Petitioners Reply Brief — Lanigan v. United States
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sme Court, U.S
ee
FILED
UL @y 198
No. 82-1635 ALEXANDER L. STEVAS
CLERK
Oli.
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1982
PAUL A. LANIGAN,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF
RICHARD A. SPRAGUE
BRUCE L. THALL
Suite 400, Wellington Building
135 South 19th Street
Philadelphia, Pa. 19103
(215) 561-7681
Counsel for Petitioner,
Paul A. Lanigan
Of Counsel:
SPRAGUE & RUBENSTONE
Suite 400, Wellington Building
135 South 19th Street
Philadelphia, Pa. 19103
(215) 561-7651
THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, 10th & SPRING GARDEN STREETS, PHILA, PA 19123 (215) 236-2080
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) .....
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) .....
Donovan v. Dewey, 101 S.Ct. 2530 .............
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) ......
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), reh. denied, 439
OR SD Ao i eee ear
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) .........
Salvucci v. Jones, 100 S.Ct. 2547 (1980) ...........
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) .........
United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123 (1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980) ...........
United States v. Jones, 641 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1981)
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions:
33 U.S. §1318(aXBYi) and (fi) 2.1... eee ee eee
Pennsylvania Clean Stream Act, 35 P.S. §691.1 et seq.
Pennsylvania Solid Waste Act, 35 P.S. §6001 et seq.
l
ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Rule 22.5 of the United States Supreme Court
Rules, Petitioner hereby submits his Reply Brief in support of
his Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.
1. The United States argues (Brief at 11) that it need not
prove harm to the environment in order to sustain a Refuse Act
or Clean Water Act conviction and that the government's evi-
dence demonstrated environmental harm resulting from to the
operation of Moyer’s Landfill. The law requiring that the gov-
ernment establish a measurable harm to the environment in or-
der to meet i s burden under the Clean Water Act and Refuse
Act has been set forth in the cert petition. The evidence negat-
ing any measurable harm to the environment is discussed
herein.
The government relied upon the testimony of its witness,
Dr. Jane Massey, in order to attempt to prove diminished water
quality in Skippack Creek. It made no attempt to prove dimin-
ished water quality in Eagle Stream, the other waterway alleg-
edly “polluted” by Moyer’s Landfill. Dr. Massey compared
“storet” data for Skippack Creek for the periods 1950 to 1978,
and 1978 to 1980 (the periods for which E.P.A. maintained and
established such data). Storet data was obtained both immedi-
ately upstream and downstream from Moyer’s. Dr. Massey tes-
tified that the downstream samples for certain pollutants were
greater in the period from 1978 to 1980 than they had been from
1950 to 1978. Based upon the worsening of the downstream
water quality, the government contended that Moyer’s neces-
sarily polluted Skippack Creek.
What Massey failed to do, however, was to compare the storet
data for the upstream and downstream stations, from 1950 to
1978 and from 1978 to 1980. Dr. John Keenan, a Professor of
Environmental Engineering at the University of Pennsylvania,
did this analysis based on Dr. Massey's data. He testified, with-
out contradiction, that there was no evidence whatsoever that
the landfill had any adverse impact on the Skippack Creek be-
cause the downstream data was not different from the upstream
2
data in each time period compared. “Well, when one looks at
the [EPA] data, one cannot see a difference between the up-
stream point and the downstream point, and therefore you can-
not make any determination about changes in the [water] qual-
ity”. By measuring only the downstream samples, Massey did
pick up increases in certain pollutants; however, those pollu-
tants obviously did not come from Moyer's Landfill. Had their
source been the landfill, then the upstream samples would not
have reflected the same pollutants as the downstream samples
for each of the periods reflected in the storet analysis.
Donald Knorr, a DER employee, took upstream and down-
stream Skippack Creek samples on May 12, 1980. He reluc-
tantly conceded that he found “no significant difference” be-
tween these analyses. The government introduced no evidence
of any adverse impact on any water nor did it seek to introduce
any analysis of Skippack Creek which it had taken because they
demonstrated no adverse impact on the water. The reason for
this seeming anomoly is clear. Although landfill leachate in con-
tainment vessels may have contained heavy concentrations of
perameters which worsen water quality, the quantity of
leachate, if any, reaching the water was de minimus and/or the
source of leachate reaching the waters was not the containment
vessels themselves. Thus, when Dr. Massey testified that de-
spite no measurable impact on the Skippack from the landfill,
there would nonetheless be a “specific zone” due to higher con-
centrations of metals which would “create a zone where normal
acquatic life can no longer exist”, she assumed substantial
leachate discharges. She conceded, however, that she did not
know the quality or quantity, if any, of leachate actually entering
the Skippack.
In fact, a government witness testified that on May 24, 1980
— a date subsequent to all but one of the indictment charges
before the jury — he and his son were fishing in the Skippack
where the alleged leachate discharges had been occurring for a
period of years. Thus, obviously no “septic zone” existed, and no
worsening of the quality of any water was established.
2. The United States contends that since certain collection
basins near the west and south side of the landfill were not lo-
3
cated on landfill property [Br.3], and/or since Petitioner alleg-
edly consented to warrantless searches and seizures of leachate
from these collection basins, Petitioner's motion to suppress the
fruits of those searches was properly denied. The United States
also argues that since landfills are pervasively regulated, no war-
rant of any kind need have been secured so that Petitioner's mo-
tion to suppress was properly denied. The government's argu-
ments are factually and legally insufficient. Conceding no
warrant, and in absence of any evidence suggesting a random,
neutral administrative inspection scheme, the government sug-
gests that the mere fact of regulation is sufficient to circumvent
the Fourth Amendment. Obviously, were this the law, then
Camara ». Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); and Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436
U.S. 307 (1978) would have been decided differently, and
Donovan's v. Dewey's fulcrum — “the only real issue before us
is whether the statute's inspection program, in terms of the cer-
tainty and regularity of its application, provides a constitution-
ally adequate substitute for a warrant”, Donovan v. Dewey, 101
§.Ct. 2530, 2540 — would be mere surplusage. The Federal
Clean Water Act parrots the language found infirm by this Court
in Barlow's, which permits the administrator a “right of entry”
exercisable at “reasonable times” to copy records and sample
effluents, 33 U.S. §1318(a)(B)(i) and (ii), but only such records
and effluents which the operator is required to maintain or sam-
ple. No such requirement of sampling was ever imposed on Pe-
titioner. Therefore, the samples seized were taken in violation of
the Act itself, even were its inspection program able to pass con-
stitutional muster.
The Refuse Act does not purport to permit warrantless en-
tries for enforcement purposes. The Pennsylvania Solid Waste
Act, 35 P.S. §6001 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Clean Stream
Act, 35 P.S. §691.1 et seq., contain absolutely no provisions
which even imply the bounds, if any, of an inspection program
nor a regularized right of entry, nor the right to remove sam-
ples.
Therefore, the United States is forced to rely upon “con-
sent” to justify the warrantless searches. Respecting “consent”,
4
the record is uncontradicted in the following regards: (a) for nu-
merous entries, no consent from Mr. Lanigan, or any other per-
son, was either sought or obtained; (b) no one advised Mr.
Lanigan of the right to refuse entry or to preclude the taking of
samples, absent a warrant; (c) no one advised Mr. Lanigan of his
right to have samples seized by the government divided so that
he could have the samples tested independently; (d) no consid-
eration was given by the government to obtaining a search or
administrative warrant; (e) no one advised anyone that samples,
observations or photographs could be used in a criminal pro-
ceeding; and (f) no one wished Mr. Lanigan to know the true
purpose of the searches; the pursuit of citizen complaints, and
government investigations about landfill operations, with a view
towards potential criminal prosecution.
Indeed, DER Inspector Thomas Sheehan testified that Mr.
Lanigan never objected to agents on the premises because “we
both thought I had a right to go on”. Since all parties assumed a
right of entry and seizure, and no suggestions of future criminal
proceedings or uses of these materials were raised either di-
rectly or indirectly by any governmental agents through their
statements, credentials, or absence of uniforms, no consent can
possibly be claimed to here exist. Any consent claimed to
amount to a relinquishment of a Fourth Amendment right must
be voluntary; i.e., freely and intelligently given:
“When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify a
search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was,
in fact, freely and voluntarily given. This burden cannot be
discharged by showing no more than acquiesence to a claim
of lawful authority.” Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S.
543, 548-49 (1968).
See also, United States v. Jones, 641 F.2d 425, 429 (6th Cir.
1981) (“the burden of proving a valid consent was on the govern-
ment, and, as we have repeatedly held, this burden required
‘clear and positive’ proof that the consent was uncontaminated
by duress, coercion or trickery.”) Here the United States proved
no more than periodic acquiescence to a claim of lawful author-
ity, which acquiescence was based on withholding information
9
from Petitioner. Thus, no consent was obtained for any
warrantless entry.
Given the fact that no one was even consulted respecting
numerous entries, and the facts as set forth above, the govern-
ment now argues that the suppression motions were properly
denied because some of the basins were not on landfill property.
It is correct that at a suppression hearing on December 14,
1981, testimony was elicited from a government witness to the
effect that collection basins at the west and south sides of the
landfill might not be located on Moyer’s property. What the
United States has failed to disclose is that this question arose in
the context of whether observations by citizens who may have
trespassed onto Moyer's property could be admitted into evi-
dence at trial. Obviously, that question is irrelevant to the
Fourth Amendment issues here raised. Indeed, the land on
which the landfill sat was never owned by Moyer’s; Moyer’s was
merely a corporation which owned the landfill business, the
property on which it sat being owned by third parties. However,
whether located on or off the geographic boundaries of the land
owned by these third parties, it is uncontroverted that the ba-
sins themselves were the property of Moyer's. Therefore, Mr.
Lanigan as corporate owner uf the basins may properly raise
these claims, whose determination hinges on traditional Fourth
Amendment analysis. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-39,
147 (1978), reh. denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979); Rawlings v. Ken-
tucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); Salvucci v. Junes, 100 S.Ct. 2547
(1980). ,
Here, regardless of the actual property boundaries,
Moyer’s, EPA, DER, and the citizenry assumed both Moyer’s
proprietary interest in and privacy rights respecting the basins;
therefore, the warrantless searches and seizures were unconsti-
tutional.
3. The United States relies on “the poor condition of the
leachate collection basin system” in ordey to establish negli-
gence on the part of Petitioner. [Br. 5] The government also
seeks to impose criminal liability on Mr. Lanigan through obser-
vations of persons on precious few days as to the existence of
such “poor condition’, in an effort to establish his negligence.
6
The evidence, however, is overwhelming that Mr. Lanigan
did, in fact, direct daily that the first order of business was to
assure that the collection basin system was inspected and main-
tained. One Chapman Redman was specifically delegated the
daily task to inspect all pipes, lines and basins both on and off
the landfill, which task he stated he performed. In connection
with the maintenance of the system, however, vandalism was a
major and continuous problem. Acts of vandalism testified to in-
cluded pipes being shot, broken and pulled apart; pumps being
turned off and switches broken; and the setting of suspicious
fires. Some of these acts of vandalism, contemporaneously re-
ported to the police, were reflected in police reports, which re-
ports the court refused to admit into evidence.
Thus, the record discloses a daily diligence on the part of
Mr. Lanigan, directing his employees to maintain the integrity
of the leachate collection system. The government relies on “a
hole in the side of [a] basin in 1978 and 1980 [which allowed
leachate to escape into a creek].” There was no such hole in
1978.
4. The government also relies upon Petitioner allowing
“customers to dump sludges containing a substantial amount of
liquid at the landfill, thus aggravating the leachate problem.”
[Br. 6]. The government has failed to advise this Court that, as
the evidence at trial reflected, every customer who dumped
sludges containing substantial liquid at the landfill, did so only
after obtaining prior authorization and approval from DER, the
agency charged with monitoring and assuring compliance with
state and federal pollution laws.
5. In connection with its argument that “gross negligence
— the functional equivalent of willfulness” — need not be estab-
lished in order to sustain a Clean Water Act conviction, the
United States relies on the case of United States v. Frezzo Bros.,
Inc., 602 F.2d 1123 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
In Frezzo, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals did uphold a con-
viction under the Clean Water Act for negligent discharge of
pollutants. Frezzo, however, never discussed much less decided
whether gross negligence was required or whether gross negli-
gence had been proved by the government in that case. Thus,
Frezzo is of little solace to the United States.
‘
6. In his cert petition, Petitioner established how the gov-
ernment attempted to establish its claim of negligence through
reliance on the testimony of one Gary Brown, who, testifying
from a total absence of first-hand observations during the period
in question, and relying on concededly erroneous assumptions,
used a “water balance method” which led him to assume that the
landfill had generated more leachate than it was capable of ab-
sorbing. The government seized upon this purported “excess
leachate” through testimony and argument, contending that Mr.
Lanigan’s failure to haul 50,000 gallons of leachate per week to
the borough of Bridgeport, resulted in leachate discharges from
the landfill of “excess leachate”, and established negligence. In
the cert petition, Petitioner has established how the existence of
“excess leachate” is a figment of Mr. Brown's imagination,
unsupported by eyewitness observations of both residents and
regulatory personnel of DER and the EPA.
Petitioner has argued that all Brown's testimony should
have been excluded since the “water balance method” is
inadmissable. Petitioner established that the record is clear that
no court of law had accepted the water balance method and that,
when a purported scientific test is the predicate for an expert's
opinion, the government has at least some burden of establish-
ing the reliability and accuracy of the test. This the United
States failed to do.
The United States has responded by misconstruing Peti-
tioner's argument, stating that Petitioner argues that Brown's
testimony should have been excluded merely because the meth-
odology has not previously been accepted by a court. [Br. 13].
Petitioner has argued no such thing. All that Petitioner has con-
tended is that where methodology has not previously been de-
termined by a court to be reliable, the government must estab-
lish by clear and convincing evidence that the scientific
technique is reliable. This task was not undertaken by the gov-
ernment in connection with its prosecution of Petitioner herein.
Therefore, Brown's testimony should not have been admitted.
Had such testimony not been admitted, the jury might not have
found negligence, or even a violation under the Refuse Act.
Therefore, it is submitted not only that the trial court errone-
8
ously permitted Mr. Brown to testify, but also that the testi-
mony was a significant factor in connection with the verdicts of
guilty which were returned. This averment is supported by the
jury determination. Brown testified that excess leachate would
have occurred in 1980. Mr. Lanigan was acquitted of all charges
eminating from allegations of Clean Water Act and Refuse Act
violations in 1978, being convicted on only some charges in the
year 1980.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in the
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, a Writ of Certiorari should issue
to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit so that this Honor-
able Court may review and correct the decision below,
Respectfully submitted,
SPRAGUE & RUBENSTONE
By:
RICHARD A. SPRAGUE
BRUCE L. THALL
Counsel for Petitioner
Paul A. Lanigan
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