Appendix — Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.

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IN THE JAN 15 1963

Supreme Court of the United PratEs-

OCTOBER TERM, 1982 .

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,

Petitioner,

V.

FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN

MINT LIMITED, AND MCGREGOR, SWIRE

AIR SERVICES LIMITED,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

APPENDIX

JOHN N. ROMANS

ROBERT S. LIPTON

101 Park Avenue

New Yo: k, New York 10178

(212) 696-6000

Counsel for Petitioner,

Trans World Airlines, Inc.

CurTIS, MALLET-PREVOsr,

Coit & MOSLE

Scott J. McKay WOLAS

MICHAEL L. M. QuINTTUS

Of Counsel

January i5, 1983

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opir .on and Judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the SO IIE. casicsaesensntiesajenintcooliien

Order of the United States Court of —_ for the

Second Circuit staying the issuance of its mandate

subject to the filing of a Petition for Certiorari ......

Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit denying rehearing ........cccseeeeeeeees

Memorandum and Order of the United States Dis-

trict Court for the Southern District of New York,

i rn ene cuessnsuneibainnsibans

Order and Judgment of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of New York .........

Order of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York Denying Motion for

ESSERE LIISA DRIES Ca ERE AN

United States Constitution, Article I], Section 2 ....

Article 22 of the Convention for the Unification of

Certain Rules Relating to International Transporta-

tion by Air, opened for signature October 12, 1929,

49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.TS. 11,

reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 1502 note (1970) .............

Civil Aeronautics Board Order 74-1-16 ........c:ccccc000

Electronic Memories & Magnetics Corp. v. The Fly-

ing Tiger Line, Inc., Index No. 784512 (Cal. te

Ct., San Francisco Aug. 25, 1982) o..cccccccccccsecseeeeeeee

Deere & Co. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, \ndex No. 81

C 4726 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 1982) oo. cccccceccseeeeeeees

The Netherlands v. Giants Shi .. Recht-

ae . 1981) (Sup. Ct. of

May |, 1981) (a certified transla-

pea TES

Golden, Warsaw Convention Liability Limits

(May 20,198 (inpublshed memorandum bythe

and Consumer

Talon, Bik teeesoin )

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

oe

No. 999—August Term, 1981

(Argued April 22, 1982 Decided September 28, 1982)

Docket No. 82-7012

+

FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN MINT LIMITED,

and MCGREGOR, SWIRE AIR SERVICES LIMITED,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

—_—Ve—

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Before:

OAKES, CARDAMONE, and WINTER,

Circuit Judges.

+

Appeal from a final judgment of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of New York,

Whitman Knapp, Judge, utilizing the last official price of

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gold to calculate the limit on defendant’s liability under

the Warsaw Convention.

The Court holds the limitation provision of the Con-

vention prospectively unenforceable and affirms.

7

JOHN R. Foster, New York, New York

(Donald M. Waesche, Waesche, Schein-

baum & O’Regan, P.C., New York, New

York, of counsel), for Plaintiffs-Appel-

lants Franklin Mint Corporation,

Fra: Vint Limited, and McGregor,

Sy ir Services, Limited.

JOHN N. ROMANS, New York, New York

(Robert S. Lipton, Scott J. McKay Wo-

las, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mos-

ley, New York, New York, of counsel) for

Defendant-Appellee Trans World Air-

lines, Inc.

(Robert B. Hemley, Norman Williams,

Gravel, Shea & Wright, Burlington, Ver-

mont, of counsel) for Amici-Curiae

Jacques Roulin and Hugh Harley.

+

WINTER, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from a final judgment of the United

States District Court for the Southern District of New

York, Whitman Knapp, Judge, limiting the defendant’s

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liability under the Warsaw Convention (“Convention”)'

for loss of cargo. In determining the limit in United States

dollars, Judge Knapp utilized the last official price of

gold as a unit of conversion and awarded plaintiffs

$6,475.98. 525 F.Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Plaintiffs

appeal, claiming the limit should have been calculated by

other methods. While we agree with the result reached in

this case and thus affirm, we hold the Convention’s limit

on liability prospectively unenforceable in United States

Courts.

SUMMARY OF THE ISSUES AND DECISION

rhe facts in this case, if nothing else, are clear cut. In

March, 1979, plaintiffs Franklin Mint Corporation,

Franklin Mint Limited, and McGregor, Swire Air Services

Limited (collectively, “Franklin Mint”) contracted with

defendant Trans Worid Airlines, Inc. (“TWA”) for the

carriage by air from the United States to England of 714

pounds of numismatic materials Though the articles were

worth more than $6,500, Frankiin Mint made no special

declaration of value. The articles were either lost or

destroyed, thus rendering TWA liable under Article 18 of

the Convention.’ Because of the absence of a special

! The Warsaw Convention is formally known as the “Convention for

the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Tra.:sporta-

tion by Air,” opened for signature October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S.

No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (adherence of the United States proclaimed

October 29, 1934).

2 Article 18 of the Convention reads:

(1) The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of

the destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any checked baggage or

any goods, if the occurrence which caused the damage so sustained

took place during the transportation by air.

(2) The transportation by air within the meaning of the preceding

paragraph shall comprise the period during which the baggage or

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declaration, TWA sought to limit its liability under Article

22 of the Convention.

Article 22 limits the carrier’s liability for injuries to

both “checked baggage and. . . goods” and “objects of

which the passenger takes charge himself.”’ The various

limits are stated in terms of a specified number of French

gold or “Poincare” francs, a unit of account consisting of

“65'4 milligrams of gold at a standard fineness of nine

goods are in charge of the carrier, whether in an airport or on board

an aircraft, or, in the case of a landing outside an airport, in any

place whatsoever.

(3) The period of the transportation by air shall not extend to any

transportation by land, by sea, or by river performed outside an

airport. If, however, such transportation takes place in the perfor-

mance of a contract for transportation by air, for the purpose of

loading, delivery or transshipment, any damage is presumed, sub-

ject to proof to the contrary, to have been the result of an event

which took place during the *ransportation by air.

3 Article 22 of the Convention reads:

(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for

each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs.

Where, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is

submitted, damages may be awarded in the form of periodical

payments, the equivalent capita: value of the said payments shall

not exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the

carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability.

(2) In the transportation of checked baggage and of goods, the

liability of the carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250 francs per

kilogram, unless the consignor has made, at the time when the

package was handed over to the carrier, a special declaration of the

value at delivery and has paid a supplementary sum if the case so

requires. In that case the carrie: will be liable to pay a sum not

exceeding the declared sum, unless he proves that that sum is

greater than the actual value to the consignor at delivery.

(3) As regards objects of which the passenger takes charge himself

the liability of the carrier shall be limited to 5,000 francs per

passenger.

(4) The sums mentioned above shall be deemed to refer to the

French franc consisting of 65'2 milligrams of gold at the standard

of fineness of nine hundred thousandths. These sums may be

converted into any national currency in round figures.

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hundred thousandths.” The limit on baggage or other

goods is 250 Poincare francs per kilogram. The dollar

value of that limit is calculated simply by converting the

gold value of the specified unit into United States dollars,

e.g., the limit per kilogram is 250 multiplied by the dollar

value of 65 milligrams of gold.

The difficulty arises from the fact that when Article 22

was drafted, gold served official monetary functions and

its price was set bs law. The Convention thus sclected it

as the unit of conversion in order to ensure judgments of

uniform value as well as a stable and easily calculable

limitation on liability. The plain but highly troublesome

fact is that by international agreement and United States

domestic legislation gold has now lost its monetary func-

tions and no longer has an official price. Unfortunately

for parties to international airline transactions as well as

for us, the terms of Article 22 continue to utilize gold as

the unit of conversion. Thus, the perties raise the issue of

what unit of account is now to be used to convert

judgments under the Convention into United States dol-

lars.

In arguing the issue, the parties offer four alternatives:

(i) the last official price of gold in the United States; (ii)

the free market price of gold; (iii) the Special Drawing

Right (“SDR”), a unit of account established by the

International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and recently pro-

posed as a substitute for gold in the as yet unratified

Montreal Protocols to the Convention; and (iv) the ex-

change value of the current French franc. While acknowl-

edging that “the arguments in favor of. . . the SDR

[were] most persuasive,” Judge Knapp nevertheless held

that the last official price of gold was the appropriate

standard. This choice was predicated on the view that this

standard “has been. . . espoused by the Civil Aero-

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nautics Board (“CAB”), the government agency most

intimately concerned with the transaction at hand,” and

has been “used by all domestic carriers—including

TWA—in calculating the dollar value of the Article 22

limitation printed on their tariffs.” 525 F.Supp at 1289.

We share Judge Knapp’s doubt about the result. In-

deed, there are powerful arguments against each of the

proffered solutions. The last official price of gold is a

price which has been explicitly repealed by the Congress.

See note 11, infra, and accompanying text. It thus lacks

any status in law or relationship to contemporary cur-

rency values. The free market price of gold is the highly

volatile price of a commodity determined in part by

forces of supply and demand unrelated to currency

values. SDR’s are a creature of the IMF, modified at will

by that body and having no basis in the Convention. The

French franc is simply one domestic currency, subject to

change by the unilateral act of a single government.

Every proffered solution thus appears to have a devas-

tating argument against it. While the Convention has not

been formally abrogated, enforcement by national judi-

cial tribunals is impossible without their picking and

choosing among alternative units of conversion according

to their view of which is best as an initial policy matter.

We have no power to select a new unit of account. We

thus hold the Convention’s limitation of liability unen-

forceable by United States Courts.

BACKGROUND

Drafted in the late 1920’s, the Convention was designed

both to protect the fledgling aviation industry from the

alternatives of ruinous damage suits or exorbitant insur-

ance premiums and to insure a certain degree of uniform-

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ity of legal obligation given the expected international

character of the industry. See A. Lowenfeld and A.

Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Conven-

tion, 80 Harvard L. Rev. 497, 499-501 (1967) (hereafter

“Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn”); see also Reed v. Wiser,

5_5 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922

(1977) and CAB Staff Memorandum, Warsaw Conven-

tion Liability Limits, March 18, 1980, at 5-6. (App. at

43-44). A series of rules governing liability, affirmative

defenses and limitations accomplished the former goal,

while the Convention’s international scope oe ¢

=

the latter. Articles 17, 18 and 19 enunciate the carri

liability for personal injuries, for damage or loss of

baggage, and for damage due to delay. Articles 20 and 21

establish as affirmative defenses lack of fault and contrib-

utory negligence. Finally, Article 22 provides a limitation

on the extent of liability for both personal injury and loss

of luggage or other goods.

The personal injury limitations amounts have been

subject to upward revision from time to time through

protocols to the original agreement. These revisions have

come in the wake of a continuing debate, with the

developed countries, notably the United States, Great

Britain and France, arguing for higher limits, and the less

developed nations seeking reduction of the existing limit.‘

4 In 1955, at The Hague, the conferees would agree only to a doubling

of the limit to 250,000 Poincare francs or $16,600. Lowenfeld and

Mendeisohn at 504-09. The United States unenthusiastically signed the

Hague Protocol a year later, but did not present the treaty to the

Senate until July 1959. Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn at 515. The Senate

never ratified the Protocol because of its low limit, however, and

ulumately the Kennedy/Johnson Administrations actually threatened

United States denunciation of the Convention. This threat came in the

wake of Congress’ failure to enact a legislative package ratifying the

.Hague Protocol while compelling the purchase by all American air

carriers of $50,000 in insurance for each passenger. To avoid

States denunciation, a conference met in Montreal in the spring of

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Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn at 504. Throughout this pe-

riod, the level of the limitations on liability for loss or

destruction of checked baggage and other goods has

remained the same.

Defining recoveries in terms of a specified amount of

gold was intended to produce stability and uniformity.

Such a common standard allowed the conversion of

liability limits into national currencies and insulated re-

coveries from the vicissitudes of currency fluctuation and

devaluation. In drafting the Convention, a proposal to fix

recoveries purely in terms of the French franc was re-

jected by Switzerland on the ground that use of a single

national currency rendered the liability limit subject to

change by the act of one government. See Second !nterna-

tional Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, Minutes,

October 4-12, 1929, Warsaw, at 88-89 (Horner and Legrez

trans. 1975), (App. at 247-248). As the Swiss delegate put

it, “Naturally one can say ‘French franc’ but. . . its

{France’s] national law which determines it, and one need

have only a modification of the national law to overturn

the essence of this provision.” /d. at 89-90, (App. at

248-249). Accordingly, the Swiss pressed for a standard

which tied the limitation to a gold value regardless of the

national currency actually named in the article. /d. at 90,

(App. at 249). The conferees accepted the Swiss position

and stated the limitation in terms of the Poincare franc

1966. The result of this meeting was the so-called Montreal Agreement

“which provided for absolute carrier liability up to $75,000 on all

flights into or out of the United States.” Reed v. Wiser, $55 F.2d at

1087. Appeased, the United States withdrew its denunciation. How-

ever, it continued to press for an amendment to the Convention raising

personal injury liability limits. In 1971, the parties promulgated the

Guatemala City Protocol under which personal injury limits were to be

raised to $100,000 at the then current exchange rate of $35 per ounce

of gold.” /d. at 1089 n.12. However, the United States has not ratified -

that protocol.

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defined as “65'% milligrams of gold at a standard fineness

of nine hundred thousandths.” Convention, art. 22 § (4).°

From October, 1934, when the United States first

adhered to the Convention, until 1978, use of gold as unit

of account posed no problem for United States Courts or

the judicial tribunals of other signatory nations. In 1934,

the value of gold was set at $35 per troy ounce pursuant

to statute, United States Gold Reserve Act of 1934, Pub.

L. No. 73-87, 48 Stat. 337 (1934). When the United States

became a party to the International Monetary Fund

(IMF) in 1945, see Bretton Woods Agreements Act, ch.

339, § 2, Pub. L. No. 79-171, 59 Stat. 512 (1945) (codi-

fied at 22 U.S.C. § 286 (1976)), it promised to maintain

(and, if necessary, redeem) the value of United States

dollars in terms of gold. For purposes of the Conven-

tion’s limits on liability, therefore, the relationship of

gold and the dollar allowed judicial tribunals to award

judgments on a stable, uniform basis.

At the time of Bretton Woods, the United States dollar

was grossly undervalued and was actually an asset more

valuable than gold. The promise to redeem all dollars in

gold could thus be made without having to be fulfilled.*

From 1955, however, the United States faced a persistent

$ There was only one change made in this standard at the Hague in

1955. To avoid any confusion, the conferees deleted reference to the

Poincare franc and defined the specified sums as referring “to a

currency unit consisting of sixty-five and a half milligrams of gold of

millesimal fineness nine hundred.” Asser, Golden Limitations of

Liability in International Transport Conventions and the Currency

Crisis, 5 J. Mar. L. & Com. 645, 647-48 n.7 (1974). Since the United

States never ratified the Hague Protocol, the old language still governs

American courts. That change, however, is entirely formal, since the

elimination of any reference to the French franc merely clarified the

Convention's desire to use gold, a point never doubted in the United

States.

6 See P. Samuelson, Economics, 686-88 (8th ed. 1970).

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balance of payments deficit. Where once there existed a

dollar shortage, there now developed a dollar glut.” To

compensate, central banks abroad began trading their

dollars for gold, and hoarders and speculators began

accumulating the metal in increasing amounts. From 1955

to 1968, United States gold reserves plummeted from

approximately $24 billion to around $10 billion.’

These events led ultimately to the demise of the gold

standard. In early 1968, depletion of the United States

gold reserve led the central banks of Belgium, the Federal

Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland,

the United Kingdom and the United States to agree to

discontinue supplying gold to private markets. A so-

called “two-tier” system of gold pricing—a market price

set accordingly and the official price set under Bretton

Woods’—was thus created. This eased the pressure but

could not remedy the essential flaw. In addition to per-

sistent United States balance of payment deficits, interna-

tional gold reserves grew more slowly than the volume of

world economic activity. As a consequence, banks faced

pressures to liquidate official holdings in light of readily

available market profits. The stage was thus set for

abandonment of the Bretton Woods arrangements.

In August, 1971, the United States suspended its com-

mitment to convert dollars for gold." In May, 1972, it

devalued the dollar by raising the official price of gold to

$38 per ounce. See Par Value Modification Act, Pub. L.

7 Id. at 690-91.

8 Id. at 691, Figure 36-1.

9 See Asset, supra note 6, at 650; Gold, /niernational Monetary Law:

Change, Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 1S J. int'l L. & Econ. 323,

340-41; Samuelson, supra note 7, at 698-99.

10 Id. at 641; Asser, supra note 6, at 651.

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No. 92-268, § 2, 86 Stat. 116 (1972) (formerly codified at

31 U.S.C. § 449 (1972)). In October, 1973, yet another

devaluation raised the price to $42.22 per ounce. See Par

Value Modification Act, amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-

110, § 1, 87 Stat. 352 (1973) (formerly codified at 31

U.S.C. § 449 (1976)).

The dollar’s troubles led the IMF to put forth a plan to

abolish the official price of gold, to delete references to

gold in its articles, and to substitute SDR’s as the Fund’s

reserve asset and unit of account. The plan was proposed

in the 1976 Jamaica Accords, was passed by the Fund’s

members and became effective April 1, 1978. In the

interim, the United States passed implementing legislation

including a repeal of the Par Value Modification Act of

1973 and the abolition of the official price of gold.''

Along with the Jamaica Accords, the measure also be-

came effective on April 1, 1978.

This radical change in the international monetary sys-

tem created an obvious problem under the Warsaw Con-

vention. With gold abandoned as a currency base and the

official price repealed, gold became a commodity with a

daily fluctuating free mark.t price. That the difficulty in

continuing to use gold as a monetary base undermined the

Convention's unit of conversion was immediately recog-

nized. Thus, the Warsaw conferees met in Montreal in

1975, even before the Jamaica Accords, and drafted and

signed a Protocol substituting SDR’s as the Convention’s

unit of conversion. At the time of the proposal, the SDR

" In repealing the official price generally, Congress retained its use for

the limited purpose of determining the value of gold held in the form

of gold certificates. See 31 U.S.C. § 4056. The Senate noted that this

was the “only domestic purpose for which it is necessary to define a

fixed relationship between the dollar and gold. . . .” S. Rep. No.

94-1295, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong.

& Ad. News 5935, 5966-67.

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was calculated in terms of gold.’ With the Jamaica

Accords, the referent was changed to a basket of 16

national currencies, and in January, 1981, the basket was

reduced to five currencies.'’ The Montreal Protocol was

presented to the United States Senate in January, 1977 but

has not been ratified.

Meanwhile, parties to the Convention have utilized a

variety of units of conversion. The record shows Sweden

and Britain have adopted SDR’s for purposes of War-

saw."* Both a Netherlands court and the Civil Court of

Rome reached the same result.'’ Two French courts have

recently decided that the Warsaw unit is to be converted

simply into the current French franc.’* The United States

District Court in the Southern District of Texas recently

opted for the free market price of gold,” the standard

12 Gold, supra note 10, at 345.

3 Ward, The SDR in Transport Liability Conventions: Some Clarifica-

tions, 13 J. Mar. L. & Com. |. 3 (1981).

i4 See Sweden's Carriage by Air Act (1957), amendment to Chapter 9,

§ 22, effective Apri! 27, 1978, (translated and reprinted in App. at

57-61); see also the British Carriage by Air (Sterling Equivalents) Order

of 1980, Statutory Instrument 1980 No. 281, effective March 21, 1980,

(reprinted in App. at 62-63).

1s State of the Netherlands v. Giant Shipping Corp., Rechtspraak van

de Week, 30, May, 1981, 321 (Supreme Court of the Netherlands, May

1, 1981) (translated and reprinted in App. at 64-93); Limee Aerea

Italiane v. Ricciole (Rome Civil Court Judgment 609/1979, Nov. 14,

1978), (translated and reprinted in App. at 95-108).

16 See Chamie v. Egyptiar (Cours d’appel Paris, Jan. 31, 1980) (trans-

lated and reprinted in App. at 171-91); Pakistan Int’! Airlines v.

Compagnie Air Inter. S.A., (Cours d’appel Aix-en-Provence Oct. 31,

1981) (translated and reprinted in App. at 156-70).

7 Boehringer Mannheim Diagnotecs, Inc. {/k/a Hycel, Inc. v. Pan

American World Airways, Inc., $31 F.Supp. 344 (S.D. Tex. 1981).

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utilized by an Indian court,’* and a Greek court." Finally,

the last official price of gold, chosen by the District Court

in this case, was relied upon by Judge Sifton in Jn re Air

Crash Disaster at Warsaw Poland on March 14, 1980, 535

F.Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) and is still utilized by the

CAB pursuant to a 1974 order.

DISCUSSION

The controlling facts in this case are: (i) enforcement of

the Convention’s limitation on liability requires a unit of

conversion to translate judgments into domestic currency;

(ii) there is no longer an internationally agreed upon unit

of conversion; and (iii) there is no United States legisla-

tion specifying a unit to be used by United States Courts.

The need for a unit of conversion is self-evident.

Without it, a rational limit on liability cannot exist, much

less one which produccs judgments of equal value in

different currencies.

The lack of an internationally agreed upon unit is also

obvious. The very convening of the Montreal meeting in

1975 was a recognition by the Warsaw parties that the

Convention’s unit had been eliminated by events. In plain

fact, different countries now apply different units. Al-

though the alternatives argued before us yield limitations

on TWA’s liability in this case ranging from less than

$6,500 to over $400,000, each has been adopted as the

proper unit of account by at least one party, or domestic

18 Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Sanghi, Regular Appeal No. 54 of 1977

(Civil Station, Bangalore, India, August 11, 1978) (reprinted in App.

at 265-71.)

19 Zakoapolos v. Olympic Airways Corp., No. 286 of 1974 Ct. of

App.; 3d Dep’t., Athens, Greece (February 15, 1974) (translated and

reprinted in App. at 251-54.)

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tribunal of a party, to the Convention. This disarray

merely confirms the obvious fact that the Jamaica Ac-

cords destroyed the international arrangements which had

led to adoption of gold as a unit of conversion.

International disarray is also reflected in the lack of

legislation in the United States implementing the Conven-

tion by establishing a unit of conversion. While the “last”

official price of gold is offered as a possible unit, “last” is

really a euphemism for “no longer” or “repealed.” The

repeal of the Par Value Modification Act in 1978 was in

every sense a legislative declaration that the price of

$42.22 per troy ounce was no longer recognized by the

United States.” We fail to see the logic in adopting as a

legal standard a specified value for guid which has been

specifically rejected by the United States Congress. Con-

gress’ action, moreover, as well as that taken by the other

parties to the Jamaica Accords, is highly relevant to the

Convention. The repeal of the Par Value Modification

Act was based on a domestic and international conclusion

that the official »rice of gold was wholly out of touch

with economic and monetary reality. Since use of a fixed

amount of gold as the Convention’s unit was specifically

designed to establish a limitation level at a certain value,

this repeal must be taken as a statement that the official

price no longer reflects that specified value. The case for

continuing to use the now repealed price of gold thus

finds no support in law or logic.

The CAB order on which Judge Knapp relied was

expressly premised on the existence of an official price

under the Par Value Modification Act of 1973. The more

recent internal CAB memorandum supporting continua-

~ The sole remaining use of the last official price is in determining the

value of gold held in the form of gold certificates. See note 12, supra.

That is not relevant to the issues here.

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tion of that order is based ultimately on a policy deter-

mination that the last official price is the best available

standard.’ The inconsistency of the CAB position, how-

ever, is starkly evident. It rejects SDR’s because the

Senate has not ratified the Montreal Protocol, while

adopting the last official price of gold which has been

explicitly rejected by the Congress. The sole criterion

supporting the CAB’s position appears to be the law of

inertia.

The other alternatives have an equally infirm base.

Neither the free market price of gold nor the current

French franc was ever agreed to by the treaty’s framers,

both are gross departures from its purposes, and, as to

the latter, there is ample evidence that it was specifically

rejected. The framers clearly contemplated use of the

governmentally fixed price of gold in adopting it as a unit

of account in the hope of providing stability. The free

market price of gold, however, is simply the daily fluc-

tuating price of a commodity, affected by conditions

relating to supply and nonmonetary uses affecting de-

mand. The current French franc is similarly flawed. To

enforce it would amou ¢ to a deliberate departure from

the expressed wishes of the framers to avoid the use of a

single national currency subject to unilateral action.

TWA argues that we should adopt the International

Monetary Fund’s SDR as the unit of conversion. It is true

that the SDR was “created by the IMF in 1969 to replace

gold and foreign exchange as an international reserve

21 CAB Internal Memorandum, Warsaw Convention Liability Limits,

May 20, 1981 (App. at 32-38).

22. Appellant's reliance on dicta in our decision Reed v. Wiser, $55 F.2d

at 1089 n.12, is misplaced. The Reed footnote implied a free market

standard under the Guatemala City Protocol which the U.S. has not

ratified.

5029

A-16

asset.”*’ “[MJember central banks may exchange SDR’s

for other convertible currencies and, therefore, SDR

balances are actually lines of credit against which reserves

may be borrowed for use in central bank operations.”™

As noted above, methods of calculating SDR’s have been

changed from time to time. They are presently calculated

with reference to a so-called basket of five currencies—

the U.S. dollar, the Deutsche mark, the French franc, the

Japanese yen, and the pound sterling. The amount of

each currency in one SDR is a function of the percentage

weights which are assigned to each currency in the basket.

The collar value of one SDR is then determined by

adding the “dollar values of each currency component

based on daily market exchange ra‘es.””

Though the value of any one currency in terms of

SDR’s fluctuates from day to day, SDR fluctuations are

generally less extreme than fluctuations in the free market

price of gold. The relative stability of the SDR has thus

led the Warsow signatories to propose its substitution as

the Convention’s unit of account. The proposal was

formally drafted in 1975 as part of the Montreal Proto-

cols to the Convention and has been presented to the

signatory states for ratification. Though the substitution

was supported by the l'nited States, there has been

opposition by non-IMF signatories and very few signato-

ries (the United States ‘ncluded) have actually ratified the

Protocol.

The inappropriateness of our adopting SDR’s as the

unit of conversion is plain. The Convention itself con-

23 Ward, supra note 14, at 2.

ld.

&

Id. at 3.

$030

A-17

tains not the slightest authority for its use and the Senate

has thus far declined to ratify the Montreal Protocols.

Moreover, the decision in principle to use SDR’s is only

the first step. After that, a further step must be taken to

define the limitation of liability in terms of a particular

number of SDR’s per kilogram of baggage. In effect, we

would have to set the level of the limitation. Finally, the

SDR is a creature of an international body, the IMF, and

is subject to modification or outright elimination by that

body. In fact, the method of calculating SDR’s has been

changed three times in the last seven years. This Court

has no power under the terms of the Convention or

relevant domestic source of authority to adopt a unit of

conversion variable at the whim of an international body

distinct from the parties to the Convention.

It is thus clear that neither international nor domestic

sources of law specify a unit of account for purposes of

the Convention. We deal here not with ambiguities which

may be clarified by reference to underlying purpose or

with language which inadequately mirrors the understood

intentions of the drafters. For almost two generations,

the Convention’s limits on liability have been translatable

into domestic currency values by application of a clear

and easily applied formula. An essential ingredient of

that formula has, as a consequence of international ac-

tion followed by domestic legislation, ceased to exist.

What the parties ask us to do is to select, upon the basis

of our judgment as to what is best as a matter of policy, a

new unit of conversion. We are without authority to do

so.

Treaty negotiation and proposal is the province of the

executive and ratification is the exclusive province of the

United States Senate. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; Doe

ex dem. Clark et al. v. Braden, \6 How. 635, 656-57

A-18

(1853). While federal courts are necessarily called upon to

interpret treaties, The Federalist No. 3 (J. Jay) (Rossiter

ed. 1961); see also id. No. 80 (A. Hamilton), they must

observe the line between treaty interpretation on the one

hand and negotiation, proposal and ratification on the

other. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1961). To

be sure, great difficulty may arise in ascertaining where

that line is drawn and when it has been crossed.” See,

e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). However,

selection of a unit of conversion and the level of value of

a limitation on liability is plainly a matter to be nego-

tiated by the parties, as the history of the Convention

demonstrates.

While international disarray as to the proper unit of

conversion under the Convention alone might not disable

us from enforcing a new unit, such a unit must be selected

either through treaty ratification by the Senate or by

legislation passing both Houses of the Congress. The

repeal of the Par Value Modification Act was an explicit

abandonment of the previously established unit of con-

version. While Congress may not have focused explicitly

upon the Convention in repealing that Act, its purpose,

abandonment of a price which was out of touch with

economic reality, plainly encompasses use of that price to

26 Given the lack of an internationally agreed upon standard of

conversion, it might be argued that the Convention has been abro-

gated. However, treaties involve international obligations entered into

by coordinate branches of the government and it is not the province of

courts to declare treaties abrogated or to afford relief to those

(including the parties) who wish to escape their terms. These are not

matters for “judicial cognizance.” Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S.

190, 194 (1887); see also Terlinden v. Ames, \84 U.S. 270 (1901). They

belong to the executive and legislative departments because they are

more properly the domain of “diplomacy and legislation, . . . not

. the administration of laws.” Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. s. at

195.

$032

A-19

convert judgments to United States currency values. Con-

gress thus abandoned the unit of conversion specified by

the Convention and did not substitute a new one. Substi-

tution of a new term is a political question, unfit for

judicial resolution. We hold, therefore, that the Conven-

tion’s limits on liability for loss of cargo are unenforce-

able in United States Courts.”

CONCLUSION

This ruling is prospective and will apply only to events

creating liability occurring 60 days from the issuance of

the mandate in this case. Prospective effect is compelled

by the fact that this is the first case in which a court has

declined to enforce the Convention’s limits on liability.

The parties assumed our power to select a new unit and

thus our “resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.”

Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971).

Parties to transactions covered by the Convention should

have time to adjust their affairs to this ruling. Cf.

Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline

Co., 50 U.S.L.W. 4892 (U.S. June 28, 1982) (judgment

holding Bankruptcy Act unconstitutional stayed until

October 4, 1982). As to events occurring before that date,

we hold that the last official price of gold shall be used to

calculate the limits on liability. Because of both the CAB

ruling discussed above and the lack of alternatives, air

carriers, at least in this country, have relied on the last

official price of gold. All carriers have thus filed tariffs

27 ~—s- The Convention esiablishes liability as well as limits it. Note 2,

supra, Our holding is limited solely to the unenforceability of the limits

and we express no view as to the severability of those limits from t

rest of the Convention.

5033

A-20

that comply with that standard and substantial “injustice

and hardship” would result were they not allowed time to

reformulate those tariffs. Other parties may continue to

protect themselves through insurance.

Affirmed.

A-2]

Docket Number

82-7012

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Vv.

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

NOTICE OF MOTION

for Stay of Issuance of Mandate

Motion By:

CurRTIS, MALLET-PREVOST, COLT & MOSLE

Robert S. Lipton, Esq.

(212) 696-6045

Has a request of opposing counsel for con-

sent been refused? & Yes O No

Has service been effected” @ Yes 0 No

Is oral argument desired? 0 Yes @ No

(Substantive motions only)

Requested return date:

(See Second Circuit Rule 27 (b))

Date of argument of appeal, if scheduled:

Judge or agency whose order is being appealed:

OPPOSING COUNSEL: (Name and tel. no. of attorney in

charge)

WAESCHE, SHEINBAUM & O'REGAN, P.C,

John R. Foster, Esq.

(212) 227-3550

Brief statement of the relief requested: Order staying the

issuance of mandate in this case pending the filing by defendant-

A-22

appellee Trans World Airlines, Inc. (“TWA”) of a petition for

certiorari in the Supreme Court and until final disposition therein

of the case.

Previous requests for similar relief and disposition: None.

Statement of the issue(s) presented by this motion: Whether

an order staying issuance of the mandate in this case should be

entered since TWA expects and intends to make proper and

timely application to the Supreme Court of the United States by a

petition for writ of certiorari for review of certain aspects of the

decision and judgment of this Court in this case.

Brief statement of the facts (with page references to the mov-

ing papers): The relevant factual background is set forth at

paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Affidavit of John N. Romans, sworn to

on December 6, 1982, and submitted in support of this motion.

Summary of the argument (with page references to the mov-

ing papers): Pursuant to the provisions of Section 2101(f),

Title 28 U.S.C. and Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, an order should be entered staying issuance of the

mandate in this case on the ground that it is the bona fide inten-

tion of TWA to make proper application to the Supreme Court

within the time allowed by law for a writ of certiorari. The

grounds upon which TWA's petition for certiorari will be based

are set forth at paragraph 5 of the Rom:.ns Affidavit mentioned

above.

12/7/82 ROBERT S. LIPTON

Date The name signed must be printed beneath

Robert S. Lipton

Attorney for Defendant-Appellee.

A-23

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

that the motion be and it hereby

is granted

JAMES L. OAKES

Hon. James L. Oakes

RICHARD J. CARDAMONE

Hon. Richard J. Cardamone

RALPH K. WINTER

Hon. Ralph K. Winter

December 17, 1982

A-24

United States Court of Appeals

SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 82-7012

Ata stated term of the United States Court of Appeals, in and

for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Courthouse, in

the City of New York, on the first day of December one thousand

nine hundred and eighty-two.

FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN MINT LIM-

ITED, and MCGREGOR, SwiIRE AIR SERVICES LIMITED,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

A petition for rehearing containing a suggestion that the action

be reheard in banc having been filed herein by counsel for the

defendant-appellee, Trans World Airlines, Inc.,

Upon consideration by the panel that heard the appeal, it is

ORDERED that said petition for rehearing is DENIED.

aula

A-25

It is further noted that the suggestion for rehearing in banc has

been transmitted to the judges of the court in regular active

service and to any other judge on the panel that heard the appeal

and that no such judge has requested that a vote be taken thereon.

A. Daniel Fusaro, Clerk

by:

FRANCIS X. GINDHART

Francis X. Gindhart

Chief Deputy Clerk

A-26

United States District Court

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

81 Civ. 1700 (WK)

FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN MINT LIMITED,

and MCGREGOR, SWIRE AIR SERVICES, LIMITED,

Plaintiffs,

-against-

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.

Defendant.

Whitman Knapp, D.J.

On March 23, 1979, plaintiff Franklin Mint Corporation

(“Franklin”) delivered to defendant Trans World Airlines, Inc.

(“TWA”) for carriage from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to

London’s Heathrow Airport, four packages weighing some 714

pounds. Although the packages are said to have contained a

large quantity of valuable coins, Franklin made no special decla-

ration of value at the time of delivery. TWA charged Franklin

$544.96 for the shipment. The four packages never arrived at

their destination, and Franklin brought this action to recover

their full value, which it fixes at $250,000. The parties agree that

this action is governed by the terms of the Warsaw Convention,

and that TWA is liable for the loss. Before us is a motion by

TWA for partial summary judgment as to the extent of its liabil-

ity. We grant that motion in part and deny it in part.

Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention provides that, unless a

special declaration of value is made at the time of delivery, a

shipper's liability for checked baggage and goods is limited to the

equivalent of 250 francs per kilogram. Article 22 states, more-

over, that this limitation of 250 francs:

“shall be deemed to refer to the French franc consisting of

65% milligrams of gold at the standard of fineness of nine

A-27

hundred thousandths [the so-called Poincare franc].

These sums may be converted into any national currency

in round figures.” (Emphasis added.)

Counsel for TWA, in an extraordinarily lucid and comprehen-

sive brief, has suggested three possible bases for the calculation

converting the Article 22 limitation into United States dollars:

(1) the Special Drawing Right (“SDR”), used by members of

the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) as a unit of account;

(2) the last official price of gold in the United States; and (3) the

exchange value of the current French franc. Counsel for Frank-

lin, in an equally able brief, suggests a fourth possibility: the free

market price of gold.

Were we writing on a clean slate, we would find the arguments

in favor of the first of TWA’s suggestions (the SDR) most per-

suasive. However, TWA’s second suggestion (the last official

price of gold in the United States) has—arguably, at least—been

espoused by the Civil Aeronautics Board (“CAB”), the govern-

ment agency most intimately concerned with the transaction at

hand. It therefore comes as close as anything to constituting a

governmental interpretation of the Article 22 limitation. Also, it

is used by all domestic carriers—including TWA—in calculating

the dollar value of the Article 22 limitation printed on their

tariffs. It would seem to follow that the parties intended to adopt

the last official price of gold as the basis for converting the Article

22 limitation into dollars in the instant case.

Beyond saying the foregoing we can, since there are no dis-

puted issues of fact upon which a finding by us is required, see no

purpose to be served by delaying a decision while we seek to put in

our own words the arguments so cogently expressed by counsel for

TWA. Accordingly, we simply adopt those arguments to the

extent that they support our conclusion that the conversion shouid

be premised on the !ast official price of gold in the United States.

A-28

Let counsel for TWA submit a proposed order on ten days’

notice. As we understand the stipulation of the parties, such an

order would in effect direct that judgment be entered for plaintiff

in the amount of $6,475.98 plus interest and costs, a result which

would permit immediate appeal from this order.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: New York, New York

November 6, 198]

EEE EEE EEE EE EEE EERE EEE EEE EEES

Whitman Knapp, U.S.D.J.

A-29

United States District Court

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ORDER

81 Civ. 1700 (WK)

FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN MINT LIMITED

and MCGREGOR, SwirRE Air SERVICES, LIMITED,

Plaintiffs,

Vv.

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant.

APPEARANCES

For Plaintiffs: WAESCHE, SHEINBAUM &

O'REGAN

120 Broadway

New York, New York 10271

John Foster, Esq.

For Defendants: CuRTIS, MALLET-PREVOST,

CoLtT & MOSLE

100 Wall Street

New York, New York 10005

John R. Romans, Esq.

WHITMAN KNAPP, D.J.

The first sentence of the second paragraph of our November 6,

1981 Memorandum and Order is hereby amended to read:

“Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention provides that,

unless a special declaration of value is made at the time of

a delivery, a carrier's liability for checked baggage and

goods is limited to the equivalent of 250 francs per

kilogram.”

SO ORDERED.

Dated: New York, New York

December 18, 1981

SEER EERE EERE EE EE EEE HEHE EEE E HEHE EE EEE®

Whitman Knapp, U.S.D_J.

A-30

United States District Court

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

81 Civ. 1700 (WK)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN MINT LIMITED

and MCGREGOR, SwirRE AiR SERVICES, LTD..,

Plaintiffs,

— against —

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant.

For the reasons stated in the Memorandum and Order of this

Court, dated November 6, 1981, it is

ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED: that the maxi-

mum liability herein of defendant Trans World Airlines, Inc. shall

be determined under Article 22 of the Convention for the Unifica-

tion of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by

Air, 49 Stat. 3000 et. seg. (1934), T.S. 876, reprinted in 49

U.S.C. § 1502 note (1970), by a conversion factor premised on

the last official price of gold in the United States, and it is

FURTHER ORDERED, that in accordance with the forego-

ing conversion factor, final judgment shall be entered for plain-

tiffs in the amount of $6,475.98, plus interest and costs.

Dated: New York, New York

December 3, 1981

WHITMAN KNAPP

WHITMAN KNAPP |

U.S.D.J.

JUDGMENT ENTERED 12/4/81

RAYMOND F. BURGHARDT

Clerk

A-31

81 Civ. 1700 (WK)

United States District Court

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN MINT LIMITED,

and MCGREGOR, SwirRE AIR SERVICES LIMITED,

Plaintiffs,

—against—

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant.

NOTICE OF MOTION; AFFIDAVIT

MOTION DENIED

December 16, 1981]

WHITMAN KNAPP

Whitman Knapp

U.S.D.J.

A-32

United States District Court

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

81 Civ. 1700 (WK)

NOTICE OF MOTION

FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN MINT LIMITED,

and MCGREGOR, Swike AiR SERVICES LIMITED,

Plaintiffs,

~against—

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the Court's Memorandum

and Order dated November 6, 1981; on the Court's Order and

Judgment dated December 3, 1981; on the affidavit sworn to by

John R. Foster on December 14, 1981, attached hereto; on the

memorandum of law submitted herewith: and on all the prior

pleadings and proceedings had in this action, the undersigned will

move this Court before the Honorable Whitman Knapp, United

States District Judge, at the United States Courthouse, Foley

Square, New York, New York, on January 8, 1982, at 2:00 p.m.,

or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, for an order

pursuant to rule 59(¢) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

amending the Court's Order and Judgment of December 3, 1981,

by determining defendant Trans World Airlines, Inc.'s liability

A-33

under Articles 18 and 22 of the Warsaw Convention in accor-

dance with the free-market price of gold, and for such other and

further relief as to the Court may seem just and equitable.

Dated: New York, New York

December 14, 1981

WAESCHE, SHEINBAUM & O'REGAN, P.C.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

By: JOHN R. FOSTER

John R. Foster

120 Broadway, Suite 1825

New York, New York 10271

(212) 227-3550

A-34

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

Section 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the

Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the

several States, when called into the actual Service of the United

States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal

Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject

relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have

Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the

United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of

the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators

present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the

Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors,

other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme

Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appoint-

ments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be

established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the

Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the

President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of

Departments.

The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may

happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commis-

sions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.

¥

A-35

CONVENTION FOR UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN

RULES RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL

TRANSPORTATION BY AIR

Article 22

(1) In the transportation of passengers, the liability of the

carrier for each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000

francs. Where, in accordance with the law of the court to which

the case is submitted, damages may be awarded in the form of

periodical payments, the equivalent capital value of the said pay-

ments shall not exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special

contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher

limit of liability.

(2) Inthe transportation of checked baggage and of goods, the

liability of the carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250 francs per

kilogram, unless the consignor has made, at the time when the

package was handed over to the carrier, a special declaration of

the value at delivery and has paid a supplementary sum if the case

so requires. In that case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not

exceeding the declared sum, unless he proves that that sum is

greater than the actual value to the consignor at delivery.

(3) As regards objects of which the passenger takes charge

himself, the liability of the carrier shall be limited to 5,000 francs

per passenger.

(4) The sums mentioned above shall be deemed to refer to the

French franc consisting of 65 milligrams of gold at the standard

of fineness of nine hundred thousandths. These sums may be

convexted into any national currency in round figures.

A-36

Order 74-1-16

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

WASHINGTON, D. C,

Docket 26274

Adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board

at its office in Washington, D. C.

on the 3rd day of January, 1974

IN THE MATTER OF WARSAW CONVENTION LIABILITY

LIMITATIONS AS EXPRESSED IN U. S, DOLLARS

ORDER

Section 221.38(j) of the Board's Regulations requires U. S.

and foreign air carriers which avail themselves of the limits of

liability to passengers provided in the Warsaw Convention (49

Stat. 3000; T.S. 876) to include in their tariffs, inter alia, a

statement as to the amount of the liability limits of the Conven-

tion stated in dollars. These provisions of the tariffs, as well as

those setting forth limitations of liability under the Convention

with respect to baggage and property, restate the applicable law

and serve to advise the public of the Convention limitations on

their right of recovery for death, or injury or loss or damage to

baggage and property.

The liability limits in the Warsaw Convention are set forth in

terms of gold francs so that as long as the value of the dollar in

terms of gold remained constant, no change was required in the

dollar amount of the liability limits contained in the tariffs.

However, by Order 72-6-7 adopted June 2, 1972, the Board

directed the carriers to revise their tariffs to reflect the devalua-

tion of the dollar in terms of gold from $35 per ounce to approxi-

isan Cae ee aagersrcen yt etnday 1972, and such

| vane - ae we Lee ee ee ee eae ay TY wer) ie KRG

A-37

revisions have been made. On September 21, 1973, Public Law

93-110 was enacted, further devaluating the U. S. dollar to

approximately $42.22 per ounce of gold effective October 18,

1972. Asa result, the minimum liability limits specified in Order

72-6-7 and the tariffs currently on file with the Board no longer

meet the minimum liability limits of the Convention and a revi-

sion of the tariffs is necessary to accurately reflect such limits in

dollars.’

In view of the foregoing and of all other relevant matters, the

Board finds and concludes:

1. That the dollar limitations stated in the presently

effective tariffs of the respondent air carriers and foreign

air carriers no longer meet the minimum liability require-

ments of the Warsaw Convention for “international trans-

portation” or of the Hague Protocol and “international

carriage” as defined therein.

2. That, in this circumstance, such tariff limitations

are inconsistent with the applicable law as set forth in the

Convention or the Protocol, and the tariff filing require-

ments in Section 403 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,

and Part 221 of the Board's Regulations and they must be

canceled,

1, With respect to their liability to passengers, this order will affect

Tacs ameded to tesentonel eaunemetines beans

ca terna transporta

neys to or from the United States adhere to the Montreal —

Aaah aoe 18900 approved by Order E-23680 dated y 13,

A-38

3. That the minimum acceptable figures in United

States dollars for liability limits applicable to “interna-

tional transportation” and “international carriage” are as

follows:

Convention and Protocol

Minimum | iability Actual W vuinded®

125,000 francs (per passenger, Con-

VENLION OMY) cicscsserscrsereersereereerenen $10,002.90 $10,000.00

250,000 francs (per passenger,

Hague Protocol Only) o.ccccu 20,005.80 20,000.00

5,000 francs (per passenger for un-

Checked baggage) occ 400.116 400,00

250 francs (per kilogram for checked

baggage and ZOOS) oo... 20.00580 20.00

250 francs (per kilogram on a per-

EE TINNEIED -sosdectsesogeaveensonbndocecereit 9.07460 9.07

Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Aviation

Act of 1958, particularly Sections 204(a), 403, and 1002 thereof,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

|. The carriers named in Appendix A, attached hereto, shall

revise all liability limitations which may be applicable to “inter-

national transportation” or “international carriage” as defined in

the Convention or the Protocol which are inconsistent with the

dollar amounts set forth herein so as to conform with such

amounts.

2. The tariff cancellations directed in ordering paragraph |

above shall become effective on or before February 6, 1974, on

not less than 10 days’ notice.

3. Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention permits the liability limits

specified therein in gold francs to be converted into any national cur-

eae fry By The Board is the round dollar

this order to be in the tariffs for of

order is not intended to pr>hibit carriers

prow ee ances ee in their tariffs as some

2

A-39

3. That copies of this order shall be served on the air carriers

and foreign air carriers named in Appendix A.

This order will be published in the Federal Register.

By the Civil Aeronautics Board:

EDWIN Z. HOLLAND

Secretary

(SEAL)

APPENDIX A

U.S. CERTIFICATED SCHEDULED AIR CARRIERS

Airlift International, Inc.

Alaska Airlines, Inc.

Allegheny Airlines, Inc.

Aloha Airlines, Inc.

American Airlines, Inc.

Aspen Airways, Inc.

Braniff Airways, Inc.

Chicago Helicopter Airways, Inc.

Continental Air Lines, Inc.

Delta Air Lines. Inc.

Eastern Air Lines, Inc.

Frontier Airlines, Inc.

Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.

Hughes Air Corp., d/b/a Hughes Airwest

Kodiak-Western Alaska Airlines, Inc.

Los Angeles Airways, Inc.

National Airlines, Inc.

New York Airways, Inc.

North Central Airlines, Inc.

Northwest Airlines, Inc.

Ozark Air Lines, Inc.

Pan American World Airways, Inc.

Piedmont Aviation, Inc.

Reeve Aleutian Airways, Inc.

SFO Helicopter Airlines, Inc.

Seaboard World Airlines, Inc.

Southern Airways, Inc.

Texas International Airlines, Inc.

The Flying Tiger Line Inc.

Trans World Airlines, Inc.

United Air Lines, Inc.

Wien Air Alaska, Inc.

A-41

Wright Air Lines, Inc.

U.S. SUPPLEMENTAL AIR CARRIERS

Capitol International Airways, Inc.

Johnson Flying Service, Inc.

McCulloch International Airlines, Inc.

Modern Air Transport, Inc.

Overseas National Airways, Inc.

Royal International! Airlines

Saturn Airways, Inc.

Southern Air Transport, Inc.

Siandard Airways, Inc.

Trans Internationa! Airlines, Inc.

Universal Airlines, Inc.

World Airways, Inc.

U.S. AIR TAXI OPERATORS*

Aeromech, Inc.

Air East, Inc.

Air Indies Corporation

Air New England, Inc.

Air North, Inc.

Air South, Inc.

Air Wisconsin, Inc.

Alaska Aeronautica! Industries, Inc.

Altair Airlines, Inc.

Antilles Air Boats, Inc.

Apache Airlines, Inc.

Apollo Aviation, Inc.

Atlantic City Airlines, Inc.

Bar Harbor Airways, Inc.

A-42

Combs Airways, Inc.

Command Airways, Inc.

Commuter Airlines, inc.

Crown Airways, Inc.

Downeast Airlines, Inc.

Execuair, Inc.

Executive Airlines, Inc.

Fischer Bros. Aviation, Inc.

Florida Airlines, Inc.

Golden West Airlines, Inc.

Henson Aviation, Inc.

Mackey International Air Commuter

Marco Island Airways, Inc.

Metroflight Airlines, Inc., d/b/a

Houston Metro Airlines

Midstate Air Commuter

Monmouth Airlines, Inc.

Pennsylvania Commuter Airlines,

Div. of Clark Aviation Corp.

Pocono Airlines, Inc.

Provincetown-Boston Airline, Inc., d/b/a

Provincetown-Boston Airline or Naples Airlines

Puerto Rico International Airlines, Inc.

Ransome Air, Inc.

Rio Airways, Inc.

Royale Airlines, Inc.

Sedalia-Marshall Boonville Stage Line, Inc.

Shawnee Airlines, Inc.

L. B. Smith

Southeast Airlines, Inc.

Suburban Airlines, Inc., a subsidiary of

Reading Aviation Service, Inc.

Swift Air Lines, Inc. :

Travel Air Aviation, Inc.

Vercoa Air Service, Inc.

Winnepesaukee Aviation, Inc.

A-43

U.S. INDIRECT AIR CARRIERS

(Airfreight Forwarders and Air Express )

Add Airfreight Corp.

Aero Special Air Freight, Inc.

Air Cargo Expediters, Inc.

Air Cargo Specialists, Inc.

Air Freightways Corporation

Air-Land Freight Consolidators, Inc.

Air-Land Transport, Inc.

Air Overseas Corporation

Airport Packers, Inc., d/b/a

Airport Packers & Forwarders

Air Progress, Inc.

Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc.

Air Van Lines, Inc.

Airborne Freight Corporation

(a Delaware corporation)

The “AL” Naish Moving and Storage Company,

A Corporation

Alas Ibero Americanas, Inc.

Alberti Van & Storage Co., Inc., d/b/a

Mov Air

All-Airtransport, Inc.

All Carrier Transport, d/b/a

ACT Air Freight

All Hawaii Cargo Consolidators, Inc., d/b/a

A-One Air Freight

Allied Van Lines, Inc.

Allstates Air Cargo, Inc.

Ambassador Air Freight Corp.

Amerford International Corp., d/b/a

Amerford Air Cargo

American Ensign Van Service, Inc.

American Red Ball Transit Co., Inc.

American Van & Storage, Inc.

Amerpole Air Freight, Inc.

A-44

Anthony H. Osterkamp, Jr., d/b/a

Osterkamp Trucking

Apex Air Freight, Inc.

Apollo Air Freight Corporation

Armand J. Donati

Around the World Air Freight, Inc.

Anthony S. Arrico and Robert P. Landy, d/b/a

R. I. Air Freight Forwarders

Associated Air Freight, Inc.

(a Virginia corporation)

Aero Mayflower Transit Company, Inc.

Astro Air Express, Inc.

Astron Forwarding Company, Inc.

Atlas Van Lines International Corp.

Aztec Transportation Co., Inc., d/b/a

Aztec Air Freight

B & G Trucking, Inc.

Bader Bros. Van Lines, Inc.

Baker International Warehouse, Inc., d/b/a

Baker Air Cargo

Beacon Shipping Co., Inc.

Behring International, Inc.

Bekins International Lines, Inc.

Bellair Expediting Service, Inc.

Ben-Lee Motor Service Co., d/b/a

Mitchell Air Dispatch

Bennett & Taylor Trans., Inc.

J. E. Bernard & Co., Inc.

(a New York corporation )

Black & Geddes, Inc.

Bor-Air Freight Co., Inc.

Philip C. Borden, d/b/a

Borden Trucking

Brake Air Freight, Inc.

Bruce Transfer Corp.

Burlington Northern Air Freight, Inc.

A-45

A. F. Burstrom & Sons, Inc.

W. J. Byrnes and Company of New York, Inc.

Air Freight, Inc.

C&L Freight Lines, Inc., d/b/a

Commerce Air Freight

C-M-D Transport, Inc., d/b/a

C-M-D Air Forwarders

Cal-Air Forwarders, Inc.

Cal-Hawaiian Freight, Inc.

California Delivery Service (A Corp.)

Cargo Courier Air Freight, Inc.

Cargoair Forwarders, Inc.

Carmichael International Service, d/b/a

CIS Oceanair Services

Carolina Freight Carriers Corporation

Willis L. Carr and Charles D. Weist, d/b/a

Cates Carr Go

Cartwright International Van Lines, Inc.

Castelazo & Associates

Century Air Freight, Inc.

CF Air Freight, Inc.

Christman Corporation, d/b/a Christman Air Freight

Circle Airfreight Corp.

Clipper Express Company, d/b/a “Sky Ho!” Air Freight Division

Columbia Air/Frate, Inc.

Columbia Export Packers, Inc.

Com-Air Freight, Inc., d/b/a Comet Air Freight

Commercial Air-Frate, Inc.

Common Market Forwarders, Inc.

Connecticut Air Freight, Inc.

Continental Forwarders, Inc. (a Delaware corporation)

Corsair Air Cargo System, Inc.

F. X. Coughlin Co.

Crown Air Freight Corp.

D.J.C. Corporation, d/b/a Jones Air Freight

Data Air Distribution System Co., Inc.

A-46

Davidson Forwarding Company

Dean Forwarding Co., Inc.

Delcher Intercontinental Moving Service, Inc.

Woodrow W. De Witt, d/b/a De Witt Freight Forwarding

Distribution Centers, Inc., d/b/a Alpha Air Freight

District Moving & Storage, Inc., d/b/a District Containerized

Express

Domestic Air Express, Inc.

Door to Door International, Inc.

Frank P. Dow Co., inc. (a Washington corporation)

Bruce Duncan Co., Inc., d/b/a Bruce Duncan Cargo

Emery Air Freight Corporation

Empire Carriers Corp., d/b/a Entico Air Freight Service

Empire Foreign Air Forwarders, Inc.

Engel Brothers, Inc.

Enterprise Shipping Corp.

Equine Express, Inc.

Euro-American Air Freight Forwarding Co., Inc.

Express Forwarding and Storage Co., Inc.

5 Star Air Freight Corporation

Fernstrom Storage and Van Company

Flying Horse Air Freight, Inc.

Footner and Company, Inc., d/b/a Rennie Footner Air Express

Service

Foreign Trade Export Packing Corp., d/b/a Foreign Trade

Export Company

44 Air Express Systems, Inc.

Fort Pitt Consolidators, Inc.

Forwardair, Inc.

Four Winds Forwarding, Inc.

The Francesco Parisi Forwarding Corporation, d/b/a Parisi

Airfreight

Fresh Air, Inc., d/b/a Fresh Air Cargo

Fritz Air Freight

Frontier Freight Forwarders, Inc., d/b/a Frontier Freight

Consolidators

A-47

Furman Air Freight Corp.

G. & H. Transportation, Inc., d/b/a G. & H. Air Freight

Gateway Aviation Co., Inc.

Genera! Air Freight Corp.—Domestic

General Air Freight Corp.

General Transpac System, d/b/a GTS Airfreight

Genex Airfreight, Inc.

Gilbert Air Transport Corp.

Global Forwarding, Inc.

Globe Shipping Co., Inc.

Gold Wings Ltd.

Golden Gate Air Freight, Inc.

Graf Air Freight, Inc.

Arnold S. Grant, d/b/a LeMark Air Freight Service

Greene Air International, Inc.

HC & D Forwarders International, Inc.

Hallmark Cargo Services, Inc.

Hall Expediting, Inc.

Harle Consolidators International (HARLE-CON), A division

of Harle Services, Inc.

Harlo-Air Cargo Brokers, Inc.

Hemisphere Air Freight, Inc.

Home-Pack Transport, Inc.

Hop Air Freight Forwarders, Inc.

| & T Air Freight Forwarders, Inc.

Imperial Air Freight Service, Inc. (a New Jersey corporation)

Imperial Van Lines International, Inc.

Industrial Air Cargo, Inc.

Inter-Maritime Forwarding Co., Inc.

International Air Courier, Inc.

International Customs Service, Inc.

International Export Packers, Inc.

Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc.

Intra-Mar Shipping Corporation

Jet Air Freight

Jet Forwarding, Inc.

A-48

Joyce Expediting Service, Inc.

Karevan, Inc.

Karr, Ellis & Co., Inc.

Kerner Trucking Service, Inc., d/b/a KTS Air Freight Key Air

Freight, Inc.

Kimberlin Air Freight Corp.

King Van Lines, Inc.

Bernard Klainberg, d/b/a Berklay Air Services Corp.

L.T.C. Air Cargo, Inc.

La Belle Air Freight, Inc.

Landair Corporation

Richard Thomas Light, d/b/a Westchester Air Freight

Loomis Courier Service, Inc.

Luigi Serra, Inc.

John J. McCabe Agency, Inc.

McLean Cargo Specialists, Inc.

Maris Van & Storage, d/b/a Maris Air Transport Division

Mark IV Air Freight, Inc.

Mercury Motor Express, Inc. ( Mercury)

New England Air Lift, Inc.

Herb B. Meyer & Co., Inc.

Midland Forwarding Corporation, d/b/a ABC Air Freight

Missouri Pacific Air Freight, Inc.

Monumental-Security Storage Co.

Murray Air Freight, Inc.

Murty Bros. Agency, Inc.

Mustang Trucking Company, Inc., d/b/a Mustang Air Freight

National Movers Co., Inc.

National Van Lines, Inc.

Nelsonair International, Inc.

Neptune World-Wide Moving, Inc.

Network Courier Service

Alex Nichols Agency, Inc..

North American Van Lines, Inc. ~

Northern Air Freight, Inc.

Novo Airfreight Corp.

A-49

Novo International Corp., d/b/a Novo International Airfreight

O.N.C. Forwarding, d/b/a Rocor Air Freight

Oceanic Forwarders Company, d/b/a Air-Oceanic Shippers

H. G. Ollendorff, Inc.

P.I.E. Air Freight Forwarding, Inc.

Pacific Alaska Forwarders, Inc., d/b/a Arctic Air Freight

Pacific Delivery System

Panalpina Airfreight, Inc., d/b/a Panalpina Airfreight System

Par Avion Corporation

Paulssen & Guice, Ltd.

Performance by Air, Inc.

Petry & Co.'s Foreign Express (a Division Trans- World Shipping

Corporation )

Philadelphia Air Consolidators Assr.., Inc.

Pilot Air Freight Corp.

Presto Delivery Service, Inc.

Prideair Freight, Ltd.

Priority Air Freight, Inc.

Profit by Air, Inc.

Pegasus Air Transport Co.

Perfect Pak Company

Puerto Rican Forwarding Company, d/b/a Active Air Freight

Qwikway Trucking Co., d/b/a Qwik Air

Railway Express Agency, Incorporated

Ramar Air Freight Corp.

Randy International Ltd.

Rapidair Freight

Reilly Expediting Service, Inc.

Republic Airmodal, Inc.

Republic Van and Storage Co., Inc.

Rex Air Freight, Inc.

Right-O-Way, Inc., d/b/a Right-O-Way Air Freight

Royal Air Freight Corp.

Rozay’s Transfer

Saber Air Freight, Inc.

Santa Fe Air Freight Company

Satellite Air Freight, Inc.

Satin Air Freight, Inc.

Robert L. Schley, d/b/a Schley Shipping Company

Schreiber Air Freight, Inc.

Seariders, Inc.

Security Van Lines, Inc.

Senderex Cargo Company, Inc.

Sentry Air Freight Corp.

Service By Air Freight Forwarders, Inc.

Service Air Cargo

Sesko International, Inc.

Set Air Freight, Inc.

Shulman Air Freight, Inc.

Signalair, Inc.

Sincro Inter Nationa!

Sky-Hawk Forwarders, Inc.

Skyline Air Freight, Inc.

Skymaster, Inc.

J. D, Smith Inter-Ocean, Inc.

Southern Pacific Air Freight, Inc.

Star World Wide Forwarders, Inc.

Starck Van Lines, Inc.

Suarez Shipping Services, Inc.

Suddath Van Lines, Inc.

Sunpak Movers, Inc.

Superior Fast Freight, d/b/a Aecro-Ex

Supreme Air Freight Corp.

Surf-Air, Inc.

H. E. Sutton Forwarding Co., Inc.

Swift Home-Wrap, Inc.

T.F.C. Air Freight, Inc.

Tally’s Truck Line

Target Air Freight, Inc.

Three-B Freight Service, Inc.

Towne International Forwarding Inc.

Trans-Air Freight System, Inc.

A-51

Transcon Lines

Transport Express Inc.

Transpor Trade Corporation

Trans-Pacific Air Cargo

Tuya International Corp.

United News Transportation Co.

United Parcel Service Co.

United Van Lines, Inc.

U. S. Van Lines, Inc.

Usair Freight, Inc.

Vanpac Carriers, Inc.

Ven-Air Service, Inc.

Virgil's Delivery Service, Inc., d/b/a Virgil's Air Cargo

Von Der Ahe Van Lines, Inc.

B. Von Paris & Sons, Inc.

WTC Air Freight

WTC Forwarding Corp.

Benjamin H. Walder & Rubin Konlon, d/b/a Chicagoland Air

Freight

Wallkill Air Freight Corporation, d/b/a Atlas Air Cargo

Wells Fargo Air Express, Inc.

Wheaton Van Lines, Inc.

James G. Wiley Co.

Wilson Air Freight, Inc.

Wings and Wheels Express, Inc.

Wings and Wheels Express, Inc., d/b/a Air Express

International

Wits, Inc., d/b/a Wits Air Freight

World Trade Air Freight Services, Inc.

Wright Air Freight Corp.

W. R. Zanes & Co. of La. Inc., d/b/a Zanes Inter-Air

Consolidators

A-52

FOREIGN INDIRECT AIR CARRIERS

Willy Peter Daetwyler, d/b/a Interamerican Airfreight Co.

Kinki Nippon Routist Co, (Japan), d/b/a Kintetsu World

Express, Inc, (U.S.A.)

Kuehne & Nagel (Germany), d/b/a Kuehne & Nagel Air

Freight, Inc.

Lep Transport, Ltd. (United Kingdom), d/b/a Lep Transport,

Inc. (U.S.A.)

McGregor, Swire Air Services Limited, Inc. (U.K.)

Mitsui Air & Sea Service Co., Ltd. (Japan), d/b/a Mitsuiline

Travel Service of America, Inc. (U.S.A.)

Nippon Express Co., Ltd.

Pandair Freight Limited (U.K.)

Union Speditions—Gesellschaft m.b.H. Union Air Transport

Yusen Air & Sea Service Company Limited (Japan), d/b/a

Yusen Air & Sea Service (U.S.A.) Incorporated

A-53

APPENDIX A

FOREIGN AIR CARRIERS**

Adastra Aviation Limited

Aden Airways Limited

Aer Lingus Teoranta

Aerlinte Eireann Teoranta

Aereo Fletes Internacionales, S.A. (AFISA)

Aero Lineas Flecha Austral Limitada

Aero Spacelines, Inc.

Acro Trades (Western) Ltd.

Acrocosta, S.A.

Aerolineas Argentinas

Aerolineas El! Salvador, S.A.

Aerolineas Del Ecuador, S.A.

Aerolineas Peruanas, S.A.

Aecrolinee Itavia—S.p.A.

Aeromar C. por A.

Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A.

Acronaves del Ecuador, S.A.

Acronaves del Peru, S.A.

Aerotransportes Entre Rios S.R.L.

Acrovias Colombianas Limitada (ARCA)

Acrovias Condor de Colombia Ltda.

Aecrovias Lansa, S. de R.L.

Acrovias Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.

Acrovias Quisqueyana, C. por A.

Aerovias Venezolanas, S.A.

Air Afrique

Air BVI Limited

Air Canada

A-54

Air-India

Air Jamaica (1968) Limited

Air Liban (Lignes Aeriennes Libanaises)

Air Malawi Limited

Air Nauru

Air New Zealand Limited

Air Rhodesia Corporation

AIR-SIAM Air Company Limited

AIR-VIETNAM

Air Zaire

Airlines Jersey Limited T/A. British United C.I. Airways

Alia-The Royal Jordanian Airlines Corporation

Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane—S.p.A.

All Nippon Airways Company, Ltd.

ALM Dutch Antillean Airlines

Ansett—ANA (A division of Ansette Transport Industries

(Operations) Pty. Ltd.)

Argo, S.A.

Ariana Afghan Airlines Co., Ltd.

Australian National Airlines Commission, Trading as Trans-

Australia Airlines

Austrian Airlines, Osterreichische Luftverkehrs—

Aktiengesellischaft

Aviacion y Comercio, S.A.

B.K.S. Air Transport Limited

Bahamas Airways Limited

Balair AG

Belairco Aviation Inc. (Doing business as Bellingham-Seattle

Airways)

Britannia Airways Limited

British Caledonian Airways, Limited

British European Airways Corporation

British Midland Airways Limited

British Overseas Airways Corporation

British United Airways Limited

British West Indian Airways Limited

A-55

BEA Airtours Limited

Cambrian Airways Limited

Canadian Pacific Airlines, Limited

Canadian Voyageur Airlines Limited

Caraibische Lucht Transport Maatschappij, N.V. (Caribbean

Air Transport Company, Inc.)

Caribwest Airways Limited

Cathay Pacific Airways, Limited

Cayman Airways Limited

Central African Airways Corporation

Central African Airways Limited

Ceskoslovenske Aerolinie

Channel Airways Limited

China Airlines, Ltd.

Civil Air Transport Company Limited

Collingwood Air Services Limited

Compagnie Nationale Air France

Compagnie Nationale de Transports Aeriens (Royal Air Maroc)

Commuter Air Services Ltd.

Compania de Aviacion Faucett, S.A.

Compania de Dominicana de Aviacion, C. por A.

Compania Ecuatoriana de Aviacion, S.A.

Compania Internacional Aerea S.A. (CIASA)

Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A.

Compania Panamena de Aviacion, S.A.

Compania Peruana Internacional de Aviacion S.A.

Conair Ltd.

Condor Flugdienst G.m.b.H.

Cross Canada Flights Ltd.

Cyprus Airways Limited

Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengeselischaft (also operating as Luf-

thansa German Airlines)

D.T.A.—Linhas Acreas de Angola

Donaldson Line (Air Services) Limited, d/b/a Donaldson Inter-

A-56

Eastern Provincial Airways, (1963) Limited

Egypt Air

El Al Israei Airlines Limited

Emerald Airways Ltd.

Ethiopian Air Lines, Inc.

Fiji Airways Limited

Finnair Oy

Flugfelag Islands, H.F. (Icelandic Airways Ltd.)

General Department of International Air Services (Aeroflot,

“Soviet Airlines”)

Germanair Bedarfsluftfahrt Gesellschaft m.b.H. & Co. KG

Ghana Airways Corporation

Gibraltar Airways Limited

Gravenhurst Aviation Limited

Great Lakes Airlines Limited

Gulf Aviation Company

Guyana Airways Corporation

P. N. Garuda Indonesian Airways

Flightexec Limited

Empresa Guatemalteca de Aviacion

Harrison Airways Limited

Holland-America Lijn, n.v. (Netherlands) (Holland America

Line)

Iberia, Lineas Aereas de Espana, S.A.

Indian Airlines Corporation

Inex Adria Airways

Internacional de Aviacion, S.A. (INAIR)

International Jet Air Ltd.

Iran National Airlines Corporation

Iraqi Airways

Japan Air Lines Company, Ltd.

Jugoslovenski Acrotrarsport (JAT)

Kar-Air OY

K.L.M. Royal Dutch Airlines

Korean Air Lines Co., Lid.

Korea Air Terminal Service Co., Ltd. (Republic of Korea)

A-57

Kuoni Travel, Inc. (Kuoni Travel Limited (Switzerland) d/b/a)

Laker Airways Limited

Lansa, S. de R.L.

Lebanese International Airways

Leeward Air Transport Services Limited

Leeward Islands Air Transport Services Limited

Linea Aerea Nationale—Chile (LAN)

Linea Aeropostal Venezolana

Linea Aereas Costarricenses, S.A.

Lineas Aereas de Nicaragua, S.A.

Lloyd Aereo Boliviano, S.A.

Loftleidir H.F. Icelandic Airlines Ltd.

Luftverkehrsunternehmen Atlantis A.G.

LUXAIR—Societe Annonyme Luxembourgeoise de Navigation

Aerienne

Malayan Airways Limited

Malaysia-Singapore Airlines Limited

MALEV—Hungarian Airlines

Martin’s Luchtvervoer Maatschappij N.V. (Martin's Air Char-

ter Company)

Mackenzie Air Ltd.

Middle East Airlines Airliban S.A.L.

Middle East Airlines Company, S.A.

New Zealand National Airways Corporation

Nigeria Airways, Ltd.

Nordair Ltee—Nordair Ltd.

North Canada Air Limited c.o.b. NORCANAIR

Olympic Airways S.A.

Out Island Airways Limited

Pacific Western Airlines, Ltd.

Pakistan International Airlines Corporation

Philippine Air Lines, Inc.

PLUNA, Primeras Lineas Uruguayas de Navegacion Aerea

Polskie Linie Lotnicze “LOT”

A-58

Polynesian Airlines Limited

Pomair N.V.

Qantas Airways Limited

Quebecair

Reseau Aerien Interinsulaire

Royal Air Cambodge

Royal Air Lao

Saudi Arabian Airlines

Scandinavian Airlines System

Seagreen Air Transport Limited

Servicio Aereo de Honduras, S.A.

Servicio Aereo de Transportes Commerciales (SATCO)

Servicios Aereos Cruzeiro Do Sul S.A.

Sociedad Aeronautica De Medellin Consolidada S.A. SAM

Societe Anonyme Belge d’Exploitation de la Navigation Aerienne

(SABENA) (also operating as “SABENA” Belgian World

Airlines)

South African Airways

Spantax, S.A.

Sudan Airways

Superior Airways Limited

Surinaamse Luchtvfracht Onderneming N.V. (Surinam Air

Cargo Corporation)

SWISSAIR, Swiss Air Transport Company Limited

TACA Internationa! Airlines, S.A.

Tarom-Transporturile Aeriene Romine

Thai Airways International Ltd.

Thos. Cook & Son Inc. (U.S.) (Thos. Cook & Son (Continental

and Overseas), Ltd. (Great Britain) d/b/a)

Trans-Australia Airlines

Trans Caribbean Airways

Trans-Mediterranean Airways S.A.L.

Transair Limited

Transavia, N.V.

Transmeridian Air Cargo Limited

Transportation Corporation of America

A-59

Transporte Aereo Rioplatense, S.A.C.E.I.

Transportes Aereos Benianos, S.A.

Transportes Aereos De Cargo, S.A. (Transcarga)

Transportes Aereos Nacionales S.A.

Transportes Aereos Portugueses, S.A.R.L.

Turk Hava Yollari Anonim Sirketi

Turks and Caicos Air Services, Ltd.

Union de Transports Aeriens (U.T.A.)

Union of Burma Airways Board

“VARIG”, S.A. (Viacao Aerea Rio-Grandense)

Venezolana Internacional de Aviacion, S.A. (VIASA)

Viacao Aerea Sao Paulo, S/A “VASP”

Wagner Aviation Limited

Wardair Canada Ltd.

Windward Islands Airways International N.V.

A-60

Superior Court of California

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

Department Law and Motion

August 25, 1982

No. 784512

ELECTRONIC MEMORIES AND MAGNETICS CorpP.,

Plaintiff,

Vv.

THE FLYING TIGER LINE, INC., et ail.

Defendant.

The cross-motions of plaintiff and defendant for partial sum-

mary judgment were heard and submitted for decision on August

10, 1982.

The motion of plaintiff is denied.

The motion of defendant for partial summary judgment is

granted.

The Court determines that the last official U. S. price of gold at

$42.22 per ounce shall be used in calculating the limit of liability

under the Warsaw Convention.

SEER EEE EERE EEE EEE EERE EERE EEE EEE EH EEE EERE EEE EEE HEHE EEE EEE EEE HEHEHE EEE EES

Judge of the Superior Court

JOHN B. Hook, Esquire

Long & Levit

Four Embarcadero Center, Suite 1800

San Francisco, CA 94111

Jess B. MILLIKAN, Esquire

Derby, Cook, Quinby & Tweedt

333 Market Street, Suite 2800

San Francisco, CA 94105

A-61

IN THE

United States District Court

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

NO. 81 C 4726

DEERE & COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

Vv.

DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an action in which plaintiff Deere & Company

(“Deere”) seeks recovery against defendant Deutsche Lufthansa

Aktiengeselischaft (“Lufthansa”) for damage to its IBM model

3032 computer that occurred during Lufthansa’s transport of the

computer from Chicago, Illinois, to Frankfurt, Germany, The

computer was shipped in 14 packages. The package containing

the director frame was damaged. Lufthansa has moved for sum-

mary judgment regarding the applicable standard governing limi-

tation of its liability. Deere has filed a cross-motion for partial

summary judgment. We grant Lufthansa’s motion and deny

Deere’s motion.

In this memorandum opinion, we shall address one question:

whether Lufthansa's liability for the damaged computer as set

out in Article 22(2) of the Warsaw Convention—250 French

gold francs per kilogram—is to be converted to United States

dollars with reference to the exchange value of the current French

franc, the former “official” price of gold, the free market price of

gold, or the Special Drawing Right (“SDR”) used by the Inter-

national Monetary Fund.

A-62

In its motion for summary judgment, Lufthansa seeks to limit

its liability under Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention, Conven-

tion for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International

Transportation by Air, opened for signature October 12, 1929, 49

Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876,137 L.N.T.S. 11 (adherence of the

United States proclaimed October 29, 1934).' Article 22 of the

Warsaw Convention provides that, unless a special declaration of

value is made at the time of a delivery, a carrier’s liability for

baggage or goods is limited to the equivalent of 250 francs per

kilogram. Article 22 states, moreover, that this limitation of 250

francs

shall be deemed to refer to the French franc consisting of

65% milligrams of gold at the standard of fineness of nine

hundred thousandths. These sums may be converted into

any national currency in round figures.

At the time when Article 22 was drafted, gold served official

monetary functions and its price was set by law. Since that time,

in the United States' and the world, gold is no longer used as a

standard of value; it no longer has an official price. Despite this

change in the nature of the value of gold, Article 22, at least at the

time of damage to the director frame, had not been amended to

substitute a new standard of value for gold. Although the parties

to the Warsaw Convention recognized the need for some amend-

ment to Article 22, they could not agree upon one. The Civil

Aeronautics Board, however, has continued to allow airlines to

calculate their limitation of liability under the Warsaw Conven-

tion based upon the last official price of gold. The Board views

this as a legal fiction which preserves the intention of the Warsaw.

Convention to limit the liability of air carriers. Boehringer

Mannheim Diagnostics v. Pan Am, 531 F. Supp. 344, 351-52

(S.D. Tex. 1981). Nevertheless, some courts have rejected cal-

culating the limitation on liability based upon the last official

aa oars

A-63

United States price of gold. See, e.g., id.; Franklin Mint Corp. v.

Trans World Airlines, 525 F. Supp. 1288, 1289 (S.D.N.Y.

1981), reversed, No. 82-7012 (2d Cir. September 26, 1982).

We recognize that each of the solutions offered by the parties

here and elsewhere’ is easy to criticize. What is needed is a

treaty amendment, but we do not have that. Therefore, we have

to choose one of the other alternatives. The one which seems

most nearly to effectuate the intention of the treaty to /imut the

liability of air carriers is to employ the last official United States

price of gold. We agree with the court in /n re Air Crush Disaster

at Warsaw, Poland, 535 F. Supp. 833, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1982),

which, in holding as we do, stated:

The clear merit of using this price as the unit for conver-

sion is that the price constitutes a conversion factor estab-

lished by precisely the kind of mechanism that the

Convention's drafters contemplated when the applicable

clauses were drafted. The use of the last official United

States price for gold means the use of a conversion factor

chosen by the United States at the time the price was set to

determine the relationship of this country’s currency and

those of other nations using a similar standard for conver-

sion. Such a conversion factor, grounded in the policy of

this country with respect to the value of its currency vis-a-

vis all other currencies based upon the gold standard has a

2. The Second Circuit in its opinion in Franklin Mint v. Trans

World Airlines, No. 82-7012 (2d Cir. September 26, 1982), concisely

pointed out the problems with each of the solutions raised by the parties:

The last official price of gold is a price which has been explicitly

sled by the Congress... Gn ods een wane

price of is the ly volatile price of a ity deter-

ised be ot te fees of cake eo Sn

currency values. SDRs are a creature of the IMF [ International

eee Seaee, anes ot ae that and

basis in the [Warsaw] Convention. franc is simply

one domestic currency, subject to change by the unilateral act of

a single government.

id ot 4 (citation omitted). The in Franklin Mint In

tress Rom , “oa

A-64

stability which would be entirely lost if the unit of conver-

sion were subject to the fluctutations of a private commod-

ities market relatively untouched by the regulating

influence of any public policy.

We hold that the last official United States price of gold -

$42.22 per ounce - governs the limitation on liability in this case.

For the above reasons, we grant Lufthansa’s motion for sum-

mary judgment as to the use of the last official United States price

of gold in calculating the limitation of liability in Article 22 of the

Warsaw Convention. We deny Deere’s cross-motion for sum-

mary judgment on this issue.

DATED: © Dec. 30, 1982

United States District Judge

A-65

[The Netherlands v. Giants Shipping Corp.,

Rechtspraak van de Week 321 (May 30, 1981)

(Sup. Ct. of The Netherlands May 1, 1981)]

TRANSLATION FROM DUTCH

The Supreme Court of the Netherlands

Having considered the petition of the State of the Netherlands,

having its seat in The Hague (hereinafter “the State”), repre-

sented by Mr. E. Korthals Altes, Attorney, Barrister at the

Supreme Court, said petition purporting to annul a decision of

June 13, 1980 of the Court of Appeal of The Hague;

Having considered the written defense lodged by Giants Ship-

ping Corporation, a corporation under Liberian Law, having its

seat in Monrovia, Liberia (hereinafter “Giants”), represented by

Mr. C. D. van Boeschoten, Attorney, likewise Barrister at the

Supreme Court, said defense purporting, primarily, to declare

inadmissible the appeal of the State, and, alternatively, to dismiss

that appeal;

Having taken into account the pleadings of Attorney-General

Haak—delivered also in the matter No. 11.705—purporting, in

the matter under reference, to annul the Court’s contested deci-

sion, but only insofar as it fixes the amount to which Giants’

liability is limited at the equivalent in Netherlands currency of an

amount of 12,764,810 gold francs, fixed at 65.5 milligrams gold

of 900/ 1000 fineness, converted at the rate of exchange of the day

on which it [Giants] complies with the order of the Court of

Rotterdam, given in its decision of November 23, 1979, to furnish

security for this amount, and, insofar as, subject to decision by the

Supreme Court, it fixes the amount to which, for the moment,

Giants’ liability is limited, at 12,764,810 [units of] 1/15 Special

Drawing Rights considered equivalent to the franc referred to in

Article 740d, peragraph 4 of the Commercial Code, as these

[Special Drawing Rights] are defined by the Internationa! Mon-

etary Fund, converted into Netherlands money according to the

valuation method applied by the Fund for its own operations and

ar

A-66

transactions, at the rate of exchange of the day on which Giants

complies with the order of the Court of Rotterdam, given in its

decision of November 23, 1979, to furnish security;

Having considered the contested decision and the other docu-

ments, from which it appears as follows:

By petition received on June 29, 1979, by the Clerk of the

Court, Giants applied to the District Court at Rotterdam with the

following requests:

“a. to fix the amount to which Giants’ liability, as men-

tioned in the petition, is limited for the moment at

12,764,810 gold francs, fixed at 65.5 milligrams of

900/1000 fineness;

b. to order that a procedure be instituted for the distri-

bution of this amount;

c. to direct that Giants furnish security by means of a

guaranty of the United Kingdom Mutual Steam Ship

Assurance Association (Bermuda) Limited, having its

seat in Hamilton, Bermuda, for a maximum amount of Fl.

2,210,000.00, increased by legal interest thereon from the

day of the decision in this matter, and increased by an

amount to cover the costs of the proceedings, to be fixed at

Fl. 10,000.00.

d. to order that, when Giants has satisfied the Court

that it has complied with the orde: referred to under c., a

magistrate be appointed to determine the statement of

dividends of the aforementioned amount and also an

administrator thereof;

e. to order that the security bond referred to in this

petition be returned when Giants has satisfied the Court

that it has complied with the order referred to under c. and

when Giants’ petition is granted uncontested, or after any

written defense has been conclusively rejected;”.

Against this, the State lodged a written defense with the afore-

mentioned Court, which contained the following requests:

A-67

“a. to fix, for the moment, the amount to which Giants’

liability is limited at the market price of the quantity of

gold corresponding to 12,764,810 gold francs, fixed at 65.5

milligrams gold of 900/1000 fineness, to be calculated at

the price on the conversion date as referred to in Article

740d, paragraph 4 of the Commercial Code;

b. to direct Giants to furnish good and valid security

by means of a bank guaranty;”.

The Court, having heard counsel for Giants and the State,

among others, in chambers, decided on November 23, 1979, as

follows:

“Fixes the amount to which Giants’ liability is limited

for the moment, at the countervalue in Netherlands cur-

rency of 12,764,810 gold francs, fixed at 65.5 milligrams

gold of 900/ 1000 fineness, calculated according to the rate

of the free market value of that quantity of gold on the day

security is furnished.

Directs Giants to furnish security for this amount by

means of a guaranty of The United Kingdom Mutual

Steam Ship Assurance Association Limited, having its

seat and office in Hamilton, Bermuda, increased by legal

interest from the date of this decision and also by an

amount of Fl. 10,000.00 to cover the costs of these

proceedings.

Rejects any other or additional claims.”.

This decision is based on the following considerations:

“1. that Giants is owner and operator of the Liberian

seagoing vessel “Blue Hawk,” which collided on December

29, 1978, in Terneuzen with the northern bridge over the

outer mole of the western lock and the brake mechanism

at the east side of the outer mole of the western lock; that,

with respect to that collision, claims for damage to prop-

erty were lodged against Giants by the State, the

Terneuzen municipality and the Taxicentrale [Cab Ser-

vice] Terneuzen B.V.; that Giants wishes to avail itself of

A-68

the right to limitation of its liability with respect to said

collision, granted it by virtue of Articles 740a through

740d of the Commercial Code;

2. that the Court fixes the net tonnage of the “Blue

Hawk” as referred to in Article 740d, first paragraph, of

the Commercial! Code, and observing the stipulations in

the third paragraph of said article, at 12,764.81 tons; that

furthermore, the Court, pursuant, to the aforesaid article,

limits, for the moment, Giants’ aforementioned liability

to, and fixes it at, 12,764,810 gold francs, fixed at 65.5

milligrams gold of 900/1000 fineness;

3. that Giants and the State, the latter being joined by

the Terneuzen municipality and the Taxicentrale

Terneuzen B.V., differ in opinion on the applicable conver-

sion rate of those gold francs, as mentioned in the

documents;

4. that, for lack of a valid contractual and/or statutory

stipulation on a definite conversion rate to be applied, and

also because no introduction of such stipulation can be

expected, within a period that would be reasonable for the

matter now before us, that might have allowed anticipa-

tion thereon, the Court can hardly determine anything

other than that the free market value of the aforemen-

tioned legally defined quantity of gold determines at pre-

sent the conversion rate, even if this implies a greater

liability than that according to the arrangements applying

until August 1, 1978;

5. that, since this is a case of limitation of liability

deviating from that under Common Law, this exception .

should indeed not be interpreted more broadly to the dis-

advantage of the injured party, than ensues mandatorily

from contract or law;

6. that in its petition Giants has offered to furnish

security for the amount of liability to be fixed, increased

A-69

by interest and costs, by means of a guaranty of The

United Kingdom Mutual Steam Ship Assurance Associa-

tion Limited, having its seat and office in Hamilton, Ber-

muda, and the Court considers, under the circumstances

of the case, such guaranty sufficiently good and valid

security, now that the State has not further supported its

opposition thereto;

7. that, insofar as Giants’ requests as mentioned here-

inabove under b. and d. are concerned, the Court shall not

consider these matters before Giants has satisfied the

Court that the directive stipulated below has been com-

plied with, as these matters are considered premature at

this stage of the request;

8. that, insofar as Giants’ request as mentioned herein-

above under e. is concerned, it is not possible to entertain

same, as such request cannoi now be brought up;”.

Giants\appealed against this decision with the aforementioned

Court of Appeal, which after hearing at its session of April 18,

1980, counsel for Giants and for the State, gave on June 13, 1980,

the following decision, which is now contested in the present

appeal:

“Annuls, upon appeal, the decision of November 23,

1979, of the Court in Rotterdam, insofar as it:

(1) fixes the amount to which Giants’ liability is for the

moment limited, at the countervalue in Netherlands cur-

rency of an amount of 12,764,810 gold francs, fixed at

65.5 milligrams gold of 900/1000 fineness, calculated at

the rate of the free market value of that quantity of gold on

the day security is furnished;

(2) rejects the request that the Court issue an order

that a procedure be instituted for the distribution of the

amount to which liability is limited;

and, deciding anew in these respects:

A-70

(1) fixes the amount to which liability is for the

moment limited, at the countervalue in Netherlands cur-

rency of an amount of 12,764,810 gold francs, fixes at 65.5

milligrams gold of 900/1000 fineness, converted at the

rate of the day on which Giants complies with the order,

given in the aforementioned decision, to furnish security

for this amount;

(2) orders that a procedure shall be instituted for the

distribution of the amount to which the liability is limited;

Upholds the aforementioned decision for the rest;

Returns the case to the Court in Rotterdam for further

dealing with Giants’ request;”.

considerations of the Court of Appeal in the case were:

“1. The present appeal is lodged against a decision

given by the Court pursuant to Article 320c of the Code of

Civil Procedure, on a request submitted by Giants to the

Court pursuant to Article 320a of said Code.

2. The aforementioned request was to the effect, mate-

rially and insofar as is relevant at present, that

Giants—submitting to avail itself of the right, granted it

by virtue of Article 740a@ of the Commercial Code, to

limitation of its liability for claims connected with the

collision on December 29, 1978, of the seagoing vessel

“Blue Hawk” with the northern bridge over the outer mole

of the western lock in Terneuzen—requested to fix (provi-

sionally) the amount of said limited liability, in accord-

ance with the stipulations of Article 740d of said Code, at"

12,764,810 gold francs, fixed at 65.5 milligrams gold of

900/ 1000 fineness and to order that Giants furnish secur-

ity for same. The request was also to the effect that the

Court give order that a procedure shall be instituted for

the distribution of the aforementioned amount.

A-71

3. In its aforementioned decision, the Court granted

the first request, in such a manner that the amount to

which Giants’ liability is limited for the moment, was fixed

at “the countervalue in Netherlands currency of an

amount of 12,764,810 gold francs, fixed at 65.5 milligrams

gold of 900/1000 fineness, calculated at the rate of the

free market value of that quantity of gold on the day the

security is furnished,” said security being ordered, at the

same time, for said amount, increased by legal interest

from the day of the decision and by an amount of FI.

10,000.00 for the costs of the proceedings. The second

request was rejected.

4. The appeal claims, firstly, that the Court wrongfully

determined that the amount of the limited liability and the

security to be furnished for same be calculated at the rate

of the free market value of the mentioned gold francs, and

it claims, secondly, that the Court wrongfully rejected the

second request mentioned hereinabove.

5. First of all, the question arises whether the present

decision is open to appeal, and the Court of Appeal must

examine this question officially.

Relative to this question, it must be held that, by virtue

of Article 345 of the Code on Civil Procedure, appeal is

possible, because according to the law, and in particular

also in Articles 320a through 320z and especially in Arti-

cle 320x of said Code, appeal against a decision such as

the present one is not explicitly excluded, and also because

neither the effect of the present course of proceedings nor

the decision under discussion imply that appeal against it

is not permissible.

As also the term [for appeal] mentioned in said article

was observed, Giants’ appeal is, therefore, admissible.

6. With respect to the first claim put forward by

Giants, as stated hereinabove, it must be held that the

A-72

system of the procedure for the limitation of the liability

mentioned in this case implies—as explicitly expressed in

Article 740d of the Commercial Code—that in the present

case, in which the furnishing of security is ordered, the

conversion of the amount in gold francs into Netherlands

currency must be made at the rate of the day on which the

order to furnish security is complied with. Because at the

time of the Court's decision and now, it is not certain at

what time Giants shall furnish security, and it is, there-

fore, not possible to determine, at this time, which rate

must be applied, the Court wrongfully determined in the

contested decision that the conversion in Netherlands cur-

rency of the gold francs must be made at the rate of the

free market value thereof, so that this decision must be

annulled in that respect. Therefore, all the observations

concerning the rate to be taken into account for the con-

version, put forward on behalf of Giants and on behalf of

the State of the Netherlands, must now be set aside.

7. With respect to the second claim put forward by

Giants, as stated hereinabove, it must be held that by

virtue of the stipulations at the end of the first paragraph

of Article 320a of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the

further course of proceedings provided for in the subse-

quent articles of said Code, the decision granting the

request as referred to in Article 320a must also order that

a procedure be instituted for the distribution of the

amount to which the liability is limited.

Therefore, the Court wrongfully rejected this request, so that

the decision must be annulled in this respect and said order must _

yet be given.”;

Considering that the State contests this decision, basing its

appeal on the following grievances:

“Breach of justice and neglect of forms, non-observance

of which brings about nullity, as the Court of Justice

A-73

considered Giants’ appeal admissible for reasons men-

tioned in the aforementioned decision and which are con-

sidered repeated and included herein, and subsequently

decided in the verdict of the contested decision, thereby

partly annulling the decision of the Court in Rotterdam, as

mentioned in the verdict of the contested decision, all this

wrongfully for the following reasons:

a) The Court of Appeal wrongfully admitted Giants’

appeal, reasoning that, by virtue of Article 345 of the

Code of Civil Procedure, appeal is possible, because

according to the law, and in particular also in Article 320a

through 320z and especially in Article 320x of said Code,

appeal against a decision such as the present one is not

explicitly excluded, and also because neither the effect of

the present course of proceedings nor the decision under

discussion imply that appeal against it is not permissible.

The legal system, as embodied in the Articles 320a

through 320z of the Code of Civil Procedure, the nature of

the present decision as well as, in particular, Article 320x

of the Code of Civil Procedure, really does oppose the

possibility of appeal against a decision such as the one

under discussion, given by the Court by virtue of Article

320c of the Code of Civil Procedure.

b) The Court of Appeal held wrongfully that the sys-

tem of the procedure for the limitation of the liability

implies—as also explicitly expressed, according to the

Court of Appeal, in Article 740d of the Commercial

Code—that in the present case, in which the furnishing of

security is ordered, the conversion of the amount in gold

francs into Netherlands currency must be made at the rate

of the day on which the order to furnish security is com-

plied with, and that, as at the time of the Court's decision,

like now, it is not certain at what time Giants shall furnish

security and it is, therefore, not possible to determine, at

A-174

this time, which rate must be applied, the Court wrong-

fully determined in the contested decision that the conver-

sion into Netherlands currency of the gold francs must be

made at the rate of the free market value thereof. The

Court of Appeal also decided wrongfully that all the

observations concerning the rate to be taken into account

for the conversion, put forward on behalf of Giants and on

behalf of the State of the Netherlands, must now be set

aside.

Judging thus, the Court of Appeal omitted, wrongfully,

to determine at which rate—of the day on which Giants

complies with the order to furnish security—the amount

of 12,764,810 gold francs fixed at 65.5 milligrams gold of

900/1000 fineness is to be computed.

In this respect, the Court of Appeal ought to have con-

firmed the contested decision of the Court in Rotterdam

and fixed the amount to which Giants’ liability is for the

moment limited, at the countervalue in Netherlands cur-

rency of an amount of 12,764,810 gold francs fixed at 65.5

milligrams gold of 900/1000 fineness, calculated accord-

ing to the rate of the free market value of that quantity of

gold on the day security is furnished.”;

Considering that Giants, in its statement of defense

lodged with the Supreme Court, supported its appeal

against the admissibility of the appeal to the Supreme

Court by the State with the following arguments:

“The State apparently takes the position that it is one of

the parties that appeared in one of the previous instances

and that it can, therefore, appeal to the Supreme Court by

virtue of Article 426, paragraph 1 of the Code of Civil ©

Procedure. Giants is of the opinion that the State cannot

be regarded as a party that appeared in the previous

instances and was also not regarded as such by the Court

of Appeal. In the appeal proceedings at the Court of

Appeal the State has not submitted a statement of defense

A-75

and the Court of Appeal mentioned the State in its con-

tested decision only as “... one of the parties mentioned by

Giants toward whom it is of the opinion it can invoke the

right to limitation of its liability.” The nature of the

proceedings under reference implies, furthermore, that

those toward whom the limitation of liability can be

invoked cannot oppose in a suit such as the one under

reference the (provisional) limitation of the shipowner’s

liability, but must follow to that end the judicial proceed-

ings initiated with the statement of defense by virtue of

Article 320g, paragraph | of the Code of Civil Procedure.

It results from the above that the State is not permitted to

appeal to the Supreme court.

Whereas:

1. Giants argued that the State’s appeal to the

Supreme Court is not admissible, submitting that the

State cannot be regarded as having appeared “in one of

the previous instances” in the sense of Article 426, para-

graph | of the Code of Civil Procedure. This argument

must be rejected.

2. The Court mentions in its decision of November 23,

1979, that it has “seen” the State’s statement of defense

received on July 6, 1979, lodged by the State’s solicitor

E.C.G. Klinkhamer, Attorney. From this, it must be con-

cluded that the Court permitted the State to submit a

statement of defense. The decision also states that the

Court, by virtue of its decision of July 6, 1979, which

ordered, among other things, that the State be summoned,

had heard B.D. Wubs, Attorney in The Hague, counsel for

the State. All this means that the State did appear in the

first instance in the sense of Article 426, paragraph 1.

Though the creditors do not have the right to submit a

statement of defense against a request as referred to by

A-76

Article 320a and though the judge is not obliged to sum-

mon the creditors mentioned by the petitioner, no stipula-

tion in the law prevents the judge from permitting the

submission of a statement of defense and from ordering

the creditors to be summone¢. In particular, the possibil-

ity provided for by Article 320g, paragraph 1, second

sentence, to submit, when the distribution procedure

proper has been started, a statement of defense relating to

the points mentioned therein, does not prevent the judge

from offering the opportunity for defense already in an

earlier stage, i.e., that of dealing with the request as

referred to in Article 320a. If a creditor availed himself

of this opportunity, he did appear in the sense of Article

426, of paragraph 1.

Furthermore, as appears from the decision of the Court

of Appeal on the written appeal lodged by Giants, B.D.

Wubs, Attorney in The Hague, counsel for the State, was

“heard at the session of April 18, 1980.” This means that

the State also did appear in the appeal before the Court of

Appeal in the sense of Article 426, paragraph 1, even

though the State—as Giants argued—did not lodge a

statement of defense in the appeal proceedings.

The State’s grievances as to the nonadmissibility of the

appeal to the Supreme Court must therefore be rejected.

3. Part a. of the grievance refers to the question of

whether the possibility of appeal by the petitioner—the

debtor—is open on a decision on a request as referred to in

Article 320.

Firstly, the question arises if such a decision can be

regarded as “a judgment of the Court” in the sense of

Article 320x, paragraph 2. A combination of arguments

leads to a negative reply.

The latter stipulation speaks of a “judgment,” whereas

in Article 320i the determination mentioned in Article

320c is called a “decision.” Article 320x, paragraph 2,

speaks of the “day of pronouncement”; it is not plausible

A-77

that in the system that was in the mind of the legislator,

there was room for a pronouncement of a decision on a

request as referred to in Article 320a. The short term for

appeal—four weeks—is evidently connected with the leg-

islator’s desire to accelerate the distribution procedure;

same can be started only after the debtor has complied

with the order given him by the Court, as referred to in

Article 320c, paragraph 1. The decision on the request

referred to in Article 320a, however, precedes the distribu-

tion procedure proper, so that the reason to determine a

short term for appeal does not apply here. Finally, the

mandatory notification to the Clerk of the Court, stipu-

lated in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 320x, is evidently

connected with the tasks with which the Clerk of the Court

is charged by various articles—such as Article 320/ and

Article 3201, paragraph 1—within the framework of the

distribution procedure. The decision on a request as

referred to in Article 320a is given, nowever, in an earlier

Stage and one cannot see what sense a notification to the

Clerk of the Court would have at that stage.

All this leads to the conclusion that Article 320x, para-

graph 2, does not refer to a decision on a request as

referred to in Article 320a.

4. Itshould, therefore, now be examined if Article 345

implies that appeal on such a decision is open to the

petitioner.

If the request is rejected, or is granted in such a manner

that the petitioner—i.e., the debtor—is aggrieved by it, he

may appeal against the decision by virtue of Article 345.

Neither the law nor the nature of the decision are opposed

to it. At this stage, the only question that is relevant is

whether, and if so under which conditions, the debtor will

be able to have the distribution procedure started. In

these cases, the debtor has an interest to submit these

questions to the judge in appeal. Article 320g, paragraph

A-78

1, last sentence—which the State invoked in particu-

lar—plays a role only in the next stage, i.c., in that of the

distribution procedure proper. For this reason already,

that article does not stand in the way of allowing the

petitioner the right of appeal with respect to the decision

on a request as referred to in Article 320a.

5, The above implies that the Court of Appeal was

right in admitting Giants’ appeal. Therefore, Part a. of

the grievance must be rejected.

6. The grievance under b. has a twofold bearing. In

the first place, it purports to argue that the Court should

not have abstained from answering the question according

to which criterion the amount of 12,764,810 gold francs,

mentioned in the decision of the Court of Justice, should

be converted into Netherlands currency. Furthermore, it

purports to argue that that criterion should serve the free

market value of the quantity of gold involved, on the day

security is furnished,

The Supreme Court will address itself first to t!.2 ques-

tion of whether the Court of Appeal should have expressed

its opinion on the question of the criterion.

7, The arrangement contained in Articles 320a-320z,

as determined by the Law of June 3, 1965, Official Gazette

No. 239, differs, insofar as is relevant to this case, frown the

earlier arrangement, in the sense that under the present

arrangement the court fixes the amount to which the lia-

bility of the debtor is limited for the moment (Article

320c, first paragraph), whereas, previously, the law (in

the old Article 320a) referred, for the magnitude of the

amount to be paid by the debtor, to the relevant articles of

the Commercial Code. This means that under the old

arrangement, it was initially left to the debtor to deter-

mine that amount——with the understanding that during

the distribution procedure each creditor could contest the

“sufficiency” thereof (old Article 320/)—whereas at pre-

sent, the magnitude of the amount the debtor must pay, or

A-79

for which he must furnish security, is immediately put

under the supervision of the court. The legislator, in so

determining, will have intended that the calculation of the

amount in accordance with the criteria mentioned in Arti-

cle 740d, paragraphs |, 2 and 3 of the Commercial Code

shall be supervised. The question of what, for the conver-

sion referred to in Article 740d, paragraph 4, should be

considered as “the rate of the day” of payment, or of

furnishing security, was not a problem in the opinion of the

legislator; however, in the case before us, it does present a

problem, since, as will be discussed in point 10 hereunder,

at the time the Court of Appeal pronounced its deci-

sion—and also at the time of the decision of the lower

court—the official parity of the guilder expressed in gold

no longer existed. According to the documents of the

case, this problem was the subject of a debate in the first

instance and in the appeal; it was, in fact, the issue of the

dispute. Under these circumstances, the Court of Appeal

should not have abstained from answering this question.

As it is, the intent of the arrangement—that not the

debtor but the judge fixes the amount to which the liability

is limited for the moment—implies that the judge must

express himself in the order to be given by virtue of Article

320c, paragraph |, on the debated point of the criterion for

conversion, to avoid that the debtor himself, when making

payment or furnishing security, initially establishes the

criterion for the conversion, and, therewith, the magnitude

of the relevant amount. In this connection, it must also be

noted that Articles 320d, 320e and 320f, paragraph |

assume that by means of the order given by virtue of

Article 320c, paragraph |, it can be shown that the debtor

complied with that order: ana this also involves that the

order should not leave any uncertainty—in cases such as

the one before us—on the crucially important point of the

criterion for conversion.

A-80

Therefore, Part b., insofar as it submits the grievance

that the Court of Appeal wrongfully abstained from deter-

ining that criterion, is well-founded,

8. Insofar as Part b. purports to argue that the conver-

sion referred to in Article 740d, paragraph 4 of the Com-

mercial Code must be made with due regard to the free

market value of gold, it must be rejected on the grounds

following hereafter.

9. In its judgment of April 14, 1972, Netherlands

Case Law 1972, 269, the Supreme Court gave a decision

on the manner in which that conversion must be made,

which was based, among other things, on considerations

drawn from the wording, the history of the origin and the

intent of the Treaty, concluded in Brussels on October 10,

1957, on the limitation of liability of owners of seagoing

vessels, for the implementation of which Treaty Articles

740a through 740d were incorporated in the aforemen-

tioned Code, That decision held that, as long as there are

international agreements among a large majority of coun-

tries that are a party to said Treaty, on the mutual cur-

rency relations that are based on a common valuation of

gold, the conversion into Netherlands currency of the

franc referred to in said article—hereinafter referred to,

for the sake of shortness, as the franc-—must be made on

the basis of the official, i.e., the legally fixed, parity of the

guilder expressed in gold at the time of said conversion,

and not on the basis of the rate of gold quoted at that

mornent on the free market.

10. Since that time, far-reaching developments have

occurred in the international monetary field, which led to

the Second Amendment to the Articles of the Agreement

of the International Monetary Fund (Journal of Treaties

1977, 40), approved for the Kingdom by the Law of

March 23, 1978, Official Gazette 173, and, in connection

therewith, to the introduction, effective as of August |,

1978, of the Law concerning the rate of exchange of the

A-81

guilder, and the repeal, connected therewith and effective

as of the same date, of the Law on the par value of the

guilder,

These developments indicate, insofar as is relevant here,

and as far as the Netherlands are concerned at least since

the aforementioned date, that gold has lost all monetary

significance. One cannot speak any more, at present, of

an official parity of the guilder expressed in gold. This

means that in the light of the objectives of the Treaty of

1957—-as expressed by the Supreme Court in its afore-

mentioned judgment—the appropriateness of the franc,

expressed in gold, to serve as a generally accepted unit of

account for determining internationally uniform limits of

liability was lost.

11, Consequently, a lacuna occurred in Article 470d

and in the stipulation of the treaty on which it was based.

To fill same, steps were taken meanwhile, both on the

international level and by national legislators, which led to

the adjustment of the Treaty of 1957 to the new monetary

situation by means of a Protocol established in Brussels on

December 21, 1979, amending said treaty, and to similar

adjustments of the national legal arrangements in various

countries by means of legislative measures; in this country,

a draft bill (No. 15.459) for such a law was passed by the

Second Chamber of Parliament on February 17, 1981.

However, as long as the adjustment arrangement as

referred to hereinabove has not yet force of law in the

Netherlands, the judge cannot—also because of the con-

siderations under point 7 hereinabove—abstain from giv-

ing a conversion standard.

12. The point of departure should be the prefer-

ence—underlying the Treaty and, therefore, Article 740d

as well—for a standard which is current in the interna-

tional monetary field for determining the internationally

uniform limits of liability intended by the Treaty.

A-82

To convert the franc in the manner the State pleads in

these proceedings, according to the price of gold on the

free market, would be contrary to this point of departure.

The aforementioned point of departure will rather lead to

joining the choice made by the Member States of the

International Monetary Fund for a unit of account which

is suited to be used as such in international payments,

since gold has ceased to be a monetary standard. The

choice fell on the Special Drawing Right (SDR) of the

aforementioned Fund, the value of this unit being initially

expressed in gold, i.¢., a weight amounting to approxi-

mately 15 times the gold weight of the aforesaid franc.

This ratio, and the circumstance that, when gold as a

value standard of the SDR was replaced by a collection of

national currencies (the so-called standard basket), and

the new criterion was chosen in such a manner that at the

moment of change, the value of the SDR was the same

according to both criteria, make it possible to join this

choice by considering the franc equal to 1/15 SDR for its

conversion into Netherlands currency and to effect the

conversion according to the valuation method applied by

the Fund for its own operations and transactions.

13. To fill the lacuna in this manner is in harmony with

the legal conceptions adopted since, as these find their

expression in the arrangements made recently that aim at

the adjustment of international treaties and national laws

to the changed monetary situation. With respect to vari-

ous treaties in which the franc is used as unit of account,

amending protocols were adopted, such as the one already

mentioned, that prescribe that the franc be con-idered

equal to 1/15 SDR for conversion into national currency;

the same applies with respect to the adjustment legislation

adopted in several countries and, likewise, the aforemen-

tioned draft bill opted for this solution.

14. Objecting to conversion of the franc on the basis of

1/15 SDR, the State submitted that the value of the SDR

A-83

in terms of purchasing power had considerably declined

since the time when this unit was still expressed in the

aforementioned weight of gold; as a consequence thereof,

conversion of the franc on the aforementioned basis leads

to a real reduction, which cannot be neglected, in the

liability limits provided for in the Treaty and in Article

740d. This circumstance cannot, however, become a

decisive factor when the judge makes his choice on how to

fill the lacuna. Even if the aforementioned limits would

require revision in connection with the decline of the

purchasing power of the unit of account to be applied, it is

not the task of the judge to provide for this, but it is up to

the legislative body of the treaty and/or the national legis-

lator to intervene.

It is worth noting, in this connection, that on November

19, 1976, a Treaty was concluded in London—which has

not yet taken effect, however—on the limitation of liabil-

ity for maritime claims (Journal of Treaties 1980, 23).

This Treaty is intended to replace the Treaty of 1957 and

contains considerably higher limits of liability, expressed

in SDRs.

15. The fact that Part b. of the grievance, insofar as it

concerns the complaint described hereinabove at the end

of point 7, is founded, implies that the decision of the

Court of Appeal cannot be upheld, insofar as the Court of

Appeal held that it could abstain from making a decision

on the point in dispute between Giants and the State con-

cerning the conversion criterion to be applied. The

Supreme Court can settle the case itself.

It follows from the above considerations concerning the

conversion criterion, that grievance | of the appeal is

founded, insofar as it argues that the franc is to be consid-

ered equal to 1/15 SDR for the purpose of conversion.

No appeal to the Supreme Court was made against the

decision of the Court of Appeal on grievance 2.

A-84

The above leads to the conclusion that the decision of

the Court of Appeal only need be completed to the extent

that it is necessary to state the criterion—mentioned

b.'ow-—for the conversion of the amount in francs men-

tioned by the Court of Appeal;

Annuls the decision of the Court of Appeal, but only

insofar as the Court of Appeal omitted to state the crite-

rion according to which the relevant amount in francs is to

be converted;

Fixes the amount to which Giants’ liability is limited for

the moment, at the countervalue in Netherlands currency

of 12,764,810 francs fixed at 65.5 milligrams gold of

900/1000 fineness, this franc to be considered equal to

1/15 Special Drawing Right as it is defined by the Inter-

national Monetary Fund, and at the rate of the day on

which security is furnished, to be converted in Nether-

lands currency in accordance with the valuation method

applied by the Fund for its own operations and

transactions;

Rejects the appeal in all other respects.

So done by Deputy Chief Justice Ras and Justices Haardt,

Royer, Martens and de Groot, and so pronounced by the afore-

mentioned Mr. Haardt, Attorney, in public session on the first of

May nineteen hundred and eighty-one, in the presence of the

Attorney-General.

(signatures )

(signature)

(Rubber stamp:

Certified true copy)

The Clerk of the Supreme Court

of the Netherlands

(signature)

A-85§

CERTIFICATION

I, Irwin K. Styles, of ALL-LANGUAGE SERVICES, INC.,

545 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10017, hereby certify

that the foregoing is a true and faithful translation of the original

document.

IRWIN STYLES

State of New York

County of New York sory

*

Sworn to before me this 28th day of July, 1981

BARNEY ROSE,

NOTARY PUBLIC State of New York

No. 41-3343010, Qual. in Queens Co

Cert. Filed in N. Y. County

Commission Expires March 30, 1983

A-86

FOR INFORMATION

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD MEMORANDUM

May 20, 1981

TO: The Board

FROM: Director, Bureau of Compliance and Consum-

er Protection

fe Director, Bureau of International Aviation

Director, Bureau of Domestic Aviation

General Counsel

SUBJECT: Warsaw Convention Liability Limits

For more than a year now, various components of the Board's

staff have been considering the question of how the liability limi-

tations contained in the Warsaw Convention should be converted

to dollars. The question is a troublesome one, and the memo-

randa exchanged among the staff have not reached the same

conclusions of this issue. There is considerable interest in the

final resolution of this matter among parties outside the Board,

including some involved in litigation where the amount of poten-

tial liability is a significant issue.

The Board has never taken a position as to which liability

limitation level is correct, and the Bureau of Compliance and

Consumer Protection recommends that the Board decline to take

any position which would affect the determination of liability

limits until the matter has been further refined at the staff level.

Any policy recommendation that would come from the staff

should be communicated to the Departments of Transportation

and State as well in the hope of reaching interagency agreement.

1 This Bureau wrote the first memorandum in March, 1980. BIA

and BDA wrote reply memos in April, 1980.

A-87

This memorandum contains BCCP’s reappraisal of the problem

and is intended to initiate a fresh start in addressing the question

at the Board.

I. Background

The Warsaw Convention was signed at Warsaw, Poland, on

October 12, 1929, and ratified by the United States Senate on

July 31, 1934.°° Among its most compelling purposes were the

protection of the fledgling aviation industry from potentially ruin-

ous damage judgments and the assurance of some reliable and

consistent basis for recovery for injury or damage to persons or

property.’ Thus the Convention (a) enunciated carriers’ liability

for personal injuries (Article 17), damage or loss of baggage and

other property (Article 18), and damage due to delay (Article

19) subject to affirmative defenses which could be proved by a

carrier, i.e., the carrier's freedom from fault (Article 20) or the

injured person’s contributory fault (Article 21); (b) provided a

limitation on the extent of liability (Article 22); and (c) nullified

any provision tending to relieve a carrier of any such liability or to

fix a lower limit (Article 23). In addition, the Convention

required carriers to provide notice to the passengers in the form of

a ticket or baggage check with respect to, inter alia, the limita-

tions on liability, and barred defenses permitted by the Conven-

tion, including the limitation of liability, if carriers accept

passengers or baggage without delivering the required ticket or

baggage check (Articles 3 and 4).

The Board has implemented Articles 3 and 4 by specifying the

notice carriers must provide concerning the liability limits. 14

C.F.R. Sections 221.175 and 221.176. Carriers also include the

liability limits in tariffs filed with the Board, as required by

la. 49 Stat. 3000.

2. Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw

Convention, 80 Harv.L.Rev. 497, 498-500 (1967). See also Horner &

Legrez, Minutes, Second International Conference on Private Aeronau-

tical Law, Warsaw 1929 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1975), pp. 38, 40-41.

A-88

Section 403 (a) of the Act and Part 221.3 of the Board's Regula-

tions. The Board has also been an active participant in Congres-

sional hearings concerning possible amendments to the

Convention.

In March, 1980, our former Policy Development Division sent

the Board a memo suggesting that carriers are violating the War-

saw Convention by asserting liability limits much lower than

those actually permitted by the Convention. These limitations

are expressed in terms of gold and have always been converted to

dollars by use of the official rate of gold. Since there no longer is

an “official” price for gold in the U.S., the memorandum sug-

gested that the market value of gold has to be used in converting

the liability limits to dollars,

BIA and BDA have written memos responding to this sugges-

tion. Each response posed two major objections, /.e., (1) that the

recommendation is inconsistent with the intention of the Warsaw

signatories and (2) that it is inconsistent with IMF amendments

establishing “Special Drawing Rights” tied to a basket of 16

currencies, rather than gold, as the basic unit of account for

converting currencies. The Board has not taken any action on

the recommendation.

Il. Discussion

In 1929, when the Warsaw Convention was adopted, currencies

were either expressed in gold or easily convertible to gold using an

official rate. From 1933 to 1974, gold ownership in the United

States was legal only for a small class of uses, such as jewelry-

making and dentistry. The price of gold in these transactions

was dictated by the government's official price, since it was the

government's policy to buy and sell gold at that rate. A private

buyer would thus not pay more than the official rate because he

could buy it from the government at that price and, conversely, a

private seller would not accept less than the official rate because

he could sell it to the government for that amount.

The drafters of the Warsaw Convention thus foresaw no ambi-

guity in their use of gold as the unit of account because at the time

A-89

governments had an official rate of gold which was easily discerni-

ble and virtually identical to the market rate of gold, to the extent

that a market rate existed at all. Seeing no ambiguity, they never

addressed the question of whether the official or market rate

should be used in converting the limits to national currencies. To

determine how the limits should be converted now that there is no

official rate, one must attempt to determine what is most consis-

tent with the purpose of the limitation on liability.

The primary purpose of the liability limits in the Warsaw Con-

vention is the protection of carriers from unforeseeable and

unlimited liability. At the time of the Convention, it was feared

that carriers would refuse to carry passengers and/or cargo unless

they could measure the scope of risk they were assuming. The

limits were thus intended to provide a measure of predictability

for carriers so that they could operate free from the fear of

unlimited liability,

The use of gold as the unit of account was intended “to avoid, as

far us the limits are concerned, the effects of devaluations which

would result from having the limits expressed in any local cur-

rency.”’ The use of gold was thus seen as providing more stabil-

ity than any national currency could, further promoting the

predictability the limits were intended to provide. This was

because national currencies were subject to devaluation by their

country, whereas the value of gold was not subject to change as

the result of a single country’s unilateral action,

There can be no doubt that use of tne official rate of gold

produces results more consistent with these purposes than use of

3. H. Drion, Limitations of Liabilities in International Air Law

1954. p, 183, Other writers agree but add that the use of gold was also

intended to assure that damages awarded by different countries would

have a uniform value and to provide stability in terms of the purchasing

power represented by the limits. Bristow, “Gold Franc - Replacement

of Unit of Account,” LMCLQ 31 (1978); Asser, “Golden Limitations

of Liability in International Transport Conventions and the Currency

Crisis,” 5. J. Maritime L. and Com. 645 (1973-74); Norway, “Conver-

sion from Poincare oy to National arenas LG seg td to ioe —s

meeting of ICAO's | Committee, and

Drawing Right in lis ility Conventions: an Acceptable Sclopoa?™

DLMCLQ | 9, 171 (1979).

A-90

the market rate. The official rate of gold, at least in the United

States, fluctuated only rarely. Even in countries whose curren-

cies were devalued more frequently, the official rate would pro-

vide greater predictability and stability than the market rate.

This is especially true now, since speculation has led to wildly

fluctuating market prices of gold.

Use of an official rate is supported by the approach adopted in

more recent Conventions, when the ambiguity of expressing lim-

its in terms of gold was more apparent. Both the Convention

Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution, signed in Brussels in 1969,

and the Convention Relating to the Limitation of the Liability of

the Owners of Inland Navigation Vessels, signed in Geneva in

1973, expressly provided for the use of the official value of gold in

setting liability limits.‘ Conversion by the official rate is further

bolstered by the fact that a majority of courts have used it in

converting Warsaw's limits after the official and market rates

began to diverge.’ ICAO also passed a resolution in 1974 oppos-

ing the use of the market price of gold in converting Warsaw's

limits, which provides a strong indication of how other participat-

ing countries feel.‘

Since it appears that stable limits were of paramount impor-

tance to the drafters of the Convention, basing them on the mar-

ket value of gold would be inconsistent with the Convention.

Since there is no longer an official rate of gold in the United

States, however, it is not entirely clear how the limits should be

converted.

In 1975, the Warsaw signatories attempted to deal with the

changes in the role of gold in international monetary transactions.

Their answer, embodied in the Montreal Protocol, was the substi-

tution of Special Drawing Rights (SDR's) for gold as the basis |

for conversion. The SDR is a creation of the International Mon-

etary Fund (IMF), the agency which establishes the basic

4. The Lega! Committee of ICAO, Resolution Concerning the Con-

version of Poincre Francs to National Currencies in the Warsaw and

Rome Conventions, 1974.

5. Tobolewski, “The Special Drawing Right in Liability Conven-

tions: An Acceptable Solution?” 2 LMeLO 169, 171 (1979),

6. See footnote 4.

A-91

ground rules for currency transactions between member coun-

tries. Use of SDR's by the Montreal signatories was presumably

intended to eliminate the confusion over how the Warsaw limits

should be converted from gold to national currencies. With no

official rate of gold and a fluctuating market rate which would

produce results at odds with the Convention's purposes, the Mon-

treal signatories chose to abandon gold in favor of SDR’s because

SDR’s provided the stability and ease of conversion which had

attracted the Warsaw signatories to choose gold as the unit of

account.

The United States supported the SDR approach at Montreal

and signed the Montreal Protocol. If the Senate had ratified the

Protocol, the SDR approach would be law and there would be no

problem in determinirz Warsaw's limits. The Senate has not

ratifies the Pr . however, although it was submitted for

alilie in January, 1977. Its failure to either ratify or reject

the Protocol makes détermination of the proper conversion rate

diff} car § explained above, use of the market rate of

old produces results inconsistent with the Convention's pur-

poses, (2) there is no current official rate of gold and (3) the

United States is obligated by international law to refrain from

acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Montreal

Protocol.”

To fulfill its obligation to observe, to the extent possible, the

requirements of both the Warsaw Convention and Montreal Pro-

tocol, the Board has for the past five years been engaging in a

legal fiction, Unable to use the SDR approach because Montreal

has not been ratified and constrained from using the market price

of gold hecause doing so would defeat the object and purpose of

both Montreal and Warsaw, the Board has continued to convert

7, Fitzgerald, “The Four Montreal! Protocols to Amend the Warsaw

Convention Regime Governing Internation Carriage by Air,” 42 J.Air

L. & Comm. 273, 325, 329-30 (1976).

8. Article 18, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, requires a

country to refrain from acts which would defeat the purpose and object

ofa a oe aol it makes ore = intention not tae become sect

party. is obligation applies even when the treaty was si su

to ratification and has not yet been ratified.

A-92

Warsaw's limits based on the official rate of gold immediately

preceding the elimination of a!] ties between gold and the dollar.’

This approach produces the greatest degree of stability possible

since the dollar limits will remain constant unless and until the

United States reestablishes ties between gold and the dollar,

We believe that the Board's current course of action is superior

to any of the alternatives currently available. Use of the last

official rate of gold, however, may at times prevent passengers

from recovering the full extent of damages caused by

carriers.’’ Carriers may no longer need the protection of these

low limits, given the maturation of the aviation industry since

1929,

Because of the confusion inherent in converting Warsaw's lim-

its when there is no official rate of gold and the equitable consider-

ations raised by the low limits currently in force, we believe the

Board should develop a coherent policy resolution of the ques-

tions, and then meet with the Departments of Transportation and

State to review this problem. These agencies will be solely

responsible for enforcing Warsaw in the future and have partici-

pated actively in formulating U.S. policy in this area in the past.

Pending resolution of this issue by the three agencies we believe

the Board should take no action which would disturb the conver-

sion formula now contained in sections 221.175 and 221.176 of

the regulations.

JOHN GOLDEN

John Golden

Prepared by;

STEVEN ROTHENBERG

Ext. 3-5943

9. Thus, the notice of Warsaw's limits required by Parts 221.175

and 221.176 of the Board's Regulations is based on conversion at this

rate.

10. The limits are $9.07 per pound for checked luggage, $400 for

carry-on bags and approximately $10,000 per passenger. $10,000

or} is superseded, however, by a $75,000 limit adopied by carriers in

A-93

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN N, ROMANS

ROBERT S. LIPTON

101 Park Avenue

New York, New York 10178

‘212) 696-6000

Counsel for Petitioner,

Trans World Airlines, Inc.

CURTIS, MALLET-PREVOST,

CoL_t & MOSLE

Scott J. MCKAY WOLAS

MiIcHAEL L. M,. QUINTTUS

Of Counsel

January 15, 1983

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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