Amicus Brief — Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.

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No, 82-1186

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,

2 Petitioner,

FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN MINT

LIMITED and MCGREGOR, SWIRE AIR SERVICES LIMITED,

Respondents,

INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION AND

FORTY-THREE OF ITS MEMBER AIRLINES (SEE APPENDIX I),

Potential Intervenors.

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE IN

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. v.

FRANKLIN MINT CORP., NO, 82-1186 AND

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI OF

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.

CARROLL E. Dusuc *

AIDAN D. JONES

RAND! L. BRESLOW

HAIGHT, GARDNER, Poor

& HAVENS

1819 H Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 775-1300

Counsel for Petitioners

Of Counsel: International Air Transport

KENNETH F. RIPPLE Association and Forty-Three

Notre Dame Law School Member Airlines (see

Notre Dame, Ind. 46556

January 20, 1983

Appendiz 1)

* Counsel of Record

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit holding on non-constitutional grounds

that the cargo liability limitation of Article 22 of the

Warsaw Convention, a Treaty of the United States, is

prospectively unenforceable in United States courts is a

violation of the separation of powers doctrine derived

from U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl.2 where

(a) no Act of Congress specifically abrogated the

United States’ adherence to the Convention and

neither Congress nor the Executive Branch has

expressed any need for a Treaty reservation; and

(b) the decision of the Court of Appeals intrudes

upon the ongoing process of Executive and Leg-

islative Branch negotiation and ratification of

amendments to the Treaty.*

* Franklin M.nt Corporation, Franklin Mint Limited and McGre-

gor, Swire Air Services Limited, plaintiffs-appellants below (here-

inafter referred to collectively as “Franklin Mint”), and Trans

World Airlines, Inc. (TWA), defendant-appellee below, were the only

parties to these proceedings. Neither International Air Transport

Association (IATA) nor its member carriers (except TWA) were

parties in the District Court or on the appeal. However, after the

Panel of the Second Circuit’s September 28, 1982 prospective unen-

forceability ruling, IATA and 36 of its member airlines filed an

amicus curiae brief in su rt of TWA's petition for rehearing of

the Panel’s decision. IATA is an organization of 123 international

air carriers, many of whom are either owned by (“government own-

ership” herein means greater than 50% government ownership) or

represent foreign sovereign nations which are parties to the War-

saw Convention. Six U.S. airlines are members of IATA. See

Appendix (hereinafter “App.”) I (66a) for a list of IATA members.

Those members who join in this petition are marked by an asterisk

in App. I.

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ............c0ccceeecseees sicesostgiehddiainnd

IIIT MOUIIUNITT, ceseeotcecesicseessscieseconevelbbenvensanatenegnabeate

EARS CO SER CID peticcnsensectnscisnsctsistiicmmmnns

A. Summary of the Litigation and Decisions Be-

SUT cincssncsknpssnsaosntetnssindekiassciotinetsbebiataaaananaaaalie

B. The Warsaw Convention, Its Protocols And

Their Implementation By The U.S. Government..

C. The Interest of IATA and Its Member Airlines..

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ..................

A. The Decision Of The Court of Appeals Violates

The Constitutional Separation Of Powers Doc-

trine Ry Improperly Interjecting The Judiciary

Into The Conduct of Foreign Relations ..............

1. The Judiciary Has Intervened in the Treaty

eempetttie: FU GUIOE coc iccsascsccnccessscsinstetenstoasinns

2. The Court of Appeals Has Disregarded

the Division of Labor within the Political

IIE vv nncsscinstendisciiccmptanetconinaae

B. The Decision Of The Court of Appeals Has and

Will Seriously Disrupt International Air Com-

merce and the Federal Courts ............0.0..0...0.0...

1. The Decision Has an Immediate Adverse Ef-

fect on the International Air Cargo System..

2. The Decision Has An Immediate Adverse Ef-

fect on the Federal Courts ...0.000000.0.0.000cccccccce

8. The Decision Has An Adverse Long-Term

Effect on International Air Commerce........

CEPR ncscccnsnstsistesy, <ocmvenipntslocnceniceensteiiunialimdsadiaialll

Se 8 8 B

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Devel-

opment Corp., 429 U.S, 252 (1977), cert. denied,

434 U.S. 1025 (1978) .ooccccccccccccccccceeeseeeeeseceeseeeeees 12

Association Aeronautique V. Thicrache, Tribunal de

Grande Instance, Paris, France ‘February 10,

a aad sccccideiinebarhlinssnsliebininannbadabisenes 17

Bacardi Corp. V. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940). 6

Baker Vv. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) oo..0ccccccecee 12

Balkan Bulgarian Airlines Vv. Tammaro, Court of

Milan, Italy (October 25, 1976) 2.00.00... 18

Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers Association,

390 U.S. 459, motion for leave to intervene

granted, 389 U.S. 813, reh'g denied, 391 U.S. 929

SIN 7 Acl Ls acinnetsiniaintnnnnisenrevinesinndsetbenscnddsovessesss 2

Benjamins V. British European Airways, 572 F.2d

913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114

IN Sri AL os satsentdnsconninnnsseunnecblpenmnndhimenies 21

Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386

F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S.

905 (1968) .. sien 7

Boehringer Mannheim Diagnostics, Ine. v. Pan

American World Airways, Inc., 531 F.Supp. 344

(S.D. Tex. 1981), appeal pending, No. 81-2519. 17

The Bremen Vv. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1

I St as an snennnasisnachianlgsebansnennocnnannsns 26

California Vv. Teras, 450 U.S. 961 (1981) .............. 18

Chrysler Corp. V. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979)... 11

Companhia de Seguros Maritimos v. Varig, Fed-

eral Court of Appeals of Brazil (June 3, 1975).. 17

Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1983) ............ 15

Crist Vv. Cline, 484 U.S. 980 (1977) .o.cccecc 13

Dames & Moore V. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981)........ 2

Day V. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d

Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976),

reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977) oo... 7,16, 21

Deere & Co. V. Deutsche Luftansa A.G., N.D. Tl.

No. 81 C 4726 (Dec. 30, 1982) .............00000.0c0c0. 17

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Department of Revenue of Washington V. Associa-

tion of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 485 US.

PI: NRIIPID. wiccinnctsccesiessenesidicicenasinmadigbaaionanabatghanties

Doe ex dem, Clark Vv. Braden, 16 How. 635 (1858).

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study

Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) ........ ace tatacesnitidiantaeaon

Fida Cinematografica Vv. Pan American World Air-

ways, Rome Civil Court, Italy (October 13,

SIE sintecbestectasudtade .

Florencia Cia Argentina de Seguros S.A. Vv, . Varig

S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1977 Uniform L.

Rev. 198 (August 27, 1976) pe CELDT Tc LAD

Franklin Mint v. Trana World Airlines, Inc., 525

F.Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), 690 F.2d 203

(2d Cir. 1982) .. sinakiteide iii siaidceetictiaeea

Garcia Vv. Pan American Airways, Inc., 269 A.D.

287, 55 N.Y.S.2d 317, aff'd, 295 N.Y. 852, 67

N.E.2d 257, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 741 (1946)..

Geofroy V. Riggs, 188 U.S. 258 (1890) 0.000000...

Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F.Supp. 949 (D.D.C.

1979), rev'd, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated,

444 U.S. 996 (1979) .

Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce v. Gold-

schmidt, 627 F.2d 258 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 0...

Hornlinie A.G. v. Societe Nationale Petroles

Aquitaine, Supreme Court of the Netherlands,

2 ;, SS Fe |. | eee

Hunter V. Ohio ex rel. Miller, 396 U.S. 879 (1969).

Husserl Vv. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp.

702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 485 F.2d

i Rt. | senate mne a Mctierds Zon Ns

In Re Aircrash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, 535

F.Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), appeal denied on

issue of appropriate unit of conversion, No, 82-

8018 (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 1982) ...............cccccccccsceeees

Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America Vv. Pan

American Airways, Inc., 58 F.Supp. 338 (S.D.

DEE a. PMID" conascsscmssctsstcrunteanhctnetealcantienstietee mani

Page

26

15

12,14

18

18

15

17

5,17

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441

Ee RE SE TIIIIY cccsmiodcasicnecnsteecodoinecsdeciipienietebesetanse

Joint Anti-Faacist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,

341 U.S. 123 (1961) ..... selistincainiknadoadinticnensdenamteded

Kelly v. B.V. Nederlandse Luchtvaart Maatschap-

pij, No. 82 Civ. 7880 (S.D.N.Y. filed November

D4, 1968) ..020<00. =

Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 US. 187 (1961) ere

Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Sanghi, Bangalore, India

(August 11, 1978) ............ cksistuabieetanenistadeimmiadtiiniaed

Linee Aerce Italiane v. Riccioli, No. 609/79 Rome

Civil Court, Italy (November 14, 1978)

Meckenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915) ............

Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391

Be | Tea eR re ae

Michelin Tire Corp. Vv. Wages, 423 U. s. 276

CII =o i psdicljientesnahivapscaboncdanssnnactaasmeaphlannaiets

NAACP vy. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.

I OED ecicsenencotherrtcsiastccsunsapsanianniqnnsbensseatineintens

NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 384 U.S. 925

(1966) .......... sh ickiia cdiraameatneset aaa sab ieoaas

Nielson V. Johnaon, 279 US. ‘47 (1929) ESSA A ETS

Pakistan International Airlines v. Compagnie Air

Inter S.A., No. 79/2278, Court of Appeals of

Aix-en-Provence, France (October 30, 1980)...

Pigeon River Improv. Slide & Boom Co. Vv. Charles

W. Coz, Ltd., 201 U.S. 188 (1984) ............0..000.

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 255 (1981).

Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. de-

nied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977) ........ sedovateuntens

Reid v. Covert, 364 U.S. 1 (1967) .......cccccccccccscccseeees

Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) ..

Sierva Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)........

Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. Vv. Avagliano, 102

S. Ct. 2374 (1982) ......... PR SPRRD h Bex BS Ps. Ta a

Terlinden Vv. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902) Bed Df -s

Union Pacific Railroad v. United States, 99 U. S.

700 (1879)

COREE EE OEE ERE E EEE EERE EERE EERE EEE EEE EERE EEE EEEEEEEEEEES

Page

26

12

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

United States ¥. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299

EUS ED WMIED contetsnsedtsacintsabies Sueccae west

United States v. D'Auterive, 51 U.S. 609 (1850)...

United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 218

ruary 15, 1974)

Constitution, Statutes, Rules & Legislative Materials

14 C.F.R. §§ 221.175, 221.176 (1981) Al,

DN ee aa

Civil Aviation Protocols: Hearing Before th

Committee on Foreign Relations United States

Senate, 97th Cong., 1st Sess, 6-8. (1981) 00000... .

Federal Aviation Act of 1958

49 U.S.C. $1801 ef seq. oii eoccccccccccccccceee.,

49 U.S.C. §1878(a) . EEN Os oe PND eS

@ USL. § 1974(~) ........................ AP NEE. A She

49 U.S.C. § 1862 ................... mppuiltinekostnionet cae

ete SS 3 ee 2S

49 U.S.C. § 1482 | spiciapibencaninanon eam

Oe Os TR cei an es setae

Par Value Modification Act, Pub. L. No. 92-268,

86 Stat. 116 (1972), amended by Par Value Mod-

ification Act, 31 U.S.C. § 449 (1973), repealed

Page

18

19, 20

11

1,2

23

23

1976 by Pub. L. No. 94-564, 90 Stat. 2660....5, 19, 20, 21

S. Exec. Rep. No. 45, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).

wag tn by Mon Be nasal EE LE

WG sonesepinemnedusapasatisbcidsnsiasepdisecianasckiesgt Lae ee

9,11

27

18

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

U.S. Const. Page

OO MR AD cecttseeteaesens BS ee

a EI ls EL scenachcecesscieqeenss ee aaa 18

(OR oT eae arn ABR ARO tae Eee RR 3

Treaties and International Agreements

The Guatemala City Protocol, reprinted in, A.

Lowenfeld, Aviation Law, Documents Supple-

ment at 975-984 (2d ed. 1981) .0.....cecccccecseeees 8, 16

The Hague Protocol, September 28, 1955, 478

U.N.T\S. 871, reprinted in, A. Lowenfeld, Avia-

tion Law, Documents Supplement at 955-963

I ceeeuvebbennsends 8

The Hague Rules of 1921, as amended by the Brus-

sels Convention, August 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233.. 13

The Hamburg Rules, March 6, 1978, reprinted in

SF a I UIE NOTED asc: .cenccasdcescocdoescaseccpinssnsunabxees 13

Jamaica Accords (1976) ........... Dv hla: aaa ae 21

Montreal Agreement, CAB Agreement No. 18990,

of. Sp aA he) eee eRereee mr 8,11

Montreal Protocols No. 8 and No. 4 (1975), re-

printed in, A. Lowenfeld, Aviation Law, Docu-

ments Supplement at 985-1001 (2d ed. 1981)... passim

Proclamation of President Franklin D. Roosevelt

declaring U.S. adherence to the Warsaw Conven-

tion, 49 Stat. 8000, T.S. 876 (1984) .00000., 25

The Vienna Convention, reprinted in, 8 1.L.M. 679

(1969)

I ele ieee Ra Ore te ae i7

RI i chedicccta cased arenicciniabineietieantian once ae aa 24

ISTE, <aidth ues seshoisas cdenincapatiincinducmiebdccowepinaandaie cua 24

The Warsaw Convention, October 29, 1934, 49 Stat.

_ eS gm 6s & | eee passim

AS ee sescossihoctus<hhenbanemdaackaatanemian 3,7

I ca a 7

ppt Ie RED PPR el Se 7

MUAPIMIIIIET c, <t tn ccoatisn cedsiinecheatharamersecanndicc aceeanel 4,7,24

EA SS a et Meee ae 8, 7, 14, 21, 22

RATT ARNE a nee RI oe Oa I. SH. 8,5

| CREE PR enema Oe eae 8, 8, 9,10

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Administrative Materials

50 Dep't State Bull. 923 (1965) ...........ccccccccccceeeeenees

54 Dep't State Bull. 955-57 (1966) ..........cccccees

CAB Order 72-6-7, 37 Fed. Reg. 11384 (1972)........

19, 21

CAB Order 74-1-16, 39 Fed. Reg. 1526 (1974) ...... 4, 5, 10,

11,

CAB Order 78-8-10, 43 Fed. Reg. 35971 (1978)......

Carriage by Air Act Regulations (Canada), P.C.

I: I i sci sertetebeesianiapepoeanionns

J. Golden, “Warsaw Convention Liability Limits”,

Memorandum, Bureau of Compliance and Con-

sumer Protection, CAB (May 20, 1981) ............

Supplemental Compensation Plan, CAB Agreement

25632 and Order 77-7-85 (July 20, 1977) .......... 9,

Other Authorities

Aviation Daily, January 8, 1988 ................0..000

Aviation Week and Space Technology, November

SR ARE ed RT SRE Oe on ernie Soe neers

Detailed Report of the U.S. Delegation on the In-

ternational Conference on Air Law, ICAO, Mont-

EP as a ey aE

J. Foster, Esq., Remarks at Luncheon of the Air

Transportation Law Committee of the Federal

Bar Association, Dec. 7, 1982, Washington, D.C...

Minutes, Second International Conference on Pri-

vate Aeronautical Law, Warsaw, October 4-12,

1929 (Horner and Legrez trans. 1975) ...............

A. Lowenfeld, Aviation Law (2d ed. 1981) ............

Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States

and the Warsaw Convention, 80 Harv. L. Rev.

fe RE SER Se ern nec ea SO

Merren, The SDR as a Unit of Account in Private

Transactions, 16 Int'l Law 508 (1982) ..............

Restatement, 2d, Foreign Relations Law of the

United States, § 158 (1962) ....

19, 20

4,19

18

11,19

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

No, 82-1186

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,

. Petitioner,

FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN MINT

LIMITED and MCGREGOR, SWIRE AIR SERVICES LIMITED,

Respondents,

INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION AND

FORTY-THREE OF ITS MEMBER AIRLINES (SEE APPENDIX I),

Potential Intervenors.

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE IN

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC, v.

FRANKLIN MINT CORP., NO, 82-1186 AND

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI OF

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.

Potential intervenors' pray for leave to intervene and

further pray that a writ of certiorari be granted to re-

1 Although not a “party” below within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(1), petitioners IATA et al. will have that status if their peti-

tion to intervene is granted. Since the issues for review presented

herein arose after briefing, argument and decision by the Court of

Appeals, potential intervenors had no reason for prior participa-

tion. Because IATA and its members carry passengers and cargo

2

view the decision of September 28, 1982 of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Frank-

lin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.

If this Court does not grant leave to intervene, poten-

tial intervenors pray that this petition be treated as an

amicus curiae brief in support of TWA’s petition for

certiorari. The consent of Franklin Mint and TWA to

such filing has been obtained.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at 690

F.2d 303 and is set forth as App. A(la) to this petition.

The opinion and order of the District Court from which

appeal was taken is reported at 525 F.Supp 1288 and is

set forth as App. B(19a). The judgment of the Court

of Appeals sought to be reviewed appears as App. C(24a).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on

September 28, 1982. A petition for rehearing was denied

on December 1, 1982. The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).2

to the United States and are subject to litigation in our courts,

they are vitally affected by the decision below, for the reasons ex-

plained further in Section C of the Statement of the Case. The

purpose of IATA and its member airlines is (1) to promote safe,

regular and economical air transportation for the benefit of the

peoples of the world, foster air commerce, and study problems con-

nected therewith; (2) to provide a means for collaboration among

air transportation enterprises engaged in international air trans-

port and services, and (3) to cooperate with the International Civil

Aviation Organization (ICAO), an arm of the United Nations, and

other international organizations. Thus, it is submitted that inter-

vention is appropriate. See ¢.g., Dames & Moore Vv. Regan, 453 U.S.

654 (1981); Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers Ass'n., 390 U.S.

459, motion for leave to intervene granted, 389 U.S. 813, reh'g

denied, 391 U.S. 929 (1968); Hunter v. Ohio ex rel. Miller, 396

U.S. 879 (1969); NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 384 U.S. 925

(1966).

2 See note 1, supra.

3

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND

TREATY INVOLVED

In this case the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit expressly held the limitation of liability provi-

sions of Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention ® for cargo

damage, loss or delay prospectively unenforceable. Peti-

tioners submit that the Court of Appeals’ decision vio-

lates U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl.2, and art. VI, ¢l.2. For

the text of the Warsaw Convention see App. D/(26a);

the applicable constitutional provisions are set forth in

App. E/ 46a).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Summary of the Litigation And Decisions Below

In March, 1979 plaintiffs Franklin Mint contracted with

TWA for carriage by air from the United States to

England under an airway bill listing 714 pounds of

numismatic materials.‘ The articles were later stipu-

lated to be worth more than the limitation on liabil-

ity for loss or damage under Article 22 (2) and (4)

of the Warsaw Convention.’ The materials were either

* All references to “Warsaw Convention” or “Convention” are to

the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to

International Transportation by Air, October 29, 1984, 49 Stat.

3000, T.S. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (A treaty adhered to by the United

States October 29, 1934 and by over 100 foreign nations. The ad-

hering nations are listed in App, D (26a)).

‘ This constitutes * international transportation” within the mean-

ing of Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention since the United States

and the United Kingdom are parties to the Convention. See App.

D(27a).

®See App. D(36-37a). Article 22(2) of the Convention would

limit liability to $6,475.98 (250 francs per kilogram) in the ab-

sence of a special declaration of value. There was no such declara-

tion in this case. The aforementioned franc is the so called “Poin-

care franc”, which by conversion into U.S. dollars per pound at the

last official U.S. price of gold ($42.22 per troy ounce) amounts to

a Warsaw limitation of liability of $9.07 per pound (or approxi-

4

lost or destroyed, thus rendering TWA presumptively

liable.®

Franklin Mint brought an action in the District Court

to recover the full valve of the lost goods, claimed to be

$250,000. TWA sought to limit its liability under Article

22(2) of the Convention and moved for summary judg-

ment on “the sole issue [of] TWA’s liability, exclusive of

interest and costs”’.’

On that issue Franklin Mint urged that the free market

price of gold was the applicable conversion standard.

TWA suggested three other alternatives: (1) Special

Drawing Rights (SDRs), the international unit of ac-

count established by the International Monetary Fund in

1968 (and substituted for the Poincare franc in the

Montreal Protocols to the Warsaw Convention) ;* (2)

the last official price of gold in the United States (the

conversion standard selected by the Civil Aeronautics

Board (CAB) );* or (3) the exchange value of the current

French franc. The District Court at 525 F.Supp. 1288

(19a) held that the applicable conversion standard for

the limitation was the last official price of gold in the

United States (21a), in reliance on CAB orders. Thus,

the District Court entered judgment for Franklin Mint

in the amount of $6,475.98.

mately $20 per kilogram). See CAB Order 74-1-16 (January 3,

1974) 39 Fed. Reg. 1526 (1974) (App. F(48a)) and CAB Order

78-8-10 (August 3, 1978) 43 Fed. Reg. 35971 (1978) (App. G

(66a) ).

* See Article 18(1) (35a).

* Stipulation and Pre-Motion Order dated June 30, 1981 (Court

of Appeals Joint Appendix (A9a). Thus, all parties and the Court

contemplated that some limitation was applicable.

* See pp. 8-9 and notes 22 and 27, infra, for explanation of the

Montreal Protocols.

* CAB Order 74-1-16 (January 3, 1974) (48a) establishes the last

official price of gold as the unit of conversion under the Warsaw

Convention at $42.22 per troy ounce.

5

Franklin Mint appealed, and a Panel of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in an

opinion of September 28, 1982 (1a) written by Judge

Winter and joined by Judges Oakes and Cardamone,

applied the last official U.S. price of gold as the conversion

standard to the specific facts of the case but, without

inviting briefing or argument on its prospective holding,

held the Article 22(2) liability limitation of the Warsaw

Convention, for loss of cargo, prospectively unenforceable

“in United States courts”. 690 F.2d at 304 (2a),.

The Court of Appeals rejected the last official price of

gold as a unit of conversion on the ground that by repeal

of the Par Value Modification Act in 1978" Congress

had rejected gold as a monetary standard and that such

repeal “was based on a domestic and international con-

clusion that the official price of gold was wholly out of

The decision is to “apply only to events creating liability

occurring 60 days from the issuance of the mandate in this case.”

690 F.2d at 311-12 (18a). The effect of the decision, as counsel for

Franklin Mint and other plaintiffs’ attorneys have suggested, may

extend beyond cargo cases to all Warsaw Convention limits of liabil-

ity, including those for passenger injury and death. See Kelly vy.

B.V. Nederlandse Luchtvaart Maatechappij, No. 82 Civ. 7830

(S.D.N.Y. filed November 24, 1982), a case filed since the decision

below, wherein plaintiffs claim applicability of the Wars. w Con-

vention, but also that the passenger limitation of liability is unen-

forceable. Furthermore, the Second Circuit itself has denied review

of a similar question as to passenger cases, which suggests (perhaps

inferentially) that the Franklin Mint limit of liability unenforce-

ability holding may be dispositive in passenger cases as well. See ln

Re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, 535 F.

Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y, 1982), appeal denied on issue of appropriate

unit of conversion, No, 82-8018 (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 1982).

4 Par Value Modification Act, Pub. L. No. 92-268, 86 Stat. 116

(1972), amended by Par Value Modification Act, 31 U.S.C. § 449

(1973), repealed 1976 by Pub. L. No. 94-564, 90 Stat. 2660. The

repealing Act was enacted in 1976 but became effective April 1,

1978.

6

touch with economic and monetary reality.” 690 F.2d at

309 (13a).¥

TWA petitioned for rehearing. IATA and the Air

Transport Association of America (ATA) were per-

mitted to file an amicus curiae brief in support of TWA’s

petition. The petition for rehearing was denied on De-

cember 1, 1982. TWA obtained a stay of issuance of the

Second Circuit’s mandate, pending its filing of a petition

for writ of certiorari.

B. The Warsaw Convention, Its Protocols And Their Im-

plementation By The U.S. Government

After the United Nations Charter, the Warsaw Con-

vention is the most widely adopted of international

treaties.’* It was signed by the parties in 1929 and con-

tinuously adhered to by the United States since 1934."

Because it is self-executing it needed no supplementary

Congressional! legislation to bring it into force.**

The principal purpose of the framers of the Convention

was to establish a uniform body of world-wide rules re-

lating to carriage of passengers and cargo in interna-

tional aviation transportation.'* The Treaty establishes

a predictable, reliable and consistent basis for resolving

12 This is discussed at length in TWA’s Petition for Certiorari

herein, pp. 5-6 and 15-17.

‘SA non-profit association representing federally licensed U.S.

air carriers providing scheduled air transportation both domesti-

cally and abroad. It is anticipated that ATA will seek to file an

amicus brief herein.

4 A. Lowenfeld, Aviation Law, § 4.1, at 7-98 (2d ed. 1981).

18 See note 3, supra, and App. D (44a).

16 Indem. Ins. Co. of North America Vv. Pan American Airways,

Inc., 58 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Garcia v. Pan American

Airways, Inc., 269 A.D. 287, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 317, aff'd, 295 N.Y. 852,

67 N.E. 2d 257, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 741 (1946). See Bacardi

Corp. V. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 161 (1940).

17 See TWA's Petition for Certiorari herein, pp. 4-5.

7

disputes as to liability or damage arising from such

transportation, thereby providing some measure of stabil-

ity in the international commercial aviation environ-

ment.* The actual carrier is made presumptively liable

for loss, damages or delay of the cargo (Article 18)**—

and the quid pro quo for that is the limitation of its

liability under Article 22 of the Convention.” The

Convention also provides that all such claims arising

under its provisions can only be brought subject to its

provisions (Article 24) (37a). It also establishes notice

of claim provisions (Article 26), and the jurisdictions

where claims may be adjudicated (Article 28) (38-39a).

As another Panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sec-

ond Circuit recognized just several years ago, the dele

gates to the Warsaw Convention knew that in years to

come civil] aviation would change in unforeseen ways. Yet

“they wished to design a system of air law that would be

both desirable and flexible enough to keep pace with these

changes.” Day Vv. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d

31, 38 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976),

reh’g denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977). Therefore, while

1® See App. D(27-34a). To this end, the Warsaw Convention de-

fines the international transportation to which it applies (Article 1),

the ticket and baggage check requirements for passengers (Articles

3 and 4), the Air Waybill requirements (Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8),

the contractual implications of the Cargo Air Waybill (Articles 9,

10 and 11), the rights of the consignor (shipper) and consignee

(Articles 12, 13, 14 and 15) and certain customs requirements

(Article 16).

1® And as to passengers and their baggage (Article 17) (35a).

2 See Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

434 U.S. 922 (1977); Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386

F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968) ; Lowen-

feld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Conven-

tion, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 497, 499-500 (1967). See generally Minutes,

Second International Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, War-

saw, October 4-12, 1929 (Horner and Legrez trans. 1975). The

presumptions of fault are contained in Articles 17-21 (35-36a) and

Article 25 of the Convention (37-38a).

8

keeping the overall structure of the Convention intact

(including the limit of liability provisions), the parties,

including the United States, have, by means of the Guate-

mala City/Montreal Protocols, sought to amend the Con-

vention.”

The Protocols substitute the SDR as a unit of conver-

sion for Poincare francs in Article 22(4), provide for

substantial upward revision of passenger liability limits,

and permit each nation to supplement the Convention

limits with a compensation plan. Montreal Protocols 3

21 Because of historical opposition in the United States to the

Convention limits of liability for deeth and bodily injury (but not

cargo), the U.S. has striven in recent years to persuade the War-

saw parties to revise upwards those limits. The Hague Protocol,

Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371, the result of a 1955 conference of

the Warsaw parties, doubled the Warsaw limit of liability for bodily

injury or death (cargo limitations were not an issue). It was signed

but never ratified by the United States. See generally A. Lowenfeld,

Aviation Law, pp. 7-100-127 (2d ed. 1981). On November 15, 1965

the United States gave formal! notice of denunciation of the Con-

vention because of the parties’ unwillingness to agree to upward

revisions of the bodily injury or death limit to amounts desirable

to the United States (again, cargo limitations were not the ration-

ale). 50 Dep't State Bull. 923 (1965). In the wake of the adoption

of the Montrea! Agreement, the U.S. withdrew its notice of denun-

ciation on May 13, 1966. 54 Dep't State Bull. 955-57 (1966). The

Montreal Agreement, raising the limitation of liability of the War-

saw Convention to $75,000 for passenger injury or death, was filed

with and approved by the CAB on May 13, 1966 as an interim

measure pending amendment of the Warsaw Convention. CAB

Agreement 18990. Cargo limitations of liability were not changed

by the Montreal Agreement. See also note 31, infra.

22 The Guatemala City Protocol, reached in February-March, 1971,

would establish a single unbreakable limit of liability of approxi-

mately $100,000, liability without fau't, and an increase of the

baggage limitations to 62,500 francs per passenger. See generally

A. Lowenfeld, Aviation Law, pp. 7-154-155 (2d ed. 1981). Again,

there was no proposed change to the cargo limitations.

Montreal Protocols 3 and 4 were approved and signed by the Exec-

utive Branch and forwarded to the U.S. Senate for advice and con-

sent January 14, 1977. They embody the Guatemala City Protocol

9

and 4 were signed by the United States in 1975 and are

presently awaiting the advice and consent of the U.S.

Senate.” As noted in the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations

Committee Report on the Protocols, “{t]he Montreal

Protocols are the result of decades of effort by the United

States to improve the existing Warsaw Treaty system.” **

Thus, the United States government has made a clear

commitment to adhere to the Convention, while working

to amend some of its provisions, including those relating

to limits of liability.¥

and when in force would change the unit of conversion in Warsaw

Convention Article 22(4) from gold (Poincare francs) to Special

Drawing Rights (SDRs). They would also raise the limits of liabil-

ity for death to approximately 100,000 SDRs ‘approximately

$112,000) and provide for individual nations’ establishment of a

Supplemental Compensation Plan for passenger death. Their limit

for loss or damage to cargo would be 17 SDRs (approximately

$20) per kilogram, regardless of fault. U.S. ratification would be

Subject to establishment of an adequate Supplemental Compensa-

tion Plan, as reviewed and approved by the CAB. S. Exec. Rep.

No. 45, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., at 3-7 (1981). See note 31, infra.

** The Protocols were reported on favorably (16-1) by the U.S.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 17, 1981. S.

Exec. Rep. No. 45, 97th Cong., let Sess., at 3-7 (1981). Although

scneduled, they did not reach a floor vote in the last session of the

97th Congress and have been referred back to the Foreign Relations

Committee. See Aviation Week and Space Technology, November

29, 1982, at 43-44; Aviation Daily, January 3, 1983, at 1.

™S. Exec. Rep. No. 45, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.. at 5 (1981).

%* Indeed, it appears that neither the Panel (nor the parties)

had at their disposal the Detailed Report of the United States Dele-

gation to the ICAO International Conference on Air Law, Sept.

1975, to revise Montreal Protocols 3 and 4 to the Warsaw Conven-

tion. That report demonstrates that it was the United States that

urged the use of SDRs as the unit of conversion for the Montreal

Protocols. Despite this clear expression of interest by the Execu-

tive Branch, the Court of Appeals suggests that because the United

States Senate has not ratified these Protocols, their content is not a

viable alternative, and that consequently there is no viable conver-

sion rate. The Panel misapprehended the reason why the

10

Historically, and particularly since 1965, both the Ex-

ecutive and Legislative Branches have relied upon the

Civil] Aeronautics Board (CAB) to deal with Convention

issues involving limitations of liability. Congress has

delegated to the CAB authority to coordinate and review

international airline matters and agreements ** and the

power and duty to investigate and ensure that the tariffs

governing foreign air transportation, including the limi-

tation of liability for cargo carriage, are lawful, fair

and reasonable; and to suspend any tariff found to be

unlawful; *’ consistent, however, with any treaty obliga-

tion of the United States.** Since the Warsaw Conven-

tion is self-executing, the method of converting the Poin-

care franc into “lawful money of the United States” ™

pursuant to Article 22(4) of the Convention (37a) has

clearly become a tariff function and within the Board’s

legislative rulemaking functions under the Federal Avia-

tion Act.”

Despite changes in the use of gold as a currency base

and the ongoing Warsaw Convention amendment process,

the latest CAB staff memorandum as to the appropriate

unit of conversion affirms the selection of the last official

price of U.S. gold by CAB Order 74-1-16 (48a) :

[T)he Board’s current course of action [use of the

last official U.S. price of gold as a unit of conver-

sion] is superior to any of the alternatives currently

available... . Pending resolution of this issue by

the three agencies (CAB, Department of Transpor-

tation, Department of State] we believe the Board

Guatemala/Montreal Protocols have not been adopted by the United

States. The controversy that has delayed legislative approval has

to do only with the total supplemental compensation package, not

the selection of the SDR as the international unit of conversion.

2 49 U.S.C. §§ 1382 and 1386.

#7 49 U.S.C. §§ 1874(a) and 1482.

46 49 U.S.C. § 1502.

% 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a).

49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seg.

11

should take no action which would disturb the con-

version formula now contained in sections 221.175

and 221.176 of the [CAB] regulations [14 C.F.R.

$$ 221.175 and 221.176 (1981) ).

Memorandum prepared by John Golden, Director, Bureau

of Compliance and Consumer Protection, Civil Aeronau-

tics Board, May 20, 1981 (App. H (58a)). Over the

years, the Board has also been responsible for implement-

ing other provisions of the Convention and its Proto-

cols *’—particularly in recent years while coordination of

the Montreal Protocols was in process.

C. The Interest of IATA And Its Member Airlines

We recognize that a request to intervene before this

Court is unusual. The unanticipated™ decision of the

"! For instance, in 1966 the Executive Branch deferred to the

Board for review and approval of the compromise Montreal Agree-

ment, CAB No. 18990, as an interim measure pending negotiation

and ratification of a new treaty. Also, CAB Order 74-1-16 (48a)

converted Poincare francs into U.S. dollars at the last official U.S.

price of gold. And at the Senate hearings regarding the Montreal

Protocols, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee received the

views of the Board regarding the status of the Supplemental Com-

pensation Plan (prepared pursuant to the Montreal Protocols),

which is still pending before the Board. See Civil Aviation Proto-

cols: Heasing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United

States Senate, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., at 6-8 (1981). Indeed, the

Senate is looking to the Board for a reevaluation of the proposed

Supplemental Compensation Plan (See CAB Order 77-7-85 (July 20,

1977) ) a8 a condition subsequent to ratification; i.e., it would come

into force only if the CAB makes a favorable determination. See

S. Exec. Rep. No. 45, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). The Plan would

be subject to review in United States courts, presumably by peti-

tioners herein. See 5 U.S.C. § 702; Chrysler Corp. Vv. Brown, 441

U.S. 281, 317 (1979).

*2 The result reached by the Court of Appeals had not previously

been briefed by the parties, nor did IATA and its member airlines

anticipate such a decision. Since the only issue in the case prior to

the Panel's decision was the conversion standard for the limitation

(stipulated and so ordered by the District Court), and since that

12

Court of Appeals has the practical effect of denying the

member airlines (and at least vicariously some of their

owner governments) participation in the normal Warsaw

Convention administrative procedures employed by the

United States during the amendment process. It also re-

sults in additional exposure to unlimited damages and

attendant additional costs in the thousands of cargo suits

filed each year. Therefore, we submit that intervention is

appropriate.”

Most of IATA’s 123 international members carry air

cargo to and from the United States and are consequently

subject to litigation in American courts.* They carry

on their day-to-day business in reliance on the Warsaw

Convention framework. The disruption of this structure

by judicial abrogation of the limitation will greatly

hamper this important international commerce, and sig-

nificantly increase the cost of doing business in an indus-

issue had been litigated before other courts with various results,

see note 51, infra, IATA did not seek to burden the judicial process

by prior intervention.

383 See note 1, supra. IATA has standing to bring this constitu-

tional challenge in its own right and on behalf of its members.

NAACP v. Alabama ez rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1958) ;

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee Vv. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,

183-87 (Burton, J., concurring) (1951); United States v. SCRAP,

412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).

IATA and its members meet the test of standing enunciated in

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). Cf. Duke Power Co. V.

Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80-81 (1978):

Where a party champions his own rights, and where the injury

alleged is a concrete and particularized one which will be pre-

vented or redressed by the relief requested, the basic practical

and prudential concerns underlying the standing doctrine are

generally satisfied when the constitutional requisites are met.

Sec, ¢.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.

Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977).

* If the airway bill is issued here or the destination is the United

States, they are subject to suit here even if they are an interline

carrier. See Article 30(2) (39a).

13

try already staggering under the economic burdens of the

times and the effects of deregulation. Indeed, the dis-

array sown by this case may not be confined to Warsaw

cargo cases (for the treaty provisions are interrelated),

nor to the aviation industry alone.” The member airlines

of IATA (and in some cases, their governments) have a

right to know whether, by virtue of this decision, the

United States, consistent with the actions of the Legisla-

tive and Executive Branches, remains a supporter of the

Warsaw Convention framework.

IATA’s members and their governments fully support

the principle of liability limitation embodied in the War-

saw Convention and subsequent treaties. IATA, its mem-

ber airlines, their respective governments, and shippers

in international air transportation rely upon the good

faith of the United States in the treaty-making process

and United States court decisions in making their busi-

ness and legal decisions.**

The Warsaw Convention greatly facilitates an interna-

tional commercial process and uniformly establishes vari-

% See, ¢.g., Brussels Convention, August 25, 1924 (The Hague

Rules), 51 Stat. 233 (limit of liability unit of conversion in Poin-

care francs for loss of international maritime cargo); United Na-

tions Convention on the Carriage of Goods By Sea, 1978 (The Ham-

burg Rules), A/CONF. 89/13, 30 March 1978 (limit of liability

unit of conversion in SDRs for loss of international maritime cargo

(to supercede The Brussels Convention)). The SDR is a unit of

account in no leas than 15 international conventions (some of which

are in effect). Merren, The SDR as a Unit of Account in Private

Transactions, 16 Int’! Law 503, 505 (1982).

5 See note 51, infra. It is anticipated that some of their govern-

ments may file official communications with the United States De-

partment of State protesting or objecting to the decision, and

urging the United States Executive Branch to take appropriate

steps to support its commitment to a uniform treaty structure.

For these and other reasons suggested, infra, this Court should

invite the views of the Solicitor General as to the Court of Appeals’

decision. See Califorvia v. Texas, 450 U.S. 961 (1981); Crist v.

Cline, 434 U.S. 980 (1977).

14

ous predictable commercial criteria relevant to the day-to-

day conduct of business in international air cargo ship-

ment. The judicial disruption of this structure by abro-

gation (or reservation) of the limitation of liability pro-

visions will only proliferate uncertainty, increase litiga-

tion and complicate business dealings.*’

Even more important for purposes of the constitutional

question herein, IATA is sensitive to the international

repercussions of the Court of Appeals’ decision among

the world’s governments and seeks herein to advise this

Court of those problems. In the interest of judicial econ-

omy, the question presented herein should be promptly

and finally resolved * before the Court of Appeals’ deci-

sion engenders a plethora of lawsuits brought under the

“no limit of liability” regime. If courts permit the unen-

forceability holding to be asserted in passenger cases, the

upheaval and foreign government reaction could be ex-

ponentially greater. See, e.g., Duke Power Co, Vv. Carolina

Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

A. The Decision Of The Court Of Appeals Violates The

Constitutional Separation Of Powers Doctrine By

Improperly Interjecting The Judiciary Into The Con-

duct of Foreign Relations

1. The Judiciary Has Intervened in the Treaty Nego-

tiation Process

The Constitution reserves to the Executive Branch the

power to negotiate and make treaties, with the advice

and consent of the Senate.” The primacy of the political

5T See also pp. 6-7, supra.

** However, we do not believe this Court needs to decide the

proper conversion factor in Article 22 of the Convention to rectify

the disarray caused by the Court of Appeals’ decision.

% See also pp. 22-25, infra.

# U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (46a).

15

branches in the conduct of the Nation’s foreign relations

has always been a cornerstone of the federal judiciary’s

self-restraint. While the Judicial Branch’s power extends

to interpretation of treaties,"' treaties are to be interpreted

liberally to carry out the intent of the drafters. Nielson

v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 51 (1929). If circumstances have

changed, the court is to examine the conduct of the parties

subsequent to ratification of the treaty in order to ascer-

tain its proper construction. See Pigeon River Improv.

Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cor, Ltd., 291 U.S.

138, 153-63 (1934); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187,

192-194 (1961). The judiciary may not generate a

reservation or declare an abrogation of a treaty unless it

finds the treaty unconstitutional * or holds that it has

been superceded by subsequently enacted and conflicting

legislation.” However, to hold a treaty superceded by

subsequent legislation in conflict with it, a court must

find that Congress’ intent to supercede was clear, definite

and specifically in contemplation of the treaty super-

ceded. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S, 102, 120

(1933); United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S, 218, 22

S. Ct. 629, 682 (1902); Union Pacific Railroad vy. United

States, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1879); Valentine v. United-

States, 299 U.S. 5, 10-11 (1936); cf. Whitney v. Robert-

son, supra, Furthermore, it has never seriously been sug-

gested that the judiciary has the power to terminate or

generate judicial reservations to treaties.“ The judi-

“1 U.S. Const. art. ITI, § 2, cl. 1 (46a).

“2 The treaty power is unlimited except as it “extends so far as

to authorize what the Constitution forbids... ." Geofroy v. Riggs,

133 U.S. 268, 267 (1890). See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17

(1967); Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902); Doe ex dem.

Clark v. Braden, 16 How. 635, 657 (1853). There was no suggestion

by the Court of Appeals in Franklin Mint of any constitutional

infirmity in the Warsaw Convention.

* Whitney V. Robertaon, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1889).

“Cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F Supp. 949 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 617

F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).

16

ciary’s “role is limited to giving effect to the intent of

the Treaty parties.” Sumitomo Shoji America, Ine. V.

Avagliano, 102 S.Ct. 2874, 2380 (1982).

While professing its adherence to these basic princi-

ples, the Court of Appeals did precisely what it said it

could not do.** It created, in effect, a judicial reservation

in an existing treaty. More importantly, it also inter-

jected itself into the delicate process of renegotiation of

the Warsaw Convention framework, a matter which the

Constitution quite clearly leaves in the hands of the

political branches.

As we have noted above, the framers of the Warsaw

Convention understood that, in years to come, civil avia-

tion would change in unforeseen ways.** They accepted

the inevitability of future modification of the agreement

. but committed themselves to make those adjustments

within the Convention’s basic framework. Indeed, the

United States, dissatisfied with the low limits of liability

set forth in the Treaty, at one point contemplated denun-

ciation but decided to work within the framework of the

Convention for a general modernization of the limits of

liability.” It took a leadership role in the delicate recon-

ciliation of competing interests within the international

community. Those efforts culminated in the Guatemala

City/Montrea] Protocols. Today, ratification of the Mon-

treal Protocols await the advice and consent of the Senate.

In the interim, the political branches of the United States

government, along with the governments of the other

parties, have committed themselves to operate within the

framework of the Convention.

* It claimed to recognize that “it is not the province of courts

to declare treaties abrogated... ” 690 F.2d at 311, n.26 (17a).

* See p. 7, supra. Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d

at 38.

** See pp. 8-9, supra and notes 2) and 22, supra.

17

By declaring that the limitation on liability provision

of the Convention is unenforceable in “United States

courts”,** the Court of Appeals unilaterally took, in effect,

precisely the action which the political branches declined

to take when, rather than denounce the Treaty, they

determined to work with other nations for its moderniza-

tion.” Taking this unilateral action, the Panel of the

Second Circuit, unlike every other federal court™ and

foreign court “ to consider the matter, ignored the obvious

4* 690 F.2d at 304 (6a).

** Between signing and ratification of a treaty (as in the case of

Montreal Protocols 3 and 4), a party is obliged not to take any

action in contravention of the treaty. United States v. D’Auterive,

51 U.S. 609 (10 How, 607, 623) (1850). The same principle applies

under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,

reprinted in 81 I.L.M. 679, 686 (1969), which, although not ratified

by the United States, has been relied upon by U.S. courts. See, e.g.,

Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce Vv. Goldschmidt, 627 F.2d 258,

263 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Huseerl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351

F.Supp. 702, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 485 F.2d 1240

(2d Cir. 1973).

™ See notes 21, 22 and 23, supra.

5! See In Re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14,

1980, 535 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (selecting last official U.S.

price of gold in Warsaw passenger case), appeal denied on that

iseue, No. 82-8018 (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 1982). Boehringer Mannheim

Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 531 F. Supp.

344 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (selecting free market price of gold in Warsaw

cargo case), oppeal pending, No. 81-2519; Deere & Co. v. Deutache

Lufthansa 4.G., N.D. Ill. No. 81 C 4726 (Dec. 30, 1982) (selecting

last official U.S. price of gold in Warsaw cargo case).

*? The following foreign cases demonstrate a willingness by for-

eign courts to select a Warsaw unit of conversion in the face of

shifting currency bases (references in parentheses are to the Court

of Appeals Joint Appendix): Pakistan International Airlines v.

Compagnie Air Inter 8.A., No. 79/2278, Court of Appeals of Aix-en-

Provence, France (October 30, 1980) (A156-A170); Horniinie A.G.

v. Societe Nationale Petroles Aquitaine, Supreme Court of the

Netherlands, 7 Eur. Trans. L. 988 (1972) (A126-A155) ; Companhia

de Sequros Maritimos v. Varig, Federal Court of Appeals of Brazil

(June 3, 1975); Association Acronautique vy. Thierache, Tribunal

18

intent of the United States and its Treaty partners to

maintain the Treaty framework despite the transitory

difficulties thus far in setting the conversion standard.

2. The Court of Appeals Has Disregarded the Divi-

sion of Labor Within the Political Branches

Another factor makes even more obvious the radica]

nature of the Court of Appeals’ departure from the ac-

cepted paths of judicial behavior with respect to the ad-

ministration of treaty relations. In holding the limita-

tion of liability provision of the Convention unenforceable

because of the proposed impossibility of devising a satis-

factory conversion formula, the Panel did further violence

to the separation of powers principle by failing to ac-

knowledge the unique role which the CAB plays in this

aspect of effectuating the Warsaw Convention in the

United States. Through the delicate process of renego-

tiating the Convention, the Executive Branch has relied

on the CAB to confirm a viable conversion standard. Far

from following the “law of inertia” as suggested by the

Court of Appeals,“ the Board, after vigorous internal

debate," acted consistently with the intent of the treaty

de Grande Instance, Paris, France (February 10, 1973); Kuwait

Airways Corp. v. Sanghi, Bangalore, India (August 11, 1978)

(A265-A271); Balkan Bulgarian Airlines Vv. Tammaro, Court of

Milan, Italy (October 25, 1976) (A262-A264); Fida Cinematogra-

fica Vv. Pan American World Airways, Rome Civil Court, Italy

(October 13, 1976); Linee Aeree Italiane Vv. Riccioli, No. 609/79,

Rome Civil Court, Italy (November 14, 1978) (A95-A107); Floren-

cia Cia Argentina de Seguros S.A. vy. Varig S.A., Buenos Aires,

Argentina, 1977 Uniform L. Rev. 198 (August 27, 1976) (A265-

A261); Zakapoulos v. Olympic Airwaya Corp., No. 256/74, Court

of Appeal, 3d Dep’t Athens, Greece (February 15, 1974) (A251-

A254). The United Kingdom, by Statutory Instrument 1980 No. 281,

has selected SDRs as the Wareaw Convention conversion standard

(A62-A63). Canada, by regulation, has also established SDRs as

the Warsaw conversion standard. Carriage By Air Act Regulations,

P.C. 1983— “an. 13, 1983 (effective date Jan. 14, 1983).

* 690 F.2d at 310 (14a).

* Court of Appeals Joint Appendix A32-A46, A62-A56.

19

and has applied the official price of gold during the in-

terim period.” Thus, the CAB, like the Executive Branch,

has chosen to maintain the status quo* and the effec-

tiveness of a treaty that is adhered to not only by the

United States, but also by over 100 other sovereign

nations.

The Court of Appeals has disregarded, the presumptive

validity of the CAB orders" and, consequently, the his-

torical role which this agency has played in the adminis-

tration of the United States’ obligation under the Warsaw

Convention.” Reviewed in light of the CAB’s role, the

Court of Appeals’ holding that repeal of the Par Value

Modification Act of 1973 constituted “an explicit aban-

donment of the previously established unit of conver-

sion” in the Warsaw Convention is especially superfi-

cial. Of course, even under the basic principles of treaty

55 See note 5, supra, and CAB Orders 72-6-7 (June 2, 1972) 37

Fed. Reg. 11384 (1972); 74-1-16 (Jan. 3, 1974) (48a); 78-8-10

(Aug. 3, 1978) (52a).

% See Golden Memorandum, pp. 10-11, supra (58a); CAB Order

74-1-16 (48a); and 14 C.F.R. §§ 221.175 and 176 (1981).

5? Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ assumption that the CAB’s

last statement converting the gold French franc to dollars predates

the repeal of the Par Value Modification Act of 1973, the Board on

August 3, 1978, stated, with respect to IATA Conditions of Cargo

Carriage, “At the present time a carrier’s liability for Warsaw

traffic... is $20 per kilogram... .” CAB Order 78-8-10 (August 8,

1978) (52a).

5* The decision also interferes with the joint effort of the Execu-

tive Branch and the CAB to develop a Supplemental Compensation

Plan pursuant to the Montreal Protocols. See notes 22 and 31, supra.

5® Par Value Modification Act, Pub. L. No. 92-268, 86 Stat. 116

(1972), amended by Par Value Modification Act, 31 U.S.C. § 449

(1973), repealed 1976 by Pub. L. No. 94-564, 90 Stat. 2660.

© 690 F.2d at 311 (17a).

*) In fact, neither the legislative histories of the Par Value Modi-

fication Acts nor the statute repealing the latter make any mention

of the Warsaw Convention. The legislative history of the repealing

20

interpretation outlined above, the potentia! result would

be highly questionable since “the intention to abrogate or

modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to Congress.”

Pigeon River Improv. Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W.

Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. at 160, quoted in Menominee Tribe

of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968).

Certainly, a statute which, by the Court of Appeals’ own

admission was not aimed at abrogating the Warsaw Con-

vention,™ but rather ameliorating monetary shifts, can-

not be said to amount to a congressional denunciation of

the Treaty here.

However, it is not necessary to rely simply on the

general principles of treaty interpretation. The CAB,

the agency relied upon by the Executive and charged by

the Legislative Branch ® with the responsibility for ad-

ministration of this aspect of U.S. treaty obligations

under the Warsaw Convention, has—despite the repeal

of the Par Value Modification Act—consistently held to

the regulations establish d by CAB Order 74-1-16 (48a),

which applies the last oficial price of gold as the appro-

priate conversion standard for cargo (and other Warsaw)

limits of liability.* Indeed, more than two years after the

Act reflects the Senate’s recognition that there were other purposes

for which the official price would still be used to determine the

monetary value of gold. It was noted that the “only domestic

purpose for which it is necessary” was to determine the value of

gold held in the form of gold certificates. See 690 F.2d at 308, n.11

(10a). The clear inference was that there were other international

purposes, but this was overlooked by the Court of Appeals. 690 F.2d

at 309, n.20, referring to n.12 [sic; it should be n.11] (13a). Clearly,

the issue in this case is international, not domestic.

@ “Congress may not have focused explicitly upon the Convention

in repealing [the Par Value Modification Act]... .” 690 F.2d at

311 (17a).

* See notes 28 and 30, supra.

* See notes 5 and 9, supra. See also 14 C.F.R. §§ 221.175 and

176 (1981). Moreover, the Court of Appeals apparently mistakenly

believed that application of the official rate of gold to Warsaw

21

Jamaica Accords and the legislation repealing the Par

Value Modification Act of 1973, and more than four

months after that legislation became effective on April 1,

1978, the CAB valued the cargo limit according to the

last official price of U.S. gold.“ Accordingly, there was

no basis on which the Court of Appeals could constitu-

tionally render unenforceable the liability limits of Arti-

cle 22 of the Convention. Even were the Court of Ap-

peals’ decision devoid of constitutional infirmity, it would

merit this Court’s review because it conflicts with the

“familiar rule that the obligations of treaties should be

liberally construed so as to give effect to the apparent

intention of the parties.” Valentine v. United States, 299

U.S. at 10.”

Convention limitations was derived solely from the Par Value Modi-

fication Act of 1973 and its predecessor. When the Par Value

Modification Act adjusted the official rate of gold, the CAB directed

the carriers to apply the new rate of conversion in their tariffs.

The power to mandate use of the official price was derived from the

Federal Aviation Act (see CAB Order 72-6-7, June 2, 1972) and

not from the Par Value Modification Act. In issuing that Order,

the CAB took into consideration a number of policy factors, of

which the Par Value Modification Act was only one, including the

continuing application of the Warsaw Convention. Accordingly,

legislation repealing the Par Value Modification Act should not be

taken to have precluded the CAB’s approval of the last official price

of gold for filing in air carrier tariffs governed by the Warsaw

Convention.

* See note 57, supra.

* Prior to Franklin Mint, the Second Circuit had followed this

rule. See Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913,

918 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979); Reed v.

Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977);

Day Vv. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1975),

cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976), reh’g denied, 429 U.S. 1124

(1977).

22

B. The Decision Of The Court Of Appeals Has And Will

Seriously Disrupt International Air Commerce And

The Federal Courts

1. The Decision Has an Immediate Adverse Effect on

the International Air Cargo System

The Court of Appeals’ prospective unenforceability

holding frustrates the purposes of the Convention not only

by casting into limbo air cargo shippers and carriers who

will be in litigation over loss or damage to cargo but

also by disrupting the routine conduct of the interna-

tional air cargo business.” Quite simply, if the Court of

Appeals’ mandate takes effect, there will be no limit on

liability in suits filed in at least Second Circuit courts,

if not all “United States courts”,™ for loss or damage as

to Convention-governed air cargo shipments where there

has been no special declaration of value under Article 22

(36a). Since a special declaration under Article 22 for

each item of cargo is simply not practical in most cases

for reasons of time, practice and course of dealing, the

shippers and air carriers (and their governments) must

separately or together consider new arrangements. Ob-

viously, if the Court of Appeals’ decision stands, some

new arrangements for some shippers and some carriers

must be attempted, but they will probably differ and

some may prove impractical. This new process would

certainly undermine the uniformity, stability, predictabil-

ity and reliability envisioned by the framers of the War-

saw Convention.

“ As noted at pp. 6-7, supra, the Warsaw Convention estab-

lishes uniform documentation and commercial obligations require-

ments, providing an internationally consistent scheme for both cargo

shippers and air carriers. In the absence of these provisions both

shippers and carriers would have to resort to local rules of commerce

as varied as the number of Warsaw contracting parties. The

Convention aids in avoiding such a morass and also aids and enables

shipping cargo anywhere in the world on a single air waybill.

* 690 F.2d at 304 (6a).

23

The Court of Appeals apparently recognized the de-

vastating effect that this holding might have on the

present international aviation system when it provided

a moratorium on the effect of the unenforceability ruling

and suggested that the airlines reformulate their tariffs

filed with the CAB.” The Panel’s suggestion is unrealis-

tic. International tariffs must be reciprocally consistent.

Their reformulation would involve innumerable intricacies

and unavoidable delays. In some countries, new enabling

legislation and new operating agreements may have to

precede amendment of conditions of contract and airway

bills by foreign air carriers. Tariff reformulation in this

country would also be subject to a time-consuming process,

which would necessarily require more than the 60 days

allowed by the Panel.” Thus, during the interim, the

current system would be destabilized, and its uniformity

would suffer severely.

2. The Decision Has An Immediate Adverse Effect on

the Federal Courts

Apparently, the Court of Appeals suggested that tariffs

might establish a new limit of liability. Even if new

tariffs and new procedures are ultimately upheld, the

legal system will be more burdened by a plethora of liti-

gation (including future resort to this Court when, in-

evitably, the decisions are inconsistent). Such legal chal-

lenges would not be limited to those mentioned above, but

may include additional issues, relating, inter alia, to the

continued viability of the presumption c? liability under

© 690 F.2d at 312 (18a).

™ The CAB has recently promulgated a mew rule covering tariffs

for interstate or overseas air transportation as defined in the Fed-

eral Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1301, et seq. The primary reason for

the new rule is the elimination of domestic tariffs as of January 1,

1983 pursuant to the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.

95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978). See 47 Fed. Reg. 14,892 (1982) (to

be codified at 14 (.F.R. § 8399). Similar implementation orders

would probably be necessary for international tariffs if the Panel's

decision remains undisturbed, which could cause further delay.

24

Article 18 of the Warsaw Convention, the required con-

tent of new notice provisions, and the effect of possibly

inconsistent findings by foreign courts on similar issues.”

As previously noted, Franklin Mint’s attorney has already

suggested that any tariff attempting to limit liability

might be subject to legal challenge.” Other cargo ship-

pers’ attorneys have already raised issues similar to those

presented herein in other courts ” with differing results,

and certainly numerous additjonal legal challenges may

be anticipated. °

Although we deal herein with limitations on cargo

claims rather than those connected with personal injury

or death of passengers, the nufnber of such commercial

matters litigated in United States courts is several] times

the number of passenger cases. To date, because of the

uniformity and predictability of the limitation provisions,

most of tte: cargo claims are settled—but the effect of

the decision below will make settlement more difficult

and increase the number of cases filed and ultimately

tried."* These practical, severe consequences to the exist-

"1 For example, courts of other contracting parties to the Conven-

tion may reassess their interpretation of the need for uniformity as

to limits of liability, further exacerbating the disarray among air

carriers, their shippers and insurers. Moreover, under Articles 19

and 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra,

note 49, the parties to the Warsaw Convention might contend that

the Court of Appeals’ decision constitutes a material breach of the

Convention entitling them to terminate the Convention. See also

Restatement, 2d Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 153.

™ Remarks of John Foster, Esq., Luncheon of the Air Transporta-

tion Law Committee and the Water Transportation Law Committee

of the Federal Bar Association, December 7, 1982, Washington, D.C.

See qlso note 10, supra.

™ See note 10, supra.

™ With a presumption of liability and the quid pro quo of limita-

tion thereon, the issues and proof of a claim are limited—if the Con-

vention were not in existence, proof of delivery, events, defenses,

etc. would complicate the issuer and the facts in every case.

25

ing international air cargo regime demonstrate why, when

nations have agreed upon a treaty, it should not lightly be

disregarded.

3. The Decision Has An Adverse Long-Term Effect on

International Air Commerce

If the Court of Appeals’ decision is allowed to stand,

how will United States initiatives and commitments be

regarded at future meetings of Warsaw Convention

parties or, indeed, at similar international meetings?

The United States is regarded as an important party to

the Warsaw Convention .because of the relative size of

its aviation industry and its relatively large share of

international air traffic. Nevertheless, in a world in-

creasingly conscious of sovereign independence, the United

States cannot act unilaterally in a treaty -eontext. Of

course, the United States may at times seek to change

its treaty relationships or withdraw from treaties or seek

to change treaty terms. But such steps should be taken

advisedly by the Executive Branch—not by the judiciary.

Courts “should hesitate long before limiting or em-

barassing” the sovereign powers of the United States,

particularly as they concern foreign affairs. Mackenzie

v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915), quoted in United

States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 322

(1936).

Foreign relations is certainly one area where the

United States should speak with “one voice”. If allowed

to stand, the Court of Appeals’ decision will surely vitiate

the longstanding commitment of the Roosevelt Adninis-

tration that the United States would give full, “good

faith” o! servance to the Warsaw Convention.” The con-

tracting parties have manifested an intent to keep the

' Proclamation of President Franklin D. Roosevelt declaring U.S.

adherence to the Warsaw Convention, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876 (1984).

26

Warsaw Convention, including the limitation of liability

concept, alive despite the ambiguities caused by the

changing world monetary situation.”* The United States,

through its Executive Branch, has also sought to further

those goals. This Court should not permit the judiciary,

on its own motion, to isolate the U.S. legal system or

place in further doubt whether this nation “speaks with

one voice” with respect to foreign affairs. See Miahelin

Tire Corp. Vv. Wages, 423 U.S, 276, 285 (1976) ; Depart-

ment of Revenue of Washington v. Association of Wash-

ington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 784, 752-53 (1978);

Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434,

449 (1979). As this Court noted in The Bremen v. Zapata

Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972), the day is long past

when our courts can adhere to the “parochial concept”

that “trade and commerce in world markets and interna-

tional waters [be] exclusively on our own terms, gov-

erned by our laws, and resolved in our courts.” See also

Scherk v, Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974);

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). The

abolition of al] standards of liability is simply not a sit-

uation desired by any nation, including the United States.

Thus, it must be recognized that the decision of the Court

of Appeals will have a significant adverse impact on the

United States’ ability to deal effectively with international

legal transactions in other contexts.

™ See note 52, supra.

27

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, leave should be granted

for petitioners to intervene and to file a petition for writ

of certiorari to review the opinion and judgment of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in

Franklin Mint. Alternatively, if leave to intervene is

denied, petitioners request that this Court treat the

petition as an amicus curiae brief in support of TWA’s

petition for certiorari,”

Respectfully submitted,

CARROLL E, Dusuc *

AIDAN D. JONES

RAND! L. BRESLOW

HAIGHT, GARDNER, Poor

& HAVENS

1819 H Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 775-1800

Counsel for Petitioners

Of Counsel: International Air Transport

KENNETH F. RIPPLE Association and Forty-Three

Notre Dame Law School Member Airlines (see

Notre Dame, Ind. 46556 Appendiz |)

January 20, 1988 * Counsel of Record

= “ah No. 82-1186 MURR Sh

$

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,

7 Petitioner,

FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN MINT

LIMITED and McGreGoR, SWIRE AIR SERVICES LIMITED,

Respondents,

INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION AND

ForTY-THREE OF ITS MEMBER AIRLINES (SEE APPENDIX I),

Potential Intervenors.

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE IN

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC, vy.

FRANKLIN MINT CORP., NO, 82-1186 AND

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI OF

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC,

CARROLL E. DuBuc *

AIDAN D, JONES

RAND! L. BRESLOW

HAIGHT, GARDNER, Poor

& HAVENS

1819 H Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 775-1800

Counsel for Petitioners

Of Counsel: International Air Transport

Feanetn F. Rirrie Association and Forty-Three

Notre Dame Law School Member Airlines (see

Notre Dame, Ind. 46556 Appendiz |)

January 20, 1963 * Counsel of Reeord Db

TABLE OF CONTENTS

. Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit in Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans

World Airlines, Inc., No. 82-7012 (September 28,

A scovciiclnlane cianasisinaniaies ttieekdiasdasnanemanae

. Memorandum and Order (filed Nov. 12, 1981),

Order and Judgment (filed Dec. 4, 1981) and

Amended Order (filed Dec. 28, 1981) of the United

States District Court for the Southern District of

New York in Franklin Mint v. Trans World Air-

Lines, Inc., 81 Civ. 1700 (WK)

. Judgment of the United States Court of aie

for the Second Circuit in Franklin Mint Corp. v.

Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 82-7012 —

I isc ce ae a

. Warsaw Convention and List of Adhering Nations..

. Applicable Sections of the United States Constitu-

. CAB Order 74-1-16, 39 Fed. Reg. 1526 (1974)........

. CAB Order 78-8-10, 43 Fed. Reg. 35971 (1978)

ESET eer Crees, EES

. J. Golden, “Warsaw Convention Liability Limits”,

Bureau of Compliance and Consumer Protection,

Gath ID coecercntisnssnosncnsevcsenncesntitoniannaineadele

. Membership List of International Air Transport

Association (IATA) (asterisked to indicate individ-

ual potential intervenors) oo... ccccteenenne

Page

la

19a

la

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 999—August Term, 1981

(Argued April 22, 1982 Decided September 28, 1982)

Docket No. 82-7012

FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN MINT LIMITED,

and MCGREGOR, SWIRE AIR SERVICES LIMITED,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants,

Vv.

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Before:

OAKES, CARDAMONE, and WINTER,

Circuit Judges.

Appeal from a final judgment of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of New York,

Whitman Knapp, Judge, utilizing the last official price of

gold to calculate the limit on defendant’s liability under

the Warsaw Convention.

The Court holds the limitation provision of the Con-

vention prospectively unenforceable and affirms.

2a

JoHN R. Foster, New York, New York (Donald M.

Waesche, Waesche, Scheinbaum & O’Regan, P.C., New

York, New York, of counsel), for Plaintiffs-Appel-

lants Franklin Mint Corporation, Franklin Mint

Limited, and McGregor, Swire Air Services, Limited.

JOHN N. RoMANS, New York, New York (Robert S.

Lipton, Scott J. McKay Wolas, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost,

Colt & Mosley, New York, New York, of counsel) for

Defendant-Appellee Trans World Airlines, Inc.

(Robert B. Hemley, Norman Williams, Gravel, Shea &

Wright, Burlington, Vermont, of counsel) for Amici-

Curiae Jacques Roulin and Hugh Harley.

WINTER, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from a final judgment of the United

States District Court for the Southern District of New

York, Whitman Knapp, Judge, limiting the defendant’s

liability under the Warsaw Convention (“Convention”)?

for loss of cargo. In determining the limit in United

States dollars, Judge Knapp utilized the last official price

of gold as a unit of conversion and awarded plaintiffs

$6,475.98. 525 F.Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Plaintiffs

appeal, claiming the limit should have been calculated by

other methods. While we agree with the result reached

in this case and thus affirm, we hold the Convention’s

limit on liability prospectively unenforceable in United

States Courts.

SUMMARY OF THE ISSUES AND DECISION

The facts in this case, if nothing else, are clear cut. In

March, 1979, plaintiffs Franklin Mint Corporation, Frank-

Transportation by Air,” opened for signature October 12, 1929, 49

Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (adherence of the United

States proclaimed October 29, 1934).

3a

lin Mint Limited, and McGregor, Swire Air Services

Limited (collectively, “Franklin Mint”) contracted with

defendant Trans World Airlines, Inc. (“TWA”) for the

carriage by air from the United States to England of 714

pounds of numismatic materials. Though the articles were

worth more than $6,500, Franklin Mint made no special

declaration of value. The articles were either lost or

destroyed, thus rendering TWA liable under Article 18 of

the Convention.*? Because of the absence of a special

declaration, TWA sought to limit its liability under Article

22 of the Convention.

Article 22 limits the carrier’s liability for injuries to

both “checked baggage and .. . goods” and “objects of

which the passenger takes charge himself.” * The various

2 Article 18 of the Convention reads:

(1) The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event

of the destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any checked bag-

gage or any goods, if the occurrence which caused the damage

so sustained took place during the transportation by air.

(2) The transportation by air within the meaning of the pre-

ceding paragraph shal] comprise the period during which the

baggage or goods are in charge of the carrier, whether in an

airport or on board an aircraft, or, in the case of a landing

outside an airport, in any place whatsoever.

(3) The period of the transportation by air shall not extend

to any transportation by land, by sea, or by river performed

outside an airport. If, however, such transportation takes

place in the performance of a contract for transportation by

air, for the purpose of loading, delivery or transshipment, any

damage is presumed, subject to proof to the contrary, to have

been the result of an event which took place during the trans-

portation by air.

* Article 22 of the Convention reads:

(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability of the

carrier for each passenger shall be limited to the sum of

125,000 francs. Where, in accordance with the law of the court

to which the case is submitted. damages may be awarded in the

form of periodical payments. the equivalent capita! value of the

4a

limits are stated in terms of a specified number of French

gold or “Poincare” francs, a unit of account consisting of

“651% milligrams of gold at a standard fineness of nine

hundred thousandths.” The limit on baggage or other

goods is 250 Poincare francs per kilogram. The dollar

value of that limit is calculated simply by converting the

gold value of the specified unit into United States dollars,

e.g., the limit per kilogram is 250 multiplied by the dollar

value of 65% milligrams of gold.

The difficulty arises from the fact that when Article 22

was drafted, gold served official monetary functions and

its price was set by law. The Convention thus selected it

as the unit of conversion in order to ensure judgments of

uniform value as well as a stable and easily calculable

limitation on liability. The plain but highly troublesome

fact is that by international agreement and United States

domestic legislation gold has now lost its monetary func-

tions and no longer has an official price. Unfortunately

for parties to international airline transactions as well as

said payments shal! not exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by

special contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a

higher limit of liability.

(2) In the transportation of checked baggage and of goods, the

liability of the carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250 francs

per kilogram, unless the consignor has made, at the time when

the package was handed over to the carrier, a special declara-

tion of the value at delivery and has paid a supplementary sum

if the case so requires. In that case the carrier will be liable

to pay a sum not exceeding the declared sum, unless he proves

that that sum is greater than the actual value to the consignor

at delivery.

(3) As regards objects of which the passenger takes charge

himself the liability of the carrier shall be limited to 5,000

francs per passenger.

(4) The sums mentioned above shal! be deemed to refer to the

French franc consisting of 65', milligrams of gold at the

standard of fineness of nine hundred thousandths. These sums

may be converted into any national currency in round figures.

5a

for us, the terms of Article 22 continue to utilize gold as

the unit of conversion. Thus, the parties raise the issue

of what unit of account is now to be used to convert judg-

ments under the Convention into United States dollars.

In arguing the issue, the parties offer four alternatives:

(i) the last official price of gold in the United States; (ii)

the free market price of gold; (iii) the Special Drawing

Right (“SDR”), a unit of account established by the

International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and recently pro-

posed as a substitute for gold in the as yet unratified

Montreal] Protocols to the Convention; and (iv) the ex-

change value of the current French franc. While acknow]-

edging that “the arguments in favor of ... the SDR

[were] most persuasive,” Judge Knapp nevertheless held

that the last official price of gold was the appropriate

standard. This choice was predicated on the view that this

standard “has been ... espoused by the Civil Aero-

nautics Board (“CAB”), the government agency most

intimately concerned with the transaction at hand,” and

has been “used by all domestic carriers—including

TWA—in calculating the dollar value of the Article 22

limitation printed on their tariffs.” 525 F.Supp at 1289.

We share Judge Knapp’s doubt about the result. In-

deed, there are powerful arguments against each of the

proffered solutions. The last official price of gold is a

price which has been explicity repealed by the Congress.

See note 11, infra, and accompanying text. It thus lacks

any status in law or,relationship to contemporary cur-

rency values. The free market price of gold is the highly

volatile price of a commodity determined in part by

forces of supply and demand unrelated to currency values.

SDR’s are a creature of the IMF, modified at will by that

body and having no basis in the Convention. The French

franc is simply one domestic currency, subject to change

by the unilateral act of a single government.

6a

Every proffered solution thus appears to have a devas-

tating argument against it. While the Convention has not

been formally abrogated, enforcement by national judicial

tribunals is impossible without their picking and choosing

among alternative units of conversion according to their

view of which is best as an initial policy matter. We

have no power to select a new unit of account. We thus

hold the Convention’s limitation of liability unenforceable

by United States Courts.

BACKGROUND

Drafted in the late 1920’s, the Convention was designed

both to protect the fledgling aviation industry from the

alternatives of ruinous damage suits or exorbitant insur-

ance premiums and to insure a certain degree of uni-

formity of legal obligation given the expected interna-

tional character of the industry. See A. Lowenfeld and

A. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Con-

vention, 80 Harvard L. Rev. 497, 499-501 (1967) (here-

after “Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn’); see also Reed v.

Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434

U.S. 922 (1977) and CAB Staff Memorandum, Warsaw

Convention Liability Limits, March 18, 1980, at 5-6.

(App. at 43-44). A series of rules governing liability,

affirmative defenses and limitations accomplished the

former goal, while the Convention’s international scope

accomplished the latter. Articles 17, 18 and 19 enunciate

the carrier’s liability for personal injuries, for damage or

loss of baggage, and for damage due to delay. Articles 20

and 21 establish as affirmative defenses lack of fault and

contributory negligence. Finally, Article 22 provides a

limitation on the extent of liability for both personal

injury and less of luggage or other goods.

The personal injury limitations amounts have been

subject to upward revision from time to time

protocols to the original agreement. These revisions

come in the wake of a continuing debate, with the

7!

-

7a

veloped countries, notably the United States, Great Britain

and France, arguing for higher limits, and the less de-

veloped nations seeking reduction of the existing limit.‘

Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn at 504. Throughout this

period, the level of the limitations on liability for loss or

destruction of checked baggage and other goods has

remained the same.

Defining recoveries in terms of a specified amount of

gold was intended to produce stability and uniformity.

Such a common standard allowed the conversion of liability

limits into national currencies and insulated recoveries

from the vicissitudes of currency fluctuation and devalua-

tion. In drafting the Convention, a proposal to fix re-

coveries purely in terms of the French franc was rejected

by Switzerland on the ground that use of a single na-

tional currency rendered the liability limit subject to

change by the act of one government. See Second Interna-

4In 1955, at The Hague, the conferees would agree only to a

doubling of the limit to 250,000 Poincare francs or $16,600. Lowen-

feld and Mendelsohn at 504-09. The United States unenthusiastically

signed the Hague Protocol a year later, but did not present the

treaty to the Senate until July 1959. Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn

at 515. The Senate never ratified the Protocol because of its low

limit, however, and ultimately the Kennedy/Johnson Administra-

tions actually threatened United States denunciation of the Con-

vention. This threat came in the wake of Congress’ failure to en-

act a legislative package ratifying the Hague Protocol while com-

pelling the purchase by all American air carriers of $50,000 in

insurance for each passenger. To avoid United States denunciation,

a conference met in Montreal in the spring of 1966. The result of

this meeting was the so-called Montreal Agreement “which pro-

vided for absolute carrier liability up to $75,000 on all flights into

or out of the United States.” Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d at 1087.

Appeased, the United States withdrew its denunciation. However,

it continued to press for an amendment to the Convention raising

personal injury liability limits. In 1971, the parties promulgated

the Guatemala City Protocol under which personal injury limits

were to be raised to $100,000 at the then current exchange rate

of $35 per ounce of gold.” /d. at 1089 n.12. However, the United

States has not ratified that protocol.

ang

—_ a Cw * P - J *. aeu a

8a

tional Conference on Private Aeronautica! Law, Minutes,

October 4-12, 1929, Warsaw, at 88-89 (Horner and Legrez

trans. 1975), (App. at 247-248). As the Swiss delegate

put it, “Naturally one can say ‘French franc’ but .. . its

{France’s] national law which determines it, and one need

have only a modification of the national law to overturn

the essence of this provision.” Jd. at 89-90, (App. at 248-

249). Accordingly, the Swiss pressed for a standard

which tied the limitation to a gold value regardless of the

national currency actually named in the article. Jd. at 90,

(App. at 249). The conferees accepted the Swiss position

and stated the limitation in terms of the Poincare franc

defined as “65% milligrams of gold at a standard fineness

of nine hundred thousandths.” Convention, art. 22 § (4).°

From October, 1934, when the United States first ad-

hered to the Convention, until 1978, use of gold as unit

of account posed no problem for United States Courts or

the judicial tribunals of other signatory nations. In 1934,

the value of yold was set at $35 per troy ounce pursuant

to statute, United States Gold Reserve Act of 1934, Pub.

L. No. 73-87, 48 Stat. 337 (1934). When the United States

became a party to the International Monetary Fund

(IMF) in 1945, see Bretton Woods Agreements Act, ch.

339, § 2, Pub. L. No. 79-171, 59 Stat. 512 (1945) (codified

at 22 U.S.C. § 286 (1976) ), it promised to maintain (and,

if necessary, redeem) the value of United States dollars

5 There was only one change made in this standard at the Hague

in 1955. To avoid any confusion, the conferees deleted reference to

the Poincare franc and defined the specified sums as referring “to

a currency unit consisting of sixty-five and a half milligrams of

gold of millesima! fineness nine hundred.” Asser, Golden Limita-

tions of Liability in International Transport Conventions and the

Currency Crisis, 5 J. Mar. L. & Com. 645, 647-48 n.7 (1974). Since

9a

in terms of gold. For purposes of the Convention’s limits

on liability, therefore, the relationship of gold and the

dollar allowed judicial tribunals to award judgments on a

stable, uniform basis.

At the time of Bretton Woods, the United States dollar

was grossly undervalued and was actually an asset more

valuable than gold. The promise to redeem all dollars in

gold could thus be made without having to be fulfilled.*

From 1955, however, the United States faced a persistent

balance of payments deficit. Where once there existed a

dollar shortage, there now developed a dollar glut.’ To

compensate, central banks abroad began trading their

dollars for gold, and hoarders and speculators began

accumulating the metal in increasing amounts. From 1955

to 1968, United States gold reserves plummeted from

approximately $24 billion to around $10 billion.*

These events led ultimately to the demise of the gold

standard. In early 1968, depletion of the United States

gold reserve led the central banks of Belgium, the Federal

Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland,

the United Kingdom and the United States to agree to

discontinue supplying gold to private markets. A so-

called “two-tier” system of gold pricing—a market price

set accordingly and the official price set under Bretton

Woods *—was thus created. This eased the pressure but

could not remedy the essential flaw. In addition to per-

sistent United States balance of payment deficits, interna-

tional gold reserves grew more slowly than the volume of

world economic activity. As a consequence, banks faced

* See P. Samuelson, Economics, 686-68 (8th ed. 1970).

7 Jd. at 690-91.

* Jd. at 691, Figure 36-1.

* See Asser, supra note 6, at 650; Gold, /nternational Monetary

Law: Change, Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 15 J. Int'l L. & Econ.

323, 340-41; Samuelson, supra note 7, at 698-99.

10a

pressures to liquidate official holdings in light of readily

available market profits. The stage was thus set for

abandonment of the Bretton Woods arrangements.

In August, 1971, the United States suspended its com-

mitment to convert dollars for gold.*° In May, 1972, it

devalued the dollar by raising the official price of gold to

$38 per ounce. See Par Value Modification Act, Pub. L.

No, 92-268, § 2, 86 Stat. 116 (1972) (formerly codified at

$1 U.S.C. § 449 (1972)). In October, 1973, yet another

devaluation raised the price to $42.22 per ounce. See Par

Value Modification Act, amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-

110, §1, 87 Stat. 352 (1973) (formerly codified at 31

U.S.C. § 449 (1976)).

The dollar’s troubles led the IMF to put forth a plan to

abolish the official price of gold, to delete references to

gold in its articles, and to substitute SDR’s as the Fund’s

reserve asset and unit of account. The plan was proposed

in the 1976 Jamaica Accords, was passed by the Fund’s

members and became effective April 1, 1978. In the

interim, the United States passed implementing legisla-

tion including a repeal of the Par Value Modification Act

of 1973 and the abolition of the official price of gold.”

Along with the Jamaica Accords, the measure also became

effective on April 1, 1978.

This radical change in the internationa] monetary sys-

tem created an obvious problem under the Warsaw Con-

vention. With gold abandoned as a currency base and the

official price repealed, gold became a commodity with a

10 Jd. at 641; Asser, supra note 6, at 651.

11 In repealing the official price generally, Congress retained its use

for the limited purpose of determining the value of gold held in the

form of certificates. See 31 U.S.C. § 4056. The Senate noted that this

was the “only domestic purpose for which it is necessary to define a

fixed relationship between the dollar and gold... .” 8. Rep. No.

94-1295, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code

Cong. & Ad. News 5935, 5966-67.

lla

daily fluctuating free market price. That the difficulty in

continuing to use gold as a monetary base undermined the

Convention’s unit of conversion was immediately recog-

nized. Thus, the Warsaw conferees met in Montreal] in

1975, even before the Jamaica Accords, and drafted and

signed a Protocol substituting SDR’s as the Convention’s

unit of conversion. At the time of the proposal, the SOR

was calculated in terms of gold.* With the Jamaica

Accords, the referent was changed to a basket of 16

national currencies, and in January, 1981, the basket was

reduced to five currencies." The Montreal] Prutocol was

presented to the United States Senate in January, 1977

but has not been ratified.

Meanwhile, parties to the Convention have utilized a

variety of units of conversion. The record shows Sweden

and Britain have adopted SDR’s for purposes of War-

saw.’* Both a Netherlands court and the Civil Court of

Rome reached the same result."* Two French courts have

recently decided that the Warsaw unit is to be converted

simply into the current French franc.'* The United States

12 Gold, supra note 10, at 345.

18 Ward, The SDR in Transport Liability Conventions: Some

Clarifications, 13 J. Mar. L. & Com. 1, 3 (1981).

4 See Sweden's Carriage by Air Act (1957), amendment to

Chapter 9, § 22, effective April 27, 1978, (translated and reprinted

in App. at 57-61); see also the British Carriage by Air (Sterling

Equivalents) Order of 1980, Statutory Instrument 1980 No. 281,

effective March 21, 1980, (reprinted in App. at 62-63).

18 State of the Netherlands v. Giant Shipping Corp., Rechtspraak

van de Week, 30, May, 1981, 321 (Supreme Court of the Nether-

lands, May 1, 1981) (translated and reprinted in App. at 64-93);

Linee Aerea Italiane v. Ricciole (Rome Civil Court Judgment 609/

1979, Nov. 14, 1978), (translated and reprinted in App. at 95-108).

1% See Chamie v. Egyptiar (Cours d’appel Paris, Jan. 31, 1980)

(translated and reprinted in App. at 171-91); Pakistan /nt’l Airlines

v. Compagnie Air Inter. S.A.. (Cours d’appel Aix-en-Provence Oct.

31, 1981) (translated and reprinted in App. at 156-70).

12a

District Court in the Southern District of Texas recently

opted for the free market price of gold,’ the standard

utilized by an Indian court,'* and a Greek court.”* Finally,

the last official price of gold, chosen by the District Court

in this case, was relied upon by Judge Sifton in Jn re Air

Crash Disaster at Warsaw Poland on March 14, 1980, 535

F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) and is still utilized by the

CAB pursuant to a 1974 order.

DISCUSSION

The controlling facts in this case are: (i) enforcement

of the Convention’s limitation on liability requires a unit

of conversion to translate judgments into domestic cur-

rency; (ii) there is no longer an internationally agreed

upon unit of conversion; and (iii) there is no United

States legislation specifying a unit to be used by United

States Courts.

The need for a unit of conversion is self-evident.

Without it, a rational limit on liability cannot exist, muca

less one which produces judgments of equal value in

different currencic..

The lack of an internationally agreed npon unit is also

obvious. The very convening of the Montreal meeting in

1975 was a recognition by the Warsaw parties that the

Convention’s unit had been eliminated by events. In plain

fact, different countries now apply different units. Al-

though the alternatives argued before us yield limitations

17 Boehringer Mannheim Diagnotecs, Inc. f/k/a Hycel, Inc. v.

Pan American World Airways, Inc., 531 F.Supp. 344 (S.D. Tex.

1981).

18 Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Sanghi, Regular Appeal No. 54 of

1977 (Civil Station, Bangalore, India, August 11, 1978) (reprinted

in App. at 265-71.)

19 Zakoapolos v. Olympic Airways Corp., No. 256 of 1974 Ct. of

App.; 3d Dep’t., Athens, Greece (February 15, 1974) (translated

and reprinted in App. at 251-54.)

13a

on TWA’s liability in this case ranging from less than

$6,500 to over $400,000, each has been adopted as the

proper unit of account by at least one party, or domestic

tribunal of a party, to the Convention. This disarray

merely confirms the obvious fact that the Jamaica Ac-

cords destroyed the international arrangements which had

led to adoption of gold as a unit of conversion.

International disarray is also reflected in the lack of

legislation in the United States implementing the Conven-

tion by establishing a unit of conversion. While the “last”

official price of gold is offered as a possible unit, “last” is

really an euphemism for “no longer” or “repealed.” The

repeal of the Par Value Modification Act in 1978 was in

every sense a legislative declaration that the price of

$42.22 per troy ounce was no longer recognized by the

United States.” We fail to see the logic in adopting as a

legal standard a specified value for gold which has been

specifically rejected by the United States Congress. Con-

gress’ action, moreover, as well as that taken by the other

parties to the Jamaica Accords, is highly relevant to the

Convention. The repeal of the Par Value Modification

Act was based on a domestic and international conclusion

that the official price of gold was wholly out of touch

with economic and monetary reality. Since use of a fixed

amount of gold as the Convention’s unit was specifically

designed to establish a limitation level at a certain value,

this repeal must be taken as a statement that the official

price no longer reflects that specified value. The case for

continuing to use the now repealed price of gold thus

finds no support in law or logic.

The CAB order on which Judge Knapp relied was ex-

pressly premised on the existence of an official price under

the Par Value Modification Act of 1973. The more recent

* The sole rerraining use of the last official price is in deter-

mining the value of gold held in the form of gold certificates. See

note 12, supra. That is not relevant to the issues here.

l4a

internal CAB memorandum supporting continuation of

that order is based ultimately on a policy determination

that the last official price is the best available standard.”

The inconsistency of the CAB position, however, is starkly

evident. It rejects SDR’s because the Senate has not

ratified the Montreal Protocol, while adopting the last

official price of gold which has been explicity rejected by

the Congress. The sole criterion supporting the CAB’s

position appears to the the law of inertia.

The other alternatives have an equally infirm base.

Neither the free market price of gold nor the current

French frane was ever agreed to by the treaty’s framers,

both are gross departures from its purposes, and, as to

the latter, there is ample evidence that it was specifically

rejected. The framers clearly contemplated use of the

governmentally fixed price of gold in adopting it as a unit

of account in the hope of providing stability. The free

market price of gold, however, is simply the daily fluc-

tuating price of a commodity, affected by conditions relat-

ing to supply and nonmonetary uses affecting demand.”

The current French franc is similarly flawed. To enforce

it would amount to a deliberate departure from the ex-

pressed wishes of the framers to avoid the use of a single

national currency subject to unilateral action.

TWA argues that we should adopt the International

Monetary Fund’s SDR as the unit of conversion. It is true

that the SDR was “created by the IMF in 1969 to replace

gold and the foreign exchange as an international reserve

asset.” ** “|Mjember central banks may exchange SDR’s

21CAB Internal Memorandum, Warsaw Convention Liability

Limits, May 20, 1981 (App. at 32-38).

22 Appellant's reliance on dicta in our decision Reed v. Wiser,

555 F.2d at 1089 n.12, is misplaced. The Reed footnote implied a

free market standard under the Guatemala City Protocol which

the U.S. has not ratified

3 Ward, supra note 14, at 2.

l5da

for other convertible currencies and, therefore, SDR

balances are actually lines of credit against which reserves

may be borrowed for use in central bank operations.” *

As noted above, methods of calculating SDR’s have been

changed from time to time. They are presently calculated

with reference to a so-calied basket of five currencies—

the U.S. dollar, the Deutsche mark, the French franc, the

Japanese yen, and the pound sterling. The amount of

each currency in one SDR is a function of the percentage

weights which are assigned to each currency in the basket.

The dollar value of one SDR is then determined by

adding the “dollar values of each currency component

based on daily market exchange rates.” *

Though the value of any one currency in terms of

SDR’s fluctuates from day to day, SDR fluctuations are

generally less extreme than fluctuations in the free market

price of gold. The relative stability of the SDR has thus

led the Warsaw signatories to propose its substitution as

the Convention’s unit of account. The proposal was

formally drafted in 1975 as part of the Montreal Proto-

cols to the Convention and has been presented to the

signatory states for ratification. Though the substitution

was supported by the United States, there has been

opposition by non-IMF signatories and very few signa-

tories (the United States included) have actually ratified

the Protocol.

The inappropriateness of our adopting SDR’s as the

unit of conversion is plain. The Convention itself con-

tains not the slightest authority for its use and the Senate

has thus far declined to ratify the Montreal Protocols.

Moreover, the decision in principle to use SDR’s is only

the first step. After that, a further step must be taken to

define the limitation of liability in terms of a particular

number of SDR’s per kilogram of baggage. In effect, we

* Jd.

* jd. at 2.

16a

would have to set the level of the limitation. Finally, the

SDR is a creature of an international body, the IMF, and

is subject to modification or outright elimination by that

body. In fact, the method of calculating SDR’s has been

changed three times in the last seven years. This Court

has no power under the terms of the Convention or

relevant domestic source of authority to adopt a unit of

conversion variable at the whim of an international body

distinct from the parties to the Convention.

It is thus clear that neither international nor domestic

sources of law specify a unit of account for purposes of

the Convention. We deal here not with ambiguities which

may be clarified by reference to underlying purpose or

with language which inadequately mirrors the understood

intentions of the drafters. For almost two generations,

the Convention’s limits on liability have been translatable

into domestic currency values by application of a clear

and easily applied formula. An essential ingredient of

that formula has, as a consequence of international ac-

tion followed by domestic legislation, ceased to exist.

What the parties ask us to do is to select, upon the basis

of our judgment as to what is best as a matter of policy, a

new unit of conversion. We are without authority to do so.

Treaty negotiation and proposal is the province of the

executive and ratification is the exclusive province of the

United States Senate. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; Doe

ex dem. Clark et al. v. Braden, 16 How. 635, 656-57

(1853). While federal courts are necessarily called upon

to interpret treaties, The Federalist No. 3 (J. Jay) (Rossi-

ter ed. 1961) ; see also id. No. 80 (A. Hamilton), they must

observe the line between treaty interpretation on the one

hand and negotiation, proposa] and ratification on the

other. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1961). To

be sure, great difficulty may arise in ascertaining where

that line is drawn and when it has been crossed.** See,

** Given the lack of an internationally agreed upon standard of

conversion, it might be argued that the Convention has been abro-

17a

e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). However,

selection of a unit of conversion and the level of value of

a limitation on liability is plainly a matter to be negoti-

ated by the parties, as the history of the Convention

demonstrates.

While international disarray as to the proper unit of

conversion under the Convention alone might not disable

us from enforcing a new unit, such a unit must be selected

either through treaty ratification by the Senate or by

legislation passing both Houses of the Congress. The

repeal of the Par Value Modification Act was an explicit

abandonment of the previously established unit of con-

version. While Congress may not have focused explicitly

upon the Convention in repealing that Act, its purpose,

abandonment of a price which was out of touch with

economic reality, plainly encompasses use of that price to

convert judgments to United States currency values. Con-

gress thus abandoned the unit of conversion specified by

the Convention and did not substitute a new one. Substi-

tution of a new term is a political question, unfit for

judicial resolution. We hold, therefore, that the Conven-

tion’s limits on liability for loss of cargo are unenforce-

able in United States Courts.”’

gated. However, treaties involve international obligations entered

into by coordinate branches of the government and it is not the

province of courts to declare treaties abrogated or to afford relief

to those (including the parties) who wish to escape their terms.

These are not matters for “judicial cognizance.” Whitney v. Robin-

son, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1887); see also Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S.

270 (1901). They belong to the executive and legislative depart-

ments because they are more properly the domain of “displomacy

and legislation, ... not... the administration of laws.” Whitney

v. Robertson, 124 U.S. at 195.

27 The Convention establishes liability as well as limits it. Note

2, supra. Our holding is limited solely to the unenforceability

of the limits and we express no view as to the severability of those

limits from the rest of the Convention.

18a

CONCLUSION

This ruling is prospective and will apply only to events

creating liability occurring 60 days from the issuance of

the mandate in this case. Prospective effect is compelled

by the fact that this is the first case in which a court has

declined to enforce the Convention’s limits on liability.

The parties assumed our power to select a new unit and

thus our “resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.”

Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971).

Parties to transactions covered by the Convention should

have time to adjust their affairs to this ruling. Cf.

Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline

Co., 50 U.S.L.W. 4892 (U.S. June 28, 1982) (judgment

holding Bankruptcy Act unconstitutional stayed until

October 4, 1982). As to events occurring before that date,

we hold that the last official price of gold shall be used to

calculate the limits on liability. Because of both the CAB

ruling discussed above and the lack of alternatives, air

carriers, at least in this country, have relied on the last

official price of gold. All carriers have thus filed tariffs

that comply with that standard and substantial “injustice

and hardship” would result were they not allowed time to

reformulate those tariffs. Other parties may continue to

protect themselves through insurance.

Affirmed.

i

19a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

81 Civ. 1700 (WK)

FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION,

FRANKLIN MINT LIMITED, and

MCGREGOR, SWIRE AIR SERVICES, LIMITED,

Plaintiffs,

—against—

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WHITMAN Knapp, D.J.

On March 23, 1979, plaintiff Franklin Mint Corporation

(“Franklin”) delivered to defendant Trans World Air-

lines, Inc. (“TWA”) for carriage from Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania to London’s Heathrow Airport, four pack-

ages weighing some 714 pounds. Although the packages

are said to have contained a large quantity of valuable

coins, Franklin made no special declaration of value at the

time of delivery. TWA charged Franklin $544.96 for the

shipment. The four packages never arrived at their desti-

nation, and Franklin brought this action to recover their

full value, which it fixes at $250,000. The parties agree

that this action is governed by the terms of the Warsaw

Convention, and that TWA is liable for the loss. Before

us is a motion by TWA for partial summary judgment as

to the extent of its liability. We grant that motion in

part and deny it in part.

20a

Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention provides that,

unless a special declaration of value is made at the time

of delivery, a shipper’s liability for checked baggage and

goods is limited to the equivalent of 250 francs per kilo-

gram. Article 22 states, moreover, that this limitation of

250 francs:

“shall be deemed to refer to the French franc consist-

ing of 6514 milligrams of gold at the standard of

fineness of nine hundred thousandths [the so-called

Poincare franc]. These sums may be converted into

any national currency in round figures.” (Emphasis

added. )

Counsel for TWA, in an extraordinary lucid and com-

prehensive brief, has suggested three possible bases for the

calculation converting the Article 22 limitation into United

States dollars: (1) the Special Drawing Right (“SDR”),

used by members of the International Monetary Fund

(“IMF”) as a unit of account; (2) the last official price

of gold in the United States; and (3) the exchange value

of the current French franc. Counsel for Franklin, in an

equally able brief, suggests a fourth possibility: the free

market price of gold.

Were we writing on a clean slate, we would find the

arguments in favor of the first of TWA’s suggestions (the

SDR) most persuasive. However, TWA’s second sugges-

tion (the last official price of gold in the United States)

has—arguably, at least—been espoused by the Civil Aero-

nautics Board (“CAB”), the government agency most in-

timately concerned with the transaction at hand. It there-

fore comes as close as anything to constituting a govern-

mental interpretation of the Ariicle 22 limitation. Also, it

is used by all domestic carriers—including TWA—in

calculating the dollar value of the Article 22 limitation

printed on their tariffs. It would seem to follow that the

parties intended to adopt the last official price of gold as

the basis for converting the Article 22 limitation into

dollars in the instant case.

2la

Beyond saying the foregoing we can, since there are no

disputed issues of fact upon which a finding by us is

required, see no purpose to be served by delaying a de-

cision while we seek to put in our own words the argu-

ments so cogently expressed by counsel for TWA. Accord-

ingly, we simply adopt those arguments to the extent that

they support our conclusion that the conversion should be

premised on the last official price of gold in the United

States.

Let counsel for TWA submit a proposed order on ten

days notice. As we understand the stipulation of the

parties, such an order would in effect direct that judg-

ment be entered for plaintiff in the amount of $6,475.98

plus interest and costs, a result which would permit

immediate appeal from this order.

SO ORDERED.

Dated:

New York, New York

November 6, 1981

/s/ Whitman Knapp

WHITMAN KNAPP

U.S.D.J.

22a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

81 Civ. 1700 (WK)

FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION,

FRANKLIN MINT LIMITED, and

MCGREGOR, SWIRE AIR SERVICES, LIMITED,

—against— Plaintiffs,

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant.

[Filed Dec. 4, 1981]

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

For the reasons stated in the Memorandum and Order

of this Court, dated November 6, 1981, it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: that the

maximum liability herein of defendant Trans World Air-

lines, Inc. shall be determined under Article 22 of the Con-

vention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to

International Transportation by Air, 49 Stat. 3000 et seq.

(19384), T.S. 876, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 1502 note

(1970), by a conversion factor premised on the last official

price of gold in the United States, and it is

FURTHER ORDERED, that in accordance with the

foregoing conversion factor, final judgment shall be en-

tered for plaintiffs in the amount of $6,475.98, plus

interest and costs.

Dated:

New York, New York

December 3, 1981

s/ Whitman Knapp

WHITMAN KNAPP

U.S.D.J.

Judgment Entered 12/4/81

/s/

Clerk

23a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

81 Civ. 1700 (WK)

FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION,

FRANKLIN MINT LIMITED, and

MCGREGOR, SWIRE AIR SERVICES, LIMITED,

Plaintiffs,

—against—

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant.

ORDER

WHITMAN KNAPP, D.J.

The first sentence of the second paragraph of our

November 6, 1981 Memorandum and Order is hereby

amended to read:

“Article 22 of the Warsaw convention provides that,

unless a special declaration of value is made at the

time of a delivery, a carrier’s liability for checked

baggage and goods is limited to the equivalent of 250

francs per kilogram.”

SO ORDERED.

Dated: New York, New York

December 18, 1981

WHITMAN Knapp, U.S.D.J.

.

i

24a

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

At a stated Term of the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Second Circuit, held at the United States

Courthouse in the City of New York, on the twenty-

eighth day of September one thovsand nine hundred and

eighty-two.

Present:

HON. JAMES L. OAKES

HON. RICHARD J. CARDAMONE

HON. RALPH K. WINTER

Circuit Judges,

#82-7012

FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION,

FRANKLIN MINT LIMITED, and

MCGREGOR, SWIRE AIR SERVICES LIMITED,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants,

Vv.

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of

record from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York, and was argued by

counsel.

25a

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOPF, it is now hereby

ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment of said

District Court be and it hereby is affirmed in accordance

with the opinion of this court with costs to be taxed

against the appellants.

A. DANIEL FUSARO

Clerk

by /s/ Arthur Heller

ARTHUR HELLER

Deputy Clerk

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APPENDIX D

WARSAW CONVENTION

49 Stat. 3000, T. S. 876

CONVENTION FOR UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN

RULES RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL

TRANSPORTATION BY AIR

The President of the German Reich, the Federal Presi-

dent of the Republic of Austria, His Majesty the King of

the Belgians, the President of the United States of Brazil,

His Majesty the King of the Bulgarians, the President of

the Nationalist Government of China, His Majesty the

King of Denmark and Iceland, His Majesty the King of

Egypt, His Majesty the King of Spain, the Chief of State

of the Republic of Estonia, the President of the Republic

of Finland, the President of the French Republic, His

Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the Brit-

ish Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the

President of the Hellenic Republic, His Most Serene High-

ness the Regent of the Kingdom of Hungary, His Majesty

the King of Italy, His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, the

President of the Republic of Latvia, Her Royal Highness

the Grand Duchess of Luxemburg, the President of the

United Mexican States, His Majesty the King of Norway,

Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, the President

of the Republic of Poland, His Majesty she King of Ru-

mania, His Majesty the King of Sweden, the Swiss Fed-

era] Council, the President_af the Czechoslovak Republic,

the advantage of regulating in a

conditions of international transpor-

of the documents used for such

liability of the carrier.

uniform manner

tation by air in

transportation and o

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Have nominated to this end their respective Plenipo-

tentiaries, who, being thereto duly authorized, have con-

cluded and signed the following convention:

CHAPTERI, ScopE—DEFINITIONS

Article 1

(1) This convention shall apply to all international

transportation of persons, baggage, or goods performed

by aircraft for hire. It shall apply equally to gratuitous

transportation by aircraft performed by an air transpor-

tation enterprise.

(2) For the purposes of this convention the expression

“international transportation” shall mean any transpor-

tation in which, according to the contract made by the

parties, the place of departure and the place of destina-

tion, whether or not there be a break in the transporta-

tion or a transshipment, are situated either within the

territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within the

territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is

an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the

sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another

power, even though that power is not a party to this con-

vention. Transportation without such an agreed stopping

place between territories subject to the sovereignty, suzer-

ainty, mandate, or authority of the same High Contract-

ing Party shall not be deemed to be international for the

purposes of this convention.

(3) Transportation to be performed by several successive

air carriers shal! be deemed, for the purposes of this con-

vention, to be one undivided transportation, if it has been

regarded by the parties as a single operation, whether it

has been agreed upon under the form of a single con-

tract or of a series of contracts, and it shal! not lose its in-

ternational character merely because one contract or a

series of contracts is to be performed entirely within a

territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate,

or authority of the same High Contracting Party.

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Article 2

(1) This convention shall apply to transportation per-

formed by the state or by iegal entities constituted under

public law provided it falls within the conditions laid

down in article 1.

(2) This convention shall not apply to transportation

performed under the terms of any international postal

convention.

CHAPTER II, TRANSPORTATION DOCUMENTS

SECTION I. PASSENGER TICKET

Article 3

(1) For the transportation of passengers the carrier

must deliver a passenger ticket which shall contain the

following particulars:

(a) The place and date of issue;

(b) The place of departure and of destination;

(ce) The agreed stopping places, provided that the car-

rier may reserve the right to alter the stopping places in

case of necessity, and that if he exercises that right, the

alteration shall not have the effect of depriving the trans-

portation of its international character ;

(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;

(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to

the rules relating to liability established by this conven-

tion.

(2) The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger

ticket shall not affect the existence or the validity of the

contract of transportation, which shall none the less be

subject to the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, if

the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger

ticket having been delivered he shall not be entitled to

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avail himself of those provisions of this convention which

exclude or limit his liability.

SECTION II. BAGGAGE CHECK

Article 4

(1) For the transportation of baggage, other than

small personal objects of which the passenger takes

charge himself, the carrier must deliver a baggage check.

(2) The baggage check shall be made out in duplicate,

one part for the passenger and the other part for the

carrier.

(3) The baggage check shall contain the following par-

ticulars:

(a) The place and date of issue;

(b) The place of departure and of destination;

(c) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;

(d) The number of the passenger ticket;

(e) A statement that delivery of the baggage will be

made to the bearer of the baggage check;

(f) The number and weight of the packages;

(g) The amount of the value declared in accordance

with article 22(2) ;

(h) A statement that the transportation is subject to

the rules relating to liability established by this conven-

tion.

(4) The absence, irregularity, or loss of the baggage,

check shall not affect the existence or the validity of the

contract of transportation which shall none the less be

subject to the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, if the

carrier accepts baggage without a baggage check having

been delivered, or if the baggage check does not contain

the particulars set out at (d), (f), and (h) above, the

carrier shal] not be entitled to avail himself of those pro-

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visions of the convention which exclude or limit his lia-

bility.

SECTION III. AIR WAYBILL

Article 5

(1) Every carrier of goods has the right to require the

consignor to make out and hand over to him a document

called an “air waybill”: every consignor has the right to

require the carrier to accept this document.

(2) The absence, irregularity, or loss of this document

shall not affect the existence or the validity of the contract

of transportation which shall, subject to the provisions of

article 9, be none the less governed by the rules of this

convention.

Article 6

(1) The air waybill shall be made out by the consignor

in three original parts and be handed over with the goods.

(2) The first part shall be marked “for the carrier’,

and shall be signed by the consignor. The second part

shall be marked “for the consignee”’; it shall be signed by

the consignor and by the carrier and shall accompany the

goods. The third part shall be signed by the carrier and

handed by him to the consignor after the goods have been

accepted.

(3) The carrier shall sign on acceptance of the goods.

{4) The signature of the carrier may be stamped; that

of the consignor may be printed or stamped.

(5) If, at the request of the consignor, the carrier

makes out the air waybill, he shall be deemed, subject to

proof to the contrary, to have done so on behalf of the

consignor.

Article 7

The carrier of goods has the right to require the con-

signor to make out separate waybills when there is more

than one package.

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Article 8

The air waybill shall contain the following particulars:

(a) The place and date of its execution;

(b) The place of departure and of destination;

(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the car-

rier may reserve the right to alter the stopping places in

case of necessity, and that if he exercises that right the

alteration shall not have the effect of depriving the trans-

portation of its international character;

(d) The name and address of the consignor;

(e) The name and address of the first carrier;

(f) The name and address of the consignee, if the case

so requires;

(g) The nature of the goods;

(h) The number of packages, the method of packing,

and the particular marks or numbers upon them;

(i) The weight, the quantity, the volume, or dimen-

sions of the goods;

(j) The apparent condition of the goods and of the

packing;

(k) The freight, if it has been agreed upon, the date

and place of payment, and the person who is to pay it;

(1) If the goods are sent for payment on delivery, the

price of the goods, and, if the case so requires, the amount

of the expenses incurred;

(m) The amount of the value declared in accordance

with article 22(2);

(n) The number of parts of the air waybill;

(o) The documents handed to the carrier to accompany

the air waybill ;

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(p) The time fixed for the completion of the transpor-

tation and a brief note of the route to be followed, if

these matters have been agreed upon;

(qg) A statement that the transportation is subject to

the rules relating to liability established by this conven-

tion.

Article 9

If the carrier accepts goods without an air waybill hav-

ing been made out, or if the air waybill does not contain

all the particulars set out in article 8(a) to (7), inclusive,

and (q), the carrier shal] not be entitled to avail himself

of the provisions of this convention which exclude or limit

his liability.

Article 10

(1) The consignor shall be responsible for the correct-

ness of the particulars and statements relating to the

goods which he inserts in the air waybill.

(2) The consignor shall be liable for all damages suf-

fered by the carrier or any other person by reason of the

irregularity, incorrectness or incompleteness of the said

particulars and statements.

Article 11

(1) The air waybill shall be prima facie evidence of

the conclusion of the contract, of the receipt of the goods

and of the conditions of transportation.

(2) The statements in the air waybill relating to the

weight, dimensions, and packing of the goods, as well as

those relating to the number of packages, shall be prima

facie evidence of the facts stated; those relating to the

quantity, volume and condition of the goods shall not con-

stitute evidence against the carrier except so far as they

both have been, and are stated in the air waybill to have

been, checked by him in the presence of the consignor, or

reiate to the apparent condition of the goods.

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Article 12

(1) Subject to his liability to carry out all his obliga-

tions under the contract of transportation, the consignor

shall have the right to dispose of the goods by withdraw-

ing them at the airport of departure or destination, or by

stopping them in the course of the journey on any land-

ing, or by calling for them to be delivered at the place of

destination, or in the course of the journey to a person

other than the consignee named in the air waybill, or by

requiring them to be returned to the airport of departure.

He must not exercise this right of disposition in such a

way as to prejudice the carrier or other consignors, and

he must repay any expenses occasioned by the exercise

of this right.

(2) If it is impossible to carry out the orders of the

consignor the carrier must so inform him forthwith.

(3) If the carrier obeys the orders of the consignor

for the disposition of the goods without requiring the pro-

duction of the part of the air waybill delivered to the

latter, he will be liable, without prejudice to his right

of recovery from the consignor, for any damage which

may be caused thereby to any person who is lawfully in

possession of that part of the air waybill.

(4) The right conferred on the consignor shall cease

at the moment when that of the consignee begins in ac-

cordance with article 13, below. Nevertheless, if the con-

signee declines to accept the waybill or the goods, or if

he cannot be communicated with, the consignor shall re-

sume his right of disposition.

Article 13

(1) Except in the circumstances set out in the pre-

ceding article, the consignee shall be entitled, on arrival

of the goods at the place of destination, to require the

carrier to hand over to him the air waybill and to deliver

the goods to him, on payment of the charges due and on

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complying with the conditions of transportation set out

in the air waybill.

(2) Unless it is otherwise agreed, it shall be the duty

of the carrier to give notice to the consignee as soon as

the goods arrive.

(3) If the carrier admits the loss of the goods, or if

the goods have not arrived at the expiration of seven days

after the date on which they ought to have arrived, the

consignee shal] be entitled to put into force against the

carrier the rights which flow from the contract of trans-

portation.

Article 14

The consignor and the consignee can respectively en-

force all the rights given them by articles 12 and 13, each

in his own name, whether he is acting in his own inter-

est or in the interest of another, provided that he car~ies

out the obligations imposed by the contract.

Article 15

(1) Articles 12, 13, and 14 shall not affect either the

relations of the consignor and the consignee with each

other or the relations of third parties whose rights are de-

rived either from the consignor or from the consignee.

(2) The provisions of articles 12, 13, and 14 can only

be varied by express provision in the air waybill.

Article 16

(1) The consignor must furnish such information and

attach to the air waybill such documents as are neces-

sary to meet the formalities of customs, octroi, or police

betore the goods can be delivered to the consignee. The

consignor shal! be liable to the carrier for any damage oc-

casioned by the absence, insufficiency, or irregularity of

any such information or documents, unless the damage is

due to the fault of the carrier or his agents.

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(2) The carrier is under no obligation to enquire into

the correctness or sufficiency of such information or doc-

uments.

CHAPTER III. LIABILITY OF CARRIER

Article 17

The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the

event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any

other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the acci-

dent which caused the damage so sustained took place on

board the aircraft or in the course of any of the opera-

tions of embarking or disembarking.

Article 18

(1) The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in

the event of the destruction or loss of, or of damage to,

any checked baggage or any goods, if the occurrence

which caused the damage so sustained took place during

the transportation by air.

(2) The transportation by air within the meaning of

the preceding paragraph shall comprise the period during

which the baggage or goods are in charge of the carrier,

whether in an airport or on board an aircraft, or, in the

case of a landing outside an airport, in any place what-

soever.

(3 The period of the transportation by air shall not ex-

tend to any transportation by land, by sea, or by river

performed outside an airport. If, however, such transpor-

tation takes place in the performance of a contract for

transportation by air, for the purpose of loading, delivery

or transshipment, any damage is presumed, subject to

proof to the contrary, to have been the result of an event

which took place during the transportation by air.

Article 19

The carrier shall be liable for damage occasioned by

delay in the transportation by air of passengers, baggage,

or goods.

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Article 20

(1) The carrier shal] not be liable if he proves that he

and his agents have taken 4]! necessary measures to avoid

the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to

take such measures.

(2) In the transportation of goods and baggage the

carrier shall not be liable if he proves that the damage

was occasioned by an error in piloting, in the handling of

the aircraft, or in navigation and that, in all other re-

spects, he and his agents have taken all necessary mea-

sures to avoid the damage.

Article 21

If the carrier proves that the damage was caused by or

contributed to by the negligence of the injured person the

court may, in accordance with the provisions of its own

law, exonerate the carrier wholly or partly from his

liability.

Article 22

(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability of

the carrier for each passenger shall be limited to the sum

of 125,000 francs. Where, in accordance with the law of

the court to which the case is submitted, damages may be

awarded in the form of periodical payments, the equiva-

lent capital value of the said payments shall not exceed

125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the

carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of

liability.

(2) In the transportation of checked baggage and of

goods, the liabiilty of the carrier shall be limited to a sum

of 250 francs per kilogram, unless the consignor has

made, at the time when the package was handed over to

the carrier, a special declaration of the value at delivery

and has paid a supplementary sum if the case so requires.

In that case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not ex-

ceeding the declared sum, unless it proves that the sum is

greater than the actual value to the consignor at delivery.

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(3) As regards objects of which the passenger takes

charge himself the liability of the carrier shall be limited

to 5,000 francs per passenger.

(4) The sums mentioned above shall be deemed to

refer to the French franc consisting of 654, milligrams

of gold at the standard of fineness of nine hundred thou-

sandths. These sums may be converted into any national

currency in round figures.

Article 23

Any provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability

or to fix a lower sum than that which is laid down in

this convention shal] be null and void, but the nullity of

any such provision shall not involve the nullity of the

whole contract which shall remain subject to the provi-

sions of this convention.

Article 24

(1) In the cases covered by articles 18 and 19 any ac-

tion for damages, however founded, can only be brought

subject to the conditions and limits set out in the con-

vention.

(2) In the cases covered by article 17, the provision of

the preceding paragraph shall also apply, without preju-

dice to the questions as to who are the persons who have

the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights.

Article 25

(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself

of the provisions of this convention which exclude or limit

his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful mis-

conduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance

with the law of the court to which the case is submitted,

is considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct.

(2) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail

himself of the said provisions, if the damage is caused

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under the same circumstances by any agent of tue carrier

acting within the scope of his employment.

Article 26

(1) receipt by the person entitled to the delivery of

baggage or goods without complaint shall be prima facie

evidence that the same have been delivered in good condi-

tion and in accordance with the document of transporta-

tion.

(2) In case of damage, the person entitled to delivery

must complain to the carrier forthwith after the discov-

ery of the damage, and at the latest, within 3 days from

the date of receipt in the case of baggage and 7 days

from the date of receipt in the case of goods. In case of

delay the complaint must be made at the latest within 14

days from the date on which the baggage or goods have

been placed at his disposal.

(8) Every complaint must be made in writing upon the

document of transportation or by separate notice in writ-

ing dispatched within the times aforesaid.

(4) Failing complaint within the times aforesaid, no

action shall lie against the carrier, save in the case of

fraud on his part.

Article 27

In the case of the death of the person liable, an action

for damages lies in accordance with the terms of this con-

vention against those legally representing his estate.

Article 28

(1) An action for damages must be brought, at the op-

tion of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High

Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domi-

cile of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or

where he has a place of business through which the con-

tract has been made, or before the court at the place of

destination.

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(2) Questions of procedure shall be governed by the

law of the court to which the case is submitted.

Article 29

(1) The right to damages shall be extinguished if an

action is not brought within 2 years, reckoned from the

date of arrival at the destination, or from the date on

which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from the

date on which the transportation stopped.

(2) The method of calculating the period of limitation

shal] be determined by the law of the court to which the

case is submitted.

Article 30

(1) In the case of transportation to be performed by

various successive carriers and falling within the defini-

tion set out in the third paragraph of article 1, each car-

rier who accepts passengers, baggage or goods shall be

subject to the rules set out in this convention, and shall

be deemed to be one of the contracting parties to the con-

tract of transportation insofar as the contract deals with

that part of the transportation which is performed

under his supervision,

(2) In the case of transportation of this nature, the

passenger or his representative can take action only

against the carrier who performed the transportation

during which the accident or the delay occurred, save in

the case where, by express agreement, the first carrier has

assumed liability for the whole journey.

(3) As regards baggage or goods, the passenger or con-

signor shal! have a right of action against the first car-

rier, and the passenger or consignee who is entitled to

delivery shill have a right of action against the last car-

rier, and further, each may take action against the car-

rier who performed the transportation during which the

destruction, loss, damage, or delay took place. These car-

riers shal] be jointly and severally liable to the passenger

or to the consignor or consignee.

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CHAPTER IV. PROVISIONS RELATING TO

COMBINED TRANSPORTATION

Article 31

(1) In the case of combined transportation performed

partly by air and partly by any other mode of transporta-

tion, the provisions of this convention shall apply only to

the transportation by air, provided that the transporta-

tion by air falls within the terms of article 1,

(2) Nothing in this convention shall prevent the par-

ties in the case of combined transportation from insert-

ing in the document of air transportation conditions relat-

ing to other modes of transportation, provided that the

provisions of this convention are observed as regards the

transportation by air.

CHAPTER V. GENERAL AND FINAL

PROVISIONS

Article 32

Any clause contained in the contract and all special

agreements entered into before the damage occurred by

which the parties purport to infringe the rules laid down

by this convention, whether by deciding the law to be ap-

plied, or by altering the rules as to jurisdiction, shall be

null and void, Nevertheless for the transportation of

goods arbitration clauses shal] be allowed, subject to this

convention, if the arbitration is to take place within one

of the jurisdictions referred to in the first paragraph of

article 28.

Article 39

Nothing contained in this convention shall prevent the

carrier either from refusing to enter into any contract

of transportation or from making regulations which do

not conflict with the provisions of this convention.

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Article 34

This vonvention shall not apply to international trans-

portation by air performed by way of experimenta! trial

by air navigation enterprises with the view to the estab-

lishment of regular lines of air navigation, nor shall it

apply to transportation performed in extraordinary cir-

cumstances outside the normal scope of an air carrier’s

business.

Article 35

The expression “days” when used in this convention

meuns current days, not working days.

Article 36

This convention is drawn up in French in a single copy

which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Minis-

try for Foreign Affairs of Poland and of which one duly

certified copy shall be sent by the Polish Government to

the Government of each of the High Contracting Parties.

Article 37

(1) This convention shall be ratified. The instruments

of ratification shall be deposited in the archives of the

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Poland, which shall give

notice of the deposit to the Government of each of the

High Contracting Parties.

(2) As soon as this convention shall have been rati-

fied by five of the High Contracting Parties it shall come

into force as between them on the ninetieth day after

the deposit of the fifth ratification. Thereafter it shall

come into force between the High Contracting Parties

which shall have ratified and the High Contracting Party

which deposits its instrument of ratification on the

ninetiech day after the deposit.

(3) It shall be the duty of the Government of the Re-

public of Poland to notify the Government of each of the

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High Contracting Parties of the date on which this con-

vention comes into force as well as the date of the de-

posit of each ratification.

Article 38

(1) This convention shall, after it has come into force,

remain open for adherence by any state,

(2) The adherence shall be effected by a notification

addressed to the Government of the Republic of Poland,

which shall inform the Government of each of the High

Contracting Parties thereof.

(3) The adherence shall take effect as from the

ninetieth day after the notification made to the Govern-

ment of the Republic of Poland,

Article 39

(1) Any one of the High Contracting Parties may de-

nounce this convention by a notification addressed to the

Government of the Republic of Poland, which shall at

once inform the Government of each of the High Con-

tracting Parties.

(2) Denunciation shall take effect six months after the

notification of denunciation, and shall operate only as

regards the party which shall have proceeded to de-

nunciation.

Article 40

(1) Any High Contracting Party, may at the time of

signature ov of deposit of ratification or of adherence,

declare that the acceptance which it gives to this con-

vention does not apply to all or any of its colonies, pro-

tectorates, territovies under mandate, or any other terri-

tory subject to its sovereignty or its authority, or any

other territory under its suzerainty.

(2) Accordingly any High Contracting Party may sub-

sequently adhere separately in the name of all or any of

its colonies, protectorates, territories under mandate, or

43a

any other territory subject to its sovereignty or to its

authority or any other territory under its suzerainty

which have been thus excluded by its original declaration.

(3) Any High Contracting Party may denounce this

convention, in accordance with its provisions, separately

or for all or any of its colonies, protectorates, territories

under mandate, or any other territory subject to its sov-

ereignty or to its authority, or any other territory under

its suzerainty.

Article 41

Any High Contracting Party shall be entitled not earlier

than two years after the coming into force of this con-

vention to call for the assembling of a new international

conference in order to consider any improvements which

may be made in this convention. To this end it will com-

municate with the Government of the French Republic

which will take the necessary measures to make prepara-

tions for such conference.

44a

NATIONS ADHERING TO WARSAW CONVENTION

as listed in Treaties in Force, A List of Treaties and

Other International Agreements of the United States in

Force on January 1, 1982, at 207 (U.S. Dept. of State)

Afghanistan Gabon

Algeria Gambia, The

Antigua & Barbuda German Dem. Rep.

Argentina Germany, Fed. Rep.

Australia Ghana

Austria Greece

Bahamas, The Grenada

Bangladesh Guinea

Barbados Guyana

Belgium Hungary

Benin Iceland

Botswana India

Brazil Indonesia

Bulgaria Iran

Burma Iraq

Cameroon Ireland

Canada Israel

Chile Italy

China Ivory Coast

Colombia Jamaica

Congo Japan

Cuba Kenya

Cyprus Kiribati

Czechoslovakia Korea, Dem. People’s Rep.

Denmark, not including

Kuwait

Greenland Laos

Dominican Rep. Latvia

Ecuador Lebanon

Egypt Lesotho

Ethiopia Liberia

Fiji Libya

Finland Liechtenstein

France, including French Luxembourg

colonies

Madagascar

Malawi

Malaysia

Mali

Malta

Mauritania

Mauritius

Mexico

Mongolia

Morocco

Nauru

Nepal

Netherlands

New Zealand

Niger

Nigeria

Norway

Oman

Pakistan

Papua New Guinea

Paraguay

Philippines

Poland

Portugal

Romania

Rwanda

St. Lucia

Saudi Arabia

Senegal

Seychelles

Sierra Leone

Singapore

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Solomon Is,

South Africa

Spain

Sri Lanka

Sudan

Suriname

Swaziland

Sweden

Switzerland

Syrian Arab Rep.

Tanzania

Tonga

Trinidad & Tobago

Tunisia

Turkey

Tuvalu

Uganda

Union of Soviet Socialist

Reps.

United Kingdom

United States

Upper Volta

Uruguay

Venezuela

Viet-Nam, Rep.

Western Samoa

Yemen (Aden)

Yugoslavia

Zaire

Zambia

Zimbabwe

46a

APPENDIX E

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

ARTICLE II

SECTION 2. ‘' The President * * *.

*He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and

Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-

thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nomi-

nate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the

Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers

and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other

Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not

herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be estab-

lished by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Ap-

pointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper,

in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in tne

Heads of Departments.

o e eo *

ARTICLE III

SECTION 2. ' The judicial Power shall extend to all

Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,

the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or

which shall be made, under their Authority ;—to all Cases

affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-

suls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdic-

tion;—to Controversies to which the United States shall

be a party;—to Controversies between two or more

States ;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—

between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of

the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different

States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and

foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

47a

ARTICLE VI

* This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States

which shail be made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties

made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the

United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land, and

the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any

Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the

Contrary notwithstanding.

48a

APPENDIX F

Order 74-1-16

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C,

Adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board

at its office in Washington, D.C.

on the 38rd day of January, 1974

Docket 26274

IN THE MATTER OF WARSAW CONVENTION LIABILITY

LIMITATIONS AS EXPRESSED IN U.S. DOLLARS

ORDER

Section 221.388(j) of the Board’s Regulations requires

U.S. and foreign air carriers which avail themselves of

the limits of liability to passengers provided in the War-

saw Convention (49 Stat. 3000; T.S. 876) to include in

their tariffs, inter alia, a statement as to the amount of

the liability limits of the Convention stated in dollars.

These provisions of the tariffs, as well as those setting

forth limitations of liability under the Convention with

respect to baggage and property, restate the applicable

law and serve to advise the public of the Convention

limitations on their right of recovery for death, or injury

or loss or damage to baggage and property.

The liability limits in the Warsaw Convention are set

forth in terms of gold francs so that as long as the value

of the dollar in terms of gold remained constant, no change

was required in the dollar amount of the liability limits

contained in the tariffs. However, by Order 72-6-7 adopted

49a

June 2, 1972, the Board directed the carriers to revise

their tariffs to reflect the devaluation of the dollar in

terms of gold from $3. per ounce to approximately $38

which took place effective May 8, 1972, and such revisions

have been made. On September 21, 1973, Public Law 98-

110 was enacted further devaluating the U.S. dollar to

approximately $42.22 per ounce of gold effective October

18, 1972. As a result, the minimum liability limits speci-

fied in Order 72-6-7 and the tariffs currently on file with

the Board no longer meet the minimum liability limits of

the Convention and a revision of the tariffs is necessary

to accurately reflect such limits in dollars.’

In view of the foregoing and all other relevant matters,

the Board finds and concludes:

1. That the dollar limitations stated in the presently

effective tariffs of the respondent air carriers and foreign

air carriers no longer meet the minimum liability require-

ments of the Warsaw Convention for “international trans-

portation” or of the Hague Protocol* and “international

carriage” as defined therein.

2. That, in this circumstance, such tariff limitations

are inconsistent with th> applicable law as set forth in

the Convention or the Protocol, and the tariff filing re-

quirements in Section 403 of the Federal Aviation Act of

1 With respect to their liability to passengers, this order will

affect only a smal! proportion of the U.S. and foreign air carriers.

Most carriers engaged in international transport«tion by air in-

volving journeys to or from the United States adhere to the Mon-

treal Agreement ( Agreement CAB 18900 approved by Order E-23680

dated May 13, 1966, 31 FR 7302) pursuant to which they have filed

tariffs providing for a $75,000 limit of liability for death or injury

to passengers. Since this limit is stated in terms of U.S. dollars, it

is unaffected by the change in the gold value of the dollar.

2? The Hague Protocol of 1955 doubles the Warsaw liabiuty limit

for passengers, but since the United States has not signed or ad-

hered to the Protocol, its provisions do not normally apply with

respect to air transportation.

50a

1958, and Part 221 of the Board’s Regulations and they

must be canceled.

8. That the minimum acceptable figures in United

States dollars for liability limits applicable to “interna-

tional transportation” and “international carriage” are as

follows’

Convention and Protocol

Minimum Liability Actual Rounded °

125,000 francs (per passenger, $10,002.90 $10,000.00

Convention only)

250,000 francs (per passenger, 20,005.80 20,000.00

Hague Protocol only)

5,000 francs (per passenger for 400,116 400.00

unchecked baggage )

250 francs (per kilogram for 20.00580 20.00

checked baggage and goods)

250 francs (per kilog.am on a 9.07460 9.07

per-pound basis )

Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of the Federal

Aviation Act of 1958, particularly Sections 204(a), 403,

and 1002 thereof,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1, The carriers named in Appendix A, attached hereto,

shall revise all liability limitations which may be applica-

ble to “international transportation” or “international car-

riage” as defined in the Convention or the Protocol which

are inconsistent with the dollar amounts set forth herein

so as to conform with suci, amounts,

* Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention permits the liability limits

specified therein in gold franca to be converted into any national

currency in round figures. The Board is permitting the round

dollar amounts set forth in this order to be filed in the tariffs for

purpose of convenience. This order is not intended to prohibit car-

riers from specifying the actual! dollar equivalents in their tariffs as

some of them do at the present time. The dollar values herein are

calculated in accordance with the criteria detailed in Order 72-6-7.

5la

2. The tariff cancellations directed in ordering para-

graph 1 above shall become effective on or before February

6, 1974 on not less than 10 days’ notice.

8. That copies of this order shall be served on the air

carriers and foreign air carriers named in Appendix A.

This order will be published in the Federal Register.

By the Civil Aeronautics Board:

EDWIN Z, HOLLAND

Secretary

[SEAL]

52a

APPENDIX G

Civil Aeronautics Board Order 78-8-10 (excerpts)

DOCKETS 25280, 27578, AGREEMENTS CAB 2698, R-41;

2699, R-49; 2700, R-43; 3119; 7648, R-107; 24475, R-4,

R-5; 25186, R-12; 25954, R-1, R-2, R-3; 26701, R-9,

IATA, CARGO CARRIAGE CONDITIONS—order 78-8-10

adopted August 8, 1978.

On June 21, 1974, the Internationa! Air Transport

Association submitted, pursuant to section 412 of the

Act, resolution 600b (agreement CAB 24475, R-4) re-

stating the conditions of carriage of cargo to appear on

the back of cargo airwaybills and resolution 600j (agree-

ment CAB 24475, R-5) restating the condition to appear

on the face of the airwaybills. Thereafter, the Board

issued order 75-11-106 on November 26, 1975, inviting

all interested persons to submit comments on these agree-

ments and to show cause why the proceeding in agree-

ment CAB 7648, order E-8543 (printed with order

E-11024), Pan Am. World Airways et al., Conditions of

Carriage, 24 C.A.B. 575, 580-591 (1957), should not be

terminated and why the Board’s earlier approval of

agreements CAB 2698 et al., order E-3230, JATA Traffic

Conference Resolutions, 10 C.A.B. 788 (1949), should not

be withdrawn.

The last previous Board approval of IATA conditions

of carriage for cargo occurred on September 1, 1949,

IATA Traffic Conference Resolutions, supra. Though the

Board approved the resolution then before it on the

ground that the “establishment of these uniform condi-

ditions should minimize confusion and misunderstanding,”

the Board took pains to note that “serious questions relat-

ing to the public interest could arise,” and placed its in-

terpretation on several of the provisions. The Board con-

cluded with the following admonition (id. at 798-794) :

We extend our approval for a temporary period

in order to permit the immediate use of the uniform

58a

arrangements discussed herein pending revision of

the provision under consideration in a manner con-

sistent with the views expressed herein. Should the

carriers fai] to make such revision at their first op-

portunity, the public interest may require us to with-

draw the approval herein granted.

In 1954 the IATA carriers filed a revision to the ear-

lier approved resolution (agreement CAB 7648, R-107,

adopted by the IATA traffic conferences in Honolulu in

November 1953). In considering the Honolulu revisions

in order E-85438,' the Board stated:

The Board is seriously concerned with the little

progress that appears to have been made to revise

the basic provisions of these agreements to meet the

points raised in the aforesaid opinion. While still

recognizing the importance of uniformity in the

tickets, waybills, and conditions of carriage, it is of

the opinion that such uniformity should not be ob-

tained at the sacrifice of the rights of passengers and

shippers, and that further approval of provisions

which are otherwise adverse to the public interest is

not warranted.

The Board, accordingly, tentatively approved some of

the provisions, some conditionally, and tentatively disap-

proved others, giving parties 30 days within which to file

objections. Objections were filed by the IATA carriers,

in which they requested the opportunity for conferences

with the staff of the Board for purposes of facilitating

disposition of the issues. The Board authorized such in-

formal! discussions by order E-8842, dated December 22,

1954, but no final resolution of the cargo issues ever

materialized.* The result is that the tentative order of

August 5, 1954, with respect to cargo, never became final,

1 Pan Am, World Airways et al, Conditions of Carriage, supra

at 581.

2 The informal conferences resulted in a revised resolution re-

specting passenger service which was approved by order E-11024.

54a

and the only order of approval of IATA conditions on

cargo now in effect is that of September 1, 1949 (JATA

Traffic Conference Resolutions, supra).

Comments * in response to order 75-11-106 have been

filed by IATA, Seaboard, the Board’s Office of Consumer

Advocate (OCA), and (jointly) the National Retail Mer-

chants Association, the Shippers Nationa] Freight Claim

Council, Inc., and the National Small Shipments Traffic

Conference (Shippers). In addition, IATA submitted

agreement CAB 25954, R-1, R-2, and R-3, docket 27573,

revising or canceling some of the provisions in the 1974

agreements, which meet some of the objections listed in

appendix C to order 75-11-106. Attached are appendixes

A and B containing resolutions 600b and 600j, as filed

and as amended. Neither IATA nor the carrier parties

address the part of order 75-11-106 dealing with the

rescission of the Board’s approval of the earlier IATA

agreement in JATA Traffic Conference Resolutions, supra,

or the termination of the proceeding in Pan Am, World

Airways et al., Conditions of Carriage, supra.

Order 75-11-106 also deferred decision on the provisions

of the agreement that presented issues similar to those

under review by the Board in the Liability and Claim

Rules and Practices Investigation, docket 19923. By

order 76-3-139, March 22, 1976, and order 77-3-61,

Liability and Claim Rules and Practices, 73 C.A.B. 116

(1977), the Board resolved these issues, and we are now

able to dispose of the matters before us. Petitions to

review certain aspects of orders 76-3-139 and 77-3-61

were filed by American Airlines et al. in the U.S. Court

of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. There-

after Congress passed and the President signed Public

Law 95-163, removing Board jurisdiction over the reason-

ableness of domestic cargo rates and rules. When the

* App. C to order 75-11-106 contains an analysis and the Board's

tentative findings as to each provision of the IATA agreements in

issue so that comments could be directed to the specific problems

enumerated.

55a

enactment of Public Law 95-163 was called to the atten-

tion of the court, the court vacated and remanded the

proceedings to the Board.

Inasmuch as the resolutions and agreements before us

concern international traffic, we believe that neither the

court’s remand nor Public Law 95-163 prevents us from

giving such weight as we think necessary to the findings

and conclusions of the Liability Rules case.

We turn now to section-by-section consideration of the

conditions of carriage.

RESOLUTION 600b

v

Article (1).—Article (1) is the preamble to the condi-

tions of carriage and states that the Warsaw Convention,*

if applicable, limits the liability of the carriers for loss

or damage to the cargo. Though this preamble on the

back of the waybill does not specifically refer to the car-

rier’s liability for delay, the front of the waybill contains

a statement that Warsaw limits the carrier’s liability for

loss, damage, or delay of cargo. Moreover, article 19 of

Warsaw specifically provides that the carrier shall be

liable for damages occasioned by delay in the transporta-

tion of cargo.’ In these circumstances, we consider the

omission of the word “delay” in the preamble to be an

oversight, which the carriers shall correct.

Article (1)1.—This subparagraph defines carrier as all

air carriers which carry or undertake to carry cargo

under the airwaybill or perform any other services inci-

dental to such air carriage. The Warsaw Convention is

defined as the convention signed at Warsaw on Octo-

4 Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transpor-

tation by Air, signed at Warsaw Oct. 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000), re-

ferred to as “Warsaw Convention” or simply “Warsaw.”

8 Art. 23 of Warsaw further provides that any provision tending

to relieve a carrier of its liability under Warsaw shall be null and

void.

56a

ber 12, 1929, or the Convention as amended at The

Hague, September 28, 1955." The definition of French

gold francs is the same as the definition in the Warsaw

Convention—consis

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