Amicus Brief — United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp.
Supreme Court brief1984
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. 82-1616
ALEXANDER L. STEVAS,
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE cnrvub-coilien
— :
OCTOBER TERM, 1983
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER |
Ve
WEBER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, ET AL.,
RESPONDENTS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT
BRIEF OF INDERJIT BADHWAR
AND DONALD J. GOLDBERG
AS AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT_OR AFFIRMANCE
ee ee ae 8
RAYMOND D. BATTOCCHI
Counsel of Record
es: : ALFRED F. BELCUORE
, STEVEN F, KOROSTOFP
¥ COLE AND GRONER, P.C.
Te | 1730 K Street, N.W.
Bry: Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 331-8888
Attorneys f
QUESTION PRESENTED
Are witness statements con-
taining solely factual matter, which were
made during a Governmental investigation
into an air crash, and which were not
prepared by attorneys or in anticipation
of litigation, exempt from disclosure
under Exemption 5 of the Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5)?
» iio
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Question Presented ...++-ees
Interest of Inderjit Badhwar and
Donald J. Goldberg . ...+++-e-«s
Summary of Argument .... ++ « «
Argument . . . . 7 . . . . . . . .
Witness Statements Containing
Solely Factual Matter, Which Were
Made During A Governmental In-
vestigation Into An Air Crash,
And Which Were Not Prepared By
Attorneys Or In Anticipation Of
Litigation, Are Not Shielded
From Disclosure Under Exemption
5 Of The Freedom Of Information
Act > . . o . . . . . . . . . .
I. Congress Intended That Purely
Pactual Witness Statements
Not Be Exempt From Disclosure
Under Exemption5 ....
A. This Court Has Clearly
Held That Purely Factual
Documents Of This Kind Are
Not Within Exemption 5 .
B. Pertinent Legislative
History Illustrates
Congress’ Clear Intent
That Purely Factual
Witness Statements Not
Be Shielded By Exemption
5 . . . . . o . * * . .
11
17
16
18
- ili -
Petitioner Misreads
Legislative History To
Assert That Exemption
5 Embraces Purely
Factual Witness State-
ments 7 + . . . . . . .
1.
This Court Held In
Mink That Congress
Changed The Lanauage
Of Exemption 5 Por A
Specific Reason Dif-
ferent From What
Petitioner Contends.
Petitioner's Argument
Rests Solely Upon A
Solitary Phrase In
The Legislative His-
tory, Taken Out Of
Context, In Disregard
Of The Balance And
Principal Thrust Of
That History And The
Congressional Intent
It Reflects .. « e
Under The Case Law As Of
The Enactment Of FOIA, The
Witness Statements At Bar
Were Subject To Discovery
The Reynolds Case é
Other Pre-FOIA Cases
Petitioner's Reliance
Upon Machin v. Zuckert
Is Misplaced... .
22
24
26
33
34
37
39
II.
- iv-
This Court Should Not Adopt A
Special Privilege For These
Witness Statements To Exempt
Them From POIA . « « © © « « 40
A. Purely Factual Witness
Statements Not Taken In
Anticipation Of Litigation
Are Generally Subject To
Disclosure ..«s+s-¢e. 42
B. The National Transporta-
tion Safety Board, Which
For Civil Aviation Has
Responsibilities Identical
To Military Air Crash Safety
Investigation Boards,
Routinely Makes Available
To The Public Witness
Statements Taken In Its
Investigations of Civil Air
Cragnae «6:4, € sea 46
C. The Alleged Promise Of
Confidentiality Ex-
tended To These Air
Force Witnesses Does
Not Confer Any
Privilege Upon The
Witness Statements Or
Exempt Them From Dis-
closure Under FOIA. . 53
D. Accordingly, These
Witness Statements
Should Not Be Afforded
A Special Exemption
From Disclosure ... 56
Conclusion
Appendix
At The Very Least, The
Law Commends Not
Adopting Such A Privi-
lege, Having Such Far-
Reaching Consequences,
Except Upon A Full
Record That Is Absent
ai: & 6 6 6 @ « e
= yi «
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
Brockway v. Department of Air
Porce, 518 F.2d 1184 (8th Cir.
1975) o . -_ . . . . . . . . . . 58
Charlotte-Macklenburg Hospital
Authority v. Perry, 571 F.2d
195 (4th Cir. 1978) . « « « « « 43
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S.
281 (1979) 7 . . + . ° . ° . . 11
Church of Scientology v. Department
of Army, 611 F.2d 738 (9th Cir.
1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry-
dock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708
(E.D. Pa. 1968) . . . . . . . . 43
Cooper v. Navy, 558 F.2d 274 (5th
Cir. 1977), on petition for
rehearing, 594 F.2d 484 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
gk. ata ag papeepered Ieee ae pA 58, 60
Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D.
203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) . 2 — _ _ > 37-38
Department of Air Force v. Rose,
S25 O.8. 352 (1976). .« s 6 & es 12
as
- vii -
Page
Department of State v. Washington
Post Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982) . 27-28
EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). Te Ye
12, 15,
17-18,
23, 24, 25
29-30, 34
FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255
(1975) . . . _ . . . >. . > > . 52
FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615
(1982) _ . > >. . . . . . o > 14, 32
Federal Open Market Committee v.
Merrill, 443 U.S. 340 (1979) 13, 14
15, 42
FTC v. Grolier, Inc., 462 U.S. °
tee B.6t. Baer (190s) « «es 2 tae 3
14, 41
Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S.
273 (1968) ° ° e ° ° ° . . . 61
Janicker v. George Washington
University, 94 F.R.D. 648 (D.D.C.
1982) @ o o o eo . > > . . eo o J 42
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S.
801 (1977) . o . . . * o . _ 61
Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336
(eC. Cir.-1963) << ¢ «ee bs eee
39-40
58, 61
- vill -
Page
McFadden v. Avco Corp., 278 F. Supp.
S7 (ND. Ala. 1967) . « « @» 8 @ 57
Mercy v. County of Suffolk, 93
PR.D. 520 CE.DN.Y. 1902). © « 42
Miles v. Bell Helicopter Co., 385
F. Supp. 1029 (N.D. Ga. 1974) . 42-43
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.,
S37 O.8..204 (1978) « « 0 © « 0 «. 44745
O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 38 F.R.D.
pam GmeDelsts THOS) + 6 6 0 0 6 o See OC
Petkas v. Staats, 501 F.2d 887
(D.C. af 1974) e oO 8 ° °° . 8 54
Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft
Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974). 6
Reynolds v. United States, 10
F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1950),
aff'd, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir.
, rev'd on other grounds,
345 U.S. ] (1953) . . . . ° . . 34-36
Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB,
563 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1977),
rev'd on other grounds, 437 U.S.
Der -. 6. ee 6 ke aes 43-44
Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843 (4th
Cake 1973) ° .s 6, « ° * e . . « 53-54
Royal Exchange Assur. v. McGrath,
13 F.R.D. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) . 43
- ix -
Pace
Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska
Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367
(N.D. eae 1972) . . . . > o . 43
Uniformed Sanitation Men Associa-
tion v. Commissioner of Sanitation,
392 U.S. 280 (1968) . ” . . . a 61
‘United Air Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 186 F. Supp. 824 (D.Del.
1960) . . > . * > > >. >. . >. >. * 38
United Air Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 26 F.R.D. 213 (D.Del.
1960) >. . . > . . . — .* a >. * 38
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S.
1 (1953) ee We “SY Se Ae Sa ee oe oe ee 36-37
Weber Aircraft Corp. v. United
States, 688 F.2d 638 (9th Cir.
1982) *. * >. > . . . * >. >. *. . . 58
Whitaker v. Davis, 45 F.R.D. 270
(W.D. Mo. 1968) * — > - >. * * >. 43
Wunderly v. United States, 8 F.R.D.
356 (E.D. Pa. 1948) 7 . . . . 7 43
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) ... 54-55
Bo 1: 5 Re ee ee 49
S Seetb)(S) « « « @-e « passim
7? elles a tee bs «' & eal’ 46, 47
S.Weeee es: ta os ae 47
y 1902(a) . . . . . 47
s 1903(a) - . . . . . 48
§ 1903(a)(2) . 2. we 49
49 U0.8.C. iS 1905 . . . . . - . a
iS 1906 . . . . . . . .
Public Law 89-670, 80 Stat. 935
(1966) - . . . . . . . “se . .
S00.2 « es ee
S00.3 .«.s2.e «
S00.3(a) .« « e
801 (Appendix)
SOT.2 .« ce © eo
SOT.10 « «
6071.35 ..«
801.50 ..
801.54(b)
| ee ee
49 C.FP.R.
AAMAAAAAAAAMAAHM
5218 (8. oa ee. 8 8
Se) 'S: O-e Be ee 6
ey oe a ae a to ee i a
AFR 127-4
4 2
q 2 d. t3 era
q 2-
q 5-
oe
.
—
Le
~
~
m
~~
Se (65a) «©
Se . . . .
LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS
S.1666, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1964) a . * . . . . >. . o * .
S$.1160, 89th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1965) - ” 2 ¢ . . . - . . . .
Administrative Procedure Act:
Hearings Before the Subcomm,. on
Administrative Practice and Pro-
cedures of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 89th Conq., Ist
SOG Cupeer « 6s 0 6:38.66
i
- gi -
Page
Federal Public Records Law:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
6) } Re eer ee ak ae ee ee ee ee 23, 32
S. Rep. No. 1219, 88th Conag., 2d
Sess. (1964) . . . . . . . 7 . 18-19,
23
S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Conq., Ist
meee. (1985S) = «)s 2 6 eee eee
23, 27
S. Rep. No. 93-1347, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 31, 1974 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 7669 . . . * . . 7. . * 47
H. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 24
Sess. 6, 1966 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 2418 — . 7 . * 7. . * . 12
110 Cong. Rec. 17088-89 (1964) . 19, 20
110 Cong. Rec. 17667 (1964) .. 20-22
110 Cong. Rec. 17668 (1964) .. 21-22
112 Cong. Rec. 13648 (1966) .. 6
112 Cong. Rec. 13653 (1966) .. 30
112 Cong. Rec. 13654 (1966) .. 11
112 Cong. Rec. 13658 (1966) .. 6
120 Cong. Rec. 34081 (1974) .. 48
MISCELLANEOUS
4 Moore's Federal Practice
q@ 26.64[2) (2d ed. 1983) ... 43
No. 82-1616
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1983
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER
Vv.
WEBER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, ET AL.,
RESPONDENTS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT
BRIEF OF INDERJIT BADHWAR
AN :
~~ AS AMICI CORIAE
Messrs. Inderiit Badhwar and Donald J.
Goldberg, with the consent of the
parties, submit this Brief as Amici
Curiae in support of Respondents.
Bake
INTEREST OF INDERJIT BADHWAR AND
Messrs. Badhwar and Goldberg are
journalists on the staff of nationally
syndicated columnist Jack Anderson. They
are investigating the military's aircraft
accident investigation program, and are
focusing on such questions as: Why is
the Air Force accident rate so much
higher than the civilian accident rate?
Has the military's practice of conducting
its accident investigations in secret,
and maintaining most portions of its
accident reports secret, enhanced or
detracted from aviation safety? Particu-
larly since the National Transportation
Safety Board conducts its investigations
of civil aircraft accidents in public,
and makes its accident reports public, is
there any justification for the mili-
tary's practice of secrecy?
Messrs. Badhwar and Goldberg have been
frustrated in their attempts to obtain
through the Freedom of Information Act
pertinent information and documents, in-
cluding witness statements such as those
at issue in this case, because of the
interposition of Exemption 5 and the
asserted “privilege” advanced by Peti-
tioner herein. The Air Force has been
using Exemption 5 and the asserted
"privilege” not only to shield witness
statements, but also to prevent dis-
closure of voluminous other data relating
to accident investigations, including
recommendations for corrective action
contained in the final reports of in-
vestigations, and information reflecting
whether such recommendations were imple-
mented. Messrs. Radhwar and Goldberg
will soon institute an action in the
United States District Court seeking the
information that has been withheld from
them.
The parties to this case necessarily
must focus upon the facts and the law in
the context of their own interests and
the particular circumstances of this
case. But the question of the extent to
which purely factual witness statements
involving military air crashes, not taken
by attorneys or in anticipation of liti-
gation, are available to the public
implicates interests transcending the
specific and narrow interests of Peti-
tioner and Respondents in this litiga-
tion. Although the propriety of the
Government's broad assertion of "“privi-
lege" and its use of Exemption 5 to
shield many elements of military air
crash investigations, including the final
reports of military safety investigation
boards, is not before this Court, a
ruling sustaining Petitioner's assertion
of privilege with respect to witness
statements might be relied upon by the
Government in defense of its broader
assertion of privilege. Since different
legal issues are involved, that reliance
would be misplaced. Nonetheless, Amici
Curiae seek to avoid that result not only
because they believe the decision below
was correctly decided, but also because
acceptance of the Government's broad as-
sertion of privilege would substantially
hinder the free flow of information on
the readiness of the Nation's military
personnel, the quality of its equipment,
and the manner in which military com-
manders investigate aircraft mishaps
occurring under their command -- all
matters of grave public concern.
When it enacted the Freedom of
Information Act, Conaress placed hiah
regard upon the role of journalists to
obtain and report the public's informa-
tion to the Nation. See Renegotiation
Board v.- Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415
U.S. 1, 17 (1974). It highlighted the
Act's value to "the conscientious news-
paperman who was seeking material for a
serious article that he is preparing on
the operations of a particular agency of
Government." 112 Cong. Rec. 13658 (1966)
(remarks of Rep. Anderson); see aiso id.
at 13648 (remarks of Rep. Pucinski).
Congress emphasized the need, even after
passage of the Act, for the continuing
vigilance of the press, the public, and
the Congress. Id. (remarks of Rep.
Laird). Messrs. RBadhwar and Goldberg
appear as Amici Curiae in this case with
those responsibilities.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A. This Court has held that purely
factual documents like the witness
Statements at bar are not exempt from
disclosure under the Freedom of In-
formation Act ("FOIA") by Exemption 5.
EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86-89 (1973).
Congress' intent that such factual
materials not be within Exemption 5 is
clear from the carefully developed legis-
lative history, including discussion
particularly directed to the release of
witness statements.
B. Petitioner urges a construction of
legislative history that may not. be
reconciled with this Court's analysis of
the same history in Mink. 410 U.S. at
90-91. It rests its entire argument upon
a brief clause taken out of context in a
Senate Report, which was not specifically
directed to Exemption 5 at all. Its
argument ignores the balance and
principal thrust of the legislative his-
tory commending the release of purely
factual material, and if accepted, would
mean that every suggestion or criticism
of FOIA made in Congressional Hearings
should be read into the Act. Such a
broadening of FOIA's Exemptions, by
implication, may not be squared with
clear Congressional intent that the Act
be viewed as a disclosure statute, and
that its exemptions be narrowly construed
so that there are clearly defined
"workable standards” for applying them.
Cc. Petitioner seeks a special
exemption for a select class of documents
-- witness statements not taken by
attorneys or in anticipation of
litigation, but for military air crash
safety investiaqations. Under the case
law as of the enactment of FOIA, such
statements as those at bar were subject
to discovery and "[w]e must assume...
that Congress legislated against the
backdrop of this case law." Mink, supra,
ooe-: 8.8, et 89. Generally, witness
statements not taken in anticipation of
litigation are available in discovery and
through FOIA. These witness statements
should not be accorded special treatment.
D. The National Transportation Safety
Board has responsibilities, for civil
aviation, that are identical to military
air crash safety investigation boards.
The NTSB conducts its investigations in
public, and routinely makes its witness
Statements available. Its record of
assuring air safety is far better than
that of the military safety boards.
Actual practice thus refutes Petitioner's
claim that safety investigations best
proceed in secret and that witness
@ 10 «=
statements must be withheld from the
public.
E. The better view of the law is that
no special protection should extend to
these documents. At the very least,
however, the Record in this case is
inadequate to warrant this Court's
adoption of a special privilege, as Peti-
tioner urges, to exempt these witness
statements from FOIA. Many questions,
including such basic ones as_ whether
these witnesses were actually promised
confidentiality, and how the Air Force
could square promises of confidentiality
with its own Regulations permitting
disclosure in certain circumstances (in-
cluding as required by FOIA), remain to
be answered in a full hearing. Thus, if
the Court disagrees with our position
that the asserted “privilege” is not
within Exemption 5, and further disagrees
a 94\ <<
with our position that there can be no
justification for such a special
privileae, it should remand this case so
that a proper’ Record, testing the
asserted basis for the privilege, may be
made.
ARGUMENT
WITNESS STATEMENTS CONTAINING
SOLELY FACTUAL MATTER, WHICH WERE
MADE DURING A GOVERNMENTAL IN-
VESTIGATION INTO AN AIR CRASH, AND
WHICH WERE NOT PREPARED BY ATTOR-
NEYS OR IN ANTICIPATION OF LITIGA-
TION, ARE NOT SHIELDED FROM DIS-
CLOSURE UNDER EXEMPTION 5 OF THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT.
The law of FOIA is familiar. The
Statute is a disclosure statute. ~ E.g.,
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,
290 & n.10 (1979); see also 112 Cong.
Rec. 13654 (1966) (remarks of Rep.
Rumsfeld) .1/ Its exemptions “must be
V/ "It is our intent that the courts
interpret this legislation broad-
(footnote continued)
= 429 «
narrowly construed" and "do not obscure
the basic policy that disclosure, not
secrecy, is the dominant objective of the
Act." Department of Air Force v. Rose,
425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976). Congress
crafted the statute with specificity in
order to provide concrete, “workable
standards" for determining when informa-
tion must be released. See, e.g., FTC v.
Grolier, Inc., 462 U.S. » Os. Seb.
2209, 2214-2215 (1983); SPA v. Mink, 410
U.S. 73, 79 (1973); S. Rep. No. 813, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) ("Senate
Report"); H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 6, 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2418, 2423.
(footnote continued from previous page)
ly, as a disclosure statute and
not as an excuse to withhold in-
formation from the public.”
Representative Rumsfeld was one of the
sponsors of the bill that became FOIA and
was a member of the House Committee that
had studied the bill and reported it
favorably.
- 13 -
Exemption 5 of FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)
(5), exempts from mandatory disclosure
"inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums
or letters which would not be available
by law to a party... in litigation
with the agency.” This Court has
consistently applied this Exemption in
conformity with the quiding principles
underlying FOIA. As recently as last
Term this Court stated, "In keeping with
the Act's policy of ‘the fullest respon-
sible disclosure,'. . . Congress intended
Exemption 5 to be ‘as narrow[{] as [is]
consistent with efficient Government
operations.'" Grolier, supra, 103 S.Ct.
at 2212 (citing legislative history).
The Court has expressed uncertainty that
Exemption 5 "was intended to incorporate
every privilege known to civil dis-
covery," Federal Open Market Committee v.
Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 354 (1979), and
« 14 <
has looked to legislative history to
determine whether a privilege asserted to
be embraced by Exemption 5 may fairly be
said to have been within Congressional
intention at the time the statute was
passed. See id. at 354-360. "[A] claim
that a privilege other than executive
privilege or the attorney privilege is
covered by Exemption 5 must be viewed
with caution," id. at 355, and must be
consistent with the "primary purpose” of
Exemption 5 "to enable the Government to
benefit from ‘frank discussion of legal
or policy matters.'" Grolier, supra, 103
S.Ct. at 2212 (citing legislative his-
tory); see also PBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S.
615, 630 (1982) ("purposes behind Exemp-
tion 5 [are] protecting the give-and-take
of the decisional process").
Petitioner makes no claim that the
documents at issue are protected by.
» 98 «
"executive privilege or the attorney
privilege"; instead it seeks to extend
Exemption 5 to reach documents that con-
tain the kind of “purely factual, in-
vestigative" matter that this Court held
in EPA v. Mink, supra, 410 U.S. at 86-91,
was not within the purview of Exemp-
tion 5. The documents at bar do not
embody "legal or policy matters” at all;
they are merely raw witness statements,
reciting facts, that concededly were
prepared neither by attorneys nor in
anticipation of litigation,
Petitioner asks this Court either to
distort legislative history to rationa-
lize the implied existence of a special
privilege for a select group of factual
documents, or to abandon the approach of
Mink and Merrill and make Exemption 5
boundless. To adopt either of Peti-
tioner's views would create uncertainty
- 16 =
with respect to the scope of Exemption 5.
Instead of providing a workable standard,
it would make the exemption an open-ended
source of protection for factual docu-
ments generated in the course of Govern-
mental investigations. The Court of
Appeals properly rejected Petitioner's
contentions, and its decision should be
affirmed.
I. CONGRESS INTENDED THAT PURELY
FACTUAL WITNESS STATEMENTS NOT BE
EXEMPT PROM DISCLOSURE ONDER
EXEMPTION 5.
A. This Court Has Clearly
Held That Purely Pactual
Documents Of This Kind Are
Not Within Exemption 5.
Ten years ago this Court studied the
leaislative history of Exemption 5, and
its relationship with the kind of factual
documents at issue here, and unequivo-
cally concluded that such documents were
not included within the Exemption:
a 19 =
"(T]he legislative history of
Exemption 5 demonstrates’ that
Congress intended to incorporate
generally the recognized rule
that ‘confidential intra-agency
advisory opinions... are
privileged from inspection. '
. * &
"But the privilege that has been
held to attach to intragovern-
mental memoranda clearly has
finite limits, even in civil
litigation. ... M)emoranda
consisting only of compiled fac-
tual material or purely factual
material sadennaal in Nel ikere=
tive memoranda and severable
from its context would generally
be available for discovery by
private parties in litigation
with the Government. ... We
must assume, therefore, that
Congress legislated against the
Eactdco 5. this case law,
particularly since expressly
intended ‘to delimit the excep-
tion [5) as narrowly as con-
sistent with efficient Govern-
ment operation.' .. . Virtu-
ally all of the courts that have
thus far applied exemption 5
have recognized that it requires
Gitterent treatment for mate-
rials reflecting deliberative or
Olicy-makin rocesses on the
one an an ure actua
nvestigative matters on e
other.
"Nothin in the legislative
history ot Exemption 5 is con-
- 18 =
trary to such a construction.”
Mink, Supra, 410 U.S. at 66-89
(emphasis added; footnotes
omitted).
B. Pertinent Legislative
History Illustrates Con-
' gress' Clear Intent That
Purely Factual Witness
Statements Not Be Shield-
ed By Exemption 5.
S.1160, the bill that was enacted as
FOIA in 1966, was “based” on a prior
Senate bill, S.1666, passed by the Senate
in July 1964. Senate Report 4.2/ The
Senate Report accompanying S.1666, when
describing Exemption 5, declared, "All
factual material in Government records is
to be made available to the pub-
Bee « /@-4:-0" S. Rep. No. 1219, 88th
Conq., 2d Sess. 7 (1964) (emphasis in
original). In further discussing Fxemp-
2/ $.1666 was passed by the Senate, but
insufficient time remained in the Eighty-
Eighth Congress for its consideration by
the House, It was reintroduced in the
Eiahty-Ninth Congress as S.1160. Senate
Report 4.
- 19 «-
tion 5, the Report states, "[I]t will be
noted that there is no exemption for
matters of a factual nature.” Id. at 14.
When S.1666 was discussed on the
Senate floor, Senator Dirksen spoke in
favor of the bill and noted how it would
remedy one particular example of "depart-
mental and agency abuse" involving the
failure to disclose witness statements.
110 Cong. Rec. 17088-17089 (1964) (re-
marks of Sen. Dirksen). He related the
story of a farmer who had been told by
the Department of Agriculture that his
acreage allotment was being '~ reduced
because of certain information against
him. When he, and later Senator Dirksen,
tried to determine from the Department
what this information was, the Department
advised them that the information was
contained in witness statements that had
been given "on a confidential basis" and
= 20 «
thus could not be released. Passage of
S.1666, Senator Dirksen concluded, was an
"essential step" to avoid this kind of
abuse. The bill passed the Senate. Id.
at 17089.
Later in July 1964, the Senate
reconsidered S.1666 at the request of
Senator Humphrey, who stated that "“addi-
tional clarification would be helpful."
110 Cong. Rec. 17667 (1964) (remarks of
Sen. Humphrey). He stated that he had
"prepared certain amendments which
would... assist in clarifying these
sections,” but that it might “be possible
to accomplish the objective of removing
these potential ambiguities or uncertain-
ties through a more complete exposition
of the committee's intention without
actually having to amend S.1666." Id.
Senator Humphrey expressed concern that,
as Exemption 5 was then written, it would
» 21 «=
not exempt memoranda prepared by agency
employees giving their evaluation of the
credibility of evidence obtained from
witnesses or other sources, and memoranda
"summarizing facts used as a basis for
recommendations for agency action.” Id.
Senator Humphrey suggested an amendment
changing the lanquage of the Exemption so
that it would exempt "“intra-agency or
interagency memorandums or letters
dealing with matters of fact, law or
policy." Senator Long, the sponsor of
S.1666, stated that this proposal was
unacceptable, because:
"The suggestion with respect to
[Exemption.5], adding ‘matters
of fact' to ‘matters of law or
policy’ would result in a great
lessening of information avail-
able to the public and to the
press." Id. (remarks of Sen.
Long).
Senator Long further clarified that:
"(The documents described by
Senator Humphrey lead) me to
point out that there is nothing
in this bill which would over-
~)
= 22 -
ride normal privileges dealing
with the work product and other
memorandums summarizina facts
used as a basis for recom-
mendations for agency action if
those facts were otherwise
available to the public." Id.
at 17667-17668.3/ og
The Senate did not accept Senator
Humphrey's proposed change to Exemption
5, and the bill passed the Senate a
second time, without any pertinent
change. Id. at 17668.
C. Petitioner Misreads Leg-
islative History To As-
sert That Exemption 5
Embraces Purely Factual
Witness Statements.
As originally introduced in the
Eighty-Eighth and Eighty-Ninth Con-
gresses, the bills that ultimately became
FOIA, S.1666 and S.1160, contained an
exemption for “inter-agency or intra-
3/ We reiterate that the witness
statements at bar are not asserted to be
deliberative material within an
"executive privilege" or work product
prepared in anticipation of litigation.
-
wa
» 93:
agency memorandums or letters dealing
solely with matters of law or policy."
S. Rep. No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 17
(1964) (S.1666; emphasis added); Senate
Report 1 (S.1160; emphasis added). After
the House and Senate Hearings, Exemption
5 was changed to_ substantially its
present form. See Mink, supra, 410 U.S.
at 89-91. Petitioner argues broadly that
"it may reasonably be inferred that one
of the suggestions that precipitated
{this change in Exemption 5] concerned
the Machin privilege" for witness state-
ments taken in military air crash safety
investigations (Pet, Br. 26). The arqu-
ment fails for several reasons.
@ 24 =
1. This Court Held In
Mink That Congress
Changed The Language
Of Exemption 5 For A
Specific Reason Dif-
ferent From What
Petitioner Contends.
After studying the pertinent history,
this Court concluded in Mink that Con-
gress changed Exemption 5's language to
accommodate one particular criticism that
had nothing to do with the asserted
"Machin privilege" for purely factual
witness statements.
"The [prior] formulation was
severely criticized... on
the ground that it would permit
compelled disclosure of an
otherwise private document
simply because the document did
not deal ‘solely’ with leqgal or
policy matters. Documents
dealing with mixed questions of
fact, law, and policy would
inevitably, under the proposed
exemption, become available to
the public. As a result of
this criticism, Exemption 5 was
Changed to substantially its
present form." Mink, supra,
410 U.S. at 90-5T (emphasis
added).
- 25 -
This particular criticism appeared numer-
ous times in the testimony of several
persons. See, e.g., Administrative Pro-
cedure Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Administrative Practice and Procedures
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., Ist Sess. 36, 205, 236, 366-
367, 383, 406-407, 417, 437, 445-446,
450, 490 (1965) ("Senate Hearings");
Federal Public Records Law: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Government Operations, 89th Cong., Ist
Sess. 27, 208, 220, 224, 229-230, 256
(1965) ("House Hearings"). As the Court
found, the change was intended to reach
documer s containina mixed questions of
fact, law, and policy, where factual
matter is "inextricably intertwined” with
legal or policy matter. It was not
intended to shield purely factual matter
such as the witness statements at issue.
See Mink, supra, 410 U.S. at 91-92.
2 26 -
2. Petitioner's Argument
Rests Solely Upon A
Solitary Phrase In The
Legislative History, Taken
Out Of Context, In Disre-
gard Of The Balance And
Principal Thrust Of That
History And The Congres-
sional Intent It Reflects.
a. Petitioner rests its argument
solely upon a brief passage from the
Senate Report stating that the change
discussed above “'reflect[ed) suggestions
made to the committee in the course of
the hearings.'" (Pet. Br. 26). This ex-
cerpt has been taken out of context, and
is quoted in full below. It appeared in
an introductory section of the Senate
Report that discussed past FOIA bills; it
did not appear in the portion of the
Report explaining Exemption 5, or indeed
in any portion of the Report discussing
the substantive provisions of FOIA. The
last paragraph of the introductory
- 27 - (
mn.
en
section of the Senate Report, entitled
"History of Legislation,” reads:
"In the last Congress, the
Senate passed S.1666, upon
which this bill [S.1160]}) is
based, on July 31, 1964, but
sufficient time did not remain
in that Congress for its full
consideration by the _ iouse.
The present bill is substan-
tially S.1666, as passed by the
Senate, with amendments” re-
flecting suggestions made to
the committee in the course of
the hearings." Senate Report
4.
This cryptic comment can hardly
Support the notion that Congress in-
tended, through the use of only a general
introductory statement not dealing with
Exemption 5 or any substantive portion of
the bill, to change the force of ex-
tensively developed legislative history
and make purely factual, investigative
witness statements exempt from disclosure
by Exemption 5. See Department of State
v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 600
(1982) ("(p)assing references and
» 26 «
isolated phrases are not controlling when
analyzing a legislative history").
Pairly read, this general introductory
language means only that the revised
version of the Senate bill reflected
certain suggestions made in the course of
the Hearings. Obviously the amended
Senate bill reflected some suagestions;
as noted above, the reason for the change
in the language of Exemption 5 was the
concern voiced during the Hearings that
otherwise-exempt material would have to
be released merely because it did not
deal "solely" with law and policy. To
read this language, as Petitioner urges,
to mean that each and every suggestion
made to the Senate Committee during the
course of the Hearings may “reasonably be
inferred" to be incorporated in FOIA is
at war with the specificity with which
Congress drafted the statute, with the
= 29 -
expressed Congressional intent that
FOIA's Exemptions be narrowly construed,
and with Congress' desire that there be
concrete “workable standards" for the
sound administration of the Act. Such a
construction is no less objectionable
than the construction, rejected by this
Court in Mink, that the change in
Exemption 5's language should be read as
providing that all factual material is
exempt from disclosure. Mink, supra, 410
U.S. at 91.
b. The flaws of Petitioner's position
are further evident when some of the
"suggestions" made in the Hearings are
recounted. The recurring theme among the
Executive departments and agencies was
opposition to FOIA.4/ For example, the
4/ Indeed, Congress noted that, even
after the Hearings and "a carefully
prepared report -- which clarifies
legislative intent... [t]here still
remains some opposition on the part of a
(footnote continued)
@ 30 <-
Interstate Commerce Commission urged that
"all internal memorandums be withheld
from disclosure.” Senate Hearings 244.
The Federal Communications Commission
urged that Exemption 5 should include all
inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums
or letters that did not fall "within one
of the categories of agency records
required to be published or disclosed by
some other worovision of this Act." Id.
at 459, Indeed, Assistant Attorney
General Norbert A. Schlei, who was the
principal spokesman for the Executive
Branch and whose testimony is relied upon
by Petitioner (Pet. Br. 27-28), did not
limit his comments to the so-called
"Machin privilege" for witness statements
(footnote continued from previous page)
few Government administrators ... .”"
112 Cong. Rec. 13653 (1966) (remarks of
Rep. Rumsfeld). This continued oppvosi-
tion, of course, is a further refutation
of Petitioner's argument that all “sugq-
gestions" made at the Hearings were
heeded by Congress.
=» 31 «
taken in military air crash safety
investigations, but urged the existence
of a broac privilege "in any case where
G@isclosure would hamper an important
governmental function." House Hearings
220. It could not seriously be contended
that any of these suggestions became the
law. That a “privilege” to protect
witness statements was mentioned during
the Hearings similarly cannot, ipso
facto, serve to incorporate that
privilege into Exemption 5.
Cc. Further illustrating the
weakness in Petitioner's argument that
Exemption 5 should be extended by impli-
cation (or Congressional silence) is the
fact that the references in the Hearings
to witness statements such as those at
bar do not appear in Exemption 5 contexts
at all. Most of the references cited by
Petitioner were made in the course of
@ 32 <-
~
criticizing the Senate's formulation of
Exemption 7,.2/ See Senate Hearings 417-
418 and House Hearings 220 (Department of
Defense); Senate Hearings 296 (Assistant
Attorney General Schlei); Senate Hearings
366-367 and House Hearings 237 (Civil
Aeronautics Board). Other references do
not mention any Exemption at all. See
Senate Hearings 418 (Department of
Defense); Senate Hearings 196 (Assistant
Attorney General Schlei). A number of
the comments that Petitioner cites do not
even specifically mention witness
statements made in the course of air
5/ Exemption 7 clearly does not apply to
the witness statements at bar, since the
statements were not taken for law en-
forcement purposes, but rather were taken
as part of an investigation the “sole
purpose” of which "is to determine the
cause of the accident and to develop
corrective measures to prevent similar
mishaps in the future” (Pet. Br. 3). See
FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615,
(1982); Church of Scientolo v. Dep't of
Army, 611 F.2d 730, 740 (oer Cir. °
Seti cioner acknowledges as much (Pet. Br.
30).
» 93 «
crash accident investigations. See,
@e.g., Senate Hearings 206 (Assistant
Attorney General Schlei). In short, none
of the comments cited by Petitioner
fairly supports the notion that Congress
intended witness statements of the type
involved in this case to be covered by
Exemption 5.
D. Under The Case Law As
Of The Enactment Of FOIA,
The Witness Statements At
Bar Were Subject To Dis-
covery.
Petitioner's strained view of the
legislative history is further demon-
strated by the pertinent case law as of
the enactment of FOIA in 1966. We have
found no reported decision as of the
passage of FOIA that would have shielded
the witness statements at bar _ from
discovery. It is simply illogical to
imply a Congressional intendment that
= 34 -
these statements be embraced by Exemp-
tion 5, when all judicial authority
available to Congress would not have
viewed these statements as “not routinely
available” in litigation. Simply put, as
of the passage of FOIA, these statements
were weeilebie to litigants, and "“"[wle
must assume ... that Congress legis-
lated against the backdrop of this case
law." Mink, supra, 410 U.S. at 89.
1. The Reynolds Case.
A typical example of the generally
recognized rejection of privilege before
FOIA is found in the landmark case of
Reynolds v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468
(E.D. Pa. 1950), aff'd, 192 F.2d 987 (3d
Cir. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 345
U.S. 1 (1953). Reynolds was a Federal
Tort Claims Act suit seeking recovery of
damages arising from the crash of a
» 95 @
military aircraft. Judge Kirkpatrick
ordered that the report and findings of
the military investigation board and
witness statements given by military
personnel to the board must be produced.
He specifically rejected the claim of
privilege that Petitioner urges here:
"In effect, the Government
claims a new kind of privi-
lege. Its position is that
the proceedings of boards of
investigation of the armed
services should be privi-
leged in order to allow the
free and unhampered self-
criticism within the service
necessary to obtain maximum
efficiency, fix responsi-
bility and maintain proper
discipline. I can find no
recognition in the law of
the existence of such a
Privilege. 10 F.R.D. at 472
(emphasis added).
The Third Circuit affirmed this ruling
and held "that the district court rightly
rejected the broad claim of privilege
made by the United States not to produce
any statements cr reports’ regarding
=» 36 «
airplane accidents," 192 F.2d at 998,
Writing for that Court, Judge Maris
Speqeent ty explained why the Government's
interest in shielding this material must
yield to a free society's paramount
interest in freedom of information. Id.
at 994-995. And he further noted:
"It may well be more convenient
and efficient in the conduct of
accident investigations for the
[Air Force] Department not to
be required to disclose state-
ments and reports of this
character. But the same would
be true in the case of any
private person and the latter
do not ordinarily enjoy that
privilege.” Id. at 994.
This Court reversed the judgment of
the Court of Appeals in Reynolds. The
Court did not, however, review this
ground relied upon by the Court of
Appeals, but expressly decided only the
alternative, “narrower ground" that dis-
covery should not proceed because of the
presence of military and state secrets.
- 37 «
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1,
6-7, 10-11 (1953). The District Court's
and Court of Appeals' analysis rejecting
the privilege asserted by Petitioner
herein was left untouched, Indeed, to
the extent any Justice considered that
analysis, it met with approval, since
Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson
dissented in Reynolds “substantially for
the reasons set forth in the opinion of
Judqe Maris below.” 345 U.S. at 12.
2. Other Pre-FPOIA Cases.
Reynolds was but one of several pre-
FOIA cases ordering the disclosure of
reports and witness statements generated
in the course of military safety
investigations of military aircraft
accidents. In Cresmer v. United States,
9 F.R.D. 203, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1949), the
Court qave the following reason for
- 36 -
rejecting the assertion of "privilege"
and ordering the disclosure of a Report
of a Navy Board of Investigation:
"In the absence of a showing
of a war secret, or secret
in respect to munitions of
war, Or any secret appliance
used by the armed forces, or
any threat to the National
security, it would appear to
be unseemly for the Govern-
ment to thwart <«<ne efforts
of a plaintiff in a case
such as this to learn as
much .asS possible concerning
the cause of the disaster
(emphasis added).
See also United Air Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 186 F. Supp. 824 (D. Del. 1960),
later opinion, 26 F.R.D. 213 (D. Del.
1960) (statements of fact witnesses);
O'Keefe v. Boeinc Co., 38 F.R.D. 329,
334-335 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (records of
facts, including witness statements, made
in air crash safety investigation).
= 39 =
a 3. Petitioner's Reliance
Upon Machin v. Zuckert
Is Misplaced.
Petitioner relies upon Machin v.
Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
as the case that assertedly served as the
basis for Congress' implicit recognition
tnat witness statements like the ones at
bar fall within Exemption 5. Machin did
not extend a privilege, however, to
statements -- such as those involved
here -- taken from witnesses who are
military personnel. The Machin court
expressly declined to shield from dis-
closure such statements, and limited
protection to the “testimony of private
parties” and to such portions of the
investiqative report "reflecting Air
Force deliberations or recommendations as
to policies that should be pursued." 316
F.2d at 339-341. Machin can hardly serve
as the implicit predicate for Peti-
t
ae
a 40 «
tioner's assertion that, in passing FOIA,
Congress gave recognition that witness
statements of military personnel were not
routinely available. No court -- not
even the Machin court -- had yet extended
the privilege that far. Congress, which
obviously did not even discuss the so-
called "Machin privilege” in its Reports
or debates, should not be held to have
done so silently.
II. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT A
SPECIAL PRIVILEGE FOR THESE
WITNESS STATEMENTS TO EXEMPT THEM
FROM FOIA,
As discussed above, the Court below
correctly held that the asserted privi-
lege which Petitioner asks this Court to
recognize was not within the contempla-
tion of Congress when it enacted FOIA.
Petitioner arques in the alternative,
however, that the asserted privileae is
today "clearly recoanized" and the
« &) =
language of Exemption 5 is broad enough
to include it. Petitioner fares no
better on this point.
At the outset, for the Court to accept
Petitioner's argument it must accept, on
the merits, that there should be a
special privilege extended for witness
statements, concededly not taken in
anticipation of litigation but in con-
nection with military air crash safety
investigations. See FTC v. Grolier,
Inc., 462 U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 2209, 2214
(1983); id., 103 S.Ct. at 2218 (Brennan
and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). The exist-
ence vel non of this privilege was not
passed upon by either Court below. Not
only does this Court not have the benefit
of decisions below, but also the Record
is not properly developed to decide
whether, or to what extent, these witness
» 42 =
statements should be shielded from civil
discovery. In the circumstances, "[t])hat
determination must await the development
of a proper record,” and a remand to the
District Court for that purpose is
appropriate. See, e.g., Federal Open
Market Committee v. Merrill, 443 U.S.
340, 364 (1979).
A. Purely Factual Witness
Statements Not Taken
In Anticipation Of
Litigation Are Gene-
rally Subject to Dis-
closure.
Generally, witness statements not
taken in anticipation of litigation are
required to be produced in discovery.
E.g., Mercy v. County of Suffolk, 93
P.R.D. 520 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Janicker v.
George Washington University, 94 F.R.D.
648 (D.D.C. 1982); Miles v. Bell Heli-
copter Co., 385 F. Supp. 1029 (N.D.Ga.
1974) (accident reports made by emplovees
@ 43 -
of airplane manufacturer); Thomas Organ
Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 54
F.R.D. 367 (N.D.I11. 1972); Whitaker v.
Davis, 45 F.R.D. 270 (W.D.Mo. 1968); 4
Moore's Federal Practice @ 26.64[2], at
26-414 to 26-415 & niu. 2-4 (2d ed. 1983).
Even when such statements have been taken
as part of Governmental investigations,
they have routinely been available to
parties in litigation. E.g., Royal
Exchange Assur. v. McGrath, 13 F.R.D. 150
(S.D.N.Y. 1952); Wunderly Vv. United
States, 8 F.R.D. 356 (E.D.Pa. 1948); see
also Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock
Co., 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D.Pa. 1968).
And witness statements have, moreover,
been held not to fall within Exemption 5
of FOIA. E.g., Charlotte-Macklenburg
Hospital Authority v. Perry, 571 F.2d
195, 198 n. 5 (4th Cir. 1978); Robbins
Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 563 F.2d 724,
@ 44
734-737 (Sth Cir. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 437 U.S. 214 (1978); see also
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437
U.S. 214, 254 n.12 (1978) (Powell, with
Brennan, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) .6/ There is no
6/ "In light of my view of the
limits of Exemption 7 (A), I
reach the Board's alternative
argument that the witness
affidavits in dispute are
protected against disclosure by
Exemption 5... . I aqree gene-
rally with the analysis of the
Court of Appeals that the purpose
of this Exemption is to protect
agency litigation strategy and
decisionmaking processes, and not
to incorporate fully the ‘work
product’ privileae recoanized in
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495
(1547), and Fed.Rule Civ.Proc.
26(b)(3). Our decision in NLRB
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S.
132, - - (1975),
provides support for this view.
In this case, by contrast, the
Board does not suggest that the
witness affidavits in question
are anything other than verbatim
transcripts of statements made by
witnesses to Board personnel.”
The witness statements at bar were not
even taken in anticivation of litigation,
(footnote continued)
- 45 -
Greater public interest serving to shield
the witness statements at bar than the
interests served by those statements
normally and routinely released. Indeed,
the public's interests in ensuring that
the Nation's military aircraft operate
with maximum safety, that our military
commanders responsibly discharge their
responsibilities to promote safety and
investigate the causes of mishaps, that
ovr military personnel are _ properly
trained and combat ready, and that the
military services and its private
contractors furnish the highest quality
equipment, at reasonable cost, for our
personnel, all commend the release of the
statements to the public.
(footnote continued from previous page)
as were the statements in Robbins Tire &
Rubber Co., and thus are not “work
product” of any kind.
oe A @
B. The National Transporta-
tion Safety Board, Which
For Civil Aviation Has
Responsibilities Identical
To Military Air Crash
Safety Investigation
Boards, Routinely Makes
Available To The Public
Witness Statements Taken
In Its Investigations Of
Civil Air Crashes.
The practice of the National Trans-
portation Safety Board ("NTSB"), hich is
charged by law with investigating and
determining the causes of civil air
crashes, makes clear that there is abso-
lutely no need to shield witness state-
ments like the ones at bar from dis-
closure.
Conaress established the NTSB in 1966
as a part of the Department of Trans-
portation. 49 U.S.C. § 1901; see Public
Law 89-670, 80 Stat. 935 (1966). In
1975, Congress found that the functions
of NTSB, including those involving
criticism of other agencies, could not be
ia
= 67 =
properly performed unless the NTSB was
totally separate and independent, and so
it removed the NTSB from the Department
of Transportation and made it an inde-
pendent agency. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1901,
1902(a); see 49 C.P.R. § 800.2; see also
S. Rep. No. 93-1347, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
31, 1974 U.S. Co@e Cong. & Ad. News 7669,
7694,
The NTSB's mission is "to promote
transportation safety by conducting inde-
pendent accident investigations and by
formulating safety improvement '§ recom-
mendations." 49 U.S.C. § 1901(1); 49
C.F.R. § 800.3(a). It is responsible for
investigating and determining the facts,
conditions, circumstances and the cause
Or probable cause of various specified
types of accidents, including all acci-
dents involving civil aircraft, and for
developing measures designed to ensure
« 66 «
the safety of all modes of transporta-
tion, including air travel. See 49
U.S.C. § 1903(a); 49 C.F.R. § 800.3.
The statutory and regulatory scheme
demonstrate that neither Congress nor the
NTSB perceives a need to conduct aircraft
accident investigations in secret. On
the contrary, the public benefits from
being deliberately made aware of the
NTSB's' work, As Senator Hartke, the
sponsor of the bill establishing the NTSB
as an independent agency, stated:
"The great power that’ they
[NTSB] have is that their in-
formation is transmitted to
Congress and, therefore, it
becomes a matter of conside-
ration. Their information is
transmitted to the public,
which is certainly ultimately
very vitally concerned, and
will become more concerned.”
120 Cong. Rec. 34081 (1974)
(remarks of Sen. Hartke).
The NTSB's hearings are generally open
to the public, with witnesses giving
their testimony in the open. See 49
a 49 =
C.P.R. § 845.3. 49 U.S.C. § 1903(a)(2)
requires the Board to:
"report in writing on the
facts, conditions, and cir-
cumstances of each accident
investigated... and cause
such reports to be made avail-
able to the public at reason-
able cost and to cause notice
of the issuance and availa-
bility of such reports to be
published in the Federal
Register."
See also 49 C.F.R. §§ 801.35, 845.40.
The NTSB's enabling legislation also
requires it to make public all informa-
tion it receives, with two exceptions not
pertinent here, except to the extent such
information is exempted from FOIA by 5
U.S.C. § 552(b), or is otherwise pro-
tected by law from disclosure to the
public. 49 0.8.C. § 1905. As a matter
of practice, the NTSB normally'= and
routinely makes public its reports and
its accident files, including witness
statements. Its regulations state that
- 50 -
"it is the policy of the Board to make
information available to the public to
the greatest extent possible." 49 C.F.R.
§ 801.2; see also 49 C.F.R. § 801.10 and
the Appendix to 49 C.F.R. Part 801.
According to its regulations, the NTSB
thus regards the release of these witness
statements not to be inconsistent with
the purposes of Exemption 5. See 49
C.F.R. § 801.50; see also 49 C.F.R.
§ 801.54(b).
The NTSB has been highly effective in
achieving the goal of promoting safety in
civil air travel. For the period from
1974 through 1979, the civilian accident
rate per 100,000 aircraft hours flown for
all civilian aircraft (including sched-
uled air carriers, aqeneral aviation, and
unscheduled carriers) dropped from 0.77
to 0.40, a decrease of almost one-half
(Appendix ("App.") infra, at 1a). For
= 81 «
the same period, the Air Force accident
rate per 100,000 hours flown actually
increased from 2.90 to 2.92. Id. Thus,
the Air Force accident rate per 100,000
hours flown increased from 3.8 times the
civilian rate in 1974 (2.90 v. 0.77), to
7.3 times the civilian rate in 1979 (2.92
v. 0.40).2/
When Air Force accident rates are
compared with domestic scheduled airline
accident rates (exclusive of general
aviation and unscheduled carriers), the
results are even more dramatic. The
7/ tt is difficult to obtain from
publicly available sources comprehensive
information about Air Force accident
rates. Unlike the NTSB, which makes
annual reports to the Congress, and which
routinely publishes comprehensive in-
formation about accident rates, the Air
Force publishes scant little information
about its own accident rates.
The information reflected in the text
above is based upon NTSB publications and
the Air Force Inspector General's Listing
of Class A Aircraft Mishaps per 100,000
flight hours for the years 1974 to
September 1983.
- §2 «
accident rate per 100,000 hours flown for
scheduled airlines decreased from 0.57 in
1975 to 0.23 in 1982. The Air Force
accident rate per 100,000 hours flown was
2.80 in 1975, and 2.30 in 1982. Thus the
Air Force accident rate per 100,000 hours
flown was approximately 4.9 times higher
than the scheduled airline rate in 1972
(2.80 v. 0.57), and a full 10 times
higher than the scheduled airline rate in
1982 (2.30 v. 0.23). (App. 2a.)
The interests served by the NTSB are
as compelling, if not more compelling,
than the interests served by investi-
gations into the causes of military air
crashes. See FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S.
255, 266-267 (1975). The NTSB has well
served the public and these interests and
has done so while making its work avail-
able for public scrutiny. Its record
Clearly demonstrates that the NTSB's
= §3 «
policy of releasing witness statements
has in no way prevented the NTSB from
greatly improving the safety record for
civil air travel. There is no basis for
Petitioner's speculative claim that the
withholding of witness statements is
necessary to promote the safety of mili-
tary travel.
C. The Alleged Promise Of
Confidentiality Extended
To These Air Force Wit-
nesses Does Not Confer
Any Privilege Upon The
Witness Statements Or
Exempt Them From Dis-
closure Under FOIA.
Petitioner arques that these witness
statements were received upon a promise
of confidentiality. Such an alleged
promise, however, is no justification for
the special privilege Petitioner seeks.
Promises of confidentiality “cannot,
in and of themselves, override [FOIA]."
Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 846 (4th
- 54 -
Cir. 1973); accord, e.g., Petkas v.
Staats, 501 P.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
In any event, there is no evidence in
this Record that the witnesses were given
any specific promises of confidentiality,
at any specified time, by any specified
person, under any specified circum-
stances. The Record does not reflect
where, when, by whom, to whom, or in what
words such an alleged promise was made.
The Record merely contains a _ broad
statement that it is general Air Force
policy to promise confidentiality (Pet.
Br. 7), but this gqeneralized policy
simply does not speak to whether specific
promises of confidentiality were made to
the witnesses whose statements are
involved herein. Petitioner's failure to
document any specific promises of
confidentiality is not insignificant,
since this is a FOIA case where the
matter is heard de novo, and "the burden
= §§ =
is on the agency to sustain its action."
5 u.S.C. § 552 (a) (4)(B).
Further, the Air Force could not,
consistently with its regulations, make a
blanket promise of confidentiality to any
potential accident board witness. The
Air Force Regulations reguire that wit-
ness statements be released in certain
circumstances (see AFR 127-4, 4% 2-5.d.
(Pet. Br. 3a))? the Regulations even
provide that "factual parts" of safety
investigation reports (including witness
statements that are attached) “must be
released... fa]Js required by the
Freedom of Information Act" (AFR 127-4,
q 2-5.d. (Pet. Br. 3a)). APR 127-4,
q 2-5.d.(3) (Pet. Br. 3a) requires that
any person who is court martialed be
furnished with all statements, sworn or
unsworn, given to Federal agents, by any
witness who testifies against the
= 86 «
accused. And AFR 127-4, @4 5-4.d. and
2-10.a.(2)(a) (App., infra, 3a-4a) pro-
vide that if the accident report names an
Air Force employee as responsible for
causing the accident, that person must be
given the opportunity to review the
entire accident report and submit a
refuttal statement. Thus the most that
an Air Force employee could promise a
potential witness, consistent with AFR
127-4, is that the witness's statement
will be kept confidential, except as it ~-
may be required to be released, including
by operation of FOIA. Such a "Catch-22"
promise of confidentiality is no promise
at all.
D. Accordingly, These wWit-
ness Statements Should
Not Be Af forded A
Special Exemption From
Disclosure.
In view of the general rules and
policies favorina disclosure, and the
» 87 «
lack of any distinguishing, practical
reason for nondisclosure, the cases
holding that these witness statements are
not entitled to a special protection from
disclosure represent the better view of
the law. See cases cited supra at 34-38;
see also McFadden v. Avco Corp., 278
F. Supp. 57, 60 (M.D.Ala. 1967). Witness
statements such as those at bar normally
are given at or near the time the crashes
occur, and the public, the courts, and
litigants -- no less than the military --
are entitled to accurate information on
the causes of these incidents.
E. At The Very Least, The
Law Commends Not Adopting
Such A Privilege, Having
Such Far-Reaching Conse-
quences, Except Upon A
Full Record That Is Ab-
sent Here.
The Machin privilege rests entirely
upon a factual hypothesis: unless the
@ 86 «
Air Force is able to promise witnesses
confidentiality, it will fail to obtain
important information about the causes of
accidents, and will be unable to take
appropriate corrective measures to pre-
vent recurrence. Cooper v. Navy, 558
F.2d 274, 277 (Sth Cir. 1977), on
petition for rehearing, 594 F.2d 484 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979);
Brockway v. Dep't of Air Force, 518 F.2d
1184, 1191 (8th Cir. 1975); Machin,
supra, 316 F.2d at 339. If that factual
hypothesis is unsound, there would be no
basis for the privilege.
The Court of Appeals expressly assumed
the existence of a "Machin privilege" and
held that, nonetheless, it was not
subsumed within Exemption 5. 688 F.2d at
642. It did not decide whether or not
the Machin privilege should be recognized
in the Ninth Circuit, and there has been
o '§9 «
no Record developed with respect to the
putative basis for such a privilege.
There has been no judicial scrutiny in
this case as to whether the asserted
grounds for the privilege in fact are
justified.
This Court should not approve the
Machin privilege without the benefit of
an adequate Record. Many questions
remain unanswered, and there is a need
for full development of the facts. Does
the Air Force in fact routinely advise
witnesses before they are interviewed
that their statements will not be used
for » any purpose except accident
prevention? What is the specific text of
the promise allegedly made? Does the Air
Force advise witnesses of the provisions
of its Regulations requiring disclosure
of witness statements when persons
testify at court martials, when mandated
= 60 -
by POIA, or to military personnel named
as having caused an accident? To whom
are these witness statements dissemi-
nated?8/ How important are such
witnesses to Air Force investigations?
(Much direct physical evidence, such as
flight data recorders and cockpit voice
recorders, is usually available to
military investigators; witness accounts
may not be as precise and may be less
valuable to the military than Petitioner
contends, ) Would the information be
8/ In Cooper, supra, 594 F.2d at 488-
489 n.2, the Court of Appeals required
the District Court to conduct a hearing
with respect to the Navy's assertion of a
privilege preventing the disclosure of a
report of a Navy safety investigation
into a helicopter crash. After the
hearing, the Court found a limited waiver
of the privilege because of the dissemi-
nation of the report beyond the Navy, in
violation of the Navy's regulations. See
also O'Keefe v. Boeina Co., 38 F.R.D. 329
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (production allowed on
alternative ground of waiver of alleged
privileae, based upon disclosure of acci-
dent report to Boeing, the Government's
prime contractor).
» 61 '=
obtainable from witnesses absent any
promise? (For example, when, as in this
case, the witnesses are also members of
the military, they may in certain
circumstances be required to answer
questions about their official duties,
and discharged if they fail to do so.
See, e.g9., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431
U.S. 801 (1977); Uniformed Sanitation Men
Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392
U.S. 280 (1968); Gardner v. Broderick,
392 U.S. 273 (1968)). Does the Air Force
act promptly to implement the _ recom-
mendations for corrective action
contained in its accident reports? A
Court asked to approve the Machin
privilege is entitled to know whether the
Air Force regularly implements, or
disregards, those corrective action
@ 62 -
recommendations for which these witness
statements obstensibly are obtained.2/
The conclusory assertions in the
Affidavits in this case have not been
tested. Should this Court disagree with
Our positions that Congress did not
intend purely factual material such as
these witness statements to be exempt
from FOIA under Exemption 5, or that the
better view of the law is that no special
privilege should be extended to these
particular witness statements, there
9/ The only issue presented to this Court
involves the availability of witness
statements; the availability to the
public of other sections of the Air
Force's formal accident report, such as
the recommendations section, is not at
issue here. Whether Exemption 5 extends
to such other sections of the accident
report presents additional legal issues
that have not been briefed by’ the
parties, See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1906.
Even if the content of such recommenda-
tions may mot be disclosed, however, no
reason apvears why the Air Force's record
of implementing or disregarding recom-
mendations may not be examined through,
for example, the use of statistical in-
formation.
hoo
- 63 «-
should nonetheless be a full exploration
in the District Court of the basis for
the asserted "privilege," before this
Court considers Petitioner's request for
a special exemption from discovery.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAYMOND D. BATTOCCHI
Counsel of Record
ALFRED F,. BELCUORE
STEVEN F. KOROSTOFF
COLE AND GRONER, P.C.
1730 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 331-8888
Attorneys for Amici Curiae
Inderjit Badhwar and
Donald J. Goldberg
December 1983
APPENDIX
- la -
ACCIDENT RATES PER 100,000
AIRCRAFT-HOURS FLOWN
U.S. Certificated
Route and
Supplemental Air Air Force
Carriers Class A
Year (All Operations) Mishaps!
1974 0.772 2.9
1975 0.677 2.8
1976 0.433 2.8
1977 0.36° 2.78
1978 0.35° 3.16
1979 0.402 2.92
1 Taken from Air Force Inspector General
Listing of Class A Mishaps from 1974 to
September 1983. "Class A" mishaps are
those resulting in (1) a total cost of
$200,000 or more for injury, occupational
illness, and property damages, or (2) a
fatality, or (3) destruction of, or
damage beyond economical repair to, an
Air Force aircraft. AFR 127-4, 9 1-4a.
2 Taken from 1976 NTSB Annual Report to
Congress.
3 Taken from 1979 NTSB Annual Report to
Congress.
- 2a -
ACCIDENT RATES PER 100,000
AIRCRAFT=-HOURS FLOWN
U.S. Air Carriers
Operating Under
14 C.F.R. 121 All Air Force
Scheduled Service Class A
Year (Air Lines) 1 Mishaps
1975 0.57 2.8
1976 0.39 2.8
1977 0.36 2.78
1978 0.35 3.16
1979 0.36 2.92
1980 0.22 2.73
1981 0.38 2.44
1982 0.23 2.3
1 Taken from attachments to NTSB Release
No. SB-83-1, dated January 7, 1983.
2 Taken from Air Force Inspector General
Listing of Class A Mishaps from 1974 to
September 1983.
- 3a -
Air Force Regulation 127-4 (Jan. 18,
1980) provides in pertinent part:
2.10. Notifying Persons Found
Responsible for an Aircraft, Missile,
or Nuclear Mishap. Use the following
procedures for formal reports:
a. Military and Civilian Personnel
Under Air Force Jurisdiction. When an
Air Force person is named as a cause of
one of these mishaps, he or she should
have a chance to correct the record.
This applies to the formal report, an
indorsement by a reviewing commander,
and the AF/IGD letter of final
evaluation. Ask the involved indivi-
dual to submit a statement of rebuttal
or a statement declining rebuttal.
(See ettachment 4 for a suggested
format. ) The person must be advised
that paragraph 3-8d applies to the
Statemert of rebuttal and that the
statement becomes an attachment to the
mishap report. If the person found
responsitle is:
* we *
(2) Attached oor assigned to
another najor command, the investi-
gator(s) sends a copy of the report to
the person's immediate commander.
Attach a letter asking that commander
to:
(a) Netify and give the persen a
chance to review the report.
* a *
5-4. Who Reviews the Formal Report.
Mishap causes may require corrective
actions by a aumber of organizations,
both within and external to the chain
of command. Tinerefore, the report is
reviewed by the following:
- 4éa-
* * *
d. Each person who has been named
responsible for an aircraft, missile,
or nuclear mishap. (See paragraph 2-
10 for rebuttal procedures. )
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.