereby

reversed, The orders are in all other respects affirmed. This

case is remanded to the trial court for a prompt evidentiary

hearing on the question of ineffective assistance ef counsel.

The stay of execution previously granted by this Court on

February 11, 1980, is dissolved.

It is so ordered.

ENGLAND, C.J., OVERTON, SUNDBERG, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., Concur

OVERTON. J., Concurs specially with an opinion, with which ALDERMAN

and McDONALD, JJ., Concur

SUNDBERG, J., Concurs specially with an opinion, wita which

ENGLAND, C.J., Concurs

ADKINS, J., Oissents with an opinion, with which BOYD, J., Concurs

OT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO PILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF

TILED, DETERMINED.

OVERTON, ae specially concurring.

I would totally reject the contention of the movant-

appellant that a victim-oriented statistical factual basis may be

submitted within the purview of Henry v. State, 377 So. 24 692

(Fla. 1979), to show that Florida's death penalty statute is

imposed in an unconstitutional and discriminatory manner.

The appellant's statistical allegations are based entirely

on the race of the victim rather than the race of the offender.

To try to statistically correlate offenders’ race with the race

of their victias results in a gathematical nightmare which has no

bearing on the actual conduct. of the offender as the determining

fecter cf who lives and who dies. We are obligated to review

@ach case upon its facts and circumstances and determine whether

Or not the conduct of the offender justifies the imposition of

the death penalty.

The appellant's own statistical allegations clearly

establish that this black appellant has not been prejudiced. The

figures specifically reflect that of the 2,606 homicides

committed by blacks, fifty-nine have resulted in the death

penalty. Om the other hand, of the 2,256 homicides committed by

whites, seventy-two have resulted in the death penalty. These

statistics reflect no disparity or discrimination. In my view,

the statistical information subsitted by appellant in this cause

is Similar to that rejected by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

in Spinkelilink v. Wainwright, $76 F.24 $82 (Sth Cir. 1978). cert.

Genied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979). There Spinkellink submitted

statistical evidence which reflected that °92 percent of the

smmates on Florida death row had surdered white victims while

only 8 percent had murdered black victias.* (Emphasis added.)

$78 F.24 at 612. This data was held to be legally insufficient

to establish @ prima facie showing of racial discrimination. f

conclude that the instant figures similarly fail to establish a

factual basis for the proposition that our death penalty statute

is being applied in a ciscriminatory manner or is not racially

neutral. See Lewis, Mannie, Allen, and Vetter, A_Post-Purman

Profile of Plorida‘s Condemned--A Question of Discrimination in

Terms of the Race of the Victim and a Comment on Spinkellink v.

Wainwright, 9 Stetson Law Review 1 (1979).

ALDERMAN and MCDONALD, J3., Concur <-7-

}

SUNDBERG, J., concurring specially.

While I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment in this

case, I deem it appropriate to express the reason for sy

concurrence in the conclusion that appellant is not entitled to

an evidentiary hearing regarding his contention that Florida's

death penalty statute is imposed in an unconstitutionally

4iscriminatory fashion. The reason is that I do not believe

appellant has made a sufficient preliminary showing to require

such a hearing. Counsel for appellant urges us to adopt the

test enunciated in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 0.8. 482 (1977). as

a guide in determining whether our statute has been unevenly

ppiied. Pursuant to that test it would be sppellant’s task to

show: (1) a marked statistical disparity over a significant

period of time in the way the death penalty is imposed upon black

and white capital defendants, and (2) that the capital sentencing

procedure in Plorida is susceptible of abuse or not racially

neutral. If appellant introduced competent evidence in support

of these two elements, he would have made a prima facie showlag

of discriminatory application of the death penalty, and the burden

would then shift to the state to rebut appeliant's case. Id. at

494-95. Gee Rose v. Mitchell, v.s. » 99 8. Ct. 3993,

L.246.2¢ (1979); Washincton v. Davis, 426 ©.S. 229 (1976).

Assuming. without deciding, that the Castaneda test is an

appropriate analytical tool in this case. appellant has failed,

even on @ preliminary basis so as to justify an evidentiary hearing.

to present a sufficiently compelling statistical showing over a

significant period of time that Plorida’s death penalty statute

has been unconstitutionally applied. I! would note incidentally

that eppellant’s statistical data is victim-oriented; there has been

no showing of disproportionate black representation of those now

residing on death row as a result of the operation of our capital

sentencing statute, section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1979).

ENGLAND, C.J., Concurs

Indeed, that the Castaneda analysis is appropriate in the

context of an equal protection challenge to Plorida's death

penalty statute is not without some doubt. See Spinkellink v.

Wainwright, $78 7.24 582 (Sth Cir. 1978). ~

ADKINS, J., Oissenting.

The motion, the files, and the records in the case conclu-

sively show that defendant is not entitled to relief. The trial

judge properly denied an evidentiary hearing.

After meticulously picking through the record, appellate

counsel has differed with the judgment of trial counsel in the

manner in which certain portions of the trial were conducted.

Therefore appellate counsel says trial counsel should be placed

upon trial before the trial judge. The trial judge has carefully

considered contentions of appellate counsel and decided that

trial counsel rendered reasonably effective counsel based on «

totality of the circumstances. The record disclosed this on its

face, so the trial judge denied the motion. Appellate counsel

now complains to us, saying the trial judge committed error. We

have examined this record twice in the past, and our decision was

not disturbed by the United States Supreme Court. The majority

has been led into a quagmire of confusion and decided that stil.

another hearing should be held.

Using general terms and without setting forth specific

guidelines, the majority is teliing the trial judge to try triel

counsel. Even « defendant in a criminal case requires a more

definite specification of charges before he is required to answer.

The guilt of the defendant is firmly established by the

evidence. The trial judge justified his sentence of death in

writing and provided this Court the opportunity for a seaningful

review. We determined that the trial judge viewed the issue of

life or death within the framework of the rules provided by

statute. The Supreme Court of the United States agreed with us.

As stated in State v. Dixon, 283 So.24 1 (Pla. 1973), dis-

crimination or capriciousness cannot stand where reason is required.

This was an aggravated and indefensible crime. The alleged

statistics gathered by appellate counsel do not change the nature

of this crime nor do they have any bearing on whether this particular

defendant should or should not receive capital punishment.

The citizens of our state, speaking through the legislature,

have determined that capital punishment should be inflicted in

-9-

certain instances. The Supreme Court of the United States has

held that our form of procedure is constitutional. This Court

has followed the guidelines set forth by the legisleture and

approvec by the United States Supreme Court. If we continue to

create new procedures, anc cause more delays, the deterrence

of capital punishment will be ineffective.

To be successful in his contention, the deferdant would

be required to show that the procedure under which 4 person is

selected for a death sentence is susceptible to abuse or not

racially neutral. Unless there is & scheme or conspiracy among

the twenty state attorneys in Florida to seek death penalties

primarily when # white victim has been surdered, then race-of-the-

victim argument must fail under its own weight. Also, the

imposition of the death pens!ty ultimately requires the concurrence

of the trial judge, the Florida Supreme Court, and the Governor's

Executive Clemency Board. To be successful, the defendant must

show that all of these officers participated in intentional or

purposeful discrimination. As stated in °A Post-Purman Profile

of Plorida's Condemned, etc.,° by Lewis, Mannie. Allen and Vetter.

9 Stetson Law Review 1 (Fall 1979), “it is thus unlikely that

any defendant will be able to establish ea prima facie case of

purposeful discrimination based on a ‘race-of-the-victis’ hypothesis.*°

Our system guarcs against discrimination in terms of the

rece of the victia and is not subject to attack on that basis.

Our responsibility is « tremendous one in capital cases.

However, this defendant has received « fair and impartial trial,

counsel was reasonably effective based on the totality of the

circumstances, and there is a total absence of discrimination

in the imposition of the death penalty.

In my opinion the stay order should be dissolved and the

decision of the trial judge should be affirmed.

BOYD, J., Concurs

-10-

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Taylor County,

Royce Agner, Judge - Case Nos. 74-299-CF and 74-300-CF

Stephen D. Stitt and June Rice, Gainesville, Florid

Jim Smith, Attorney Genera ané Wallace £. Allbritton, Assistant

Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellee

bee . awe THe THIRD SAL ciRcUIT CouRT

: TAYLOR COUNTY, FLURIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA

Vv.

Case No. 74-299

DOUGLAS RAY MEEKS :

MOTION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF

1. Name and location of the court which entered the Judgment of convic-

tion under attack: Third Judicial Circuit Court, Taylor County,

Florida. . °

2. Date of judgment of conviction: March 12, 1975

3. Length of sentence: Count I, Death; Count II, Life; Count III,

15 years consecutive; Count IV, 15 years consecutive.

‘h. Nature of offense(s) involved (al! counts): Count I, Murder in the

First Degree; Count II, Robbery; Count III, Assault with the Intent

to Commit Murder; Count IV, Use of a Firearm in the Commission of a

Fehony mar was your plea? (check only one)

(a) Not Guilty x

(b) Guilty

(d) Not Guilty by reason of Insanity

If you entered one plea to ore count, and a different plea to another

count, give details:

N/A

6. Kind of trial: (check only one)

(a) Jury x -

(b) Judge onty without jury -

7. Did you testify at the trial or at any pre-trial hearing?

Yes No X

If yes, list each such occasion:

8. Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction?

Yes Xx No

9. tf you did appeal, answer the following:

(a) Name of court: Florida Supreme Court

{b) Result: affirmed conviction si

(d) Citation (if known): 339 So. 2d 186

10. Other than a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence,

have you previously filed any petitions, applications, motions, etc. with

Fespect to this judgment in this court? .

Yes No X f :

Page 1 of 5

1. If you ser to number 10 was "yes". the following informa-

tion (applies onty .» proceedings in this court): N/A

(a) (1) Mature of the proceeding:

(2) Grounds raised:

(3) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition,

application, motion, etc.?

Yes No

(4) Result:

(5) Date of result:

(b) As to any second petition, application, motion, etc. give the

same information:

(1) Nature of the proceeding:

(2) Grounds raised:

(3) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition,

application, motion, etc?

Yes No

(4) Result:

(S) Date of result:

12. Other than a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and

sentence, have you previously filed any petition, applications, motions, etc.

with respect to this judgment in any other court?

Yes X No

13. Jf your answer to number 12 was "yes", give the following Information:

(a) (1) Name of courtUnited States Supreme Court

(2) Nature of the proceeding: petition for Writ of Certiorari

(3) Grounds raised: (a) Whether Nondisclosure of Psychiatric

report violates 6th and 14th Amendment rights; (b) Witherspoon

challenges; and (c) Whether the death sentence violates 8th and 14th

Amendment rights.

Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition,

application, motions, etc?

Yes No y

(5) Result: Petition denied

(6) Date of result: November 27, 1978

(b) As to any second petition, application, motion, etc. give the

same information:

N/A

(1) Name of Court:

(2) Mature of the proceeding:

(3) Grounds raised:

Page 2 of 5S

; Te ——

‘application, motion, c.?

Yes

'Vwewe ee =e

ee —e

tlo

(5) Result:

(6) Date of result:

(c} As to any third petition, application, motion, etc., give the

same information: N/A

(1) Name of Court:

(2) Nature of

the proceeding:

(3) Grounds raised:

(4) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing om your petition,

application, motion, etc.?

Yes

(5) Result:

(6) Date of result:

14, State concisely every ground on which you claim that the judgment or

sentence is umlawful. Summarize briefly the facts supporting each ground. if

necessary, you may attach pages stating additional grounds and the facts

supporting them.

For your information, the following is a list of the most frequently

raised grounds for post-convict

ion relief. Each statement preceded by a

letter constitutes a separate ground for possible relief. You may raise any

grounds which you may have other than those listed. However, you should raise

in this motion all available

grounds (relating to this conviction) on which

you base your allegations that your conviction or sentence is unlawful.

DO NOT CHECK ANY OF THESE LISTED GROUNDS. If you select one or more of

these grounds for relief, you must allege facts. The motion will not be

accepted by the Court if you

{a) Conviction obtained

merely check (a) through (1).

by plea of guilty or nolo enntendere which was

unlawfully induced or mot made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of

the charge and the consequences of the plea.

(b) Conviction obtained

tutional search and seizure.

(d) Conviction obtained

érrest.

(e) Conviction obtained

incrimination.

(f) Conviction obtained

to disclose to the defendant

(g) Conviction obtained

jeopardy.

(h) Conviction obtained

by use of coerced confession.

by use of evidence gained pursuant to an unconsti-

by use of evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful

by a violation of the privilege against sel f-

by the unconstitutional failure of the prosecution

evidence favorable to the defendant.

by a violation of the protection against double

by action of a grand or petit jury which was

unconstitutionally selected or impanelled.

(i) Denial of effective assistance of counsel.

(j) Denial or right of appeal.

(k) Lack of jurisdiction of the court to enter the judgnent or impose

sentence (such as an unconsti

tutional statute).

(1) Sentence in excess of the maximum authorized by law.

weer mee

Page 3 of S

A. Ground one’ ° is the position or th " endant/Petitioner

“that court appoin.ed counsel did not render effective assistance

of counsel at trial, at the sentencing hearing, Gr on appeal.

Supporting Facts: Please see attached Supplement to Motion for

Post Conviction Relief incorporated herein by reference.

B. Ground two: Defendant's death sentence was imposed in viola-

tion of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution because it was imposed upon the recommendation

of a jury that was not required to be unanimous.

Supporting Facts: Please see attached Supplement to Motion for

Post Conviction Relief incorporated herein by referencc.

C. Ground three: Defendant's death sentence was imposed pursuant

to a recommendation of a jury selected through procedures that

Systematically excluded from jury service persons having scruples

against the death penalty, in violation of Witherspoon v. Illinois.

Supporting Facts: Please see attached Supplement to Motion for

Post Conviction Relief incorporated herein by reference.

D. Ground four: Defendant's death sentence violates the Equal

Protection clause of state and federal constitutions because it

was imposed pursuant to a pattern and practice of racial discrim-

ination in capital sentencing.

Supporting Facts: Please see attached Supplement to Motion for

Post Conviction Relief incorporated herein by reference.

E. Ground five: Defendant's sentence of life imprisonment on the

conviction of robbery should be vacated because there was no

evidence of premeditation in the charge. gf murder. Therefore,

the Defendant could not be convicted of“felony-murder and the

underlying felony upon which the murder conviction was based.

Supporting Facts: Please see attached Supplement to Motion for

Post Conviction Relief incorporated herein by reference.

I Ground six: The Defendant is entitled to a resentencing

hearing on the conviction for first degree murder because

statutory mandates were not followed and because the prosecutor

was allowed to make improper argument to the jury. These

procedures denied the Defendant due process of the law, in

contravention of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution.

Supporting Facts" Please sce attached Supplement to Motion for

Post Conviction Relief incorporated herein by reference.

15. If any of the grounds listed in 14A, B, C and D were not

previously presented on your direct appeal, state briefly what

gounds were not so presented, and give your reasons why they

were not so presented:

Due to lack of effective representation at trial and on appeal,

issues were not raised or preserved. There was no knowing waiver

on the part of the Defendant of any of the preceding issues and

failure to raise or argue issues was not grounded in strategy

by counsel.

16. Do you have any petition, application, appeal, motion, ctc.

now pending in any court, either state or federal, as to the

judgement under attack?

Yes No x

Page 4 of 5

- —-o* _———- ae ee ee Oe ee -- ee rm ee SE ee ee ee ee

gree a Ie

17. If your answer to number 16 was "yes", give the following

information: N/A

(a) Name of Court:

: (b) Nature of the Proceedings:

: (d) Status of the proceedings:

18. Give the name and address, if known, of each attorney who

represented you in the following stages of the judgment

attacked herein.

(a) At preliminary hearing: TW

(b) At arraignment and plea:

(d) At sentencing: Mr. John Howard, Cross City, Florida

(e) On appeal: Mr. John Howard, Cross City, Florida

(f) In any post-conviction proceeding: On Petition for

Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme

Court: David Kendall, Jack Greenberg, James Nabritt

III, Joel Berger, N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense Fund,

New York, and Anthony G. Amsterdam, Stanford, Cal-

ifornia.

(g) On appeal from any adverse ruling in a post-convict-

tion proceeding:

WHEREFORE, Movant prays that the Court grant all relief to

which he may be entitled in this proceeding, including but

not limited to (here list the nature of the relief sought):

1. Vacation of judgment and sentence and new trial, and ~

2. Such other and further relief as the Court deems just

and proper.

STATE OF FLORIDA

COUNTY OF {@en

Before me, the undersigned authority, this day

personally appeared June Rice who first being duly sworn,

Says that she is counsel for the Defendant in the above-styled

cause, that she has read the foregoing Mction for Post-Convict-

ion Relief and has knowledge of the facts and matters therein

set forth and alleged; and that each and all of these facts and

matters are true and correct to the best of her knowledge.

SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED J TO

before me this Cine

day of December, .

Cy ta Z fiske FeMpons

Commission exe ines

3]7/82

Page 5 of 5

SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF

A.Grounld Onc Supporting Facts:

1. Ineffective Assistance at Trial.

a. Although defense counsel originally filed a plea of Not

Guilty by Reason of Insanity, counsel later withdrew that plea

and did nothing further to explore theories of diminished

responsibility or prior mental health problems.

Counsel was present during a psychiatric examination of

the Defendant but it does not appear from the report or any

where on the record that the Defendant was advised that statc-

ments made to the psychiatris. would be used against him. The

majority of the report amounts to nothing more than a confession

with very little comment on the issues of competency or insanity.

The record does not reflect any advice on counsel's part as

to the Defendant's Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrin-

ination.

b. There was no motion for change of venue or in the alterna-

tive any effective voir dire questioning by counsel concerning

publicity and/or knowledge of the case. Almost all of the

prospective jurors admitted they had some knowledge of the case,

either from reading about it in the newspaper, hearing abcut

it on the radio, or hearing gossip or “street talk" about it.

Several jurors were acquainted with various critical parties

in the case, including the victim, the co-defendant, the

de fendent and several witnesses.

It appears from the record that two spparate murder tria!s

for the Defendant were scheduled back-to-back. There were no

voir dire questions that explored knowledge of the fact that

there was another murder charge or whether jurors had inforwa-

tion concerring the other charge. Only pro forma questions

were asked and there was no attempt to probe into prejudicial

areas im camsra. Because of the size of the town and the

notoriety of the cases, counsel's failure to effectively voir

dire prospective jurors denied the Defendant a fair and impar-

tial jury. Counsel failed to establish a record reflecting the

Passe 1 of 6

‘©,

hime,

prejudice that is highly likely to exist in such a situaticn.

No effort was made to determine the content of the "yossip" and

“street talk’ the prospective jurors were exposed to.

c. Counsel failed to establish a record concerning possible

jury selection violations, both in the grand and petit juries.

Counsel did not question prospective jurors about possible race

prejudice, even though the Defendant was Black and the victims

white. The record does not reflect whether there were members

of the Defendant's race in the grand jury pool, the petit jury

pool, or on the jury itself.

d. Counsel failed to build a record concerning possible

Witherspoon challenges. The trial transcript contains numerous

notations of “inaudible” and it is impossible to tell from the

transcript which juror answered questions in what manner and

which jurors were excused as a result. Defense counsel made

no effort to make sure that the prospective jurors understood

their legal duty to subordinate their scruples and apply the law

as instructed by the judge. Counsel's failure to rehabilitate

prospective jurors or to make sure they understood the issue

served to deny the Defendant any possibility of representation

on the jury of persons with scruples against the death penalty.

Please see Ground Three for additional supporting facts.

z. Ineffective Assistance at the Sentencing Phase.

It is clear from the record that there was literally no prep

aration by counsel for the seatencing phase of the trial. The

jury returned a verdict of guilty to all counts of the indict-

ment at 4:52 p.m. Defense counsel did not request a continuance

to prepare for argument or the presentation of mitigating circum-

stances. The sentencing phase began at 5:05 p.m.and the only

witness called was the Taylor County clerk of the court. Defense

counsel, by asking the clerk about pending cases in other counties,

opened the door for the prosecutor to ask on cross examinction

about other pending charges in Taylor County. The jury was

therefore allowed to hear information that was highly prejudicial

to the Defendant and which was a non-statutory aggravating

.Circumstance.

Page 2 of 6

the jury in this life or death recommendation was a few

seconds of argument which did not touch on any of the statutory

mitigating circumstances. Nor did defense counsel rebut

any of the inaccurate or inappropriate argument made by the

state attorney. Please see Ground Six for additional

supporting facts. as

3. Ineffective Assistance on Appeal. The court-appointed

trial counsel was designated by the trial judge to represent

the Defendant on appeal. Although counsel raised seven points

on appeal, the brief filed by counsel contained less than six

pages of argument. One of the points raised on appeal was

specifically waived by counsel at trial, that of polling the

jury regarding their sentencing recommendation. Because of

counsel's failure to raise and preserve possible points of

appeal at the trial stage, counsel prevented the Defendant

fron having a full review of his death sentence as mandated

by the Florida Supreme Court and the United States Supreme

Court. ,

B. Ground Two Supporting Facts:

‘ Florida Statutes 921.141(3) provides that the jury

recommendation of sentence shall be by majority vote.

C. Ground Three Supporting Facts:

Witherspoon forbids the allowance of a challenge for

cause to a veniremafi unless that venireman has first been

instructed by the frial judge that he has a legal duty to sub-

ordinate his scruples to his ébidestion to sit as a juror and

to follow the tf AF be possibly can. Unless the venireman,

after such instyuction, makes it unmistakably clear that he is

unable to ions faas the application of the death penalty in any

case, he canngt be excused for cause.

Two juroys were excused for cause without such instruct.on

by the Sudes: Mrs. Tumlin (p. 56 of the trial transcript) and

Mrs. Hale Ap. 82 of the trial transcript). Defense counsel

did not @oject to the challenges for cause and also failed to

deternife whether the juror understood the issue and would

Page 3 of 6

‘

ner eee LES 58GB tPF EM OA SR EEL g: SIT OP ites So epee-o sol cs Tame ae

follow the law as instructed. In the case of Mrs. Tumlin,

she at one point stated she would b: able to reach a verdict

in spite of her oj sition to the death penalty. Im the ca

of Mrs. Hale, it is impossible to tell whether the challeng:

for cause was appropriate because the record only reflects

that her responses to questions concerning her ability to

reach a verdict were inaudible.

Ground Four Supporting Facts

The death penalty h been imposed against the Defendant

in violation of his constitutional rights under the Eighth,

and Fourteenth Amendments in that the penalty improperly di

Criminates against black people and in favor of white people

On informati and belief, the Defendant avers, and requests a

hearing at which he y prove, that fifty percent of Florid

murder victims are white, yet their killers comprise 95 per t

of the state's death row The death penalty in Florida is f

more likely to | j i in “black on white” homicide case

th in those similaz it t es but. involving a different

racial mixture

G 1 Five § rt Fact

The stat tt ; Bt. €] r to prospective juror

on voir dire j t the j y in « ing statement and clos!

argu t that } j ha to prove premeditation in o1

for th jury t t the Defendant of first degre rd

No evi e¢ ted at trial or during the penalt

pha t t ti : row itted with premeditation. Th

court it y tate, 33 2d 38 (3DCA 1978), heid that

wher 2 jur i have found t Defendant guilty of first

legree mur : ly on the | is of evidence that he killed t}

victim during t perpretration of an itemized felony, ard

without evidencs f pr editation, there could not be a sent

for the underlying felony as well as for the first degree r I

Ground S:.x Supporting Fact:

At the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury was pe

mitted to hear evidence that the Defendant had another pending

charge in Taylor County This is an impermissable non-statutory

—

the

r that was

rcumstance.

“a> ~ fe %

attorney

The jury also heard argument fror

inaccurate and inapp

‘

ropriate. Spec

argued that the fact that the

not have a prior or significant history of pri

vitics

e. The

pre

nelantte

NUsgnt >

non-statu

ecutor dou

| ,

u Clay

i to be

; 5 e¢

l the jur

sld receive

sible to

issues

ic sentencing phase

trial, beginn

should

ies when in fact he was only 21. This

low

factor by th

gue

were

i not be any kind of mitigating c

23 of the trial transcript), directly contr

secutor argued that the Defendant 1

was ultimately determined to

1.Q.

ial judge, but it is possib]

imy >

considered any mitigating factors

and defense

erroneous arguments

mitigation. The prosecutor also

was convictea

nsidered in aggravation, another

ory aggravating circumstance.

led up on factors involving pecuni

& fe] y of robbery and 0 } ri

mpermissable under subsequent case

led to infor the jury that a capit

> yea mandatory without parol

by . ying that if they re c } ]

J receive no greater senter than

er The argument tnat “to r

turn him lt e with murder" was

Ty. B ause the prosecutor ar;

Try aggravating circumstances an:

y in several other regards, the

ntencing hearing.

iclude that the advisory

their decision in light

arcu ne osecutor,

rebut or offer mitigation, the brevity,

considered after a long and diffi

was conducted immediately after

:05 p.m. The jury reti

OF FLO

DOUGLAS RAY

GROUND

without the

vided to the

held to dete

competency

aya

SIX

rmi

violated Pet

Fourteenth Ar

rting

report in |?

j n¢ qué ?

and that he

the consider:

that the exp!

does not open

prejudicail t

confidential

applied

States ¢€

“Or

pattern of

Supporting Facts:

1972 death penalty statute }

stitution

DA,

The

} , ;

itio

he d

imposition

Petitioner is

consideration of

rt after a <¢

ne Petitioner

tand trial.

oner's rights

din nt to the

The psychi

ente ing t

In 74-299,

ritt. findi

ed at

t he re}

of insa

r Zor ¢%

sour

itione

eh ® bh

ss sa

in the

hough

‘

;

IN -THE

COURT,

TH!

Case 7

No.

psychiatric

atric

entitled

-ordered psyci

use of the

TAYI

4a-

psyc

JUDICIAL

AR COUNTY,

hiatric

CIRCUI

FLORI!

299-CF

EYGNT_TO MOTION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF

resentenced

report which was pro

examinatic

rej

"Tt

crime an

under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

United States Constitution.

report provided by Dr. Carr

the judge in both cass ageail

judge quoted extensively from tl

supporting the death sentence. Th

rt worked to disadvantage Petit

to the defense of insanity t

ner when

suc

in sentencing

as a defens¢

udge to rely o

h informatio

Petitioner submi

Spcc i f ic

was

indi

_¢

mained from

t-ordered psychiatrists.

State

the

as been upheld,

death sentence

Fourteenth

part a

of Florida.

facial constitutionality of Florida’:

Amendments

wanton

unconstitutior

to the

and freakish

orma

the death penaity has

Since been administered and applied under the statute in a manner

which is inconsistent with the premises of State v. Dixon, 283 So.

2d 1 (Fla. 1973) and Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).

Death sentences are imposed irregularly, unpredictably and whimsically

in cases which are no more deserving of capital punishment, under a

standard that considers the character of the offender and the offense,

than many other cases in which sentences of imprisonment are imposed.

I. GROUND EIGHT: Prejudicial error was committed by the trial court,

when during jury deliberation, a question was presented by the jury

which was answered with information not in evidence and which mad

inferences concerning the Petitioner's failure to testify in his

own behalf, thereby constituting an improper comment on Petitioner's

right to remain silent as provided by the Fifth Amendment to the

Supporting Facts The jury asked the following question

" JUROR Yes, Your Honor, the question has come over and

over in our discu ion, why Mr. Hardwick was not a wit

ness in any way relating to the case."

(T-299, Pp. 391 )

The ¢ rt a re in the fol} way

“COURT Court is in order. Members of the Jury, Homer

Lee Hardwick, Jr., is under an Indictment charging hir

wit crimes ar ing out of the same transaction as that

which thi trial is concerned and therefore he cannot

be <¢ lled to te« tif

(T-299,p. 395)

TI answer was outside the evidence presented in the ca

and inferred not only that if Mr. Hardwick were required to testify

that he might incriminate himself, it also implied that Mr. Hardwick's

test€mony would incriminate the Petitioner. It is also an implication

that failing to testify results from an unwillingness to incriminate

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the for

going Supplement to Motion for Post Conviction Relief, in Case N

299, has been furnished to the Office of the State Attorney,

Third Judicial Circuit Court, P. GO. Drawer 1546, Lake City, Florida,

32055, by first-class mail, this 16th day of January, 19806.

Stephen D. Stitt

ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER?

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE

THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND

FOR TAYLOR COUNTY, FLORIDA.

x STATE OF FLORIDA,

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No. 74-299-CF

DOUGLAS RAY MEEKS,

Defendant.

STATEMENT OF JUDICIAL ACTS TO BE REVIEWED

COMES NOW the Defendant, Douglas Ray Meeks, by and

through undersigned counsel and respectfully files his Statement

of Judicial Acts to be Reviewed, pursuant to Rule 9.140(d),

Florida Appellate Rules, and intended to be relied upon in the

Florida Supreme Court, and states the following

‘ as The Trial Court erred in failing to admit as evidence

proffered testimony regarding the racial atmosphere existing in

Perry, Florida, at and around the time of the trial, which was

f relevant t the issue of trial counsel's ineffective representation.

° 2. The Trial Court erred in failing to admit as evidenc:

‘

the testimony of a witness proffered to show mitigating circur

Stances which should have been presented at the penalty phase

Trial Court erred in denying Defendant's Motion tor

; who would have offered testimony in mitigation at

the sentencing phase, and for experts who would testify regardin the

prevalence of racial bias in the community from which the jury wa

drawn.

4. The Trial Court erred in denying Defendant's Motion for

Transciption of the voir dire examination in the co-defendant's cuse

as evidence relating to community attitudes and racial atmospher:

relevant to trial counsel's ineffectiveness.

5S. The Trial Court erred in denying Defendant's Motion fo

Prior Authorization of Costs reasonably necessary to the preparation

of Defendant's case.

Page 1 of 2

6. The Trial Court erred in denying Defendant's motion

for a copy of the transcripts in the co-defendant's case as evidence

relating to trial counseis's ineffectiveness.

7. The Trial Court erred in holding that under the total

of circumstances, the Defendant received reasonably effective

assistance of counsel at trial, at sentencing, and on appeal.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a tru py of the foregoing

beer. furnished to the Office of the State Attorney, Third Judicial

Circuit, Taylor County, Florida, this 20th day of November, 1980,

al Ladd 4 - ~~

° - Pal > ied

otepnhe UD. Stitt

; 7 " “»*

Holland Law Center

_ a4 t (<<

Juhe Rice

3915 § w 18th Str t

iinesville Fiori

Page 2oL 2

Pla.

APPENDIX D

Stat. §921.141 SENTENCE OF DEATH OR LIFE IMPRISONMENT

FOR CAPITAL FELONIES; FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

TO DETERMINE SENTENCE

(1) Separate proceedings on issue of penalty. --

Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant

in a capital felony, the court shall conduct a4 Separate

sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant

should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment a

authorized by s. 775.082. The proceeding shall be

conducted by the trial judge before the trial jury

soon as practicable. If, through impossibility or

inability, the trial jury is unable to recwnvene f

hearing on the issue of penalty, having determined

guilt of the accused, the trial judge may summon a

special juror or jurors as provided in chapter 913

determine the issue of the imposition o7 the penalt

If the trial jury has been waived, or if the defena

pleaded guilty, a jury impaneled for that purpose,

unless waived by the defendant. In the proceeding,

evidence may be presented as to any matter that thr

court deems relevant to the nature of the crime an

the character of the defendant and shall include ma

relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating ci

stances enumerated in subsections (5) and 6). Any

such evidence which the court deems to have probati

value may be received, regardless of its admissibii:

under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided

defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut

hearsay statements. However, this subsection shal

not be construed to authorize the introductior f

evidence secured in violation f the Constituti

the Urited States or the Constitution of the State

of Florida. The state and the defendant oy his

punsel shall be permitted to present argument for

against sentence of death.

f wt : ‘ : v he ‘. , -- ‘ee he

2) Advisory sentence by he jury. After heari

all the evidence, the jury shall deliberate ana re

an advisory sentence to the court, based upon the

following matters:

(a) Whether sufficient aggravating cir

stances exist as enumerateac in subsection 5);

(b) Whether sufficient mitigating iz

stances exist which outweigh the aggravating ircur

stances found to exist; and

{c) Based on these considerations, whet

the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonr

or death.

(3) Findings in support of sentence of death. --

Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority o!

jury. the court, after weighing the aggravating an

mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence o!

life imprisonment or death, but if the court imposs

sentence of death, it shall set forth in writing it

findings upon which the sentence of death is based

to the facts:

um-

(a) That sufficient aggravating circum-

stances exist as enumerated in subsection (5), and

(b) That there are insufficient miti-

gating circumstances.

In each case in which the court imposes the death

sentence, the determination of the court shall be

supported by specific written findings of fact based

upon the circumstances in subsections (5) and (6) and

upon the records of the trial and the sentencing

proceedings. If the court does not make the findings

requiring the death sentence, the court shall impose

sentence of life imprisonment in accordance with

s. 775.082.

(4) Review of judgment and sentence. <-- The

judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be

subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of

Florida within sixty (60) days after certification

by the sentencing court of the entire record, unless

the time is extended for an additional period not to

exceed thirty (30) days by the Supreme Court for

good cause shown. Such review by the Supreme Court shall

have priority over all other cases and shall be heard

in accordance with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.

(S$) Aggravating circumstances. -- Aggravating circum-

stances shall be limited to the following:

(a) The capital felony was committed

by a person under sentence of imprisonment.

(b) The defendant was previously con-

victed of another capital felony or of a felony

involving the use or threat of violence to the person.

{c) The defendant knowingly createc a

Great risk of death to many persons.

(da) The capital felony was committed

while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice,

in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or

flight after committing or attempting to commit, any

robbery, rape, argon, burglary, kidnapping or aircraft

piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging

of a Gestructive device or bomb.

(e) The capital felony was committed

for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful

arrest or effecting an escape from custody.

(f) The capital felony was committed

for pecuniary gain.

(g) The capital felony was committed

to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any

governmental function or the enforcement of laws.

(h) The capital felony was especially

heinous, atrocious, or cruel.

(i) The capital felony was a homicide

and was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated

manner without any pretense of moral or legal justifica-

tion.

, 11 P ee

(6) Mitigating circumstances. -- Mitigating

circumstances shall be the following:

(a) The @efendant has no signifi-

cant history of prior criminal activity.

(b) The capital felony was committed

while the defendant was under the influence of extreme

mental or emotional disturbance.

the defendant's conduct or consented to the act.

(a) The defendant was an accomplice in

the capital felony committed by another person and his

participation was relatively minor.

(e) The defendant acted under extreme

Guress or under the substantial domination of another

person

(ft) The capacity of the defendant ¢t

appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform

his mnduct to the requirem-nts of law was substantially

impairea.

(g) The age of the defendant at the time

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, THIRD

JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR

TAYLOR COUNTY, FLORIDA.

. CRIMINAL CASE NO: 74-299-CF

STATE OF FLORIDA, : FILED IN OFFICE THIS

= JUN 4 1975

DOUGLAS RAY MEEKS, CHARLES RALPH CARLTON

CLERK CIRCUIT COURT

Defendant. $ JAYLOR GOUNTY, FLORID.\

(last forth

“7 ee ee eo ee ee ee rr er er er er Hr er er re er ee ee ee A

WRITTEN FINDINGS UPON WHICH SENTENCE

OF DEATH TS BASED

On March 12, 1975, in the Taylor County Courtroom

at Perry, Florida, the defendant was found guilty of murder

in the first degree of the death of Lioyd Walker, of the age

of siwteen (16) years under Count I of a IV-Count indictment.

Under Count II, the defendant was found guilty of robbery of

Diane Allen. Under Count III, the defendant was found guilty

of assault upon Diane Alien with intent to commit murder in the

first degree. Under Count IV, he was found guilty of the use

of a firearm during the commission of robbery.

The undersigned judge heard all the evidence in this

case and observed al! the witnesses as they testified.

Following reception of the jury's verdict finding

guilt of murder in the first degree, a separate sentencing pro-

ceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced

to death or life imprisonment was held. In this proceeding,

the State rested upon the evidence previously introduced during

the trial as to guilt. The defendant calied the clerk in cus-

tody of the Taylor County Sheriff's records as his sole witness.

In response to defense counsel's questions, she testified that

‘there were no charges pending against the defendant in any other |

county. Over defense counsel's objections, she testified that

there was an additional charge of murder pending against the

defendant in this county.

ry By agreement, counsel for the State and the defendant,

in the order named, then made arguments to the jury for and

against the death sentence.

The Court then instructed the jury as to the provi-

sions of Fla.Stat. 921.141 and the jury retired for delibera-

tions. It rendered an advisory sentence of death.

The death sentenced was imposed.

This Court finds that the facts of this case do not

support the aggravating circumstances in Fla. Stat. 921.141(6},

subsections (a),(b) and (c) in that this captial felony was

not committed by 4 person under sentence of imprisonment nor

had the defendant previously been convicted of a capital felony

nor did the defendant knowingly create a great risk of death to

many “person.

The Court does find, as an aggravating circumstance,

that the capital felony, the gurder of Lioyd Walker, was com-

mitted as a part of another dangerous and violent felony, the

robbery of Diane Allen at gunpoint and in flight after commit-

ting that felony, Fla.Stat. 921.141(6)(d).

The Court also finds, as an aggravating circumstance,

that the capital felony was committed with the motive of avoid:

ing and preventing arrest, was committed for pecuniary gain

and to hinder the enforcement of laus. Fila. Stat. 921.141 (6)

(e)(f)(g).

The uncontroverted testimony of Diane Allen at the

trial was that she was on duty as a clerk in @ Junior Food

Store in Perry, Florida, at approximately 8:00 o'clock p.m. on

November 6, 1974, a Wednesday. She was behind the counter to

the left of the cash register. Lloyd Walker, sixteen (16), was

the only other person in the store. He was standing slightly

to her right ard in front of the counter. Two men entered the

store. The taller of the two, the accomplice not on trial,

ow Walker around his neck from behind with such

force/to almost lift him from the floor and the second, the

defendant, held a small revolver on Diane Allen and told her

to give him the money which she did. It amounted to about

$35.00. The defendant then told Diane Allen and Lioyd Walker

to go to the back. They did go to a small room in the rear of

the store where soft drink bottles were kept. They were ordered

to lie down on the floor. They did lie down on their backs.

Defendant Meeks still had the revolver in his hand. They were

told to turn over on their stomachs. They did. Thereafter

Diane Allen heard shots. About the third or fourth shot, she

felt a pain or indication that she had been struck in her left

upper back region. She heard another shot or so, then heard

the bell on the door to the store ring.

4 She then got up and came to the front area of the

store. The defendant Meeks and his accomplice were nowhere to

be seen. She returned to the rear area of the store where Lioyd

Walker was lying and called to hia.

He did not respond to her calls. He died in Tallahassee

Memorial Hospital on November 12, 1974, due to transection of

his spinal cord from the brainstem by bullet wound, according

to the autopsy report of Doctor Thomas P. Wood, who testified

at the trial. (Copy of report attached). He found the bullet

to have entered the right side of the base of the neck poster-

forly, to course slightly superiorly and to the left.

Turning to mitigating circumstances, the Court finds

that the defendant has no prior signifcant history of criminal

activity. Fla.Stat.921.141(7)(a) and therefore this fact has

been considered as a mitigating circumstance.

Under Fla.Stat.921.141(7) subsections (b) and (f),

the Court finds that the defendant was suffering from no extrere

mental or emotional disturbance and that his capacity to appre-

ciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct

to the requirements of law was not substantially impaired.

The defendant moved for appointment of psychiatrists

to po him “...to substantiate the insanity of the Defendant

at the time of the crime and subsequently thereto...". (Prior

to trial defendant's counsel moved to withdraw the motion alleg-

ing insanity). Doctors Barnard and Carrera were appointed and

reported the results of their examination. Their report is

devoid of any evidence of mental or emotional disturbance of

the defendant. Ooctor Carrera's report shows that the defend-

ant stated that "... I just did it... after it was a1! over I

just felt like myself... I wasn't scared or upset... no change

in myself... I wasn't angry with any one that day". According

to the report, the defendant had whiled away the hours of the

day of the offense, attending a portion of a football game

immediately prior to the offense. The psychiatrists both con-

cludesthat the defendant was sane at the time of the examination

and at the time of the offense.

Doctor Carrera’s report has been received and read |

by the undersigned but has not been filed. Insofar as the Court

is now aware, it has never been seen by counsel for the State

or the defendant. The report recites, however, that defense

counsel was present during the psychiatric examination of the

defendant which forms the basis of the report. Doctor Carrera's

report includes a history taken from the defendant. In this

history, the defendant told Doctor Carrera that he and his

accomplice discussed robbing the store. The accomplice told

the defendant that the girl in the store knew the accomplice.

The accomplice also said that, if they robbed the store, he

didn't want anyone talking on him, so it would be necessary

for them to shoot her. According to the report, the defendant's

response was that it was all right with him and that it seemed

like a good idea to shoot the store employee so that in that

way nobody would recgonize them and blame them for it.

This fact has been considered under Fia.Stat.921.141

(7)(e). The Court rejects it as a mitigating circumstance and

finds that Meeks was mot under the duress or domination of his

accomplice at the time he committed the capital felony.

On the contrary, this fact supports the finding that

the capital felony was committed under the aggravating circum-

stances hereinabove outlined with respect to avoiding arrest

and to hinder the enforcement of law.

Further, the Court finds that the victim certainly

was not a participant in nor consented to the criminal conduct,

Fla.Stat.921.141 (c)(e) and that the defendant, even if found

to be an accomplice, did play a major part in the capital

felony. Fla.Stat.921.141(7)(d). No mitigation exists under

either of these subsections.

Finally, the age of the defendant has been considered

as required by Fla.Stat.921.141(7}(g). The defendant is 21.

The report of Doctor Barnard contained his medical judgment

that the defendant was of dull-normal intelligence.

The Court finds the combination of the defendant's

youthful age and his intelligence to be a mitigating factor.

The Court, in the circumstances of this case, deemed

the requirement of CrPR 3.710 to be directory and not mandatory.

Therefore, no pre-sentence report has been considered.

The Court and counsel throughout the conduct of this

trial, and especially after determination of guilt, considered

the pronouncement of the Supreme Court of Florida in Dixon v.

State, 283 So2d 1.

Mindful of the language on page eight (8) of that

opinion by Chief Justice Adkins, this trial judge attempted to

give thoughtful consideration to the evidence in this case as

to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances. In particular,

an absolute presumption of innocence has been accorded the

defendant as to a pending indictment in this Court for a sub-

sequent alleged murder in a transaction completely unrelated

to this instant capital felony.

Upon consideration, it was at the time of sentencing

and is now, some hours later as the sentence of death is justi-

fied in writing, the inescapable conclusion of the undersigned

that sufficient aggravating circumstances exist in the facts

to justify the death penalty. The murder of the victim by the

defendant was for the express purpose of executing the victim

to prevent his identifying the defendant, so that the defendant

could flee after having committed robbery at gunpoint for

pecuniary gain which robbery was witnessed by the victim and

to prevent the lawful arrest of the defendant and thus this

conscienceless murder was designed to hinder the enforcement

of laws.

The mitigating circumstances of a young age and no

prior history of criminal conduct on the part of the defendant

are entirely insufficient to and do not outweigh the aggrava-

ting circumstances.

SIGNED this March 17 » 1975.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.