Petition — Beil v. Illinois

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

OcroBeErR Term, 1982

JAMES BEIL,

Petitioner,

Vs

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Ree sponde nl,

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS,

SECOND DISTRICT

EDWARD M. GENSON

33 West Monro

2ist Floo:

Chieago, Hlineis 60608

312) 726-9015

Attorney for JAMes BEL

Of Counsel:

ALAN D. BLUMENTHAL,

UNITED STATES LAW PRINTING CO., CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60618 (312) 525-6581

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the fruits of the warrantless station-louse

search of Petitioner’s automobile trunk were properly

suppressed by the trial court when such was pursuant to

an initial detention by police based on nothing more than

an inarticulate hunch and a stated desire to cheek the

identification of Petitioner; did the Appellate Court of

Illinois, Second District, err in reversing the suppression

order?

2. Whether the warrantless station-house search of

Petitioner’s automobile trunk was violative of Petitioner’s

right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures

where the searching officers admittedly had uo probable

cause to believe the automobile contained contraband,

fruits, or instrumentalities of the crime they were investi-

gating; and whether the Appellate Court of Hlinois, See-

ond District, erred in reversing the trial court’s suppres-

sion order,

Questions Presented

Opinion Below |. a PSOE ROE

Jurisdiction

Constitutional Provisions and Statutes Involved

Statement of the Cause

Reasons for Granting the Writ:

1. Where the initial detention of Petitioner and

his automobile, from which flowed the warrant-

less search of his automobile trunk and seizure

of items therefrom, was based on nothing more

than an inarticulate hunch and a desire by police

to obtain Petitioner's identification, the deten.

tion Was a seizure violative of Petitioner's

Fourth Amendment right to be free from unrea-

sonable searches and seizures, and the Appellate

Court erred in reversing the trial court's sup-

pression order

Il. Where there was no probable cause to believe that

Petitioner or his car were involved in the theft

of another auto, where the police neither sought

nor expected to find contraband or fruits or

instrumentalities of the theft of the other auto

in the Petitioner’s car, and where the officer

testified that his purpose in searching Petition-

er’s auto trunk was to verify Petitioner's own-

ership thereof, which verification the officer had

otherwise already accomplished, the warrant-

less search of [Petitioner's auto trunk and

seizure of items therefrom was violative of

Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights, and

Appellate Court erred in reversing the trial

court's suppression order... SA SESE

PAGE

CEI secs vecccniencerrmensesnsesss: ne 15

Appendix .\—-Opinion of the Appellate Court of

Illinois, Second District, dated November 12,

a cpenees . , App. 1

Appendix B—Order denying Petition for Leave

to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois,

dated April 12, 1983. ...... a UE App. 7

AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases

Brown v. Texas, 943 U.S. 47 (1979) ....-.---+------10, 11, 12

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S, 1382 (1925) 13

Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) ~.......-.... fe

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)... 1.13

Michigan v. Thomas, ....... ES. ncn 108 BCL.

(1DBD) ncacerecesnvscscenssnssonescsnensnensenrenensennneceeneenens Scie i3

Stanford v. ‘lexas, 279 U.S. 476 Go) | SE GR esae ib 14

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ; swsaray By 10, 32, 13

United States v. Ross, ........ U.S. , 102 S.Ct. 2157

CTO) ancccccr rcs arennoveensconnonnatanseansnesnnsnnapnnnsennnonnntcnssennsranines 13

Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)... ie

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

Oeroner Term, 1982

No.

JAMES BEIL,

Pe titione i,

VS.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS,

SECOND DISTRICT

Petitioner James Beil prays that a writ of certiorari be

issued to review the judgment of the Appellate Court of

Illinois, Second Distriet.

OPINION BELOW

The as yet unpublished opinion of the Appellate Court

of Hlinois, Second District, is appended to this petition as

Appendix A. The order denying Petitioner leave to a})-

peal to the Supreme Court of Illinois is likewise appended

to this petition as Appendix B.

2

JURISDICTION

The opinion and judgment of the Appellate Court of

Illinois, Second District, was entered on November 12,

1982. The Supreme Court of Illinois denied a timely filed

Petition for Leave to Appeal on April 12, 1983. The in-

stant Petition for Writ of Certiorari is filed within sixty

(60) days of said denial by the Supreme Court of Illinois.

The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is invoked pur-

suant to Title 28, U.S.C., Seetion 1257(3).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitu-

tion provides:

‘“The right of the people to be secure in their per-

sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-

ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-

scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or

things to be seized.’’

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-

stitution provides, in pertinent part:

‘*No state shall make or enforce any law which shall

abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the

United States; nor shall any state deprive any person

of life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction

the equal protection of the laws.’’

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On October 31, 1980, Information No. SO CF 1977-1978

was filed in the Cireuit Court of the 18th Judicial Cireuit,

DuPage County, Illinois, which, in two counts, charged

Petitioner James Beil with theft and possession of bur-

glary tools, violations of Chapter 38, Illinois Revised Stat-

utes, Sections 16-l(a) (1) and 19-2. respectively.

On December 11, 1980, Petitioner filed a motion to quash

his arrest and suppress evidence which were the fruits

of the arrest. Prior to trial and after hearings on the

motion, the trial court granted that part of the motion

whieh sought suppression of items of physical evidence

Which had been seized by police officers from the trunk of

Petitioner’s automobile subsequent to his arrest.

The People of the State of Illinois appealed this order

of suppression to the Illinois Appellate Court, which Court

reversed the trial court’s order on November 12, 1982.

The Supreme (Court of Illinois denied Petitioner leave

to appeal to the higher court on April 12, 1983.

The facts of the Case as pertinent to the IsSUeS in the

instant petition, and as adduced at the hearing at the trial

court are as follows,

On October 6, 1980, at approximately 8:00 p.m, Detee-

tive Romani of the Oak Brook, Illinois, Police, was parked

in his unmarked squad car in a shopping center parking

lot. Romani observed a maroon Cadillac (hereafter, the

‘Beil Cadillac’*), with three occupants, drive by and park

to the rear of Romani’s squad. The two vehicles were

parked rear to rear. Through his rear view mirror, Ro-

mani Observed the driver of the Beil Cadillac emerge and

proceed to the vehicle's trunk. While Romani saw the

trunk open, he was unable to observe what, if any, activity

occurred at the trunk.

Officer Romani first took note of this otherwise unnote

worthy activity because the driver of the ‘Beil Cadillae’’

appeared to be a young man dressed in blue jeans. The

officer admitted, however, that it was not unusual in Oak:

Brook, an affluent suburb of Chicago, to see similar youn

i

men in blue jeans driving luxury automobiles. (Please

note that the prosecutor herein admitted in remarks at

trial that Petitioner and his purported companions did

not appear to be children or even teenagers).

Nonetheless, Detective Romani radioed for a_ license

plate registration check on the ‘‘ Beil Cadillac’* and deter-

mined thereby that the automobile was registered to (Peti-

tioner) James Beil of Chicago and that the car was neither

stolen nor the subject of any warrants. The detective, at

the time, recalled that he had previously heard of a simi-

lar sounding surname with respect to auto thefts in

Chicago.

Having admittedly observed no illegal or suspicious acts

in the shopping center parking lot, and having received

the unremarkable response to the license check, Romani,

nonetheless, followed the ‘‘ Beil Cadillac’’ out of the park-

ing lot; he also, at this time, radioed for other officers to

assist him.

While stopped at a red light, Romani observed the Beil

Cadillac proceed to enter a large hotel parking lot. Romani

lost sight of the Beil Cadillac for sometime. Romani then

proceeded into the hotel lot and observed the ‘* Beil Cadil-

lac’’ parked in a driving aisle. The lot appeared to be full

and, as Romani drove by and passed the ‘* Beil Cadillae”’.

he observed a young man (not the driver he had previously

seen at the trunk) in a plaid shirt standing next to the

driver's side of the Beil car apparently talking to the oe

cupants. The officer, at that time, could not observe the

number of occupants in the Beil car.

Romani parked lis car and entered the hotel. He no

ticed, due to its excellent condition, a 1967 Cadillae (here

after, the ‘white Cadillac’’) parked near the Beil car.

While in the hotel, Romani lost sight of the Beil car and

the parking lot generally. At that time Romani, by his

d

testimony, had observed no illegal nor unusual acts. He

Was unaware of the ownership status of any of the cars

in the lot, including the ‘white Cadillac’’, he was unaware

of the identity of the young man in the plaid shirt, or

Whether this man owned the ‘white Cadillae’*, he had

seen no tools in the man’s hand, he had not seen any para-

phernalia in the Beil car nor taken from it. Moreover, it

Was a typical antumn night and it was not unusual for

people to be standing and talking in the hotel lot. according

to Romani.

While in the hotel, Romani radioed to an Officer Golz

who had responded to Romani’s “arlier call for assistance

and who had positioned himself .n an adjacent parking lot

about 100 feet from the ‘white Cadillac’’. According to

Golz, from his vantage point he was only able to see the

“white Cadillae’’ from its top up. Golz observed the young

man in the plaid shirt approach the ‘white Cadillac’? and

then lost sight of the man as he went below Golz’s field of

vision. Golz communicated this to Romani.

Romani then left the hote] building, from which he had

lost sight of the situation, and reentered the parking lot

area. Romani observed the ‘Beil Cadillac’’ backing up

in the driving aisle, and he saw the “white (‘adillac’’

emerging from its parking stall. As he observed the two

cars proceeding toward the exit of the lot. Romani radioed

an order to Golz to stop the two cars.

Romani ran toward the two ears whieh were stopped for

a red traflic signal at the exit. Romani arrived before Golz

and went directly to the ‘Beil Cadillae’’. He ordered th

geeupants to emerge and to produce identifieation. Ty

driver of the ‘Beil Cadillac’’ was Petitioner James Beil

who complied with Romani’s order

Meanwhile, Golz arrived a moment later, and. with five

or SIN other offieers On thie scene, approached the ** whys

6

Cadillac’’ and, at gunpoint, ordered the driver, a John

Wirth, to emerge.

Romani’s stated reason for stopping the ‘* Beil Cadil-

lac,’’ which stop occurred a moment before the stop of the

‘‘white Cadillac’’, was to check the driver’s license and

vehicle registration of the driver of the Beil car.

After Petitioner emerged from his car upon Romani’s

order, he was patted down by Romani, which pat-down

produced nothing, and he was placed in the custody of

other officers. He was told to stand with his hands spread

on the trunk of his car. Romani then walked over to the

‘‘white Cadillae’’, which along with its driver, was in the

custody of Golz.

According to Romani, Petitioner Beil was in custody at

that time, not free to leave the scene.

As Romani then looked into the ‘‘white Cadillae’’, he

observed, on the front seat, a pulled ignition still attached

to a slamhammer tool, and a screwdriver which he be-

lieved had been used to start the car. Romani then re-

turned to the area of the Beil car and thoroughly searched

Beil’s person, finding a screw in one of Beil’s pockets.

Romani then ran a license check on the ‘*t white Cadillac’,

went into the hotel and located its owner, and determined

that while the owner had left the car unlocked, he had

given nobody permission to take the car.

Meanwhile, Petitioner Beil, in custody, had been trans-

ported to the local police station, and his car was towed

to the station.

Later, at the station, Detective Romani, seeking to search

the trunk of the ** Beil Cadillac’*’, was unable to locate the

key to the trunk of Beil’s car, and without the consent of

Petitioner, forced the trunk open and seized its contents

The officer had sought no warrants approving the searel.

‘

Petitioner and his car, at the time, were in police custody.

Also, at the time, the officer had access to an emergency

Judge to whom he could have gone for authorization for

the search, but chose not to.

Romani testified that at the time of the station-house

search of the Beil trunk, he knew that no tools had been

used to enter the unlocked ‘‘white Cadillac’? and he had

already otherwise recovered the ignition puller and serew.

driver from the ‘‘white Cadillac’’. When asked to charac-

terize the nature and object of the search of the Beil trunk

in light of these circumstances, Romani said that it had

been an ‘‘investigatory’’ search, the object of which was

to *‘ascertain if, in fact, he (Petitioner Beil) was the law-

ful owner of that vehicle (Beil (adillae)*’

Romani, however, testified that he had much earlier

verified the registration of the vehicle to Petitioner Beil

and that Petitioner had earlier produced proper identifi-

cation.

Petitioner was charged with theft of the ‘“white Cadil-

lac’’ and possession of burglary tools, both charges on an

accountability basis. The burglary tools, as charged, were

the ignition puller and screwdriver found in the ‘white

Cadillac’? and with which Petitioner Beil is charged for

constructive possession.

The items seized from the Beil trunk in the station-

house seareh, and which were the object of the motion to

suppress below, are items sought by the prosecution to

be used as corroborative evidence at trial.

The trial court granted the motion to suppress, pre.

cluded the use at trial of the fruits of the search, and the

prosecution took an interlocutory appeal. It is the reversal

of this suppression order by the Appellate Court of Illi-

nois Which is the basis for the instant petition for a writ

of certiorari.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

i

WHERE THE INITIAL DETENTION OF PETITION.

ER AND HIS AUTOMOBILE, FROM WHICH FLOWED

THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF HIS AUTOMO.

BILE TRUNK AND SEIZURE OF ITEMS THERE.

FROM, WAS BASED ON NOTHING MORE THAN AN

INARTICULATE HUNCH AND A DESIRE BY POLICE

TO OBTAIN PETITIONER’S IDENTIFICATION, THE

DETENTION WAS A SEIZURE VIOLATIVE OF PETI-

TIONER’S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO BE

FREE FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEI.

ZURES, AND THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN

REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT’S SUPPRESSION

ORDER.

The Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, justified

the initial stopping of Petitioner and his automobile as a

temporary and limited detention as authorized by this

Court’s holding in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868,

20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). It was pursuant to this threshold

determination of the propriety of the initial stop, that the

Appellate Court herein approved the later search of Peti-

tioner’s automobile trunk and seizure of the contents

therein, reversing the trial court’s suppression order.

The teachings of this Court, indeed, require such a

threshold determination. The Appellate Court, however,

erred in finding that the initial detention of Petitioner

amounted to a ‘‘7erry’’ stop.

In Terry, supra, this Court held that where a police ofti-

cer observes unusual conduct which leads him to reason-

{)

ably conclude that criminal action is afoot, he may stop

an individual on the street for investigative inquiry. Such

® stop is something less than a technical arrest and re-

quires less than probable cause for constitutional justifi-

cation. Nonetheless, Terry teaches that such a stop is a

seizure comprehended by the Fourth Amendment, and. as

such, must be reasonable.

This Court, in Terry, deseribed the standard of this

reasonableness as an ‘‘objective’’ one:

‘*Would the facts available to the officer at the mo-

ment of the seizure ... warrant a man of reasonable

caution in the belief that the action taken was appro-

priate?

*... «Anything less would invite intrusions upon con-

stitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more

substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result. this

Court has consistently refused to sanction’’. Terry vy.

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22.

In the instant case, Petitioner's activity, prior to his

being stopped by the officer, was in no way unusual, fur-

tive, or in violation of the law. This is manifest by the

facts adduced through the testimony of the officer upon

the hearing and in the statement of facts contained in the

opinion of the Appellate Court (Appendix A). The Appel-

late Court, however, in seeking to bring the tacts of this

ease within the ambit of Terry, characterized the Peti-

tioner’s pre-stop conduct as ‘ta course of conduct which

caught (the officers’) professional attention as police ofti-

cers’’ (Appendix A, p. A.5).

Such conduct, according to the Appellate Court, in this

case, ineluded stopping in a shopping center parking lot

and opening the trunk of his car, leaving the parking lot

and entering the parking lot of a hotel, engaging therein

10

in conversation with another person, and then leaving the

lot (Appendix A, p. A.9.).

Such conduct is not only not unusual or furtive, but,

according to the officer upon the hearing, the appearance

and activity of Fetitioner was normal in that area on a

typical autumn evening."

The Appellate Court’s conclusion that this activity ap-

propriately ‘‘caught (the officer’s) professional atten-

tion’’, is simply a rewording of the type of basis for deten-

tion which this Court specifically proscribed in Terry,

supra,: an ‘‘inarticulate hunch’’.

As such, the Petitioner’s original detention was unlaw-

ful as an unreasonable seizure based neither on probable

cause nor specific and articulable facts leading the officer

to conclude that criminal activity was afoot. Thus, the

later search and seizure involving the Petitioner’s likewise

detained automobile without benefit of warrant can not be

justified under any known exception to the warrant re.

quirement.

In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.

2d 357 (1979) this Court reversed the conviction of a man

who was initially stopped by police for reasons similar to

those in the instant case, and whose subsequent refusal to

cooperate in identifying procedures led to prosecution.

There the suspicious activity involved conversing with

another man in an alley, separating upon the arrival of

police, looking suspicious, and being in an area of high

incidence of drug traffic. In Brown, this Court found that

* Although the .\ppellate Court emphasizes in its opinion that the

man in the plaid shirt was observed ducking down between cars

prior to the detention, the record is clear that the man simply fell

below the officer's limited field of vision and, as such, was not seen

as a furtive move.

11

the officers’ suspicion and the fact that the area was a

high crime area were not sufficient to justify the stop

where the defendant’s activities, viewed objectively, were

not unusual.

In the instant case, Petitioner’s pre-stop activities,

viewed objectively, were certainly not unusual. The Appel-

late Court’s emphasis herein that parking lots are auto-

theft prone is a similar observation to the ‘thigh drug

traffic area™* factor condemned in Brown,

It is significant that in Brown, this Court found that the

officer therein, ‘‘when pressed, ... acknowledged that the

only reason he stopped (the defendant) was to ascertain

his identity’? (443 U.S. at 52). This Court found that that

purpose does not negate the Fourth Amendment guaran-

tees such to authorize the arbitrary detention which fol-

lowed from that purpose. Interestingly, in the instant case,

Officer Romani, when pressed to describe his purpose in

initially stopping the Petitioner, explained that he had

wanted to ask Petitioner for his driver’s license and evi-

dence of ownership of his vehicle. This, notwithstanding

that Romani had already determined that the Beil vehicle

Was neither stolen nor wanted. Romani merely wanted to

detain Beil for identification or pending his similarly un-

justified stopping of the other vehicle. This Court’s hold-

ing in Brown, supra, specifically condemns this practice,

See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391,

99 L.Ed. 2d 660 (1979), wherein this Court proseribed such

arbitrary identification registration checks absent reason-

able suspicion that a driver is unlicensed or that an auto-

mobile is not registered, or articulable facts relating io

criminal activity.

Every factual aspect of this case, from the innocent pre-

detention activities of Petitioner, to the suspicions and

motivations of the stopping officers, fits into the mold of

12

constitutional condemnation as set by this Court in Terry

v. Ohio, supra, Brown vy, Texas, supra, and Delaware vy.

Prouse, supra.

The initial detention of Petitioner being unlawful, the

subsequent warrantless search of his vehicle and the sei-

zure of items therefrom are likewise unlawful. The Appel-

late Court’s order, reversing the trial court’s suppression

order, should itself be reversed and this Court should grant

certiorari toward that end.

II.

WHERE THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO

BELIEVE THAT PETITIONER OR HIS CAR WERE

INVOLVED IN THE THEFT OF ANOTHER AUTO,

WHERE THE POLICE NEITHER SOUGHT NOR EX

PECTED TO FIND CONTRABAND OR FRUITS OR

INSTRUMENTALITIES OF THE THEFT OF THE

OTHER AUTO IN THE PETITIONER’S CAR, AND

WHERE THE OFFICER TESTIFIED THAT HIS PUR.

POSE IN SEARCHING PETITIONER’S AUTO TRUNK

WAS TO VERIFY PETITIONER’S OWNERSHIP

THEREOF, WHICH VERIFICATION THE OFFICER

HAD OTHERWISE ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED, THE

WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF PETITIONER’S AUTO

TRUNK AND SEIZURE OF ITEMS THEREFROM WAS

VIOLATIVE OF PETITIONER’S FOURTH AMEND-

MENT RIGHTS, AND THE APPELLATE COURT

ERRED IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT'S SUP-

PRESSION ORDER.

Building upon its holding that the initial detention of

the Petitioner and his automobile was a justifiable Terry

intrusion, the Appellate Court of Llinois held that the sub-

sequent warrantless station-house search of Petitioner's

automobile trunk was appropriate under the ‘‘automobile

13

exception’’ to the search warrant requirement. The Ap-

pellate Court cited as authority for this holding this

Court’s opinions from Carroll y. Umted States, 267 U.S,

132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), through Chambers

v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed. 2d 419

(1970), and up to Umted States v. Ross, ........ Ve, 4,

102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed. 2d 572 (1982) and Michigan v.

Thome, OUR, , 102 S.Ct. 2079, 73 L.Ed. 2d 750

(1982).

These cases, indeed, established the exception and went

on to provide guidelines as to scope and situs for such

automobile searches. The Appellate Court herein, in its

opinion, concedes that such warrantless searches still re-

quire probable cause to believe that a crime has been com-

mitted and that evidence of that crime is contained in the

subject vehicle.

Despite such concession to the law, however, the Appel-

late Court went on to ignore the facts of this case in de-

termining that such probable cause existed here. The Court

articulated its findings toward this end. It found that after

the initial ‘‘7erry’’ stop, the officers determined that the

car preceding Petitioner’s car out of the hotel parking lot

Was apparently stolen. According to the Appellate Court,

this fact amounted to probable cause that Petitioner was

engaged in the theft of that auto (Appendix uA, p. A.9),

notwithstanding that Petitioner was not in that stolen car

and had never been seen touching the stolen car. Nonethe-

less, the Appellate Court went on to find that the officers

subsequently found tools in the backseat of Petitioner's

own car (not burglary tools, as witness the charging of

Petitioner with constructive possession of the burglary

tools found in the stolen ear). Thus, according to the Ap-

pellate Court, the officers then had probable cause to be-

lieve that Petitioner’s car contained other evidence relat-

I4

ing to the theft of the ‘‘white Cadillac’? (Appendix .A, pp.

A. 5-6).

Not only is the Appellate Court being over-generous to

the police in allowing them probable cause based on such

marginal and innocuous facts, the Court ignores the fact

that, according to the officer, he had already recovered all

the tools the other man had used to steal the ‘white Cadil-

lac’’, the officer was not looking for further evidence, much

less did he think he had reason to so look: according to

the officer’s own testimony, he sought to search Petitioner's

trunk merely to ascertain whether Petitioner actually

owned the Beil car. (This, notwithstanding the officer had

already determined Petitioner’s rightful ownership of the

car).

Thus, not only, under the circumstances of this case,

was there no probable cause to search Petitioner’s car for

anything, the police made no pretense of seeking or ex-

pecting to find contraband, instrumentalities, or fruits of a

crime, therein.

All the opinions of this Court cited by the Appellate

Court require a presence of probable cause that a particu-

larly sought item may be found in an automobile sought

to be searched, with a warrant, or without a warrant under

the exception. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87

S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed. 2d 782 (1967) and Stanford v. Texas,

279 U.S. 476, 85 S.Ct. 506, 13 L.Ed. 2d 431 (1965).

Probable cause for the search of Petitioner’s car being

totally lacking herein, the search and the seizure of the

items pursuant thereto were unlawful. The Appellate

Court's order, reversing the suppression order of the trial

court, should itself be reversed, and this Court should

grant certiorari herein toward that end.

15

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Writ of

Certiorari should be allowed to review the instant decision

of the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Respectfully submitted,

Kvwarp M. GENson

35 W. Monroe, 21st Floor

Chicago, Illinois 60603

(312) 726-9015

Attorney for Petitioner

OF Counsel:

AuaN ID. BLUMENTHAL

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

81-645

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

Kiled Nov. 12, 1982

Loren .J. Strotz, Clerk

Appellate Court, 2nd District

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-A ppellant,

JAMES (. BEIL,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the 18th Judicial Cireuit,

DuPage County, Illinois.

MR. JUSTICE NASH delivered the opinion of the court:

The State appeals from a pretrial order suppressing

evidence seized from the trunk of defendant’s car after a

warrantless search alleged to have been conducted in viola-

tion of defendant's constitutional rights. We reverse.

On October 6, 1980, Detective James Romani of the Oak

Brook Police Department was stationed in an unmarked

squad car in the Oak Brook Shopping Center parking lot.

At approximately 8 p.m., Romani observed a maroon

Cadillac with three occupants driving in the parking lot

App. 2

and stop near the officer’s car. The driver of the maroon

Cadillac exited the car and opened its trunk; Romani could

not observe the driver’s further actions while at the trunk.

Romani made a radio check of the license plates whieh

revealed that the car was registered to defendant, .James

Beil, at 4820 South Keeler in Chicago. ‘The car was not

reported as stolen nor was it wanted for any reason; how-

ever, Romani recalled that he had heard the name ‘* Beil”’

on u prior occasion with regard to auto thefts in Chicago.

Subsequently, the driver got back into the maroon

Cadillac and drove out of the parking lot. Romani was

aware that parking lots in the area had a relatively high

incidence of auto theft, and he followed the Cadillac across

22nd street and into the parking lot of the nearby Sheraton

Hotel. There, Romani observed the maroon Cadillac

parked in a driving aisle behind a 1967 white Cadillac

convertible which was in ‘‘exceptional condition’’. A man

wearing a plaid shirt was standing next to the maroon

Cadillac in apparent conversation with the driver. Romani

parked his car nearby and entered the hotel where he con-

tacted another detective, Michael Golz, who was apparently

watching that parking lot. The two detectives exchanged

their observations and Golz informed Romani that he had

seen the man in the plaid shirt duck down between the

two Cadillacs. Romani left the hotel and noticed that the

maroon Cadillac had backed up and that the white Cadillac

was pulling out of its stall. Both cars, with the white

Cadillac leading, then proceeded towards the 22nd street

exit of the parking lot; at that time there were two persons

in the maroon Cadillac and one person in the white Cadillac.

Romani and Golz stopped both cars at the exit and iden-

tified themselves as police officers. While defendant and

the other passenger of the maroon Cadillac were producing

identification, Romani went to the white Cadillae where he

App. 3

observed that its ignition had been pulled and that there

was a ‘‘slam hammer’’ still attached to it: there was a

screw driver on the front seat.

Romani made a radio check of the license plates of the

white Cadillac and learned it was registered to a Joseph

Klingler, who was not one of the three men in the two

cars. Romani returned to the Sheraton Hotel where he

contacted Klingler who stated he had not given anyone

permission to use his car. Upon returning to the auto-

mobiles, Romani noticed a vise grip and an Allen type

wrench on the back seat of the maroon Cadillac. The three

men were thereupon arrested and were taken to the police

station with the two cars.

At the station, Romani and CGolz searched the maroon

Cadillac, including the trunk, and discovered additional

burglary tools and other items; the search was conducted

without a warrant and without Beil’s consent. He was

subsequently charged with felony theft and possession of

burglary tools based upon his alleged accountability for

the theft of the white Cadillac and constructive possession

of those tools found in the white Cadillac.

Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the intro-

duction of the property taken from his ear trunk con-

tending that the initial stop and subsequent search of his

automobile were in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. After an

evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined that the

initial stop of the defendant and seizure of those tools

found in the back seat of his car met constitutional

standards; however, the court suppressed those tools and

other property found in the trunk of Beil’s car.

Generally, the Fourth Amendment requires police to ob-

tain a warrant prior to the search or seizure of persons

<

or property. However, it is recognized that a police officer

App. 4

may stop and temporarily detain a person for the purpose

of a limited investigation absent probable cause to arrest

him if the officer is able io point to specific and articulable

facets which, taken together with reasonable inferences

drawn from the officer’s experience, would reasonably

warrant the extent of the intrusion. (Zerry vy. Ohio (1963),

392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868; Beck v. Ohto

(1964), 379 U.S. 89, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 8 S. Ct Ze;

Carroll v. United States (1925), 267 U.S. 132, 69 L. Ed.

543, 45 S. Ct. 280.) In the case of an automobile, if the

officer’s investigation uncovers facts which give probable

cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that

evidence of that crime is contained in the vehicle in which

the suspect is riding, the officer may conduct a search ot

the vehicle without a warrant. (Michigan vy. Thomas

(1982) sw US. ......, 73 L. Bd. Od 150, 102 5. CL WU;

United States v. Ross (1982), LS. . (2 ts Ge Ba

572, 102 S. Ct. 2157; Chambers v. Maroney (1970), 399

U.S. 42, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 90 S. Ct. 1975; Carroll v. United

States (1925), 267 U.S. 132, 69 L. Ed. 543, 45 S. Ct. 280.)

Given probable cause, the permissible scope of such a

warrantless search is as broad as that which a magistrate

could have legitimately authorized by warrant. Thus, the

search may extend to every part of the vehicle, and its

contents, that may conceal the object of the search. ((nited

States v. Ross (1982), US... wl Be. aa ai

102 S. Ct. 2157; People v. Clark (Docket No. 55591, Sept.

Term 1982), ...... ll. 2d na N.E. 2d .) The

permissible areas of search include the trunk of the vehicle.

(United States v. Ross (1982), LS. 72 1. Ba. Se

572, 102 S. Ct. 2157; People v. Carter (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 496,

9239 N.S. 2d 692. cert. denied (1968), 391 U.S. 965, 20 L. Ed.

2d 877, 88S. Ct. 2033.) The fact that the suspect may have

been arrested and is without access to the vehicle or that

the vehicle has been immobilized and taken to the station

App. 5

house does not obviate the justification to conduct. the

warrantless search. The probable cause that develops at

the scene still obtains at the station house. Michigan v.

Thomes (1962), US. ,» 10 La. Ed. 2d THO, 102

S. Ct. 3079; Texas v. White (1975), 423 U.S. 67, 46 L. Ed.

2d 209, 96 S. Ct. 304; Chambers v. Maroney (1970), 399

U.S. 42, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 90 S. Ct. 1975; People v. Joyner

(1972), 50 ll. 2d 302, 278 N.E.2d 7356.

We conclude that the initial stop of the defendant and

the subsequent search of his car met constitutional stan-

dards. Prior to the stop, officers Romani and Golz each

observed defendant and his companions engage in a course

of conduct which caught their professional attention as

police officers. This included stopping in the shopping

center parking lot and opening the trunk of the car, then

immediately exiting that lot and proceeding to another

parking lot. There defendant parked his car behind the

white Cadillac convertible and engaged in conversation

With a man standing by the two cars who then ducked

down between them. When the white Cadillae was then

driven towards the exit defendant followed it in his ear.

At that point, based upon those observations and Romani's

association of Beil’s name with auto thefts, the officers

had specific and artieulable facts upon which to base a be-

lief that further investigation was warranted. Their stop

of defendant for that purpose was therefore proper.

After the stop, upon seeing the pulled ignition in the

white Cadillac and the tools used to remove it, the officers

verified with its owner that no one had permission to drive

the car. The officers then had probable cause to believe

that defendant was engaged in the theft of the white

Cadillac and further upon seeing the additional tools on

the back seat of defendant's maroon Cadillac, the officers

also had probable cause to believe that evidence relating

App. 6

to the theft of the white Cadillac may be contained in de-

fendant’s car. The officers were then justified in search-

ing the entire car, including the trunk for such evidence.

(Catted Siates vy. Ross (1962), ..... US. ........ 72 L. Ba 2d

972, 102 S.Ct. 2157.) Neither the fact that the officers de-

layed the search until the car was safely at the station

nor that they obtained additional information regarding

defendant’s identity and ownership of the maroon Cadillac

diminished the justification for the search. (Michigan vy.

Thomas (1982), ....... US. ..., 732 L. Be MT ee

S. Ct. 3079.) We conelude the trial court erred in sup-

pressing those items found in the trunk of defendant’s ear.

Defendant has relied upon People v. Reinecke (1980), 84

Ill. App. 8d 222, 405 N.B.2d 480 and People v. Rinaldo

(1980), 80 Il. App. 3d 438, 399 N.E.2d 1027, leave to appeal

demed, to support his argument. However, the facts pre-

sented by those cases are Inapposite and the analysis ap-

plied preceded and is inconsistent with the definitive rul-

ings of United States v. Ross (1982, CFR

L. Ed. 2d 572, 102 S. Ct. 2157 and People v. Clark (Docket

No. 55591, Sept. Term 1982), . Bh, 0 oy ns

Kor the foregoing reasons the order of the cireuit court

of DuPage County is reversed and this cause remanded

for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

UNVERZAGT, VAN DEUSEN, JJ., concur.

App. 7

APPENDIX B

[ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT

JULEANN Hornyak, Clerk

SUPREME COURT BUILDING

SPRINGFIELD, ILL. 62706

(217) 782-2035

April 12, 1983

Mr. Edward M. Genson

Attorney at Law

134 N. LaSalle St., S300

Chicago, I], 60602

No. o7808-—~ People State of Illinois, respondent, vs.

James (. Beil, petitioner. Leave to appeal,

Appellate Court, Second District.

The Supreme Court today DENIED the petition for

leave to appeal in the above entitled cause,

Very truly vours,

/s/ Jduleann Llornyal,

Clerk of the Supreme Court