Appendix — Tassone v. United States

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No. 80-1684

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

-VS-

ANTHONY TASSONE

Defendant-Appellant

ORDER

(Filed: December 27, 1982)

Before: MERRITT and CONTIE, Circuit Judges; and

NEESE, District Judge.*

The defendant Tassone has petitioned the panel for

rehearing. Upon consideration, the petition is denied.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

(s) John P. Hehman, Clerk

*The Honorable C. G. Neese, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.

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Nos. 80-1657; 80-1684; 81-1382

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

-VS-

BENJAMIN SERIDO, (80-1657)

ANTHONY TASSONE, (80-1684)

LARRY Koojt KUNITAKE, (81-1382)

Defendants-Appellants

ORDER

(Filed: October 13, 1982)

Before: MERRITT and CONTIE, Circuit Judges; and

NEESE, District Judge.*

John P. Hehman, Clerk

These cases involve the appeals by defendants Serido,

Tassone and Kunitake of their convictions involving a horse

race fixing scheme in Detroit, Michigan. These defendants,

as well as five other co-defendants, were charged in a

seven-count indictment for their participation in a conspi-

racy to knowingly influence, by fraud and bribery,

thoroughbred horse races at the Detroit Race Course and

the Hazel Park Race Track. Count | charged the defendants

with the use of wire communications in the execution of a

scheme and artifice to defraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.

$1343. Count 2 charged the defendants with participating in

a bribery conspiracy of sporting events in violation of 18

U.S.C, §224, Counts 3 through 7 charged various defen-

dants with participating in the fixing of specific races on

specific dates.

* The Honorable C, G. Neese, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.

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Defendant Serido was charged with violating counts |, 2

and 4 and was found not guilty on count 4 but guilty as to

counts | and 2, Defendant Tassone was charged with violat-

ing counts | through 7 but was found guilty of counts 2

through 7. The trial court declared a mistrial as to count |.

Defendant Kunitake was charged with violating counts 1, 2,

5 and 6. He was acquitted on count | and the district court

declared a mistrial with regard to counts 2, 5 and 6. He was

then retried and found guilty of counts 2, 5 and 6.

The conspiracy to knowingly influence horse racing at

the two race tracks was initiated and orchestrated by unin-

dicted co-defendant Anthony Ciulla. Mr. Ciulla was the

government's key witness in the conviction of these defen-

dants. He was granted immunity in exchange for his tes-

timony. Mr. Ciulla put together this conspiracy by the

following means: (a) obtaining financial backing for the

scheme from defendant Tassone, (b) bribing owners, train-

ers and groomers to allow access to horses for the purpose

of administering drugs and stimulants, (c) bribing jockeys to

manipulate the outcome of horse races, (d) causing and

attempting to cause certain persons to place wagers on

certain predetermined races for the purpose of increasing

profits from wagering pools, and (e) administering drugs and

stimulants to race horses.

The three defendants have raised several issues concern-

ing their convictions. We find no merit in these assignments

of error, however, and we affirm all three convictions.

Defendants Tassone and Serido first assert prosecutorial

misconduct in violation of their due process rights. They

assert that the prosecutor improperly used the testimony of

witness Ciulla knowing said testimony to be false and

perjured,

Ciulla testified that in June, 1973, he met with defen-

dants Tassone and Serido in Detroit, Michigan. At this

time, however, Tassone was in prison in New Jersey.

Defendant Tassone introduced prison records, as well as

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the testimony of two prison officials, indicating that he was

incarcerated in June when this meeting allegedly occurred.

The defendants claim that the government deliberately de-

ceived the jury by using the testimony of Ciulla concerning

the Detroit meeting in June, 1973. The defendants assert

that the government had a duty to refrain from using this

testimony or a duty to correct it when it appeared.

Due process is violated when a prosecutor obtains a

conviction with the aid of evidence whi.) he knows is false

regardless of whether such evidence concerns the pro-

secutor’s proof or the credibility of a witness. Napue v

Illinois, 360 U.S, 264 (1959), Further, due process is viol-

ated and a new trial is required when a prosecutor inten-

tionally or inadvertently fails to correct materially false

testimony relevant to the credibility of a key government

witness. Giglio v United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972),

In the present case, there is no evidence that the pro-

secutor knowingly used perjured testimony. First, there is

no evidence that the testimony of the government's witness

was deliberately falsified concerning the June meeting. Sec-

ond, the government records indicate that defendant Tas-

sone was arrested on May 23, 1973, and that he was

incarcerated in the Trenton State Prison on July 9, 1973. It

is not clear, however, that the government knew that the

defendant was jailed in the Mercer County Jail since May

25, 1973. At the time that Ciulla testified, we cannot find

that the government knew that defendant Tassone was in

prison for the entire month of June. Further, records of

arrest or incarceration do not conclusively prove that such

a meeting could not have possibly occurred. Conceivably,

the defendant may have obtained leave from prison for

some reason, See United States v Indelicato, 611 F.2d 376

(Ist Cir, 1979),

Assuming arguendo, however, that prosecutorial mis-

conduct exists in this case, we do not believe that the

defendant was prejudiced thereby. A new trial is required

only when the tainted evidence was material to the case.

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And, the materiality requirement recognizes that the mis-

conduct's effect on the trial, not the blameworthiness of the

prosecutor, is the crucial inquiry for due process purposes.

Smith v Phillips, —. U.S. —_., 102 S.Ct. 940 (1982). The

only question is whether the defendants received a fair trial.

In the cases Napue and Giglio, supra, neither the pro-

secutor nor defense counsel had knowledge that the pro-

secution witnesses’ testimony was false. In the present

case, however, the defense counsel were aware that, con-

trary to the testimony of Ciulla, defendant Tassone was

incarcerated during the month of June, 1973. Further, the

defense counsel chose not to cross-examine Ciulla concern-

ing the inconsistency. Rather, Ciulla’s testimony was im-

peached by the introduction of prison records and the

testimony of prison officials that defendant Tassone was

incarcerated at the time that the Detroit meeting was to

take place.

Unlike Napue and Giglio, supra, therefore, the trial in

this case was not substantially affected by the inaccessibil-

ity, at the time of trial, of information that would enable the

defendants to bring the matter before the jury for its evalua-

tion. United States v Bruner, 657 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir.

1981); United States v Iverson, 648 F.2d 737 (D.C. Cir.

1981); Ross v Heyne, 638 F.2d 979 (7th Cir, 1980). The

defendants were provided with an adequate opportunity for

cross-examination and impeachment concerning the al-

legedly perjured and at least inconsistent evidence. We

cannot find that the defendants have been denied a fair

trial.

The defendant Tassone further argues, however, that

Ciulla’s testimony caused him to introduce prejudicial evi-

dence. Defendant Tassone asserts that in order to impeach

Ciulla’s testimony he was required to introduce the prejudi-

cial evidence that he was incarcerated during the relevant

period. Reviewing the evidence in this case, however, we

find that this argument is without merit. The government

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introduced evidence of Tassone’s incarceration in proving

that Ciulla met with Tassone in August, 1973 at the Trenton

State Prison. Thus, the jury would have known of Tas-

sone’s incarceration even if Ciulla’s testimony concerning

the Detroit meeting was not contradicted by the prison

evidence.

Defendant Tassone raises two additional issues. First,

he asserts that the district court improperly coerced a juror

to vote in open court. On May 12, 1980, the jury foreperson

advised the trial court that the jury could not reach a

verdict regarding some of the defendants. The court was

advised, however, that the jury had arrived at a verdict

concerning defendants Serido and Tassone. By agreement

of counsel, the jury was asked to return a verdict concern-

ing the defendants on which it could agree. The jury found

Tassone guilty of counts | through 7. The court then polled

the jury, pursuant to rule 31 (d) of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure, and foreperson Klea responded that as

to Tassone it was not her verdict. After a bench conference

with counsel, the court then questioned Mrs. Klea as to

each count against defendant Tassone. She first responded

that it was her verdict on each count. But, upon a second

poll, Mrs. Klea stated that it was not her verdict as to

count | but that it was her verdict as to the remaining

counts.

Upon review of the transcript of the colloquy between

the court and foreperson Klea, we find that the district

court's inquiry was not coercive. The purpose of a jury poll

is to determine if there is a valid verdict based on unanimi-

ty. United States v Love, 597 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1979). If a

lack of unanimity is discovered, the district court may

either discharge the jury or retire it for further delibera-

tions. The court, however, may question a juror to clarify a

verdict and to elicit an unequivocable expression of the

juror’s vote. United States v Lockhart, 366 F.Supp. 843

(E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 495 F.2d 1369 (3d Cir. 1974).

6b

In the present case, foreperson Klea had already made

her decision concerning the Tassone verdict and the district

court's inquiry only identified that the lack of unanimity

existed only with regard to count |. Foreperson Klea was

not coerced into surrendering a view conscientiously enter-

tained,

Tassone finally argues that the trial judge should have

recused himself under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §45S(a).

The Detroit Race Course and Hazel Park Race Track were

owned and operated by two individuals who, along with the

trial judge, held an ownership interest in an apartment

complex. The trial judge owned a 13.3% interest in the

apartment complex and the two race track owners owned a

50% interest. The race track owners acquired their interest

independent of and after the trial judge had acquired his

interest. No other relationship existed between these indi-

viduals, and the trial judge did not associate with the race

track owners personally or in any other way. This relation-

ship was revealed to counsel by the trial judge upon discov-

ery during the second day of impaneling the jury.

Section 45S(a) provides:

Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United

States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in

which his impartiality might reasonably be ques-

tioned.

Under the provisions of this statute, a trial judge must

disqualify himself if a reasonable man, were he to know all

the facts and circumstances, would harbor doubts as to the

judge's impartiality. Potashnick vy Port City Construction

Co., 609 F.2d 1101 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820

(1980). Under the facts of this case, we find that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to recuse

himself. The court revealed the relationship to counsel to

avoid any appearance of partiality. Further, the court dis-

closed that no interest or relationship existed between him-

self and the two race track owners other than the collateral

7b

business relationship. Finally, the court tried the case with

the assistance of a jury. We conclude that a reasonable

man, with knowledge of these facts, would not question the

trial court's impartiality in this case based on a remote

business association. Additionally, the trial judge possessed

no financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or

in a party to the proceeding. 28 U.S.C. §455(b) and (d).

Defendant Serido raises five issues in addition to the

claim of prosecutorial misconduct. First, he asserts that the

district court failed to fully investigate the possibility of

improper contact with a juror. On May 8, 1980, the trial

court's law clerk received a phone call from an unknown

woman stating that she was a juror. She stated that one of

the jurors told other jurors that she got drunk with her

husband, discussed the case with him and that her husband

told her what to do on the case. The clerk asked for the

juror’s name but the woman hung up.

The trial court conducted an in-chambers questioning of

foreperson Klea concerning the call. Mrs. Klea stated that

she did not hear any such talk. Mrs. Klea, however, told

the court she had drawn her own conclusion and then

attempted to relate something to the court. The court re-

fused to allow Mrs. Klea to relate anything further. The

Court then re-instructed the entire jury concerning their

duty as jurors. Finally, upon the jury's rendering of a

verdict, the court questioned each juror concerning the

phone call and found that none of the jurors had knowledge

of the phone call or its subject matter. The trial court

refused to allow inquiry of Mrs. Klea concerning what she

wished to relate to the court on the basis of Federal Rules

of Evidence 606(b).

The trial court had a duty to inquire into the character

of potentially prejudicial material, the extent of the expo-

sure and its effect on the jury's ability to render an impar-

tial verdict. United States v Spinella, 506 F.2d 426 (Sth

Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 917 (1975). But the court also

had a duty to be careful not to make inquiry with regard to

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the jury’s deliberation of the evidence. Fed. R. Evid.

606(b). In this case, the court determined that all of the

jurors had no knowledge of the phone call or the subject

matter of the call. Having made this determination, that no

improper jury contact occurred, the court properly refused

inquiry into what Mrs. Klea attempted to tell the court

in-chambers.

Defendant Serido next contends there was a fatal var-

iance between the single conspiracy alleged in the indict-

ment and the two conspiracies proven at trial. He also

asserts that the evidence revealed a conspiracy between

himself and co-defendant Owens, of receiving payment from

clients for information on how to wager on certain races,

which is not conduct violative of the sports bribery statute,

18 U.S.C. §224. We disagree. Unlike the case Kotteakos v

United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), the evidence indicates

that the scheme of Serido and Owens became part of

Ciulla’s bribery conspiracy. Ciulla’s testimony reveals that

the clients of Serido and Owens were used in order to get

them to wager on certain fixed races, thereby increasing

profits within the wage earning pools. Thus, the government

sufficiently proved one conspiracy as well as conduct viola-

tive of 18 U.S.C. §224. United States v Phillips, 630 F.2d

1138, 1146 (6th Cir. 1980).

Related to these claims, we also find that there exists

sufficient evidence to sustain Serido’s convictions on counts

1 and 2. Determining the sufficiency of the evidence re-

quires the Court to view the evidence in a light most

favorable to the government, Glasser v United States, 315

U.S. 60 (1942), and to determine whether there exists

sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find that the

defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. U.S. v

Francis, 646 F.2d 251, (6th Cir.) cert. denied, __. U.S.

——., 102 S.Ct. 637 (1981). Under this standard, credibility

choices must be determined in favor of the government.

Accordingly, the testimony of the government's witness

Ciulla is sufficient to implicate defendant Serido in the

conspiracy charged in counts | and 2.

9b

Finally, defendant Serido contends that an in-court iden-

tification by F.B.1l. agent Langford should have been

excluded because of the out-of-court identification proce-

dures used. Assuming this in-court identification was based

on unreasonably suggestive out-of-court identifications and

was unreliable under the totality of the circumstances, Neil

v Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), we find this error to be

harmless. This identification evidence was cumulative in

that witness Ciulla and another FBI agent identified Serido

as being with Ciulla on September 15, 1973. Additionally,

defendant Serido was acquitted on count 4, which charged

Serido with participating in the fixing of the tenth race on

September 15, 1973. No prejudice to the defendant occurred

as a result of the introduction of this evidence.

Defendant Kunitake has raised two issues: that he was

granted immunity from prosecution in exchange for his

grand jury testimony; and, that the district court improperly

limited the cross-examination of witness John Hamilton

concerning an extortionate demand allegedly made by Ciulla

in 1978. Reviewing the entire record as well as the parties’

briefs, we conclude that the district court's finding, that no

informal grant of immunity was given to Kunitake in ex-

change for his grand jury testimony, was not clearly er-

roneous. We, therefore, find Santobello v New York, 404

U.S. 257 (1971), inapplicable. Further, the fact that the

district court excluded the defendant's grand jury tes-

timony, based on a finding that the defendant possessed a

subjective belief that immunity had been granted, rendered

any error harmless.

In regard to the limit placed on the cross-examination of

witness John Hamilton during the course of defendant

Kunitake’s second trial, we find that the district court did

not abuse its discretion. Hamilton's testimony was a general

attack on the credibility of the government's key witness.

The evidence was offered only to show Ciulla’s willingness

to fabricate testimony. It was not a particular attack di-

rected toward revealing biases, prejudices or ulterior mo-

10b

tives of the government's witness as they relate to the

issues in this case. Davis v Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).

The district court properly excluded the extrinsic evidence

under Federal Rules of Evidence, 609%a) and (b). See Un-

ited States v Withers, 637 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1980).

Accordingly, the convictions of all three defendants are

hereby AFFIRMED.

AFFIRMED BY ORDER OF THE COURT.

(s) John P. Hehman, Clerk

ISSUED AS MANDATE ON CASE NOS. 80-1657 and

80-1684 ONLY

January 4, 1983

COSTS: NONE

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