Petition — Dolenz v. All Saints Episcopal Hospital

Oftice- Supreme Court, U.S.

12-1902 sithordbedng

es

1) MAY 28 1993

In THe

Supreme Court of the Unites Sts —

October Term, 1982

No.

BERNARD J. DOLENZ, M.D.

Petitioner,

V6.

ALL SAINTS EPISCOPAL HOSPITAL

Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

Bernard J. Dolenz, M.D.

6102 Swiss Avenue

Dallas, Texas 75214

Pro Se

To the Justices of the Supreme Court

of the United States:

Bernard J. Dolenz, M.D., the petitioner

herein, prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to

review the decision of The Supreme Court of Texas

denying review of the judgment and opinion of the

Texas Appeals Court in Fort Worth. Alternatively,

if the Court deems it more appropriate that the Writ

be directed instead to the Texas Appellate Court, it

is requested that this petition be so read.

OPINIONS BELOW

The trial court withdrew this case from the

jury at the close of Plaintiff's evidence and

granted Defendant Hospital's Motion for Directed

Verdict August 24, 1981. This was affirmed at the

Appeals level July 1, 1982. A motion for rehearing

was overruled September 9, 1982. The Texas Supreme

Court refused an application for Writ of Error

December 31, 1982 and overruled the Motion for

Rehearing February 9, 1983.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is

invoked under 28 USC Sec. 1257 (3).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

l. Whether the Texas Supreme Court and

Appeals Court erred in failing to identify and

consider substantial questions of due process and

equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment by

not requiring non profit private hospitals to

follow their own medical staff bylaws adopted by the

medical staff and approved by the governing board.

2. Whether or not the Texas Nonprofit

Corporation Act, which regulates nonprofit

corporations in Texas and requires them to adhere to

their own adopted rules should apply to private non

profit hospitals and provide Fourteenth Amendment

due process and equal protection.

STATUTE INVOLVED

This case involves interpretation of

Article 1396 - 1.02(5) Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. (Vernon

1980): “"Bylaws' means the code or codes of rules

adopted for the regulation or Management of the

corporation, irrespective of the name or names by

which such rules are designated" and the Fourteenth

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States:

"...nor shall any State deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law;

nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff psychiatrist was involuntarily

removed from the staff of All Saints Episcopal

Hospital after being a staff member in good standing

for 13 years, primarily because of a personality

clash with the head psychiatric nurse over the

Christian thrust he was giving his patients in

conjunction with an Episcopal priest. A faction

arose and conspired to oust Plaintiff and used

"inadequacy" of records as the reason; however, the

hospital refused to allow the records to be reviewed

by an impartial party such as an outside independent

medical records librarian, by respected peers of the

American Psychiatric Association, by the Joint

Commission, or even by its own staff psychiatrists.

During depositions, the Administrator of the

hospital ADMITTED that the’ medical records

"inadequacy" was merely a ploy to oust this

psychiatrist. Various procedures of due process in

the hospital bylaws were denied Plaintiff.

Defendant hospital admitted on Request for

Admissions: “Defendant did not follow its Bylaws in

terminating Plaintiff from its medical staff, from

his medical staff privileges." Plaintiff sued

Defendant hospital to be reinstated on the staff

after wrongful terinination of his position due to a

deprivation of his Constitutionally protected right

to due process of law and a conspiracy among

certain members of Defendant's staff, its agents and

employees, and additionally sought damages for

breach of contract and defamation. The lack of due

process was brought out at all trial levels, but the

Texas courts hold that Weary and this case suggest

that private hospitals are not required to follow

their own medical staff bylaws adopted by the

medical staff and approved by the governing board.

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

1.

Certiorari Should Be Granted to Resolve Conflicts in

Principle Among the Lower Courts that give rise to

substantial Constitutional questions and equal

protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The private hospital oriented physician can

be easily handcuffed from having hospital staff

privileges. He has essentially no recourse in the

Texas courts in a private non profit hospital, even

though such hospitals may have funding from Federal

sources such as Hill-Burton funds and Medicare.

1

Notwithstanding the importance to

physicians, hospitals, and the public of grants of

medical staff privileges, procedures for staff

selection are often capricious and arbitrary.

Although staff privileges are officially granted by

the hospital's board, the actual decisions

concerning staff selection are generally made b

members of the hespital's current medical staff.

These medical staffs often function like “exclusive

social clubs or secret fraternal societies,"° having

power to exclude an applicant for “ideological,

moral Of even political reasons," or for no reason

at all. Furthermore, the denial of privileges at

one hospital may have adverse or even disastrous

consequences for the physician's career in

general. Widespread abuse in the staff selection

process has been alleged or documented in numerous

cases and may involve copspiracy to exclude ney

competition for patients, rac¢, discrimination,

bias against osteopathic doctors, intolerance of?

doctor's criticism of hospital policy,

irrationally restrictive bylaws, mistaken summary

aporaisal of a octor based on uncorroborated

hearsay and rumor, and conspiracy to exclude a

physician who testifies extensively in malpractice

litigation.

Considering the abuses and importance of

properly granting staff privileges, there should be

some means of correcting improper denials of staff

privileges. Tf the hospital is ai public

institution, owned and operated by government

entities, a physician denied staff privileges may

contest the denial in court and assert his right to

the due process and equal protection safeguards of

the United States Constitytion and to certain

federal statutory safeguards.

Most hospitals are private non-profit

corporations; some private hospitals are operated

for profit. The question whether the denial of

staff privileges by a private hospital is judicially

reviewable has been approached differently by the

courts. In general the approaches provide the same

kind of protection for the physician: procedural

and substantive safeguards to insure a fair hearing

on his qualifications. Many jurisdictions, when

confronted with a private hospital's unreasonable

denial of staff privileges, have imposed a common

law FIDUCIARY duty upon the hospital. Under this

duty, the hospital must insure that privileges are

not denied unreasonably, arbitrarily, or

capriciously. I @ leading case, Greisman v.

Newcomb Hospital, the New Jersey Supreme Court

held that the defendant private, non profit hospital

had a fiduciary duty to evaluate the plaintiff

Physician's application for staff privileges on its

merits, rather than arbitrarily excluding all

Osteopathic doctors under a provision of the

hospital's bylaws. In finding a Fiduciary duty, the

court relied upon its determination that the

hospital was not strictly private because it had

received substantial funds from public sources and

through public solicitations, had received tax

benefits, possessed a virtual monopoly on area

health care facilities, and was a non profit

organization dedicated by virtue of its certificate

of incorporation to serving the sick and injured.

The court further noted that enterprises even more

private in nature than hospitals had been subjected

to state regulation. The court also observed that

courts had imposed a common law duty on innkeepers,

carriers, and farriers to serve all "comers".

Finally, the court noted that it hed the power to

expand the common law to serve current public needs

and cited its own recent decision vesting a local.

medical society with a ftiduciary duty respecting

membership applications. Therefore, the court

concluded that it was justified in imposing a

similar duty on the defendant hospital.

Such is not the case_jn Texas. Weary v.

Baylor University Hospital controls staff

privileges:

There is no question but that

the various committees of the

Medical Staff including the Medical

Board could only recommend = and

advise on reappointments; and the

Governing Board has final authority

on reappointments and is under no

Obligation to accept or reject the

recommendations of the Medical

Board. The governing board has the

power to determine who shall

practice in the hospital, and such

power to make staff appointments

and reappointments is without

restriction. Neither the results of

a hearing, nor the provisions for a

hearing before the Medical Board are

binding on the Governing Board; and

internal procedures set forth in the

Medical Staff Bylaws, even though

such Bylaws he approved and adopted

by the Governing Board, cannot limit

the power of the Governing Board of

the hospital to reappointing or not

reappointing a staff doctor.

(Emphasis added.)

Dallas Neurosurgeon Weary had a

personality clash with someone on the staff. The

hospital would not reappoint him to the staff, and

the Weary court held that this was proper without

a hearing.

While at first blush it would appear that

after an appointment to the staff had been made,

the hospital would then he obligated by law to

follow its bylaws, rules and regulations. Such is

not the case in Texas, as the All Saints court

Suggests that Weary applies to members who were

Currently on the staff as well, and that the

Governing Body has unbridled authority to oust a

staff member without following its own bylaws.

While Weary stands and has been expanded

to cyprent staff members in Texas, other

courts impose limitations on such unfettered

power.

In an interesting suit between St. John's

Hospital Medical Staff and its hospital, the

Supreme Court of South Dakota (1976) held that

where the medical staff bylaws were adopted and

approved by both the hospital and the medical

Staff, a contractual relationship existed, subject

Only to amendment upon agreement by both the

hospital staff and the hospital. The hospital

tried to unilaterally modify the bylaws, which

bylaws unilaterally adopted by the hospital were

held to be null and void.

In O'Brien, 6 the Maryland Special

Appeals Court (1981) held that hospital bylaws

have force and effect of an enforceable contract.

The requirement of due process of law, as

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, embraces

those "fundamental principles of liberty and

justice which lie at the base of all ovr civil and

political institutions."

Due process must be determined "by taking

into account the purposes of the procedure and its

effect upon the rights asserted and all other

circumstances which may render the _ proceeds

appropriate to the nature of the case." Anderson

National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246 (1944)

The fundamental requirement of due process is an

opportunity to he heard upon such notice and at

such proceedings as are adequate to safequard the

right for which protection is invoked. Louisville

& Nashville R.R. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230 (1900).

Procedural due process rights attach where state

action condemns a person to “suffer grievous loss

of an tind.” Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee

Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951).

In Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 17 and

18, 92 L.Ed. 1161, 68 S. Ct. 836 (1948) the Court

noted that the Fourteenth Amendment protections

extend to the action of state courts as well as to

other state infringements.

2.

Certiorari Should be Granted as the Texas courts

have decided an important issue in a way in

conflict with applicable state law.

*t is unfortunate that the Weary and All

Saints cases suggest that private hospitals are

not required to follow their own medical staff

Sylaws adopted by the medical staff and approved

by whe governing body. This is specially true in

light of the Texas Nonprofit Corporation Act,

which regulates non-profit corporations in Texas

and requires them to adhere to their own adopted

rules. (Article 1396 - 1.02).

3.

Certiorari Should be Granted as Public Policy

Demands It.

St. John's Hospital Medical Staff,

O'Brien, and others seem to be the hetter view as

such unfettered power by the hospital's governing

boards in Texas should be against public policy.

In Texas a physician can be kept excluded from a

staff because he is unliked, because he has given

testimony against a local physician, because he

wears the wrong tie, or for any reason, and it

does not have to be given!

In all malpractice cases a physician must

Serve aS an expert witness to establish the

standard of medical practice against which the

medical defendant will be judged. What physician

will given expert testimony if he knows he can be

passed over when it comes to appointment time, or

just kicked off the staff at any time, at any

private non profit hospital without any procedural

or “due process" protection? Do you need any

better reason for the “conspiracy of silence"?

4.

Certiorari Should Be Granted as the Doctors

Desperately Need Judiciary Help

Chief Justice Burger in the Annual

Report of the State of the Judiciary (ABA Journal,

April 1983) who analogizes the Court's burden and

"crying wolf":

But I suggest the analogy of the

early pioneer who, looking out the

window of his log cabin, saw a pack

of wolves destroying his livestock,

killing his chickens, and clawing at

his smokehouse with its supply of

food. Someone in that situation

need not be apologetic about calling

for help--if there is anyone within

hearing who can help--as you who are

within hearing can help.

The doctors need someone to hear them

too, and the doctors hope that this Court is

within hearing, as a doctor without a hospital is

like a lawyer without a courthouse. The doctor's

prayer regarding the hospital and judiciary is

similar to that of Habakkuk (The Living Bible at

715) :

O Lord, how long must I call for

help before you will listen? I

shout to you in vain; there is no

answer. ‘Help! Murder!' I cry, but

no one comes to save. Must I

forever see this sin and sadness all

around me?

Wherever I look there is oppression

and bribery and men who love to

argue and to fight. The law is not

enforced and there is no justice

given in the courts, for the wicked

far outnumber the righteous, and

bribes and trickery prevail.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons this petition

for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted.

ctfully aa

Ber OlenZ, gi 5.

6102 Seles Avenue

Dallas, Texas 75214

PRO SE

FOOTNOTES

Health Law Center, Problems in Hospital Law

(2 ed. 1974).

Barrett v. United Hosp. 376 F. Supp. 791, 803

(S.D.N.Y. 1974) e

Joining the Hospital's Professional Social

Club. Action Action Kit for Hospital Law.

November 1973 at 3.

Id.

Td.

Hawkins v. Kinsie, 540 P. 2d 345, 348 (Colo.

App. 1975).

Christhilf ov. Annapolis Emergency Hosp.

Assn., 496 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1974).

Willis v. Santa Ana Comm. Hosp. Ass'n, 58

Cal. 2d 806, 376 P. 2d 568, 26 Cal Rptr. 640

(1962); Burkhart v. Comm. Med. Center, 432

S.W. 2d 433 (Ky 1968); Cowan v. Gibson, 392

S.W. 2d 307 (Mo. 1965); Nashville Mem. Hosp.

Inc. v. Brinkley, 534 S.W. 2d 318 (Tenn.

1976).

Foster v. Mobile County Hosp. Bd., 398 F. 2d

227 (5th Cir. 1968); Meredith v. Allen County

War Memorial Hosp. Comm'n, 397 F. 2d 33 (6th

Cir. 1968); Cypress v. Newport News Gen. &

Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F 2d 648 (4th

Cir. 1967); Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F. 2d 710

(4th Cir. 1964); Siminks v. Moses H. Cone

Memorial Hosp., 323 F. 2d 959 (4th Cir.

1963), cert. denied 376 U.S. 938 (1964).

10.

ll.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.Y. 389, 192

A. 2d 817 (1963); Schneir v. Englewood Hosp.

Ass'n, 91 N.J. Super. 74%p 221 A 28 S59

(1966). Health Law Center, Supra at 199,

Ascherman v. San Francisco Med. Soc., 39 Cal.

App. 3d 623, 114 Cal. Reptr. 681 (1974).

Brinker vy. Crane, 468 F. 24 1228 (lst. Cir.

1972).

Kline v. Lutheran Charities Ass'n, 523 F. 2a

56 (8th Cir 1975); Schooler v. Navarro County

Mem. Hosp., 375 F. Suppl 841 (N.D. Tex. 1973;

Schuman_v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F,

Supp. 59 (D.D.C. 1963). Annot. 37 A.L.R. 3d

645, 666-669 (1971).

Peterson v. Tuscon Gen. Hosp., Inc., 114

Ariz. 66, 559 P. 24 186 (Ariz. App. i976);

Anton v. San Antonio Comm. Hosp. 55 Cal. App.

3d 212, 127 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1976); Hawkins v

Kinsie, 520 P. 2d 345 (Col. App. 1975);

Silver _v. Castle Memorial Hos er 53 Hawaii

475, 497 P. 2d 567 (1972), cert. denied, 409

U.S. 1048 (1972).

Weary v. Baylor Univ. Hosp., 360 SW 2d 895

(CCA Waco 1962) writ ref.

St. John's Hospital Medical Staff v. St.

John's Regional Medical Center, Inc., 245

N.W. 2d 472 (So. Dak. 1976). Berberian v.

Lancaster Osteopathic Hospital, 149 A 2d 456

(Pa); Joseph v. Passaic Hosp. Ass'n, 141 A 2a

18 (New Jersey); and Anne Arundel Gen. Hosp.,

Inc. v. O'Brien, 423 A. 2d 483 (Maryland

1980).

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).

APPENDIX ''A"'

NO. 48-44953-77

BERNARD J]. DOLENZ, M.D. IN THE DISTRICT COURT

VS. TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS

ALL SAINTS EPISCOPAL HOSPITAL 48th JUDICIAL DISTRICT

JUDGMENT

That portion of the above styled and num

bered cause not disposed of by this Court's Partial

Summary Judgment signed on May 2, 1978, wherein

Bernard J. Dolenz is Plaintiff and All Saints Epi s—

copal Hospital is Defendant was duly and regularly

set for trial and came on for hearing on August

10, 1981, and all parties announced ready for trial.

A jury having been demanded in this case, such

jury consisting of twelve good and qualified jurors

was duly empaneled, sworn, and the case proceeded

to trial.

On August 11, 1981, at the conclusion

of the Plaintiff's evidence, the Plaintiff rested

and the Defendant moved that the case be withdrawn

from the jury and that it be given judgment as

a matter of law. The Court, being of the opinion

that the Defendant was entitled to judgment as

a matter of law, withdrew the case from the jury

and, considering its Partial Summary Judgment pre-

viously entered, enters judgment as follows:

It is, therefore, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED that Plaintiff, BERNARD J. DOLENZ, take

nothing against Defendant, ALL SAINTS EPISCOPAL

HOSPITAL, and that said Defendant stands fully

and finally released and discharged from all lia-

bility to Plaintiff on account of all matters and

things asserted in this case. It is further ORDERED

that all costs of court incurred herein, be, and

they are hereby, taxed against the Plaintiff for

which the Clerk may have his execution.

SIGNED this the 24th day of August, 1981.

(s) Walter E. Jordan

JUDGE PRESIDING

APPENDIX "'B"

COURT OF APPEALS

Second Supreme Judicial District

Fort Worth, Texas, July 1, 1982.

Mr. Mack Ed Swindle 335 4417

Owen, Michener, Swindle, Whitaker & Pratt

1700 Continental Nat'l. Bank Bldg.

Fort Worth, Texas 76102

Dear Sir:

The Juddment of the Trial Court in case of

Bernard J. Dolenz, M.D. vs.

All Saints Episcopal Hospital No. 2-81-044-CV

from Tarrant County, was affirmed

today. Copies of the opinion and judgment of the

Court are hereto attached.

Yours truly,

Yvonne Palmer, Clerk

YP /mf t

APPENDIX "'C"'

No. 2-81-044-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SECOND SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS

BERNARD J. DOLENZ, *D. APPELLANT

vs.

ALL SAINTS EPISCOPAL HOSPITAL APPELLEE

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

OP IN ION

Bernard J. Dolenz, as plaintiff, brought

suit against All Saints Episcopal Hospital prior

to March 14, 1978. m that date Dolenz filed his

First Amended Petition in which he sought mandatory

injunctive relief by a writ "restraining All Saints

Staff, servants, agents and employees from rescind-

ing Plaintiff's staff privileges, until a final

hearing; (2) That on final hearing thereof Defendant

All Saints whose agents, servants and employees

be permanently enjoined...". He also sought

$100,000.00 for "slanderous and untrue remarks

made by agents of All Saints Hospital that have

been comminicated...".

Following a March 31, 1978 hearing om

All Saint's motion for partial summary judgment

to deny Dolenz injunctive relief, a partial summary

judgment was rendered and entered in denial of

the Dolenz claim therefor on May 2, 1978.

Subsequently Dolenz' pleadings were twice

amended. Afterward trial was held on his cause

af actiom far damagec for clander, bog ismrciag, stupuse

10th, 1981. This trial was on Dolenz' Third Amended

Original petition. In that amended pleading Dolenz

neither alleged circumstances by which he might

have founded a claim for injunctive relief nor

did he pray for such form of relief. A _ result

is that on August 10th, 1981 Dolenz is to be treated

as having abandoned his prior suit for injunction.

At the conclusion of Dolénz' case in chief,

defendant All Saints moved for instructed verdict

or withdrawal of the case from the jury and for

rendition of a take nothing judgment. The court

granted the motion and rendered such a judgment

on August 24, 1981. By recitations of the judgment

it was held that the evidence tendered presented

no case for slander against All Saints; and, if

the evidence did prove slanderous statements char-

geable against said defendant, that there was no

slander which was slanderous per se; and that there

was no proof of damages. The take nothing judgment

also recited the fact of the rendition and ent ry

of the earlier partial judgment. Therefrom Dolenz

appealed.

We affirm the judgments by the trial court.

This we do because we hold Dolenz abandoned his

claim for injunctive relief, and because there

was no evidence which required submission of any

special inquiring as to existence of any defamation

or any conspiracy to defame plaintiff Dolenz as

charged in the amended pleading on which he an-

nounced ready for trial.

On Dolenz' abandonment of his claim for

injunctive relief the law is correctly stated in

McDonald, Texas Civil Practice, Revised, in Chapter

VIII, "Supplemental & Amended Pleadings", sec.

8.01.3, "(Definitions and Distinctions) - B. Func-

tion of Amended Pleading", and sec. 8.10., '(Amended

Pleadings. A. Right to Amend) - E. Status of Suner-—

seded eadings and of Replies Thereto". In a

Situation such as presented an amended pleading

supplants the instrument amended and that which

it amends is no longer proper to be considered

part of the trial record. We hold that prior to

time of the trial begun August 10th, 1981, by oper-

ation of law, Dolenz had abandoned his suit for

injunctive relief, permanent as well as temporary,

and his cause of action did not then enbrance any

claim therfor. In Dolenz' appeal from the judgment

of August 24, 1981 he could not complain of the

adjudication upon his original plea for injunction

because his cause of action therefor had been aban-

doned when he went to trial on his Third Amended

Original Petition.

Doienz' appeal as applied to his charge

of conspiracy and slander by All Saints is concluded

to be without merit because it did not present

any reversible error by the judgment that he take

nothig. As a corporation, All Saints could not

be guilty save by acts for it through agents.

No slander, nor conspiracy to accomplish slander,

was proved as applied to any employee or agent

- acting within the scope and course of his capacity

as agent or in furtherance of the interests of

All Saints as his principal. Neither were any

Statements Dolenz deemed slanderous as made by

All Saint's employees and agents referable to or

in discharge of any duty owed to All Sants as prin-

cipal. Further, even should we attribute the re—

marks charged to amount to an accomplished slander

(by any employee or agent, acting within his capa-

city as such, with the same heard only by another

employee or agent of All Saints acting in like

capacity) the remarks proved as made and heard

could only have operated to prove that All Saints

had conspired with itself. This would not amount

to evidence of conspiracy. This was the nature

of the evidence unon which Dolenz relies.

Finally, we hold the nature of the remarks

charged to be slanderous, even should they be treat-

ed as amounting to a slander, would not qualify

to be slander bee se, or within themselves, so

that injury to Doienz would be presumed to have

resulted. By the remarks was no defamation of

Dolenz' character by imputation of crime or, as

applied to the situation in this case, calculated

to affect him injuriously in his medial practice.

Continuing in our treatment of the remarks as amoun-

ting to stander, they could have amounted to no

more than slander per qo. i.e. words communicated

to third persons i would be actionable only

because of damages proved to have resulted. By

such treatment and hypothesis it would be necessary

for Dolenz to go further with his proof and show

that he suffered injury thereby proximately caused,

as by proof of diminishment in earings, etc.

Dolenz tendered no proof on any such damages; and

as applied to damages attempted to be proved there

was absefnce of proof of any causal connection.

Indeed, it was not shown that any hearer of the

words deemed slanderous understood them to be defam-

atory while there is evidence from one who them

that they did not cause him to doubt Dolenz' pro-

fessional ability or his standing as a physician.

Af firmed.

FRANK A. MASSEY

CHIEF JUSTICE

PANEL A

MASSEY, C.].: SPURLOCK AND HUGHES, jj.

PUBL 1SH

JUL 1 1982

APPENDIX "D"

JUDGMENT

Bernard J]. Dolenz, M.D. From the District Court

of Tarrant County

2-81-044-CV vs. July 1, 1982 (48-44953-77)

All Saints Episcopal Hospital Opinion by Chief

Justice Massey

This cause came on to be heard on the

transcipt of the record and the same having been

reviewed it is the opinion of the Court that there

waS no error in the judgment. It is therefore

ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment

of the trial court in this cause be and it is hereby

af firmed.

It is further ordered that appellant,

Bernard J. Dolenz, M.D., and his surety, American

Sentinel Insurance Agency, pay all costs in this

behalf expended, for which let execution issue,

and that this decision be certified below for ob-

servance.

(P)

APPENDIX "E"

COURT OF APPEALS

200 Civil Ceurts Building

Fort Worth, TX 76102

817/334-1166

Yvonne Palmer, Clerk

September 9, 1982

TO: ALL ATTORNEYS OF RECORD

RE: CA No. 2-81-044-CV

Bernard J. Dolenz, M.D.

vs.

All Saints Episcopal

Hospital

Please take notice that the Court has

this date OVERRULED motion for rehearing of appel-

lant in the above styled cause.

Yours very truly,

Yvonne Palmer, Clerk

By

Mary Johns

APPENDIX "F"

THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

P.O. Box 12248 Capitol Station

Austin, Texas 78711

December 31, 1982

Mr. Ragan s. Tate, Attormey

1700 Texas Building

200 West 7th Street

Fort Worth, Texas 76102

Mr. Grant Liser, »At torney

203 Fort Worth Club Bui lding

Fort Worth, Texas 76102

Dear Sirs:

The application for writ of error in the

case of BERNARD J. DOLENZ v. ALL SAINTS EP 1SCOPAI

HOSPITAL, No. C-1639,, was this day refused.

No reversible error.

Very truly yours,

Garson R. Jackson, Clerk

APPENDIX "'G"

TIE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

P.O. BOX 12248 Capitol Station

Austin, Texas 78711

February 9, 1983.

Mr. Ragan S. Tate, At torney

1700 Texas Building

200 West 7th Street

Fort Worth, Texas 76102

Mr. Grant Liser, At torney

203 Fort Worth Club Bui lding

Fort Worth, Texas 76102

Dear Sirs:

The motion for rehearing in the case of

BERNARD J. DOLENZ v. ALL SAINTS EPISCOPAL HOSP ITAL ,

No. C-1639, was this day overruled.

Very truly yours,

Garson R. Jackson, Clerk

APPENDIX "'H"

(Comment: For some Strange reason, the Texas Civil

Court and the Texas Supreme Court avoided answering

issues relating to due process, the hospital bylaws

and its contractural relationship with the medical

staff, if any.)