Petitioners Reply Brief — Western Oil & Gas Association v. California
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Office -Supreme Court, US,
FILED ms
No. 82-1327 OCT 5 1983
ALEXANDE
IN THE —_—
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1983
WESTERN OIL AND GaAs ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Petitioners,
Ta
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,
Respondents.
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONERS
WESTERN OIL & GAS ASSOCIATION,
ET AL.
HowarRD J. PRIVETT E. EDWARD BRUCE*
Donna R. BLACK Boppy R. BURCHFIELD
McCuTCHEN, BLACK, COVINGTON & BURLING
VERLEGER & SHEA 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
600 Wilshire Boulevard Post Office Box 7566
Los Angeles, CA 90017 Washington, DC 20044
(213) 624-2400 (202) 662-6000
Attorneys for Petitioners
*Counsel of Record
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. RESPONDENTS Have Not REBUTTED ANY OF THE
Essential ELEMENTS OF WOGA'S ARGUMENT ..
A. Congress In 1953 Settled The Controversy Be-
B. The “Clear Statement” Doctrine Is Applicable
ay bok. io cvkevacses.....
C. Neither Section 307(¢)(1) Nor Its Legislative
History Constitutes a Clear Statement of Con-
gress’ Intention To Provide the States with Au-
thority To Apply CZMA Programs To Sar
Leasing of Federal OCS Lands .........___
D. The 1976 CZMA Amendments and the 1978
OCSLA Amendments Do Not Reflect Con-
“ong Intention To Subject the Selection of
CS Tracts for Leasing to State CZMA Pro-
ERIE SS DOS Ne ae
II. RESPONDENTS’ RELIANCE Upox COMMENTARY By
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES IN 1980 Wits RESPECT
To THE CZMA Does Not Support Tue DECISION
io. c es ccc ccecsececen,...
III. RESPONDENTS’ Pouicy ARGUMENTS Do Not Support
as. cys ces ec cecsceecsesss...,
A. The OCSLA Provides Sufficient Environmen-
tal Protection and Coastal State Co-Operative
ia patent
B. The CZMA Does Not Contemplate Premature
ae
C. The Pyramidic Structure of OCS Leasing Obvi-
ates the Need for Leasing Stage Consistency
Sa a a arnaanae,
IV. RESPONDENTS AMBIGUITY Cont ‘ERNING THE Iptica.
TIONS OF THEIR ConsTRUCTION OF SECTION 307) ¢)(1)
CONDEMNS THEIR PosiTION .....................
eed. sass cecceeccocelec..
to
ow
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: Page
Andrus v. Shell Oil Company, 446 U.S. 657 (1980)... 10
Bellv. New Jersey, ___ U.S. —_., 1038S. Ct. 2187(1983) = 11
California v. Kleppe, 604 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1979)... 3
California v. Watt, 712 F.2d 584(D.C., Cir. 1983), petition
fda a FS ee Oe errr 7
California v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1981)... 17
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Ine. v. Volpe, 401
Sime RRNEED, WoC i 05 c ok s Viccakaliee Weimaneas 20
Conservation Law Foundation v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712
Ce PEIN on Lok Raidoleh ce ceabwere vets viens 12
County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d
1369 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064
SN SS oc ch iaveiwe othe Nilo he Cactal tee malin het 12, 16
Freeman v. Summers, 52 L.D. 201 (1927) ........... 10
North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir.
SE PO bu Vos cob chcw awd nites Wes oe ide baa ee 12, 17
Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club, —-. U.S. ---, 41
Sy eae x Ue GFE Ay SOOO) co ex sc cciccyeerSvss 3
Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp, v. Shell Oil Company, 444
Creer ee CUNO? S 5a<a w Gk occ be cr baie te eh oR 11
STATUTES:
Clean Air Act,
SE EOE. Sch ce che cadceaseccdtbeveseueat 3
Coastal Zone Management Act,
§ 305(c)(8), 16 U.S.C. $ 1455 (¢)(8), Pub. L. No. 94-370,
Sy ee RTE ao ic vad eas ubicacesucyemeeceaae 5
§$ 307(cX 1), 16 U.S.C. 1466(e)(1) «0.6... eae passim
§ 307(cXS), 16 U.S.C. § 1456(eN8) .......... cece eee 56
§ 307(¢)(3)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1456(¢)(3)(B) ....... 4, 14, 15
Outer Continential Shelf Lands Act,
Be Sas Oe SS eS Sis ven epen seven tades 2
OD Ue U0 TUOMAS hive nsone we Suiuses Gnaecs 13
Table of Authorities Continued
Page
Oe Rie © UIC Ce accccnvedstnriaccveveenss 16
Oe Ue EN vcs vac avenas ce cdaae camweneue 16
OE Us. © BD ds cb No Wa Cen tacebes kankuaee 13
Se es IO cc inh Ce cckn che eepaveeuies 13
Sn Ge Sea Oe kkcb abaswdoreedbaceueete passim
OP Cen OREO wis Coad dy baxacgspeenbeuvesees 13
MUS SRR) vn cecascilersabenbevens 13
OG Oe Tes Ce UD) vida ce eas ceaececeedes 13
Submerged Lands Act,
Ren OO Rees OC. O00. vicntcccedien ce Ge bewuthens 2
LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:
H. Rep. No. 950, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) ....... 17
H. Rep. No. 1012, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) ..... 10, 11
S. Rep. No. 783, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) ........ 12
Hearings on 8.9 Comm. on Energy and Natural Re-
sources, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) ............ i)
Hearings on H.R. 1614 Before the House Select Comm.
on the OCS, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) ........ 4
House Ad Hoc Commmttee on the OCS, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., Effects of Offshore Oi! and Natural Gas Devel-
opment on the Coastal Zone (Comm. Print 1976) .
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1983
No, 82-1327
WESTERN OIL AND GAS ASSOCIATION, ef a/.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ef a/.,
Respondents.
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONERS
WESTERN OIL & GAS ASSOCIATION,
ET AL.
I. RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT REBUTTED ANY OF THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF WOGA’S ARGUMENT.
Our opening brief set forth four basic propositions in
support of our argument that the selection of OCS tracts
for leasing is not a federal activity “directly affecting” the
coastal zone within the meaning of Section 307(c)(1) of the
Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1456(¢)(1)
(CZMA): (1) The “1953 Compromise” embodied in the
‘The brief which Western Oil & Gas Association, ef a/., filed as
petitioners in No. 82-1327 will hereafter be cited as “WOGA Br.” Our
brief as cross-respondent in No. 82-1511 will be cited as “WOGA
Resp. Br.” The briefs of respondents in Nos. 32-1326 & 82-1327,
State of California, Natural Resources Defense Council, ef a/., and
County of Humboldt, et a/., will be cited as “Cal. Br.,” “NRDC Br.,”
and “Local Gov. Br.,” respectively. The briefs of amici curiae Coas-
tal States Organization, ef a/., Alaska, and New Jersey will be cited
as “CSO Br.,” “Alaska Br.,” and “N.J. Br.,” respectively.
2
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 1331, ef
seq. (OCSLA), and the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.
1301, et seg., prescribed clear-cut lines of federal and
state authority over the leasing of OCS lands; (2) an
intention to depart from these clearly delineated lines
should not be assumed, absent a clear statement in sub-
sequent legislation; (3) Section 307(¢)(1) of the CZMA
contains no such clear statement either on its face or in its
legislative history; and (4) the amendments in 1976 to the
CZMA and in 1978 to the OCSLA evidence no con-
gressional intention to depart from the 1953 resolution of
state-federal control over OCS leasing decisions.
Neither respondents nor the amici curiae supporting
them have advanced anything to counter any of the fun-
damental underpinnings of WOGA’s argument.
A. Congress in 1953 Settled the Controversy Between the
State and Federal Governments Over Ownership of the
OCS,
Respondents argue that Congress retained the power,
following its adoption of the 1953 Compromise, to provide
the States with additional authority over OCS leasing.
(NRDC Br, 6), This, of course, contributes nothing to the
point at issue—did Congress subsequently exercise that
power when it adopted or amended the CZMA?
They also rebut an argument, which WOGA did not
make—"that the OCSLA is the sole vehicle” through
which authority over the OCS can be exercised (id. at
4)—by pointing to the application of general federal en-
vironmental statutes to the OCS. (Jd. at 8-9 n.7; see also
Cal. Br, 33 n.53; Local Gov. Br. 43). But obviously, Con-
gress’ inclusion of OCS-related activities within the ambit
of general federal environmental statutes has nothing to
3
do with the 1953 resolution of the state-federa! proprieta-
ry control issue.’
B, The “Clear Statement” Doctrine Is Applicable Here,
Respondents note that the clear statement doctrine has
sometimes been used out of “solicitude for legitimate
state concerns” and thus find “irony” in WOGA's reliance
upon it here. (NRDC Br. 7n.5), Notably, they do not (and
could not) explain this Court's application of the doctrine
in Rucklehaus v, Sierra Club, _w U.S. ——, 51
U.S.L.W, 5132 (July 1, 1983), on these grounds. Similar-
ly, they offer no principled argument why solicitude for
legitimate federal concerns, such as ownership and con-
trol over the OCS, should not be protected by the doe-
trine,
C, Neither Section 307(c)( 1) Nor Its Legislative History Con-
stitutes a Clear Statement of Congress’ Intention To Pro-
vide the States with Authority To Apply CZMA Programs
To Bar Leasing of Federal OCS Lands.
Far from arguing that Section 307(¢)(1) contains a clear
statement of congressional intention to extend con-
sistency review to the selection of OCS tracts for leasing,
respondents state that the meaning of the term “directly
affecting” is unclear, (Cal, Br, 21; NRDC Br, 19-20; CSO
Br. 6). Moreover, instead of adopting a “plain meaning”
approach to Section 307(c)(1), respondents concede that a
‘The Local Governments refer to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C,
§ 7401, as supposedly typifying the approach embodied there and in
the CZMA of permitting States to have a significant role in address-
ing environmental or resource issues, (Local Gov. Br, 16). They fail
to mention, however, that the the Clean Air Act (loes not apply to the
federal OCS, in the light of the Secretary of the Interior's “compre-
hensive” responsibilities under the OCSLA. California vy. Kleppe,
604 F.2d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir, 1979),
4
“liberal,” “expansive,” or “broad” definition of the term is
needed to support their position, (Cal. Br, 9 & n.12, 47),
Further reflecting their concession that the statute on its
face does not support them, respondents offer a variety of
formulations for the “directly affecting” test of that sec-
tion, none of which ascribes any meaning to the term
“directly.” (See, e.g., Local Gov, Br, 26-27; NRDC Br,
2-3, 21-22; N.J. Br. 11-12).
Respondents attempt to obscure the lack of support for
their position in the language of Section 307(c)(1) by citing
other portions of the CZMA or its legislative history
which refer in general terms to OCS activities. (Cal. Br.
19 n.31, 29-30 n.48; NRDC Br. 13 n. 12, 36-37), However,
as amici CSO admits, the issue in this case is “when” not
“whether” the CZMA applies to an OCS project. (CSO
Br. 5).' Plainly, Congress was concerned that those
stages of OCS projects having actual effects on state
coastal zones be subjected to CZMA consistency review,
and it accordingly delineated in Section 307(¢)(3)(B) the
way in which state programs apply to OCS exploration
and development production, when such impacts normal-
ly first arise. This action does not support the application
of Section 307(c)(1) to the earlier OCS leasing stage when,
as here, it gives rise to no such impacts.’
Instead of finding a clear statement in the statute to
support them, respondents ask the Court to infer, from
‘CSO's admission refutes California's charge that Interior's con-
struction of Section 307(c)(1) permits OCS projects “completely (to)
escape compliance with the CZMA .. .” (Cal. Br, 23), as well as
NRDC's argument that WOGA believes the OCSLA “completely
subsumed” the CZMA (NRDC Br, 10).
‘ Similarly, those provisions of the CZMA requiring States to make
adequate provision for the national interest associated with coustal
zone related energy facilities pertain to state authority under Section
307(¢)(3)(B) to regulate the exploration and development production
(Footnote continued)
o
what they assert are the purposes of the C ZMA, Con-
gress’ intention to apply Section 307(c)(1) to OCS leasing.
Thus, California states that “effectuating the purpose of
(the CZMA\ is critical to [its] interpretation” (Cal. Br. 8),
while NRDC describes as the first of the “best sources of
the interpretation of [Section 307(c)(1)]" not its language,
but rather “the purposes and policies behind the
(CZMA])” (NRDC Br. 2; see a/so CSO Br. 7). While these
policy arguments are themselves misconceived, see pp.
12-17, infra, the important point here is that reliance
upon such a policy-based approach to the statute, in and of
itself, concedes that the CZMA on its face contains no
clear statement to support respondents.
Finally, respondents have identified no clear statement
in the contemporaneous legislative history of Section
307(¢)(1) to support them.’ Instead, they rely upon a
passage from a 1971 Senate Report, which stated that
waters under federal jurisdiction having a “functional
interrelationship” with waters in the coastal zone should
be administered consistently with state CZMA pro-
grams. (See, ¢.g., Cal. Br. 12). However, since the ver-
sion of Section 307(c)(1) that was then before the Senate
Committee was specifically limited to federal activities
stages of an OCS project. (See, ¢.g.. CSO Br. 9; Local Gov. Br. 9).
That these provisions of the Act do not support respondents’ con-
struction of Section 307(c)(1) is revealed by the fact that they were
not made a part of the CZMA in 1972 when that section was enacted,
but instead were added to the statute in 1976 when Congress mod-
ified Section 307(c\(3) to specify the application of the statute to the
later stages of OCS projects. See, ¢.g., Section 305(c8), 16 U.S.C.
1454(¢8), which was added to the CZMA by Pub. L. No. 94-370, July
26, 1976.
‘CSO admits that the “legislative history does not explain why
Congress” substituted “directly affecting” for “in” the coastal zone.
(CSO Br. 6-7).
6
“in the coastal zone,” it is obvious that the Committee
could not have contemplated that Section 307(¢c)(1) would
extend to OCS activities on federal waters.
D. The 1976 CZMA Amendments and the 1978 OCSLA
Amendments Do Not Reflect Congress’ Intention To Sub-
ject the Selection of OCS Tracts for Leasing to State
CZMA Programs.
Respondents argue that Congress’ determination in
1976 not to amend Section 307(¢)(3) to include the term
“lease” is consistent with the belief that Section 307(¢)(1)
already applied to the selection of OCS tracts for leasing.
(NRDC Br. 32; CSO Br. 27). Respondents, however, fail
to cite the remarks of a single member of Congress to
support this hypothesis. To the contrary, the Senate
Committee, which first proposed to add the term “lease”
to Section 307(c)(3), stated that this amendment would
require the Secretary of the Interior to consult with
governors before issuing leases. (WOGA Br. 40-41).”
Instead of rejecting the proposed amendment to Sec-
tion 307(c)(3) as being redundant in the manner now
suggested by respondents, the requirement of con-
sistency review at the leasing stage ofan OCS project was
debated and rejected on the merits. (WOGA Br. 41-42).
Had Congress believed that the selection of OCS tracts
for leasing was already subject to Section 307(¢)(1) con-
sistency review, surely at least one member would have
" California quotes the 1975 Senate report for the proposition that
“full implementation” of the CZMA would include applying the con-
sistency provisions of the Act to “the decision to lease large tracts of
the OCS. . .” (Cal. Br. 27). However, the proposal to add the term
“lease” to Section 307(c)\(3) to achieve this result was ultimately
rejected. The same observation vitiates NRDC’s reliance upon the
1976 House Report. (NRDC Br. 31-32).
mentioned this fact during consideration of the 1976
CZMA amendments.
Similarly, nothing in the 1978 amendments to the
OCSLA evidences Congress’ intention to permit States
to apply their CZMA programs to the selection of OCS
tracts for leasing. To the contrary, as we have previously
argued (WOGA Br. 24-27), Congress prescribed in Sec-
tion 19 of that Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1345, quite different
arrangements for state input into this decision.
Respondents make much of a footnote in a 1977 House
Report, which recognized that “lease sales ... must
comply with ‘consistency requirements’ ” under the
CZMA. (See, e.g., NRDC Br. 39).’ However, as we previ-
ously explained (WOGA Br. 26 n. 19), this fragment from
the massive legislative history underlying the 1978
amendments can be explained as a recognition that, on
occasion, certain limited aspects of the leasing stage of an
OCS project may give rise to direct coastal zone impacts
which create consistency issues under Section 307(c¢)("),
Permitting States to require CZMA consistency for those
unusual cases involving such leasing-stage impacts does
not constitute the basis for permitting them to use their
programs routinely to challenge the Secretary's selection
*NRDC also relies upon committee prints to support its argument
that Section 307(c)(1) applies to OCS leasing. (NRDC Br. 38). These
prints do not even purport to communicate the intention of members
of Congress. Moreover, they represent such a misunderstanding of
the application of the CZMA to the OCS process that they are
entitled to no consideration whatsoever. For example, the 1976 com-
mittee print of the House Ad Hoc Committee on the OCS, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., Effects of Offshore Oil and Natural Gas Develop-
ment on the Coastal Zone erroneously reports that “the Secretary of
the Interior can withhold approval of a State's Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Plan if the plan interferes with the ‘national interest’ of the
nation.” (/d. at 228-29).
8
of OCS tracts for leasing." Exercise of the former author-
ity is consistent with Section 19 of the OCSLA, since it
merely gives States a voice in the design of some limited
aspects of an OCS project; the latter authority, on the
other hand, puts them in a position to supercede Section
19 and challenge the Secretary's basic proprietary deci-
sion to engage in leasing itself.’
Moreover, it is clear that state representatives who
testified during the consideration of the 1978 amend-
ments to the OCSLA did not then view the CZMA as
granting States authority with respect to the selection of
OCS tracts for leasing. Thus, a California witness testi-
fied that the State would not have “any voice in major
petroleum production off [its] coast with all of their atten-
dant offshore problems until major changes are made in
*WOGA's and the federal defendants’ recognition that Section
307(¢)(1) does apply at the leasing stage to deal with any direct effects
on the coastal zone which might occur then answers respondents’
arguments that we are seeking an implied exemption fromthe CZMA
for OCS projects. (Cal. Br. 24-25). In this case, no leasing-stage
impacts were identified by the lower courts.
*The substantial difference between applying Section 307(c¢)(1) to
deal with occasional leasing-stage impacts and routinely applying it
to challenge the Secretary's selection of OCS tracts refutes CSO’s
argument that our “concession” as to the application of Section
307(c)(1) at the leasing stage contradicts our reliance upon the 1953
Compromise of federal-state proprietary interests in the OCS. (CSO
Br. 27 n.18). Moreover, this distinction answers the argument
(NRDC Br. 32; CSO Br. 29) that we inconsistently rely on the 1976
CZMA legislative history not to extend the Act generally to “leases,”
while conceding that it can apply to leasing-stage impacts. CZMA
review of “leases” would have allowed review of the Secretary's
selection of OCS tracts; such review of isolated leasing-stage impacts
rarely, if ever, would lead to review of tract selection.
9
Federal law.” On this basis, California urged the adop-
tion of Section 19 of the OCSLA to fill a gap which it
perceived in existing federal law:
“It is for situations like these—where there is a
clearly identifiable state interest—that we see the
need for a process which would allow the governor to
negatively nominate tracts and have that decision
accepted by the Interior Secretary unless he makes
specific national interest findings to justify a contra-
ry conclusion.”
California’s recognition that existing law—i.e., the
CZMA—did not provide the States with adequate input
into the decisional process for the selection of OCS tracts
was echoed by Alaska and Massachusetts, two of the
other States that now seek as amici to convince the Court
that Section 307(c)(1) of the CZMA, enacted in 1972, gives
them greater authority than Section 19 of the OCSLA.™
Hearings on 8.9 Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natu-
ral Resources, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 575 (1977) (Statement of Bill
Press, Director, California Governor's Office of Planning and Re-
search),
‘Id. at 584. In criticizing the adequacy of existing federal law,
California, of course, was fully aware of the application of the CZMA
to OCS development activities. For on the very same page of the
testimony urging passage of Section 19, California's witness recog-
nized the application of the CZMA to the later stages of an OCS
project. Jd.
** See id. at 514 (Statement of Robert LaResche, Alaska’s Commis-
sioner of Natural Resources); Hearings on H.R. 1614 Before the
House Ad Hoc Select Comm. on the OCS, 95th Cong., lst Sess.
671-72 (1977) (Statement of Evelyn F. Murphy, Massachusetts’ Sec-
retary of Environmental Affairs).
10
Il. RESPONDENTS’ RELIANCE UPON COMMENTARY
BY CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES IN 1980 WITH
RESPECT TO THE CZMA DOES NOT SUPPORT THE
DECISION BELOW,
In our opening brief, we discussed the skepticism with
which a court should proceed in reviewing post-hoc
legislative materials. (See also CSO Br. 13 n.7 (“recogniz-
ing] the hazards of relying on subsequent legislative
history”)). The very cases upon which respondents rely in
urging this Court to give decisive weight to the 1980
committee commentary on Section 307(c)(1) undermine
their position.
In Andrus v. Shel! Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657 (1980), this
Court construed a 1920 statute by, inter alia, examining
1931 Senate hearings:
“The 1931 Senate hearings were called specifically
to review the Freeman [v. Summers, 52 L.D. 201
(1927)] case for fear that another ‘Teapot Dome’ scan-
dal was brewing. Rarely has an administrative law
decision received such exhaustive congressional
scrutiny. And following that scrutiny, no action was
taken to disburb the settled administrative practice;
rather Senator Nye advised the Interior Depart-
ment to continue patenting oil shale claims.” /d. at
673 n.12.
Here, far from endorsing prior administrative con-
struction of the CZMA, the 1980 House Report stated
that it was “disappointed” there had been no administra-
tive resolution of the Section 307(¢)(1) “directly affecting”
issue as it applies to OCS leasing. H. Rep. No. 1012, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1980). It went on to note that
_ “In light of the initiative to issue regulations defin-
ing the term ‘directly affecting,’ the committee be-
1]
lieves it is premature to amend section 307 to redress
the problem which has emerged.” /d."’
Finally, the 1980 committee reports, which NRDC con-
cedes are “hardly . . . model[s] of clarity” (NRDC Br. 34
n.36), do not unequivocally state that Section 307(¢)(1)
should be applied to OCS tract selection. The House
Committee merely stated that the section should
“apply whenever a Federal activity ha[s] a functional
interrelationship from an economic, geographic, or
social standpoint with a State coastal rogram’s land
or water use policies. ... Thus, when a Federal
agency initiates a series of events of coastal manage-
ment consequences, the intergovernmental
coordination of the Federal consistency require-
ments should apply.” H. Rep. No. 1012 at 34.
The first justification offered by the House Committee for
this approach was that, inter alia,
“it allows Federal agencies to avoid the irretreivable
commitment of resources for Federal activities likely
to lead to results inconsistent with the requirements
of approved state programs.” Jd.
However, courts adjudicating leasing stage OCS cases
have consistently held that, in the light of Interior’s au-
thority to regulate the later stages of an OCS project, the
‘The other cases relied upon by respondents are inapposite. In
Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. vy. Shell Oil Company, 444 U.S. 572
(1980), the court justified its reliance on post-enactment legislative
history by reasoning that Congress had rejected a proposed amend-
ment on the very ground that it was unnecessary in the light of prior
administrative interpretation. In Bell v. New Jersey, —_ U.S. ,
103 S. Ct. 2187, 2192-94 (1983), the court relied on 1978 amendments
to assess the scope of a 1970 statute because the amendments were
necessarily premised upon the adoption of a particular interpretation
of the 1970 Act.
12
lease sale itself is not an “irretrievable” or “irreversible”
commitment of resources."
The 1980 Senate Report stated only that
“the Department of the Interior’s activities which
preceded lease sales were to remain subject to the
requirements of Section 307(¢)(1). As a result, in-
tergovernmental coordination for purposes of OCS
development commences at the earliest practicable
time in the opinion of the Committee, as the Depart-
ment of the Interior sets in motion a series of events
which have consequences in the coastal zone.” S.
Rep. No. 783, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980).
Neither the federal nor WOGA petitioners dispute that
Section 307(c)(1) applies to the so-called pre-leasing acti-
vities of the Department of the Interior: it does require
consistency determinations for those aspects, if any, of
the OCS leasing stage which “directly” affect the coastal
zone. (See pp. 7-8, supra; WOGA Br. 26 n.19). But the
selection of OCS tracts for leasing does not “directly”
affect the coastal zone simply because later exploration
and development production activities might do so.
II]. RESPONDENTS’ POLICY ARGUMENTS DO NOT
SUPPORT THEM.
A. The OCSLA Provides Sufficient Environmental
Protection and Coastal State Co-Operative Mechan-
isms.
Respondents contend that a “liberal” construction of
the CZMA is necessary to permit rational coastal plan-
ning and protection. This argument is ultimately pre-
4 County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 32 F.2d 136,
1390 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978): Conservation
Law Foundation vy. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712, 714-15 (ist Cir. 1979»;
North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 3589, 607-09 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
13
mised on the assertion that the CZMA and the OCSLA
serve “vastly different” national purposes—the CZMA
protecting the environment and the OCSLA “focus[ing]
upon the development of the mineral resources of the
OCS.” (NRDC Br. 10: see a/so Local Gov. Br. 21-22. 41).
On this basis, they contend that, if OCS leasing is not
constrained by the CZMA, it will proceed without ade-
quate environmental safeguards or coastal state planning
mechanisms.
However, as even California recognizes, the OCSLA
' does not focus solely upon expeditious resource develop-
ment, but “also makes clear Congressional intent to pro-
tect the environment.” (Cal. Br. 41 n.70; see also CSO Br.
24). Thus, the Act’s purposes repeatedly refer to protec-
tion of the environment,” and it is embedded with provi-
sions requiring the most careful attention to environmen-
tal concerns."
Indeed, the very policy which respondents claim can be
furthered only by their construction of the CZMA—the
participation of State and local governments in the plan-
ning stages of an OCS project—is specifically recited in
the OCSLA and specifically implemented for every stage
of an OCS project, including leasing. (See WOGA Br.
22-23).""
3 See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 1802(2), (3), (7).
* See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. $$ 1334(ay2W A), 1344(an2) & (3), 1346, &
1351(h\ 1D).
" Respondents seek to distinguish the scope of Section 19 of the
OCSLA from that of Section 307(¢\1) of the CZMA by arguing that
the former permits “any coastal states that would be affected” by
leasing to make recommendations and that the latter provides au-
thority only to States that have approved CZMA programs. (NRDC
Br. 12; see also CSO Br. 24-25 & n.17). However, respondents’ and
the lower courts’ conception of the “direct” effects of leasing is so
broad that virtually any coastal state that would have Section 19
(Footnote continued)
l4
B. The CZMA Does Not Contemplate Premature Review
Of Impacts.
Respondents’ contend that denying them the opportun-
ity to apply CZMA programs at the leasing stage results
in a “piecemeal” approach and prevents them from
reviewing an OCS project “as a whole.” (Local Gov. Br.
28-29; NRDC Br. 45-46). But this argument begs the
question that is before the Court—whether Congress
intended for States to have general authority under Sec-
tion 307(c)(1) to review OCS projects as a whole or
whether, instead, it intenced that state CZMA programs
be applied to assess specific coastal zone effects at the
time they are anticipated.”
A construction of Section 307(c¢)(1) as applying only to
leasing-stage impacts, rather than allowing a broad over-
view of all impacts which might occur at later stages, is
authority could also invoke its CZMA program at the leasing stage.
Moreover, 28 states or territories. including virtually every one
affected by OCS activities, have approved CZMA programs. (CSO
Br. 3).
“The Local Governments unwittingly undermine their own posi-
tion by relying upon the opinion of the Department of Justice con-
cerning application of Section 307(¢\(1) to OCS preleasing activities.
As the Department stated:
“It is well possible that some of the preleasing activities of the
Secretary of the Interior will give rise to consistency problems
which cannot be reviewed at all under the paragraph B proce-
dure (307(¢3B)), or for which such review comes too late.”
(Local Gov. Br. 30).
We have conceded the application of Section 307(¢)1) to leasing-
stage impacts, if any, associated with an OCS project. The issue in
this case is whether that section also permits leasing-stage review of
exploration and production development stage impacts that are later
reviewable under Section 307(c¢3)B).
Certainly, the insistence that Section 307(c)1) review be utilized
to prescribe stipulations for leases (/d. at 33-34; CSO Br. 17) cannot
(Footnote continued)
15
strongly supported by Section 307(¢)(3)(B) of the CZMA.
That section provides that
“any person who submits to the Secretary of the
Interior any plan for the exploration or development
of, or production from, any area which has been
leased under the [OCSLA]. . . shall, with respect to
any exploration, development, or production de-
scribed in such plan and affecting any land use or
water use in the coastal zone of such state, attach to
such plan a certification that each activity which is
described in detail in such plan complies with such
State's approved management program... .*
Thus, States clearly are not permitted at exploration to
speculate about the later impacts upon the coastal zone
that may arise at the development production stage.
Whether this is called “piecemeal” review or is character-
ized as preventing States from prematurely applying
their CZMA programs to deal with coastal zone impacts
that are only hypothetical and speculative at early stages
ofan OCS project, it was clearly the intention of C ongress
that CZMA review relate to specific impacts at the stage
when they might arise, not a project in general and all its
potential effects.’
justify invocation of CZMA programs to challenge the selection of
OCS tracts for leasing. Moreover, respondents offer no examples of
the type of issue that must be addressed through lease stipulation, as
opposed to later conditioning of exploration or development
production permits following Section 307(¢(3)(B) CZMA review.
* Respondents’ assertion of the need to have a broad overview of
OCS projects through the CZMA prior to exploration and
development production ignores the fact that they have the right to
exercise this type of broad scrutiny under Section 19 of the OCSLA.
prior to the Secretary's selection of OCS tracts for leasing.
16
C. The Pyramidic Structure of OCS Leasing Obviates the
Need for Leasing Stage Consistency Review.
Respondents claim that the definition of the term
“lease” within the OCSLA guarantees OCS lessees the
right to proceed with later stages of the project, so that
CZMA review at the later stages is “too late” to be
effective. (Cal. Br. 36-37). This argument ignores Section
8(b)(4) of the OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(4), which
states that a lessee’s rights are “conditioned upon. . . the
approval of the development and production plan re-
quired by this Act,” as well as Section 11(c), 43 U.S.C.
§ 1340(c), which requires Secretarial approval prior to
exploration.
The degree to which respondents distort the OCS
statutory scheme is perhaps best revealed by their con-
tention that “due to the pyramidic structure of OCS leas-
ing, basic decisions by DOI at the lease sale stage, such as
choice of lease stipulations and tract selection, cannot
easily be undone at later stages.” (NRDC Br. 49). How-
ever, as the D.C. Circuit recently reiterated:
“the [OCS] .. . process is ‘pyramidic in structure,
proceeding from broad-based planning to an increas-
ingly narrower focus as actual development grows
more imminent.’ Additional study and consideration
” A related misconception is that the Department of the Interior
determines or influences, at the leasing stage, whether oil will be
pipelined or shipped by tanker, the flow of vessel traffic, the siting of
onshore construction, and other related matters. (Cal. Br. 36-37).
The pyramidic structure of OCS decision-making, however, post-
pones determination of those matters until later stages. As the court
held in County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d at
1379, the specification of pipeline routes, destination refineries, and
other similar matters requires “endless hypothesis as to remote
possibilities” which not even NEPA requires at the leasing stage of
an OCS project.
7
is required before each succeeding step is taken.”
California v. Watt, 712 F.2d 584, 588 (D.C. Cir.
(1983), petition for rehearing pending.”
The very point of such a pyramidic structure, as stres-
sed by the framers of the OCSLA, is to provide a mechan-
ism for continuous “review and evaluation of, and decision
on” an OCS project after leasing has occured and thus to
avoid “extensive litigation prior to lease sales, when
onshore and environmental impacts of production activity
are not yet known.” WOGA Br. 30, citing H. Rep. No.
950, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 164 (1977). Respondents’ in-
sistence that their CZMA programs be applied at the
leasing stage of an OCS project to govern tract selection
on the basis of speculation about coastal zone impacts that
cannot occur until much later is flatly inconsistent with
the policies adopted by Congress in enacting the OCSLA.
IV. RESPONDENTS’ AMBIGUITY CONCERNING THE
IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR CONSTRUCTION OF
SECTION 307(c)1) CONDEMNS THEIR POSITION.
Although California’s complaint boldly proclaimed that
it has the last word in determining consistency issues
(WOGA Resp. Br. 5-6), California now states that it
would have no CZMA veto authority and that, if there is
disagreement as to a consistency issue, the federal agen-
cy can proceed. (Cal. Br. 44-45). California, however,
carefully hedges this position by preserving its right to
sue (id. at 44 n.75) and asserting that courts should pay
“substantial deference” to a State’s construction of its
CZMA program. (Jd. at 43 n.73).
2 See also North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 593-94
(D.C. Cir. 1980); California v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290, 1297 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
18
The Local Governments have a more expansive view of
state authority. They claim that the States and indeed the
localities themselves “make the basic decisions” with re-
spect to balancing competing demands on the coastal zone
caused by OCS projects. (Local Gov. Br. 10). They assert
that federal agencies should give “substantial deference”
to their interpretation of CZMA programs and obviously
would invoke federal litigation to ensure this deference.
The CSO approaches the matter from still a different
perspective. It argues that the balancing of energy and
environmental issues raised by OCS leasing has already
been accomplished by virtue of the Department of Com-
merce’s approval of State CZMA programs. (CSO Br.
25-26). CSO apparently assumes that courts could ex-
amine a State CZMA program de novo to discern that
balance.
Thus, rather than presenting a consistent or coherent
view as to how CZMA programs would actually be ap-
plied at the leasing stage of OCS projects, respondents
and amici simply rely on litigation in the federal courts to
resolve the issue. At no point, however, do they suggest
how a court is to choose between conflicting federal and
state views of the general requirements of a CZMA pro-
gram, nor do they identify any provisions of the CZMA or
OCSLA that a court could consult in undertaking this
task. Moreover, respondents seek to perpetuate the
uncertainty and confusion that would be created by the
adoption of their construction of Section 307(c)(1) by
attacking in their cross-petition the Ninth Circuit’s
efforts to introduce some measure of clarification via its
= While respondents assert that the “spectre of hypothetical state
abuse of § 307(c)(1) consistency requirements is completely unfound-
ed” (Cal. Br. 45-46), they do not deny that following the lower courts’
decisions in this case, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Mary-
(Footnote continued)
19
construction of the “maximum extent practicable” provi-
sion of the statute.
Ultimately, therefore, respondents’ view of Section
307(c)(1) is that Congress gave States some undefined
measure of authority over the disposition of federal OCS
lands, without providing any guidance to the courts as to
how CZMA consistency issues are to be resolved and
without providing any alternative means for resolving
such disputes. As we have submitted, it is simply in-
conceivable that Congress intended to plunge the
proprietary aspects of OCS leasing into such a “morass.”
(WOGA Br. 45; WOGA Resp. Br. 37-38).
States can have their CZMA programs considered at
the leasing stage of an OCS project without creating the
confusion implicit in respondents’ view of the CZMA. As
we have previously pointed out (WOGA Br. 26-27), under
Section 19 of the OCSLA the Secretary of the Interior is
obliged to consider any provisions of state CZMA pro-
grams brought to his attention by a governor's recom-
mendations and, indeed, he is directed to accept those
recommendations if they result in an appropriate balance
between national and state interests. Moreover, Con-
gress has specifically provided a judicial remedy should
the Secretary inadequately consider a governor's recom-
mendations in the Section 19 OCSLA process.*
By declaring that the selection of OCS tracts for leasing
does not “directly affect” a State’s coastal zone under
land, Virginia, North Carolina, California, and several Alaska local
governments have instituted Section 307(c)(1) actions to complain of
various aspects of OCS lease sales. (See WOGA Br. 20 n.14; WOGA
Petn. 9 n.10).
*The “arbitrary or capricious” standard of review specified by
Section 1%d), 43 U.S.C. § 1345(d), plainly requires the Secretary to
(Footnote continued)
20
Section 307(¢)(1), but that CZMA programs must be con-
sidered in the Section 19 process when invoked by gov-
ernors, this Court would harmonize the CZMA and
OCSLA, serve what respondents assert is the CZMA
policy interest of ensuring early consideration of state
programs, and channel disputes into a congressionally
prescribed judicial review mechanism.
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's decision that the selection of OCS
tracts for leasing is a federal activity “directly affecting” a
state’s coastal zone should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
HowarRD J. PRIVETT E. EDWARD BRUCE
Donna R. BLACK Bossy R. BURCHFIELD
McCCUTCHEN, BLACK, COVINGTON & BURLING
VERLEGER & SHEA 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
600 Wilshire Boulevard P.O. Box 7566
Los Angeles, CA 90017 Washington, DC 20044
Attorneys for Petitioners
consider all relevant matters brought to his attention by the State in
the Section 19 process. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971).
Alaska notes that Interior's promulgation, under protest pending
this litigation, of consistency determinations led to the imposition of
stipulations for several OCS lease sales off Alaska which persuaded
the State not to pursue leasing-stage litigation. (Alaska Br. 9-11).
Alaska fails to note, however, that Interior considered Alaska’s
views as to these stipulations under both Section 19 of the OCSLA
and the CZMA.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.