Petitioners Reply Brief — Western Oil & Gas Association v. California

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Office -Supreme Court, US,

FILED ms

No. 82-1327 OCT 5 1983

ALEXANDE

IN THE —_—

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

WESTERN OIL AND GaAs ASSOCIATION, et al.,

Petitioners,

Ta

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONERS

WESTERN OIL & GAS ASSOCIATION,

ET AL.

HowarRD J. PRIVETT E. EDWARD BRUCE*

Donna R. BLACK Boppy R. BURCHFIELD

McCuTCHEN, BLACK, COVINGTON & BURLING

VERLEGER & SHEA 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

600 Wilshire Boulevard Post Office Box 7566

Los Angeles, CA 90017 Washington, DC 20044

(213) 624-2400 (202) 662-6000

Attorneys for Petitioners

*Counsel of Record

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. RESPONDENTS Have Not REBUTTED ANY OF THE

Essential ELEMENTS OF WOGA'S ARGUMENT ..

A. Congress In 1953 Settled The Controversy Be-

B. The “Clear Statement” Doctrine Is Applicable

ay bok. io cvkevacses.....

C. Neither Section 307(¢)(1) Nor Its Legislative

History Constitutes a Clear Statement of Con-

gress’ Intention To Provide the States with Au-

thority To Apply CZMA Programs To Sar

Leasing of Federal OCS Lands .........___

D. The 1976 CZMA Amendments and the 1978

OCSLA Amendments Do Not Reflect Con-

“ong Intention To Subject the Selection of

CS Tracts for Leasing to State CZMA Pro-

ERIE SS DOS Ne ae

II. RESPONDENTS’ RELIANCE Upox COMMENTARY By

CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES IN 1980 Wits RESPECT

To THE CZMA Does Not Support Tue DECISION

io. c es ccc ccecsececen,...

III. RESPONDENTS’ Pouicy ARGUMENTS Do Not Support

as. cys ces ec cecsceecsesss...,

A. The OCSLA Provides Sufficient Environmen-

tal Protection and Coastal State Co-Operative

ia patent

B. The CZMA Does Not Contemplate Premature

ae

C. The Pyramidic Structure of OCS Leasing Obvi-

ates the Need for Leasing Stage Consistency

Sa a a arnaanae,

IV. RESPONDENTS AMBIGUITY Cont ‘ERNING THE Iptica.

TIONS OF THEIR ConsTRUCTION OF SECTION 307) ¢)(1)

CONDEMNS THEIR PosiTION .....................

eed. sass cecceeccocelec..

to

ow

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page

Andrus v. Shell Oil Company, 446 U.S. 657 (1980)... 10

Bellv. New Jersey, ___ U.S. —_., 1038S. Ct. 2187(1983) = 11

California v. Kleppe, 604 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1979)... 3

California v. Watt, 712 F.2d 584(D.C., Cir. 1983), petition

fda a FS ee Oe errr 7

California v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1981)... 17

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Ine. v. Volpe, 401

Sime RRNEED, WoC i 05 c ok s Viccakaliee Weimaneas 20

Conservation Law Foundation v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712

Ce PEIN on Lok Raidoleh ce ceabwere vets viens 12

County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d

1369 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064

SN SS oc ch iaveiwe othe Nilo he Cactal tee malin het 12, 16

Freeman v. Summers, 52 L.D. 201 (1927) ........... 10

North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir.

SE PO bu Vos cob chcw awd nites Wes oe ide baa ee 12, 17

Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club, —-. U.S. ---, 41

Sy eae x Ue GFE Ay SOOO) co ex sc cciccyeerSvss 3

Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp, v. Shell Oil Company, 444

Creer ee CUNO? S 5a<a w Gk occ be cr baie te eh oR 11

STATUTES:

Clean Air Act,

SE EOE. Sch ce che cadceaseccdtbeveseueat 3

Coastal Zone Management Act,

§ 305(c)(8), 16 U.S.C. $ 1455 (¢)(8), Pub. L. No. 94-370,

Sy ee RTE ao ic vad eas ubicacesucyemeeceaae 5

§$ 307(cX 1), 16 U.S.C. 1466(e)(1) «0.6... eae passim

§ 307(cXS), 16 U.S.C. § 1456(eN8) .......... cece eee 56

§ 307(¢)(3)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1456(¢)(3)(B) ....... 4, 14, 15

Outer Continential Shelf Lands Act,

Be Sas Oe SS eS Sis ven epen seven tades 2

OD Ue U0 TUOMAS hive nsone we Suiuses Gnaecs 13

Table of Authorities Continued

Page

Oe Rie © UIC Ce accccnvedstnriaccveveenss 16

Oe Ue EN vcs vac avenas ce cdaae camweneue 16

OE Us. © BD ds cb No Wa Cen tacebes kankuaee 13

Se es IO cc inh Ce cckn che eepaveeuies 13

Sn Ge Sea Oe kkcb abaswdoreedbaceueete passim

OP Cen OREO wis Coad dy baxacgspeenbeuvesees 13

MUS SRR) vn cecascilersabenbevens 13

OG Oe Tes Ce UD) vida ce eas ceaececeedes 13

Submerged Lands Act,

Ren OO Rees OC. O00. vicntcccedien ce Ge bewuthens 2

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:

H. Rep. No. 950, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) ....... 17

H. Rep. No. 1012, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) ..... 10, 11

S. Rep. No. 783, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) ........ 12

Hearings on 8.9 Comm. on Energy and Natural Re-

sources, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) ............ i)

Hearings on H.R. 1614 Before the House Select Comm.

on the OCS, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) ........ 4

House Ad Hoc Commmttee on the OCS, 94th Cong., 2d

Sess., Effects of Offshore Oi! and Natural Gas Devel-

opment on the Coastal Zone (Comm. Print 1976) .

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

No, 82-1327

WESTERN OIL AND GAS ASSOCIATION, ef a/.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ef a/.,

Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONERS

WESTERN OIL & GAS ASSOCIATION,

ET AL.

I. RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT REBUTTED ANY OF THE

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF WOGA’S ARGUMENT.

Our opening brief set forth four basic propositions in

support of our argument that the selection of OCS tracts

for leasing is not a federal activity “directly affecting” the

coastal zone within the meaning of Section 307(c)(1) of the

Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1456(¢)(1)

(CZMA): (1) The “1953 Compromise” embodied in the

‘The brief which Western Oil & Gas Association, ef a/., filed as

petitioners in No. 82-1327 will hereafter be cited as “WOGA Br.” Our

brief as cross-respondent in No. 82-1511 will be cited as “WOGA

Resp. Br.” The briefs of respondents in Nos. 32-1326 & 82-1327,

State of California, Natural Resources Defense Council, ef a/., and

County of Humboldt, et a/., will be cited as “Cal. Br.,” “NRDC Br.,”

and “Local Gov. Br.,” respectively. The briefs of amici curiae Coas-

tal States Organization, ef a/., Alaska, and New Jersey will be cited

as “CSO Br.,” “Alaska Br.,” and “N.J. Br.,” respectively.

2

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 1331, ef

seq. (OCSLA), and the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.

1301, et seg., prescribed clear-cut lines of federal and

state authority over the leasing of OCS lands; (2) an

intention to depart from these clearly delineated lines

should not be assumed, absent a clear statement in sub-

sequent legislation; (3) Section 307(¢)(1) of the CZMA

contains no such clear statement either on its face or in its

legislative history; and (4) the amendments in 1976 to the

CZMA and in 1978 to the OCSLA evidence no con-

gressional intention to depart from the 1953 resolution of

state-federal control over OCS leasing decisions.

Neither respondents nor the amici curiae supporting

them have advanced anything to counter any of the fun-

damental underpinnings of WOGA’s argument.

A. Congress in 1953 Settled the Controversy Between the

State and Federal Governments Over Ownership of the

OCS,

Respondents argue that Congress retained the power,

following its adoption of the 1953 Compromise, to provide

the States with additional authority over OCS leasing.

(NRDC Br, 6), This, of course, contributes nothing to the

point at issue—did Congress subsequently exercise that

power when it adopted or amended the CZMA?

They also rebut an argument, which WOGA did not

make—"that the OCSLA is the sole vehicle” through

which authority over the OCS can be exercised (id. at

4)—by pointing to the application of general federal en-

vironmental statutes to the OCS. (Jd. at 8-9 n.7; see also

Cal. Br, 33 n.53; Local Gov. Br. 43). But obviously, Con-

gress’ inclusion of OCS-related activities within the ambit

of general federal environmental statutes has nothing to

3

do with the 1953 resolution of the state-federa! proprieta-

ry control issue.’

B, The “Clear Statement” Doctrine Is Applicable Here,

Respondents note that the clear statement doctrine has

sometimes been used out of “solicitude for legitimate

state concerns” and thus find “irony” in WOGA's reliance

upon it here. (NRDC Br. 7n.5), Notably, they do not (and

could not) explain this Court's application of the doctrine

in Rucklehaus v, Sierra Club, _w U.S. ——, 51

U.S.L.W, 5132 (July 1, 1983), on these grounds. Similar-

ly, they offer no principled argument why solicitude for

legitimate federal concerns, such as ownership and con-

trol over the OCS, should not be protected by the doe-

trine,

C, Neither Section 307(c)( 1) Nor Its Legislative History Con-

stitutes a Clear Statement of Congress’ Intention To Pro-

vide the States with Authority To Apply CZMA Programs

To Bar Leasing of Federal OCS Lands.

Far from arguing that Section 307(¢)(1) contains a clear

statement of congressional intention to extend con-

sistency review to the selection of OCS tracts for leasing,

respondents state that the meaning of the term “directly

affecting” is unclear, (Cal, Br, 21; NRDC Br, 19-20; CSO

Br. 6). Moreover, instead of adopting a “plain meaning”

approach to Section 307(c)(1), respondents concede that a

‘The Local Governments refer to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C,

§ 7401, as supposedly typifying the approach embodied there and in

the CZMA of permitting States to have a significant role in address-

ing environmental or resource issues, (Local Gov. Br, 16). They fail

to mention, however, that the the Clean Air Act (loes not apply to the

federal OCS, in the light of the Secretary of the Interior's “compre-

hensive” responsibilities under the OCSLA. California vy. Kleppe,

604 F.2d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir, 1979),

4

“liberal,” “expansive,” or “broad” definition of the term is

needed to support their position, (Cal. Br, 9 & n.12, 47),

Further reflecting their concession that the statute on its

face does not support them, respondents offer a variety of

formulations for the “directly affecting” test of that sec-

tion, none of which ascribes any meaning to the term

“directly.” (See, e.g., Local Gov, Br, 26-27; NRDC Br,

2-3, 21-22; N.J. Br. 11-12).

Respondents attempt to obscure the lack of support for

their position in the language of Section 307(c)(1) by citing

other portions of the CZMA or its legislative history

which refer in general terms to OCS activities. (Cal. Br.

19 n.31, 29-30 n.48; NRDC Br. 13 n. 12, 36-37), However,

as amici CSO admits, the issue in this case is “when” not

“whether” the CZMA applies to an OCS project. (CSO

Br. 5).' Plainly, Congress was concerned that those

stages of OCS projects having actual effects on state

coastal zones be subjected to CZMA consistency review,

and it accordingly delineated in Section 307(¢)(3)(B) the

way in which state programs apply to OCS exploration

and development production, when such impacts normal-

ly first arise. This action does not support the application

of Section 307(c)(1) to the earlier OCS leasing stage when,

as here, it gives rise to no such impacts.’

Instead of finding a clear statement in the statute to

support them, respondents ask the Court to infer, from

‘CSO's admission refutes California's charge that Interior's con-

struction of Section 307(c)(1) permits OCS projects “completely (to)

escape compliance with the CZMA .. .” (Cal. Br, 23), as well as

NRDC's argument that WOGA believes the OCSLA “completely

subsumed” the CZMA (NRDC Br, 10).

‘ Similarly, those provisions of the CZMA requiring States to make

adequate provision for the national interest associated with coustal

zone related energy facilities pertain to state authority under Section

307(¢)(3)(B) to regulate the exploration and development production

(Footnote continued)

o

what they assert are the purposes of the C ZMA, Con-

gress’ intention to apply Section 307(c)(1) to OCS leasing.

Thus, California states that “effectuating the purpose of

(the CZMA\ is critical to [its] interpretation” (Cal. Br. 8),

while NRDC describes as the first of the “best sources of

the interpretation of [Section 307(c)(1)]" not its language,

but rather “the purposes and policies behind the

(CZMA])” (NRDC Br. 2; see a/so CSO Br. 7). While these

policy arguments are themselves misconceived, see pp.

12-17, infra, the important point here is that reliance

upon such a policy-based approach to the statute, in and of

itself, concedes that the CZMA on its face contains no

clear statement to support respondents.

Finally, respondents have identified no clear statement

in the contemporaneous legislative history of Section

307(¢)(1) to support them.’ Instead, they rely upon a

passage from a 1971 Senate Report, which stated that

waters under federal jurisdiction having a “functional

interrelationship” with waters in the coastal zone should

be administered consistently with state CZMA pro-

grams. (See, ¢.g., Cal. Br. 12). However, since the ver-

sion of Section 307(c)(1) that was then before the Senate

Committee was specifically limited to federal activities

stages of an OCS project. (See, ¢.g.. CSO Br. 9; Local Gov. Br. 9).

That these provisions of the Act do not support respondents’ con-

struction of Section 307(c)(1) is revealed by the fact that they were

not made a part of the CZMA in 1972 when that section was enacted,

but instead were added to the statute in 1976 when Congress mod-

ified Section 307(c\(3) to specify the application of the statute to the

later stages of OCS projects. See, ¢.g., Section 305(c8), 16 U.S.C.

1454(¢8), which was added to the CZMA by Pub. L. No. 94-370, July

26, 1976.

‘CSO admits that the “legislative history does not explain why

Congress” substituted “directly affecting” for “in” the coastal zone.

(CSO Br. 6-7).

6

“in the coastal zone,” it is obvious that the Committee

could not have contemplated that Section 307(¢c)(1) would

extend to OCS activities on federal waters.

D. The 1976 CZMA Amendments and the 1978 OCSLA

Amendments Do Not Reflect Congress’ Intention To Sub-

ject the Selection of OCS Tracts for Leasing to State

CZMA Programs.

Respondents argue that Congress’ determination in

1976 not to amend Section 307(¢)(3) to include the term

“lease” is consistent with the belief that Section 307(¢)(1)

already applied to the selection of OCS tracts for leasing.

(NRDC Br. 32; CSO Br. 27). Respondents, however, fail

to cite the remarks of a single member of Congress to

support this hypothesis. To the contrary, the Senate

Committee, which first proposed to add the term “lease”

to Section 307(c)(3), stated that this amendment would

require the Secretary of the Interior to consult with

governors before issuing leases. (WOGA Br. 40-41).”

Instead of rejecting the proposed amendment to Sec-

tion 307(c)(3) as being redundant in the manner now

suggested by respondents, the requirement of con-

sistency review at the leasing stage ofan OCS project was

debated and rejected on the merits. (WOGA Br. 41-42).

Had Congress believed that the selection of OCS tracts

for leasing was already subject to Section 307(¢)(1) con-

sistency review, surely at least one member would have

" California quotes the 1975 Senate report for the proposition that

“full implementation” of the CZMA would include applying the con-

sistency provisions of the Act to “the decision to lease large tracts of

the OCS. . .” (Cal. Br. 27). However, the proposal to add the term

“lease” to Section 307(c)\(3) to achieve this result was ultimately

rejected. The same observation vitiates NRDC’s reliance upon the

1976 House Report. (NRDC Br. 31-32).

mentioned this fact during consideration of the 1976

CZMA amendments.

Similarly, nothing in the 1978 amendments to the

OCSLA evidences Congress’ intention to permit States

to apply their CZMA programs to the selection of OCS

tracts for leasing. To the contrary, as we have previously

argued (WOGA Br. 24-27), Congress prescribed in Sec-

tion 19 of that Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1345, quite different

arrangements for state input into this decision.

Respondents make much of a footnote in a 1977 House

Report, which recognized that “lease sales ... must

comply with ‘consistency requirements’ ” under the

CZMA. (See, e.g., NRDC Br. 39).’ However, as we previ-

ously explained (WOGA Br. 26 n. 19), this fragment from

the massive legislative history underlying the 1978

amendments can be explained as a recognition that, on

occasion, certain limited aspects of the leasing stage of an

OCS project may give rise to direct coastal zone impacts

which create consistency issues under Section 307(c¢)("),

Permitting States to require CZMA consistency for those

unusual cases involving such leasing-stage impacts does

not constitute the basis for permitting them to use their

programs routinely to challenge the Secretary's selection

*NRDC also relies upon committee prints to support its argument

that Section 307(c)(1) applies to OCS leasing. (NRDC Br. 38). These

prints do not even purport to communicate the intention of members

of Congress. Moreover, they represent such a misunderstanding of

the application of the CZMA to the OCS process that they are

entitled to no consideration whatsoever. For example, the 1976 com-

mittee print of the House Ad Hoc Committee on the OCS, 94th

Cong., 2d Sess., Effects of Offshore Oil and Natural Gas Develop-

ment on the Coastal Zone erroneously reports that “the Secretary of

the Interior can withhold approval of a State's Coastal Zone Manage-

ment Plan if the plan interferes with the ‘national interest’ of the

nation.” (/d. at 228-29).

8

of OCS tracts for leasing." Exercise of the former author-

ity is consistent with Section 19 of the OCSLA, since it

merely gives States a voice in the design of some limited

aspects of an OCS project; the latter authority, on the

other hand, puts them in a position to supercede Section

19 and challenge the Secretary's basic proprietary deci-

sion to engage in leasing itself.’

Moreover, it is clear that state representatives who

testified during the consideration of the 1978 amend-

ments to the OCSLA did not then view the CZMA as

granting States authority with respect to the selection of

OCS tracts for leasing. Thus, a California witness testi-

fied that the State would not have “any voice in major

petroleum production off [its] coast with all of their atten-

dant offshore problems until major changes are made in

*WOGA's and the federal defendants’ recognition that Section

307(¢)(1) does apply at the leasing stage to deal with any direct effects

on the coastal zone which might occur then answers respondents’

arguments that we are seeking an implied exemption fromthe CZMA

for OCS projects. (Cal. Br. 24-25). In this case, no leasing-stage

impacts were identified by the lower courts.

*The substantial difference between applying Section 307(c¢)(1) to

deal with occasional leasing-stage impacts and routinely applying it

to challenge the Secretary's selection of OCS tracts refutes CSO’s

argument that our “concession” as to the application of Section

307(c)(1) at the leasing stage contradicts our reliance upon the 1953

Compromise of federal-state proprietary interests in the OCS. (CSO

Br. 27 n.18). Moreover, this distinction answers the argument

(NRDC Br. 32; CSO Br. 29) that we inconsistently rely on the 1976

CZMA legislative history not to extend the Act generally to “leases,”

while conceding that it can apply to leasing-stage impacts. CZMA

review of “leases” would have allowed review of the Secretary's

selection of OCS tracts; such review of isolated leasing-stage impacts

rarely, if ever, would lead to review of tract selection.

9

Federal law.” On this basis, California urged the adop-

tion of Section 19 of the OCSLA to fill a gap which it

perceived in existing federal law:

“It is for situations like these—where there is a

clearly identifiable state interest—that we see the

need for a process which would allow the governor to

negatively nominate tracts and have that decision

accepted by the Interior Secretary unless he makes

specific national interest findings to justify a contra-

ry conclusion.”

California’s recognition that existing law—i.e., the

CZMA—did not provide the States with adequate input

into the decisional process for the selection of OCS tracts

was echoed by Alaska and Massachusetts, two of the

other States that now seek as amici to convince the Court

that Section 307(c)(1) of the CZMA, enacted in 1972, gives

them greater authority than Section 19 of the OCSLA.™

Hearings on 8.9 Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natu-

ral Resources, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 575 (1977) (Statement of Bill

Press, Director, California Governor's Office of Planning and Re-

search),

‘Id. at 584. In criticizing the adequacy of existing federal law,

California, of course, was fully aware of the application of the CZMA

to OCS development activities. For on the very same page of the

testimony urging passage of Section 19, California's witness recog-

nized the application of the CZMA to the later stages of an OCS

project. Jd.

** See id. at 514 (Statement of Robert LaResche, Alaska’s Commis-

sioner of Natural Resources); Hearings on H.R. 1614 Before the

House Ad Hoc Select Comm. on the OCS, 95th Cong., lst Sess.

671-72 (1977) (Statement of Evelyn F. Murphy, Massachusetts’ Sec-

retary of Environmental Affairs).

10

Il. RESPONDENTS’ RELIANCE UPON COMMENTARY

BY CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES IN 1980 WITH

RESPECT TO THE CZMA DOES NOT SUPPORT THE

DECISION BELOW,

In our opening brief, we discussed the skepticism with

which a court should proceed in reviewing post-hoc

legislative materials. (See also CSO Br. 13 n.7 (“recogniz-

ing] the hazards of relying on subsequent legislative

history”)). The very cases upon which respondents rely in

urging this Court to give decisive weight to the 1980

committee commentary on Section 307(c)(1) undermine

their position.

In Andrus v. Shel! Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657 (1980), this

Court construed a 1920 statute by, inter alia, examining

1931 Senate hearings:

“The 1931 Senate hearings were called specifically

to review the Freeman [v. Summers, 52 L.D. 201

(1927)] case for fear that another ‘Teapot Dome’ scan-

dal was brewing. Rarely has an administrative law

decision received such exhaustive congressional

scrutiny. And following that scrutiny, no action was

taken to disburb the settled administrative practice;

rather Senator Nye advised the Interior Depart-

ment to continue patenting oil shale claims.” /d. at

673 n.12.

Here, far from endorsing prior administrative con-

struction of the CZMA, the 1980 House Report stated

that it was “disappointed” there had been no administra-

tive resolution of the Section 307(¢)(1) “directly affecting”

issue as it applies to OCS leasing. H. Rep. No. 1012, 96th

Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1980). It went on to note that

_ “In light of the initiative to issue regulations defin-

ing the term ‘directly affecting,’ the committee be-

1]

lieves it is premature to amend section 307 to redress

the problem which has emerged.” /d."’

Finally, the 1980 committee reports, which NRDC con-

cedes are “hardly . . . model[s] of clarity” (NRDC Br. 34

n.36), do not unequivocally state that Section 307(¢)(1)

should be applied to OCS tract selection. The House

Committee merely stated that the section should

“apply whenever a Federal activity ha[s] a functional

interrelationship from an economic, geographic, or

social standpoint with a State coastal rogram’s land

or water use policies. ... Thus, when a Federal

agency initiates a series of events of coastal manage-

ment consequences, the intergovernmental

coordination of the Federal consistency require-

ments should apply.” H. Rep. No. 1012 at 34.

The first justification offered by the House Committee for

this approach was that, inter alia,

“it allows Federal agencies to avoid the irretreivable

commitment of resources for Federal activities likely

to lead to results inconsistent with the requirements

of approved state programs.” Jd.

However, courts adjudicating leasing stage OCS cases

have consistently held that, in the light of Interior’s au-

thority to regulate the later stages of an OCS project, the

‘The other cases relied upon by respondents are inapposite. In

Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. vy. Shell Oil Company, 444 U.S. 572

(1980), the court justified its reliance on post-enactment legislative

history by reasoning that Congress had rejected a proposed amend-

ment on the very ground that it was unnecessary in the light of prior

administrative interpretation. In Bell v. New Jersey, —_ U.S. ,

103 S. Ct. 2187, 2192-94 (1983), the court relied on 1978 amendments

to assess the scope of a 1970 statute because the amendments were

necessarily premised upon the adoption of a particular interpretation

of the 1970 Act.

12

lease sale itself is not an “irretrievable” or “irreversible”

commitment of resources."

The 1980 Senate Report stated only that

“the Department of the Interior’s activities which

preceded lease sales were to remain subject to the

requirements of Section 307(¢)(1). As a result, in-

tergovernmental coordination for purposes of OCS

development commences at the earliest practicable

time in the opinion of the Committee, as the Depart-

ment of the Interior sets in motion a series of events

which have consequences in the coastal zone.” S.

Rep. No. 783, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980).

Neither the federal nor WOGA petitioners dispute that

Section 307(c)(1) applies to the so-called pre-leasing acti-

vities of the Department of the Interior: it does require

consistency determinations for those aspects, if any, of

the OCS leasing stage which “directly” affect the coastal

zone. (See pp. 7-8, supra; WOGA Br. 26 n.19). But the

selection of OCS tracts for leasing does not “directly”

affect the coastal zone simply because later exploration

and development production activities might do so.

II]. RESPONDENTS’ POLICY ARGUMENTS DO NOT

SUPPORT THEM.

A. The OCSLA Provides Sufficient Environmental

Protection and Coastal State Co-Operative Mechan-

isms.

Respondents contend that a “liberal” construction of

the CZMA is necessary to permit rational coastal plan-

ning and protection. This argument is ultimately pre-

4 County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 32 F.2d 136,

1390 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978): Conservation

Law Foundation vy. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712, 714-15 (ist Cir. 1979»;

North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 3589, 607-09 (D.C. Cir.

1980).

13

mised on the assertion that the CZMA and the OCSLA

serve “vastly different” national purposes—the CZMA

protecting the environment and the OCSLA “focus[ing]

upon the development of the mineral resources of the

OCS.” (NRDC Br. 10: see a/so Local Gov. Br. 21-22. 41).

On this basis, they contend that, if OCS leasing is not

constrained by the CZMA, it will proceed without ade-

quate environmental safeguards or coastal state planning

mechanisms.

However, as even California recognizes, the OCSLA

' does not focus solely upon expeditious resource develop-

ment, but “also makes clear Congressional intent to pro-

tect the environment.” (Cal. Br. 41 n.70; see also CSO Br.

24). Thus, the Act’s purposes repeatedly refer to protec-

tion of the environment,” and it is embedded with provi-

sions requiring the most careful attention to environmen-

tal concerns."

Indeed, the very policy which respondents claim can be

furthered only by their construction of the CZMA—the

participation of State and local governments in the plan-

ning stages of an OCS project—is specifically recited in

the OCSLA and specifically implemented for every stage

of an OCS project, including leasing. (See WOGA Br.

22-23).""

3 See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 1802(2), (3), (7).

* See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. $$ 1334(ay2W A), 1344(an2) & (3), 1346, &

1351(h\ 1D).

" Respondents seek to distinguish the scope of Section 19 of the

OCSLA from that of Section 307(¢\1) of the CZMA by arguing that

the former permits “any coastal states that would be affected” by

leasing to make recommendations and that the latter provides au-

thority only to States that have approved CZMA programs. (NRDC

Br. 12; see also CSO Br. 24-25 & n.17). However, respondents’ and

the lower courts’ conception of the “direct” effects of leasing is so

broad that virtually any coastal state that would have Section 19

(Footnote continued)

l4

B. The CZMA Does Not Contemplate Premature Review

Of Impacts.

Respondents’ contend that denying them the opportun-

ity to apply CZMA programs at the leasing stage results

in a “piecemeal” approach and prevents them from

reviewing an OCS project “as a whole.” (Local Gov. Br.

28-29; NRDC Br. 45-46). But this argument begs the

question that is before the Court—whether Congress

intended for States to have general authority under Sec-

tion 307(c)(1) to review OCS projects as a whole or

whether, instead, it intenced that state CZMA programs

be applied to assess specific coastal zone effects at the

time they are anticipated.”

A construction of Section 307(c¢)(1) as applying only to

leasing-stage impacts, rather than allowing a broad over-

view of all impacts which might occur at later stages, is

authority could also invoke its CZMA program at the leasing stage.

Moreover, 28 states or territories. including virtually every one

affected by OCS activities, have approved CZMA programs. (CSO

Br. 3).

“The Local Governments unwittingly undermine their own posi-

tion by relying upon the opinion of the Department of Justice con-

cerning application of Section 307(¢\(1) to OCS preleasing activities.

As the Department stated:

“It is well possible that some of the preleasing activities of the

Secretary of the Interior will give rise to consistency problems

which cannot be reviewed at all under the paragraph B proce-

dure (307(¢3B)), or for which such review comes too late.”

(Local Gov. Br. 30).

We have conceded the application of Section 307(¢)1) to leasing-

stage impacts, if any, associated with an OCS project. The issue in

this case is whether that section also permits leasing-stage review of

exploration and production development stage impacts that are later

reviewable under Section 307(c¢3)B).

Certainly, the insistence that Section 307(c)1) review be utilized

to prescribe stipulations for leases (/d. at 33-34; CSO Br. 17) cannot

(Footnote continued)

15

strongly supported by Section 307(¢)(3)(B) of the CZMA.

That section provides that

“any person who submits to the Secretary of the

Interior any plan for the exploration or development

of, or production from, any area which has been

leased under the [OCSLA]. . . shall, with respect to

any exploration, development, or production de-

scribed in such plan and affecting any land use or

water use in the coastal zone of such state, attach to

such plan a certification that each activity which is

described in detail in such plan complies with such

State's approved management program... .*

Thus, States clearly are not permitted at exploration to

speculate about the later impacts upon the coastal zone

that may arise at the development production stage.

Whether this is called “piecemeal” review or is character-

ized as preventing States from prematurely applying

their CZMA programs to deal with coastal zone impacts

that are only hypothetical and speculative at early stages

ofan OCS project, it was clearly the intention of C ongress

that CZMA review relate to specific impacts at the stage

when they might arise, not a project in general and all its

potential effects.’

justify invocation of CZMA programs to challenge the selection of

OCS tracts for leasing. Moreover, respondents offer no examples of

the type of issue that must be addressed through lease stipulation, as

opposed to later conditioning of exploration or development

production permits following Section 307(¢(3)(B) CZMA review.

* Respondents’ assertion of the need to have a broad overview of

OCS projects through the CZMA prior to exploration and

development production ignores the fact that they have the right to

exercise this type of broad scrutiny under Section 19 of the OCSLA.

prior to the Secretary's selection of OCS tracts for leasing.

16

C. The Pyramidic Structure of OCS Leasing Obviates the

Need for Leasing Stage Consistency Review.

Respondents claim that the definition of the term

“lease” within the OCSLA guarantees OCS lessees the

right to proceed with later stages of the project, so that

CZMA review at the later stages is “too late” to be

effective. (Cal. Br. 36-37). This argument ignores Section

8(b)(4) of the OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(4), which

states that a lessee’s rights are “conditioned upon. . . the

approval of the development and production plan re-

quired by this Act,” as well as Section 11(c), 43 U.S.C.

§ 1340(c), which requires Secretarial approval prior to

exploration.

The degree to which respondents distort the OCS

statutory scheme is perhaps best revealed by their con-

tention that “due to the pyramidic structure of OCS leas-

ing, basic decisions by DOI at the lease sale stage, such as

choice of lease stipulations and tract selection, cannot

easily be undone at later stages.” (NRDC Br. 49). How-

ever, as the D.C. Circuit recently reiterated:

“the [OCS] .. . process is ‘pyramidic in structure,

proceeding from broad-based planning to an increas-

ingly narrower focus as actual development grows

more imminent.’ Additional study and consideration

” A related misconception is that the Department of the Interior

determines or influences, at the leasing stage, whether oil will be

pipelined or shipped by tanker, the flow of vessel traffic, the siting of

onshore construction, and other related matters. (Cal. Br. 36-37).

The pyramidic structure of OCS decision-making, however, post-

pones determination of those matters until later stages. As the court

held in County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d at

1379, the specification of pipeline routes, destination refineries, and

other similar matters requires “endless hypothesis as to remote

possibilities” which not even NEPA requires at the leasing stage of

an OCS project.

7

is required before each succeeding step is taken.”

California v. Watt, 712 F.2d 584, 588 (D.C. Cir.

(1983), petition for rehearing pending.”

The very point of such a pyramidic structure, as stres-

sed by the framers of the OCSLA, is to provide a mechan-

ism for continuous “review and evaluation of, and decision

on” an OCS project after leasing has occured and thus to

avoid “extensive litigation prior to lease sales, when

onshore and environmental impacts of production activity

are not yet known.” WOGA Br. 30, citing H. Rep. No.

950, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 164 (1977). Respondents’ in-

sistence that their CZMA programs be applied at the

leasing stage of an OCS project to govern tract selection

on the basis of speculation about coastal zone impacts that

cannot occur until much later is flatly inconsistent with

the policies adopted by Congress in enacting the OCSLA.

IV. RESPONDENTS’ AMBIGUITY CONCERNING THE

IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR CONSTRUCTION OF

SECTION 307(c)1) CONDEMNS THEIR POSITION.

Although California’s complaint boldly proclaimed that

it has the last word in determining consistency issues

(WOGA Resp. Br. 5-6), California now states that it

would have no CZMA veto authority and that, if there is

disagreement as to a consistency issue, the federal agen-

cy can proceed. (Cal. Br. 44-45). California, however,

carefully hedges this position by preserving its right to

sue (id. at 44 n.75) and asserting that courts should pay

“substantial deference” to a State’s construction of its

CZMA program. (Jd. at 43 n.73).

2 See also North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 593-94

(D.C. Cir. 1980); California v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290, 1297 (D.C. Cir.

1981).

18

The Local Governments have a more expansive view of

state authority. They claim that the States and indeed the

localities themselves “make the basic decisions” with re-

spect to balancing competing demands on the coastal zone

caused by OCS projects. (Local Gov. Br. 10). They assert

that federal agencies should give “substantial deference”

to their interpretation of CZMA programs and obviously

would invoke federal litigation to ensure this deference.

The CSO approaches the matter from still a different

perspective. It argues that the balancing of energy and

environmental issues raised by OCS leasing has already

been accomplished by virtue of the Department of Com-

merce’s approval of State CZMA programs. (CSO Br.

25-26). CSO apparently assumes that courts could ex-

amine a State CZMA program de novo to discern that

balance.

Thus, rather than presenting a consistent or coherent

view as to how CZMA programs would actually be ap-

plied at the leasing stage of OCS projects, respondents

and amici simply rely on litigation in the federal courts to

resolve the issue. At no point, however, do they suggest

how a court is to choose between conflicting federal and

state views of the general requirements of a CZMA pro-

gram, nor do they identify any provisions of the CZMA or

OCSLA that a court could consult in undertaking this

task. Moreover, respondents seek to perpetuate the

uncertainty and confusion that would be created by the

adoption of their construction of Section 307(c)(1) by

attacking in their cross-petition the Ninth Circuit’s

efforts to introduce some measure of clarification via its

= While respondents assert that the “spectre of hypothetical state

abuse of § 307(c)(1) consistency requirements is completely unfound-

ed” (Cal. Br. 45-46), they do not deny that following the lower courts’

decisions in this case, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Mary-

(Footnote continued)

19

construction of the “maximum extent practicable” provi-

sion of the statute.

Ultimately, therefore, respondents’ view of Section

307(c)(1) is that Congress gave States some undefined

measure of authority over the disposition of federal OCS

lands, without providing any guidance to the courts as to

how CZMA consistency issues are to be resolved and

without providing any alternative means for resolving

such disputes. As we have submitted, it is simply in-

conceivable that Congress intended to plunge the

proprietary aspects of OCS leasing into such a “morass.”

(WOGA Br. 45; WOGA Resp. Br. 37-38).

States can have their CZMA programs considered at

the leasing stage of an OCS project without creating the

confusion implicit in respondents’ view of the CZMA. As

we have previously pointed out (WOGA Br. 26-27), under

Section 19 of the OCSLA the Secretary of the Interior is

obliged to consider any provisions of state CZMA pro-

grams brought to his attention by a governor's recom-

mendations and, indeed, he is directed to accept those

recommendations if they result in an appropriate balance

between national and state interests. Moreover, Con-

gress has specifically provided a judicial remedy should

the Secretary inadequately consider a governor's recom-

mendations in the Section 19 OCSLA process.*

By declaring that the selection of OCS tracts for leasing

does not “directly affect” a State’s coastal zone under

land, Virginia, North Carolina, California, and several Alaska local

governments have instituted Section 307(c)(1) actions to complain of

various aspects of OCS lease sales. (See WOGA Br. 20 n.14; WOGA

Petn. 9 n.10).

*The “arbitrary or capricious” standard of review specified by

Section 1%d), 43 U.S.C. § 1345(d), plainly requires the Secretary to

(Footnote continued)

20

Section 307(¢)(1), but that CZMA programs must be con-

sidered in the Section 19 process when invoked by gov-

ernors, this Court would harmonize the CZMA and

OCSLA, serve what respondents assert is the CZMA

policy interest of ensuring early consideration of state

programs, and channel disputes into a congressionally

prescribed judicial review mechanism.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit's decision that the selection of OCS

tracts for leasing is a federal activity “directly affecting” a

state’s coastal zone should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

HowarRD J. PRIVETT E. EDWARD BRUCE

Donna R. BLACK Bossy R. BURCHFIELD

McCCUTCHEN, BLACK, COVINGTON & BURLING

VERLEGER & SHEA 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

600 Wilshire Boulevard P.O. Box 7566

Los Angeles, CA 90017 Washington, DC 20044

Attorneys for Petitioners

consider all relevant matters brought to his attention by the State in

the Section 19 process. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.

Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971).

Alaska notes that Interior's promulgation, under protest pending

this litigation, of consistency determinations led to the imposition of

stipulations for several OCS lease sales off Alaska which persuaded

the State not to pursue leasing-stage litigation. (Alaska Br. 9-11).

Alaska fails to note, however, that Interior considered Alaska’s

views as to these stipulations under both Section 19 of the OCSLA

and the CZMA.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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