Amicus Brief — United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp.

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No. 82-1616

ALEXANDER L. STEVAS,

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE cnrvub-coilien

— :

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER |

Ve

WEBER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, ET AL.,

RESPONDENTS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH

CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF INDERJIT BADHWAR

AND DONALD J. GOLDBERG

AS AMICI CURIAE

IN SUPPORT_OR AFFIRMANCE

ee ee ae 8

RAYMOND D. BATTOCCHI

Counsel of Record

es: : ALFRED F. BELCUORE

, STEVEN F, KOROSTOFP

¥ COLE AND GRONER, P.C.

Te | 1730 K Street, N.W.

Bry: Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 331-8888

Attorneys f

QUESTION PRESENTED

Are witness statements con-

taining solely factual matter, which were

made during a Governmental investigation

into an air crash, and which were not

prepared by attorneys or in anticipation

of litigation, exempt from disclosure

under Exemption 5 of the Freedom of

Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5)?

» iio

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question Presented ...++-ees

Interest of Inderjit Badhwar and

Donald J. Goldberg . ...+++-e-«s

Summary of Argument .... ++ « «

Argument . . . . 7 . . . . . . . .

Witness Statements Containing

Solely Factual Matter, Which Were

Made During A Governmental In-

vestigation Into An Air Crash,

And Which Were Not Prepared By

Attorneys Or In Anticipation Of

Litigation, Are Not Shielded

From Disclosure Under Exemption

5 Of The Freedom Of Information

Act > . . o . . . . . . . . . .

I. Congress Intended That Purely

Pactual Witness Statements

Not Be Exempt From Disclosure

Under Exemption5 ....

A. This Court Has Clearly

Held That Purely Factual

Documents Of This Kind Are

Not Within Exemption 5 .

B. Pertinent Legislative

History Illustrates

Congress’ Clear Intent

That Purely Factual

Witness Statements Not

Be Shielded By Exemption

5 . . . . . o . * * . .

11

17

16

18

- ili -

Petitioner Misreads

Legislative History To

Assert That Exemption

5 Embraces Purely

Factual Witness State-

ments 7 + . . . . . . .

1.

This Court Held In

Mink That Congress

Changed The Lanauage

Of Exemption 5 Por A

Specific Reason Dif-

ferent From What

Petitioner Contends.

Petitioner's Argument

Rests Solely Upon A

Solitary Phrase In

The Legislative His-

tory, Taken Out Of

Context, In Disregard

Of The Balance And

Principal Thrust Of

That History And The

Congressional Intent

It Reflects .. « e

Under The Case Law As Of

The Enactment Of FOIA, The

Witness Statements At Bar

Were Subject To Discovery

The Reynolds Case é

Other Pre-FOIA Cases

Petitioner's Reliance

Upon Machin v. Zuckert

Is Misplaced... .

22

24

26

33

34

37

39

II.

- iv-

This Court Should Not Adopt A

Special Privilege For These

Witness Statements To Exempt

Them From POIA . « « © © « « 40

A. Purely Factual Witness

Statements Not Taken In

Anticipation Of Litigation

Are Generally Subject To

Disclosure ..«s+s-¢e. 42

B. The National Transporta-

tion Safety Board, Which

For Civil Aviation Has

Responsibilities Identical

To Military Air Crash Safety

Investigation Boards,

Routinely Makes Available

To The Public Witness

Statements Taken In Its

Investigations of Civil Air

Cragnae «6:4, € sea 46

C. The Alleged Promise Of

Confidentiality Ex-

tended To These Air

Force Witnesses Does

Not Confer Any

Privilege Upon The

Witness Statements Or

Exempt Them From Dis-

closure Under FOIA. . 53

D. Accordingly, These

Witness Statements

Should Not Be Afforded

A Special Exemption

From Disclosure ... 56

Conclusion

Appendix

At The Very Least, The

Law Commends Not

Adopting Such A Privi-

lege, Having Such Far-

Reaching Consequences,

Except Upon A Full

Record That Is Absent

ai: & 6 6 6 @ « e

= yi «

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Brockway v. Department of Air

Porce, 518 F.2d 1184 (8th Cir.

1975) o . -_ . . . . . . . . . . 58

Charlotte-Macklenburg Hospital

Authority v. Perry, 571 F.2d

195 (4th Cir. 1978) . « « « « « 43

Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S.

281 (1979) 7 . . + . ° . ° . . 11

Church of Scientology v. Department

of Army, 611 F.2d 738 (9th Cir.

1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry-

dock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708

(E.D. Pa. 1968) . . . . . . . . 43

Cooper v. Navy, 558 F.2d 274 (5th

Cir. 1977), on petition for

rehearing, 594 F.2d 484 (5th

Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.

gk. ata ag papeepered Ieee ae pA 58, 60

Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D.

203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) . 2 — _ _ > 37-38

Department of Air Force v. Rose,

S25 O.8. 352 (1976). .« s 6 & es 12

as

- vii -

Page

Department of State v. Washington

Post Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982) . 27-28

EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). Te Ye

12, 15,

17-18,

23, 24, 25

29-30, 34

FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255

(1975) . . . _ . . . >. . > > . 52

FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615

(1982) _ . > >. . . . . . o > 14, 32

Federal Open Market Committee v.

Merrill, 443 U.S. 340 (1979) 13, 14

15, 42

FTC v. Grolier, Inc., 462 U.S. °

tee B.6t. Baer (190s) « «es 2 tae 3

14, 41

Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S.

273 (1968) ° ° e ° ° ° . . . 61

Janicker v. George Washington

University, 94 F.R.D. 648 (D.D.C.

1982) @ o o o eo . > > . . eo o J 42

Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S.

801 (1977) . o . . . * o . _ 61

Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336

(eC. Cir.-1963) << ¢ «ee bs eee

39-40

58, 61

- vill -

Page

McFadden v. Avco Corp., 278 F. Supp.

S7 (ND. Ala. 1967) . « « @» 8 @ 57

Mercy v. County of Suffolk, 93

PR.D. 520 CE.DN.Y. 1902). © « 42

Miles v. Bell Helicopter Co., 385

F. Supp. 1029 (N.D. Ga. 1974) . 42-43

NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.,

S37 O.8..204 (1978) « « 0 © « 0 «. 44745

O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 38 F.R.D.

pam GmeDelsts THOS) + 6 6 0 0 6 o See OC

Petkas v. Staats, 501 F.2d 887

(D.C. af 1974) e oO 8 ° °° . 8 54

Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft

Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974). 6

Reynolds v. United States, 10

F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1950),

aff'd, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir.

, rev'd on other grounds,

345 U.S. ] (1953) . . . . ° . . 34-36

Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB,

563 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1977),

rev'd on other grounds, 437 U.S.

Der -. 6. ee 6 ke aes 43-44

Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843 (4th

Cake 1973) ° .s 6, « ° * e . . « 53-54

Royal Exchange Assur. v. McGrath,

13 F.R.D. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) . 43

- ix -

Pace

Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska

Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367

(N.D. eae 1972) . . . . > o . 43

Uniformed Sanitation Men Associa-

tion v. Commissioner of Sanitation,

392 U.S. 280 (1968) . ” . . . a 61

‘United Air Lines, Inc. v. United

States, 186 F. Supp. 824 (D.Del.

1960) . . > . * > > >. >. . >. >. * 38

United Air Lines, Inc. v. United

States, 26 F.R.D. 213 (D.Del.

1960) >. . . > . . . — .* a >. * 38

United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S.

1 (1953) ee We “SY Se Ae Sa ee oe oe ee 36-37

Weber Aircraft Corp. v. United

States, 688 F.2d 638 (9th Cir.

1982) *. * >. > . . . * >. >. *. . . 58

Whitaker v. Davis, 45 F.R.D. 270

(W.D. Mo. 1968) * — > - >. * * >. 43

Wunderly v. United States, 8 F.R.D.

356 (E.D. Pa. 1948) 7 . . . . 7 43

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) ... 54-55

Bo 1: 5 Re ee ee 49

S Seetb)(S) « « « @-e « passim

7? elles a tee bs «' & eal’ 46, 47

S.Weeee es: ta os ae 47

y 1902(a) . . . . . 47

s 1903(a) - . . . . . 48

§ 1903(a)(2) . 2. we 49

49 U0.8.C. iS 1905 . . . . . - . a

iS 1906 . . . . . . . .

Public Law 89-670, 80 Stat. 935

(1966) - . . . . . . . “se . .

S00.2 « es ee

S00.3 .«.s2.e «

S00.3(a) .« « e

801 (Appendix)

SOT.2 .« ce © eo

SOT.10 « «

6071.35 ..«

801.50 ..

801.54(b)

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LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

S.1666, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.

(1964) a . * . . . . >. . o * .

S$.1160, 89th Cong., Ist Sess.

(1965) - ” 2 ¢ . . . - . . . .

Administrative Procedure Act:

Hearings Before the Subcomm,. on

Administrative Practice and Pro-

cedures of the Senate Comm. on

the Judiciary, 89th Conq., Ist

SOG Cupeer « 6s 0 6:38.66

i

- gi -

Page

Federal Public Records Law:

Hearings Before the Subcomm. of

the House Comm. on Government

Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.

6) } Re eer ee ak ae ee ee ee ee 23, 32

S. Rep. No. 1219, 88th Conag., 2d

Sess. (1964) . . . . . . . 7 . 18-19,

23

S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Conq., Ist

meee. (1985S) = «)s 2 6 eee eee

23, 27

S. Rep. No. 93-1347, 93d Cong., 2d

Sess. 31, 1974 U.S. Code Cong. &

Ad. News 7669 . . . * . . 7. . * 47

H. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 24

Sess. 6, 1966 U.S. Code Cong. &

Ad. News 2418 — . 7 . * 7. . * . 12

110 Cong. Rec. 17088-89 (1964) . 19, 20

110 Cong. Rec. 17667 (1964) .. 20-22

110 Cong. Rec. 17668 (1964) .. 21-22

112 Cong. Rec. 13648 (1966) .. 6

112 Cong. Rec. 13653 (1966) .. 30

112 Cong. Rec. 13654 (1966) .. 11

112 Cong. Rec. 13658 (1966) .. 6

120 Cong. Rec. 34081 (1974) .. 48

MISCELLANEOUS

4 Moore's Federal Practice

q@ 26.64[2) (2d ed. 1983) ... 43

No. 82-1616

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER

Vv.

WEBER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, ET AL.,

RESPONDENTS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH

CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF INDERJIT BADHWAR

AN :

~~ AS AMICI CORIAE

Messrs. Inderiit Badhwar and Donald J.

Goldberg, with the consent of the

parties, submit this Brief as Amici

Curiae in support of Respondents.

Bake

INTEREST OF INDERJIT BADHWAR AND

Messrs. Badhwar and Goldberg are

journalists on the staff of nationally

syndicated columnist Jack Anderson. They

are investigating the military's aircraft

accident investigation program, and are

focusing on such questions as: Why is

the Air Force accident rate so much

higher than the civilian accident rate?

Has the military's practice of conducting

its accident investigations in secret,

and maintaining most portions of its

accident reports secret, enhanced or

detracted from aviation safety? Particu-

larly since the National Transportation

Safety Board conducts its investigations

of civil aircraft accidents in public,

and makes its accident reports public, is

there any justification for the mili-

tary's practice of secrecy?

Messrs. Badhwar and Goldberg have been

frustrated in their attempts to obtain

through the Freedom of Information Act

pertinent information and documents, in-

cluding witness statements such as those

at issue in this case, because of the

interposition of Exemption 5 and the

asserted “privilege” advanced by Peti-

tioner herein. The Air Force has been

using Exemption 5 and the asserted

"privilege” not only to shield witness

statements, but also to prevent dis-

closure of voluminous other data relating

to accident investigations, including

recommendations for corrective action

contained in the final reports of in-

vestigations, and information reflecting

whether such recommendations were imple-

mented. Messrs. Radhwar and Goldberg

will soon institute an action in the

United States District Court seeking the

information that has been withheld from

them.

The parties to this case necessarily

must focus upon the facts and the law in

the context of their own interests and

the particular circumstances of this

case. But the question of the extent to

which purely factual witness statements

involving military air crashes, not taken

by attorneys or in anticipation of liti-

gation, are available to the public

implicates interests transcending the

specific and narrow interests of Peti-

tioner and Respondents in this litiga-

tion. Although the propriety of the

Government's broad assertion of "“privi-

lege" and its use of Exemption 5 to

shield many elements of military air

crash investigations, including the final

reports of military safety investigation

boards, is not before this Court, a

ruling sustaining Petitioner's assertion

of privilege with respect to witness

statements might be relied upon by the

Government in defense of its broader

assertion of privilege. Since different

legal issues are involved, that reliance

would be misplaced. Nonetheless, Amici

Curiae seek to avoid that result not only

because they believe the decision below

was correctly decided, but also because

acceptance of the Government's broad as-

sertion of privilege would substantially

hinder the free flow of information on

the readiness of the Nation's military

personnel, the quality of its equipment,

and the manner in which military com-

manders investigate aircraft mishaps

occurring under their command -- all

matters of grave public concern.

When it enacted the Freedom of

Information Act, Conaress placed hiah

regard upon the role of journalists to

obtain and report the public's informa-

tion to the Nation. See Renegotiation

Board v.- Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415

U.S. 1, 17 (1974). It highlighted the

Act's value to "the conscientious news-

paperman who was seeking material for a

serious article that he is preparing on

the operations of a particular agency of

Government." 112 Cong. Rec. 13658 (1966)

(remarks of Rep. Anderson); see aiso id.

at 13648 (remarks of Rep. Pucinski).

Congress emphasized the need, even after

passage of the Act, for the continuing

vigilance of the press, the public, and

the Congress. Id. (remarks of Rep.

Laird). Messrs. RBadhwar and Goldberg

appear as Amici Curiae in this case with

those responsibilities.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A. This Court has held that purely

factual documents like the witness

Statements at bar are not exempt from

disclosure under the Freedom of In-

formation Act ("FOIA") by Exemption 5.

EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86-89 (1973).

Congress' intent that such factual

materials not be within Exemption 5 is

clear from the carefully developed legis-

lative history, including discussion

particularly directed to the release of

witness statements.

B. Petitioner urges a construction of

legislative history that may not. be

reconciled with this Court's analysis of

the same history in Mink. 410 U.S. at

90-91. It rests its entire argument upon

a brief clause taken out of context in a

Senate Report, which was not specifically

directed to Exemption 5 at all. Its

argument ignores the balance and

principal thrust of the legislative his-

tory commending the release of purely

factual material, and if accepted, would

mean that every suggestion or criticism

of FOIA made in Congressional Hearings

should be read into the Act. Such a

broadening of FOIA's Exemptions, by

implication, may not be squared with

clear Congressional intent that the Act

be viewed as a disclosure statute, and

that its exemptions be narrowly construed

so that there are clearly defined

"workable standards” for applying them.

Cc. Petitioner seeks a special

exemption for a select class of documents

-- witness statements not taken by

attorneys or in anticipation of

litigation, but for military air crash

safety investiaqations. Under the case

law as of the enactment of FOIA, such

statements as those at bar were subject

to discovery and "[w]e must assume...

that Congress legislated against the

backdrop of this case law." Mink, supra,

ooe-: 8.8, et 89. Generally, witness

statements not taken in anticipation of

litigation are available in discovery and

through FOIA. These witness statements

should not be accorded special treatment.

D. The National Transportation Safety

Board has responsibilities, for civil

aviation, that are identical to military

air crash safety investigation boards.

The NTSB conducts its investigations in

public, and routinely makes its witness

Statements available. Its record of

assuring air safety is far better than

that of the military safety boards.

Actual practice thus refutes Petitioner's

claim that safety investigations best

proceed in secret and that witness

@ 10 «=

statements must be withheld from the

public.

E. The better view of the law is that

no special protection should extend to

these documents. At the very least,

however, the Record in this case is

inadequate to warrant this Court's

adoption of a special privilege, as Peti-

tioner urges, to exempt these witness

statements from FOIA. Many questions,

including such basic ones as_ whether

these witnesses were actually promised

confidentiality, and how the Air Force

could square promises of confidentiality

with its own Regulations permitting

disclosure in certain circumstances (in-

cluding as required by FOIA), remain to

be answered in a full hearing. Thus, if

the Court disagrees with our position

that the asserted “privilege” is not

within Exemption 5, and further disagrees

a 94\ <<

with our position that there can be no

justification for such a special

privileae, it should remand this case so

that a proper’ Record, testing the

asserted basis for the privilege, may be

made.

ARGUMENT

WITNESS STATEMENTS CONTAINING

SOLELY FACTUAL MATTER, WHICH WERE

MADE DURING A GOVERNMENTAL IN-

VESTIGATION INTO AN AIR CRASH, AND

WHICH WERE NOT PREPARED BY ATTOR-

NEYS OR IN ANTICIPATION OF LITIGA-

TION, ARE NOT SHIELDED FROM DIS-

CLOSURE UNDER EXEMPTION 5 OF THE

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT.

The law of FOIA is familiar. The

Statute is a disclosure statute. ~ E.g.,

Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,

290 & n.10 (1979); see also 112 Cong.

Rec. 13654 (1966) (remarks of Rep.

Rumsfeld) .1/ Its exemptions “must be

V/ "It is our intent that the courts

interpret this legislation broad-

(footnote continued)

= 429 «

narrowly construed" and "do not obscure

the basic policy that disclosure, not

secrecy, is the dominant objective of the

Act." Department of Air Force v. Rose,

425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976). Congress

crafted the statute with specificity in

order to provide concrete, “workable

standards" for determining when informa-

tion must be released. See, e.g., FTC v.

Grolier, Inc., 462 U.S. » Os. Seb.

2209, 2214-2215 (1983); SPA v. Mink, 410

U.S. 73, 79 (1973); S. Rep. No. 813, 89th

Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) ("Senate

Report"); H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong.,

2d Sess. 6, 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.

News 2418, 2423.

(footnote continued from previous page)

ly, as a disclosure statute and

not as an excuse to withhold in-

formation from the public.”

Representative Rumsfeld was one of the

sponsors of the bill that became FOIA and

was a member of the House Committee that

had studied the bill and reported it

favorably.

- 13 -

Exemption 5 of FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)

(5), exempts from mandatory disclosure

"inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums

or letters which would not be available

by law to a party... in litigation

with the agency.” This Court has

consistently applied this Exemption in

conformity with the quiding principles

underlying FOIA. As recently as last

Term this Court stated, "In keeping with

the Act's policy of ‘the fullest respon-

sible disclosure,'. . . Congress intended

Exemption 5 to be ‘as narrow[{] as [is]

consistent with efficient Government

operations.'" Grolier, supra, 103 S.Ct.

at 2212 (citing legislative history).

The Court has expressed uncertainty that

Exemption 5 "was intended to incorporate

every privilege known to civil dis-

covery," Federal Open Market Committee v.

Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 354 (1979), and

« 14 <

has looked to legislative history to

determine whether a privilege asserted to

be embraced by Exemption 5 may fairly be

said to have been within Congressional

intention at the time the statute was

passed. See id. at 354-360. "[A] claim

that a privilege other than executive

privilege or the attorney privilege is

covered by Exemption 5 must be viewed

with caution," id. at 355, and must be

consistent with the "primary purpose” of

Exemption 5 "to enable the Government to

benefit from ‘frank discussion of legal

or policy matters.'" Grolier, supra, 103

S.Ct. at 2212 (citing legislative his-

tory); see also PBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S.

615, 630 (1982) ("purposes behind Exemp-

tion 5 [are] protecting the give-and-take

of the decisional process").

Petitioner makes no claim that the

documents at issue are protected by.

» 98 «

"executive privilege or the attorney

privilege"; instead it seeks to extend

Exemption 5 to reach documents that con-

tain the kind of “purely factual, in-

vestigative" matter that this Court held

in EPA v. Mink, supra, 410 U.S. at 86-91,

was not within the purview of Exemp-

tion 5. The documents at bar do not

embody "legal or policy matters” at all;

they are merely raw witness statements,

reciting facts, that concededly were

prepared neither by attorneys nor in

anticipation of litigation,

Petitioner asks this Court either to

distort legislative history to rationa-

lize the implied existence of a special

privilege for a select group of factual

documents, or to abandon the approach of

Mink and Merrill and make Exemption 5

boundless. To adopt either of Peti-

tioner's views would create uncertainty

- 16 =

with respect to the scope of Exemption 5.

Instead of providing a workable standard,

it would make the exemption an open-ended

source of protection for factual docu-

ments generated in the course of Govern-

mental investigations. The Court of

Appeals properly rejected Petitioner's

contentions, and its decision should be

affirmed.

I. CONGRESS INTENDED THAT PURELY

FACTUAL WITNESS STATEMENTS NOT BE

EXEMPT PROM DISCLOSURE ONDER

EXEMPTION 5.

A. This Court Has Clearly

Held That Purely Pactual

Documents Of This Kind Are

Not Within Exemption 5.

Ten years ago this Court studied the

leaislative history of Exemption 5, and

its relationship with the kind of factual

documents at issue here, and unequivo-

cally concluded that such documents were

not included within the Exemption:

a 19 =

"(T]he legislative history of

Exemption 5 demonstrates’ that

Congress intended to incorporate

generally the recognized rule

that ‘confidential intra-agency

advisory opinions... are

privileged from inspection. '

. * &

"But the privilege that has been

held to attach to intragovern-

mental memoranda clearly has

finite limits, even in civil

litigation. ... M)emoranda

consisting only of compiled fac-

tual material or purely factual

material sadennaal in Nel ikere=

tive memoranda and severable

from its context would generally

be available for discovery by

private parties in litigation

with the Government. ... We

must assume, therefore, that

Congress legislated against the

Eactdco 5. this case law,

particularly since expressly

intended ‘to delimit the excep-

tion [5) as narrowly as con-

sistent with efficient Govern-

ment operation.' .. . Virtu-

ally all of the courts that have

thus far applied exemption 5

have recognized that it requires

Gitterent treatment for mate-

rials reflecting deliberative or

Olicy-makin rocesses on the

one an an ure actua

nvestigative matters on e

other.

"Nothin in the legislative

history ot Exemption 5 is con-

- 18 =

trary to such a construction.”

Mink, Supra, 410 U.S. at 66-89

(emphasis added; footnotes

omitted).

B. Pertinent Legislative

History Illustrates Con-

' gress' Clear Intent That

Purely Factual Witness

Statements Not Be Shield-

ed By Exemption 5.

S.1160, the bill that was enacted as

FOIA in 1966, was “based” on a prior

Senate bill, S.1666, passed by the Senate

in July 1964. Senate Report 4.2/ The

Senate Report accompanying S.1666, when

describing Exemption 5, declared, "All

factual material in Government records is

to be made available to the pub-

Bee « /@-4:-0" S. Rep. No. 1219, 88th

Conq., 2d Sess. 7 (1964) (emphasis in

original). In further discussing Fxemp-

2/ $.1666 was passed by the Senate, but

insufficient time remained in the Eighty-

Eighth Congress for its consideration by

the House, It was reintroduced in the

Eiahty-Ninth Congress as S.1160. Senate

Report 4.

- 19 «-

tion 5, the Report states, "[I]t will be

noted that there is no exemption for

matters of a factual nature.” Id. at 14.

When S.1666 was discussed on the

Senate floor, Senator Dirksen spoke in

favor of the bill and noted how it would

remedy one particular example of "depart-

mental and agency abuse" involving the

failure to disclose witness statements.

110 Cong. Rec. 17088-17089 (1964) (re-

marks of Sen. Dirksen). He related the

story of a farmer who had been told by

the Department of Agriculture that his

acreage allotment was being '~ reduced

because of certain information against

him. When he, and later Senator Dirksen,

tried to determine from the Department

what this information was, the Department

advised them that the information was

contained in witness statements that had

been given "on a confidential basis" and

= 20 «

thus could not be released. Passage of

S.1666, Senator Dirksen concluded, was an

"essential step" to avoid this kind of

abuse. The bill passed the Senate. Id.

at 17089.

Later in July 1964, the Senate

reconsidered S.1666 at the request of

Senator Humphrey, who stated that "“addi-

tional clarification would be helpful."

110 Cong. Rec. 17667 (1964) (remarks of

Sen. Humphrey). He stated that he had

"prepared certain amendments which

would... assist in clarifying these

sections,” but that it might “be possible

to accomplish the objective of removing

these potential ambiguities or uncertain-

ties through a more complete exposition

of the committee's intention without

actually having to amend S.1666." Id.

Senator Humphrey expressed concern that,

as Exemption 5 was then written, it would

» 21 «=

not exempt memoranda prepared by agency

employees giving their evaluation of the

credibility of evidence obtained from

witnesses or other sources, and memoranda

"summarizing facts used as a basis for

recommendations for agency action.” Id.

Senator Humphrey suggested an amendment

changing the lanquage of the Exemption so

that it would exempt "“intra-agency or

interagency memorandums or letters

dealing with matters of fact, law or

policy." Senator Long, the sponsor of

S.1666, stated that this proposal was

unacceptable, because:

"The suggestion with respect to

[Exemption.5], adding ‘matters

of fact' to ‘matters of law or

policy’ would result in a great

lessening of information avail-

able to the public and to the

press." Id. (remarks of Sen.

Long).

Senator Long further clarified that:

"(The documents described by

Senator Humphrey lead) me to

point out that there is nothing

in this bill which would over-

~)

= 22 -

ride normal privileges dealing

with the work product and other

memorandums summarizina facts

used as a basis for recom-

mendations for agency action if

those facts were otherwise

available to the public." Id.

at 17667-17668.3/ og

The Senate did not accept Senator

Humphrey's proposed change to Exemption

5, and the bill passed the Senate a

second time, without any pertinent

change. Id. at 17668.

C. Petitioner Misreads Leg-

islative History To As-

sert That Exemption 5

Embraces Purely Factual

Witness Statements.

As originally introduced in the

Eighty-Eighth and Eighty-Ninth Con-

gresses, the bills that ultimately became

FOIA, S.1666 and S.1160, contained an

exemption for “inter-agency or intra-

3/ We reiterate that the witness

statements at bar are not asserted to be

deliberative material within an

"executive privilege" or work product

prepared in anticipation of litigation.

-

wa

» 93:

agency memorandums or letters dealing

solely with matters of law or policy."

S. Rep. No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 17

(1964) (S.1666; emphasis added); Senate

Report 1 (S.1160; emphasis added). After

the House and Senate Hearings, Exemption

5 was changed to_ substantially its

present form. See Mink, supra, 410 U.S.

at 89-91. Petitioner argues broadly that

"it may reasonably be inferred that one

of the suggestions that precipitated

{this change in Exemption 5] concerned

the Machin privilege" for witness state-

ments taken in military air crash safety

investigations (Pet, Br. 26). The arqu-

ment fails for several reasons.

@ 24 =

1. This Court Held In

Mink That Congress

Changed The Language

Of Exemption 5 For A

Specific Reason Dif-

ferent From What

Petitioner Contends.

After studying the pertinent history,

this Court concluded in Mink that Con-

gress changed Exemption 5's language to

accommodate one particular criticism that

had nothing to do with the asserted

"Machin privilege" for purely factual

witness statements.

"The [prior] formulation was

severely criticized... on

the ground that it would permit

compelled disclosure of an

otherwise private document

simply because the document did

not deal ‘solely’ with leqgal or

policy matters. Documents

dealing with mixed questions of

fact, law, and policy would

inevitably, under the proposed

exemption, become available to

the public. As a result of

this criticism, Exemption 5 was

Changed to substantially its

present form." Mink, supra,

410 U.S. at 90-5T (emphasis

added).

- 25 -

This particular criticism appeared numer-

ous times in the testimony of several

persons. See, e.g., Administrative Pro-

cedure Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm.

on Administrative Practice and Procedures

of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,

89th Cong., Ist Sess. 36, 205, 236, 366-

367, 383, 406-407, 417, 437, 445-446,

450, 490 (1965) ("Senate Hearings");

Federal Public Records Law: Hearings

Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on

Government Operations, 89th Cong., Ist

Sess. 27, 208, 220, 224, 229-230, 256

(1965) ("House Hearings"). As the Court

found, the change was intended to reach

documer s containina mixed questions of

fact, law, and policy, where factual

matter is "inextricably intertwined” with

legal or policy matter. It was not

intended to shield purely factual matter

such as the witness statements at issue.

See Mink, supra, 410 U.S. at 91-92.

2 26 -

2. Petitioner's Argument

Rests Solely Upon A

Solitary Phrase In The

Legislative History, Taken

Out Of Context, In Disre-

gard Of The Balance And

Principal Thrust Of That

History And The Congres-

sional Intent It Reflects.

a. Petitioner rests its argument

solely upon a brief passage from the

Senate Report stating that the change

discussed above “'reflect[ed) suggestions

made to the committee in the course of

the hearings.'" (Pet. Br. 26). This ex-

cerpt has been taken out of context, and

is quoted in full below. It appeared in

an introductory section of the Senate

Report that discussed past FOIA bills; it

did not appear in the portion of the

Report explaining Exemption 5, or indeed

in any portion of the Report discussing

the substantive provisions of FOIA. The

last paragraph of the introductory

- 27 - (

mn.

en

section of the Senate Report, entitled

"History of Legislation,” reads:

"In the last Congress, the

Senate passed S.1666, upon

which this bill [S.1160]}) is

based, on July 31, 1964, but

sufficient time did not remain

in that Congress for its full

consideration by the _ iouse.

The present bill is substan-

tially S.1666, as passed by the

Senate, with amendments” re-

flecting suggestions made to

the committee in the course of

the hearings." Senate Report

4.

This cryptic comment can hardly

Support the notion that Congress in-

tended, through the use of only a general

introductory statement not dealing with

Exemption 5 or any substantive portion of

the bill, to change the force of ex-

tensively developed legislative history

and make purely factual, investigative

witness statements exempt from disclosure

by Exemption 5. See Department of State

v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 600

(1982) ("(p)assing references and

» 26 «

isolated phrases are not controlling when

analyzing a legislative history").

Pairly read, this general introductory

language means only that the revised

version of the Senate bill reflected

certain suggestions made in the course of

the Hearings. Obviously the amended

Senate bill reflected some suagestions;

as noted above, the reason for the change

in the language of Exemption 5 was the

concern voiced during the Hearings that

otherwise-exempt material would have to

be released merely because it did not

deal "solely" with law and policy. To

read this language, as Petitioner urges,

to mean that each and every suggestion

made to the Senate Committee during the

course of the Hearings may “reasonably be

inferred" to be incorporated in FOIA is

at war with the specificity with which

Congress drafted the statute, with the

= 29 -

expressed Congressional intent that

FOIA's Exemptions be narrowly construed,

and with Congress' desire that there be

concrete “workable standards" for the

sound administration of the Act. Such a

construction is no less objectionable

than the construction, rejected by this

Court in Mink, that the change in

Exemption 5's language should be read as

providing that all factual material is

exempt from disclosure. Mink, supra, 410

U.S. at 91.

b. The flaws of Petitioner's position

are further evident when some of the

"suggestions" made in the Hearings are

recounted. The recurring theme among the

Executive departments and agencies was

opposition to FOIA.4/ For example, the

4/ Indeed, Congress noted that, even

after the Hearings and "a carefully

prepared report -- which clarifies

legislative intent... [t]here still

remains some opposition on the part of a

(footnote continued)

@ 30 <-

Interstate Commerce Commission urged that

"all internal memorandums be withheld

from disclosure.” Senate Hearings 244.

The Federal Communications Commission

urged that Exemption 5 should include all

inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums

or letters that did not fall "within one

of the categories of agency records

required to be published or disclosed by

some other worovision of this Act." Id.

at 459, Indeed, Assistant Attorney

General Norbert A. Schlei, who was the

principal spokesman for the Executive

Branch and whose testimony is relied upon

by Petitioner (Pet. Br. 27-28), did not

limit his comments to the so-called

"Machin privilege" for witness statements

(footnote continued from previous page)

few Government administrators ... .”"

112 Cong. Rec. 13653 (1966) (remarks of

Rep. Rumsfeld). This continued oppvosi-

tion, of course, is a further refutation

of Petitioner's argument that all “sugq-

gestions" made at the Hearings were

heeded by Congress.

=» 31 «

taken in military air crash safety

investigations, but urged the existence

of a broac privilege "in any case where

G@isclosure would hamper an important

governmental function." House Hearings

220. It could not seriously be contended

that any of these suggestions became the

law. That a “privilege” to protect

witness statements was mentioned during

the Hearings similarly cannot, ipso

facto, serve to incorporate that

privilege into Exemption 5.

Cc. Further illustrating the

weakness in Petitioner's argument that

Exemption 5 should be extended by impli-

cation (or Congressional silence) is the

fact that the references in the Hearings

to witness statements such as those at

bar do not appear in Exemption 5 contexts

at all. Most of the references cited by

Petitioner were made in the course of

@ 32 <-

~

criticizing the Senate's formulation of

Exemption 7,.2/ See Senate Hearings 417-

418 and House Hearings 220 (Department of

Defense); Senate Hearings 296 (Assistant

Attorney General Schlei); Senate Hearings

366-367 and House Hearings 237 (Civil

Aeronautics Board). Other references do

not mention any Exemption at all. See

Senate Hearings 418 (Department of

Defense); Senate Hearings 196 (Assistant

Attorney General Schlei). A number of

the comments that Petitioner cites do not

even specifically mention witness

statements made in the course of air

5/ Exemption 7 clearly does not apply to

the witness statements at bar, since the

statements were not taken for law en-

forcement purposes, but rather were taken

as part of an investigation the “sole

purpose” of which "is to determine the

cause of the accident and to develop

corrective measures to prevent similar

mishaps in the future” (Pet. Br. 3). See

FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615,

(1982); Church of Scientolo v. Dep't of

Army, 611 F.2d 730, 740 (oer Cir. °

Seti cioner acknowledges as much (Pet. Br.

30).

» 93 «

crash accident investigations. See,

@e.g., Senate Hearings 206 (Assistant

Attorney General Schlei). In short, none

of the comments cited by Petitioner

fairly supports the notion that Congress

intended witness statements of the type

involved in this case to be covered by

Exemption 5.

D. Under The Case Law As

Of The Enactment Of FOIA,

The Witness Statements At

Bar Were Subject To Dis-

covery.

Petitioner's strained view of the

legislative history is further demon-

strated by the pertinent case law as of

the enactment of FOIA in 1966. We have

found no reported decision as of the

passage of FOIA that would have shielded

the witness statements at bar _ from

discovery. It is simply illogical to

imply a Congressional intendment that

= 34 -

these statements be embraced by Exemp-

tion 5, when all judicial authority

available to Congress would not have

viewed these statements as “not routinely

available” in litigation. Simply put, as

of the passage of FOIA, these statements

were weeilebie to litigants, and "“"[wle

must assume ... that Congress legis-

lated against the backdrop of this case

law." Mink, supra, 410 U.S. at 89.

1. The Reynolds Case.

A typical example of the generally

recognized rejection of privilege before

FOIA is found in the landmark case of

Reynolds v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468

(E.D. Pa. 1950), aff'd, 192 F.2d 987 (3d

Cir. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 345

U.S. 1 (1953). Reynolds was a Federal

Tort Claims Act suit seeking recovery of

damages arising from the crash of a

» 95 @

military aircraft. Judge Kirkpatrick

ordered that the report and findings of

the military investigation board and

witness statements given by military

personnel to the board must be produced.

He specifically rejected the claim of

privilege that Petitioner urges here:

"In effect, the Government

claims a new kind of privi-

lege. Its position is that

the proceedings of boards of

investigation of the armed

services should be privi-

leged in order to allow the

free and unhampered self-

criticism within the service

necessary to obtain maximum

efficiency, fix responsi-

bility and maintain proper

discipline. I can find no

recognition in the law of

the existence of such a

Privilege. 10 F.R.D. at 472

(emphasis added).

The Third Circuit affirmed this ruling

and held "that the district court rightly

rejected the broad claim of privilege

made by the United States not to produce

any statements cr reports’ regarding

=» 36 «

airplane accidents," 192 F.2d at 998,

Writing for that Court, Judge Maris

Speqeent ty explained why the Government's

interest in shielding this material must

yield to a free society's paramount

interest in freedom of information. Id.

at 994-995. And he further noted:

"It may well be more convenient

and efficient in the conduct of

accident investigations for the

[Air Force] Department not to

be required to disclose state-

ments and reports of this

character. But the same would

be true in the case of any

private person and the latter

do not ordinarily enjoy that

privilege.” Id. at 994.

This Court reversed the judgment of

the Court of Appeals in Reynolds. The

Court did not, however, review this

ground relied upon by the Court of

Appeals, but expressly decided only the

alternative, “narrower ground" that dis-

covery should not proceed because of the

presence of military and state secrets.

- 37 «

United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1,

6-7, 10-11 (1953). The District Court's

and Court of Appeals' analysis rejecting

the privilege asserted by Petitioner

herein was left untouched, Indeed, to

the extent any Justice considered that

analysis, it met with approval, since

Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson

dissented in Reynolds “substantially for

the reasons set forth in the opinion of

Judqe Maris below.” 345 U.S. at 12.

2. Other Pre-FPOIA Cases.

Reynolds was but one of several pre-

FOIA cases ordering the disclosure of

reports and witness statements generated

in the course of military safety

investigations of military aircraft

accidents. In Cresmer v. United States,

9 F.R.D. 203, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1949), the

Court qave the following reason for

- 36 -

rejecting the assertion of "privilege"

and ordering the disclosure of a Report

of a Navy Board of Investigation:

"In the absence of a showing

of a war secret, or secret

in respect to munitions of

war, Or any secret appliance

used by the armed forces, or

any threat to the National

security, it would appear to

be unseemly for the Govern-

ment to thwart <«<ne efforts

of a plaintiff in a case

such as this to learn as

much .asS possible concerning

the cause of the disaster

(emphasis added).

See also United Air Lines, Inc. v. United

States, 186 F. Supp. 824 (D. Del. 1960),

later opinion, 26 F.R.D. 213 (D. Del.

1960) (statements of fact witnesses);

O'Keefe v. Boeinc Co., 38 F.R.D. 329,

334-335 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (records of

facts, including witness statements, made

in air crash safety investigation).

= 39 =

a 3. Petitioner's Reliance

Upon Machin v. Zuckert

Is Misplaced.

Petitioner relies upon Machin v.

Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963),

as the case that assertedly served as the

basis for Congress' implicit recognition

tnat witness statements like the ones at

bar fall within Exemption 5. Machin did

not extend a privilege, however, to

statements -- such as those involved

here -- taken from witnesses who are

military personnel. The Machin court

expressly declined to shield from dis-

closure such statements, and limited

protection to the “testimony of private

parties” and to such portions of the

investiqative report "reflecting Air

Force deliberations or recommendations as

to policies that should be pursued." 316

F.2d at 339-341. Machin can hardly serve

as the implicit predicate for Peti-

t

ae

a 40 «

tioner's assertion that, in passing FOIA,

Congress gave recognition that witness

statements of military personnel were not

routinely available. No court -- not

even the Machin court -- had yet extended

the privilege that far. Congress, which

obviously did not even discuss the so-

called "Machin privilege” in its Reports

or debates, should not be held to have

done so silently.

II. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT A

SPECIAL PRIVILEGE FOR THESE

WITNESS STATEMENTS TO EXEMPT THEM

FROM FOIA,

As discussed above, the Court below

correctly held that the asserted privi-

lege which Petitioner asks this Court to

recognize was not within the contempla-

tion of Congress when it enacted FOIA.

Petitioner arques in the alternative,

however, that the asserted privileae is

today "clearly recoanized" and the

« &) =

language of Exemption 5 is broad enough

to include it. Petitioner fares no

better on this point.

At the outset, for the Court to accept

Petitioner's argument it must accept, on

the merits, that there should be a

special privilege extended for witness

statements, concededly not taken in

anticipation of litigation but in con-

nection with military air crash safety

investigations. See FTC v. Grolier,

Inc., 462 U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 2209, 2214

(1983); id., 103 S.Ct. at 2218 (Brennan

and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and

concurring in the judgment). The exist-

ence vel non of this privilege was not

passed upon by either Court below. Not

only does this Court not have the benefit

of decisions below, but also the Record

is not properly developed to decide

whether, or to what extent, these witness

» 42 =

statements should be shielded from civil

discovery. In the circumstances, "[t])hat

determination must await the development

of a proper record,” and a remand to the

District Court for that purpose is

appropriate. See, e.g., Federal Open

Market Committee v. Merrill, 443 U.S.

340, 364 (1979).

A. Purely Factual Witness

Statements Not Taken

In Anticipation Of

Litigation Are Gene-

rally Subject to Dis-

closure.

Generally, witness statements not

taken in anticipation of litigation are

required to be produced in discovery.

E.g., Mercy v. County of Suffolk, 93

P.R.D. 520 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Janicker v.

George Washington University, 94 F.R.D.

648 (D.D.C. 1982); Miles v. Bell Heli-

copter Co., 385 F. Supp. 1029 (N.D.Ga.

1974) (accident reports made by emplovees

@ 43 -

of airplane manufacturer); Thomas Organ

Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 54

F.R.D. 367 (N.D.I11. 1972); Whitaker v.

Davis, 45 F.R.D. 270 (W.D.Mo. 1968); 4

Moore's Federal Practice @ 26.64[2], at

26-414 to 26-415 & niu. 2-4 (2d ed. 1983).

Even when such statements have been taken

as part of Governmental investigations,

they have routinely been available to

parties in litigation. E.g., Royal

Exchange Assur. v. McGrath, 13 F.R.D. 150

(S.D.N.Y. 1952); Wunderly Vv. United

States, 8 F.R.D. 356 (E.D.Pa. 1948); see

also Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock

Co., 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D.Pa. 1968).

And witness statements have, moreover,

been held not to fall within Exemption 5

of FOIA. E.g., Charlotte-Macklenburg

Hospital Authority v. Perry, 571 F.2d

195, 198 n. 5 (4th Cir. 1978); Robbins

Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 563 F.2d 724,

@ 44

734-737 (Sth Cir. 1977), rev'd on other

grounds, 437 U.S. 214 (1978); see also

NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437

U.S. 214, 254 n.12 (1978) (Powell, with

Brennan, JJ., concurring in part and

dissenting in part) .6/ There is no

6/ "In light of my view of the

limits of Exemption 7 (A), I

reach the Board's alternative

argument that the witness

affidavits in dispute are

protected against disclosure by

Exemption 5... . I aqree gene-

rally with the analysis of the

Court of Appeals that the purpose

of this Exemption is to protect

agency litigation strategy and

decisionmaking processes, and not

to incorporate fully the ‘work

product’ privileae recoanized in

Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495

(1547), and Fed.Rule Civ.Proc.

26(b)(3). Our decision in NLRB

v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S.

132, - - (1975),

provides support for this view.

In this case, by contrast, the

Board does not suggest that the

witness affidavits in question

are anything other than verbatim

transcripts of statements made by

witnesses to Board personnel.”

The witness statements at bar were not

even taken in anticivation of litigation,

(footnote continued)

- 45 -

Greater public interest serving to shield

the witness statements at bar than the

interests served by those statements

normally and routinely released. Indeed,

the public's interests in ensuring that

the Nation's military aircraft operate

with maximum safety, that our military

commanders responsibly discharge their

responsibilities to promote safety and

investigate the causes of mishaps, that

ovr military personnel are _ properly

trained and combat ready, and that the

military services and its private

contractors furnish the highest quality

equipment, at reasonable cost, for our

personnel, all commend the release of the

statements to the public.

(footnote continued from previous page)

as were the statements in Robbins Tire &

Rubber Co., and thus are not “work

product” of any kind.

oe A @

B. The National Transporta-

tion Safety Board, Which

For Civil Aviation Has

Responsibilities Identical

To Military Air Crash

Safety Investigation

Boards, Routinely Makes

Available To The Public

Witness Statements Taken

In Its Investigations Of

Civil Air Crashes.

The practice of the National Trans-

portation Safety Board ("NTSB"), hich is

charged by law with investigating and

determining the causes of civil air

crashes, makes clear that there is abso-

lutely no need to shield witness state-

ments like the ones at bar from dis-

closure.

Conaress established the NTSB in 1966

as a part of the Department of Trans-

portation. 49 U.S.C. § 1901; see Public

Law 89-670, 80 Stat. 935 (1966). In

1975, Congress found that the functions

of NTSB, including those involving

criticism of other agencies, could not be

ia

= 67 =

properly performed unless the NTSB was

totally separate and independent, and so

it removed the NTSB from the Department

of Transportation and made it an inde-

pendent agency. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1901,

1902(a); see 49 C.P.R. § 800.2; see also

S. Rep. No. 93-1347, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.

31, 1974 U.S. Co@e Cong. & Ad. News 7669,

7694,

The NTSB's mission is "to promote

transportation safety by conducting inde-

pendent accident investigations and by

formulating safety improvement '§ recom-

mendations." 49 U.S.C. § 1901(1); 49

C.F.R. § 800.3(a). It is responsible for

investigating and determining the facts,

conditions, circumstances and the cause

Or probable cause of various specified

types of accidents, including all acci-

dents involving civil aircraft, and for

developing measures designed to ensure

« 66 «

the safety of all modes of transporta-

tion, including air travel. See 49

U.S.C. § 1903(a); 49 C.F.R. § 800.3.

The statutory and regulatory scheme

demonstrate that neither Congress nor the

NTSB perceives a need to conduct aircraft

accident investigations in secret. On

the contrary, the public benefits from

being deliberately made aware of the

NTSB's' work, As Senator Hartke, the

sponsor of the bill establishing the NTSB

as an independent agency, stated:

"The great power that’ they

[NTSB] have is that their in-

formation is transmitted to

Congress and, therefore, it

becomes a matter of conside-

ration. Their information is

transmitted to the public,

which is certainly ultimately

very vitally concerned, and

will become more concerned.”

120 Cong. Rec. 34081 (1974)

(remarks of Sen. Hartke).

The NTSB's hearings are generally open

to the public, with witnesses giving

their testimony in the open. See 49

a 49 =

C.P.R. § 845.3. 49 U.S.C. § 1903(a)(2)

requires the Board to:

"report in writing on the

facts, conditions, and cir-

cumstances of each accident

investigated... and cause

such reports to be made avail-

able to the public at reason-

able cost and to cause notice

of the issuance and availa-

bility of such reports to be

published in the Federal

Register."

See also 49 C.F.R. §§ 801.35, 845.40.

The NTSB's enabling legislation also

requires it to make public all informa-

tion it receives, with two exceptions not

pertinent here, except to the extent such

information is exempted from FOIA by 5

U.S.C. § 552(b), or is otherwise pro-

tected by law from disclosure to the

public. 49 0.8.C. § 1905. As a matter

of practice, the NTSB normally'= and

routinely makes public its reports and

its accident files, including witness

statements. Its regulations state that

- 50 -

"it is the policy of the Board to make

information available to the public to

the greatest extent possible." 49 C.F.R.

§ 801.2; see also 49 C.F.R. § 801.10 and

the Appendix to 49 C.F.R. Part 801.

According to its regulations, the NTSB

thus regards the release of these witness

statements not to be inconsistent with

the purposes of Exemption 5. See 49

C.F.R. § 801.50; see also 49 C.F.R.

§ 801.54(b).

The NTSB has been highly effective in

achieving the goal of promoting safety in

civil air travel. For the period from

1974 through 1979, the civilian accident

rate per 100,000 aircraft hours flown for

all civilian aircraft (including sched-

uled air carriers, aqeneral aviation, and

unscheduled carriers) dropped from 0.77

to 0.40, a decrease of almost one-half

(Appendix ("App.") infra, at 1a). For

= 81 «

the same period, the Air Force accident

rate per 100,000 hours flown actually

increased from 2.90 to 2.92. Id. Thus,

the Air Force accident rate per 100,000

hours flown increased from 3.8 times the

civilian rate in 1974 (2.90 v. 0.77), to

7.3 times the civilian rate in 1979 (2.92

v. 0.40).2/

When Air Force accident rates are

compared with domestic scheduled airline

accident rates (exclusive of general

aviation and unscheduled carriers), the

results are even more dramatic. The

7/ tt is difficult to obtain from

publicly available sources comprehensive

information about Air Force accident

rates. Unlike the NTSB, which makes

annual reports to the Congress, and which

routinely publishes comprehensive in-

formation about accident rates, the Air

Force publishes scant little information

about its own accident rates.

The information reflected in the text

above is based upon NTSB publications and

the Air Force Inspector General's Listing

of Class A Aircraft Mishaps per 100,000

flight hours for the years 1974 to

September 1983.

- §2 «

accident rate per 100,000 hours flown for

scheduled airlines decreased from 0.57 in

1975 to 0.23 in 1982. The Air Force

accident rate per 100,000 hours flown was

2.80 in 1975, and 2.30 in 1982. Thus the

Air Force accident rate per 100,000 hours

flown was approximately 4.9 times higher

than the scheduled airline rate in 1972

(2.80 v. 0.57), and a full 10 times

higher than the scheduled airline rate in

1982 (2.30 v. 0.23). (App. 2a.)

The interests served by the NTSB are

as compelling, if not more compelling,

than the interests served by investi-

gations into the causes of military air

crashes. See FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S.

255, 266-267 (1975). The NTSB has well

served the public and these interests and

has done so while making its work avail-

able for public scrutiny. Its record

Clearly demonstrates that the NTSB's

= §3 «

policy of releasing witness statements

has in no way prevented the NTSB from

greatly improving the safety record for

civil air travel. There is no basis for

Petitioner's speculative claim that the

withholding of witness statements is

necessary to promote the safety of mili-

tary travel.

C. The Alleged Promise Of

Confidentiality Extended

To These Air Force Wit-

nesses Does Not Confer

Any Privilege Upon The

Witness Statements Or

Exempt Them From Dis-

closure Under FOIA.

Petitioner arques that these witness

statements were received upon a promise

of confidentiality. Such an alleged

promise, however, is no justification for

the special privilege Petitioner seeks.

Promises of confidentiality “cannot,

in and of themselves, override [FOIA]."

Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 846 (4th

- 54 -

Cir. 1973); accord, e.g., Petkas v.

Staats, 501 P.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

In any event, there is no evidence in

this Record that the witnesses were given

any specific promises of confidentiality,

at any specified time, by any specified

person, under any specified circum-

stances. The Record does not reflect

where, when, by whom, to whom, or in what

words such an alleged promise was made.

The Record merely contains a _ broad

statement that it is general Air Force

policy to promise confidentiality (Pet.

Br. 7), but this gqeneralized policy

simply does not speak to whether specific

promises of confidentiality were made to

the witnesses whose statements are

involved herein. Petitioner's failure to

document any specific promises of

confidentiality is not insignificant,

since this is a FOIA case where the

matter is heard de novo, and "the burden

= §§ =

is on the agency to sustain its action."

5 u.S.C. § 552 (a) (4)(B).

Further, the Air Force could not,

consistently with its regulations, make a

blanket promise of confidentiality to any

potential accident board witness. The

Air Force Regulations reguire that wit-

ness statements be released in certain

circumstances (see AFR 127-4, 4% 2-5.d.

(Pet. Br. 3a))? the Regulations even

provide that "factual parts" of safety

investigation reports (including witness

statements that are attached) “must be

released... fa]Js required by the

Freedom of Information Act" (AFR 127-4,

q 2-5.d. (Pet. Br. 3a)). APR 127-4,

q 2-5.d.(3) (Pet. Br. 3a) requires that

any person who is court martialed be

furnished with all statements, sworn or

unsworn, given to Federal agents, by any

witness who testifies against the

= 86 «

accused. And AFR 127-4, @4 5-4.d. and

2-10.a.(2)(a) (App., infra, 3a-4a) pro-

vide that if the accident report names an

Air Force employee as responsible for

causing the accident, that person must be

given the opportunity to review the

entire accident report and submit a

refuttal statement. Thus the most that

an Air Force employee could promise a

potential witness, consistent with AFR

127-4, is that the witness's statement

will be kept confidential, except as it ~-

may be required to be released, including

by operation of FOIA. Such a "Catch-22"

promise of confidentiality is no promise

at all.

D. Accordingly, These wWit-

ness Statements Should

Not Be Af forded A

Special Exemption From

Disclosure.

In view of the general rules and

policies favorina disclosure, and the

» 87 «

lack of any distinguishing, practical

reason for nondisclosure, the cases

holding that these witness statements are

not entitled to a special protection from

disclosure represent the better view of

the law. See cases cited supra at 34-38;

see also McFadden v. Avco Corp., 278

F. Supp. 57, 60 (M.D.Ala. 1967). Witness

statements such as those at bar normally

are given at or near the time the crashes

occur, and the public, the courts, and

litigants -- no less than the military --

are entitled to accurate information on

the causes of these incidents.

E. At The Very Least, The

Law Commends Not Adopting

Such A Privilege, Having

Such Far-Reaching Conse-

quences, Except Upon A

Full Record That Is Ab-

sent Here.

The Machin privilege rests entirely

upon a factual hypothesis: unless the

@ 86 «

Air Force is able to promise witnesses

confidentiality, it will fail to obtain

important information about the causes of

accidents, and will be unable to take

appropriate corrective measures to pre-

vent recurrence. Cooper v. Navy, 558

F.2d 274, 277 (Sth Cir. 1977), on

petition for rehearing, 594 F.2d 484 (5th

Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979);

Brockway v. Dep't of Air Force, 518 F.2d

1184, 1191 (8th Cir. 1975); Machin,

supra, 316 F.2d at 339. If that factual

hypothesis is unsound, there would be no

basis for the privilege.

The Court of Appeals expressly assumed

the existence of a "Machin privilege" and

held that, nonetheless, it was not

subsumed within Exemption 5. 688 F.2d at

642. It did not decide whether or not

the Machin privilege should be recognized

in the Ninth Circuit, and there has been

o '§9 «

no Record developed with respect to the

putative basis for such a privilege.

There has been no judicial scrutiny in

this case as to whether the asserted

grounds for the privilege in fact are

justified.

This Court should not approve the

Machin privilege without the benefit of

an adequate Record. Many questions

remain unanswered, and there is a need

for full development of the facts. Does

the Air Force in fact routinely advise

witnesses before they are interviewed

that their statements will not be used

for » any purpose except accident

prevention? What is the specific text of

the promise allegedly made? Does the Air

Force advise witnesses of the provisions

of its Regulations requiring disclosure

of witness statements when persons

testify at court martials, when mandated

= 60 -

by POIA, or to military personnel named

as having caused an accident? To whom

are these witness statements dissemi-

nated?8/ How important are such

witnesses to Air Force investigations?

(Much direct physical evidence, such as

flight data recorders and cockpit voice

recorders, is usually available to

military investigators; witness accounts

may not be as precise and may be less

valuable to the military than Petitioner

contends, ) Would the information be

8/ In Cooper, supra, 594 F.2d at 488-

489 n.2, the Court of Appeals required

the District Court to conduct a hearing

with respect to the Navy's assertion of a

privilege preventing the disclosure of a

report of a Navy safety investigation

into a helicopter crash. After the

hearing, the Court found a limited waiver

of the privilege because of the dissemi-

nation of the report beyond the Navy, in

violation of the Navy's regulations. See

also O'Keefe v. Boeina Co., 38 F.R.D. 329

(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (production allowed on

alternative ground of waiver of alleged

privileae, based upon disclosure of acci-

dent report to Boeing, the Government's

prime contractor).

» 61 '=

obtainable from witnesses absent any

promise? (For example, when, as in this

case, the witnesses are also members of

the military, they may in certain

circumstances be required to answer

questions about their official duties,

and discharged if they fail to do so.

See, e.g9., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431

U.S. 801 (1977); Uniformed Sanitation Men

Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392

U.S. 280 (1968); Gardner v. Broderick,

392 U.S. 273 (1968)). Does the Air Force

act promptly to implement the _ recom-

mendations for corrective action

contained in its accident reports? A

Court asked to approve the Machin

privilege is entitled to know whether the

Air Force regularly implements, or

disregards, those corrective action

@ 62 -

recommendations for which these witness

statements obstensibly are obtained.2/

The conclusory assertions in the

Affidavits in this case have not been

tested. Should this Court disagree with

Our positions that Congress did not

intend purely factual material such as

these witness statements to be exempt

from FOIA under Exemption 5, or that the

better view of the law is that no special

privilege should be extended to these

particular witness statements, there

9/ The only issue presented to this Court

involves the availability of witness

statements; the availability to the

public of other sections of the Air

Force's formal accident report, such as

the recommendations section, is not at

issue here. Whether Exemption 5 extends

to such other sections of the accident

report presents additional legal issues

that have not been briefed by’ the

parties, See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1906.

Even if the content of such recommenda-

tions may mot be disclosed, however, no

reason apvears why the Air Force's record

of implementing or disregarding recom-

mendations may not be examined through,

for example, the use of statistical in-

formation.

hoo

- 63 «-

should nonetheless be a full exploration

in the District Court of the basis for

the asserted "privilege," before this

Court considers Petitioner's request for

a special exemption from discovery.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the deci-

sion of the Court of Appeals should be

affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

RAYMOND D. BATTOCCHI

Counsel of Record

ALFRED F,. BELCUORE

STEVEN F. KOROSTOFF

COLE AND GRONER, P.C.

1730 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 331-8888

Attorneys for Amici Curiae

Inderjit Badhwar and

Donald J. Goldberg

December 1983

APPENDIX

- la -

ACCIDENT RATES PER 100,000

AIRCRAFT-HOURS FLOWN

U.S. Certificated

Route and

Supplemental Air Air Force

Carriers Class A

Year (All Operations) Mishaps!

1974 0.772 2.9

1975 0.677 2.8

1976 0.433 2.8

1977 0.36° 2.78

1978 0.35° 3.16

1979 0.402 2.92

1 Taken from Air Force Inspector General

Listing of Class A Mishaps from 1974 to

September 1983. "Class A" mishaps are

those resulting in (1) a total cost of

$200,000 or more for injury, occupational

illness, and property damages, or (2) a

fatality, or (3) destruction of, or

damage beyond economical repair to, an

Air Force aircraft. AFR 127-4, 9 1-4a.

2 Taken from 1976 NTSB Annual Report to

Congress.

3 Taken from 1979 NTSB Annual Report to

Congress.

- 2a -

ACCIDENT RATES PER 100,000

AIRCRAFT=-HOURS FLOWN

U.S. Air Carriers

Operating Under

14 C.F.R. 121 All Air Force

Scheduled Service Class A

Year (Air Lines) 1 Mishaps

1975 0.57 2.8

1976 0.39 2.8

1977 0.36 2.78

1978 0.35 3.16

1979 0.36 2.92

1980 0.22 2.73

1981 0.38 2.44

1982 0.23 2.3

1 Taken from attachments to NTSB Release

No. SB-83-1, dated January 7, 1983.

2 Taken from Air Force Inspector General

Listing of Class A Mishaps from 1974 to

September 1983.

- 3a -

Air Force Regulation 127-4 (Jan. 18,

1980) provides in pertinent part:

2.10. Notifying Persons Found

Responsible for an Aircraft, Missile,

or Nuclear Mishap. Use the following

procedures for formal reports:

a. Military and Civilian Personnel

Under Air Force Jurisdiction. When an

Air Force person is named as a cause of

one of these mishaps, he or she should

have a chance to correct the record.

This applies to the formal report, an

indorsement by a reviewing commander,

and the AF/IGD letter of final

evaluation. Ask the involved indivi-

dual to submit a statement of rebuttal

or a statement declining rebuttal.

(See ettachment 4 for a suggested

format. ) The person must be advised

that paragraph 3-8d applies to the

Statemert of rebuttal and that the

statement becomes an attachment to the

mishap report. If the person found

responsitle is:

* we *

(2) Attached oor assigned to

another najor command, the investi-

gator(s) sends a copy of the report to

the person's immediate commander.

Attach a letter asking that commander

to:

(a) Netify and give the persen a

chance to review the report.

* a *

5-4. Who Reviews the Formal Report.

Mishap causes may require corrective

actions by a aumber of organizations,

both within and external to the chain

of command. Tinerefore, the report is

reviewed by the following:

- 4éa-

* * *

d. Each person who has been named

responsible for an aircraft, missile,

or nuclear mishap. (See paragraph 2-

10 for rebuttal procedures. )

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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