Petitioners Reply Brief — Lanigan v. United States

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sme Court, U.S

ee

FILED

UL @y 198

No. 82-1635 ALEXANDER L. STEVAS

CLERK

Oli.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1982

PAUL A. LANIGAN,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF

RICHARD A. SPRAGUE

BRUCE L. THALL

Suite 400, Wellington Building

135 South 19th Street

Philadelphia, Pa. 19103

(215) 561-7681

Counsel for Petitioner,

Paul A. Lanigan

Of Counsel:

SPRAGUE & RUBENSTONE

Suite 400, Wellington Building

135 South 19th Street

Philadelphia, Pa. 19103

(215) 561-7651

THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, 10th & SPRING GARDEN STREETS, PHILA, PA 19123 (215) 236-2080

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) .....

Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) .....

Donovan v. Dewey, 101 S.Ct. 2530 .............

Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) ......

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), reh. denied, 439

OR SD Ao i eee ear

Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) .........

Salvucci v. Jones, 100 S.Ct. 2547 (1980) ...........

See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) .........

United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123 (1979),

cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980) ...........

United States v. Jones, 641 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1981)

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions:

33 U.S. §1318(aXBYi) and (fi) 2.1... eee ee eee

Pennsylvania Clean Stream Act, 35 P.S. §691.1 et seq.

Pennsylvania Solid Waste Act, 35 P.S. §6001 et seq.

l

ARGUMENT

Pursuant to Rule 22.5 of the United States Supreme Court

Rules, Petitioner hereby submits his Reply Brief in support of

his Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit.

1. The United States argues (Brief at 11) that it need not

prove harm to the environment in order to sustain a Refuse Act

or Clean Water Act conviction and that the government's evi-

dence demonstrated environmental harm resulting from to the

operation of Moyer’s Landfill. The law requiring that the gov-

ernment establish a measurable harm to the environment in or-

der to meet i s burden under the Clean Water Act and Refuse

Act has been set forth in the cert petition. The evidence negat-

ing any measurable harm to the environment is discussed

herein.

The government relied upon the testimony of its witness,

Dr. Jane Massey, in order to attempt to prove diminished water

quality in Skippack Creek. It made no attempt to prove dimin-

ished water quality in Eagle Stream, the other waterway alleg-

edly “polluted” by Moyer’s Landfill. Dr. Massey compared

“storet” data for Skippack Creek for the periods 1950 to 1978,

and 1978 to 1980 (the periods for which E.P.A. maintained and

established such data). Storet data was obtained both immedi-

ately upstream and downstream from Moyer’s. Dr. Massey tes-

tified that the downstream samples for certain pollutants were

greater in the period from 1978 to 1980 than they had been from

1950 to 1978. Based upon the worsening of the downstream

water quality, the government contended that Moyer’s neces-

sarily polluted Skippack Creek.

What Massey failed to do, however, was to compare the storet

data for the upstream and downstream stations, from 1950 to

1978 and from 1978 to 1980. Dr. John Keenan, a Professor of

Environmental Engineering at the University of Pennsylvania,

did this analysis based on Dr. Massey's data. He testified, with-

out contradiction, that there was no evidence whatsoever that

the landfill had any adverse impact on the Skippack Creek be-

cause the downstream data was not different from the upstream

2

data in each time period compared. “Well, when one looks at

the [EPA] data, one cannot see a difference between the up-

stream point and the downstream point, and therefore you can-

not make any determination about changes in the [water] qual-

ity”. By measuring only the downstream samples, Massey did

pick up increases in certain pollutants; however, those pollu-

tants obviously did not come from Moyer's Landfill. Had their

source been the landfill, then the upstream samples would not

have reflected the same pollutants as the downstream samples

for each of the periods reflected in the storet analysis.

Donald Knorr, a DER employee, took upstream and down-

stream Skippack Creek samples on May 12, 1980. He reluc-

tantly conceded that he found “no significant difference” be-

tween these analyses. The government introduced no evidence

of any adverse impact on any water nor did it seek to introduce

any analysis of Skippack Creek which it had taken because they

demonstrated no adverse impact on the water. The reason for

this seeming anomoly is clear. Although landfill leachate in con-

tainment vessels may have contained heavy concentrations of

perameters which worsen water quality, the quantity of

leachate, if any, reaching the water was de minimus and/or the

source of leachate reaching the waters was not the containment

vessels themselves. Thus, when Dr. Massey testified that de-

spite no measurable impact on the Skippack from the landfill,

there would nonetheless be a “specific zone” due to higher con-

centrations of metals which would “create a zone where normal

acquatic life can no longer exist”, she assumed substantial

leachate discharges. She conceded, however, that she did not

know the quality or quantity, if any, of leachate actually entering

the Skippack.

In fact, a government witness testified that on May 24, 1980

— a date subsequent to all but one of the indictment charges

before the jury — he and his son were fishing in the Skippack

where the alleged leachate discharges had been occurring for a

period of years. Thus, obviously no “septic zone” existed, and no

worsening of the quality of any water was established.

2. The United States contends that since certain collection

basins near the west and south side of the landfill were not lo-

3

cated on landfill property [Br.3], and/or since Petitioner alleg-

edly consented to warrantless searches and seizures of leachate

from these collection basins, Petitioner's motion to suppress the

fruits of those searches was properly denied. The United States

also argues that since landfills are pervasively regulated, no war-

rant of any kind need have been secured so that Petitioner's mo-

tion to suppress was properly denied. The government's argu-

ments are factually and legally insufficient. Conceding no

warrant, and in absence of any evidence suggesting a random,

neutral administrative inspection scheme, the government sug-

gests that the mere fact of regulation is sufficient to circumvent

the Fourth Amendment. Obviously, were this the law, then

Camara ». Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of

Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); and Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436

U.S. 307 (1978) would have been decided differently, and

Donovan's v. Dewey's fulcrum — “the only real issue before us

is whether the statute's inspection program, in terms of the cer-

tainty and regularity of its application, provides a constitution-

ally adequate substitute for a warrant”, Donovan v. Dewey, 101

§.Ct. 2530, 2540 — would be mere surplusage. The Federal

Clean Water Act parrots the language found infirm by this Court

in Barlow's, which permits the administrator a “right of entry”

exercisable at “reasonable times” to copy records and sample

effluents, 33 U.S. §1318(a)(B)(i) and (ii), but only such records

and effluents which the operator is required to maintain or sam-

ple. No such requirement of sampling was ever imposed on Pe-

titioner. Therefore, the samples seized were taken in violation of

the Act itself, even were its inspection program able to pass con-

stitutional muster.

The Refuse Act does not purport to permit warrantless en-

tries for enforcement purposes. The Pennsylvania Solid Waste

Act, 35 P.S. §6001 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Clean Stream

Act, 35 P.S. §691.1 et seq., contain absolutely no provisions

which even imply the bounds, if any, of an inspection program

nor a regularized right of entry, nor the right to remove sam-

ples.

Therefore, the United States is forced to rely upon “con-

sent” to justify the warrantless searches. Respecting “consent”,

4

the record is uncontradicted in the following regards: (a) for nu-

merous entries, no consent from Mr. Lanigan, or any other per-

son, was either sought or obtained; (b) no one advised Mr.

Lanigan of the right to refuse entry or to preclude the taking of

samples, absent a warrant; (c) no one advised Mr. Lanigan of his

right to have samples seized by the government divided so that

he could have the samples tested independently; (d) no consid-

eration was given by the government to obtaining a search or

administrative warrant; (e) no one advised anyone that samples,

observations or photographs could be used in a criminal pro-

ceeding; and (f) no one wished Mr. Lanigan to know the true

purpose of the searches; the pursuit of citizen complaints, and

government investigations about landfill operations, with a view

towards potential criminal prosecution.

Indeed, DER Inspector Thomas Sheehan testified that Mr.

Lanigan never objected to agents on the premises because “we

both thought I had a right to go on”. Since all parties assumed a

right of entry and seizure, and no suggestions of future criminal

proceedings or uses of these materials were raised either di-

rectly or indirectly by any governmental agents through their

statements, credentials, or absence of uniforms, no consent can

possibly be claimed to here exist. Any consent claimed to

amount to a relinquishment of a Fourth Amendment right must

be voluntary; i.e., freely and intelligently given:

“When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify a

search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was,

in fact, freely and voluntarily given. This burden cannot be

discharged by showing no more than acquiesence to a claim

of lawful authority.” Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S.

543, 548-49 (1968).

See also, United States v. Jones, 641 F.2d 425, 429 (6th Cir.

1981) (“the burden of proving a valid consent was on the govern-

ment, and, as we have repeatedly held, this burden required

‘clear and positive’ proof that the consent was uncontaminated

by duress, coercion or trickery.”) Here the United States proved

no more than periodic acquiescence to a claim of lawful author-

ity, which acquiescence was based on withholding information

9

from Petitioner. Thus, no consent was obtained for any

warrantless entry.

Given the fact that no one was even consulted respecting

numerous entries, and the facts as set forth above, the govern-

ment now argues that the suppression motions were properly

denied because some of the basins were not on landfill property.

It is correct that at a suppression hearing on December 14,

1981, testimony was elicited from a government witness to the

effect that collection basins at the west and south sides of the

landfill might not be located on Moyer’s property. What the

United States has failed to disclose is that this question arose in

the context of whether observations by citizens who may have

trespassed onto Moyer's property could be admitted into evi-

dence at trial. Obviously, that question is irrelevant to the

Fourth Amendment issues here raised. Indeed, the land on

which the landfill sat was never owned by Moyer’s; Moyer’s was

merely a corporation which owned the landfill business, the

property on which it sat being owned by third parties. However,

whether located on or off the geographic boundaries of the land

owned by these third parties, it is uncontroverted that the ba-

sins themselves were the property of Moyer's. Therefore, Mr.

Lanigan as corporate owner uf the basins may properly raise

these claims, whose determination hinges on traditional Fourth

Amendment analysis. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-39,

147 (1978), reh. denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979); Rawlings v. Ken-

tucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); Salvucci v. Junes, 100 S.Ct. 2547

(1980). ,

Here, regardless of the actual property boundaries,

Moyer’s, EPA, DER, and the citizenry assumed both Moyer’s

proprietary interest in and privacy rights respecting the basins;

therefore, the warrantless searches and seizures were unconsti-

tutional.

3. The United States relies on “the poor condition of the

leachate collection basin system” in ordey to establish negli-

gence on the part of Petitioner. [Br. 5] The government also

seeks to impose criminal liability on Mr. Lanigan through obser-

vations of persons on precious few days as to the existence of

such “poor condition’, in an effort to establish his negligence.

6

The evidence, however, is overwhelming that Mr. Lanigan

did, in fact, direct daily that the first order of business was to

assure that the collection basin system was inspected and main-

tained. One Chapman Redman was specifically delegated the

daily task to inspect all pipes, lines and basins both on and off

the landfill, which task he stated he performed. In connection

with the maintenance of the system, however, vandalism was a

major and continuous problem. Acts of vandalism testified to in-

cluded pipes being shot, broken and pulled apart; pumps being

turned off and switches broken; and the setting of suspicious

fires. Some of these acts of vandalism, contemporaneously re-

ported to the police, were reflected in police reports, which re-

ports the court refused to admit into evidence.

Thus, the record discloses a daily diligence on the part of

Mr. Lanigan, directing his employees to maintain the integrity

of the leachate collection system. The government relies on “a

hole in the side of [a] basin in 1978 and 1980 [which allowed

leachate to escape into a creek].” There was no such hole in

1978.

4. The government also relies upon Petitioner allowing

“customers to dump sludges containing a substantial amount of

liquid at the landfill, thus aggravating the leachate problem.”

[Br. 6]. The government has failed to advise this Court that, as

the evidence at trial reflected, every customer who dumped

sludges containing substantial liquid at the landfill, did so only

after obtaining prior authorization and approval from DER, the

agency charged with monitoring and assuring compliance with

state and federal pollution laws.

5. In connection with its argument that “gross negligence

— the functional equivalent of willfulness” — need not be estab-

lished in order to sustain a Clean Water Act conviction, the

United States relies on the case of United States v. Frezzo Bros.,

Inc., 602 F.2d 1123 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).

In Frezzo, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals did uphold a con-

viction under the Clean Water Act for negligent discharge of

pollutants. Frezzo, however, never discussed much less decided

whether gross negligence was required or whether gross negli-

gence had been proved by the government in that case. Thus,

Frezzo is of little solace to the United States.

‘

6. In his cert petition, Petitioner established how the gov-

ernment attempted to establish its claim of negligence through

reliance on the testimony of one Gary Brown, who, testifying

from a total absence of first-hand observations during the period

in question, and relying on concededly erroneous assumptions,

used a “water balance method” which led him to assume that the

landfill had generated more leachate than it was capable of ab-

sorbing. The government seized upon this purported “excess

leachate” through testimony and argument, contending that Mr.

Lanigan’s failure to haul 50,000 gallons of leachate per week to

the borough of Bridgeport, resulted in leachate discharges from

the landfill of “excess leachate”, and established negligence. In

the cert petition, Petitioner has established how the existence of

“excess leachate” is a figment of Mr. Brown's imagination,

unsupported by eyewitness observations of both residents and

regulatory personnel of DER and the EPA.

Petitioner has argued that all Brown's testimony should

have been excluded since the “water balance method” is

inadmissable. Petitioner established that the record is clear that

no court of law had accepted the water balance method and that,

when a purported scientific test is the predicate for an expert's

opinion, the government has at least some burden of establish-

ing the reliability and accuracy of the test. This the United

States failed to do.

The United States has responded by misconstruing Peti-

tioner's argument, stating that Petitioner argues that Brown's

testimony should have been excluded merely because the meth-

odology has not previously been accepted by a court. [Br. 13].

Petitioner has argued no such thing. All that Petitioner has con-

tended is that where methodology has not previously been de-

termined by a court to be reliable, the government must estab-

lish by clear and convincing evidence that the scientific

technique is reliable. This task was not undertaken by the gov-

ernment in connection with its prosecution of Petitioner herein.

Therefore, Brown's testimony should not have been admitted.

Had such testimony not been admitted, the jury might not have

found negligence, or even a violation under the Refuse Act.

Therefore, it is submitted not only that the trial court errone-

8

ously permitted Mr. Brown to testify, but also that the testi-

mony was a significant factor in connection with the verdicts of

guilty which were returned. This averment is supported by the

jury determination. Brown testified that excess leachate would

have occurred in 1980. Mr. Lanigan was acquitted of all charges

eminating from allegations of Clean Water Act and Refuse Act

violations in 1978, being convicted on only some charges in the

year 1980.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in the

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, a Writ of Certiorari should issue

to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit so that this Honor-

able Court may review and correct the decision below,

Respectfully submitted,

SPRAGUE & RUBENSTONE

By:

RICHARD A. SPRAGUE

BRUCE L. THALL

Counsel for Petitioner

Paul A. Lanigan

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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