Amicus Brief — Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.
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No, 82-1186
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1982
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
2 Petitioner,
FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN MINT
LIMITED and MCGREGOR, SWIRE AIR SERVICES LIMITED,
Respondents,
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION AND
FORTY-THREE OF ITS MEMBER AIRLINES (SEE APPENDIX I),
Potential Intervenors.
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE IN
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. v.
FRANKLIN MINT CORP., NO, 82-1186 AND
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI OF
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.
CARROLL E. Dusuc *
AIDAN D. JONES
RAND! L. BRESLOW
HAIGHT, GARDNER, Poor
& HAVENS
1819 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 775-1300
Counsel for Petitioners
Of Counsel: International Air Transport
KENNETH F. RIPPLE Association and Forty-Three
Notre Dame Law School Member Airlines (see
Notre Dame, Ind. 46556
January 20, 1983
Appendiz 1)
* Counsel of Record
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit holding on non-constitutional grounds
that the cargo liability limitation of Article 22 of the
Warsaw Convention, a Treaty of the United States, is
prospectively unenforceable in United States courts is a
violation of the separation of powers doctrine derived
from U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl.2 where
(a) no Act of Congress specifically abrogated the
United States’ adherence to the Convention and
neither Congress nor the Executive Branch has
expressed any need for a Treaty reservation; and
(b) the decision of the Court of Appeals intrudes
upon the ongoing process of Executive and Leg-
islative Branch negotiation and ratification of
amendments to the Treaty.*
* Franklin M.nt Corporation, Franklin Mint Limited and McGre-
gor, Swire Air Services Limited, plaintiffs-appellants below (here-
inafter referred to collectively as “Franklin Mint”), and Trans
World Airlines, Inc. (TWA), defendant-appellee below, were the only
parties to these proceedings. Neither International Air Transport
Association (IATA) nor its member carriers (except TWA) were
parties in the District Court or on the appeal. However, after the
Panel of the Second Circuit’s September 28, 1982 prospective unen-
forceability ruling, IATA and 36 of its member airlines filed an
amicus curiae brief in su rt of TWA's petition for rehearing of
the Panel’s decision. IATA is an organization of 123 international
air carriers, many of whom are either owned by (“government own-
ership” herein means greater than 50% government ownership) or
represent foreign sovereign nations which are parties to the War-
saw Convention. Six U.S. airlines are members of IATA. See
Appendix (hereinafter “App.”) I (66a) for a list of IATA members.
Those members who join in this petition are marked by an asterisk
in App. I.
(i)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED ............c0ccceeecseees sicesostgiehddiainnd
IIIT MOUIIUNITT, ceseeotcecesicseessscieseconevelbbenvensanatenegnabeate
EARS CO SER CID peticcnsensectnscisnsctsistiicmmmnns
A. Summary of the Litigation and Decisions Be-
SUT cincssncsknpssnsaosntetnssindekiassciotinetsbebiataaaananaaaalie
B. The Warsaw Convention, Its Protocols And
Their Implementation By The U.S. Government..
C. The Interest of IATA and Its Member Airlines..
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ..................
A. The Decision Of The Court of Appeals Violates
The Constitutional Separation Of Powers Doc-
trine Ry Improperly Interjecting The Judiciary
Into The Conduct of Foreign Relations ..............
1. The Judiciary Has Intervened in the Treaty
eempetttie: FU GUIOE coc iccsascsccnccessscsinstetenstoasinns
2. The Court of Appeals Has Disregarded
the Division of Labor within the Political
IIE vv nncsscinstendisciiccmptanetconinaae
B. The Decision Of The Court of Appeals Has and
Will Seriously Disrupt International Air Com-
merce and the Federal Courts ............0.0..0...0.0...
1. The Decision Has an Immediate Adverse Ef-
fect on the International Air Cargo System..
2. The Decision Has An Immediate Adverse Ef-
fect on the Federal Courts ...0.000000.0.0.000cccccccce
8. The Decision Has An Adverse Long-Term
Effect on International Air Commerce........
CEPR ncscccnsnstsistesy, <ocmvenipntslocnceniceensteiiunialimdsadiaialll
Se 8 8 B
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Devel-
opment Corp., 429 U.S, 252 (1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1025 (1978) .ooccccccccccccccccceeeseeeeeseceeseeeeees 12
Association Aeronautique V. Thicrache, Tribunal de
Grande Instance, Paris, France ‘February 10,
a aad sccccideiinebarhlinssnsliebininannbadabisenes 17
Bacardi Corp. V. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940). 6
Baker Vv. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) oo..0ccccccecee 12
Balkan Bulgarian Airlines Vv. Tammaro, Court of
Milan, Italy (October 25, 1976) 2.00.00... 18
Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers Association,
390 U.S. 459, motion for leave to intervene
granted, 389 U.S. 813, reh'g denied, 391 U.S. 929
SIN 7 Acl Ls acinnetsiniaintnnnnisenrevinesinndsetbenscnddsovessesss 2
Benjamins V. British European Airways, 572 F.2d
913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114
IN Sri AL os satsentdnsconninnnsseunnecblpenmnndhimenies 21
Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386
F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S.
905 (1968) .. sien 7
Boehringer Mannheim Diagnostics, Ine. v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 531 F.Supp. 344
(S.D. Tex. 1981), appeal pending, No. 81-2519. 17
The Bremen Vv. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1
I St as an snennnasisnachianlgsebansnennocnnannsns 26
California Vv. Teras, 450 U.S. 961 (1981) .............. 18
Chrysler Corp. V. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979)... 11
Companhia de Seguros Maritimos v. Varig, Fed-
eral Court of Appeals of Brazil (June 3, 1975).. 17
Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1983) ............ 15
Crist Vv. Cline, 484 U.S. 980 (1977) .o.cccecc 13
Dames & Moore V. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981)........ 2
Day V. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976),
reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977) oo... 7,16, 21
Deere & Co. V. Deutsche Luftansa A.G., N.D. Tl.
No. 81 C 4726 (Dec. 30, 1982) .............00000.0c0c0. 17
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Department of Revenue of Washington V. Associa-
tion of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 485 US.
PI: NRIIPID. wiccinnctsccesiessenesidicicenasinmadigbaaionanabatghanties
Doe ex dem, Clark Vv. Braden, 16 How. 635 (1858).
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) ........ ace tatacesnitidiantaeaon
Fida Cinematografica Vv. Pan American World Air-
ways, Rome Civil Court, Italy (October 13,
SIE sintecbestectasudtade .
Florencia Cia Argentina de Seguros S.A. Vv, . Varig
S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1977 Uniform L.
Rev. 198 (August 27, 1976) pe CELDT Tc LAD
Franklin Mint v. Trana World Airlines, Inc., 525
F.Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), 690 F.2d 203
(2d Cir. 1982) .. sinakiteide iii siaidceetictiaeea
Garcia Vv. Pan American Airways, Inc., 269 A.D.
287, 55 N.Y.S.2d 317, aff'd, 295 N.Y. 852, 67
N.E.2d 257, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 741 (1946)..
Geofroy V. Riggs, 188 U.S. 258 (1890) 0.000000...
Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F.Supp. 949 (D.D.C.
1979), rev'd, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated,
444 U.S. 996 (1979) .
Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce v. Gold-
schmidt, 627 F.2d 258 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 0...
Hornlinie A.G. v. Societe Nationale Petroles
Aquitaine, Supreme Court of the Netherlands,
2 ;, SS Fe |. | eee
Hunter V. Ohio ex rel. Miller, 396 U.S. 879 (1969).
Husserl Vv. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp.
702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 485 F.2d
i Rt. | senate mne a Mctierds Zon Ns
In Re Aircrash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, 535
F.Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), appeal denied on
issue of appropriate unit of conversion, No, 82-
8018 (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 1982) ...............cccccccccsceeees
Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America Vv. Pan
American Airways, Inc., 58 F.Supp. 338 (S.D.
DEE a. PMID" conascsscmssctsstcrunteanhctnetealcantienstietee mani
Page
26
15
12,14
18
18
15
17
5,17
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441
Ee RE SE TIIIIY cccsmiodcasicnecnsteecodoinecsdeciipienietebesetanse
Joint Anti-Faacist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123 (1961) ..... selistincainiknadoadinticnensdenamteded
Kelly v. B.V. Nederlandse Luchtvaart Maatschap-
pij, No. 82 Civ. 7880 (S.D.N.Y. filed November
D4, 1968) ..020<00. =
Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 US. 187 (1961) ere
Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Sanghi, Bangalore, India
(August 11, 1978) ............ cksistuabieetanenistadeimmiadtiiniaed
Linee Aerce Italiane v. Riccioli, No. 609/79 Rome
Civil Court, Italy (November 14, 1978)
Meckenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915) ............
Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391
Be | Tea eR re ae
Michelin Tire Corp. Vv. Wages, 423 U. s. 276
CII =o i psdicljientesnahivapscaboncdanssnnactaasmeaphlannaiets
NAACP vy. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
I OED ecicsenencotherrtcsiastccsunsapsanianniqnnsbensseatineintens
NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 384 U.S. 925
(1966) .......... sh ickiia cdiraameatneset aaa sab ieoaas
Nielson V. Johnaon, 279 US. ‘47 (1929) ESSA A ETS
Pakistan International Airlines v. Compagnie Air
Inter S.A., No. 79/2278, Court of Appeals of
Aix-en-Provence, France (October 30, 1980)...
Pigeon River Improv. Slide & Boom Co. Vv. Charles
W. Coz, Ltd., 201 U.S. 188 (1984) ............0..000.
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 255 (1981).
Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977) ........ sedovateuntens
Reid v. Covert, 364 U.S. 1 (1967) .......cccccccccccscccseeees
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) ..
Sierva Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)........
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. Vv. Avagliano, 102
S. Ct. 2374 (1982) ......... PR SPRRD h Bex BS Ps. Ta a
Terlinden Vv. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902) Bed Df -s
Union Pacific Railroad v. United States, 99 U. S.
700 (1879)
COREE EE OEE ERE E EEE EERE EERE EERE EEE EEE EERE EEE EEEEEEEEEEES
Page
26
12
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
United States ¥. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
EUS ED WMIED contetsnsedtsacintsabies Sueccae west
United States v. D'Auterive, 51 U.S. 609 (1850)...
United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 218
ruary 15, 1974)
Constitution, Statutes, Rules & Legislative Materials
14 C.F.R. §§ 221.175, 221.176 (1981) Al,
DN ee aa
Civil Aviation Protocols: Hearing Before th
Committee on Foreign Relations United States
Senate, 97th Cong., 1st Sess, 6-8. (1981) 00000... .
Federal Aviation Act of 1958
49 U.S.C. $1801 ef seq. oii eoccccccccccccccceee.,
49 U.S.C. §1878(a) . EEN Os oe PND eS
@ USL. § 1974(~) ........................ AP NEE. A She
49 U.S.C. § 1862 ................... mppuiltinekostnionet cae
ete SS 3 ee 2S
49 U.S.C. § 1482 | spiciapibencaninanon eam
Oe Os TR cei an es setae
Par Value Modification Act, Pub. L. No. 92-268,
86 Stat. 116 (1972), amended by Par Value Mod-
ification Act, 31 U.S.C. § 449 (1973), repealed
Page
18
19, 20
11
1,2
23
23
1976 by Pub. L. No. 94-564, 90 Stat. 2660....5, 19, 20, 21
S. Exec. Rep. No. 45, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
wag tn by Mon Be nasal EE LE
WG sonesepinemnedusapasatisbcidsnsiasepdisecianasckiesgt Lae ee
9,11
27
18
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
U.S. Const. Page
OO MR AD cecttseeteaesens BS ee
a EI ls EL scenachcecesscieqeenss ee aaa 18
(OR oT eae arn ABR ARO tae Eee RR 3
Treaties and International Agreements
The Guatemala City Protocol, reprinted in, A.
Lowenfeld, Aviation Law, Documents Supple-
ment at 975-984 (2d ed. 1981) .0.....cecccccecseeees 8, 16
The Hague Protocol, September 28, 1955, 478
U.N.T\S. 871, reprinted in, A. Lowenfeld, Avia-
tion Law, Documents Supplement at 955-963
I ceeeuvebbennsends 8
The Hague Rules of 1921, as amended by the Brus-
sels Convention, August 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233.. 13
The Hamburg Rules, March 6, 1978, reprinted in
SF a I UIE NOTED asc: .cenccasdcescocdoescaseccpinssnsunabxees 13
Jamaica Accords (1976) ........... Dv hla: aaa ae 21
Montreal Agreement, CAB Agreement No. 18990,
of. Sp aA he) eee eRereee mr 8,11
Montreal Protocols No. 8 and No. 4 (1975), re-
printed in, A. Lowenfeld, Aviation Law, Docu-
ments Supplement at 985-1001 (2d ed. 1981)... passim
Proclamation of President Franklin D. Roosevelt
declaring U.S. adherence to the Warsaw Conven-
tion, 49 Stat. 8000, T.S. 876 (1984) .00000., 25
The Vienna Convention, reprinted in, 8 1.L.M. 679
(1969)
I ele ieee Ra Ore te ae i7
RI i chedicccta cased arenicciniabineietieantian once ae aa 24
ISTE, <aidth ues seshoisas cdenincapatiincinducmiebdccowepinaandaie cua 24
The Warsaw Convention, October 29, 1934, 49 Stat.
_ eS gm 6s & | eee passim
AS ee sescossihoctus<hhenbanemdaackaatanemian 3,7
I ca a 7
ppt Ie RED PPR el Se 7
MUAPIMIIIIET c, <t tn ccoatisn cedsiinecheatharamersecanndicc aceeanel 4,7,24
EA SS a et Meee ae 8, 7, 14, 21, 22
RATT ARNE a nee RI oe Oa I. SH. 8,5
| CREE PR enema Oe eae 8, 8, 9,10
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Administrative Materials
50 Dep't State Bull. 923 (1965) ...........ccccccccccceeeeenees
54 Dep't State Bull. 955-57 (1966) ..........cccccees
CAB Order 72-6-7, 37 Fed. Reg. 11384 (1972)........
19, 21
CAB Order 74-1-16, 39 Fed. Reg. 1526 (1974) ...... 4, 5, 10,
11,
CAB Order 78-8-10, 43 Fed. Reg. 35971 (1978)......
Carriage by Air Act Regulations (Canada), P.C.
I: I i sci sertetebeesianiapepoeanionns
J. Golden, “Warsaw Convention Liability Limits”,
Memorandum, Bureau of Compliance and Con-
sumer Protection, CAB (May 20, 1981) ............
Supplemental Compensation Plan, CAB Agreement
25632 and Order 77-7-85 (July 20, 1977) .......... 9,
Other Authorities
Aviation Daily, January 8, 1988 ................0..000
Aviation Week and Space Technology, November
SR ARE ed RT SRE Oe on ernie Soe neers
Detailed Report of the U.S. Delegation on the In-
ternational Conference on Air Law, ICAO, Mont-
EP as a ey aE
J. Foster, Esq., Remarks at Luncheon of the Air
Transportation Law Committee of the Federal
Bar Association, Dec. 7, 1982, Washington, D.C...
Minutes, Second International Conference on Pri-
vate Aeronautical Law, Warsaw, October 4-12,
1929 (Horner and Legrez trans. 1975) ...............
A. Lowenfeld, Aviation Law (2d ed. 1981) ............
Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States
and the Warsaw Convention, 80 Harv. L. Rev.
fe RE SER Se ern nec ea SO
Merren, The SDR as a Unit of Account in Private
Transactions, 16 Int'l Law 508 (1982) ..............
Restatement, 2d, Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, § 158 (1962) ....
19, 20
4,19
18
11,19
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1982
No, 82-1186
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
. Petitioner,
FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN MINT
LIMITED and MCGREGOR, SWIRE AIR SERVICES LIMITED,
Respondents,
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION AND
FORTY-THREE OF ITS MEMBER AIRLINES (SEE APPENDIX I),
Potential Intervenors.
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE IN
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC, v.
FRANKLIN MINT CORP., NO, 82-1186 AND
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI OF
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.
Potential intervenors' pray for leave to intervene and
further pray that a writ of certiorari be granted to re-
1 Although not a “party” below within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(1), petitioners IATA et al. will have that status if their peti-
tion to intervene is granted. Since the issues for review presented
herein arose after briefing, argument and decision by the Court of
Appeals, potential intervenors had no reason for prior participa-
tion. Because IATA and its members carry passengers and cargo
2
view the decision of September 28, 1982 of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Frank-
lin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
If this Court does not grant leave to intervene, poten-
tial intervenors pray that this petition be treated as an
amicus curiae brief in support of TWA’s petition for
certiorari. The consent of Franklin Mint and TWA to
such filing has been obtained.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at 690
F.2d 303 and is set forth as App. A(la) to this petition.
The opinion and order of the District Court from which
appeal was taken is reported at 525 F.Supp 1288 and is
set forth as App. B(19a). The judgment of the Court
of Appeals sought to be reviewed appears as App. C(24a).
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on
September 28, 1982. A petition for rehearing was denied
on December 1, 1982. The jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).2
to the United States and are subject to litigation in our courts,
they are vitally affected by the decision below, for the reasons ex-
plained further in Section C of the Statement of the Case. The
purpose of IATA and its member airlines is (1) to promote safe,
regular and economical air transportation for the benefit of the
peoples of the world, foster air commerce, and study problems con-
nected therewith; (2) to provide a means for collaboration among
air transportation enterprises engaged in international air trans-
port and services, and (3) to cooperate with the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), an arm of the United Nations, and
other international organizations. Thus, it is submitted that inter-
vention is appropriate. See ¢.g., Dames & Moore Vv. Regan, 453 U.S.
654 (1981); Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers Ass'n., 390 U.S.
459, motion for leave to intervene granted, 389 U.S. 813, reh'g
denied, 391 U.S. 929 (1968); Hunter v. Ohio ex rel. Miller, 396
U.S. 879 (1969); NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 384 U.S. 925
(1966).
2 See note 1, supra.
3
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
TREATY INVOLVED
In this case the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit expressly held the limitation of liability provi-
sions of Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention ® for cargo
damage, loss or delay prospectively unenforceable. Peti-
tioners submit that the Court of Appeals’ decision vio-
lates U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl.2, and art. VI, ¢l.2. For
the text of the Warsaw Convention see App. D/(26a);
the applicable constitutional provisions are set forth in
App. E/ 46a).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of the Litigation And Decisions Below
In March, 1979 plaintiffs Franklin Mint contracted with
TWA for carriage by air from the United States to
England under an airway bill listing 714 pounds of
numismatic materials.‘ The articles were later stipu-
lated to be worth more than the limitation on liabil-
ity for loss or damage under Article 22 (2) and (4)
of the Warsaw Convention.’ The materials were either
* All references to “Warsaw Convention” or “Convention” are to
the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Transportation by Air, October 29, 1984, 49 Stat.
3000, T.S. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (A treaty adhered to by the United
States October 29, 1934 and by over 100 foreign nations. The ad-
hering nations are listed in App, D (26a)).
‘ This constitutes * international transportation” within the mean-
ing of Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention since the United States
and the United Kingdom are parties to the Convention. See App.
D(27a).
®See App. D(36-37a). Article 22(2) of the Convention would
limit liability to $6,475.98 (250 francs per kilogram) in the ab-
sence of a special declaration of value. There was no such declara-
tion in this case. The aforementioned franc is the so called “Poin-
care franc”, which by conversion into U.S. dollars per pound at the
last official U.S. price of gold ($42.22 per troy ounce) amounts to
a Warsaw limitation of liability of $9.07 per pound (or approxi-
4
lost or destroyed, thus rendering TWA presumptively
liable.®
Franklin Mint brought an action in the District Court
to recover the full valve of the lost goods, claimed to be
$250,000. TWA sought to limit its liability under Article
22(2) of the Convention and moved for summary judg-
ment on “the sole issue [of] TWA’s liability, exclusive of
interest and costs”’.’
On that issue Franklin Mint urged that the free market
price of gold was the applicable conversion standard.
TWA suggested three other alternatives: (1) Special
Drawing Rights (SDRs), the international unit of ac-
count established by the International Monetary Fund in
1968 (and substituted for the Poincare franc in the
Montreal Protocols to the Warsaw Convention) ;* (2)
the last official price of gold in the United States (the
conversion standard selected by the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) );* or (3) the exchange value of the current
French franc. The District Court at 525 F.Supp. 1288
(19a) held that the applicable conversion standard for
the limitation was the last official price of gold in the
United States (21a), in reliance on CAB orders. Thus,
the District Court entered judgment for Franklin Mint
in the amount of $6,475.98.
mately $20 per kilogram). See CAB Order 74-1-16 (January 3,
1974) 39 Fed. Reg. 1526 (1974) (App. F(48a)) and CAB Order
78-8-10 (August 3, 1978) 43 Fed. Reg. 35971 (1978) (App. G
(66a) ).
* See Article 18(1) (35a).
* Stipulation and Pre-Motion Order dated June 30, 1981 (Court
of Appeals Joint Appendix (A9a). Thus, all parties and the Court
contemplated that some limitation was applicable.
* See pp. 8-9 and notes 22 and 27, infra, for explanation of the
Montreal Protocols.
* CAB Order 74-1-16 (January 3, 1974) (48a) establishes the last
official price of gold as the unit of conversion under the Warsaw
Convention at $42.22 per troy ounce.
5
Franklin Mint appealed, and a Panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in an
opinion of September 28, 1982 (1a) written by Judge
Winter and joined by Judges Oakes and Cardamone,
applied the last official U.S. price of gold as the conversion
standard to the specific facts of the case but, without
inviting briefing or argument on its prospective holding,
held the Article 22(2) liability limitation of the Warsaw
Convention, for loss of cargo, prospectively unenforceable
“in United States courts”. 690 F.2d at 304 (2a),.
The Court of Appeals rejected the last official price of
gold as a unit of conversion on the ground that by repeal
of the Par Value Modification Act in 1978" Congress
had rejected gold as a monetary standard and that such
repeal “was based on a domestic and international con-
clusion that the official price of gold was wholly out of
The decision is to “apply only to events creating liability
occurring 60 days from the issuance of the mandate in this case.”
690 F.2d at 311-12 (18a). The effect of the decision, as counsel for
Franklin Mint and other plaintiffs’ attorneys have suggested, may
extend beyond cargo cases to all Warsaw Convention limits of liabil-
ity, including those for passenger injury and death. See Kelly vy.
B.V. Nederlandse Luchtvaart Maatechappij, No. 82 Civ. 7830
(S.D.N.Y. filed November 24, 1982), a case filed since the decision
below, wherein plaintiffs claim applicability of the Wars. w Con-
vention, but also that the passenger limitation of liability is unen-
forceable. Furthermore, the Second Circuit itself has denied review
of a similar question as to passenger cases, which suggests (perhaps
inferentially) that the Franklin Mint limit of liability unenforce-
ability holding may be dispositive in passenger cases as well. See ln
Re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, 535 F.
Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y, 1982), appeal denied on issue of appropriate
unit of conversion, No, 82-8018 (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 1982).
4 Par Value Modification Act, Pub. L. No. 92-268, 86 Stat. 116
(1972), amended by Par Value Modification Act, 31 U.S.C. § 449
(1973), repealed 1976 by Pub. L. No. 94-564, 90 Stat. 2660. The
repealing Act was enacted in 1976 but became effective April 1,
1978.
6
touch with economic and monetary reality.” 690 F.2d at
309 (13a).¥
TWA petitioned for rehearing. IATA and the Air
Transport Association of America (ATA) were per-
mitted to file an amicus curiae brief in support of TWA’s
petition. The petition for rehearing was denied on De-
cember 1, 1982. TWA obtained a stay of issuance of the
Second Circuit’s mandate, pending its filing of a petition
for writ of certiorari.
B. The Warsaw Convention, Its Protocols And Their Im-
plementation By The U.S. Government
After the United Nations Charter, the Warsaw Con-
vention is the most widely adopted of international
treaties.’* It was signed by the parties in 1929 and con-
tinuously adhered to by the United States since 1934."
Because it is self-executing it needed no supplementary
Congressional! legislation to bring it into force.**
The principal purpose of the framers of the Convention
was to establish a uniform body of world-wide rules re-
lating to carriage of passengers and cargo in interna-
tional aviation transportation.'* The Treaty establishes
a predictable, reliable and consistent basis for resolving
12 This is discussed at length in TWA’s Petition for Certiorari
herein, pp. 5-6 and 15-17.
‘SA non-profit association representing federally licensed U.S.
air carriers providing scheduled air transportation both domesti-
cally and abroad. It is anticipated that ATA will seek to file an
amicus brief herein.
4 A. Lowenfeld, Aviation Law, § 4.1, at 7-98 (2d ed. 1981).
18 See note 3, supra, and App. D (44a).
16 Indem. Ins. Co. of North America Vv. Pan American Airways,
Inc., 58 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Garcia v. Pan American
Airways, Inc., 269 A.D. 287, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 317, aff'd, 295 N.Y. 852,
67 N.E. 2d 257, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 741 (1946). See Bacardi
Corp. V. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 161 (1940).
17 See TWA's Petition for Certiorari herein, pp. 4-5.
7
disputes as to liability or damage arising from such
transportation, thereby providing some measure of stabil-
ity in the international commercial aviation environ-
ment.* The actual carrier is made presumptively liable
for loss, damages or delay of the cargo (Article 18)**—
and the quid pro quo for that is the limitation of its
liability under Article 22 of the Convention.” The
Convention also provides that all such claims arising
under its provisions can only be brought subject to its
provisions (Article 24) (37a). It also establishes notice
of claim provisions (Article 26), and the jurisdictions
where claims may be adjudicated (Article 28) (38-39a).
As another Panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit recognized just several years ago, the dele
gates to the Warsaw Convention knew that in years to
come civil] aviation would change in unforeseen ways. Yet
“they wished to design a system of air law that would be
both desirable and flexible enough to keep pace with these
changes.” Day Vv. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d
31, 38 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976),
reh’g denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977). Therefore, while
1® See App. D(27-34a). To this end, the Warsaw Convention de-
fines the international transportation to which it applies (Article 1),
the ticket and baggage check requirements for passengers (Articles
3 and 4), the Air Waybill requirements (Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8),
the contractual implications of the Cargo Air Waybill (Articles 9,
10 and 11), the rights of the consignor (shipper) and consignee
(Articles 12, 13, 14 and 15) and certain customs requirements
(Article 16).
1® And as to passengers and their baggage (Article 17) (35a).
2 See Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 922 (1977); Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386
F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968) ; Lowen-
feld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Conven-
tion, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 497, 499-500 (1967). See generally Minutes,
Second International Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, War-
saw, October 4-12, 1929 (Horner and Legrez trans. 1975). The
presumptions of fault are contained in Articles 17-21 (35-36a) and
Article 25 of the Convention (37-38a).
8
keeping the overall structure of the Convention intact
(including the limit of liability provisions), the parties,
including the United States, have, by means of the Guate-
mala City/Montreal Protocols, sought to amend the Con-
vention.”
The Protocols substitute the SDR as a unit of conver-
sion for Poincare francs in Article 22(4), provide for
substantial upward revision of passenger liability limits,
and permit each nation to supplement the Convention
limits with a compensation plan. Montreal Protocols 3
21 Because of historical opposition in the United States to the
Convention limits of liability for deeth and bodily injury (but not
cargo), the U.S. has striven in recent years to persuade the War-
saw parties to revise upwards those limits. The Hague Protocol,
Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371, the result of a 1955 conference of
the Warsaw parties, doubled the Warsaw limit of liability for bodily
injury or death (cargo limitations were not an issue). It was signed
but never ratified by the United States. See generally A. Lowenfeld,
Aviation Law, pp. 7-100-127 (2d ed. 1981). On November 15, 1965
the United States gave formal! notice of denunciation of the Con-
vention because of the parties’ unwillingness to agree to upward
revisions of the bodily injury or death limit to amounts desirable
to the United States (again, cargo limitations were not the ration-
ale). 50 Dep't State Bull. 923 (1965). In the wake of the adoption
of the Montrea! Agreement, the U.S. withdrew its notice of denun-
ciation on May 13, 1966. 54 Dep't State Bull. 955-57 (1966). The
Montreal Agreement, raising the limitation of liability of the War-
saw Convention to $75,000 for passenger injury or death, was filed
with and approved by the CAB on May 13, 1966 as an interim
measure pending amendment of the Warsaw Convention. CAB
Agreement 18990. Cargo limitations of liability were not changed
by the Montreal Agreement. See also note 31, infra.
22 The Guatemala City Protocol, reached in February-March, 1971,
would establish a single unbreakable limit of liability of approxi-
mately $100,000, liability without fau't, and an increase of the
baggage limitations to 62,500 francs per passenger. See generally
A. Lowenfeld, Aviation Law, pp. 7-154-155 (2d ed. 1981). Again,
there was no proposed change to the cargo limitations.
Montreal Protocols 3 and 4 were approved and signed by the Exec-
utive Branch and forwarded to the U.S. Senate for advice and con-
sent January 14, 1977. They embody the Guatemala City Protocol
9
and 4 were signed by the United States in 1975 and are
presently awaiting the advice and consent of the U.S.
Senate.” As noted in the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Report on the Protocols, “{t]he Montreal
Protocols are the result of decades of effort by the United
States to improve the existing Warsaw Treaty system.” **
Thus, the United States government has made a clear
commitment to adhere to the Convention, while working
to amend some of its provisions, including those relating
to limits of liability.¥
and when in force would change the unit of conversion in Warsaw
Convention Article 22(4) from gold (Poincare francs) to Special
Drawing Rights (SDRs). They would also raise the limits of liabil-
ity for death to approximately 100,000 SDRs ‘approximately
$112,000) and provide for individual nations’ establishment of a
Supplemental Compensation Plan for passenger death. Their limit
for loss or damage to cargo would be 17 SDRs (approximately
$20) per kilogram, regardless of fault. U.S. ratification would be
Subject to establishment of an adequate Supplemental Compensa-
tion Plan, as reviewed and approved by the CAB. S. Exec. Rep.
No. 45, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., at 3-7 (1981). See note 31, infra.
** The Protocols were reported on favorably (16-1) by the U.S.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 17, 1981. S.
Exec. Rep. No. 45, 97th Cong., let Sess., at 3-7 (1981). Although
scneduled, they did not reach a floor vote in the last session of the
97th Congress and have been referred back to the Foreign Relations
Committee. See Aviation Week and Space Technology, November
29, 1982, at 43-44; Aviation Daily, January 3, 1983, at 1.
™S. Exec. Rep. No. 45, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.. at 5 (1981).
%* Indeed, it appears that neither the Panel (nor the parties)
had at their disposal the Detailed Report of the United States Dele-
gation to the ICAO International Conference on Air Law, Sept.
1975, to revise Montreal Protocols 3 and 4 to the Warsaw Conven-
tion. That report demonstrates that it was the United States that
urged the use of SDRs as the unit of conversion for the Montreal
Protocols. Despite this clear expression of interest by the Execu-
tive Branch, the Court of Appeals suggests that because the United
States Senate has not ratified these Protocols, their content is not a
viable alternative, and that consequently there is no viable conver-
sion rate. The Panel misapprehended the reason why the
10
Historically, and particularly since 1965, both the Ex-
ecutive and Legislative Branches have relied upon the
Civil] Aeronautics Board (CAB) to deal with Convention
issues involving limitations of liability. Congress has
delegated to the CAB authority to coordinate and review
international airline matters and agreements ** and the
power and duty to investigate and ensure that the tariffs
governing foreign air transportation, including the limi-
tation of liability for cargo carriage, are lawful, fair
and reasonable; and to suspend any tariff found to be
unlawful; *’ consistent, however, with any treaty obliga-
tion of the United States.** Since the Warsaw Conven-
tion is self-executing, the method of converting the Poin-
care franc into “lawful money of the United States” ™
pursuant to Article 22(4) of the Convention (37a) has
clearly become a tariff function and within the Board’s
legislative rulemaking functions under the Federal Avia-
tion Act.”
Despite changes in the use of gold as a currency base
and the ongoing Warsaw Convention amendment process,
the latest CAB staff memorandum as to the appropriate
unit of conversion affirms the selection of the last official
price of U.S. gold by CAB Order 74-1-16 (48a) :
[T)he Board’s current course of action [use of the
last official U.S. price of gold as a unit of conver-
sion] is superior to any of the alternatives currently
available... . Pending resolution of this issue by
the three agencies (CAB, Department of Transpor-
tation, Department of State] we believe the Board
Guatemala/Montreal Protocols have not been adopted by the United
States. The controversy that has delayed legislative approval has
to do only with the total supplemental compensation package, not
the selection of the SDR as the international unit of conversion.
2 49 U.S.C. §§ 1382 and 1386.
#7 49 U.S.C. §§ 1874(a) and 1482.
46 49 U.S.C. § 1502.
% 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a).
49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seg.
11
should take no action which would disturb the con-
version formula now contained in sections 221.175
and 221.176 of the [CAB] regulations [14 C.F.R.
$$ 221.175 and 221.176 (1981) ).
Memorandum prepared by John Golden, Director, Bureau
of Compliance and Consumer Protection, Civil Aeronau-
tics Board, May 20, 1981 (App. H (58a)). Over the
years, the Board has also been responsible for implement-
ing other provisions of the Convention and its Proto-
cols *’—particularly in recent years while coordination of
the Montreal Protocols was in process.
C. The Interest of IATA And Its Member Airlines
We recognize that a request to intervene before this
Court is unusual. The unanticipated™ decision of the
"! For instance, in 1966 the Executive Branch deferred to the
Board for review and approval of the compromise Montreal Agree-
ment, CAB No. 18990, as an interim measure pending negotiation
and ratification of a new treaty. Also, CAB Order 74-1-16 (48a)
converted Poincare francs into U.S. dollars at the last official U.S.
price of gold. And at the Senate hearings regarding the Montreal
Protocols, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee received the
views of the Board regarding the status of the Supplemental Com-
pensation Plan (prepared pursuant to the Montreal Protocols),
which is still pending before the Board. See Civil Aviation Proto-
cols: Heasing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United
States Senate, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., at 6-8 (1981). Indeed, the
Senate is looking to the Board for a reevaluation of the proposed
Supplemental Compensation Plan (See CAB Order 77-7-85 (July 20,
1977) ) a8 a condition subsequent to ratification; i.e., it would come
into force only if the CAB makes a favorable determination. See
S. Exec. Rep. No. 45, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). The Plan would
be subject to review in United States courts, presumably by peti-
tioners herein. See 5 U.S.C. § 702; Chrysler Corp. Vv. Brown, 441
U.S. 281, 317 (1979).
*2 The result reached by the Court of Appeals had not previously
been briefed by the parties, nor did IATA and its member airlines
anticipate such a decision. Since the only issue in the case prior to
the Panel's decision was the conversion standard for the limitation
(stipulated and so ordered by the District Court), and since that
12
Court of Appeals has the practical effect of denying the
member airlines (and at least vicariously some of their
owner governments) participation in the normal Warsaw
Convention administrative procedures employed by the
United States during the amendment process. It also re-
sults in additional exposure to unlimited damages and
attendant additional costs in the thousands of cargo suits
filed each year. Therefore, we submit that intervention is
appropriate.”
Most of IATA’s 123 international members carry air
cargo to and from the United States and are consequently
subject to litigation in American courts.* They carry
on their day-to-day business in reliance on the Warsaw
Convention framework. The disruption of this structure
by judicial abrogation of the limitation will greatly
hamper this important international commerce, and sig-
nificantly increase the cost of doing business in an indus-
issue had been litigated before other courts with various results,
see note 51, infra, IATA did not seek to burden the judicial process
by prior intervention.
383 See note 1, supra. IATA has standing to bring this constitu-
tional challenge in its own right and on behalf of its members.
NAACP v. Alabama ez rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1958) ;
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee Vv. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
183-87 (Burton, J., concurring) (1951); United States v. SCRAP,
412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
IATA and its members meet the test of standing enunciated in
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). Cf. Duke Power Co. V.
Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80-81 (1978):
Where a party champions his own rights, and where the injury
alleged is a concrete and particularized one which will be pre-
vented or redressed by the relief requested, the basic practical
and prudential concerns underlying the standing doctrine are
generally satisfied when the constitutional requisites are met.
Sec, ¢.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977).
* If the airway bill is issued here or the destination is the United
States, they are subject to suit here even if they are an interline
carrier. See Article 30(2) (39a).
13
try already staggering under the economic burdens of the
times and the effects of deregulation. Indeed, the dis-
array sown by this case may not be confined to Warsaw
cargo cases (for the treaty provisions are interrelated),
nor to the aviation industry alone.” The member airlines
of IATA (and in some cases, their governments) have a
right to know whether, by virtue of this decision, the
United States, consistent with the actions of the Legisla-
tive and Executive Branches, remains a supporter of the
Warsaw Convention framework.
IATA’s members and their governments fully support
the principle of liability limitation embodied in the War-
saw Convention and subsequent treaties. IATA, its mem-
ber airlines, their respective governments, and shippers
in international air transportation rely upon the good
faith of the United States in the treaty-making process
and United States court decisions in making their busi-
ness and legal decisions.**
The Warsaw Convention greatly facilitates an interna-
tional commercial process and uniformly establishes vari-
% See, ¢.g., Brussels Convention, August 25, 1924 (The Hague
Rules), 51 Stat. 233 (limit of liability unit of conversion in Poin-
care francs for loss of international maritime cargo); United Na-
tions Convention on the Carriage of Goods By Sea, 1978 (The Ham-
burg Rules), A/CONF. 89/13, 30 March 1978 (limit of liability
unit of conversion in SDRs for loss of international maritime cargo
(to supercede The Brussels Convention)). The SDR is a unit of
account in no leas than 15 international conventions (some of which
are in effect). Merren, The SDR as a Unit of Account in Private
Transactions, 16 Int’! Law 503, 505 (1982).
5 See note 51, infra. It is anticipated that some of their govern-
ments may file official communications with the United States De-
partment of State protesting or objecting to the decision, and
urging the United States Executive Branch to take appropriate
steps to support its commitment to a uniform treaty structure.
For these and other reasons suggested, infra, this Court should
invite the views of the Solicitor General as to the Court of Appeals’
decision. See Califorvia v. Texas, 450 U.S. 961 (1981); Crist v.
Cline, 434 U.S. 980 (1977).
14
ous predictable commercial criteria relevant to the day-to-
day conduct of business in international air cargo ship-
ment. The judicial disruption of this structure by abro-
gation (or reservation) of the limitation of liability pro-
visions will only proliferate uncertainty, increase litiga-
tion and complicate business dealings.*’
Even more important for purposes of the constitutional
question herein, IATA is sensitive to the international
repercussions of the Court of Appeals’ decision among
the world’s governments and seeks herein to advise this
Court of those problems. In the interest of judicial econ-
omy, the question presented herein should be promptly
and finally resolved * before the Court of Appeals’ deci-
sion engenders a plethora of lawsuits brought under the
“no limit of liability” regime. If courts permit the unen-
forceability holding to be asserted in passenger cases, the
upheaval and foreign government reaction could be ex-
ponentially greater. See, e.g., Duke Power Co, Vv. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978).
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
A. The Decision Of The Court Of Appeals Violates The
Constitutional Separation Of Powers Doctrine By
Improperly Interjecting The Judiciary Into The Con-
duct of Foreign Relations
1. The Judiciary Has Intervened in the Treaty Nego-
tiation Process
The Constitution reserves to the Executive Branch the
power to negotiate and make treaties, with the advice
and consent of the Senate.” The primacy of the political
5T See also pp. 6-7, supra.
** However, we do not believe this Court needs to decide the
proper conversion factor in Article 22 of the Convention to rectify
the disarray caused by the Court of Appeals’ decision.
% See also pp. 22-25, infra.
# U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (46a).
15
branches in the conduct of the Nation’s foreign relations
has always been a cornerstone of the federal judiciary’s
self-restraint. While the Judicial Branch’s power extends
to interpretation of treaties,"' treaties are to be interpreted
liberally to carry out the intent of the drafters. Nielson
v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 51 (1929). If circumstances have
changed, the court is to examine the conduct of the parties
subsequent to ratification of the treaty in order to ascer-
tain its proper construction. See Pigeon River Improv.
Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cor, Ltd., 291 U.S.
138, 153-63 (1934); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187,
192-194 (1961). The judiciary may not generate a
reservation or declare an abrogation of a treaty unless it
finds the treaty unconstitutional * or holds that it has
been superceded by subsequently enacted and conflicting
legislation.” However, to hold a treaty superceded by
subsequent legislation in conflict with it, a court must
find that Congress’ intent to supercede was clear, definite
and specifically in contemplation of the treaty super-
ceded. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S, 102, 120
(1933); United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S, 218, 22
S. Ct. 629, 682 (1902); Union Pacific Railroad vy. United
States, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1879); Valentine v. United-
States, 299 U.S. 5, 10-11 (1936); cf. Whitney v. Robert-
son, supra, Furthermore, it has never seriously been sug-
gested that the judiciary has the power to terminate or
generate judicial reservations to treaties.“ The judi-
“1 U.S. Const. art. ITI, § 2, cl. 1 (46a).
“2 The treaty power is unlimited except as it “extends so far as
to authorize what the Constitution forbids... ." Geofroy v. Riggs,
133 U.S. 268, 267 (1890). See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1967); Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902); Doe ex dem.
Clark v. Braden, 16 How. 635, 657 (1853). There was no suggestion
by the Court of Appeals in Franklin Mint of any constitutional
infirmity in the Warsaw Convention.
* Whitney V. Robertaon, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1889).
“Cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F Supp. 949 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 617
F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
16
ciary’s “role is limited to giving effect to the intent of
the Treaty parties.” Sumitomo Shoji America, Ine. V.
Avagliano, 102 S.Ct. 2874, 2380 (1982).
While professing its adherence to these basic princi-
ples, the Court of Appeals did precisely what it said it
could not do.** It created, in effect, a judicial reservation
in an existing treaty. More importantly, it also inter-
jected itself into the delicate process of renegotiation of
the Warsaw Convention framework, a matter which the
Constitution quite clearly leaves in the hands of the
political branches.
As we have noted above, the framers of the Warsaw
Convention understood that, in years to come, civil avia-
tion would change in unforeseen ways.** They accepted
the inevitability of future modification of the agreement
. but committed themselves to make those adjustments
within the Convention’s basic framework. Indeed, the
United States, dissatisfied with the low limits of liability
set forth in the Treaty, at one point contemplated denun-
ciation but decided to work within the framework of the
Convention for a general modernization of the limits of
liability.” It took a leadership role in the delicate recon-
ciliation of competing interests within the international
community. Those efforts culminated in the Guatemala
City/Montrea] Protocols. Today, ratification of the Mon-
treal Protocols await the advice and consent of the Senate.
In the interim, the political branches of the United States
government, along with the governments of the other
parties, have committed themselves to operate within the
framework of the Convention.
* It claimed to recognize that “it is not the province of courts
to declare treaties abrogated... ” 690 F.2d at 311, n.26 (17a).
* See p. 7, supra. Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d
at 38.
** See pp. 8-9, supra and notes 2) and 22, supra.
17
By declaring that the limitation on liability provision
of the Convention is unenforceable in “United States
courts”,** the Court of Appeals unilaterally took, in effect,
precisely the action which the political branches declined
to take when, rather than denounce the Treaty, they
determined to work with other nations for its moderniza-
tion.” Taking this unilateral action, the Panel of the
Second Circuit, unlike every other federal court™ and
foreign court “ to consider the matter, ignored the obvious
4* 690 F.2d at 304 (6a).
** Between signing and ratification of a treaty (as in the case of
Montreal Protocols 3 and 4), a party is obliged not to take any
action in contravention of the treaty. United States v. D’Auterive,
51 U.S. 609 (10 How, 607, 623) (1850). The same principle applies
under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
reprinted in 81 I.L.M. 679, 686 (1969), which, although not ratified
by the United States, has been relied upon by U.S. courts. See, e.g.,
Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce Vv. Goldschmidt, 627 F.2d 258,
263 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Huseerl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351
F.Supp. 702, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 485 F.2d 1240
(2d Cir. 1973).
™ See notes 21, 22 and 23, supra.
5! See In Re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14,
1980, 535 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (selecting last official U.S.
price of gold in Warsaw passenger case), appeal denied on that
iseue, No. 82-8018 (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 1982). Boehringer Mannheim
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 531 F. Supp.
344 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (selecting free market price of gold in Warsaw
cargo case), oppeal pending, No. 81-2519; Deere & Co. v. Deutache
Lufthansa 4.G., N.D. Ill. No. 81 C 4726 (Dec. 30, 1982) (selecting
last official U.S. price of gold in Warsaw cargo case).
*? The following foreign cases demonstrate a willingness by for-
eign courts to select a Warsaw unit of conversion in the face of
shifting currency bases (references in parentheses are to the Court
of Appeals Joint Appendix): Pakistan International Airlines v.
Compagnie Air Inter 8.A., No. 79/2278, Court of Appeals of Aix-en-
Provence, France (October 30, 1980) (A156-A170); Horniinie A.G.
v. Societe Nationale Petroles Aquitaine, Supreme Court of the
Netherlands, 7 Eur. Trans. L. 988 (1972) (A126-A155) ; Companhia
de Sequros Maritimos v. Varig, Federal Court of Appeals of Brazil
(June 3, 1975); Association Acronautique vy. Thierache, Tribunal
18
intent of the United States and its Treaty partners to
maintain the Treaty framework despite the transitory
difficulties thus far in setting the conversion standard.
2. The Court of Appeals Has Disregarded the Divi-
sion of Labor Within the Political Branches
Another factor makes even more obvious the radica]
nature of the Court of Appeals’ departure from the ac-
cepted paths of judicial behavior with respect to the ad-
ministration of treaty relations. In holding the limita-
tion of liability provision of the Convention unenforceable
because of the proposed impossibility of devising a satis-
factory conversion formula, the Panel did further violence
to the separation of powers principle by failing to ac-
knowledge the unique role which the CAB plays in this
aspect of effectuating the Warsaw Convention in the
United States. Through the delicate process of renego-
tiating the Convention, the Executive Branch has relied
on the CAB to confirm a viable conversion standard. Far
from following the “law of inertia” as suggested by the
Court of Appeals,“ the Board, after vigorous internal
debate," acted consistently with the intent of the treaty
de Grande Instance, Paris, France (February 10, 1973); Kuwait
Airways Corp. v. Sanghi, Bangalore, India (August 11, 1978)
(A265-A271); Balkan Bulgarian Airlines Vv. Tammaro, Court of
Milan, Italy (October 25, 1976) (A262-A264); Fida Cinematogra-
fica Vv. Pan American World Airways, Rome Civil Court, Italy
(October 13, 1976); Linee Aeree Italiane Vv. Riccioli, No. 609/79,
Rome Civil Court, Italy (November 14, 1978) (A95-A107); Floren-
cia Cia Argentina de Seguros S.A. vy. Varig S.A., Buenos Aires,
Argentina, 1977 Uniform L. Rev. 198 (August 27, 1976) (A265-
A261); Zakapoulos v. Olympic Airwaya Corp., No. 256/74, Court
of Appeal, 3d Dep’t Athens, Greece (February 15, 1974) (A251-
A254). The United Kingdom, by Statutory Instrument 1980 No. 281,
has selected SDRs as the Wareaw Convention conversion standard
(A62-A63). Canada, by regulation, has also established SDRs as
the Warsaw conversion standard. Carriage By Air Act Regulations,
P.C. 1983— “an. 13, 1983 (effective date Jan. 14, 1983).
* 690 F.2d at 310 (14a).
* Court of Appeals Joint Appendix A32-A46, A62-A56.
19
and has applied the official price of gold during the in-
terim period.” Thus, the CAB, like the Executive Branch,
has chosen to maintain the status quo* and the effec-
tiveness of a treaty that is adhered to not only by the
United States, but also by over 100 other sovereign
nations.
The Court of Appeals has disregarded, the presumptive
validity of the CAB orders" and, consequently, the his-
torical role which this agency has played in the adminis-
tration of the United States’ obligation under the Warsaw
Convention.” Reviewed in light of the CAB’s role, the
Court of Appeals’ holding that repeal of the Par Value
Modification Act of 1973 constituted “an explicit aban-
donment of the previously established unit of conver-
sion” in the Warsaw Convention is especially superfi-
cial. Of course, even under the basic principles of treaty
55 See note 5, supra, and CAB Orders 72-6-7 (June 2, 1972) 37
Fed. Reg. 11384 (1972); 74-1-16 (Jan. 3, 1974) (48a); 78-8-10
(Aug. 3, 1978) (52a).
% See Golden Memorandum, pp. 10-11, supra (58a); CAB Order
74-1-16 (48a); and 14 C.F.R. §§ 221.175 and 176 (1981).
5? Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ assumption that the CAB’s
last statement converting the gold French franc to dollars predates
the repeal of the Par Value Modification Act of 1973, the Board on
August 3, 1978, stated, with respect to IATA Conditions of Cargo
Carriage, “At the present time a carrier’s liability for Warsaw
traffic... is $20 per kilogram... .” CAB Order 78-8-10 (August 8,
1978) (52a).
5* The decision also interferes with the joint effort of the Execu-
tive Branch and the CAB to develop a Supplemental Compensation
Plan pursuant to the Montreal Protocols. See notes 22 and 31, supra.
5® Par Value Modification Act, Pub. L. No. 92-268, 86 Stat. 116
(1972), amended by Par Value Modification Act, 31 U.S.C. § 449
(1973), repealed 1976 by Pub. L. No. 94-564, 90 Stat. 2660.
© 690 F.2d at 311 (17a).
*) In fact, neither the legislative histories of the Par Value Modi-
fication Acts nor the statute repealing the latter make any mention
of the Warsaw Convention. The legislative history of the repealing
20
interpretation outlined above, the potentia! result would
be highly questionable since “the intention to abrogate or
modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to Congress.”
Pigeon River Improv. Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W.
Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. at 160, quoted in Menominee Tribe
of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968).
Certainly, a statute which, by the Court of Appeals’ own
admission was not aimed at abrogating the Warsaw Con-
vention,™ but rather ameliorating monetary shifts, can-
not be said to amount to a congressional denunciation of
the Treaty here.
However, it is not necessary to rely simply on the
general principles of treaty interpretation. The CAB,
the agency relied upon by the Executive and charged by
the Legislative Branch ® with the responsibility for ad-
ministration of this aspect of U.S. treaty obligations
under the Warsaw Convention, has—despite the repeal
of the Par Value Modification Act—consistently held to
the regulations establish d by CAB Order 74-1-16 (48a),
which applies the last oficial price of gold as the appro-
priate conversion standard for cargo (and other Warsaw)
limits of liability.* Indeed, more than two years after the
Act reflects the Senate’s recognition that there were other purposes
for which the official price would still be used to determine the
monetary value of gold. It was noted that the “only domestic
purpose for which it is necessary” was to determine the value of
gold held in the form of gold certificates. See 690 F.2d at 308, n.11
(10a). The clear inference was that there were other international
purposes, but this was overlooked by the Court of Appeals. 690 F.2d
at 309, n.20, referring to n.12 [sic; it should be n.11] (13a). Clearly,
the issue in this case is international, not domestic.
@ “Congress may not have focused explicitly upon the Convention
in repealing [the Par Value Modification Act]... .” 690 F.2d at
311 (17a).
* See notes 28 and 30, supra.
* See notes 5 and 9, supra. See also 14 C.F.R. §§ 221.175 and
176 (1981). Moreover, the Court of Appeals apparently mistakenly
believed that application of the official rate of gold to Warsaw
21
Jamaica Accords and the legislation repealing the Par
Value Modification Act of 1973, and more than four
months after that legislation became effective on April 1,
1978, the CAB valued the cargo limit according to the
last official price of U.S. gold.“ Accordingly, there was
no basis on which the Court of Appeals could constitu-
tionally render unenforceable the liability limits of Arti-
cle 22 of the Convention. Even were the Court of Ap-
peals’ decision devoid of constitutional infirmity, it would
merit this Court’s review because it conflicts with the
“familiar rule that the obligations of treaties should be
liberally construed so as to give effect to the apparent
intention of the parties.” Valentine v. United States, 299
U.S. at 10.”
Convention limitations was derived solely from the Par Value Modi-
fication Act of 1973 and its predecessor. When the Par Value
Modification Act adjusted the official rate of gold, the CAB directed
the carriers to apply the new rate of conversion in their tariffs.
The power to mandate use of the official price was derived from the
Federal Aviation Act (see CAB Order 72-6-7, June 2, 1972) and
not from the Par Value Modification Act. In issuing that Order,
the CAB took into consideration a number of policy factors, of
which the Par Value Modification Act was only one, including the
continuing application of the Warsaw Convention. Accordingly,
legislation repealing the Par Value Modification Act should not be
taken to have precluded the CAB’s approval of the last official price
of gold for filing in air carrier tariffs governed by the Warsaw
Convention.
* See note 57, supra.
* Prior to Franklin Mint, the Second Circuit had followed this
rule. See Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913,
918 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979); Reed v.
Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977);
Day Vv. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976), reh’g denied, 429 U.S. 1124
(1977).
22
B. The Decision Of The Court Of Appeals Has And Will
Seriously Disrupt International Air Commerce And
The Federal Courts
1. The Decision Has an Immediate Adverse Effect on
the International Air Cargo System
The Court of Appeals’ prospective unenforceability
holding frustrates the purposes of the Convention not only
by casting into limbo air cargo shippers and carriers who
will be in litigation over loss or damage to cargo but
also by disrupting the routine conduct of the interna-
tional air cargo business.” Quite simply, if the Court of
Appeals’ mandate takes effect, there will be no limit on
liability in suits filed in at least Second Circuit courts,
if not all “United States courts”,™ for loss or damage as
to Convention-governed air cargo shipments where there
has been no special declaration of value under Article 22
(36a). Since a special declaration under Article 22 for
each item of cargo is simply not practical in most cases
for reasons of time, practice and course of dealing, the
shippers and air carriers (and their governments) must
separately or together consider new arrangements. Ob-
viously, if the Court of Appeals’ decision stands, some
new arrangements for some shippers and some carriers
must be attempted, but they will probably differ and
some may prove impractical. This new process would
certainly undermine the uniformity, stability, predictabil-
ity and reliability envisioned by the framers of the War-
saw Convention.
“ As noted at pp. 6-7, supra, the Warsaw Convention estab-
lishes uniform documentation and commercial obligations require-
ments, providing an internationally consistent scheme for both cargo
shippers and air carriers. In the absence of these provisions both
shippers and carriers would have to resort to local rules of commerce
as varied as the number of Warsaw contracting parties. The
Convention aids in avoiding such a morass and also aids and enables
shipping cargo anywhere in the world on a single air waybill.
* 690 F.2d at 304 (6a).
23
The Court of Appeals apparently recognized the de-
vastating effect that this holding might have on the
present international aviation system when it provided
a moratorium on the effect of the unenforceability ruling
and suggested that the airlines reformulate their tariffs
filed with the CAB.” The Panel’s suggestion is unrealis-
tic. International tariffs must be reciprocally consistent.
Their reformulation would involve innumerable intricacies
and unavoidable delays. In some countries, new enabling
legislation and new operating agreements may have to
precede amendment of conditions of contract and airway
bills by foreign air carriers. Tariff reformulation in this
country would also be subject to a time-consuming process,
which would necessarily require more than the 60 days
allowed by the Panel.” Thus, during the interim, the
current system would be destabilized, and its uniformity
would suffer severely.
2. The Decision Has An Immediate Adverse Effect on
the Federal Courts
Apparently, the Court of Appeals suggested that tariffs
might establish a new limit of liability. Even if new
tariffs and new procedures are ultimately upheld, the
legal system will be more burdened by a plethora of liti-
gation (including future resort to this Court when, in-
evitably, the decisions are inconsistent). Such legal chal-
lenges would not be limited to those mentioned above, but
may include additional issues, relating, inter alia, to the
continued viability of the presumption c? liability under
© 690 F.2d at 312 (18a).
™ The CAB has recently promulgated a mew rule covering tariffs
for interstate or overseas air transportation as defined in the Fed-
eral Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1301, et seq. The primary reason for
the new rule is the elimination of domestic tariffs as of January 1,
1983 pursuant to the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978). See 47 Fed. Reg. 14,892 (1982) (to
be codified at 14 (.F.R. § 8399). Similar implementation orders
would probably be necessary for international tariffs if the Panel's
decision remains undisturbed, which could cause further delay.
24
Article 18 of the Warsaw Convention, the required con-
tent of new notice provisions, and the effect of possibly
inconsistent findings by foreign courts on similar issues.”
As previously noted, Franklin Mint’s attorney has already
suggested that any tariff attempting to limit liability
might be subject to legal challenge.” Other cargo ship-
pers’ attorneys have already raised issues similar to those
presented herein in other courts ” with differing results,
and certainly numerous additjonal legal challenges may
be anticipated. °
Although we deal herein with limitations on cargo
claims rather than those connected with personal injury
or death of passengers, the nufnber of such commercial
matters litigated in United States courts is several] times
the number of passenger cases. To date, because of the
uniformity and predictability of the limitation provisions,
most of tte: cargo claims are settled—but the effect of
the decision below will make settlement more difficult
and increase the number of cases filed and ultimately
tried."* These practical, severe consequences to the exist-
"1 For example, courts of other contracting parties to the Conven-
tion may reassess their interpretation of the need for uniformity as
to limits of liability, further exacerbating the disarray among air
carriers, their shippers and insurers. Moreover, under Articles 19
and 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra,
note 49, the parties to the Warsaw Convention might contend that
the Court of Appeals’ decision constitutes a material breach of the
Convention entitling them to terminate the Convention. See also
Restatement, 2d Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 153.
™ Remarks of John Foster, Esq., Luncheon of the Air Transporta-
tion Law Committee and the Water Transportation Law Committee
of the Federal Bar Association, December 7, 1982, Washington, D.C.
See qlso note 10, supra.
™ See note 10, supra.
™ With a presumption of liability and the quid pro quo of limita-
tion thereon, the issues and proof of a claim are limited—if the Con-
vention were not in existence, proof of delivery, events, defenses,
etc. would complicate the issuer and the facts in every case.
25
ing international air cargo regime demonstrate why, when
nations have agreed upon a treaty, it should not lightly be
disregarded.
3. The Decision Has An Adverse Long-Term Effect on
International Air Commerce
If the Court of Appeals’ decision is allowed to stand,
how will United States initiatives and commitments be
regarded at future meetings of Warsaw Convention
parties or, indeed, at similar international meetings?
The United States is regarded as an important party to
the Warsaw Convention .because of the relative size of
its aviation industry and its relatively large share of
international air traffic. Nevertheless, in a world in-
creasingly conscious of sovereign independence, the United
States cannot act unilaterally in a treaty -eontext. Of
course, the United States may at times seek to change
its treaty relationships or withdraw from treaties or seek
to change treaty terms. But such steps should be taken
advisedly by the Executive Branch—not by the judiciary.
Courts “should hesitate long before limiting or em-
barassing” the sovereign powers of the United States,
particularly as they concern foreign affairs. Mackenzie
v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915), quoted in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 322
(1936).
Foreign relations is certainly one area where the
United States should speak with “one voice”. If allowed
to stand, the Court of Appeals’ decision will surely vitiate
the longstanding commitment of the Roosevelt Adninis-
tration that the United States would give full, “good
faith” o! servance to the Warsaw Convention.” The con-
tracting parties have manifested an intent to keep the
' Proclamation of President Franklin D. Roosevelt declaring U.S.
adherence to the Warsaw Convention, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876 (1984).
26
Warsaw Convention, including the limitation of liability
concept, alive despite the ambiguities caused by the
changing world monetary situation.”* The United States,
through its Executive Branch, has also sought to further
those goals. This Court should not permit the judiciary,
on its own motion, to isolate the U.S. legal system or
place in further doubt whether this nation “speaks with
one voice” with respect to foreign affairs. See Miahelin
Tire Corp. Vv. Wages, 423 U.S, 276, 285 (1976) ; Depart-
ment of Revenue of Washington v. Association of Wash-
ington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 784, 752-53 (1978);
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434,
449 (1979). As this Court noted in The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972), the day is long past
when our courts can adhere to the “parochial concept”
that “trade and commerce in world markets and interna-
tional waters [be] exclusively on our own terms, gov-
erned by our laws, and resolved in our courts.” See also
Scherk v, Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974);
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). The
abolition of al] standards of liability is simply not a sit-
uation desired by any nation, including the United States.
Thus, it must be recognized that the decision of the Court
of Appeals will have a significant adverse impact on the
United States’ ability to deal effectively with international
legal transactions in other contexts.
™ See note 52, supra.
27
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, leave should be granted
for petitioners to intervene and to file a petition for writ
of certiorari to review the opinion and judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Franklin Mint. Alternatively, if leave to intervene is
denied, petitioners request that this Court treat the
petition as an amicus curiae brief in support of TWA’s
petition for certiorari,”
Respectfully submitted,
CARROLL E, Dusuc *
AIDAN D. JONES
RAND! L. BRESLOW
HAIGHT, GARDNER, Poor
& HAVENS
1819 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 775-1800
Counsel for Petitioners
Of Counsel: International Air Transport
KENNETH F. RIPPLE Association and Forty-Three
Notre Dame Law School Member Airlines (see
Notre Dame, Ind. 46556 Appendiz |)
January 20, 1988 * Counsel of Record
= “ah No. 82-1186 MURR Sh
$
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1982
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
7 Petitioner,
FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN MINT
LIMITED and McGreGoR, SWIRE AIR SERVICES LIMITED,
Respondents,
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION AND
ForTY-THREE OF ITS MEMBER AIRLINES (SEE APPENDIX I),
Potential Intervenors.
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE IN
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC, vy.
FRANKLIN MINT CORP., NO, 82-1186 AND
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI OF
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC,
CARROLL E. DuBuc *
AIDAN D, JONES
RAND! L. BRESLOW
HAIGHT, GARDNER, Poor
& HAVENS
1819 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 775-1800
Counsel for Petitioners
Of Counsel: International Air Transport
Feanetn F. Rirrie Association and Forty-Three
Notre Dame Law School Member Airlines (see
Notre Dame, Ind. 46556 Appendiz |)
January 20, 1963 * Counsel of Reeord Db
TABLE OF CONTENTS
. Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., No. 82-7012 (September 28,
A scovciiclnlane cianasisinaniaies ttieekdiasdasnanemanae
. Memorandum and Order (filed Nov. 12, 1981),
Order and Judgment (filed Dec. 4, 1981) and
Amended Order (filed Dec. 28, 1981) of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of
New York in Franklin Mint v. Trans World Air-
Lines, Inc., 81 Civ. 1700 (WK)
. Judgment of the United States Court of aie
for the Second Circuit in Franklin Mint Corp. v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 82-7012 —
I isc ce ae a
. Warsaw Convention and List of Adhering Nations..
. Applicable Sections of the United States Constitu-
. CAB Order 74-1-16, 39 Fed. Reg. 1526 (1974)........
. CAB Order 78-8-10, 43 Fed. Reg. 35971 (1978)
ESET eer Crees, EES
. J. Golden, “Warsaw Convention Liability Limits”,
Bureau of Compliance and Consumer Protection,
Gath ID coecercntisnssnosncnsevcsenncesntitoniannaineadele
. Membership List of International Air Transport
Association (IATA) (asterisked to indicate individ-
ual potential intervenors) oo... ccccteenenne
Page
la
19a
la
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
No. 999—August Term, 1981
(Argued April 22, 1982 Decided September 28, 1982)
Docket No. 82-7012
FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN MINT LIMITED,
and MCGREGOR, SWIRE AIR SERVICES LIMITED,
Plaintiffs-A ppellants,
Vv.
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before:
OAKES, CARDAMONE, and WINTER,
Circuit Judges.
Appeal from a final judgment of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York,
Whitman Knapp, Judge, utilizing the last official price of
gold to calculate the limit on defendant’s liability under
the Warsaw Convention.
The Court holds the limitation provision of the Con-
vention prospectively unenforceable and affirms.
2a
JoHN R. Foster, New York, New York (Donald M.
Waesche, Waesche, Scheinbaum & O’Regan, P.C., New
York, New York, of counsel), for Plaintiffs-Appel-
lants Franklin Mint Corporation, Franklin Mint
Limited, and McGregor, Swire Air Services, Limited.
JOHN N. RoMANS, New York, New York (Robert S.
Lipton, Scott J. McKay Wolas, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost,
Colt & Mosley, New York, New York, of counsel) for
Defendant-Appellee Trans World Airlines, Inc.
(Robert B. Hemley, Norman Williams, Gravel, Shea &
Wright, Burlington, Vermont, of counsel) for Amici-
Curiae Jacques Roulin and Hugh Harley.
WINTER, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, Whitman Knapp, Judge, limiting the defendant’s
liability under the Warsaw Convention (“Convention”)?
for loss of cargo. In determining the limit in United
States dollars, Judge Knapp utilized the last official price
of gold as a unit of conversion and awarded plaintiffs
$6,475.98. 525 F.Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Plaintiffs
appeal, claiming the limit should have been calculated by
other methods. While we agree with the result reached
in this case and thus affirm, we hold the Convention’s
limit on liability prospectively unenforceable in United
States Courts.
SUMMARY OF THE ISSUES AND DECISION
The facts in this case, if nothing else, are clear cut. In
March, 1979, plaintiffs Franklin Mint Corporation, Frank-
Transportation by Air,” opened for signature October 12, 1929, 49
Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (adherence of the United
States proclaimed October 29, 1934).
3a
lin Mint Limited, and McGregor, Swire Air Services
Limited (collectively, “Franklin Mint”) contracted with
defendant Trans World Airlines, Inc. (“TWA”) for the
carriage by air from the United States to England of 714
pounds of numismatic materials. Though the articles were
worth more than $6,500, Franklin Mint made no special
declaration of value. The articles were either lost or
destroyed, thus rendering TWA liable under Article 18 of
the Convention.*? Because of the absence of a special
declaration, TWA sought to limit its liability under Article
22 of the Convention.
Article 22 limits the carrier’s liability for injuries to
both “checked baggage and .. . goods” and “objects of
which the passenger takes charge himself.” * The various
2 Article 18 of the Convention reads:
(1) The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event
of the destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any checked bag-
gage or any goods, if the occurrence which caused the damage
so sustained took place during the transportation by air.
(2) The transportation by air within the meaning of the pre-
ceding paragraph shal] comprise the period during which the
baggage or goods are in charge of the carrier, whether in an
airport or on board an aircraft, or, in the case of a landing
outside an airport, in any place whatsoever.
(3) The period of the transportation by air shall not extend
to any transportation by land, by sea, or by river performed
outside an airport. If, however, such transportation takes
place in the performance of a contract for transportation by
air, for the purpose of loading, delivery or transshipment, any
damage is presumed, subject to proof to the contrary, to have
been the result of an event which took place during the trans-
portation by air.
* Article 22 of the Convention reads:
(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability of the
carrier for each passenger shall be limited to the sum of
125,000 francs. Where, in accordance with the law of the court
to which the case is submitted. damages may be awarded in the
form of periodical payments. the equivalent capita! value of the
4a
limits are stated in terms of a specified number of French
gold or “Poincare” francs, a unit of account consisting of
“651% milligrams of gold at a standard fineness of nine
hundred thousandths.” The limit on baggage or other
goods is 250 Poincare francs per kilogram. The dollar
value of that limit is calculated simply by converting the
gold value of the specified unit into United States dollars,
e.g., the limit per kilogram is 250 multiplied by the dollar
value of 65% milligrams of gold.
The difficulty arises from the fact that when Article 22
was drafted, gold served official monetary functions and
its price was set by law. The Convention thus selected it
as the unit of conversion in order to ensure judgments of
uniform value as well as a stable and easily calculable
limitation on liability. The plain but highly troublesome
fact is that by international agreement and United States
domestic legislation gold has now lost its monetary func-
tions and no longer has an official price. Unfortunately
for parties to international airline transactions as well as
said payments shal! not exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by
special contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a
higher limit of liability.
(2) In the transportation of checked baggage and of goods, the
liability of the carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250 francs
per kilogram, unless the consignor has made, at the time when
the package was handed over to the carrier, a special declara-
tion of the value at delivery and has paid a supplementary sum
if the case so requires. In that case the carrier will be liable
to pay a sum not exceeding the declared sum, unless he proves
that that sum is greater than the actual value to the consignor
at delivery.
(3) As regards objects of which the passenger takes charge
himself the liability of the carrier shall be limited to 5,000
francs per passenger.
(4) The sums mentioned above shal! be deemed to refer to the
French franc consisting of 65', milligrams of gold at the
standard of fineness of nine hundred thousandths. These sums
may be converted into any national currency in round figures.
5a
for us, the terms of Article 22 continue to utilize gold as
the unit of conversion. Thus, the parties raise the issue
of what unit of account is now to be used to convert judg-
ments under the Convention into United States dollars.
In arguing the issue, the parties offer four alternatives:
(i) the last official price of gold in the United States; (ii)
the free market price of gold; (iii) the Special Drawing
Right (“SDR”), a unit of account established by the
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and recently pro-
posed as a substitute for gold in the as yet unratified
Montreal] Protocols to the Convention; and (iv) the ex-
change value of the current French franc. While acknow]-
edging that “the arguments in favor of ... the SDR
[were] most persuasive,” Judge Knapp nevertheless held
that the last official price of gold was the appropriate
standard. This choice was predicated on the view that this
standard “has been ... espoused by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board (“CAB”), the government agency most
intimately concerned with the transaction at hand,” and
has been “used by all domestic carriers—including
TWA—in calculating the dollar value of the Article 22
limitation printed on their tariffs.” 525 F.Supp at 1289.
We share Judge Knapp’s doubt about the result. In-
deed, there are powerful arguments against each of the
proffered solutions. The last official price of gold is a
price which has been explicity repealed by the Congress.
See note 11, infra, and accompanying text. It thus lacks
any status in law or,relationship to contemporary cur-
rency values. The free market price of gold is the highly
volatile price of a commodity determined in part by
forces of supply and demand unrelated to currency values.
SDR’s are a creature of the IMF, modified at will by that
body and having no basis in the Convention. The French
franc is simply one domestic currency, subject to change
by the unilateral act of a single government.
6a
Every proffered solution thus appears to have a devas-
tating argument against it. While the Convention has not
been formally abrogated, enforcement by national judicial
tribunals is impossible without their picking and choosing
among alternative units of conversion according to their
view of which is best as an initial policy matter. We
have no power to select a new unit of account. We thus
hold the Convention’s limitation of liability unenforceable
by United States Courts.
BACKGROUND
Drafted in the late 1920’s, the Convention was designed
both to protect the fledgling aviation industry from the
alternatives of ruinous damage suits or exorbitant insur-
ance premiums and to insure a certain degree of uni-
formity of legal obligation given the expected interna-
tional character of the industry. See A. Lowenfeld and
A. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Con-
vention, 80 Harvard L. Rev. 497, 499-501 (1967) (here-
after “Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn’); see also Reed v.
Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 922 (1977) and CAB Staff Memorandum, Warsaw
Convention Liability Limits, March 18, 1980, at 5-6.
(App. at 43-44). A series of rules governing liability,
affirmative defenses and limitations accomplished the
former goal, while the Convention’s international scope
accomplished the latter. Articles 17, 18 and 19 enunciate
the carrier’s liability for personal injuries, for damage or
loss of baggage, and for damage due to delay. Articles 20
and 21 establish as affirmative defenses lack of fault and
contributory negligence. Finally, Article 22 provides a
limitation on the extent of liability for both personal
injury and less of luggage or other goods.
The personal injury limitations amounts have been
subject to upward revision from time to time
protocols to the original agreement. These revisions
come in the wake of a continuing debate, with the
7!
-
7a
veloped countries, notably the United States, Great Britain
and France, arguing for higher limits, and the less de-
veloped nations seeking reduction of the existing limit.‘
Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn at 504. Throughout this
period, the level of the limitations on liability for loss or
destruction of checked baggage and other goods has
remained the same.
Defining recoveries in terms of a specified amount of
gold was intended to produce stability and uniformity.
Such a common standard allowed the conversion of liability
limits into national currencies and insulated recoveries
from the vicissitudes of currency fluctuation and devalua-
tion. In drafting the Convention, a proposal to fix re-
coveries purely in terms of the French franc was rejected
by Switzerland on the ground that use of a single na-
tional currency rendered the liability limit subject to
change by the act of one government. See Second Interna-
4In 1955, at The Hague, the conferees would agree only to a
doubling of the limit to 250,000 Poincare francs or $16,600. Lowen-
feld and Mendelsohn at 504-09. The United States unenthusiastically
signed the Hague Protocol a year later, but did not present the
treaty to the Senate until July 1959. Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn
at 515. The Senate never ratified the Protocol because of its low
limit, however, and ultimately the Kennedy/Johnson Administra-
tions actually threatened United States denunciation of the Con-
vention. This threat came in the wake of Congress’ failure to en-
act a legislative package ratifying the Hague Protocol while com-
pelling the purchase by all American air carriers of $50,000 in
insurance for each passenger. To avoid United States denunciation,
a conference met in Montreal in the spring of 1966. The result of
this meeting was the so-called Montreal Agreement “which pro-
vided for absolute carrier liability up to $75,000 on all flights into
or out of the United States.” Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d at 1087.
Appeased, the United States withdrew its denunciation. However,
it continued to press for an amendment to the Convention raising
personal injury liability limits. In 1971, the parties promulgated
the Guatemala City Protocol under which personal injury limits
were to be raised to $100,000 at the then current exchange rate
of $35 per ounce of gold.” /d. at 1089 n.12. However, the United
States has not ratified that protocol.
ang
—_ a Cw * P - J *. aeu a
8a
tional Conference on Private Aeronautica! Law, Minutes,
October 4-12, 1929, Warsaw, at 88-89 (Horner and Legrez
trans. 1975), (App. at 247-248). As the Swiss delegate
put it, “Naturally one can say ‘French franc’ but .. . its
{France’s] national law which determines it, and one need
have only a modification of the national law to overturn
the essence of this provision.” Jd. at 89-90, (App. at 248-
249). Accordingly, the Swiss pressed for a standard
which tied the limitation to a gold value regardless of the
national currency actually named in the article. Jd. at 90,
(App. at 249). The conferees accepted the Swiss position
and stated the limitation in terms of the Poincare franc
defined as “65% milligrams of gold at a standard fineness
of nine hundred thousandths.” Convention, art. 22 § (4).°
From October, 1934, when the United States first ad-
hered to the Convention, until 1978, use of gold as unit
of account posed no problem for United States Courts or
the judicial tribunals of other signatory nations. In 1934,
the value of yold was set at $35 per troy ounce pursuant
to statute, United States Gold Reserve Act of 1934, Pub.
L. No. 73-87, 48 Stat. 337 (1934). When the United States
became a party to the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) in 1945, see Bretton Woods Agreements Act, ch.
339, § 2, Pub. L. No. 79-171, 59 Stat. 512 (1945) (codified
at 22 U.S.C. § 286 (1976) ), it promised to maintain (and,
if necessary, redeem) the value of United States dollars
5 There was only one change made in this standard at the Hague
in 1955. To avoid any confusion, the conferees deleted reference to
the Poincare franc and defined the specified sums as referring “to
a currency unit consisting of sixty-five and a half milligrams of
gold of millesima! fineness nine hundred.” Asser, Golden Limita-
tions of Liability in International Transport Conventions and the
Currency Crisis, 5 J. Mar. L. & Com. 645, 647-48 n.7 (1974). Since
9a
in terms of gold. For purposes of the Convention’s limits
on liability, therefore, the relationship of gold and the
dollar allowed judicial tribunals to award judgments on a
stable, uniform basis.
At the time of Bretton Woods, the United States dollar
was grossly undervalued and was actually an asset more
valuable than gold. The promise to redeem all dollars in
gold could thus be made without having to be fulfilled.*
From 1955, however, the United States faced a persistent
balance of payments deficit. Where once there existed a
dollar shortage, there now developed a dollar glut.’ To
compensate, central banks abroad began trading their
dollars for gold, and hoarders and speculators began
accumulating the metal in increasing amounts. From 1955
to 1968, United States gold reserves plummeted from
approximately $24 billion to around $10 billion.*
These events led ultimately to the demise of the gold
standard. In early 1968, depletion of the United States
gold reserve led the central banks of Belgium, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom and the United States to agree to
discontinue supplying gold to private markets. A so-
called “two-tier” system of gold pricing—a market price
set accordingly and the official price set under Bretton
Woods *—was thus created. This eased the pressure but
could not remedy the essential flaw. In addition to per-
sistent United States balance of payment deficits, interna-
tional gold reserves grew more slowly than the volume of
world economic activity. As a consequence, banks faced
* See P. Samuelson, Economics, 686-68 (8th ed. 1970).
7 Jd. at 690-91.
* Jd. at 691, Figure 36-1.
* See Asser, supra note 6, at 650; Gold, /nternational Monetary
Law: Change, Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 15 J. Int'l L. & Econ.
323, 340-41; Samuelson, supra note 7, at 698-99.
10a
pressures to liquidate official holdings in light of readily
available market profits. The stage was thus set for
abandonment of the Bretton Woods arrangements.
In August, 1971, the United States suspended its com-
mitment to convert dollars for gold.*° In May, 1972, it
devalued the dollar by raising the official price of gold to
$38 per ounce. See Par Value Modification Act, Pub. L.
No, 92-268, § 2, 86 Stat. 116 (1972) (formerly codified at
$1 U.S.C. § 449 (1972)). In October, 1973, yet another
devaluation raised the price to $42.22 per ounce. See Par
Value Modification Act, amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-
110, §1, 87 Stat. 352 (1973) (formerly codified at 31
U.S.C. § 449 (1976)).
The dollar’s troubles led the IMF to put forth a plan to
abolish the official price of gold, to delete references to
gold in its articles, and to substitute SDR’s as the Fund’s
reserve asset and unit of account. The plan was proposed
in the 1976 Jamaica Accords, was passed by the Fund’s
members and became effective April 1, 1978. In the
interim, the United States passed implementing legisla-
tion including a repeal of the Par Value Modification Act
of 1973 and the abolition of the official price of gold.”
Along with the Jamaica Accords, the measure also became
effective on April 1, 1978.
This radical change in the internationa] monetary sys-
tem created an obvious problem under the Warsaw Con-
vention. With gold abandoned as a currency base and the
official price repealed, gold became a commodity with a
10 Jd. at 641; Asser, supra note 6, at 651.
11 In repealing the official price generally, Congress retained its use
for the limited purpose of determining the value of gold held in the
form of certificates. See 31 U.S.C. § 4056. The Senate noted that this
was the “only domestic purpose for which it is necessary to define a
fixed relationship between the dollar and gold... .” 8. Rep. No.
94-1295, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 5935, 5966-67.
lla
daily fluctuating free market price. That the difficulty in
continuing to use gold as a monetary base undermined the
Convention’s unit of conversion was immediately recog-
nized. Thus, the Warsaw conferees met in Montreal] in
1975, even before the Jamaica Accords, and drafted and
signed a Protocol substituting SDR’s as the Convention’s
unit of conversion. At the time of the proposal, the SOR
was calculated in terms of gold.* With the Jamaica
Accords, the referent was changed to a basket of 16
national currencies, and in January, 1981, the basket was
reduced to five currencies." The Montreal] Prutocol was
presented to the United States Senate in January, 1977
but has not been ratified.
Meanwhile, parties to the Convention have utilized a
variety of units of conversion. The record shows Sweden
and Britain have adopted SDR’s for purposes of War-
saw.’* Both a Netherlands court and the Civil Court of
Rome reached the same result."* Two French courts have
recently decided that the Warsaw unit is to be converted
simply into the current French franc.'* The United States
12 Gold, supra note 10, at 345.
18 Ward, The SDR in Transport Liability Conventions: Some
Clarifications, 13 J. Mar. L. & Com. 1, 3 (1981).
4 See Sweden's Carriage by Air Act (1957), amendment to
Chapter 9, § 22, effective April 27, 1978, (translated and reprinted
in App. at 57-61); see also the British Carriage by Air (Sterling
Equivalents) Order of 1980, Statutory Instrument 1980 No. 281,
effective March 21, 1980, (reprinted in App. at 62-63).
18 State of the Netherlands v. Giant Shipping Corp., Rechtspraak
van de Week, 30, May, 1981, 321 (Supreme Court of the Nether-
lands, May 1, 1981) (translated and reprinted in App. at 64-93);
Linee Aerea Italiane v. Ricciole (Rome Civil Court Judgment 609/
1979, Nov. 14, 1978), (translated and reprinted in App. at 95-108).
1% See Chamie v. Egyptiar (Cours d’appel Paris, Jan. 31, 1980)
(translated and reprinted in App. at 171-91); Pakistan /nt’l Airlines
v. Compagnie Air Inter. S.A.. (Cours d’appel Aix-en-Provence Oct.
31, 1981) (translated and reprinted in App. at 156-70).
12a
District Court in the Southern District of Texas recently
opted for the free market price of gold,’ the standard
utilized by an Indian court,'* and a Greek court.”* Finally,
the last official price of gold, chosen by the District Court
in this case, was relied upon by Judge Sifton in Jn re Air
Crash Disaster at Warsaw Poland on March 14, 1980, 535
F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) and is still utilized by the
CAB pursuant to a 1974 order.
DISCUSSION
The controlling facts in this case are: (i) enforcement
of the Convention’s limitation on liability requires a unit
of conversion to translate judgments into domestic cur-
rency; (ii) there is no longer an internationally agreed
upon unit of conversion; and (iii) there is no United
States legislation specifying a unit to be used by United
States Courts.
The need for a unit of conversion is self-evident.
Without it, a rational limit on liability cannot exist, muca
less one which produces judgments of equal value in
different currencic..
The lack of an internationally agreed npon unit is also
obvious. The very convening of the Montreal meeting in
1975 was a recognition by the Warsaw parties that the
Convention’s unit had been eliminated by events. In plain
fact, different countries now apply different units. Al-
though the alternatives argued before us yield limitations
17 Boehringer Mannheim Diagnotecs, Inc. f/k/a Hycel, Inc. v.
Pan American World Airways, Inc., 531 F.Supp. 344 (S.D. Tex.
1981).
18 Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Sanghi, Regular Appeal No. 54 of
1977 (Civil Station, Bangalore, India, August 11, 1978) (reprinted
in App. at 265-71.)
19 Zakoapolos v. Olympic Airways Corp., No. 256 of 1974 Ct. of
App.; 3d Dep’t., Athens, Greece (February 15, 1974) (translated
and reprinted in App. at 251-54.)
13a
on TWA’s liability in this case ranging from less than
$6,500 to over $400,000, each has been adopted as the
proper unit of account by at least one party, or domestic
tribunal of a party, to the Convention. This disarray
merely confirms the obvious fact that the Jamaica Ac-
cords destroyed the international arrangements which had
led to adoption of gold as a unit of conversion.
International disarray is also reflected in the lack of
legislation in the United States implementing the Conven-
tion by establishing a unit of conversion. While the “last”
official price of gold is offered as a possible unit, “last” is
really an euphemism for “no longer” or “repealed.” The
repeal of the Par Value Modification Act in 1978 was in
every sense a legislative declaration that the price of
$42.22 per troy ounce was no longer recognized by the
United States.” We fail to see the logic in adopting as a
legal standard a specified value for gold which has been
specifically rejected by the United States Congress. Con-
gress’ action, moreover, as well as that taken by the other
parties to the Jamaica Accords, is highly relevant to the
Convention. The repeal of the Par Value Modification
Act was based on a domestic and international conclusion
that the official price of gold was wholly out of touch
with economic and monetary reality. Since use of a fixed
amount of gold as the Convention’s unit was specifically
designed to establish a limitation level at a certain value,
this repeal must be taken as a statement that the official
price no longer reflects that specified value. The case for
continuing to use the now repealed price of gold thus
finds no support in law or logic.
The CAB order on which Judge Knapp relied was ex-
pressly premised on the existence of an official price under
the Par Value Modification Act of 1973. The more recent
* The sole rerraining use of the last official price is in deter-
mining the value of gold held in the form of gold certificates. See
note 12, supra. That is not relevant to the issues here.
l4a
internal CAB memorandum supporting continuation of
that order is based ultimately on a policy determination
that the last official price is the best available standard.”
The inconsistency of the CAB position, however, is starkly
evident. It rejects SDR’s because the Senate has not
ratified the Montreal Protocol, while adopting the last
official price of gold which has been explicity rejected by
the Congress. The sole criterion supporting the CAB’s
position appears to the the law of inertia.
The other alternatives have an equally infirm base.
Neither the free market price of gold nor the current
French frane was ever agreed to by the treaty’s framers,
both are gross departures from its purposes, and, as to
the latter, there is ample evidence that it was specifically
rejected. The framers clearly contemplated use of the
governmentally fixed price of gold in adopting it as a unit
of account in the hope of providing stability. The free
market price of gold, however, is simply the daily fluc-
tuating price of a commodity, affected by conditions relat-
ing to supply and nonmonetary uses affecting demand.”
The current French franc is similarly flawed. To enforce
it would amount to a deliberate departure from the ex-
pressed wishes of the framers to avoid the use of a single
national currency subject to unilateral action.
TWA argues that we should adopt the International
Monetary Fund’s SDR as the unit of conversion. It is true
that the SDR was “created by the IMF in 1969 to replace
gold and the foreign exchange as an international reserve
asset.” ** “|Mjember central banks may exchange SDR’s
21CAB Internal Memorandum, Warsaw Convention Liability
Limits, May 20, 1981 (App. at 32-38).
22 Appellant's reliance on dicta in our decision Reed v. Wiser,
555 F.2d at 1089 n.12, is misplaced. The Reed footnote implied a
free market standard under the Guatemala City Protocol which
the U.S. has not ratified
3 Ward, supra note 14, at 2.
l5da
for other convertible currencies and, therefore, SDR
balances are actually lines of credit against which reserves
may be borrowed for use in central bank operations.” *
As noted above, methods of calculating SDR’s have been
changed from time to time. They are presently calculated
with reference to a so-calied basket of five currencies—
the U.S. dollar, the Deutsche mark, the French franc, the
Japanese yen, and the pound sterling. The amount of
each currency in one SDR is a function of the percentage
weights which are assigned to each currency in the basket.
The dollar value of one SDR is then determined by
adding the “dollar values of each currency component
based on daily market exchange rates.” *
Though the value of any one currency in terms of
SDR’s fluctuates from day to day, SDR fluctuations are
generally less extreme than fluctuations in the free market
price of gold. The relative stability of the SDR has thus
led the Warsaw signatories to propose its substitution as
the Convention’s unit of account. The proposal was
formally drafted in 1975 as part of the Montreal Proto-
cols to the Convention and has been presented to the
signatory states for ratification. Though the substitution
was supported by the United States, there has been
opposition by non-IMF signatories and very few signa-
tories (the United States included) have actually ratified
the Protocol.
The inappropriateness of our adopting SDR’s as the
unit of conversion is plain. The Convention itself con-
tains not the slightest authority for its use and the Senate
has thus far declined to ratify the Montreal Protocols.
Moreover, the decision in principle to use SDR’s is only
the first step. After that, a further step must be taken to
define the limitation of liability in terms of a particular
number of SDR’s per kilogram of baggage. In effect, we
* Jd.
* jd. at 2.
16a
would have to set the level of the limitation. Finally, the
SDR is a creature of an international body, the IMF, and
is subject to modification or outright elimination by that
body. In fact, the method of calculating SDR’s has been
changed three times in the last seven years. This Court
has no power under the terms of the Convention or
relevant domestic source of authority to adopt a unit of
conversion variable at the whim of an international body
distinct from the parties to the Convention.
It is thus clear that neither international nor domestic
sources of law specify a unit of account for purposes of
the Convention. We deal here not with ambiguities which
may be clarified by reference to underlying purpose or
with language which inadequately mirrors the understood
intentions of the drafters. For almost two generations,
the Convention’s limits on liability have been translatable
into domestic currency values by application of a clear
and easily applied formula. An essential ingredient of
that formula has, as a consequence of international ac-
tion followed by domestic legislation, ceased to exist.
What the parties ask us to do is to select, upon the basis
of our judgment as to what is best as a matter of policy, a
new unit of conversion. We are without authority to do so.
Treaty negotiation and proposal is the province of the
executive and ratification is the exclusive province of the
United States Senate. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; Doe
ex dem. Clark et al. v. Braden, 16 How. 635, 656-57
(1853). While federal courts are necessarily called upon
to interpret treaties, The Federalist No. 3 (J. Jay) (Rossi-
ter ed. 1961) ; see also id. No. 80 (A. Hamilton), they must
observe the line between treaty interpretation on the one
hand and negotiation, proposa] and ratification on the
other. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1961). To
be sure, great difficulty may arise in ascertaining where
that line is drawn and when it has been crossed.** See,
** Given the lack of an internationally agreed upon standard of
conversion, it might be argued that the Convention has been abro-
17a
e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). However,
selection of a unit of conversion and the level of value of
a limitation on liability is plainly a matter to be negoti-
ated by the parties, as the history of the Convention
demonstrates.
While international disarray as to the proper unit of
conversion under the Convention alone might not disable
us from enforcing a new unit, such a unit must be selected
either through treaty ratification by the Senate or by
legislation passing both Houses of the Congress. The
repeal of the Par Value Modification Act was an explicit
abandonment of the previously established unit of con-
version. While Congress may not have focused explicitly
upon the Convention in repealing that Act, its purpose,
abandonment of a price which was out of touch with
economic reality, plainly encompasses use of that price to
convert judgments to United States currency values. Con-
gress thus abandoned the unit of conversion specified by
the Convention and did not substitute a new one. Substi-
tution of a new term is a political question, unfit for
judicial resolution. We hold, therefore, that the Conven-
tion’s limits on liability for loss of cargo are unenforce-
able in United States Courts.”’
gated. However, treaties involve international obligations entered
into by coordinate branches of the government and it is not the
province of courts to declare treaties abrogated or to afford relief
to those (including the parties) who wish to escape their terms.
These are not matters for “judicial cognizance.” Whitney v. Robin-
son, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1887); see also Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S.
270 (1901). They belong to the executive and legislative depart-
ments because they are more properly the domain of “displomacy
and legislation, ... not... the administration of laws.” Whitney
v. Robertson, 124 U.S. at 195.
27 The Convention establishes liability as well as limits it. Note
2, supra. Our holding is limited solely to the unenforceability
of the limits and we express no view as to the severability of those
limits from the rest of the Convention.
18a
CONCLUSION
This ruling is prospective and will apply only to events
creating liability occurring 60 days from the issuance of
the mandate in this case. Prospective effect is compelled
by the fact that this is the first case in which a court has
declined to enforce the Convention’s limits on liability.
The parties assumed our power to select a new unit and
thus our “resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.”
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971).
Parties to transactions covered by the Convention should
have time to adjust their affairs to this ruling. Cf.
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline
Co., 50 U.S.L.W. 4892 (U.S. June 28, 1982) (judgment
holding Bankruptcy Act unconstitutional stayed until
October 4, 1982). As to events occurring before that date,
we hold that the last official price of gold shall be used to
calculate the limits on liability. Because of both the CAB
ruling discussed above and the lack of alternatives, air
carriers, at least in this country, have relied on the last
official price of gold. All carriers have thus filed tariffs
that comply with that standard and substantial “injustice
and hardship” would result were they not allowed time to
reformulate those tariffs. Other parties may continue to
protect themselves through insurance.
Affirmed.
i
19a
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
81 Civ. 1700 (WK)
FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION,
FRANKLIN MINT LIMITED, and
MCGREGOR, SWIRE AIR SERVICES, LIMITED,
Plaintiffs,
—against—
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WHITMAN Knapp, D.J.
On March 23, 1979, plaintiff Franklin Mint Corporation
(“Franklin”) delivered to defendant Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. (“TWA”) for carriage from Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania to London’s Heathrow Airport, four pack-
ages weighing some 714 pounds. Although the packages
are said to have contained a large quantity of valuable
coins, Franklin made no special declaration of value at the
time of delivery. TWA charged Franklin $544.96 for the
shipment. The four packages never arrived at their desti-
nation, and Franklin brought this action to recover their
full value, which it fixes at $250,000. The parties agree
that this action is governed by the terms of the Warsaw
Convention, and that TWA is liable for the loss. Before
us is a motion by TWA for partial summary judgment as
to the extent of its liability. We grant that motion in
part and deny it in part.
20a
Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention provides that,
unless a special declaration of value is made at the time
of delivery, a shipper’s liability for checked baggage and
goods is limited to the equivalent of 250 francs per kilo-
gram. Article 22 states, moreover, that this limitation of
250 francs:
“shall be deemed to refer to the French franc consist-
ing of 6514 milligrams of gold at the standard of
fineness of nine hundred thousandths [the so-called
Poincare franc]. These sums may be converted into
any national currency in round figures.” (Emphasis
added. )
Counsel for TWA, in an extraordinary lucid and com-
prehensive brief, has suggested three possible bases for the
calculation converting the Article 22 limitation into United
States dollars: (1) the Special Drawing Right (“SDR”),
used by members of the International Monetary Fund
(“IMF”) as a unit of account; (2) the last official price
of gold in the United States; and (3) the exchange value
of the current French franc. Counsel for Franklin, in an
equally able brief, suggests a fourth possibility: the free
market price of gold.
Were we writing on a clean slate, we would find the
arguments in favor of the first of TWA’s suggestions (the
SDR) most persuasive. However, TWA’s second sugges-
tion (the last official price of gold in the United States)
has—arguably, at least—been espoused by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board (“CAB”), the government agency most in-
timately concerned with the transaction at hand. It there-
fore comes as close as anything to constituting a govern-
mental interpretation of the Ariicle 22 limitation. Also, it
is used by all domestic carriers—including TWA—in
calculating the dollar value of the Article 22 limitation
printed on their tariffs. It would seem to follow that the
parties intended to adopt the last official price of gold as
the basis for converting the Article 22 limitation into
dollars in the instant case.
2la
Beyond saying the foregoing we can, since there are no
disputed issues of fact upon which a finding by us is
required, see no purpose to be served by delaying a de-
cision while we seek to put in our own words the argu-
ments so cogently expressed by counsel for TWA. Accord-
ingly, we simply adopt those arguments to the extent that
they support our conclusion that the conversion should be
premised on the last official price of gold in the United
States.
Let counsel for TWA submit a proposed order on ten
days notice. As we understand the stipulation of the
parties, such an order would in effect direct that judg-
ment be entered for plaintiff in the amount of $6,475.98
plus interest and costs, a result which would permit
immediate appeal from this order.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
New York, New York
November 6, 1981
/s/ Whitman Knapp
WHITMAN KNAPP
U.S.D.J.
22a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
81 Civ. 1700 (WK)
FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION,
FRANKLIN MINT LIMITED, and
MCGREGOR, SWIRE AIR SERVICES, LIMITED,
—against— Plaintiffs,
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant.
[Filed Dec. 4, 1981]
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
For the reasons stated in the Memorandum and Order
of this Court, dated November 6, 1981, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: that the
maximum liability herein of defendant Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. shall be determined under Article 22 of the Con-
vention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Transportation by Air, 49 Stat. 3000 et seq.
(19384), T.S. 876, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 1502 note
(1970), by a conversion factor premised on the last official
price of gold in the United States, and it is
FURTHER ORDERED, that in accordance with the
foregoing conversion factor, final judgment shall be en-
tered for plaintiffs in the amount of $6,475.98, plus
interest and costs.
Dated:
New York, New York
December 3, 1981
s/ Whitman Knapp
WHITMAN KNAPP
U.S.D.J.
Judgment Entered 12/4/81
/s/
Clerk
23a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
81 Civ. 1700 (WK)
FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION,
FRANKLIN MINT LIMITED, and
MCGREGOR, SWIRE AIR SERVICES, LIMITED,
Plaintiffs,
—against—
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant.
ORDER
WHITMAN KNAPP, D.J.
The first sentence of the second paragraph of our
November 6, 1981 Memorandum and Order is hereby
amended to read:
“Article 22 of the Warsaw convention provides that,
unless a special declaration of value is made at the
time of a delivery, a carrier’s liability for checked
baggage and goods is limited to the equivalent of 250
francs per kilogram.”
SO ORDERED.
Dated: New York, New York
December 18, 1981
WHITMAN Knapp, U.S.D.J.
.
i
24a
APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
At a stated Term of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, held at the United States
Courthouse in the City of New York, on the twenty-
eighth day of September one thovsand nine hundred and
eighty-two.
Present:
HON. JAMES L. OAKES
HON. RICHARD J. CARDAMONE
HON. RALPH K. WINTER
Circuit Judges,
#82-7012
FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION,
FRANKLIN MINT LIMITED, and
MCGREGOR, SWIRE AIR SERVICES LIMITED,
Plaintiffs-A ppellants,
Vv.
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of
record from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, and was argued by
counsel.
25a
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOPF, it is now hereby
ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment of said
District Court be and it hereby is affirmed in accordance
with the opinion of this court with costs to be taxed
against the appellants.
A. DANIEL FUSARO
Clerk
by /s/ Arthur Heller
ARTHUR HELLER
Deputy Clerk
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APPENDIX D
WARSAW CONVENTION
49 Stat. 3000, T. S. 876
CONVENTION FOR UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN
RULES RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION BY AIR
The President of the German Reich, the Federal Presi-
dent of the Republic of Austria, His Majesty the King of
the Belgians, the President of the United States of Brazil,
His Majesty the King of the Bulgarians, the President of
the Nationalist Government of China, His Majesty the
King of Denmark and Iceland, His Majesty the King of
Egypt, His Majesty the King of Spain, the Chief of State
of the Republic of Estonia, the President of the Republic
of Finland, the President of the French Republic, His
Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the Brit-
ish Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the
President of the Hellenic Republic, His Most Serene High-
ness the Regent of the Kingdom of Hungary, His Majesty
the King of Italy, His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, the
President of the Republic of Latvia, Her Royal Highness
the Grand Duchess of Luxemburg, the President of the
United Mexican States, His Majesty the King of Norway,
Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, the President
of the Republic of Poland, His Majesty she King of Ru-
mania, His Majesty the King of Sweden, the Swiss Fed-
era] Council, the President_af the Czechoslovak Republic,
the advantage of regulating in a
conditions of international transpor-
of the documents used for such
liability of the carrier.
uniform manner
tation by air in
transportation and o
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Have nominated to this end their respective Plenipo-
tentiaries, who, being thereto duly authorized, have con-
cluded and signed the following convention:
CHAPTERI, ScopE—DEFINITIONS
Article 1
(1) This convention shall apply to all international
transportation of persons, baggage, or goods performed
by aircraft for hire. It shall apply equally to gratuitous
transportation by aircraft performed by an air transpor-
tation enterprise.
(2) For the purposes of this convention the expression
“international transportation” shall mean any transpor-
tation in which, according to the contract made by the
parties, the place of departure and the place of destina-
tion, whether or not there be a break in the transporta-
tion or a transshipment, are situated either within the
territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within the
territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is
an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the
sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another
power, even though that power is not a party to this con-
vention. Transportation without such an agreed stopping
place between territories subject to the sovereignty, suzer-
ainty, mandate, or authority of the same High Contract-
ing Party shall not be deemed to be international for the
purposes of this convention.
(3) Transportation to be performed by several successive
air carriers shal! be deemed, for the purposes of this con-
vention, to be one undivided transportation, if it has been
regarded by the parties as a single operation, whether it
has been agreed upon under the form of a single con-
tract or of a series of contracts, and it shal! not lose its in-
ternational character merely because one contract or a
series of contracts is to be performed entirely within a
territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate,
or authority of the same High Contracting Party.
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Article 2
(1) This convention shall apply to transportation per-
formed by the state or by iegal entities constituted under
public law provided it falls within the conditions laid
down in article 1.
(2) This convention shall not apply to transportation
performed under the terms of any international postal
convention.
CHAPTER II, TRANSPORTATION DOCUMENTS
SECTION I. PASSENGER TICKET
Article 3
(1) For the transportation of passengers the carrier
must deliver a passenger ticket which shall contain the
following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(ce) The agreed stopping places, provided that the car-
rier may reserve the right to alter the stopping places in
case of necessity, and that if he exercises that right, the
alteration shall not have the effect of depriving the trans-
portation of its international character ;
(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to
the rules relating to liability established by this conven-
tion.
(2) The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger
ticket shall not affect the existence or the validity of the
contract of transportation, which shall none the less be
subject to the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, if
the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger
ticket having been delivered he shall not be entitled to
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avail himself of those provisions of this convention which
exclude or limit his liability.
SECTION II. BAGGAGE CHECK
Article 4
(1) For the transportation of baggage, other than
small personal objects of which the passenger takes
charge himself, the carrier must deliver a baggage check.
(2) The baggage check shall be made out in duplicate,
one part for the passenger and the other part for the
carrier.
(3) The baggage check shall contain the following par-
ticulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(d) The number of the passenger ticket;
(e) A statement that delivery of the baggage will be
made to the bearer of the baggage check;
(f) The number and weight of the packages;
(g) The amount of the value declared in accordance
with article 22(2) ;
(h) A statement that the transportation is subject to
the rules relating to liability established by this conven-
tion.
(4) The absence, irregularity, or loss of the baggage,
check shall not affect the existence or the validity of the
contract of transportation which shall none the less be
subject to the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, if the
carrier accepts baggage without a baggage check having
been delivered, or if the baggage check does not contain
the particulars set out at (d), (f), and (h) above, the
carrier shal] not be entitled to avail himself of those pro-
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visions of the convention which exclude or limit his lia-
bility.
SECTION III. AIR WAYBILL
Article 5
(1) Every carrier of goods has the right to require the
consignor to make out and hand over to him a document
called an “air waybill”: every consignor has the right to
require the carrier to accept this document.
(2) The absence, irregularity, or loss of this document
shall not affect the existence or the validity of the contract
of transportation which shall, subject to the provisions of
article 9, be none the less governed by the rules of this
convention.
Article 6
(1) The air waybill shall be made out by the consignor
in three original parts and be handed over with the goods.
(2) The first part shall be marked “for the carrier’,
and shall be signed by the consignor. The second part
shall be marked “for the consignee”’; it shall be signed by
the consignor and by the carrier and shall accompany the
goods. The third part shall be signed by the carrier and
handed by him to the consignor after the goods have been
accepted.
(3) The carrier shall sign on acceptance of the goods.
{4) The signature of the carrier may be stamped; that
of the consignor may be printed or stamped.
(5) If, at the request of the consignor, the carrier
makes out the air waybill, he shall be deemed, subject to
proof to the contrary, to have done so on behalf of the
consignor.
Article 7
The carrier of goods has the right to require the con-
signor to make out separate waybills when there is more
than one package.
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Article 8
The air waybill shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of its execution;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the car-
rier may reserve the right to alter the stopping places in
case of necessity, and that if he exercises that right the
alteration shall not have the effect of depriving the trans-
portation of its international character;
(d) The name and address of the consignor;
(e) The name and address of the first carrier;
(f) The name and address of the consignee, if the case
so requires;
(g) The nature of the goods;
(h) The number of packages, the method of packing,
and the particular marks or numbers upon them;
(i) The weight, the quantity, the volume, or dimen-
sions of the goods;
(j) The apparent condition of the goods and of the
packing;
(k) The freight, if it has been agreed upon, the date
and place of payment, and the person who is to pay it;
(1) If the goods are sent for payment on delivery, the
price of the goods, and, if the case so requires, the amount
of the expenses incurred;
(m) The amount of the value declared in accordance
with article 22(2);
(n) The number of parts of the air waybill;
(o) The documents handed to the carrier to accompany
the air waybill ;
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(p) The time fixed for the completion of the transpor-
tation and a brief note of the route to be followed, if
these matters have been agreed upon;
(qg) A statement that the transportation is subject to
the rules relating to liability established by this conven-
tion.
Article 9
If the carrier accepts goods without an air waybill hav-
ing been made out, or if the air waybill does not contain
all the particulars set out in article 8(a) to (7), inclusive,
and (q), the carrier shal] not be entitled to avail himself
of the provisions of this convention which exclude or limit
his liability.
Article 10
(1) The consignor shall be responsible for the correct-
ness of the particulars and statements relating to the
goods which he inserts in the air waybill.
(2) The consignor shall be liable for all damages suf-
fered by the carrier or any other person by reason of the
irregularity, incorrectness or incompleteness of the said
particulars and statements.
Article 11
(1) The air waybill shall be prima facie evidence of
the conclusion of the contract, of the receipt of the goods
and of the conditions of transportation.
(2) The statements in the air waybill relating to the
weight, dimensions, and packing of the goods, as well as
those relating to the number of packages, shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts stated; those relating to the
quantity, volume and condition of the goods shall not con-
stitute evidence against the carrier except so far as they
both have been, and are stated in the air waybill to have
been, checked by him in the presence of the consignor, or
reiate to the apparent condition of the goods.
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Article 12
(1) Subject to his liability to carry out all his obliga-
tions under the contract of transportation, the consignor
shall have the right to dispose of the goods by withdraw-
ing them at the airport of departure or destination, or by
stopping them in the course of the journey on any land-
ing, or by calling for them to be delivered at the place of
destination, or in the course of the journey to a person
other than the consignee named in the air waybill, or by
requiring them to be returned to the airport of departure.
He must not exercise this right of disposition in such a
way as to prejudice the carrier or other consignors, and
he must repay any expenses occasioned by the exercise
of this right.
(2) If it is impossible to carry out the orders of the
consignor the carrier must so inform him forthwith.
(3) If the carrier obeys the orders of the consignor
for the disposition of the goods without requiring the pro-
duction of the part of the air waybill delivered to the
latter, he will be liable, without prejudice to his right
of recovery from the consignor, for any damage which
may be caused thereby to any person who is lawfully in
possession of that part of the air waybill.
(4) The right conferred on the consignor shall cease
at the moment when that of the consignee begins in ac-
cordance with article 13, below. Nevertheless, if the con-
signee declines to accept the waybill or the goods, or if
he cannot be communicated with, the consignor shall re-
sume his right of disposition.
Article 13
(1) Except in the circumstances set out in the pre-
ceding article, the consignee shall be entitled, on arrival
of the goods at the place of destination, to require the
carrier to hand over to him the air waybill and to deliver
the goods to him, on payment of the charges due and on
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complying with the conditions of transportation set out
in the air waybill.
(2) Unless it is otherwise agreed, it shall be the duty
of the carrier to give notice to the consignee as soon as
the goods arrive.
(3) If the carrier admits the loss of the goods, or if
the goods have not arrived at the expiration of seven days
after the date on which they ought to have arrived, the
consignee shal] be entitled to put into force against the
carrier the rights which flow from the contract of trans-
portation.
Article 14
The consignor and the consignee can respectively en-
force all the rights given them by articles 12 and 13, each
in his own name, whether he is acting in his own inter-
est or in the interest of another, provided that he car~ies
out the obligations imposed by the contract.
Article 15
(1) Articles 12, 13, and 14 shall not affect either the
relations of the consignor and the consignee with each
other or the relations of third parties whose rights are de-
rived either from the consignor or from the consignee.
(2) The provisions of articles 12, 13, and 14 can only
be varied by express provision in the air waybill.
Article 16
(1) The consignor must furnish such information and
attach to the air waybill such documents as are neces-
sary to meet the formalities of customs, octroi, or police
betore the goods can be delivered to the consignee. The
consignor shal! be liable to the carrier for any damage oc-
casioned by the absence, insufficiency, or irregularity of
any such information or documents, unless the damage is
due to the fault of the carrier or his agents.
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(2) The carrier is under no obligation to enquire into
the correctness or sufficiency of such information or doc-
uments.
CHAPTER III. LIABILITY OF CARRIER
Article 17
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the
event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any
other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the acci-
dent which caused the damage so sustained took place on
board the aircraft or in the course of any of the opera-
tions of embarking or disembarking.
Article 18
(1) The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in
the event of the destruction or loss of, or of damage to,
any checked baggage or any goods, if the occurrence
which caused the damage so sustained took place during
the transportation by air.
(2) The transportation by air within the meaning of
the preceding paragraph shall comprise the period during
which the baggage or goods are in charge of the carrier,
whether in an airport or on board an aircraft, or, in the
case of a landing outside an airport, in any place what-
soever.
(3 The period of the transportation by air shall not ex-
tend to any transportation by land, by sea, or by river
performed outside an airport. If, however, such transpor-
tation takes place in the performance of a contract for
transportation by air, for the purpose of loading, delivery
or transshipment, any damage is presumed, subject to
proof to the contrary, to have been the result of an event
which took place during the transportation by air.
Article 19
The carrier shall be liable for damage occasioned by
delay in the transportation by air of passengers, baggage,
or goods.
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Article 20
(1) The carrier shal] not be liable if he proves that he
and his agents have taken 4]! necessary measures to avoid
the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to
take such measures.
(2) In the transportation of goods and baggage the
carrier shall not be liable if he proves that the damage
was occasioned by an error in piloting, in the handling of
the aircraft, or in navigation and that, in all other re-
spects, he and his agents have taken all necessary mea-
sures to avoid the damage.
Article 21
If the carrier proves that the damage was caused by or
contributed to by the negligence of the injured person the
court may, in accordance with the provisions of its own
law, exonerate the carrier wholly or partly from his
liability.
Article 22
(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability of
the carrier for each passenger shall be limited to the sum
of 125,000 francs. Where, in accordance with the law of
the court to which the case is submitted, damages may be
awarded in the form of periodical payments, the equiva-
lent capital value of the said payments shall not exceed
125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the
carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of
liability.
(2) In the transportation of checked baggage and of
goods, the liabiilty of the carrier shall be limited to a sum
of 250 francs per kilogram, unless the consignor has
made, at the time when the package was handed over to
the carrier, a special declaration of the value at delivery
and has paid a supplementary sum if the case so requires.
In that case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not ex-
ceeding the declared sum, unless it proves that the sum is
greater than the actual value to the consignor at delivery.
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(3) As regards objects of which the passenger takes
charge himself the liability of the carrier shall be limited
to 5,000 francs per passenger.
(4) The sums mentioned above shall be deemed to
refer to the French franc consisting of 654, milligrams
of gold at the standard of fineness of nine hundred thou-
sandths. These sums may be converted into any national
currency in round figures.
Article 23
Any provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability
or to fix a lower sum than that which is laid down in
this convention shal] be null and void, but the nullity of
any such provision shall not involve the nullity of the
whole contract which shall remain subject to the provi-
sions of this convention.
Article 24
(1) In the cases covered by articles 18 and 19 any ac-
tion for damages, however founded, can only be brought
subject to the conditions and limits set out in the con-
vention.
(2) In the cases covered by article 17, the provision of
the preceding paragraph shall also apply, without preju-
dice to the questions as to who are the persons who have
the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights.
Article 25
(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself
of the provisions of this convention which exclude or limit
his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful mis-
conduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance
with the law of the court to which the case is submitted,
is considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct.
(2) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail
himself of the said provisions, if the damage is caused
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under the same circumstances by any agent of tue carrier
acting within the scope of his employment.
Article 26
(1) receipt by the person entitled to the delivery of
baggage or goods without complaint shall be prima facie
evidence that the same have been delivered in good condi-
tion and in accordance with the document of transporta-
tion.
(2) In case of damage, the person entitled to delivery
must complain to the carrier forthwith after the discov-
ery of the damage, and at the latest, within 3 days from
the date of receipt in the case of baggage and 7 days
from the date of receipt in the case of goods. In case of
delay the complaint must be made at the latest within 14
days from the date on which the baggage or goods have
been placed at his disposal.
(8) Every complaint must be made in writing upon the
document of transportation or by separate notice in writ-
ing dispatched within the times aforesaid.
(4) Failing complaint within the times aforesaid, no
action shall lie against the carrier, save in the case of
fraud on his part.
Article 27
In the case of the death of the person liable, an action
for damages lies in accordance with the terms of this con-
vention against those legally representing his estate.
Article 28
(1) An action for damages must be brought, at the op-
tion of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domi-
cile of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or
where he has a place of business through which the con-
tract has been made, or before the court at the place of
destination.
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(2) Questions of procedure shall be governed by the
law of the court to which the case is submitted.
Article 29
(1) The right to damages shall be extinguished if an
action is not brought within 2 years, reckoned from the
date of arrival at the destination, or from the date on
which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from the
date on which the transportation stopped.
(2) The method of calculating the period of limitation
shal] be determined by the law of the court to which the
case is submitted.
Article 30
(1) In the case of transportation to be performed by
various successive carriers and falling within the defini-
tion set out in the third paragraph of article 1, each car-
rier who accepts passengers, baggage or goods shall be
subject to the rules set out in this convention, and shall
be deemed to be one of the contracting parties to the con-
tract of transportation insofar as the contract deals with
that part of the transportation which is performed
under his supervision,
(2) In the case of transportation of this nature, the
passenger or his representative can take action only
against the carrier who performed the transportation
during which the accident or the delay occurred, save in
the case where, by express agreement, the first carrier has
assumed liability for the whole journey.
(3) As regards baggage or goods, the passenger or con-
signor shal! have a right of action against the first car-
rier, and the passenger or consignee who is entitled to
delivery shill have a right of action against the last car-
rier, and further, each may take action against the car-
rier who performed the transportation during which the
destruction, loss, damage, or delay took place. These car-
riers shal] be jointly and severally liable to the passenger
or to the consignor or consignee.
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CHAPTER IV. PROVISIONS RELATING TO
COMBINED TRANSPORTATION
Article 31
(1) In the case of combined transportation performed
partly by air and partly by any other mode of transporta-
tion, the provisions of this convention shall apply only to
the transportation by air, provided that the transporta-
tion by air falls within the terms of article 1,
(2) Nothing in this convention shall prevent the par-
ties in the case of combined transportation from insert-
ing in the document of air transportation conditions relat-
ing to other modes of transportation, provided that the
provisions of this convention are observed as regards the
transportation by air.
CHAPTER V. GENERAL AND FINAL
PROVISIONS
Article 32
Any clause contained in the contract and all special
agreements entered into before the damage occurred by
which the parties purport to infringe the rules laid down
by this convention, whether by deciding the law to be ap-
plied, or by altering the rules as to jurisdiction, shall be
null and void, Nevertheless for the transportation of
goods arbitration clauses shal] be allowed, subject to this
convention, if the arbitration is to take place within one
of the jurisdictions referred to in the first paragraph of
article 28.
Article 39
Nothing contained in this convention shall prevent the
carrier either from refusing to enter into any contract
of transportation or from making regulations which do
not conflict with the provisions of this convention.
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Article 34
This vonvention shall not apply to international trans-
portation by air performed by way of experimenta! trial
by air navigation enterprises with the view to the estab-
lishment of regular lines of air navigation, nor shall it
apply to transportation performed in extraordinary cir-
cumstances outside the normal scope of an air carrier’s
business.
Article 35
The expression “days” when used in this convention
meuns current days, not working days.
Article 36
This convention is drawn up in French in a single copy
which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Minis-
try for Foreign Affairs of Poland and of which one duly
certified copy shall be sent by the Polish Government to
the Government of each of the High Contracting Parties.
Article 37
(1) This convention shall be ratified. The instruments
of ratification shall be deposited in the archives of the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Poland, which shall give
notice of the deposit to the Government of each of the
High Contracting Parties.
(2) As soon as this convention shall have been rati-
fied by five of the High Contracting Parties it shall come
into force as between them on the ninetieth day after
the deposit of the fifth ratification. Thereafter it shall
come into force between the High Contracting Parties
which shall have ratified and the High Contracting Party
which deposits its instrument of ratification on the
ninetiech day after the deposit.
(3) It shall be the duty of the Government of the Re-
public of Poland to notify the Government of each of the
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High Contracting Parties of the date on which this con-
vention comes into force as well as the date of the de-
posit of each ratification.
Article 38
(1) This convention shall, after it has come into force,
remain open for adherence by any state,
(2) The adherence shall be effected by a notification
addressed to the Government of the Republic of Poland,
which shall inform the Government of each of the High
Contracting Parties thereof.
(3) The adherence shall take effect as from the
ninetieth day after the notification made to the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Poland,
Article 39
(1) Any one of the High Contracting Parties may de-
nounce this convention by a notification addressed to the
Government of the Republic of Poland, which shall at
once inform the Government of each of the High Con-
tracting Parties.
(2) Denunciation shall take effect six months after the
notification of denunciation, and shall operate only as
regards the party which shall have proceeded to de-
nunciation.
Article 40
(1) Any High Contracting Party, may at the time of
signature ov of deposit of ratification or of adherence,
declare that the acceptance which it gives to this con-
vention does not apply to all or any of its colonies, pro-
tectorates, territovies under mandate, or any other terri-
tory subject to its sovereignty or its authority, or any
other territory under its suzerainty.
(2) Accordingly any High Contracting Party may sub-
sequently adhere separately in the name of all or any of
its colonies, protectorates, territories under mandate, or
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any other territory subject to its sovereignty or to its
authority or any other territory under its suzerainty
which have been thus excluded by its original declaration.
(3) Any High Contracting Party may denounce this
convention, in accordance with its provisions, separately
or for all or any of its colonies, protectorates, territories
under mandate, or any other territory subject to its sov-
ereignty or to its authority, or any other territory under
its suzerainty.
Article 41
Any High Contracting Party shall be entitled not earlier
than two years after the coming into force of this con-
vention to call for the assembling of a new international
conference in order to consider any improvements which
may be made in this convention. To this end it will com-
municate with the Government of the French Republic
which will take the necessary measures to make prepara-
tions for such conference.
44a
NATIONS ADHERING TO WARSAW CONVENTION
as listed in Treaties in Force, A List of Treaties and
Other International Agreements of the United States in
Force on January 1, 1982, at 207 (U.S. Dept. of State)
Afghanistan Gabon
Algeria Gambia, The
Antigua & Barbuda German Dem. Rep.
Argentina Germany, Fed. Rep.
Australia Ghana
Austria Greece
Bahamas, The Grenada
Bangladesh Guinea
Barbados Guyana
Belgium Hungary
Benin Iceland
Botswana India
Brazil Indonesia
Bulgaria Iran
Burma Iraq
Cameroon Ireland
Canada Israel
Chile Italy
China Ivory Coast
Colombia Jamaica
Congo Japan
Cuba Kenya
Cyprus Kiribati
Czechoslovakia Korea, Dem. People’s Rep.
Denmark, not including
Kuwait
Greenland Laos
Dominican Rep. Latvia
Ecuador Lebanon
Egypt Lesotho
Ethiopia Liberia
Fiji Libya
Finland Liechtenstein
France, including French Luxembourg
colonies
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Mongolia
Morocco
Nauru
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Rwanda
St. Lucia
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
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Solomon Is,
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syrian Arab Rep.
Tanzania
Tonga
Trinidad & Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Tuvalu
Uganda
Union of Soviet Socialist
Reps.
United Kingdom
United States
Upper Volta
Uruguay
Venezuela
Viet-Nam, Rep.
Western Samoa
Yemen (Aden)
Yugoslavia
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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APPENDIX E
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
ARTICLE II
SECTION 2. ‘' The President * * *.
*He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-
thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nomi-
nate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be estab-
lished by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Ap-
pointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper,
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in tne
Heads of Departments.
o e eo *
ARTICLE III
SECTION 2. ' The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority ;—to all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdic-
tion;—to Controversies to which the United States shall
be a party;—to Controversies between two or more
States ;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—
between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of
the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
47a
ARTICLE VI
* This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shail be made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land, and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
48a
APPENDIX F
Order 74-1-16
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C,
Adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board
at its office in Washington, D.C.
on the 38rd day of January, 1974
Docket 26274
IN THE MATTER OF WARSAW CONVENTION LIABILITY
LIMITATIONS AS EXPRESSED IN U.S. DOLLARS
ORDER
Section 221.388(j) of the Board’s Regulations requires
U.S. and foreign air carriers which avail themselves of
the limits of liability to passengers provided in the War-
saw Convention (49 Stat. 3000; T.S. 876) to include in
their tariffs, inter alia, a statement as to the amount of
the liability limits of the Convention stated in dollars.
These provisions of the tariffs, as well as those setting
forth limitations of liability under the Convention with
respect to baggage and property, restate the applicable
law and serve to advise the public of the Convention
limitations on their right of recovery for death, or injury
or loss or damage to baggage and property.
The liability limits in the Warsaw Convention are set
forth in terms of gold francs so that as long as the value
of the dollar in terms of gold remained constant, no change
was required in the dollar amount of the liability limits
contained in the tariffs. However, by Order 72-6-7 adopted
49a
June 2, 1972, the Board directed the carriers to revise
their tariffs to reflect the devaluation of the dollar in
terms of gold from $3. per ounce to approximately $38
which took place effective May 8, 1972, and such revisions
have been made. On September 21, 1973, Public Law 98-
110 was enacted further devaluating the U.S. dollar to
approximately $42.22 per ounce of gold effective October
18, 1972. As a result, the minimum liability limits speci-
fied in Order 72-6-7 and the tariffs currently on file with
the Board no longer meet the minimum liability limits of
the Convention and a revision of the tariffs is necessary
to accurately reflect such limits in dollars.’
In view of the foregoing and all other relevant matters,
the Board finds and concludes:
1. That the dollar limitations stated in the presently
effective tariffs of the respondent air carriers and foreign
air carriers no longer meet the minimum liability require-
ments of the Warsaw Convention for “international trans-
portation” or of the Hague Protocol* and “international
carriage” as defined therein.
2. That, in this circumstance, such tariff limitations
are inconsistent with th> applicable law as set forth in
the Convention or the Protocol, and the tariff filing re-
quirements in Section 403 of the Federal Aviation Act of
1 With respect to their liability to passengers, this order will
affect only a smal! proportion of the U.S. and foreign air carriers.
Most carriers engaged in international transport«tion by air in-
volving journeys to or from the United States adhere to the Mon-
treal Agreement ( Agreement CAB 18900 approved by Order E-23680
dated May 13, 1966, 31 FR 7302) pursuant to which they have filed
tariffs providing for a $75,000 limit of liability for death or injury
to passengers. Since this limit is stated in terms of U.S. dollars, it
is unaffected by the change in the gold value of the dollar.
2? The Hague Protocol of 1955 doubles the Warsaw liabiuty limit
for passengers, but since the United States has not signed or ad-
hered to the Protocol, its provisions do not normally apply with
respect to air transportation.
50a
1958, and Part 221 of the Board’s Regulations and they
must be canceled.
8. That the minimum acceptable figures in United
States dollars for liability limits applicable to “interna-
tional transportation” and “international carriage” are as
follows’
Convention and Protocol
Minimum Liability Actual Rounded °
125,000 francs (per passenger, $10,002.90 $10,000.00
Convention only)
250,000 francs (per passenger, 20,005.80 20,000.00
Hague Protocol only)
5,000 francs (per passenger for 400,116 400.00
unchecked baggage )
250 francs (per kilogram for 20.00580 20.00
checked baggage and goods)
250 francs (per kilog.am on a 9.07460 9.07
per-pound basis )
Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, particularly Sections 204(a), 403,
and 1002 thereof,
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1, The carriers named in Appendix A, attached hereto,
shall revise all liability limitations which may be applica-
ble to “international transportation” or “international car-
riage” as defined in the Convention or the Protocol which
are inconsistent with the dollar amounts set forth herein
so as to conform with suci, amounts,
* Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention permits the liability limits
specified therein in gold franca to be converted into any national
currency in round figures. The Board is permitting the round
dollar amounts set forth in this order to be filed in the tariffs for
purpose of convenience. This order is not intended to prohibit car-
riers from specifying the actual! dollar equivalents in their tariffs as
some of them do at the present time. The dollar values herein are
calculated in accordance with the criteria detailed in Order 72-6-7.
5la
2. The tariff cancellations directed in ordering para-
graph 1 above shall become effective on or before February
6, 1974 on not less than 10 days’ notice.
8. That copies of this order shall be served on the air
carriers and foreign air carriers named in Appendix A.
This order will be published in the Federal Register.
By the Civil Aeronautics Board:
EDWIN Z, HOLLAND
Secretary
[SEAL]
52a
APPENDIX G
Civil Aeronautics Board Order 78-8-10 (excerpts)
DOCKETS 25280, 27578, AGREEMENTS CAB 2698, R-41;
2699, R-49; 2700, R-43; 3119; 7648, R-107; 24475, R-4,
R-5; 25186, R-12; 25954, R-1, R-2, R-3; 26701, R-9,
IATA, CARGO CARRIAGE CONDITIONS—order 78-8-10
adopted August 8, 1978.
On June 21, 1974, the Internationa! Air Transport
Association submitted, pursuant to section 412 of the
Act, resolution 600b (agreement CAB 24475, R-4) re-
stating the conditions of carriage of cargo to appear on
the back of cargo airwaybills and resolution 600j (agree-
ment CAB 24475, R-5) restating the condition to appear
on the face of the airwaybills. Thereafter, the Board
issued order 75-11-106 on November 26, 1975, inviting
all interested persons to submit comments on these agree-
ments and to show cause why the proceeding in agree-
ment CAB 7648, order E-8543 (printed with order
E-11024), Pan Am. World Airways et al., Conditions of
Carriage, 24 C.A.B. 575, 580-591 (1957), should not be
terminated and why the Board’s earlier approval of
agreements CAB 2698 et al., order E-3230, JATA Traffic
Conference Resolutions, 10 C.A.B. 788 (1949), should not
be withdrawn.
The last previous Board approval of IATA conditions
of carriage for cargo occurred on September 1, 1949,
IATA Traffic Conference Resolutions, supra. Though the
Board approved the resolution then before it on the
ground that the “establishment of these uniform condi-
ditions should minimize confusion and misunderstanding,”
the Board took pains to note that “serious questions relat-
ing to the public interest could arise,” and placed its in-
terpretation on several of the provisions. The Board con-
cluded with the following admonition (id. at 798-794) :
We extend our approval for a temporary period
in order to permit the immediate use of the uniform
58a
arrangements discussed herein pending revision of
the provision under consideration in a manner con-
sistent with the views expressed herein. Should the
carriers fai] to make such revision at their first op-
portunity, the public interest may require us to with-
draw the approval herein granted.
In 1954 the IATA carriers filed a revision to the ear-
lier approved resolution (agreement CAB 7648, R-107,
adopted by the IATA traffic conferences in Honolulu in
November 1953). In considering the Honolulu revisions
in order E-85438,' the Board stated:
The Board is seriously concerned with the little
progress that appears to have been made to revise
the basic provisions of these agreements to meet the
points raised in the aforesaid opinion. While still
recognizing the importance of uniformity in the
tickets, waybills, and conditions of carriage, it is of
the opinion that such uniformity should not be ob-
tained at the sacrifice of the rights of passengers and
shippers, and that further approval of provisions
which are otherwise adverse to the public interest is
not warranted.
The Board, accordingly, tentatively approved some of
the provisions, some conditionally, and tentatively disap-
proved others, giving parties 30 days within which to file
objections. Objections were filed by the IATA carriers,
in which they requested the opportunity for conferences
with the staff of the Board for purposes of facilitating
disposition of the issues. The Board authorized such in-
formal! discussions by order E-8842, dated December 22,
1954, but no final resolution of the cargo issues ever
materialized.* The result is that the tentative order of
August 5, 1954, with respect to cargo, never became final,
1 Pan Am, World Airways et al, Conditions of Carriage, supra
at 581.
2 The informal conferences resulted in a revised resolution re-
specting passenger service which was approved by order E-11024.
54a
and the only order of approval of IATA conditions on
cargo now in effect is that of September 1, 1949 (JATA
Traffic Conference Resolutions, supra).
Comments * in response to order 75-11-106 have been
filed by IATA, Seaboard, the Board’s Office of Consumer
Advocate (OCA), and (jointly) the National Retail Mer-
chants Association, the Shippers Nationa] Freight Claim
Council, Inc., and the National Small Shipments Traffic
Conference (Shippers). In addition, IATA submitted
agreement CAB 25954, R-1, R-2, and R-3, docket 27573,
revising or canceling some of the provisions in the 1974
agreements, which meet some of the objections listed in
appendix C to order 75-11-106. Attached are appendixes
A and B containing resolutions 600b and 600j, as filed
and as amended. Neither IATA nor the carrier parties
address the part of order 75-11-106 dealing with the
rescission of the Board’s approval of the earlier IATA
agreement in JATA Traffic Conference Resolutions, supra,
or the termination of the proceeding in Pan Am, World
Airways et al., Conditions of Carriage, supra.
Order 75-11-106 also deferred decision on the provisions
of the agreement that presented issues similar to those
under review by the Board in the Liability and Claim
Rules and Practices Investigation, docket 19923. By
order 76-3-139, March 22, 1976, and order 77-3-61,
Liability and Claim Rules and Practices, 73 C.A.B. 116
(1977), the Board resolved these issues, and we are now
able to dispose of the matters before us. Petitions to
review certain aspects of orders 76-3-139 and 77-3-61
were filed by American Airlines et al. in the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. There-
after Congress passed and the President signed Public
Law 95-163, removing Board jurisdiction over the reason-
ableness of domestic cargo rates and rules. When the
* App. C to order 75-11-106 contains an analysis and the Board's
tentative findings as to each provision of the IATA agreements in
issue so that comments could be directed to the specific problems
enumerated.
55a
enactment of Public Law 95-163 was called to the atten-
tion of the court, the court vacated and remanded the
proceedings to the Board.
Inasmuch as the resolutions and agreements before us
concern international traffic, we believe that neither the
court’s remand nor Public Law 95-163 prevents us from
giving such weight as we think necessary to the findings
and conclusions of the Liability Rules case.
We turn now to section-by-section consideration of the
conditions of carriage.
RESOLUTION 600b
v
Article (1).—Article (1) is the preamble to the condi-
tions of carriage and states that the Warsaw Convention,*
if applicable, limits the liability of the carriers for loss
or damage to the cargo. Though this preamble on the
back of the waybill does not specifically refer to the car-
rier’s liability for delay, the front of the waybill contains
a statement that Warsaw limits the carrier’s liability for
loss, damage, or delay of cargo. Moreover, article 19 of
Warsaw specifically provides that the carrier shall be
liable for damages occasioned by delay in the transporta-
tion of cargo.’ In these circumstances, we consider the
omission of the word “delay” in the preamble to be an
oversight, which the carriers shall correct.
Article (1)1.—This subparagraph defines carrier as all
air carriers which carry or undertake to carry cargo
under the airwaybill or perform any other services inci-
dental to such air carriage. The Warsaw Convention is
defined as the convention signed at Warsaw on Octo-
4 Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transpor-
tation by Air, signed at Warsaw Oct. 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000), re-
ferred to as “Warsaw Convention” or simply “Warsaw.”
8 Art. 23 of Warsaw further provides that any provision tending
to relieve a carrier of its liability under Warsaw shall be null and
void.
56a
ber 12, 1929, or the Convention as amended at The
Hague, September 28, 1955." The definition of French
gold francs is the same as the definition in the Warsaw
Convention—consis
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