Appendix — Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.
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IN THE JAN 15 1963
Supreme Court of the United PratEs-
OCTOBER TERM, 1982 .
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
Petitioner,
V.
FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN
MINT LIMITED, AND MCGREGOR, SWIRE
AIR SERVICES LIMITED,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
APPENDIX
JOHN N. ROMANS
ROBERT S. LIPTON
101 Park Avenue
New Yo: k, New York 10178
(212) 696-6000
Counsel for Petitioner,
Trans World Airlines, Inc.
CurTIS, MALLET-PREVOsr,
Coit & MOSLE
Scott J. McKay WOLAS
MICHAEL L. M. QuINTTUS
Of Counsel
January i5, 1983
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Opir .on and Judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the SO IIE. casicsaesensntiesajenintcooliien
Order of the United States Court of —_ for the
Second Circuit staying the issuance of its mandate
subject to the filing of a Petition for Certiorari ......
Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit denying rehearing ........cccseeeeeeeees
Memorandum and Order of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York,
i rn ene cuessnsuneibainnsibans
Order and Judgment of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York .........
Order of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York Denying Motion for
ESSERE LIISA DRIES Ca ERE AN
United States Constitution, Article I], Section 2 ....
Article 22 of the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Transporta-
tion by Air, opened for signature October 12, 1929,
49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.TS. 11,
reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 1502 note (1970) .............
Civil Aeronautics Board Order 74-1-16 ........c:ccccc000
Electronic Memories & Magnetics Corp. v. The Fly-
ing Tiger Line, Inc., Index No. 784512 (Cal. te
Ct., San Francisco Aug. 25, 1982) o..cccccccccccsecseeeeeeee
Deere & Co. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, \ndex No. 81
C 4726 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 1982) oo. cccccceccseeeeeeees
The Netherlands v. Giants Shi .. Recht-
ae . 1981) (Sup. Ct. of
May |, 1981) (a certified transla-
pea TES
Golden, Warsaw Convention Liability Limits
(May 20,198 (inpublshed memorandum bythe
and Consumer
Talon, Bik teeesoin )
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
oe
No. 999—August Term, 1981
(Argued April 22, 1982 Decided September 28, 1982)
Docket No. 82-7012
+
FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN MINT LIMITED,
and MCGREGOR, SWIRE AIR SERVICES LIMITED,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
—_—Ve—
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before:
OAKES, CARDAMONE, and WINTER,
Circuit Judges.
+
Appeal from a final judgment of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York,
Whitman Knapp, Judge, utilizing the last official price of
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gold to calculate the limit on defendant’s liability under
the Warsaw Convention.
The Court holds the limitation provision of the Con-
vention prospectively unenforceable and affirms.
7
JOHN R. Foster, New York, New York
(Donald M. Waesche, Waesche, Schein-
baum & O’Regan, P.C., New York, New
York, of counsel), for Plaintiffs-Appel-
lants Franklin Mint Corporation,
Fra: Vint Limited, and McGregor,
Sy ir Services, Limited.
JOHN N. ROMANS, New York, New York
(Robert S. Lipton, Scott J. McKay Wo-
las, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mos-
ley, New York, New York, of counsel) for
Defendant-Appellee Trans World Air-
lines, Inc.
(Robert B. Hemley, Norman Williams,
Gravel, Shea & Wright, Burlington, Ver-
mont, of counsel) for Amici-Curiae
Jacques Roulin and Hugh Harley.
+
WINTER, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, Whitman Knapp, Judge, limiting the defendant’s
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liability under the Warsaw Convention (“Convention”)'
for loss of cargo. In determining the limit in United States
dollars, Judge Knapp utilized the last official price of
gold as a unit of conversion and awarded plaintiffs
$6,475.98. 525 F.Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Plaintiffs
appeal, claiming the limit should have been calculated by
other methods. While we agree with the result reached in
this case and thus affirm, we hold the Convention’s limit
on liability prospectively unenforceable in United States
Courts.
SUMMARY OF THE ISSUES AND DECISION
rhe facts in this case, if nothing else, are clear cut. In
March, 1979, plaintiffs Franklin Mint Corporation,
Franklin Mint Limited, and McGregor, Swire Air Services
Limited (collectively, “Franklin Mint”) contracted with
defendant Trans Worid Airlines, Inc. (“TWA”) for the
carriage by air from the United States to England of 714
pounds of numismatic materials Though the articles were
worth more than $6,500, Frankiin Mint made no special
declaration of value. The articles were either lost or
destroyed, thus rendering TWA liable under Article 18 of
the Convention.’ Because of the absence of a special
! The Warsaw Convention is formally known as the “Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Tra.:sporta-
tion by Air,” opened for signature October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S.
No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (adherence of the United States proclaimed
October 29, 1934).
2 Article 18 of the Convention reads:
(1) The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
the destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any checked baggage or
any goods, if the occurrence which caused the damage so sustained
took place during the transportation by air.
(2) The transportation by air within the meaning of the preceding
paragraph shall comprise the period during which the baggage or
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declaration, TWA sought to limit its liability under Article
22 of the Convention.
Article 22 limits the carrier’s liability for injuries to
both “checked baggage and. . . goods” and “objects of
which the passenger takes charge himself.”’ The various
limits are stated in terms of a specified number of French
gold or “Poincare” francs, a unit of account consisting of
“65'4 milligrams of gold at a standard fineness of nine
goods are in charge of the carrier, whether in an airport or on board
an aircraft, or, in the case of a landing outside an airport, in any
place whatsoever.
(3) The period of the transportation by air shall not extend to any
transportation by land, by sea, or by river performed outside an
airport. If, however, such transportation takes place in the perfor-
mance of a contract for transportation by air, for the purpose of
loading, delivery or transshipment, any damage is presumed, sub-
ject to proof to the contrary, to have been the result of an event
which took place during the *ransportation by air.
3 Article 22 of the Convention reads:
(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for
each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs.
Where, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is
submitted, damages may be awarded in the form of periodical
payments, the equivalent capita: value of the said payments shall
not exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the
carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability.
(2) In the transportation of checked baggage and of goods, the
liability of the carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250 francs per
kilogram, unless the consignor has made, at the time when the
package was handed over to the carrier, a special declaration of the
value at delivery and has paid a supplementary sum if the case so
requires. In that case the carrie: will be liable to pay a sum not
exceeding the declared sum, unless he proves that that sum is
greater than the actual value to the consignor at delivery.
(3) As regards objects of which the passenger takes charge himself
the liability of the carrier shall be limited to 5,000 francs per
passenger.
(4) The sums mentioned above shall be deemed to refer to the
French franc consisting of 65'2 milligrams of gold at the standard
of fineness of nine hundred thousandths. These sums may be
converted into any national currency in round figures.
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hundred thousandths.” The limit on baggage or other
goods is 250 Poincare francs per kilogram. The dollar
value of that limit is calculated simply by converting the
gold value of the specified unit into United States dollars,
e.g., the limit per kilogram is 250 multiplied by the dollar
value of 65 milligrams of gold.
The difficulty arises from the fact that when Article 22
was drafted, gold served official monetary functions and
its price was set bs law. The Convention thus sclected it
as the unit of conversion in order to ensure judgments of
uniform value as well as a stable and easily calculable
limitation on liability. The plain but highly troublesome
fact is that by international agreement and United States
domestic legislation gold has now lost its monetary func-
tions and no longer has an official price. Unfortunately
for parties to international airline transactions as well as
for us, the terms of Article 22 continue to utilize gold as
the unit of conversion. Thus, the perties raise the issue of
what unit of account is now to be used to convert
judgments under the Convention into United States dol-
lars.
In arguing the issue, the parties offer four alternatives:
(i) the last official price of gold in the United States; (ii)
the free market price of gold; (iii) the Special Drawing
Right (“SDR”), a unit of account established by the
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and recently pro-
posed as a substitute for gold in the as yet unratified
Montreal Protocols to the Convention; and (iv) the ex-
change value of the current French franc. While acknowl-
edging that “the arguments in favor of. . . the SDR
[were] most persuasive,” Judge Knapp nevertheless held
that the last official price of gold was the appropriate
standard. This choice was predicated on the view that this
standard “has been. . . espoused by the Civil Aero-
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nautics Board (“CAB”), the government agency most
intimately concerned with the transaction at hand,” and
has been “used by all domestic carriers—including
TWA—in calculating the dollar value of the Article 22
limitation printed on their tariffs.” 525 F.Supp at 1289.
We share Judge Knapp’s doubt about the result. In-
deed, there are powerful arguments against each of the
proffered solutions. The last official price of gold is a
price which has been explicitly repealed by the Congress.
See note 11, infra, and accompanying text. It thus lacks
any status in law or relationship to contemporary cur-
rency values. The free market price of gold is the highly
volatile price of a commodity determined in part by
forces of supply and demand unrelated to currency
values. SDR’s are a creature of the IMF, modified at will
by that body and having no basis in the Convention. The
French franc is simply one domestic currency, subject to
change by the unilateral act of a single government.
Every proffered solution thus appears to have a devas-
tating argument against it. While the Convention has not
been formally abrogated, enforcement by national judi-
cial tribunals is impossible without their picking and
choosing among alternative units of conversion according
to their view of which is best as an initial policy matter.
We have no power to select a new unit of account. We
thus hold the Convention’s limitation of liability unen-
forceable by United States Courts.
BACKGROUND
Drafted in the late 1920’s, the Convention was designed
both to protect the fledgling aviation industry from the
alternatives of ruinous damage suits or exorbitant insur-
ance premiums and to insure a certain degree of uniform-
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ity of legal obligation given the expected international
character of the industry. See A. Lowenfeld and A.
Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Conven-
tion, 80 Harvard L. Rev. 497, 499-501 (1967) (hereafter
“Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn”); see also Reed v. Wiser,
5_5 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922
(1977) and CAB Staff Memorandum, Warsaw Conven-
tion Liability Limits, March 18, 1980, at 5-6. (App. at
43-44). A series of rules governing liability, affirmative
defenses and limitations accomplished the former goal,
while the Convention’s international scope oe ¢
=
the latter. Articles 17, 18 and 19 enunciate the carri
liability for personal injuries, for damage or loss of
baggage, and for damage due to delay. Articles 20 and 21
establish as affirmative defenses lack of fault and contrib-
utory negligence. Finally, Article 22 provides a limitation
on the extent of liability for both personal injury and loss
of luggage or other goods.
The personal injury limitations amounts have been
subject to upward revision from time to time through
protocols to the original agreement. These revisions have
come in the wake of a continuing debate, with the
developed countries, notably the United States, Great
Britain and France, arguing for higher limits, and the less
developed nations seeking reduction of the existing limit.‘
4 In 1955, at The Hague, the conferees would agree only to a doubling
of the limit to 250,000 Poincare francs or $16,600. Lowenfeld and
Mendeisohn at 504-09. The United States unenthusiastically signed the
Hague Protocol a year later, but did not present the treaty to the
Senate until July 1959. Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn at 515. The Senate
never ratified the Protocol because of its low limit, however, and
ulumately the Kennedy/Johnson Administrations actually threatened
United States denunciation of the Convention. This threat came in the
wake of Congress’ failure to enact a legislative package ratifying the
.Hague Protocol while compelling the purchase by all American air
carriers of $50,000 in insurance for each passenger. To avoid
States denunciation, a conference met in Montreal in the spring of
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Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn at 504. Throughout this pe-
riod, the level of the limitations on liability for loss or
destruction of checked baggage and other goods has
remained the same.
Defining recoveries in terms of a specified amount of
gold was intended to produce stability and uniformity.
Such a common standard allowed the conversion of
liability limits into national currencies and insulated re-
coveries from the vicissitudes of currency fluctuation and
devaluation. In drafting the Convention, a proposal to fix
recoveries purely in terms of the French franc was re-
jected by Switzerland on the ground that use of a single
national currency rendered the liability limit subject to
change by the act of one government. See Second !nterna-
tional Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, Minutes,
October 4-12, 1929, Warsaw, at 88-89 (Horner and Legrez
trans. 1975), (App. at 247-248). As the Swiss delegate put
it, “Naturally one can say ‘French franc’ but. . . its
{France’s] national law which determines it, and one need
have only a modification of the national law to overturn
the essence of this provision.” /d. at 89-90, (App. at
248-249). Accordingly, the Swiss pressed for a standard
which tied the limitation to a gold value regardless of the
national currency actually named in the article. /d. at 90,
(App. at 249). The conferees accepted the Swiss position
and stated the limitation in terms of the Poincare franc
1966. The result of this meeting was the so-called Montreal Agreement
“which provided for absolute carrier liability up to $75,000 on all
flights into or out of the United States.” Reed v. Wiser, $55 F.2d at
1087. Appeased, the United States withdrew its denunciation. How-
ever, it continued to press for an amendment to the Convention raising
personal injury liability limits. In 1971, the parties promulgated the
Guatemala City Protocol under which personal injury limits were to be
raised to $100,000 at the then current exchange rate of $35 per ounce
of gold.” /d. at 1089 n.12. However, the United States has not ratified -
that protocol.
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defined as “65'% milligrams of gold at a standard fineness
of nine hundred thousandths.” Convention, art. 22 § (4).°
From October, 1934, when the United States first
adhered to the Convention, until 1978, use of gold as unit
of account posed no problem for United States Courts or
the judicial tribunals of other signatory nations. In 1934,
the value of gold was set at $35 per troy ounce pursuant
to statute, United States Gold Reserve Act of 1934, Pub.
L. No. 73-87, 48 Stat. 337 (1934). When the United States
became a party to the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) in 1945, see Bretton Woods Agreements Act, ch.
339, § 2, Pub. L. No. 79-171, 59 Stat. 512 (1945) (codi-
fied at 22 U.S.C. § 286 (1976)), it promised to maintain
(and, if necessary, redeem) the value of United States
dollars in terms of gold. For purposes of the Conven-
tion’s limits on liability, therefore, the relationship of
gold and the dollar allowed judicial tribunals to award
judgments on a stable, uniform basis.
At the time of Bretton Woods, the United States dollar
was grossly undervalued and was actually an asset more
valuable than gold. The promise to redeem all dollars in
gold could thus be made without having to be fulfilled.*
From 1955, however, the United States faced a persistent
$ There was only one change made in this standard at the Hague in
1955. To avoid any confusion, the conferees deleted reference to the
Poincare franc and defined the specified sums as referring “to a
currency unit consisting of sixty-five and a half milligrams of gold of
millesimal fineness nine hundred.” Asser, Golden Limitations of
Liability in International Transport Conventions and the Currency
Crisis, 5 J. Mar. L. & Com. 645, 647-48 n.7 (1974). Since the United
States never ratified the Hague Protocol, the old language still governs
American courts. That change, however, is entirely formal, since the
elimination of any reference to the French franc merely clarified the
Convention's desire to use gold, a point never doubted in the United
States.
6 See P. Samuelson, Economics, 686-88 (8th ed. 1970).
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balance of payments deficit. Where once there existed a
dollar shortage, there now developed a dollar glut.” To
compensate, central banks abroad began trading their
dollars for gold, and hoarders and speculators began
accumulating the metal in increasing amounts. From 1955
to 1968, United States gold reserves plummeted from
approximately $24 billion to around $10 billion.’
These events led ultimately to the demise of the gold
standard. In early 1968, depletion of the United States
gold reserve led the central banks of Belgium, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom and the United States to agree to
discontinue supplying gold to private markets. A so-
called “two-tier” system of gold pricing—a market price
set accordingly and the official price set under Bretton
Woods’—was thus created. This eased the pressure but
could not remedy the essential flaw. In addition to per-
sistent United States balance of payment deficits, interna-
tional gold reserves grew more slowly than the volume of
world economic activity. As a consequence, banks faced
pressures to liquidate official holdings in light of readily
available market profits. The stage was thus set for
abandonment of the Bretton Woods arrangements.
In August, 1971, the United States suspended its com-
mitment to convert dollars for gold." In May, 1972, it
devalued the dollar by raising the official price of gold to
$38 per ounce. See Par Value Modification Act, Pub. L.
7 Id. at 690-91.
8 Id. at 691, Figure 36-1.
9 See Asset, supra note 6, at 650; Gold, /niernational Monetary Law:
Change, Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 1S J. int'l L. & Econ. 323,
340-41; Samuelson, supra note 7, at 698-99.
10 Id. at 641; Asser, supra note 6, at 651.
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No. 92-268, § 2, 86 Stat. 116 (1972) (formerly codified at
31 U.S.C. § 449 (1972)). In October, 1973, yet another
devaluation raised the price to $42.22 per ounce. See Par
Value Modification Act, amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-
110, § 1, 87 Stat. 352 (1973) (formerly codified at 31
U.S.C. § 449 (1976)).
The dollar’s troubles led the IMF to put forth a plan to
abolish the official price of gold, to delete references to
gold in its articles, and to substitute SDR’s as the Fund’s
reserve asset and unit of account. The plan was proposed
in the 1976 Jamaica Accords, was passed by the Fund’s
members and became effective April 1, 1978. In the
interim, the United States passed implementing legislation
including a repeal of the Par Value Modification Act of
1973 and the abolition of the official price of gold.''
Along with the Jamaica Accords, the measure also be-
came effective on April 1, 1978.
This radical change in the international monetary sys-
tem created an obvious problem under the Warsaw Con-
vention. With gold abandoned as a currency base and the
official price repealed, gold became a commodity with a
daily fluctuating free mark.t price. That the difficulty in
continuing to use gold as a monetary base undermined the
Convention's unit of conversion was immediately recog-
nized. Thus, the Warsaw conferees met in Montreal in
1975, even before the Jamaica Accords, and drafted and
signed a Protocol substituting SDR’s as the Convention’s
unit of conversion. At the time of the proposal, the SDR
" In repealing the official price generally, Congress retained its use for
the limited purpose of determining the value of gold held in the form
of gold certificates. See 31 U.S.C. § 4056. The Senate noted that this
was the “only domestic purpose for which it is necessary to define a
fixed relationship between the dollar and gold. . . .” S. Rep. No.
94-1295, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 5935, 5966-67.
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was calculated in terms of gold.’ With the Jamaica
Accords, the referent was changed to a basket of 16
national currencies, and in January, 1981, the basket was
reduced to five currencies.'’ The Montreal Protocol was
presented to the United States Senate in January, 1977 but
has not been ratified.
Meanwhile, parties to the Convention have utilized a
variety of units of conversion. The record shows Sweden
and Britain have adopted SDR’s for purposes of War-
saw."* Both a Netherlands court and the Civil Court of
Rome reached the same result.'’ Two French courts have
recently decided that the Warsaw unit is to be converted
simply into the current French franc.’* The United States
District Court in the Southern District of Texas recently
opted for the free market price of gold,” the standard
12 Gold, supra note 10, at 345.
3 Ward, The SDR in Transport Liability Conventions: Some Clarifica-
tions, 13 J. Mar. L. & Com. |. 3 (1981).
i4 See Sweden's Carriage by Air Act (1957), amendment to Chapter 9,
§ 22, effective Apri! 27, 1978, (translated and reprinted in App. at
57-61); see also the British Carriage by Air (Sterling Equivalents) Order
of 1980, Statutory Instrument 1980 No. 281, effective March 21, 1980,
(reprinted in App. at 62-63).
1s State of the Netherlands v. Giant Shipping Corp., Rechtspraak van
de Week, 30, May, 1981, 321 (Supreme Court of the Netherlands, May
1, 1981) (translated and reprinted in App. at 64-93); Limee Aerea
Italiane v. Ricciole (Rome Civil Court Judgment 609/1979, Nov. 14,
1978), (translated and reprinted in App. at 95-108).
16 See Chamie v. Egyptiar (Cours d’appel Paris, Jan. 31, 1980) (trans-
lated and reprinted in App. at 171-91); Pakistan Int’! Airlines v.
Compagnie Air Inter. S.A., (Cours d’appel Aix-en-Provence Oct. 31,
1981) (translated and reprinted in App. at 156-70).
7 Boehringer Mannheim Diagnotecs, Inc. {/k/a Hycel, Inc. v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., $31 F.Supp. 344 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
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utilized by an Indian court,’* and a Greek court." Finally,
the last official price of gold, chosen by the District Court
in this case, was relied upon by Judge Sifton in Jn re Air
Crash Disaster at Warsaw Poland on March 14, 1980, 535
F.Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) and is still utilized by the
CAB pursuant to a 1974 order.
DISCUSSION
The controlling facts in this case are: (i) enforcement of
the Convention’s limitation on liability requires a unit of
conversion to translate judgments into domestic currency;
(ii) there is no longer an internationally agreed upon unit
of conversion; and (iii) there is no United States legisla-
tion specifying a unit to be used by United States Courts.
The need for a unit of conversion is self-evident.
Without it, a rational limit on liability cannot exist, much
less one which produccs judgments of equal value in
different currencies.
The lack of an internationally agreed upon unit is also
obvious. The very convening of the Montreal meeting in
1975 was a recognition by the Warsaw parties that the
Convention’s unit had been eliminated by events. In plain
fact, different countries now apply different units. Al-
though the alternatives argued before us yield limitations
on TWA’s liability in this case ranging from less than
$6,500 to over $400,000, each has been adopted as the
proper unit of account by at least one party, or domestic
18 Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Sanghi, Regular Appeal No. 54 of 1977
(Civil Station, Bangalore, India, August 11, 1978) (reprinted in App.
at 265-71.)
19 Zakoapolos v. Olympic Airways Corp., No. 286 of 1974 Ct. of
App.; 3d Dep’t., Athens, Greece (February 15, 1974) (translated and
reprinted in App. at 251-54.)
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tribunal of a party, to the Convention. This disarray
merely confirms the obvious fact that the Jamaica Ac-
cords destroyed the international arrangements which had
led to adoption of gold as a unit of conversion.
International disarray is also reflected in the lack of
legislation in the United States implementing the Conven-
tion by establishing a unit of conversion. While the “last”
official price of gold is offered as a possible unit, “last” is
really a euphemism for “no longer” or “repealed.” The
repeal of the Par Value Modification Act in 1978 was in
every sense a legislative declaration that the price of
$42.22 per troy ounce was no longer recognized by the
United States.” We fail to see the logic in adopting as a
legal standard a specified value for guid which has been
specifically rejected by the United States Congress. Con-
gress’ action, moreover, as well as that taken by the other
parties to the Jamaica Accords, is highly relevant to the
Convention. The repeal of the Par Value Modification
Act was based on a domestic and international conclusion
that the official »rice of gold was wholly out of touch
with economic and monetary reality. Since use of a fixed
amount of gold as the Convention’s unit was specifically
designed to establish a limitation level at a certain value,
this repeal must be taken as a statement that the official
price no longer reflects that specified value. The case for
continuing to use the now repealed price of gold thus
finds no support in law or logic.
The CAB order on which Judge Knapp relied was
expressly premised on the existence of an official price
under the Par Value Modification Act of 1973. The more
recent internal CAB memorandum supporting continua-
~ The sole remaining use of the last official price is in determining the
value of gold held in the form of gold certificates. See note 12, supra.
That is not relevant to the issues here.
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tion of that order is based ultimately on a policy deter-
mination that the last official price is the best available
standard.’ The inconsistency of the CAB position, how-
ever, is starkly evident. It rejects SDR’s because the
Senate has not ratified the Montreal Protocol, while
adopting the last official price of gold which has been
explicitly rejected by the Congress. The sole criterion
supporting the CAB’s position appears to be the law of
inertia.
The other alternatives have an equally infirm base.
Neither the free market price of gold nor the current
French franc was ever agreed to by the treaty’s framers,
both are gross departures from its purposes, and, as to
the latter, there is ample evidence that it was specifically
rejected. The framers clearly contemplated use of the
governmentally fixed price of gold in adopting it as a unit
of account in the hope of providing stability. The free
market price of gold, however, is simply the daily fluc-
tuating price of a commodity, affected by conditions
relating to supply and nonmonetary uses affecting de-
mand. The current French franc is similarly flawed. To
enforce it would amou ¢ to a deliberate departure from
the expressed wishes of the framers to avoid the use of a
single national currency subject to unilateral action.
TWA argues that we should adopt the International
Monetary Fund’s SDR as the unit of conversion. It is true
that the SDR was “created by the IMF in 1969 to replace
gold and foreign exchange as an international reserve
21 CAB Internal Memorandum, Warsaw Convention Liability Limits,
May 20, 1981 (App. at 32-38).
22. Appellant's reliance on dicta in our decision Reed v. Wiser, $55 F.2d
at 1089 n.12, is misplaced. The Reed footnote implied a free market
standard under the Guatemala City Protocol which the U.S. has not
ratified.
5029
A-16
asset.”*’ “[MJember central banks may exchange SDR’s
for other convertible currencies and, therefore, SDR
balances are actually lines of credit against which reserves
may be borrowed for use in central bank operations.”™
As noted above, methods of calculating SDR’s have been
changed from time to time. They are presently calculated
with reference to a so-called basket of five currencies—
the U.S. dollar, the Deutsche mark, the French franc, the
Japanese yen, and the pound sterling. The amount of
each currency in one SDR is a function of the percentage
weights which are assigned to each currency in the basket.
The collar value of one SDR is then determined by
adding the “dollar values of each currency component
based on daily market exchange ra‘es.””
Though the value of any one currency in terms of
SDR’s fluctuates from day to day, SDR fluctuations are
generally less extreme than fluctuations in the free market
price of gold. The relative stability of the SDR has thus
led the Warsow signatories to propose its substitution as
the Convention’s unit of account. The proposal was
formally drafted in 1975 as part of the Montreal Proto-
cols to the Convention and has been presented to the
signatory states for ratification. Though the substitution
was supported by the l'nited States, there has been
opposition by non-IMF signatories and very few signato-
ries (the United States ‘ncluded) have actually ratified the
Protocol.
The inappropriateness of our adopting SDR’s as the
unit of conversion is plain. The Convention itself con-
23 Ward, supra note 14, at 2.
ld.
&
Id. at 3.
$030
A-17
tains not the slightest authority for its use and the Senate
has thus far declined to ratify the Montreal Protocols.
Moreover, the decision in principle to use SDR’s is only
the first step. After that, a further step must be taken to
define the limitation of liability in terms of a particular
number of SDR’s per kilogram of baggage. In effect, we
would have to set the level of the limitation. Finally, the
SDR is a creature of an international body, the IMF, and
is subject to modification or outright elimination by that
body. In fact, the method of calculating SDR’s has been
changed three times in the last seven years. This Court
has no power under the terms of the Convention or
relevant domestic source of authority to adopt a unit of
conversion variable at the whim of an international body
distinct from the parties to the Convention.
It is thus clear that neither international nor domestic
sources of law specify a unit of account for purposes of
the Convention. We deal here not with ambiguities which
may be clarified by reference to underlying purpose or
with language which inadequately mirrors the understood
intentions of the drafters. For almost two generations,
the Convention’s limits on liability have been translatable
into domestic currency values by application of a clear
and easily applied formula. An essential ingredient of
that formula has, as a consequence of international ac-
tion followed by domestic legislation, ceased to exist.
What the parties ask us to do is to select, upon the basis
of our judgment as to what is best as a matter of policy, a
new unit of conversion. We are without authority to do
so.
Treaty negotiation and proposal is the province of the
executive and ratification is the exclusive province of the
United States Senate. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; Doe
ex dem. Clark et al. v. Braden, \6 How. 635, 656-57
A-18
(1853). While federal courts are necessarily called upon to
interpret treaties, The Federalist No. 3 (J. Jay) (Rossiter
ed. 1961); see also id. No. 80 (A. Hamilton), they must
observe the line between treaty interpretation on the one
hand and negotiation, proposal and ratification on the
other. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1961). To
be sure, great difficulty may arise in ascertaining where
that line is drawn and when it has been crossed.” See,
e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). However,
selection of a unit of conversion and the level of value of
a limitation on liability is plainly a matter to be nego-
tiated by the parties, as the history of the Convention
demonstrates.
While international disarray as to the proper unit of
conversion under the Convention alone might not disable
us from enforcing a new unit, such a unit must be selected
either through treaty ratification by the Senate or by
legislation passing both Houses of the Congress. The
repeal of the Par Value Modification Act was an explicit
abandonment of the previously established unit of con-
version. While Congress may not have focused explicitly
upon the Convention in repealing that Act, its purpose,
abandonment of a price which was out of touch with
economic reality, plainly encompasses use of that price to
26 Given the lack of an internationally agreed upon standard of
conversion, it might be argued that the Convention has been abro-
gated. However, treaties involve international obligations entered into
by coordinate branches of the government and it is not the province of
courts to declare treaties abrogated or to afford relief to those
(including the parties) who wish to escape their terms. These are not
matters for “judicial cognizance.” Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S.
190, 194 (1887); see also Terlinden v. Ames, \84 U.S. 270 (1901). They
belong to the executive and legislative departments because they are
more properly the domain of “diplomacy and legislation, . . . not
. the administration of laws.” Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. s. at
195.
$032
A-19
convert judgments to United States currency values. Con-
gress thus abandoned the unit of conversion specified by
the Convention and did not substitute a new one. Substi-
tution of a new term is a political question, unfit for
judicial resolution. We hold, therefore, that the Conven-
tion’s limits on liability for loss of cargo are unenforce-
able in United States Courts.”
CONCLUSION
This ruling is prospective and will apply only to events
creating liability occurring 60 days from the issuance of
the mandate in this case. Prospective effect is compelled
by the fact that this is the first case in which a court has
declined to enforce the Convention’s limits on liability.
The parties assumed our power to select a new unit and
thus our “resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.”
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971).
Parties to transactions covered by the Convention should
have time to adjust their affairs to this ruling. Cf.
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline
Co., 50 U.S.L.W. 4892 (U.S. June 28, 1982) (judgment
holding Bankruptcy Act unconstitutional stayed until
October 4, 1982). As to events occurring before that date,
we hold that the last official price of gold shall be used to
calculate the limits on liability. Because of both the CAB
ruling discussed above and the lack of alternatives, air
carriers, at least in this country, have relied on the last
official price of gold. All carriers have thus filed tariffs
27 ~—s- The Convention esiablishes liability as well as limits it. Note 2,
supra, Our holding is limited solely to the unenforceability of the limits
and we express no view as to the severability of those limits from t
rest of the Convention.
5033
A-20
that comply with that standard and substantial “injustice
and hardship” would result were they not allowed time to
reformulate those tariffs. Other parties may continue to
protect themselves through insurance.
Affirmed.
A-2]
Docket Number
82-7012
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Vv.
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
NOTICE OF MOTION
for Stay of Issuance of Mandate
Motion By:
CurRTIS, MALLET-PREVOST, COLT & MOSLE
Robert S. Lipton, Esq.
(212) 696-6045
Has a request of opposing counsel for con-
sent been refused? & Yes O No
Has service been effected” @ Yes 0 No
Is oral argument desired? 0 Yes @ No
(Substantive motions only)
Requested return date:
(See Second Circuit Rule 27 (b))
Date of argument of appeal, if scheduled:
Judge or agency whose order is being appealed:
OPPOSING COUNSEL: (Name and tel. no. of attorney in
charge)
WAESCHE, SHEINBAUM & O'REGAN, P.C,
John R. Foster, Esq.
(212) 227-3550
Brief statement of the relief requested: Order staying the
issuance of mandate in this case pending the filing by defendant-
A-22
appellee Trans World Airlines, Inc. (“TWA”) of a petition for
certiorari in the Supreme Court and until final disposition therein
of the case.
Previous requests for similar relief and disposition: None.
Statement of the issue(s) presented by this motion: Whether
an order staying issuance of the mandate in this case should be
entered since TWA expects and intends to make proper and
timely application to the Supreme Court of the United States by a
petition for writ of certiorari for review of certain aspects of the
decision and judgment of this Court in this case.
Brief statement of the facts (with page references to the mov-
ing papers): The relevant factual background is set forth at
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Affidavit of John N. Romans, sworn to
on December 6, 1982, and submitted in support of this motion.
Summary of the argument (with page references to the mov-
ing papers): Pursuant to the provisions of Section 2101(f),
Title 28 U.S.C. and Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, an order should be entered staying issuance of the
mandate in this case on the ground that it is the bona fide inten-
tion of TWA to make proper application to the Supreme Court
within the time allowed by law for a writ of certiorari. The
grounds upon which TWA's petition for certiorari will be based
are set forth at paragraph 5 of the Rom:.ns Affidavit mentioned
above.
12/7/82 ROBERT S. LIPTON
Date The name signed must be printed beneath
Robert S. Lipton
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee.
A-23
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that the motion be and it hereby
is granted
JAMES L. OAKES
Hon. James L. Oakes
RICHARD J. CARDAMONE
Hon. Richard J. Cardamone
RALPH K. WINTER
Hon. Ralph K. Winter
December 17, 1982
A-24
United States Court of Appeals
SECOND CIRCUIT
No. 82-7012
Ata stated term of the United States Court of Appeals, in and
for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Courthouse, in
the City of New York, on the first day of December one thousand
nine hundred and eighty-two.
FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN MINT LIM-
ITED, and MCGREGOR, SwiIRE AIR SERVICES LIMITED,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
A petition for rehearing containing a suggestion that the action
be reheard in banc having been filed herein by counsel for the
defendant-appellee, Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
Upon consideration by the panel that heard the appeal, it is
ORDERED that said petition for rehearing is DENIED.
aula
A-25
It is further noted that the suggestion for rehearing in banc has
been transmitted to the judges of the court in regular active
service and to any other judge on the panel that heard the appeal
and that no such judge has requested that a vote be taken thereon.
A. Daniel Fusaro, Clerk
by:
FRANCIS X. GINDHART
Francis X. Gindhart
Chief Deputy Clerk
A-26
United States District Court
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
81 Civ. 1700 (WK)
FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN MINT LIMITED,
and MCGREGOR, SWIRE AIR SERVICES, LIMITED,
Plaintiffs,
-against-
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.
Defendant.
Whitman Knapp, D.J.
On March 23, 1979, plaintiff Franklin Mint Corporation
(“Franklin”) delivered to defendant Trans World Airlines, Inc.
(“TWA”) for carriage from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to
London’s Heathrow Airport, four packages weighing some 714
pounds. Although the packages are said to have contained a
large quantity of valuable coins, Franklin made no special decla-
ration of value at the time of delivery. TWA charged Franklin
$544.96 for the shipment. The four packages never arrived at
their destination, and Franklin brought this action to recover
their full value, which it fixes at $250,000. The parties agree that
this action is governed by the terms of the Warsaw Convention,
and that TWA is liable for the loss. Before us is a motion by
TWA for partial summary judgment as to the extent of its liabil-
ity. We grant that motion in part and deny it in part.
Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention provides that, unless a
special declaration of value is made at the time of delivery, a
shipper's liability for checked baggage and goods is limited to the
equivalent of 250 francs per kilogram. Article 22 states, more-
over, that this limitation of 250 francs:
“shall be deemed to refer to the French franc consisting of
65% milligrams of gold at the standard of fineness of nine
A-27
hundred thousandths [the so-called Poincare franc].
These sums may be converted into any national currency
in round figures.” (Emphasis added.)
Counsel for TWA, in an extraordinarily lucid and comprehen-
sive brief, has suggested three possible bases for the calculation
converting the Article 22 limitation into United States dollars:
(1) the Special Drawing Right (“SDR”), used by members of
the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) as a unit of account;
(2) the last official price of gold in the United States; and (3) the
exchange value of the current French franc. Counsel for Frank-
lin, in an equally able brief, suggests a fourth possibility: the free
market price of gold.
Were we writing on a clean slate, we would find the arguments
in favor of the first of TWA’s suggestions (the SDR) most per-
suasive. However, TWA’s second suggestion (the last official
price of gold in the United States) has—arguably, at least—been
espoused by the Civil Aeronautics Board (“CAB”), the govern-
ment agency most intimately concerned with the transaction at
hand. It therefore comes as close as anything to constituting a
governmental interpretation of the Article 22 limitation. Also, it
is used by all domestic carriers—including TWA—in calculating
the dollar value of the Article 22 limitation printed on their
tariffs. It would seem to follow that the parties intended to adopt
the last official price of gold as the basis for converting the Article
22 limitation into dollars in the instant case.
Beyond saying the foregoing we can, since there are no dis-
puted issues of fact upon which a finding by us is required, see no
purpose to be served by delaying a decision while we seek to put in
our own words the arguments so cogently expressed by counsel for
TWA. Accordingly, we simply adopt those arguments to the
extent that they support our conclusion that the conversion shouid
be premised on the !ast official price of gold in the United States.
A-28
Let counsel for TWA submit a proposed order on ten days’
notice. As we understand the stipulation of the parties, such an
order would in effect direct that judgment be entered for plaintiff
in the amount of $6,475.98 plus interest and costs, a result which
would permit immediate appeal from this order.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: New York, New York
November 6, 198]
EEE EEE EEE EE EEE EERE EEE EEE EEES
Whitman Knapp, U.S.D.J.
A-29
United States District Court
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ORDER
81 Civ. 1700 (WK)
FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN MINT LIMITED
and MCGREGOR, SwirRE Air SERVICES, LIMITED,
Plaintiffs,
Vv.
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiffs: WAESCHE, SHEINBAUM &
O'REGAN
120 Broadway
New York, New York 10271
John Foster, Esq.
For Defendants: CuRTIS, MALLET-PREVOST,
CoLtT & MOSLE
100 Wall Street
New York, New York 10005
John R. Romans, Esq.
WHITMAN KNAPP, D.J.
The first sentence of the second paragraph of our November 6,
1981 Memorandum and Order is hereby amended to read:
“Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention provides that,
unless a special declaration of value is made at the time of
a delivery, a carrier's liability for checked baggage and
goods is limited to the equivalent of 250 francs per
kilogram.”
SO ORDERED.
Dated: New York, New York
December 18, 1981
SEER EERE EERE EE EE EEE HEHE EEE E HEHE EE EEE®
Whitman Knapp, U.S.D_J.
A-30
United States District Court
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
81 Civ. 1700 (WK)
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN MINT LIMITED
and MCGREGOR, SwirRE AiR SERVICES, LTD..,
Plaintiffs,
— against —
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant.
For the reasons stated in the Memorandum and Order of this
Court, dated November 6, 1981, it is
ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED: that the maxi-
mum liability herein of defendant Trans World Airlines, Inc. shall
be determined under Article 22 of the Convention for the Unifica-
tion of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air, 49 Stat. 3000 et. seg. (1934), T.S. 876, reprinted in 49
U.S.C. § 1502 note (1970), by a conversion factor premised on
the last official price of gold in the United States, and it is
FURTHER ORDERED, that in accordance with the forego-
ing conversion factor, final judgment shall be entered for plain-
tiffs in the amount of $6,475.98, plus interest and costs.
Dated: New York, New York
December 3, 1981
WHITMAN KNAPP
WHITMAN KNAPP |
U.S.D.J.
JUDGMENT ENTERED 12/4/81
RAYMOND F. BURGHARDT
Clerk
A-31
81 Civ. 1700 (WK)
United States District Court
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN MINT LIMITED,
and MCGREGOR, SwirRE AIR SERVICES LIMITED,
Plaintiffs,
—against—
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant.
NOTICE OF MOTION; AFFIDAVIT
MOTION DENIED
December 16, 1981]
WHITMAN KNAPP
Whitman Knapp
U.S.D.J.
A-32
United States District Court
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
81 Civ. 1700 (WK)
NOTICE OF MOTION
FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN MINT LIMITED,
and MCGREGOR, Swike AiR SERVICES LIMITED,
Plaintiffs,
~against—
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the Court's Memorandum
and Order dated November 6, 1981; on the Court's Order and
Judgment dated December 3, 1981; on the affidavit sworn to by
John R. Foster on December 14, 1981, attached hereto; on the
memorandum of law submitted herewith: and on all the prior
pleadings and proceedings had in this action, the undersigned will
move this Court before the Honorable Whitman Knapp, United
States District Judge, at the United States Courthouse, Foley
Square, New York, New York, on January 8, 1982, at 2:00 p.m.,
or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, for an order
pursuant to rule 59(¢) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
amending the Court's Order and Judgment of December 3, 1981,
by determining defendant Trans World Airlines, Inc.'s liability
A-33
under Articles 18 and 22 of the Warsaw Convention in accor-
dance with the free-market price of gold, and for such other and
further relief as to the Court may seem just and equitable.
Dated: New York, New York
December 14, 1981
WAESCHE, SHEINBAUM & O'REGAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
By: JOHN R. FOSTER
John R. Foster
120 Broadway, Suite 1825
New York, New York 10271
(212) 227-3550
A-34
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
Section 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the
several States, when called into the actual Service of the United
States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal
Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject
relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have
Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the
United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appoint-
ments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.
The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may
happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commis-
sions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.
¥
A-35
CONVENTION FOR UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN
RULES RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION BY AIR
Article 22
(1) In the transportation of passengers, the liability of the
carrier for each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000
francs. Where, in accordance with the law of the court to which
the case is submitted, damages may be awarded in the form of
periodical payments, the equivalent capital value of the said pay-
ments shall not exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special
contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher
limit of liability.
(2) Inthe transportation of checked baggage and of goods, the
liability of the carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250 francs per
kilogram, unless the consignor has made, at the time when the
package was handed over to the carrier, a special declaration of
the value at delivery and has paid a supplementary sum if the case
so requires. In that case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not
exceeding the declared sum, unless he proves that that sum is
greater than the actual value to the consignor at delivery.
(3) As regards objects of which the passenger takes charge
himself, the liability of the carrier shall be limited to 5,000 francs
per passenger.
(4) The sums mentioned above shall be deemed to refer to the
French franc consisting of 65 milligrams of gold at the standard
of fineness of nine hundred thousandths. These sums may be
convexted into any national currency in round figures.
A-36
Order 74-1-16
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C,
Docket 26274
Adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board
at its office in Washington, D. C.
on the 3rd day of January, 1974
IN THE MATTER OF WARSAW CONVENTION LIABILITY
LIMITATIONS AS EXPRESSED IN U. S, DOLLARS
ORDER
Section 221.38(j) of the Board's Regulations requires U. S.
and foreign air carriers which avail themselves of the limits of
liability to passengers provided in the Warsaw Convention (49
Stat. 3000; T.S. 876) to include in their tariffs, inter alia, a
statement as to the amount of the liability limits of the Conven-
tion stated in dollars. These provisions of the tariffs, as well as
those setting forth limitations of liability under the Convention
with respect to baggage and property, restate the applicable law
and serve to advise the public of the Convention limitations on
their right of recovery for death, or injury or loss or damage to
baggage and property.
The liability limits in the Warsaw Convention are set forth in
terms of gold francs so that as long as the value of the dollar in
terms of gold remained constant, no change was required in the
dollar amount of the liability limits contained in the tariffs.
However, by Order 72-6-7 adopted June 2, 1972, the Board
directed the carriers to revise their tariffs to reflect the devalua-
tion of the dollar in terms of gold from $35 per ounce to approxi-
isan Cae ee aagersrcen yt etnday 1972, and such
| vane - ae we Lee ee ee ee eae ay TY wer) ie KRG
A-37
revisions have been made. On September 21, 1973, Public Law
93-110 was enacted, further devaluating the U. S. dollar to
approximately $42.22 per ounce of gold effective October 18,
1972. Asa result, the minimum liability limits specified in Order
72-6-7 and the tariffs currently on file with the Board no longer
meet the minimum liability limits of the Convention and a revi-
sion of the tariffs is necessary to accurately reflect such limits in
dollars.’
In view of the foregoing and of all other relevant matters, the
Board finds and concludes:
1. That the dollar limitations stated in the presently
effective tariffs of the respondent air carriers and foreign
air carriers no longer meet the minimum liability require-
ments of the Warsaw Convention for “international trans-
portation” or of the Hague Protocol and “international
carriage” as defined therein.
2. That, in this circumstance, such tariff limitations
are inconsistent with the applicable law as set forth in the
Convention or the Protocol, and the tariff filing require-
ments in Section 403 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
and Part 221 of the Board's Regulations and they must be
canceled,
1, With respect to their liability to passengers, this order will affect
Tacs ameded to tesentonel eaunemetines beans
ca terna transporta
neys to or from the United States adhere to the Montreal —
Aaah aoe 18900 approved by Order E-23680 dated y 13,
A-38
3. That the minimum acceptable figures in United
States dollars for liability limits applicable to “interna-
tional transportation” and “international carriage” are as
follows:
Convention and Protocol
Minimum | iability Actual W vuinded®
125,000 francs (per passenger, Con-
VENLION OMY) cicscsserscrsereersereereerenen $10,002.90 $10,000.00
250,000 francs (per passenger,
Hague Protocol Only) o.ccccu 20,005.80 20,000.00
5,000 francs (per passenger for un-
Checked baggage) occ 400.116 400,00
250 francs (per kilogram for checked
baggage and ZOOS) oo... 20.00580 20.00
250 francs (per kilogram on a per-
EE TINNEIED -sosdectsesogeaveensonbndocecereit 9.07460 9.07
Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958, particularly Sections 204(a), 403, and 1002 thereof,
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
|. The carriers named in Appendix A, attached hereto, shall
revise all liability limitations which may be applicable to “inter-
national transportation” or “international carriage” as defined in
the Convention or the Protocol which are inconsistent with the
dollar amounts set forth herein so as to conform with such
amounts.
2. The tariff cancellations directed in ordering paragraph |
above shall become effective on or before February 6, 1974, on
not less than 10 days’ notice.
3. Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention permits the liability limits
specified therein in gold francs to be converted into any national cur-
eae fry By The Board is the round dollar
this order to be in the tariffs for of
order is not intended to pr>hibit carriers
prow ee ances ee in their tariffs as some
2
A-39
3. That copies of this order shall be served on the air carriers
and foreign air carriers named in Appendix A.
This order will be published in the Federal Register.
By the Civil Aeronautics Board:
EDWIN Z. HOLLAND
Secretary
(SEAL)
APPENDIX A
U.S. CERTIFICATED SCHEDULED AIR CARRIERS
Airlift International, Inc.
Alaska Airlines, Inc.
Allegheny Airlines, Inc.
Aloha Airlines, Inc.
American Airlines, Inc.
Aspen Airways, Inc.
Braniff Airways, Inc.
Chicago Helicopter Airways, Inc.
Continental Air Lines, Inc.
Delta Air Lines. Inc.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc.
Frontier Airlines, Inc.
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.
Hughes Air Corp., d/b/a Hughes Airwest
Kodiak-Western Alaska Airlines, Inc.
Los Angeles Airways, Inc.
National Airlines, Inc.
New York Airways, Inc.
North Central Airlines, Inc.
Northwest Airlines, Inc.
Ozark Air Lines, Inc.
Pan American World Airways, Inc.
Piedmont Aviation, Inc.
Reeve Aleutian Airways, Inc.
SFO Helicopter Airlines, Inc.
Seaboard World Airlines, Inc.
Southern Airways, Inc.
Texas International Airlines, Inc.
The Flying Tiger Line Inc.
Trans World Airlines, Inc.
United Air Lines, Inc.
Wien Air Alaska, Inc.
A-41
Wright Air Lines, Inc.
U.S. SUPPLEMENTAL AIR CARRIERS
Capitol International Airways, Inc.
Johnson Flying Service, Inc.
McCulloch International Airlines, Inc.
Modern Air Transport, Inc.
Overseas National Airways, Inc.
Royal International! Airlines
Saturn Airways, Inc.
Southern Air Transport, Inc.
Siandard Airways, Inc.
Trans Internationa! Airlines, Inc.
Universal Airlines, Inc.
World Airways, Inc.
U.S. AIR TAXI OPERATORS*
Aeromech, Inc.
Air East, Inc.
Air Indies Corporation
Air New England, Inc.
Air North, Inc.
Air South, Inc.
Air Wisconsin, Inc.
Alaska Aeronautica! Industries, Inc.
Altair Airlines, Inc.
Antilles Air Boats, Inc.
Apache Airlines, Inc.
Apollo Aviation, Inc.
Atlantic City Airlines, Inc.
Bar Harbor Airways, Inc.
A-42
Combs Airways, Inc.
Command Airways, Inc.
Commuter Airlines, inc.
Crown Airways, Inc.
Downeast Airlines, Inc.
Execuair, Inc.
Executive Airlines, Inc.
Fischer Bros. Aviation, Inc.
Florida Airlines, Inc.
Golden West Airlines, Inc.
Henson Aviation, Inc.
Mackey International Air Commuter
Marco Island Airways, Inc.
Metroflight Airlines, Inc., d/b/a
Houston Metro Airlines
Midstate Air Commuter
Monmouth Airlines, Inc.
Pennsylvania Commuter Airlines,
Div. of Clark Aviation Corp.
Pocono Airlines, Inc.
Provincetown-Boston Airline, Inc., d/b/a
Provincetown-Boston Airline or Naples Airlines
Puerto Rico International Airlines, Inc.
Ransome Air, Inc.
Rio Airways, Inc.
Royale Airlines, Inc.
Sedalia-Marshall Boonville Stage Line, Inc.
Shawnee Airlines, Inc.
L. B. Smith
Southeast Airlines, Inc.
Suburban Airlines, Inc., a subsidiary of
Reading Aviation Service, Inc.
Swift Air Lines, Inc. :
Travel Air Aviation, Inc.
Vercoa Air Service, Inc.
Winnepesaukee Aviation, Inc.
A-43
U.S. INDIRECT AIR CARRIERS
(Airfreight Forwarders and Air Express )
Add Airfreight Corp.
Aero Special Air Freight, Inc.
Air Cargo Expediters, Inc.
Air Cargo Specialists, Inc.
Air Freightways Corporation
Air-Land Freight Consolidators, Inc.
Air-Land Transport, Inc.
Air Overseas Corporation
Airport Packers, Inc., d/b/a
Airport Packers & Forwarders
Air Progress, Inc.
Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc.
Air Van Lines, Inc.
Airborne Freight Corporation
(a Delaware corporation)
The “AL” Naish Moving and Storage Company,
A Corporation
Alas Ibero Americanas, Inc.
Alberti Van & Storage Co., Inc., d/b/a
Mov Air
All-Airtransport, Inc.
All Carrier Transport, d/b/a
ACT Air Freight
All Hawaii Cargo Consolidators, Inc., d/b/a
A-One Air Freight
Allied Van Lines, Inc.
Allstates Air Cargo, Inc.
Ambassador Air Freight Corp.
Amerford International Corp., d/b/a
Amerford Air Cargo
American Ensign Van Service, Inc.
American Red Ball Transit Co., Inc.
American Van & Storage, Inc.
Amerpole Air Freight, Inc.
A-44
Anthony H. Osterkamp, Jr., d/b/a
Osterkamp Trucking
Apex Air Freight, Inc.
Apollo Air Freight Corporation
Armand J. Donati
Around the World Air Freight, Inc.
Anthony S. Arrico and Robert P. Landy, d/b/a
R. I. Air Freight Forwarders
Associated Air Freight, Inc.
(a Virginia corporation)
Aero Mayflower Transit Company, Inc.
Astro Air Express, Inc.
Astron Forwarding Company, Inc.
Atlas Van Lines International Corp.
Aztec Transportation Co., Inc., d/b/a
Aztec Air Freight
B & G Trucking, Inc.
Bader Bros. Van Lines, Inc.
Baker International Warehouse, Inc., d/b/a
Baker Air Cargo
Beacon Shipping Co., Inc.
Behring International, Inc.
Bekins International Lines, Inc.
Bellair Expediting Service, Inc.
Ben-Lee Motor Service Co., d/b/a
Mitchell Air Dispatch
Bennett & Taylor Trans., Inc.
J. E. Bernard & Co., Inc.
(a New York corporation )
Black & Geddes, Inc.
Bor-Air Freight Co., Inc.
Philip C. Borden, d/b/a
Borden Trucking
Brake Air Freight, Inc.
Bruce Transfer Corp.
Burlington Northern Air Freight, Inc.
A-45
A. F. Burstrom & Sons, Inc.
W. J. Byrnes and Company of New York, Inc.
Air Freight, Inc.
C&L Freight Lines, Inc., d/b/a
Commerce Air Freight
C-M-D Transport, Inc., d/b/a
C-M-D Air Forwarders
Cal-Air Forwarders, Inc.
Cal-Hawaiian Freight, Inc.
California Delivery Service (A Corp.)
Cargo Courier Air Freight, Inc.
Cargoair Forwarders, Inc.
Carmichael International Service, d/b/a
CIS Oceanair Services
Carolina Freight Carriers Corporation
Willis L. Carr and Charles D. Weist, d/b/a
Cates Carr Go
Cartwright International Van Lines, Inc.
Castelazo & Associates
Century Air Freight, Inc.
CF Air Freight, Inc.
Christman Corporation, d/b/a Christman Air Freight
Circle Airfreight Corp.
Clipper Express Company, d/b/a “Sky Ho!” Air Freight Division
Columbia Air/Frate, Inc.
Columbia Export Packers, Inc.
Com-Air Freight, Inc., d/b/a Comet Air Freight
Commercial Air-Frate, Inc.
Common Market Forwarders, Inc.
Connecticut Air Freight, Inc.
Continental Forwarders, Inc. (a Delaware corporation)
Corsair Air Cargo System, Inc.
F. X. Coughlin Co.
Crown Air Freight Corp.
D.J.C. Corporation, d/b/a Jones Air Freight
Data Air Distribution System Co., Inc.
A-46
Davidson Forwarding Company
Dean Forwarding Co., Inc.
Delcher Intercontinental Moving Service, Inc.
Woodrow W. De Witt, d/b/a De Witt Freight Forwarding
Distribution Centers, Inc., d/b/a Alpha Air Freight
District Moving & Storage, Inc., d/b/a District Containerized
Express
Domestic Air Express, Inc.
Door to Door International, Inc.
Frank P. Dow Co., inc. (a Washington corporation)
Bruce Duncan Co., Inc., d/b/a Bruce Duncan Cargo
Emery Air Freight Corporation
Empire Carriers Corp., d/b/a Entico Air Freight Service
Empire Foreign Air Forwarders, Inc.
Engel Brothers, Inc.
Enterprise Shipping Corp.
Equine Express, Inc.
Euro-American Air Freight Forwarding Co., Inc.
Express Forwarding and Storage Co., Inc.
5 Star Air Freight Corporation
Fernstrom Storage and Van Company
Flying Horse Air Freight, Inc.
Footner and Company, Inc., d/b/a Rennie Footner Air Express
Service
Foreign Trade Export Packing Corp., d/b/a Foreign Trade
Export Company
44 Air Express Systems, Inc.
Fort Pitt Consolidators, Inc.
Forwardair, Inc.
Four Winds Forwarding, Inc.
The Francesco Parisi Forwarding Corporation, d/b/a Parisi
Airfreight
Fresh Air, Inc., d/b/a Fresh Air Cargo
Fritz Air Freight
Frontier Freight Forwarders, Inc., d/b/a Frontier Freight
Consolidators
A-47
Furman Air Freight Corp.
G. & H. Transportation, Inc., d/b/a G. & H. Air Freight
Gateway Aviation Co., Inc.
Genera! Air Freight Corp.—Domestic
General Air Freight Corp.
General Transpac System, d/b/a GTS Airfreight
Genex Airfreight, Inc.
Gilbert Air Transport Corp.
Global Forwarding, Inc.
Globe Shipping Co., Inc.
Gold Wings Ltd.
Golden Gate Air Freight, Inc.
Graf Air Freight, Inc.
Arnold S. Grant, d/b/a LeMark Air Freight Service
Greene Air International, Inc.
HC & D Forwarders International, Inc.
Hallmark Cargo Services, Inc.
Hall Expediting, Inc.
Harle Consolidators International (HARLE-CON), A division
of Harle Services, Inc.
Harlo-Air Cargo Brokers, Inc.
Hemisphere Air Freight, Inc.
Home-Pack Transport, Inc.
Hop Air Freight Forwarders, Inc.
| & T Air Freight Forwarders, Inc.
Imperial Air Freight Service, Inc. (a New Jersey corporation)
Imperial Van Lines International, Inc.
Industrial Air Cargo, Inc.
Inter-Maritime Forwarding Co., Inc.
International Air Courier, Inc.
International Customs Service, Inc.
International Export Packers, Inc.
Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc.
Intra-Mar Shipping Corporation
Jet Air Freight
Jet Forwarding, Inc.
A-48
Joyce Expediting Service, Inc.
Karevan, Inc.
Karr, Ellis & Co., Inc.
Kerner Trucking Service, Inc., d/b/a KTS Air Freight Key Air
Freight, Inc.
Kimberlin Air Freight Corp.
King Van Lines, Inc.
Bernard Klainberg, d/b/a Berklay Air Services Corp.
L.T.C. Air Cargo, Inc.
La Belle Air Freight, Inc.
Landair Corporation
Richard Thomas Light, d/b/a Westchester Air Freight
Loomis Courier Service, Inc.
Luigi Serra, Inc.
John J. McCabe Agency, Inc.
McLean Cargo Specialists, Inc.
Maris Van & Storage, d/b/a Maris Air Transport Division
Mark IV Air Freight, Inc.
Mercury Motor Express, Inc. ( Mercury)
New England Air Lift, Inc.
Herb B. Meyer & Co., Inc.
Midland Forwarding Corporation, d/b/a ABC Air Freight
Missouri Pacific Air Freight, Inc.
Monumental-Security Storage Co.
Murray Air Freight, Inc.
Murty Bros. Agency, Inc.
Mustang Trucking Company, Inc., d/b/a Mustang Air Freight
National Movers Co., Inc.
National Van Lines, Inc.
Nelsonair International, Inc.
Neptune World-Wide Moving, Inc.
Network Courier Service
Alex Nichols Agency, Inc..
North American Van Lines, Inc. ~
Northern Air Freight, Inc.
Novo Airfreight Corp.
A-49
Novo International Corp., d/b/a Novo International Airfreight
O.N.C. Forwarding, d/b/a Rocor Air Freight
Oceanic Forwarders Company, d/b/a Air-Oceanic Shippers
H. G. Ollendorff, Inc.
P.I.E. Air Freight Forwarding, Inc.
Pacific Alaska Forwarders, Inc., d/b/a Arctic Air Freight
Pacific Delivery System
Panalpina Airfreight, Inc., d/b/a Panalpina Airfreight System
Par Avion Corporation
Paulssen & Guice, Ltd.
Performance by Air, Inc.
Petry & Co.'s Foreign Express (a Division Trans- World Shipping
Corporation )
Philadelphia Air Consolidators Assr.., Inc.
Pilot Air Freight Corp.
Presto Delivery Service, Inc.
Prideair Freight, Ltd.
Priority Air Freight, Inc.
Profit by Air, Inc.
Pegasus Air Transport Co.
Perfect Pak Company
Puerto Rican Forwarding Company, d/b/a Active Air Freight
Qwikway Trucking Co., d/b/a Qwik Air
Railway Express Agency, Incorporated
Ramar Air Freight Corp.
Randy International Ltd.
Rapidair Freight
Reilly Expediting Service, Inc.
Republic Airmodal, Inc.
Republic Van and Storage Co., Inc.
Rex Air Freight, Inc.
Right-O-Way, Inc., d/b/a Right-O-Way Air Freight
Royal Air Freight Corp.
Rozay’s Transfer
Saber Air Freight, Inc.
Santa Fe Air Freight Company
Satellite Air Freight, Inc.
Satin Air Freight, Inc.
Robert L. Schley, d/b/a Schley Shipping Company
Schreiber Air Freight, Inc.
Seariders, Inc.
Security Van Lines, Inc.
Senderex Cargo Company, Inc.
Sentry Air Freight Corp.
Service By Air Freight Forwarders, Inc.
Service Air Cargo
Sesko International, Inc.
Set Air Freight, Inc.
Shulman Air Freight, Inc.
Signalair, Inc.
Sincro Inter Nationa!
Sky-Hawk Forwarders, Inc.
Skyline Air Freight, Inc.
Skymaster, Inc.
J. D, Smith Inter-Ocean, Inc.
Southern Pacific Air Freight, Inc.
Star World Wide Forwarders, Inc.
Starck Van Lines, Inc.
Suarez Shipping Services, Inc.
Suddath Van Lines, Inc.
Sunpak Movers, Inc.
Superior Fast Freight, d/b/a Aecro-Ex
Supreme Air Freight Corp.
Surf-Air, Inc.
H. E. Sutton Forwarding Co., Inc.
Swift Home-Wrap, Inc.
T.F.C. Air Freight, Inc.
Tally’s Truck Line
Target Air Freight, Inc.
Three-B Freight Service, Inc.
Towne International Forwarding Inc.
Trans-Air Freight System, Inc.
A-51
Transcon Lines
Transport Express Inc.
Transpor Trade Corporation
Trans-Pacific Air Cargo
Tuya International Corp.
United News Transportation Co.
United Parcel Service Co.
United Van Lines, Inc.
U. S. Van Lines, Inc.
Usair Freight, Inc.
Vanpac Carriers, Inc.
Ven-Air Service, Inc.
Virgil's Delivery Service, Inc., d/b/a Virgil's Air Cargo
Von Der Ahe Van Lines, Inc.
B. Von Paris & Sons, Inc.
WTC Air Freight
WTC Forwarding Corp.
Benjamin H. Walder & Rubin Konlon, d/b/a Chicagoland Air
Freight
Wallkill Air Freight Corporation, d/b/a Atlas Air Cargo
Wells Fargo Air Express, Inc.
Wheaton Van Lines, Inc.
James G. Wiley Co.
Wilson Air Freight, Inc.
Wings and Wheels Express, Inc.
Wings and Wheels Express, Inc., d/b/a Air Express
International
Wits, Inc., d/b/a Wits Air Freight
World Trade Air Freight Services, Inc.
Wright Air Freight Corp.
W. R. Zanes & Co. of La. Inc., d/b/a Zanes Inter-Air
Consolidators
A-52
FOREIGN INDIRECT AIR CARRIERS
Willy Peter Daetwyler, d/b/a Interamerican Airfreight Co.
Kinki Nippon Routist Co, (Japan), d/b/a Kintetsu World
Express, Inc, (U.S.A.)
Kuehne & Nagel (Germany), d/b/a Kuehne & Nagel Air
Freight, Inc.
Lep Transport, Ltd. (United Kingdom), d/b/a Lep Transport,
Inc. (U.S.A.)
McGregor, Swire Air Services Limited, Inc. (U.K.)
Mitsui Air & Sea Service Co., Ltd. (Japan), d/b/a Mitsuiline
Travel Service of America, Inc. (U.S.A.)
Nippon Express Co., Ltd.
Pandair Freight Limited (U.K.)
Union Speditions—Gesellschaft m.b.H. Union Air Transport
Yusen Air & Sea Service Company Limited (Japan), d/b/a
Yusen Air & Sea Service (U.S.A.) Incorporated
A-53
APPENDIX A
FOREIGN AIR CARRIERS**
Adastra Aviation Limited
Aden Airways Limited
Aer Lingus Teoranta
Aerlinte Eireann Teoranta
Aereo Fletes Internacionales, S.A. (AFISA)
Aero Lineas Flecha Austral Limitada
Aero Spacelines, Inc.
Acro Trades (Western) Ltd.
Acrocosta, S.A.
Aerolineas Argentinas
Aerolineas El! Salvador, S.A.
Aerolineas Del Ecuador, S.A.
Aerolineas Peruanas, S.A.
Aecrolinee Itavia—S.p.A.
Aeromar C. por A.
Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A.
Acronaves del Ecuador, S.A.
Acronaves del Peru, S.A.
Aerotransportes Entre Rios S.R.L.
Acrovias Colombianas Limitada (ARCA)
Acrovias Condor de Colombia Ltda.
Aecrovias Lansa, S. de R.L.
Acrovias Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.
Acrovias Quisqueyana, C. por A.
Aerovias Venezolanas, S.A.
Air Afrique
Air BVI Limited
Air Canada
A-54
Air-India
Air Jamaica (1968) Limited
Air Liban (Lignes Aeriennes Libanaises)
Air Malawi Limited
Air Nauru
Air New Zealand Limited
Air Rhodesia Corporation
AIR-SIAM Air Company Limited
AIR-VIETNAM
Air Zaire
Airlines Jersey Limited T/A. British United C.I. Airways
Alia-The Royal Jordanian Airlines Corporation
Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane—S.p.A.
All Nippon Airways Company, Ltd.
ALM Dutch Antillean Airlines
Ansett—ANA (A division of Ansette Transport Industries
(Operations) Pty. Ltd.)
Argo, S.A.
Ariana Afghan Airlines Co., Ltd.
Australian National Airlines Commission, Trading as Trans-
Australia Airlines
Austrian Airlines, Osterreichische Luftverkehrs—
Aktiengesellischaft
Aviacion y Comercio, S.A.
B.K.S. Air Transport Limited
Bahamas Airways Limited
Balair AG
Belairco Aviation Inc. (Doing business as Bellingham-Seattle
Airways)
Britannia Airways Limited
British Caledonian Airways, Limited
British European Airways Corporation
British Midland Airways Limited
British Overseas Airways Corporation
British United Airways Limited
British West Indian Airways Limited
A-55
BEA Airtours Limited
Cambrian Airways Limited
Canadian Pacific Airlines, Limited
Canadian Voyageur Airlines Limited
Caraibische Lucht Transport Maatschappij, N.V. (Caribbean
Air Transport Company, Inc.)
Caribwest Airways Limited
Cathay Pacific Airways, Limited
Cayman Airways Limited
Central African Airways Corporation
Central African Airways Limited
Ceskoslovenske Aerolinie
Channel Airways Limited
China Airlines, Ltd.
Civil Air Transport Company Limited
Collingwood Air Services Limited
Compagnie Nationale Air France
Compagnie Nationale de Transports Aeriens (Royal Air Maroc)
Commuter Air Services Ltd.
Compania de Aviacion Faucett, S.A.
Compania de Dominicana de Aviacion, C. por A.
Compania Ecuatoriana de Aviacion, S.A.
Compania Internacional Aerea S.A. (CIASA)
Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A.
Compania Panamena de Aviacion, S.A.
Compania Peruana Internacional de Aviacion S.A.
Conair Ltd.
Condor Flugdienst G.m.b.H.
Cross Canada Flights Ltd.
Cyprus Airways Limited
Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengeselischaft (also operating as Luf-
thansa German Airlines)
D.T.A.—Linhas Acreas de Angola
Donaldson Line (Air Services) Limited, d/b/a Donaldson Inter-
A-56
Eastern Provincial Airways, (1963) Limited
Egypt Air
El Al Israei Airlines Limited
Emerald Airways Ltd.
Ethiopian Air Lines, Inc.
Fiji Airways Limited
Finnair Oy
Flugfelag Islands, H.F. (Icelandic Airways Ltd.)
General Department of International Air Services (Aeroflot,
“Soviet Airlines”)
Germanair Bedarfsluftfahrt Gesellschaft m.b.H. & Co. KG
Ghana Airways Corporation
Gibraltar Airways Limited
Gravenhurst Aviation Limited
Great Lakes Airlines Limited
Gulf Aviation Company
Guyana Airways Corporation
P. N. Garuda Indonesian Airways
Flightexec Limited
Empresa Guatemalteca de Aviacion
Harrison Airways Limited
Holland-America Lijn, n.v. (Netherlands) (Holland America
Line)
Iberia, Lineas Aereas de Espana, S.A.
Indian Airlines Corporation
Inex Adria Airways
Internacional de Aviacion, S.A. (INAIR)
International Jet Air Ltd.
Iran National Airlines Corporation
Iraqi Airways
Japan Air Lines Company, Ltd.
Jugoslovenski Acrotrarsport (JAT)
Kar-Air OY
K.L.M. Royal Dutch Airlines
Korean Air Lines Co., Lid.
Korea Air Terminal Service Co., Ltd. (Republic of Korea)
A-57
Kuoni Travel, Inc. (Kuoni Travel Limited (Switzerland) d/b/a)
Laker Airways Limited
Lansa, S. de R.L.
Lebanese International Airways
Leeward Air Transport Services Limited
Leeward Islands Air Transport Services Limited
Linea Aerea Nationale—Chile (LAN)
Linea Aeropostal Venezolana
Linea Aereas Costarricenses, S.A.
Lineas Aereas de Nicaragua, S.A.
Lloyd Aereo Boliviano, S.A.
Loftleidir H.F. Icelandic Airlines Ltd.
Luftverkehrsunternehmen Atlantis A.G.
LUXAIR—Societe Annonyme Luxembourgeoise de Navigation
Aerienne
Malayan Airways Limited
Malaysia-Singapore Airlines Limited
MALEV—Hungarian Airlines
Martin’s Luchtvervoer Maatschappij N.V. (Martin's Air Char-
ter Company)
Mackenzie Air Ltd.
Middle East Airlines Airliban S.A.L.
Middle East Airlines Company, S.A.
New Zealand National Airways Corporation
Nigeria Airways, Ltd.
Nordair Ltee—Nordair Ltd.
North Canada Air Limited c.o.b. NORCANAIR
Olympic Airways S.A.
Out Island Airways Limited
Pacific Western Airlines, Ltd.
Pakistan International Airlines Corporation
Philippine Air Lines, Inc.
PLUNA, Primeras Lineas Uruguayas de Navegacion Aerea
Polskie Linie Lotnicze “LOT”
A-58
Polynesian Airlines Limited
Pomair N.V.
Qantas Airways Limited
Quebecair
Reseau Aerien Interinsulaire
Royal Air Cambodge
Royal Air Lao
Saudi Arabian Airlines
Scandinavian Airlines System
Seagreen Air Transport Limited
Servicio Aereo de Honduras, S.A.
Servicio Aereo de Transportes Commerciales (SATCO)
Servicios Aereos Cruzeiro Do Sul S.A.
Sociedad Aeronautica De Medellin Consolidada S.A. SAM
Societe Anonyme Belge d’Exploitation de la Navigation Aerienne
(SABENA) (also operating as “SABENA” Belgian World
Airlines)
South African Airways
Spantax, S.A.
Sudan Airways
Superior Airways Limited
Surinaamse Luchtvfracht Onderneming N.V. (Surinam Air
Cargo Corporation)
SWISSAIR, Swiss Air Transport Company Limited
TACA Internationa! Airlines, S.A.
Tarom-Transporturile Aeriene Romine
Thai Airways International Ltd.
Thos. Cook & Son Inc. (U.S.) (Thos. Cook & Son (Continental
and Overseas), Ltd. (Great Britain) d/b/a)
Trans-Australia Airlines
Trans Caribbean Airways
Trans-Mediterranean Airways S.A.L.
Transair Limited
Transavia, N.V.
Transmeridian Air Cargo Limited
Transportation Corporation of America
A-59
Transporte Aereo Rioplatense, S.A.C.E.I.
Transportes Aereos Benianos, S.A.
Transportes Aereos De Cargo, S.A. (Transcarga)
Transportes Aereos Nacionales S.A.
Transportes Aereos Portugueses, S.A.R.L.
Turk Hava Yollari Anonim Sirketi
Turks and Caicos Air Services, Ltd.
Union de Transports Aeriens (U.T.A.)
Union of Burma Airways Board
“VARIG”, S.A. (Viacao Aerea Rio-Grandense)
Venezolana Internacional de Aviacion, S.A. (VIASA)
Viacao Aerea Sao Paulo, S/A “VASP”
Wagner Aviation Limited
Wardair Canada Ltd.
Windward Islands Airways International N.V.
A-60
Superior Court of California
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
Department Law and Motion
August 25, 1982
No. 784512
ELECTRONIC MEMORIES AND MAGNETICS CorpP.,
Plaintiff,
Vv.
THE FLYING TIGER LINE, INC., et ail.
Defendant.
The cross-motions of plaintiff and defendant for partial sum-
mary judgment were heard and submitted for decision on August
10, 1982.
The motion of plaintiff is denied.
The motion of defendant for partial summary judgment is
granted.
The Court determines that the last official U. S. price of gold at
$42.22 per ounce shall be used in calculating the limit of liability
under the Warsaw Convention.
SEER EEE EERE EEE EEE EERE EERE EEE EEE EH EEE EERE EEE EEE HEHE EEE EEE EEE HEHEHE EEE EES
Judge of the Superior Court
JOHN B. Hook, Esquire
Long & Levit
Four Embarcadero Center, Suite 1800
San Francisco, CA 94111
Jess B. MILLIKAN, Esquire
Derby, Cook, Quinby & Tweedt
333 Market Street, Suite 2800
San Francisco, CA 94105
A-61
IN THE
United States District Court
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
NO. 81 C 4726
DEERE & COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
Vv.
DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an action in which plaintiff Deere & Company
(“Deere”) seeks recovery against defendant Deutsche Lufthansa
Aktiengeselischaft (“Lufthansa”) for damage to its IBM model
3032 computer that occurred during Lufthansa’s transport of the
computer from Chicago, Illinois, to Frankfurt, Germany, The
computer was shipped in 14 packages. The package containing
the director frame was damaged. Lufthansa has moved for sum-
mary judgment regarding the applicable standard governing limi-
tation of its liability. Deere has filed a cross-motion for partial
summary judgment. We grant Lufthansa’s motion and deny
Deere’s motion.
In this memorandum opinion, we shall address one question:
whether Lufthansa's liability for the damaged computer as set
out in Article 22(2) of the Warsaw Convention—250 French
gold francs per kilogram—is to be converted to United States
dollars with reference to the exchange value of the current French
franc, the former “official” price of gold, the free market price of
gold, or the Special Drawing Right (“SDR”) used by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund.
A-62
In its motion for summary judgment, Lufthansa seeks to limit
its liability under Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention, Conven-
tion for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature October 12, 1929, 49
Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876,137 L.N.T.S. 11 (adherence of the
United States proclaimed October 29, 1934).' Article 22 of the
Warsaw Convention provides that, unless a special declaration of
value is made at the time of a delivery, a carrier’s liability for
baggage or goods is limited to the equivalent of 250 francs per
kilogram. Article 22 states, moreover, that this limitation of 250
francs
shall be deemed to refer to the French franc consisting of
65% milligrams of gold at the standard of fineness of nine
hundred thousandths. These sums may be converted into
any national currency in round figures.
At the time when Article 22 was drafted, gold served official
monetary functions and its price was set by law. Since that time,
in the United States' and the world, gold is no longer used as a
standard of value; it no longer has an official price. Despite this
change in the nature of the value of gold, Article 22, at least at the
time of damage to the director frame, had not been amended to
substitute a new standard of value for gold. Although the parties
to the Warsaw Convention recognized the need for some amend-
ment to Article 22, they could not agree upon one. The Civil
Aeronautics Board, however, has continued to allow airlines to
calculate their limitation of liability under the Warsaw Conven-
tion based upon the last official price of gold. The Board views
this as a legal fiction which preserves the intention of the Warsaw.
Convention to limit the liability of air carriers. Boehringer
Mannheim Diagnostics v. Pan Am, 531 F. Supp. 344, 351-52
(S.D. Tex. 1981). Nevertheless, some courts have rejected cal-
culating the limitation on liability based upon the last official
aa oars
A-63
United States price of gold. See, e.g., id.; Franklin Mint Corp. v.
Trans World Airlines, 525 F. Supp. 1288, 1289 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), reversed, No. 82-7012 (2d Cir. September 26, 1982).
We recognize that each of the solutions offered by the parties
here and elsewhere’ is easy to criticize. What is needed is a
treaty amendment, but we do not have that. Therefore, we have
to choose one of the other alternatives. The one which seems
most nearly to effectuate the intention of the treaty to /imut the
liability of air carriers is to employ the last official United States
price of gold. We agree with the court in /n re Air Crush Disaster
at Warsaw, Poland, 535 F. Supp. 833, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1982),
which, in holding as we do, stated:
The clear merit of using this price as the unit for conver-
sion is that the price constitutes a conversion factor estab-
lished by precisely the kind of mechanism that the
Convention's drafters contemplated when the applicable
clauses were drafted. The use of the last official United
States price for gold means the use of a conversion factor
chosen by the United States at the time the price was set to
determine the relationship of this country’s currency and
those of other nations using a similar standard for conver-
sion. Such a conversion factor, grounded in the policy of
this country with respect to the value of its currency vis-a-
vis all other currencies based upon the gold standard has a
2. The Second Circuit in its opinion in Franklin Mint v. Trans
World Airlines, No. 82-7012 (2d Cir. September 26, 1982), concisely
pointed out the problems with each of the solutions raised by the parties:
The last official price of gold is a price which has been explicitly
sled by the Congress... Gn ods een wane
price of is the ly volatile price of a ity deter-
ised be ot te fees of cake eo Sn
currency values. SDRs are a creature of the IMF [ International
eee Seaee, anes ot ae that and
basis in the [Warsaw] Convention. franc is simply
one domestic currency, subject to change by the unilateral act of
a single government.
id ot 4 (citation omitted). The in Franklin Mint In
tress Rom , “oa
A-64
stability which would be entirely lost if the unit of conver-
sion were subject to the fluctutations of a private commod-
ities market relatively untouched by the regulating
influence of any public policy.
We hold that the last official United States price of gold -
$42.22 per ounce - governs the limitation on liability in this case.
For the above reasons, we grant Lufthansa’s motion for sum-
mary judgment as to the use of the last official United States price
of gold in calculating the limitation of liability in Article 22 of the
Warsaw Convention. We deny Deere’s cross-motion for sum-
mary judgment on this issue.
DATED: © Dec. 30, 1982
United States District Judge
A-65
[The Netherlands v. Giants Shipping Corp.,
Rechtspraak van de Week 321 (May 30, 1981)
(Sup. Ct. of The Netherlands May 1, 1981)]
TRANSLATION FROM DUTCH
The Supreme Court of the Netherlands
Having considered the petition of the State of the Netherlands,
having its seat in The Hague (hereinafter “the State”), repre-
sented by Mr. E. Korthals Altes, Attorney, Barrister at the
Supreme Court, said petition purporting to annul a decision of
June 13, 1980 of the Court of Appeal of The Hague;
Having considered the written defense lodged by Giants Ship-
ping Corporation, a corporation under Liberian Law, having its
seat in Monrovia, Liberia (hereinafter “Giants”), represented by
Mr. C. D. van Boeschoten, Attorney, likewise Barrister at the
Supreme Court, said defense purporting, primarily, to declare
inadmissible the appeal of the State, and, alternatively, to dismiss
that appeal;
Having taken into account the pleadings of Attorney-General
Haak—delivered also in the matter No. 11.705—purporting, in
the matter under reference, to annul the Court’s contested deci-
sion, but only insofar as it fixes the amount to which Giants’
liability is limited at the equivalent in Netherlands currency of an
amount of 12,764,810 gold francs, fixed at 65.5 milligrams gold
of 900/ 1000 fineness, converted at the rate of exchange of the day
on which it [Giants] complies with the order of the Court of
Rotterdam, given in its decision of November 23, 1979, to furnish
security for this amount, and, insofar as, subject to decision by the
Supreme Court, it fixes the amount to which, for the moment,
Giants’ liability is limited, at 12,764,810 [units of] 1/15 Special
Drawing Rights considered equivalent to the franc referred to in
Article 740d, peragraph 4 of the Commercial Code, as these
[Special Drawing Rights] are defined by the Internationa! Mon-
etary Fund, converted into Netherlands money according to the
valuation method applied by the Fund for its own operations and
ar
A-66
transactions, at the rate of exchange of the day on which Giants
complies with the order of the Court of Rotterdam, given in its
decision of November 23, 1979, to furnish security;
Having considered the contested decision and the other docu-
ments, from which it appears as follows:
By petition received on June 29, 1979, by the Clerk of the
Court, Giants applied to the District Court at Rotterdam with the
following requests:
“a. to fix the amount to which Giants’ liability, as men-
tioned in the petition, is limited for the moment at
12,764,810 gold francs, fixed at 65.5 milligrams of
900/1000 fineness;
b. to order that a procedure be instituted for the distri-
bution of this amount;
c. to direct that Giants furnish security by means of a
guaranty of the United Kingdom Mutual Steam Ship
Assurance Association (Bermuda) Limited, having its
seat in Hamilton, Bermuda, for a maximum amount of Fl.
2,210,000.00, increased by legal interest thereon from the
day of the decision in this matter, and increased by an
amount to cover the costs of the proceedings, to be fixed at
Fl. 10,000.00.
d. to order that, when Giants has satisfied the Court
that it has complied with the orde: referred to under c., a
magistrate be appointed to determine the statement of
dividends of the aforementioned amount and also an
administrator thereof;
e. to order that the security bond referred to in this
petition be returned when Giants has satisfied the Court
that it has complied with the order referred to under c. and
when Giants’ petition is granted uncontested, or after any
written defense has been conclusively rejected;”.
Against this, the State lodged a written defense with the afore-
mentioned Court, which contained the following requests:
A-67
“a. to fix, for the moment, the amount to which Giants’
liability is limited at the market price of the quantity of
gold corresponding to 12,764,810 gold francs, fixed at 65.5
milligrams gold of 900/1000 fineness, to be calculated at
the price on the conversion date as referred to in Article
740d, paragraph 4 of the Commercial Code;
b. to direct Giants to furnish good and valid security
by means of a bank guaranty;”.
The Court, having heard counsel for Giants and the State,
among others, in chambers, decided on November 23, 1979, as
follows:
“Fixes the amount to which Giants’ liability is limited
for the moment, at the countervalue in Netherlands cur-
rency of 12,764,810 gold francs, fixed at 65.5 milligrams
gold of 900/ 1000 fineness, calculated according to the rate
of the free market value of that quantity of gold on the day
security is furnished.
Directs Giants to furnish security for this amount by
means of a guaranty of The United Kingdom Mutual
Steam Ship Assurance Association Limited, having its
seat and office in Hamilton, Bermuda, increased by legal
interest from the date of this decision and also by an
amount of Fl. 10,000.00 to cover the costs of these
proceedings.
Rejects any other or additional claims.”.
This decision is based on the following considerations:
“1. that Giants is owner and operator of the Liberian
seagoing vessel “Blue Hawk,” which collided on December
29, 1978, in Terneuzen with the northern bridge over the
outer mole of the western lock and the brake mechanism
at the east side of the outer mole of the western lock; that,
with respect to that collision, claims for damage to prop-
erty were lodged against Giants by the State, the
Terneuzen municipality and the Taxicentrale [Cab Ser-
vice] Terneuzen B.V.; that Giants wishes to avail itself of
A-68
the right to limitation of its liability with respect to said
collision, granted it by virtue of Articles 740a through
740d of the Commercial Code;
2. that the Court fixes the net tonnage of the “Blue
Hawk” as referred to in Article 740d, first paragraph, of
the Commercial! Code, and observing the stipulations in
the third paragraph of said article, at 12,764.81 tons; that
furthermore, the Court, pursuant, to the aforesaid article,
limits, for the moment, Giants’ aforementioned liability
to, and fixes it at, 12,764,810 gold francs, fixed at 65.5
milligrams gold of 900/1000 fineness;
3. that Giants and the State, the latter being joined by
the Terneuzen municipality and the Taxicentrale
Terneuzen B.V., differ in opinion on the applicable conver-
sion rate of those gold francs, as mentioned in the
documents;
4. that, for lack of a valid contractual and/or statutory
stipulation on a definite conversion rate to be applied, and
also because no introduction of such stipulation can be
expected, within a period that would be reasonable for the
matter now before us, that might have allowed anticipa-
tion thereon, the Court can hardly determine anything
other than that the free market value of the aforemen-
tioned legally defined quantity of gold determines at pre-
sent the conversion rate, even if this implies a greater
liability than that according to the arrangements applying
until August 1, 1978;
5. that, since this is a case of limitation of liability
deviating from that under Common Law, this exception .
should indeed not be interpreted more broadly to the dis-
advantage of the injured party, than ensues mandatorily
from contract or law;
6. that in its petition Giants has offered to furnish
security for the amount of liability to be fixed, increased
A-69
by interest and costs, by means of a guaranty of The
United Kingdom Mutual Steam Ship Assurance Associa-
tion Limited, having its seat and office in Hamilton, Ber-
muda, and the Court considers, under the circumstances
of the case, such guaranty sufficiently good and valid
security, now that the State has not further supported its
opposition thereto;
7. that, insofar as Giants’ requests as mentioned here-
inabove under b. and d. are concerned, the Court shall not
consider these matters before Giants has satisfied the
Court that the directive stipulated below has been com-
plied with, as these matters are considered premature at
this stage of the request;
8. that, insofar as Giants’ request as mentioned herein-
above under e. is concerned, it is not possible to entertain
same, as such request cannoi now be brought up;”.
Giants\appealed against this decision with the aforementioned
Court of Appeal, which after hearing at its session of April 18,
1980, counsel for Giants and for the State, gave on June 13, 1980,
the following decision, which is now contested in the present
appeal:
“Annuls, upon appeal, the decision of November 23,
1979, of the Court in Rotterdam, insofar as it:
(1) fixes the amount to which Giants’ liability is for the
moment limited, at the countervalue in Netherlands cur-
rency of an amount of 12,764,810 gold francs, fixed at
65.5 milligrams gold of 900/1000 fineness, calculated at
the rate of the free market value of that quantity of gold on
the day security is furnished;
(2) rejects the request that the Court issue an order
that a procedure be instituted for the distribution of the
amount to which liability is limited;
and, deciding anew in these respects:
A-70
(1) fixes the amount to which liability is for the
moment limited, at the countervalue in Netherlands cur-
rency of an amount of 12,764,810 gold francs, fixes at 65.5
milligrams gold of 900/1000 fineness, converted at the
rate of the day on which Giants complies with the order,
given in the aforementioned decision, to furnish security
for this amount;
(2) orders that a procedure shall be instituted for the
distribution of the amount to which the liability is limited;
Upholds the aforementioned decision for the rest;
Returns the case to the Court in Rotterdam for further
dealing with Giants’ request;”.
considerations of the Court of Appeal in the case were:
“1. The present appeal is lodged against a decision
given by the Court pursuant to Article 320c of the Code of
Civil Procedure, on a request submitted by Giants to the
Court pursuant to Article 320a of said Code.
2. The aforementioned request was to the effect, mate-
rially and insofar as is relevant at present, that
Giants—submitting to avail itself of the right, granted it
by virtue of Article 740a@ of the Commercial Code, to
limitation of its liability for claims connected with the
collision on December 29, 1978, of the seagoing vessel
“Blue Hawk” with the northern bridge over the outer mole
of the western lock in Terneuzen—requested to fix (provi-
sionally) the amount of said limited liability, in accord-
ance with the stipulations of Article 740d of said Code, at"
12,764,810 gold francs, fixed at 65.5 milligrams gold of
900/ 1000 fineness and to order that Giants furnish secur-
ity for same. The request was also to the effect that the
Court give order that a procedure shall be instituted for
the distribution of the aforementioned amount.
A-71
3. In its aforementioned decision, the Court granted
the first request, in such a manner that the amount to
which Giants’ liability is limited for the moment, was fixed
at “the countervalue in Netherlands currency of an
amount of 12,764,810 gold francs, fixed at 65.5 milligrams
gold of 900/1000 fineness, calculated at the rate of the
free market value of that quantity of gold on the day the
security is furnished,” said security being ordered, at the
same time, for said amount, increased by legal interest
from the day of the decision and by an amount of FI.
10,000.00 for the costs of the proceedings. The second
request was rejected.
4. The appeal claims, firstly, that the Court wrongfully
determined that the amount of the limited liability and the
security to be furnished for same be calculated at the rate
of the free market value of the mentioned gold francs, and
it claims, secondly, that the Court wrongfully rejected the
second request mentioned hereinabove.
5. First of all, the question arises whether the present
decision is open to appeal, and the Court of Appeal must
examine this question officially.
Relative to this question, it must be held that, by virtue
of Article 345 of the Code on Civil Procedure, appeal is
possible, because according to the law, and in particular
also in Articles 320a through 320z and especially in Arti-
cle 320x of said Code, appeal against a decision such as
the present one is not explicitly excluded, and also because
neither the effect of the present course of proceedings nor
the decision under discussion imply that appeal against it
is not permissible.
As also the term [for appeal] mentioned in said article
was observed, Giants’ appeal is, therefore, admissible.
6. With respect to the first claim put forward by
Giants, as stated hereinabove, it must be held that the
A-72
system of the procedure for the limitation of the liability
mentioned in this case implies—as explicitly expressed in
Article 740d of the Commercial Code—that in the present
case, in which the furnishing of security is ordered, the
conversion of the amount in gold francs into Netherlands
currency must be made at the rate of the day on which the
order to furnish security is complied with. Because at the
time of the Court's decision and now, it is not certain at
what time Giants shall furnish security, and it is, there-
fore, not possible to determine, at this time, which rate
must be applied, the Court wrongfully determined in the
contested decision that the conversion in Netherlands cur-
rency of the gold francs must be made at the rate of the
free market value thereof, so that this decision must be
annulled in that respect. Therefore, all the observations
concerning the rate to be taken into account for the con-
version, put forward on behalf of Giants and on behalf of
the State of the Netherlands, must now be set aside.
7. With respect to the second claim put forward by
Giants, as stated hereinabove, it must be held that by
virtue of the stipulations at the end of the first paragraph
of Article 320a of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the
further course of proceedings provided for in the subse-
quent articles of said Code, the decision granting the
request as referred to in Article 320a must also order that
a procedure be instituted for the distribution of the
amount to which the liability is limited.
Therefore, the Court wrongfully rejected this request, so that
the decision must be annulled in this respect and said order must _
yet be given.”;
Considering that the State contests this decision, basing its
appeal on the following grievances:
“Breach of justice and neglect of forms, non-observance
of which brings about nullity, as the Court of Justice
A-73
considered Giants’ appeal admissible for reasons men-
tioned in the aforementioned decision and which are con-
sidered repeated and included herein, and subsequently
decided in the verdict of the contested decision, thereby
partly annulling the decision of the Court in Rotterdam, as
mentioned in the verdict of the contested decision, all this
wrongfully for the following reasons:
a) The Court of Appeal wrongfully admitted Giants’
appeal, reasoning that, by virtue of Article 345 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, appeal is possible, because
according to the law, and in particular also in Article 320a
through 320z and especially in Article 320x of said Code,
appeal against a decision such as the present one is not
explicitly excluded, and also because neither the effect of
the present course of proceedings nor the decision under
discussion imply that appeal against it is not permissible.
The legal system, as embodied in the Articles 320a
through 320z of the Code of Civil Procedure, the nature of
the present decision as well as, in particular, Article 320x
of the Code of Civil Procedure, really does oppose the
possibility of appeal against a decision such as the one
under discussion, given by the Court by virtue of Article
320c of the Code of Civil Procedure.
b) The Court of Appeal held wrongfully that the sys-
tem of the procedure for the limitation of the liability
implies—as also explicitly expressed, according to the
Court of Appeal, in Article 740d of the Commercial
Code—that in the present case, in which the furnishing of
security is ordered, the conversion of the amount in gold
francs into Netherlands currency must be made at the rate
of the day on which the order to furnish security is com-
plied with, and that, as at the time of the Court's decision,
like now, it is not certain at what time Giants shall furnish
security and it is, therefore, not possible to determine, at
A-174
this time, which rate must be applied, the Court wrong-
fully determined in the contested decision that the conver-
sion into Netherlands currency of the gold francs must be
made at the rate of the free market value thereof. The
Court of Appeal also decided wrongfully that all the
observations concerning the rate to be taken into account
for the conversion, put forward on behalf of Giants and on
behalf of the State of the Netherlands, must now be set
aside.
Judging thus, the Court of Appeal omitted, wrongfully,
to determine at which rate—of the day on which Giants
complies with the order to furnish security—the amount
of 12,764,810 gold francs fixed at 65.5 milligrams gold of
900/1000 fineness is to be computed.
In this respect, the Court of Appeal ought to have con-
firmed the contested decision of the Court in Rotterdam
and fixed the amount to which Giants’ liability is for the
moment limited, at the countervalue in Netherlands cur-
rency of an amount of 12,764,810 gold francs fixed at 65.5
milligrams gold of 900/1000 fineness, calculated accord-
ing to the rate of the free market value of that quantity of
gold on the day security is furnished.”;
Considering that Giants, in its statement of defense
lodged with the Supreme Court, supported its appeal
against the admissibility of the appeal to the Supreme
Court by the State with the following arguments:
“The State apparently takes the position that it is one of
the parties that appeared in one of the previous instances
and that it can, therefore, appeal to the Supreme Court by
virtue of Article 426, paragraph 1 of the Code of Civil ©
Procedure. Giants is of the opinion that the State cannot
be regarded as a party that appeared in the previous
instances and was also not regarded as such by the Court
of Appeal. In the appeal proceedings at the Court of
Appeal the State has not submitted a statement of defense
A-75
and the Court of Appeal mentioned the State in its con-
tested decision only as “... one of the parties mentioned by
Giants toward whom it is of the opinion it can invoke the
right to limitation of its liability.” The nature of the
proceedings under reference implies, furthermore, that
those toward whom the limitation of liability can be
invoked cannot oppose in a suit such as the one under
reference the (provisional) limitation of the shipowner’s
liability, but must follow to that end the judicial proceed-
ings initiated with the statement of defense by virtue of
Article 320g, paragraph | of the Code of Civil Procedure.
It results from the above that the State is not permitted to
appeal to the Supreme court.
Whereas:
1. Giants argued that the State’s appeal to the
Supreme Court is not admissible, submitting that the
State cannot be regarded as having appeared “in one of
the previous instances” in the sense of Article 426, para-
graph | of the Code of Civil Procedure. This argument
must be rejected.
2. The Court mentions in its decision of November 23,
1979, that it has “seen” the State’s statement of defense
received on July 6, 1979, lodged by the State’s solicitor
E.C.G. Klinkhamer, Attorney. From this, it must be con-
cluded that the Court permitted the State to submit a
statement of defense. The decision also states that the
Court, by virtue of its decision of July 6, 1979, which
ordered, among other things, that the State be summoned,
had heard B.D. Wubs, Attorney in The Hague, counsel for
the State. All this means that the State did appear in the
first instance in the sense of Article 426, paragraph 1.
Though the creditors do not have the right to submit a
statement of defense against a request as referred to by
A-76
Article 320a and though the judge is not obliged to sum-
mon the creditors mentioned by the petitioner, no stipula-
tion in the law prevents the judge from permitting the
submission of a statement of defense and from ordering
the creditors to be summone¢. In particular, the possibil-
ity provided for by Article 320g, paragraph 1, second
sentence, to submit, when the distribution procedure
proper has been started, a statement of defense relating to
the points mentioned therein, does not prevent the judge
from offering the opportunity for defense already in an
earlier stage, i.e., that of dealing with the request as
referred to in Article 320a. If a creditor availed himself
of this opportunity, he did appear in the sense of Article
426, of paragraph 1.
Furthermore, as appears from the decision of the Court
of Appeal on the written appeal lodged by Giants, B.D.
Wubs, Attorney in The Hague, counsel for the State, was
“heard at the session of April 18, 1980.” This means that
the State also did appear in the appeal before the Court of
Appeal in the sense of Article 426, paragraph 1, even
though the State—as Giants argued—did not lodge a
statement of defense in the appeal proceedings.
The State’s grievances as to the nonadmissibility of the
appeal to the Supreme Court must therefore be rejected.
3. Part a. of the grievance refers to the question of
whether the possibility of appeal by the petitioner—the
debtor—is open on a decision on a request as referred to in
Article 320.
Firstly, the question arises if such a decision can be
regarded as “a judgment of the Court” in the sense of
Article 320x, paragraph 2. A combination of arguments
leads to a negative reply.
The latter stipulation speaks of a “judgment,” whereas
in Article 320i the determination mentioned in Article
320c is called a “decision.” Article 320x, paragraph 2,
speaks of the “day of pronouncement”; it is not plausible
A-77
that in the system that was in the mind of the legislator,
there was room for a pronouncement of a decision on a
request as referred to in Article 320a. The short term for
appeal—four weeks—is evidently connected with the leg-
islator’s desire to accelerate the distribution procedure;
same can be started only after the debtor has complied
with the order given him by the Court, as referred to in
Article 320c, paragraph 1. The decision on the request
referred to in Article 320a, however, precedes the distribu-
tion procedure proper, so that the reason to determine a
short term for appeal does not apply here. Finally, the
mandatory notification to the Clerk of the Court, stipu-
lated in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 320x, is evidently
connected with the tasks with which the Clerk of the Court
is charged by various articles—such as Article 320/ and
Article 3201, paragraph 1—within the framework of the
distribution procedure. The decision on a request as
referred to in Article 320a is given, nowever, in an earlier
Stage and one cannot see what sense a notification to the
Clerk of the Court would have at that stage.
All this leads to the conclusion that Article 320x, para-
graph 2, does not refer to a decision on a request as
referred to in Article 320a.
4. Itshould, therefore, now be examined if Article 345
implies that appeal on such a decision is open to the
petitioner.
If the request is rejected, or is granted in such a manner
that the petitioner—i.e., the debtor—is aggrieved by it, he
may appeal against the decision by virtue of Article 345.
Neither the law nor the nature of the decision are opposed
to it. At this stage, the only question that is relevant is
whether, and if so under which conditions, the debtor will
be able to have the distribution procedure started. In
these cases, the debtor has an interest to submit these
questions to the judge in appeal. Article 320g, paragraph
A-78
1, last sentence—which the State invoked in particu-
lar—plays a role only in the next stage, i.c., in that of the
distribution procedure proper. For this reason already,
that article does not stand in the way of allowing the
petitioner the right of appeal with respect to the decision
on a request as referred to in Article 320a.
5, The above implies that the Court of Appeal was
right in admitting Giants’ appeal. Therefore, Part a. of
the grievance must be rejected.
6. The grievance under b. has a twofold bearing. In
the first place, it purports to argue that the Court should
not have abstained from answering the question according
to which criterion the amount of 12,764,810 gold francs,
mentioned in the decision of the Court of Justice, should
be converted into Netherlands currency. Furthermore, it
purports to argue that that criterion should serve the free
market value of the quantity of gold involved, on the day
security is furnished,
The Supreme Court will address itself first to t!.2 ques-
tion of whether the Court of Appeal should have expressed
its opinion on the question of the criterion.
7, The arrangement contained in Articles 320a-320z,
as determined by the Law of June 3, 1965, Official Gazette
No. 239, differs, insofar as is relevant to this case, frown the
earlier arrangement, in the sense that under the present
arrangement the court fixes the amount to which the lia-
bility of the debtor is limited for the moment (Article
320c, first paragraph), whereas, previously, the law (in
the old Article 320a) referred, for the magnitude of the
amount to be paid by the debtor, to the relevant articles of
the Commercial Code. This means that under the old
arrangement, it was initially left to the debtor to deter-
mine that amount——with the understanding that during
the distribution procedure each creditor could contest the
“sufficiency” thereof (old Article 320/)—whereas at pre-
sent, the magnitude of the amount the debtor must pay, or
A-79
for which he must furnish security, is immediately put
under the supervision of the court. The legislator, in so
determining, will have intended that the calculation of the
amount in accordance with the criteria mentioned in Arti-
cle 740d, paragraphs |, 2 and 3 of the Commercial Code
shall be supervised. The question of what, for the conver-
sion referred to in Article 740d, paragraph 4, should be
considered as “the rate of the day” of payment, or of
furnishing security, was not a problem in the opinion of the
legislator; however, in the case before us, it does present a
problem, since, as will be discussed in point 10 hereunder,
at the time the Court of Appeal pronounced its deci-
sion—and also at the time of the decision of the lower
court—the official parity of the guilder expressed in gold
no longer existed. According to the documents of the
case, this problem was the subject of a debate in the first
instance and in the appeal; it was, in fact, the issue of the
dispute. Under these circumstances, the Court of Appeal
should not have abstained from answering this question.
As it is, the intent of the arrangement—that not the
debtor but the judge fixes the amount to which the liability
is limited for the moment—implies that the judge must
express himself in the order to be given by virtue of Article
320c, paragraph |, on the debated point of the criterion for
conversion, to avoid that the debtor himself, when making
payment or furnishing security, initially establishes the
criterion for the conversion, and, therewith, the magnitude
of the relevant amount. In this connection, it must also be
noted that Articles 320d, 320e and 320f, paragraph |
assume that by means of the order given by virtue of
Article 320c, paragraph |, it can be shown that the debtor
complied with that order: ana this also involves that the
order should not leave any uncertainty—in cases such as
the one before us—on the crucially important point of the
criterion for conversion.
A-80
Therefore, Part b., insofar as it submits the grievance
that the Court of Appeal wrongfully abstained from deter-
ining that criterion, is well-founded,
8. Insofar as Part b. purports to argue that the conver-
sion referred to in Article 740d, paragraph 4 of the Com-
mercial Code must be made with due regard to the free
market value of gold, it must be rejected on the grounds
following hereafter.
9. In its judgment of April 14, 1972, Netherlands
Case Law 1972, 269, the Supreme Court gave a decision
on the manner in which that conversion must be made,
which was based, among other things, on considerations
drawn from the wording, the history of the origin and the
intent of the Treaty, concluded in Brussels on October 10,
1957, on the limitation of liability of owners of seagoing
vessels, for the implementation of which Treaty Articles
740a through 740d were incorporated in the aforemen-
tioned Code, That decision held that, as long as there are
international agreements among a large majority of coun-
tries that are a party to said Treaty, on the mutual cur-
rency relations that are based on a common valuation of
gold, the conversion into Netherlands currency of the
franc referred to in said article—hereinafter referred to,
for the sake of shortness, as the franc-—must be made on
the basis of the official, i.e., the legally fixed, parity of the
guilder expressed in gold at the time of said conversion,
and not on the basis of the rate of gold quoted at that
mornent on the free market.
10. Since that time, far-reaching developments have
occurred in the international monetary field, which led to
the Second Amendment to the Articles of the Agreement
of the International Monetary Fund (Journal of Treaties
1977, 40), approved for the Kingdom by the Law of
March 23, 1978, Official Gazette 173, and, in connection
therewith, to the introduction, effective as of August |,
1978, of the Law concerning the rate of exchange of the
A-81
guilder, and the repeal, connected therewith and effective
as of the same date, of the Law on the par value of the
guilder,
These developments indicate, insofar as is relevant here,
and as far as the Netherlands are concerned at least since
the aforementioned date, that gold has lost all monetary
significance. One cannot speak any more, at present, of
an official parity of the guilder expressed in gold. This
means that in the light of the objectives of the Treaty of
1957—-as expressed by the Supreme Court in its afore-
mentioned judgment—the appropriateness of the franc,
expressed in gold, to serve as a generally accepted unit of
account for determining internationally uniform limits of
liability was lost.
11, Consequently, a lacuna occurred in Article 470d
and in the stipulation of the treaty on which it was based.
To fill same, steps were taken meanwhile, both on the
international level and by national legislators, which led to
the adjustment of the Treaty of 1957 to the new monetary
situation by means of a Protocol established in Brussels on
December 21, 1979, amending said treaty, and to similar
adjustments of the national legal arrangements in various
countries by means of legislative measures; in this country,
a draft bill (No. 15.459) for such a law was passed by the
Second Chamber of Parliament on February 17, 1981.
However, as long as the adjustment arrangement as
referred to hereinabove has not yet force of law in the
Netherlands, the judge cannot—also because of the con-
siderations under point 7 hereinabove—abstain from giv-
ing a conversion standard.
12. The point of departure should be the prefer-
ence—underlying the Treaty and, therefore, Article 740d
as well—for a standard which is current in the interna-
tional monetary field for determining the internationally
uniform limits of liability intended by the Treaty.
A-82
To convert the franc in the manner the State pleads in
these proceedings, according to the price of gold on the
free market, would be contrary to this point of departure.
The aforementioned point of departure will rather lead to
joining the choice made by the Member States of the
International Monetary Fund for a unit of account which
is suited to be used as such in international payments,
since gold has ceased to be a monetary standard. The
choice fell on the Special Drawing Right (SDR) of the
aforementioned Fund, the value of this unit being initially
expressed in gold, i.¢., a weight amounting to approxi-
mately 15 times the gold weight of the aforesaid franc.
This ratio, and the circumstance that, when gold as a
value standard of the SDR was replaced by a collection of
national currencies (the so-called standard basket), and
the new criterion was chosen in such a manner that at the
moment of change, the value of the SDR was the same
according to both criteria, make it possible to join this
choice by considering the franc equal to 1/15 SDR for its
conversion into Netherlands currency and to effect the
conversion according to the valuation method applied by
the Fund for its own operations and transactions.
13. To fill the lacuna in this manner is in harmony with
the legal conceptions adopted since, as these find their
expression in the arrangements made recently that aim at
the adjustment of international treaties and national laws
to the changed monetary situation. With respect to vari-
ous treaties in which the franc is used as unit of account,
amending protocols were adopted, such as the one already
mentioned, that prescribe that the franc be con-idered
equal to 1/15 SDR for conversion into national currency;
the same applies with respect to the adjustment legislation
adopted in several countries and, likewise, the aforemen-
tioned draft bill opted for this solution.
14. Objecting to conversion of the franc on the basis of
1/15 SDR, the State submitted that the value of the SDR
A-83
in terms of purchasing power had considerably declined
since the time when this unit was still expressed in the
aforementioned weight of gold; as a consequence thereof,
conversion of the franc on the aforementioned basis leads
to a real reduction, which cannot be neglected, in the
liability limits provided for in the Treaty and in Article
740d. This circumstance cannot, however, become a
decisive factor when the judge makes his choice on how to
fill the lacuna. Even if the aforementioned limits would
require revision in connection with the decline of the
purchasing power of the unit of account to be applied, it is
not the task of the judge to provide for this, but it is up to
the legislative body of the treaty and/or the national legis-
lator to intervene.
It is worth noting, in this connection, that on November
19, 1976, a Treaty was concluded in London—which has
not yet taken effect, however—on the limitation of liabil-
ity for maritime claims (Journal of Treaties 1980, 23).
This Treaty is intended to replace the Treaty of 1957 and
contains considerably higher limits of liability, expressed
in SDRs.
15. The fact that Part b. of the grievance, insofar as it
concerns the complaint described hereinabove at the end
of point 7, is founded, implies that the decision of the
Court of Appeal cannot be upheld, insofar as the Court of
Appeal held that it could abstain from making a decision
on the point in dispute between Giants and the State con-
cerning the conversion criterion to be applied. The
Supreme Court can settle the case itself.
It follows from the above considerations concerning the
conversion criterion, that grievance | of the appeal is
founded, insofar as it argues that the franc is to be consid-
ered equal to 1/15 SDR for the purpose of conversion.
No appeal to the Supreme Court was made against the
decision of the Court of Appeal on grievance 2.
A-84
The above leads to the conclusion that the decision of
the Court of Appeal only need be completed to the extent
that it is necessary to state the criterion—mentioned
b.'ow-—for the conversion of the amount in francs men-
tioned by the Court of Appeal;
Annuls the decision of the Court of Appeal, but only
insofar as the Court of Appeal omitted to state the crite-
rion according to which the relevant amount in francs is to
be converted;
Fixes the amount to which Giants’ liability is limited for
the moment, at the countervalue in Netherlands currency
of 12,764,810 francs fixed at 65.5 milligrams gold of
900/1000 fineness, this franc to be considered equal to
1/15 Special Drawing Right as it is defined by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, and at the rate of the day on
which security is furnished, to be converted in Nether-
lands currency in accordance with the valuation method
applied by the Fund for its own operations and
transactions;
Rejects the appeal in all other respects.
So done by Deputy Chief Justice Ras and Justices Haardt,
Royer, Martens and de Groot, and so pronounced by the afore-
mentioned Mr. Haardt, Attorney, in public session on the first of
May nineteen hundred and eighty-one, in the presence of the
Attorney-General.
(signatures )
(signature)
(Rubber stamp:
Certified true copy)
The Clerk of the Supreme Court
of the Netherlands
(signature)
A-85§
CERTIFICATION
I, Irwin K. Styles, of ALL-LANGUAGE SERVICES, INC.,
545 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10017, hereby certify
that the foregoing is a true and faithful translation of the original
document.
IRWIN STYLES
State of New York
County of New York sory
*
Sworn to before me this 28th day of July, 1981
BARNEY ROSE,
NOTARY PUBLIC State of New York
No. 41-3343010, Qual. in Queens Co
Cert. Filed in N. Y. County
Commission Expires March 30, 1983
A-86
FOR INFORMATION
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD MEMORANDUM
May 20, 1981
TO: The Board
FROM: Director, Bureau of Compliance and Consum-
er Protection
fe Director, Bureau of International Aviation
Director, Bureau of Domestic Aviation
General Counsel
SUBJECT: Warsaw Convention Liability Limits
For more than a year now, various components of the Board's
staff have been considering the question of how the liability limi-
tations contained in the Warsaw Convention should be converted
to dollars. The question is a troublesome one, and the memo-
randa exchanged among the staff have not reached the same
conclusions of this issue. There is considerable interest in the
final resolution of this matter among parties outside the Board,
including some involved in litigation where the amount of poten-
tial liability is a significant issue.
The Board has never taken a position as to which liability
limitation level is correct, and the Bureau of Compliance and
Consumer Protection recommends that the Board decline to take
any position which would affect the determination of liability
limits until the matter has been further refined at the staff level.
Any policy recommendation that would come from the staff
should be communicated to the Departments of Transportation
and State as well in the hope of reaching interagency agreement.
1 This Bureau wrote the first memorandum in March, 1980. BIA
and BDA wrote reply memos in April, 1980.
A-87
This memorandum contains BCCP’s reappraisal of the problem
and is intended to initiate a fresh start in addressing the question
at the Board.
I. Background
The Warsaw Convention was signed at Warsaw, Poland, on
October 12, 1929, and ratified by the United States Senate on
July 31, 1934.°° Among its most compelling purposes were the
protection of the fledgling aviation industry from potentially ruin-
ous damage judgments and the assurance of some reliable and
consistent basis for recovery for injury or damage to persons or
property.’ Thus the Convention (a) enunciated carriers’ liability
for personal injuries (Article 17), damage or loss of baggage and
other property (Article 18), and damage due to delay (Article
19) subject to affirmative defenses which could be proved by a
carrier, i.e., the carrier's freedom from fault (Article 20) or the
injured person’s contributory fault (Article 21); (b) provided a
limitation on the extent of liability (Article 22); and (c) nullified
any provision tending to relieve a carrier of any such liability or to
fix a lower limit (Article 23). In addition, the Convention
required carriers to provide notice to the passengers in the form of
a ticket or baggage check with respect to, inter alia, the limita-
tions on liability, and barred defenses permitted by the Conven-
tion, including the limitation of liability, if carriers accept
passengers or baggage without delivering the required ticket or
baggage check (Articles 3 and 4).
The Board has implemented Articles 3 and 4 by specifying the
notice carriers must provide concerning the liability limits. 14
C.F.R. Sections 221.175 and 221.176. Carriers also include the
liability limits in tariffs filed with the Board, as required by
la. 49 Stat. 3000.
2. Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 Harv.L.Rev. 497, 498-500 (1967). See also Horner &
Legrez, Minutes, Second International Conference on Private Aeronau-
tical Law, Warsaw 1929 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1975), pp. 38, 40-41.
A-88
Section 403 (a) of the Act and Part 221.3 of the Board's Regula-
tions. The Board has also been an active participant in Congres-
sional hearings concerning possible amendments to the
Convention.
In March, 1980, our former Policy Development Division sent
the Board a memo suggesting that carriers are violating the War-
saw Convention by asserting liability limits much lower than
those actually permitted by the Convention. These limitations
are expressed in terms of gold and have always been converted to
dollars by use of the official rate of gold. Since there no longer is
an “official” price for gold in the U.S., the memorandum sug-
gested that the market value of gold has to be used in converting
the liability limits to dollars,
BIA and BDA have written memos responding to this sugges-
tion. Each response posed two major objections, /.e., (1) that the
recommendation is inconsistent with the intention of the Warsaw
signatories and (2) that it is inconsistent with IMF amendments
establishing “Special Drawing Rights” tied to a basket of 16
currencies, rather than gold, as the basic unit of account for
converting currencies. The Board has not taken any action on
the recommendation.
Il. Discussion
In 1929, when the Warsaw Convention was adopted, currencies
were either expressed in gold or easily convertible to gold using an
official rate. From 1933 to 1974, gold ownership in the United
States was legal only for a small class of uses, such as jewelry-
making and dentistry. The price of gold in these transactions
was dictated by the government's official price, since it was the
government's policy to buy and sell gold at that rate. A private
buyer would thus not pay more than the official rate because he
could buy it from the government at that price and, conversely, a
private seller would not accept less than the official rate because
he could sell it to the government for that amount.
The drafters of the Warsaw Convention thus foresaw no ambi-
guity in their use of gold as the unit of account because at the time
A-89
governments had an official rate of gold which was easily discerni-
ble and virtually identical to the market rate of gold, to the extent
that a market rate existed at all. Seeing no ambiguity, they never
addressed the question of whether the official or market rate
should be used in converting the limits to national currencies. To
determine how the limits should be converted now that there is no
official rate, one must attempt to determine what is most consis-
tent with the purpose of the limitation on liability.
The primary purpose of the liability limits in the Warsaw Con-
vention is the protection of carriers from unforeseeable and
unlimited liability. At the time of the Convention, it was feared
that carriers would refuse to carry passengers and/or cargo unless
they could measure the scope of risk they were assuming. The
limits were thus intended to provide a measure of predictability
for carriers so that they could operate free from the fear of
unlimited liability,
The use of gold as the unit of account was intended “to avoid, as
far us the limits are concerned, the effects of devaluations which
would result from having the limits expressed in any local cur-
rency.”’ The use of gold was thus seen as providing more stabil-
ity than any national currency could, further promoting the
predictability the limits were intended to provide. This was
because national currencies were subject to devaluation by their
country, whereas the value of gold was not subject to change as
the result of a single country’s unilateral action,
There can be no doubt that use of tne official rate of gold
produces results more consistent with these purposes than use of
3. H. Drion, Limitations of Liabilities in International Air Law
1954. p, 183, Other writers agree but add that the use of gold was also
intended to assure that damages awarded by different countries would
have a uniform value and to provide stability in terms of the purchasing
power represented by the limits. Bristow, “Gold Franc - Replacement
of Unit of Account,” LMCLQ 31 (1978); Asser, “Golden Limitations
of Liability in International Transport Conventions and the Currency
Crisis,” 5. J. Maritime L. and Com. 645 (1973-74); Norway, “Conver-
sion from Poincare oy to National arenas LG seg td to ioe —s
meeting of ICAO's | Committee, and
Drawing Right in lis ility Conventions: an Acceptable Sclopoa?™
DLMCLQ | 9, 171 (1979).
A-90
the market rate. The official rate of gold, at least in the United
States, fluctuated only rarely. Even in countries whose curren-
cies were devalued more frequently, the official rate would pro-
vide greater predictability and stability than the market rate.
This is especially true now, since speculation has led to wildly
fluctuating market prices of gold.
Use of an official rate is supported by the approach adopted in
more recent Conventions, when the ambiguity of expressing lim-
its in terms of gold was more apparent. Both the Convention
Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution, signed in Brussels in 1969,
and the Convention Relating to the Limitation of the Liability of
the Owners of Inland Navigation Vessels, signed in Geneva in
1973, expressly provided for the use of the official value of gold in
setting liability limits.‘ Conversion by the official rate is further
bolstered by the fact that a majority of courts have used it in
converting Warsaw's limits after the official and market rates
began to diverge.’ ICAO also passed a resolution in 1974 oppos-
ing the use of the market price of gold in converting Warsaw's
limits, which provides a strong indication of how other participat-
ing countries feel.‘
Since it appears that stable limits were of paramount impor-
tance to the drafters of the Convention, basing them on the mar-
ket value of gold would be inconsistent with the Convention.
Since there is no longer an official rate of gold in the United
States, however, it is not entirely clear how the limits should be
converted.
In 1975, the Warsaw signatories attempted to deal with the
changes in the role of gold in international monetary transactions.
Their answer, embodied in the Montreal Protocol, was the substi-
tution of Special Drawing Rights (SDR's) for gold as the basis |
for conversion. The SDR is a creation of the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF), the agency which establishes the basic
4. The Lega! Committee of ICAO, Resolution Concerning the Con-
version of Poincre Francs to National Currencies in the Warsaw and
Rome Conventions, 1974.
5. Tobolewski, “The Special Drawing Right in Liability Conven-
tions: An Acceptable Solution?” 2 LMeLO 169, 171 (1979),
6. See footnote 4.
A-91
ground rules for currency transactions between member coun-
tries. Use of SDR's by the Montreal signatories was presumably
intended to eliminate the confusion over how the Warsaw limits
should be converted from gold to national currencies. With no
official rate of gold and a fluctuating market rate which would
produce results at odds with the Convention's purposes, the Mon-
treal signatories chose to abandon gold in favor of SDR’s because
SDR’s provided the stability and ease of conversion which had
attracted the Warsaw signatories to choose gold as the unit of
account.
The United States supported the SDR approach at Montreal
and signed the Montreal Protocol. If the Senate had ratified the
Protocol, the SDR approach would be law and there would be no
problem in determinirz Warsaw's limits. The Senate has not
ratifies the Pr . however, although it was submitted for
alilie in January, 1977. Its failure to either ratify or reject
the Protocol makes détermination of the proper conversion rate
diff} car § explained above, use of the market rate of
old produces results inconsistent with the Convention's pur-
poses, (2) there is no current official rate of gold and (3) the
United States is obligated by international law to refrain from
acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Montreal
Protocol.”
To fulfill its obligation to observe, to the extent possible, the
requirements of both the Warsaw Convention and Montreal Pro-
tocol, the Board has for the past five years been engaging in a
legal fiction, Unable to use the SDR approach because Montreal
has not been ratified and constrained from using the market price
of gold hecause doing so would defeat the object and purpose of
both Montreal and Warsaw, the Board has continued to convert
7, Fitzgerald, “The Four Montreal! Protocols to Amend the Warsaw
Convention Regime Governing Internation Carriage by Air,” 42 J.Air
L. & Comm. 273, 325, 329-30 (1976).
8. Article 18, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, requires a
country to refrain from acts which would defeat the purpose and object
ofa a oe aol it makes ore = intention not tae become sect
party. is obligation applies even when the treaty was si su
to ratification and has not yet been ratified.
A-92
Warsaw's limits based on the official rate of gold immediately
preceding the elimination of a!] ties between gold and the dollar.’
This approach produces the greatest degree of stability possible
since the dollar limits will remain constant unless and until the
United States reestablishes ties between gold and the dollar,
We believe that the Board's current course of action is superior
to any of the alternatives currently available. Use of the last
official rate of gold, however, may at times prevent passengers
from recovering the full extent of damages caused by
carriers.’’ Carriers may no longer need the protection of these
low limits, given the maturation of the aviation industry since
1929,
Because of the confusion inherent in converting Warsaw's lim-
its when there is no official rate of gold and the equitable consider-
ations raised by the low limits currently in force, we believe the
Board should develop a coherent policy resolution of the ques-
tions, and then meet with the Departments of Transportation and
State to review this problem. These agencies will be solely
responsible for enforcing Warsaw in the future and have partici-
pated actively in formulating U.S. policy in this area in the past.
Pending resolution of this issue by the three agencies we believe
the Board should take no action which would disturb the conver-
sion formula now contained in sections 221.175 and 221.176 of
the regulations.
JOHN GOLDEN
John Golden
Prepared by;
STEVEN ROTHENBERG
Ext. 3-5943
9. Thus, the notice of Warsaw's limits required by Parts 221.175
and 221.176 of the Board's Regulations is based on conversion at this
rate.
10. The limits are $9.07 per pound for checked luggage, $400 for
carry-on bags and approximately $10,000 per passenger. $10,000
or} is superseded, however, by a $75,000 limit adopied by carriers in
A-93
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN N, ROMANS
ROBERT S. LIPTON
101 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10178
‘212) 696-6000
Counsel for Petitioner,
Trans World Airlines, Inc.
CURTIS, MALLET-PREVOST,
CoL_t & MOSLE
Scott J. MCKAY WOLAS
MiIcHAEL L. M,. QUINTTUS
Of Counsel
January 15, 1983
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.