Petition — Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the Unite

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,

Petitioner,

_

FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN

MINT LIMITED, AND MCGREGOR, SWIRE

AIR SERVICES LIMITED,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

JOHN N. ROMANS

ROBERT S. LIPTON

101 Park Avenue

New York, New York 10178

(212) 696-6000

Counsel for Petitioner,

Trans World Airlines, Inc.

CURTIS, MALLET-PREVOST,

Co_t & MOSLE

Scott J. MCKAY WOLAS

MICHAEL L. M. QuINTTUS

Of Counsel

January 15, 1983

vg . f

Se. 9 iil ee

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the courts of the United States may abrogate a

provision of a treaty which is both constitutionally sound and

capable of enforcement?

2. Whether the court of appeals erroneously failed to exercise

its constitutional responsibility to construe the Warsaw Conven-

tion’s limitation of liability provisions to effectuate the intent of

the signatory States in light of changed circumstances?

3. What is the proper conversion factor for the gold franc

provisions of the Warsaw Convention in view of the unequivocal

intent of the Convention’s signatories to fix air carrier limits of

liability at a predictable, stable and definite level?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

RNUOEIIIES BPRIREMEIOTIEDD 5.cccs.cccsccccccccsconcscsedésoccescocescodecsacees

Ss snasuastibbounanaosices

JURISDICTION

SEER E EEE EEE EEE EEE EEE EEE EE EEE EE EEEE EEE HEHE EEE EERE EEEEE EERE EEE

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, TREATY INVOLVED .....

I s,s coscuhennshocnonesnnesccssteses

a csnedonnnsessobosese

I III 5. ccccccocscccsccossocccesccessucces

ee IIE NII ccc sscccasctosncescccccosscccecessee

D. The Decision of the Court Below ...............c000

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ooccccccccccccceccececeeeeeee

PoINT I.

PoINT II.

A.

CONCLUSION

THE CourT OF APPEALS WAS WITHOUT

POWER TO DECLARE THE LIMITATION

OF LIABILITY PRovisiows OF THE WaAR-

SAW CONVENTION UNENFORCEABLE .....

THE CouRT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY

FAILED TO EXERCISE ITS CONSTITU-

TIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO CONSTRUE

THE WARSAW CONVENTION ..........c0000000

The Last Official Price of Gold Is a Viable

a nsnsatintonto

Special Drawing Rights Are a Viable

Alternative Conversion Factor ...............

FEET EE EERE EEE EEE EEE EEE EEE EERE EEE EE EEE HEHEHE EERE EE EEED

co cont S&S &B WN WN -/&-.

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: PAGE

In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14,

1980, 535 F. ie 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), appeal

16

docketed, No. 82- (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 1982). .......... 13, 15

In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974, 684

ff ge fe Le Rb +: ea ee ian? 10.17

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) w....ccceeceeeeeees bihnede 10

Banks vy. Chicago Grain Trimmers Ass'n., 389 U.S. 813

SO Fy Se SPs UO CTE DD cinsndaissoreschcestovcvstedeebecioniaaas 3n.5

2: v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d

ir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979) ......... 12 n.20,

21 n.36

Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323

(Sth Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968) .... 210.36

Boehringer Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American

World Airways, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 344 (S.D. Tex. 1981),

appeal docketed, No. 81-2519 (Sth Cir. Feb. 2, 1982) 13

Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S.

Gg Dae Rite Be CEQGOD | ccccecescncsecspestattanssinnstenennien 18 n.29

Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933) c..ccccccceeeeeees 1]

Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir.

1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976) «0.0.00... 4n.7,9n.16,

21 n.37,

22 n.38, n.39

Deere & Co. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Index No. 81 C

rae CEE TE, TR, SU, TD vnccecesccocspicntnnistentntionsbianmn 13, 16

Doe ex dem. Clark v. Braden, 57 US. (16 How.) 635

TAREEIIIEEE: : cosethnadnsensuhtcbhehoriunncdusieeseuvadenstioecabaaatinecaaienania 9,10

Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804 (2d Cir.

BUNOMED \ cecacoesstassieaseepenibecéneveagspndiakensiviissenikénndiianddin aaa annn 9 n.16

Electronic Memories & Magnetics C rp v. The Flying Ti-

er Line, Inc., Index No. 784512 (Cal. Super. Ct., San

ION, FN, BS. TOGLY cccesscescssninsscccincinensabpiapeniiibabiatiing 13, 16

FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981) .... 18 0.28

Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 525 F.

DR SGe CMP es BODE D ccncrenivccscscabstigacetunuaniiidaiaeis passim

Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce v. Goldschmidt,

CFF FOG Bae. CAS. Cas, TSGD) - ccccecisccsscosninnniecinnmieniiiaingt 12n.19

PAGE

Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890) w.ccceccecseeeeeeees 14n.23

Hunter v. Ohio ex rel. Miller, 396 U.S. 879 (1967) ....... 3n.5

Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp. 702

(S.D.N.Y. 1972), afd per curiam, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d

Bee TAR ae REMEARCROER th! os A 12n.19

John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Bartels, 308

I OT i a cas a a let ee al 10n.17

Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123 (1928) cuccceccccccccccesecseeees 14n.23

Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961) c.cccccccccecceceees 18 n.29

Malrite T.V. of New York v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir.

1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982) wo. 18 n.28

Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404

INT iia cine tata tal scadd soninsnhantnagsicoheonsenealinidoscasssccanadienh 1]

Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) ...cccccccccccecceeeee 22 n.38

Mullaney v. Andersen, 342 U.S. 415 (1952) ccccccccceees 3n.5

The Netherlands vy. Giants Shipping —_ Rechtspraak

van de Week 321 (May 30, 1981) (Sup. Ct. of The

SERINE CHIE By BOMBARD csncnockasccencqassnceinsdnniassaiiinansiod 19 n.32,

20, 21 n.35

Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929) cccccccccccccscssseeceeees 10 n.16,

14.23, 21 0.37

Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles

ey EO, 20t US. 19O (19396). ccccccccumcnl 11,17, 21,

Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434

A IUAINEEEE IDIOT ikea ate scnnichdisahestsiasientasumeabeninniialimbadeamadie

Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198 (1968) ..ccccccccccsseeseeeeeeseeeee 3n.5

Serbian Loans Case, 1929 P.C.1.J., ser. A, Nos. 20/21

(Judgment of July 12), reported in 2 World Court Re-

Ports 344 (M. Hudson ed. 1935) ..ccccccccccccsseeeesenseernenes 51.8

Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, \02 S.

iy ED dadentariasincermnesarertecisstonneitibaiptaeumbaesiilian 18 n.29

Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902) cocccccccccccccccseseneeee 9,10

Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424 (1902) occccccceceee 141.23

Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965) ....cccccccccsseeeeeseeeeeees 18 n.28

PAGE

United States v. D’Auterive, 51 U.S. 609, (1850) ........... 12 n.19

United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213 (1902) ........ 11,17

Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger

Fishing Vessel Assoc., 443 U.S. 658 (1979) ccccccccccecceees 11

Weinberger v. Rossi, 50 US.L.W. 4354 (US.

IED-IET sWUNICRI ‘csccpadnssucisnonetussbtgesdeibesacsbiciianshdeeubaasabaantaael 12.19

Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888) co.cc: 9

Constitution, Statutes, Treaties, and Rules:

See, UNE, OUR Tih he OES F. cctnccenshcnnscescontiinninninenenan’ 3,9

NS GUI, wicssactasensahowiedusvansheqnectnbnnstumeisnieitaceel aaa 18 n.28

Baek ION ~ eceietencnscennivnsnocneptciienietiigunhestnieipeaticanintiaiastn 6 n.10

Peed OE cic scevcticapsecatniecnsetcssetecsiagatmnemaiatamlea 2

Be ee BIR ds sacictsanncccnensstincicasencisonsteupeneaniniannals 10n.17

Be re OD sasccniinticccrenteccscensreeesccacieennntneamaiatigaaas 16

I BEASTS <iscsevccrcssinsensinsrsntenaipprenutehamiemmmmaads 17 n.26

iit 8 SUNEE SUNIOD ciccacessnesssnsenesensscieincsentnchaiinindaantial 2n.3

Bretton Woods Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 79-171, 59

BN tee CTO cxeveccecessscsninccenccensnieantbete- sineunientsioiains 6n.10

Bretton Woods Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 94-564, 90

| EE Se ES 16.25

Civil Aeronautics Board Order 74-1-16

nature October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000,

137 LNT. 11, repoiaed io @ US

vi

PAGE

Convention Relating to the Limitation of the Liability of

Owners of Sea-going Ships (Brussels, 1957) ............. 21 n.35

Guatemala City Protocol of 1971, reprinted in

A. Lowenfeld, Aviation Law, Documents Supple-

are IT Sockisntacncsecadiscredectneneetecsnoesebsvesieieaaals 4n.7, 22 n.39

Hague Protocol of 1955, reprinted in A. Lowenfeld, Avia-

tion Law, Documents Supplement 955-63 ........c0cc0000. 4n.7

IMF Articles of Agreement, Art. XV, § 2 oo...ccececeeeee 19.3)

Montreal Agreement of 1966, reprinted in A. Lowenfeld,

Aviation Law, Documents Supplement 971-73 .......... 4n.7

Montreal Protocols No. 3 and 4, reprinted in A.

Lowenfeld, Aviation Law, Documents Supplement

I I BE ss cs acapadepeicsalebidepasiosiaieboaniaals passim

RR EEN, BID BO BON cccccccccossesnovsesscasverecseorsionens 19 n.32

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, reprinted in

ey EEE ER INEITD cicccesescoscsreconasncteoredensinndphcioibouieatd 12 n.19

Legislative Materials

Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Montreal Aviation

Protocols Nos. 3 and 4, S. Exec. Rep. No. 45, 97th

Rs NE My a CETTE D ccnrcecnnsesnconsesintidounsapestihisennotetias 7n.14

S. Rep. No. 94-1148, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.. reprinted in

1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5935 woo. 16 a

17 n.2

Vii

PAGE

Books, Articles and Other Materials:

Fitzgerald, The Four Montreal Protocols to Amend the

arsaw Convention Regime Governing International

Carriage by Air, 42 J. Air L. & Com. 273 (1976) .. 7n.12

J. Gold, SDRs, Currencies, and Gold, IMF Pamphlet

Series No. 33 (Washington, D.C. 1980) .......cccccceeee 7 n.11

J. Gold, Gold in International Monetary Law: Change,

ro and Ambiguity, 15 J. Int'l L. & Econ. 323 :

EPO E ccciithobcccktinnsandusentehecsaveconssinnsesedoembnaneneniatiabe l

J. Golden, Warsaw Convention Liability Limits (May 20,

1981) (unpublished memorandum by the Director of

the Bureau of Compliance and Consumer Protection,

ee SIND TINUED | sisresescercscectenteenncteseianasbarnaatin A

} 16 n.26

G. Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1943)... 5n.8

A. Lowenfeld, Aviation Law (2d ed. 1981) c.cccccccccccceeee 4,6n.9,

7n.12

Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the

Warsaw Convention, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 497 (1967) .. 5

P. Samuelson, Economics (11th ed. 1980) ...........0000000.. 18

Stephen A. Silard, A Comment on Franklin Mint v. TWA

(Dec. 7, 1982) (unpublished manuscript presented to

the Transportation Law Committee of the Federal Bar

Association, Washington, D.C.) ......ccccccceceenceeeeeeereeee 18 n.30

R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice (Sth

NE MEIN 2 0s diccnccissscnendequastninnbinhnpnedgdibesatbos ties dieiia Neamites

Legal Committee of the Internationa! Civil Aviation Or-

CUS 21st Sess., Minutes 84, ICAO Doc. 9131-

C/173-1, Resolution Concerning the Conversion of

Poincare Francs to National Currencies in the Warsaw

and Rome Conventions (1974) .......cccccccccccesceceeseeeeeeee 22.39

Letter from Secretary of State William P. Rogers to the

President (October 18, 1971) (S. Exec. Doc. L. 92nd

NS RE aE SP SEES AE) 12n.19

Dea, I, SU Bs RED. cacnsnscccsnccostssansinmbbenmananidien 6n.9

No.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM 1982

>

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,

Petitioner,

FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN MINT LIMITED,

AND MCGREGOR, SWiRE AIR SERVICES LIMITED,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

=

Petitioner, Trans World Airlines, Inc. (“TWA”)’ requests

that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion

of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

entered in this action on September 28, 1982, which affirmed a

final judgment of the United States District Court for the South-

ern District of New York. Specifically, TWA seeks review of that

portion of the lower court’s decision declaring that certain provi-

sions of a treaty adhered to by the United States are prospectively

unenforceable in United States courts.

1. Pursuant to Rule 28.1 of this a

states that TWA is

a wholly owned subsidiary of Trans Wor ion.

tion

2

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals, reported at 690 F.2d 303

(2d Cir. 1982), is reprinted in the Appendix hereto at A-1.’ The

opinion of the district court, reported at 525 F. Supp. 1288

(S.D.N.Y. 1981), is reprinted at A-26.

JURISDICTION

Respondents, Franklin Mint Corporation, Franklin Mint Lim-

ited, and McGregor, Swire Air Services Limited (hereinafter

collectively “Franklin Mint”), brought this action in the United

States District Court for the Southern District of New York,

alleging both federal question and diversity jurisdiction. Frank-

lin Mint sought recovery for the loss of air cargo shipped on a

TWA international flight and TWA moved for partial summary

judgment to limit its liability under Article 22 of the Warsaw

Convention.’ The district court granted TWA’s motion and

entered final judgment limiting TWA’s liability in accordance

with the Convention. Although the Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, it declared

that sixty days from the issuance of its mandate “the Conven-

tion’s limits on liability for loss of cargo [will be] unenforceable

in United States Courts.” A-19, 690 F.2d at 311.‘

This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§1254(1), which permits “any party” to a case in the court of

appeals to apply for a writ of certiorari. It is clear that Section

1254(1)’s “reference to ‘any party’ is broad enough to encompass

2. References in the form “A” refer to pages of the Appendix to this

petition.

3. All references to the “Warsaw Convention” or the “Convention”

are to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to

International Transportation by Air, October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000,

tis). 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. §1502 note

4. The court of appeals denied TWA's petition for rehearing in banc

on December 1, 1982 (A-24), and on December 17, 1982, stayed the

issuance of its mandate subject to the filing of a petition for certiorari in

this Court within thirty days of the entry of its stay order (A-21). This

petition was filed within thirty days from that date.

3

the successful or winning party before the court of appeals.” R.

Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 58 (Sth ed.

1978).

While TWA was technically victorious in the court below, the

court of appeals totally abrogated, albeit prospectively, the limi-

tation of liability provisions of the Warsaw Convention upon

which TWA's “victory” was based. Since the abrogation of those

limits will substantially increase TWA's operating costs as well as

those of virtually all international air carriers and air freight

shippers alike, there can be absolutely no doubt that the court of

appeals decision has severely and adversely affected TWA.

Accordingly, a grant of certiorari is proper in this case.’ Were

this Court to consider review improper in this situation, it would

preclude petitions for certiorari in a class of cases which may well

be among the most appropriate for review—cases which

announce such a substantial change in the law, and have such a

broad impact, that the court below feels compelled to make its

holding prospective only.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, TREATY INVOLVED

The constitutional and treaty provisions involved are Article II,

Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution and Article

22 of the Warsaw Convention, which are set out at pages A-34

and A-35, respectively.

5. Indeed, in cases in which a court of appeals decision has adversely

impacted non-parties, this Court has permitted intervention solely for

the purpose of filing a petition for certiorari. See, e.g., Banks v. Chi-

cago Grain Trimmers, 389 U.S. 813 (1967), 390 U.S. 459 (1968);

Hunter v. Ohio ex rel. Miller 396 U.S. 879 (1967); Rogers v. Paul, 382

U.S. 198 (1965); see also Mullaney v. Andersen, 342 U.S. 415 (1952).

Surely where an actual party to the action has suffered devastating

uences as a result of the decision of the court below, that party

should not be barred from seeking Supreme Court reviev merely

because the court of appeals chose to make its adverse ruling prospective

in nature.

-

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;

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Introduction

This action arises out of the loss, during a TWA flight, of four

packages of numismatic materials allegedly valued at $250,000.

The facts are undisputed. The numismatic materials in question

were delivered in unmarked packages by Franklin Mint to TWA

for shipment by air from the United States to England. Franklin

Mint made no special declaration of value at the time the pack-

ages were delivered to TWA.* The shipment never reached its

destination.

B. The Warsaw Convention

The Warsaw Convention was signed at Warsaw, Poland in

1929, and adhered to by the United States in 1934.’ Since the

Convention “is by far the most widely adopted treaty concerning

private international law and after the United Nations Charter

one of the most widely adopted of all treaties” (A. Lowenfeld,

Aviation Law § 4.1, at 7-98 (2d ed. 1981) ), its significance to the

aviation industry as well as its importance within the multilateral

treaty system is beyond dispute.

The primary purposes of the Convention are: (i) “to establish a

uniform body of world-wide liability rules to govern international

6. Franklin Mint was not required to accept the limits of liability

contained in the Convention. Pursuant to Article 22 of the Convention,

Franklin Mint had the right to make a special declaration of value and

pay an additional charge for full coverage. It chose, however, not to do

so. Asan experienced shipper of air freight, Franklin Mint presumably

decided to protect against the risk of loss through its own insurance.

7. There have been four subsequent modifications of the Warsaw

Convention: (i) Hague Protocol of 1955; (ii) the Montreal Agreement

of 1966, a private agreement among most international air carriers; (iii)

the Guatemala City Protocol of 1971; and (iv) the Montreal Protocols

of 1976. Although neither Hague Protocol nor the Guatemala City

Protocol has been ratified by the United States, both Protocols have

been looked to as indicia of the signatories’ subsequent conduct for

pares of construing Pr isions of the Convention. See, e.g., Day v.

rans World Airlines, Inc., $28 F.2d 31, 36 n.15 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.

denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976). Obviously the signatories’ most recent

word on Article 22—the Montreal Protocols—is equally relevant in

ascertaining their intent.

5

aviation, which would supersede . . . the scores of differing domes-

tic laws” (Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1090 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977) ); (ii) to limit the maximum extent

of a carrier's potential liability for damages (see Lowenfeld &

Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80

Harv. L. Rev. 497, 499-500 (1967) ); and (iii) to set a “reliable

and consistent basis for recovery for injury or damage to persons

or property” (J. Golden, Warsaw Convention Liability Limits

(May 20, 1981) (unpublished memorandum by the Director of

the Bureau of Compliance and Consumer Protection, Civil Aero-

nautics Board) [hereinafter cited as Golden Memorandum]

(reprinted at A-86)).

In order to ensure that the Warsaw limits of liability would

remain uniform and stable, the drafters of the Convention

expressed the limitation in terms of the then existing international

monetary unit of account, gold." From the inception of the Con-

vention until 1968, gold provided the stability and the uniformity

which the drafters intended. Converting the Warsaw limitation

into United States dollars involved no more than a simple mathe-

matical computation employing the official rate of gold, which

remained virtually stable throughout that period.

8. The gold unit chosen was the French guid franc (colloquially

known as the Poincare franc), which was defined as consisting of 65-'4

milligrams of gold of millesimal fineness nine hundred. Thus, the limit

of liability was fixed at 250 French gold francs per kilogram of lost cargo

(Article %(2)), convertible into national currency in round figures

(Article 22(4)). In this respect, the drafters intended the gold value

provisions to be read as referring to a definite and stable unit of account,

not to a precious metal. See Serbian Loans Case, 1929 P.C.1.J., ser. A,

Nos. 20/21 (Judgment of a 12), reported in 2 World Court Reports

344-401 (M. Hudson ed. 1935), discussed in 5G. Hackworth, Digest of

International Law 630-35 (1943). That case, decided in the year

Warsaw was signed, involved the interpretation of various international

loan agreements providing for payment based “fi the gold franc. In

i

construing those agreements, the P.C.1.J. held: “[i]t is manifest that the

Parties, in providing for gold payments, were referring, not to payment

in gold coins, but to gold as [a] standard of value.” Serbian Loans

Case, 2 World Court Reports at 365.

6

However, for a variety of reasons arising from a changing

world economy, the central banks of most States instituted proce-

dures in 1968 which separated their official monetary gold trans-

actions from non-governmental commercial gold dealings. This

resulted in a “two-tier” period, lasting until April 1, 1978, during

which the stable official price of gold existed side by side with a

constantly fluctuating commodity price for gold which, with the

passage of time, radically diverged from the official price.’

Notwithstanding the existence of both a market price and an

official price for gold throughout the two-tier period, there was no

difficulty converting the Article 22 limitation into United States

currency. Pursuant to a series of Civil Aeronautics Board

("CAB") orders, and as reflected on all air carrier tariffs and

tickets involving air transportation to or from the United States,

the Warsaw gold provisions were converted into dollars at the

official price of gold. The CAB consistently adhered to this

position, and the presently effective CAB regulation, Order 74-1-

16, dated January 3, 1974 (A-36), so provides.

In 1975, in an attempt to ameliorate the severe economic pres-

sures resulting from instability in the market price of gold, the

International Monetary Fund (the “IMF”)"* formulated a plan,

9. “[(B)y the mid-1970's, gold had become a volatile commodity,

not related to a price index, or to the rate of inflation, or indeed to any

meaningful economic measure, other than the views of whoever made up

the market about ail of the terrible things going on in the unpredictable

world.” A. Lowenfeld, Aviation Law § 6,51, at 7-169 (2d ed, 1981),

As an illustration of the volatility of the market price of gold, its price

fell from approximately $850 per ounce in January 1980 to appro ah

mately $490 per ounce on April 2 of that year and then rose again vo

approximately $700 per ounce in September 1980. During the twenty-

four day meg from January 5 to January 29, 1981, the market price of

fell from approximately $600 to $493.75 per ounce. N.Y. Times,

an. 30, 1981, at D1, col, 4,

10. The IMF was organized at the Bretton Woods Conference in

1944 to promote international monetary tion, to facilitate the

growth of international trade, and to assist in the establishment of a

multilateral system of pa ts for currency transactions among mem-

her States, United States hecame a member of the IMF in 1945,

See Bretton Woods Agreements Act, ch. 339, § 2, Pub. L. No. 79-171,

$9 Stat. $12 (1945), codified at 22 U.S.C. § 286 (1976).

5

known as the Jamaica Accords, to replace the use of gold as an

international monetary unit of account with Special Drawing

Rights (“SDRs”)."'

C, The Montreal Protocols

The Warsaw signatories met at Montreal in 1975 to attempt

“to deal with the changes in the role of gold in international

monetary transactions.” Golden Memorandum, supra, at A-90,

Their solution, embodied in the Montreal Protocols, was the sub-

stitution of SDRs for gold francs as the Warsaw conversion fac-

tor, /d.at A-90, There were two reasons for this solution: (i) as

a consequence of recent IMF actions, SDRs would soon replace

gold as the stable international monetary unit of account used for

international transactions; and (ii) the use of SDRs as the War-

saw conversion factor would effectuate the drafters’ goal of a

predictable and stable factor to express Warsaw's limits of

liability.

During the meetings at Montreal, the United States “took the

lead” in suggesting SDRs as the standard of conversion” and

signed Protocols No, 3 and No. 4,"’ which adopt SDRs as the

Warsaw unit of account, Those protocols, however, have not yet

been ratified by the Senate."

11. The SDR is a stable international unit of account, valued on the

basis of a basket of five national currencies, which does not have a

competing use as a commodity. Thus, SDRs are insulated from free

market speculation and other problems which led to instability in the

price of gold and to the ultimate breakdown of gold as an international

unit of account. Employed as a medium of exchange between govern-

ments, central banks, and the IMF, the “SDR has first claim to recogni-

tion as the unit of account to replace gold in universal international

organizations.” J. Gold, SDRs, Currencies, and Gold, MF Pamphlet

Series No, 33, at 96 (Washington, D.C, 1980), See also the decision

below at A-15-16, 690 F.2d at 310,

12. See A. Lowenfeld, Aviation Law § 6.51, at 7-171 (2 ed. 1981);

see also Fitzgerald, The Four Montreal Protocols to Amend the War-

saw Convention Regime | International Carriage by Air, 42 J.

Air L. & Com, 273, 325, 329-330 (1976).

13. Protocols No. 3 and No. 4 are reprinted in A. Lowenfeld, Avia-

tion Law 985-1001 (2d ed. Supp. 1981).

14, On November 17, 1981, the Senate Committee on Fi

Relations reported 16 to | in favor of ratification of those

Senate Comm. on F Relations, Montreal Aviation Protocols Nos.

3and 4, S. Exec, Rep, No, 45, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1981). Since the

Protocols were not voted upon in !982, they have been referred back to

the Foreign Relations Committee.

8

D. The Decision of the Court Below

TWA argued in the courts below that the Warsaw gold provi-

sions might be converted into United States . irrency by three

alternative methods: (i) the last official price of gold in the

United States; (ii) the SDR; and (iii) the exchange value of the

modern French franc. Plaintiffs responded tiat the appropriate

basis for conversion is the market price of gold."

The district court concluded that the appropriate conversion

factor is “the Jast official price of gold in the United States.” A-

27, 525 F. Supp. at 1289,

On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the

district court but held that sixty days after the issuance of its

mandate the Warsaw limitation of liability provisions would

become unenforceable. The court of appeals reached that con-

clusion because:

While the Convention has not been formally abrogated,

enforcement by national judicial tribunals is impossible

without their picking and choosing among alternative

units of conversion according to their view of which is best

as an initial policy matter. We have no power to select a

new unit of account. We thus hold the Convention's limi-

tation of liability unenforceable by United States Courts.

(A-6, 690 F.2d at 306.)

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Certiorari should be granted because this case raises the signifi-

cant question of whether the courts of the United States may

abrogate a provision of a treaty which is both constitutionally

sound and capable of enforcement. In view of the fundamental

principle that the Constitution reserves the power to abrogate

treaties to the political branches of the government, it is respect-

fully submitted that the court of appeals incorrectly declared the

15. The court of a Is correctly held that basing Warsaw limits

upon the market price of gold would constitute a “gross rture” from

the Convention's purposes since gold's market rate “is simply the daily

fluctuatin of a commodity, affected by conditions rela to

rhe on thal uses affecting demand” (A-15, 690 oe at

9

limitation provisions of the Warsaw Convention to be prospec-

tively “unenforceable in United States Courts.” A-19, 690 F.2d

at 311,

In addition, the Second Circuit erroneously failed to exercise

its responsibility to construe the treaty in the light of changed

circumstances $0 as to effectuate the intent of its drafters and

adhering nations,

POINT I

THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS WITHOUT POWER TO

DECLARE THE LIMITATION OF LIABILITY PROVISIONS

OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION UNENFORCEABLE

In concluding that the limitation of liability provisions of the

Warsaw Convention are unenforceable, the Second Circuit

greatly exceeded its constitutional powers since it was effectively

abrogating a treaty, an act which the Constitution reserves to the

Executive and Legislative branches of the Government. U.S.

Const., art. I], § 2, cl. 2. As this Court stated in Doe ex dem.

Clark v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1854):

The treaty is therefore a law made by the proper author-

ity, and the courts of justice have no right to annul or

disregard any of its provisions, unless they violate the

Constitution of the United States. It is their duty to

interpret it and administer it according to its terms.

The rule of Doe v. Braden, to which this Court has consistently

adhered (see Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194-95

(1888); Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902)), is no less

applicable because circumstances attendant to the original draft-

ing of a treaty have changed.”

16. Courts have consistently held that a change in circumstances

should not be permitted to defeat a treaty’s origi pu . See, e.g.,

Day v. Trans ld Airlines, Inc., $28 F.2d 31, 35 ( ir. 1975), cert.

denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976) (“For a court to view a treaty as frozen in

the year of its creation is scarcely more justifiable than to regard the

Constitutional clock as forever st in 1787."); Eck v. United Arab

Airlines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804, 812 (2d Cir. 1966) (The language of a

(footnote continued on next page)

10

Thus, by abrogating a treaty, whose constitutionality it did not

question’ and which is clearly capable of being construed so as to

be effective, the Second Circuit ignored the rule of Doe v. Braden

and unduly infringed upon the foreign relations power of the

United States which the Constitution entrusts to coordinate

branches of the government. If the Second Circuit's decision is

allowed to stand, courts would be empowered to abrogate any of

the myriad of treaties to which the United States is a party, a

situation which could severely impact the foreign relations inter-

ests of the United States. It is for precisely such reasons that “a

court will not ordinarily inquire whether a treaty has been termi-

nated, since on that question ‘governmental action . . . must be

regarded as of controlling importance.” Baker v. Carr, 369

U.S. 186, 212 (1962). See also Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270

(1902).

(footnote continued from previous page)

treaty “should never become a ‘verbal! prison’”). Thus, gold’s meta-

morphosis from an international unit of account into a mere commodity

does not render the Convention unenforceable or preclude the oma

from fulfilling its obligation to construe this treaty in accordance wit

the ex tions of the contracting states. See, e.g., Nielsen v. Johnson,

279 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1929) (“Treaties are to be liberally construed so as

to effect the apparent intention of the parties.”).

17. Although the Second Circuit found the Warsaw limitation =

visions unenforceable, it did not question the constitutionality of t

ovisions. However, in a decision rendered barely a month before the

Circuit's opinion in Franklin Mint, the Ninth Circuit questioned

the constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention's limitations of liability

rovisions. See In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974, 684

.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Bali]. The Bali court

indicated in d.cia that the Warsaw limitation of ro pep Bape yes

might infringe plaintiffs’ rights to due process as well as their right to

freedom of travel, unless another remedy were available to provide them

with full compensation. The Ninth Circuit then concluded that such a

remedy is available under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, “if the

liability limitation constitutes a ‘taking’ under the fifth amendment.”

Bali, 684 F.2d at 1310. However, the court of appeals did not decide

that question since Bw question is properly one for the Court of

Claims, when and if the Warsaw Convention limitation is applied to [the

Bali) plaintiffs.” Jd. at 1312.

Indeed, it is submitted that the apparent conflict te ee the

constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention when coupled with the

apertenee Se Sean te te peeee oe8 Oe ae

ient ground in and of itself for a grant of certiorari. See, e.g., John

‘on Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Bartels, 308 U.S. 180, 181

Indeed, the consequences which may flow from the abrogation

of a treaty may be so severe that any attempt to abrogate a treaty,

even by a branch of the government having the power to do so,

must be totally unequivocal. While Congress has the power to

abrogate or mnodify a treaty, the intention to do so must be clearly

expressed; | will not be lightly imputed. See Washington v.

Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assoc.,

443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United

States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968); Pigeon River Improve-

ment, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138,

160 (1934); United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 221-22

(1902); Cook v. United States, 228 U.S. 102, 120 (1933).

Significantly, in abrogating Article 22 of the Convention, the

Second Circuit considered the foregoing factors in only a single

paradoxical paragraph and an even more paradoxical footnote

(A-17-18, 690 F.2d at 311 & n.26). Thus, the court of appeals

noted that treaty negotiation, proposal and ratification are the

exclusive province of other branches of the government; that the

United States courts must observe the line between treaty inter-

pretation and treaty negotiation, proposal and ratification; and

that it is not the province of the courts to declare treaties abro-

gated. Jd. Having set forth these undeniable conclusions, the

Second Circuit then proceeded to declare that the treaty is unen-

forceable in its present form and that the proper unit of conver-

sion may only be selected by the parties to the treaty rather than

arrived at through construction by the courts.”*

In short, the Second Circuit has taken the applicable principles

“through the looking glass.” In a supposed attempt to avoid

offending other branches of the government or the Convention's

signatories, by judicially selecting a unit of conversion for the

Convention's cargo limitation provisions, the Second Circuit

abrogated those provisions in their entirety. However, the

18. As discussed in Point II below, the Second Circuit failed to

fulfill its duty to construe the Warsaw limitation provisions in accor-

dance with the intent of the framers and the subsequent conduct of the

adhering nations.

12

United States has given every indication via the Montreal Proto-

cols that it continues to support a limitation,’* and every other

signatory nation which has faced this issue, either through its

courts or by legislation, has had no difficulty in selecting a conver-

sion factor and has found that selection to be far preferable to

allowing the Warsaw liability limits to lapse.”

19. See discussion a. page 7 above. Furthermore, it is equally

apparent that the prospective abrogation of the Convention's limitation

provisions contravenes Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law

of Treaties, reprinted in 8 1.L.M. 679, 686 (1969). Under that Article,

the fact that the United States has signed the Montreal Protocols places

it under an obligation to avoid undermining them during the ratification

rs See generally United States v. D'Auterive, 51 U.S. 609, 623

(1 ).

Thus, the Second Circuit's es of Article 22 (by refusing to

enforce any limitation) is completely at odds with the limits set forth in

the Montreal! Protocols and the obligation of the United States to refrain

from acts, during the ratification process, which are inconsistent with

the terms of a treaty it has signed. In contrast, continued use of the last

official price of gold or adoption of the SDR as the Warsaw conversion

factor would be fully consistent with the Vienna Convention since

employing either conversion factor achieves the predictable and stable

limits of liability as well as the approximate level of limitation sought by

the Montreal Protocols.

Although the Vienna Convention has not been ratified by the United

States, it is “generally 3p, oem as the authoritative guide to current

treaty law and practice” (Letter from Secretazy of State William P.

Rogers to the President (October 18, 1971) (transmitting the Vienna

Convention) (S. Exec. Doc. L. 92nd Cong., Ist Sess.)). As such, it has

been relied upon by United States courts. See, e.g., Weinberger v.

Rossi, 50 U.S.L.W. 4354, 4355 n.§ (U.S. March 31,1982); Greater

Tampa Chamber of Commerce v. Goldschmidt, 627 F.2d 258, 263 4

(D.C. Cir. 1980); Husserl v. Swiss Air dicey Co., 351 F. Supp.

+ Tg (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir.

).

20. Nor, contrary te the court of appeals conclusion, is there “inter-

national disarray” with respect to the conversion issue (A-14, 690 F.2d

at 309) since the record unequivocally demonstrates that no other signa-

tory state has rejected the Convention's limitation on eee And, as

noted in Benjamins v. British European Airways, $72 F.24913, 919 (2d

Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979), decisions of “our sister

signatories [are] entitled to considerable weight.” Thus, notwithstand-

ing the conversion factor employed, it is apparent that the Second

Circuit failed to ive the crucial factor that some limitation must be

enforced in to fulfill the expectations of the Convention's

13

Moreover, the ease with which the Convention may be enforced

is illustrated by the fact that no other United States court which

has had occasion to consider the question, either before or after

the Second Circuit's decision, has found any difficulty in conclud-

ing that the primary purpose of the treaty is to employ some

limitation and that the selection of a conversion factor is an

entirely appropriate aspect of treaty construction. See Franklin

Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 1288

(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding the last official price of gold to be the

appropriate Warsaw conversion factor); /n re Air Crash Disaster

at Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, 535 F. Supp. 833

(E.D.N.Y. 1982) (applying the last official price of gold) [here-

inafter cited as Polish Case];*' Boehringer Mannheim Diagnos-

tics, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 53\ F. Supp. 344

(S.D. Tex. 1981); Electronic Memories & Magnetics Corp. v.

The Flying Tiger Line, Inc., Index No. 784512 (Cal. Super, Ct.,

San Francisco Aug. 25, 1982) (applying the last official price of

gold) (reprinted at A-60); and Deere & Co. v. Deutsche Luft-

hansa AG, Index No. 81 C 4726 (N.D. Ili. Dec. 30, 1982)

(applying the last official price of gold) (reprinted at A-61).

Indeed, the Deere court employed the last official price of gold

as the conversion factor, on the theory that a constitutional treaty

capable of enforcement must be enforced, even in the face of the

Second Circuit's decision in Franklin Mint. Unfortunately, the

district courts sitting in the Second Circuit, the primary situs for

Warsaw Convention cases because virtually all international air-

lines are subject to personal jurisdiction in New York City, do not

have the luxury of ignoring the Second Circuit’s Franklin Mint

decision. Thus, an incipient conflict has already arisen.

In sum, this case raises the substantial constitutional question

of whether a United States court may abrogate a treaty provision

21. The Polish Case is presently on an interlocutory appeal to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on an unrelated

issue—the print size uf the Warsaw notice on airline tickets.

22. Boehringer is ey on —_— to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. It he!d the market price of gold to be the

gp ag conversion factur, a result rejected in the Polish Case, by

the Deere court, and by the Second Circuit in Franklin Mint.

14

which is constitutionally sound, is capable of being enforced, and

is actually supported by numerous signatory states, merely

because a change in circumstances requires the court to construe

certain of its terms. It is submitted that this question is of major

importance and has not been directly addressed by this Court. In

view of the rather ancient vintage of this Court's prior decisions

with respect to a court’s power to abrogate a treaty, if the decision

of the court below is permitted to stand without comment, it may

be expected to lead to substantial uncertainty in the lower courts

outside the Second Circuit and to a body of case law within the

Second Circuit which is totally at odds with this Court's prior

decisions concerning the principles to be applied to treaty con-

struction. Since such a scenario points to the clear possibility

that the Constitutional wall between the coordinate branches 0°

the government will be eroded with respect to the power to abro-

gate treaties, this Court should review and modify the decision

below.

POINT II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO

EXERCISE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO

CONSTRUE THE WARSAW CONVENTION

In sharp contrast to its implicit conclusion that it was empow-

ered to nullify a provision of a treaty adhered to by the United

States, the court of appeals determined that it lacked authority to

interpret the treaty” by selecting a unit of conversion on the

ground that the “[s]ubstitution of a new term is a political ques-

tion, unfit for judicial resolution.” A-19, 690 F.2d at 311. The

court of appeals reached this conclusion after rejecting TWA’s

argument that at least two alternative conversion factors—the

last official price of gold or the SDR—are viable since employing

23. TWA submits that, far from lacking authority, the Second Cir-

cuit had an affirmative duty to ve the treaty in order to effectuate

the intent of the contracting parties. See, e. ielsen v. Johnson, 279

U.S. 47, 51-52 (1929); Jordan v. Tashiro, par U.S. 123, 127 (1928);

Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 437 (1902); Geofroy v. Riggs,

133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890).

15

either unit results in a stable and predictable limit of liability

which fully conforms to the purposes envisioned by the framers of

the Convention as well as the subsequent conduct of the parties to

the treaty.

A. The Last Official Price of Gold Is a Viable Conversion

Factor

The district court held that the appropriate unit of conversion

for determining Warsaw limits of liability is “the last official price

of gold in the United States.” A-27, 525 F. Supp. at 1289. That

conclusion was based upon the following factors:™

(i) employing the last official price of gold as a conver-

sion factor completely effectuates the objectives of the

Warsaw signatories—to fix predictable, stable and definite

limits of liability for air carriers;

(ii) the only currently effective CAB Order dealing

with the conversion issue, Order 74-1-16, employs the last

official price of gold as the Article 22 conversion factor

and specifically requires all United States air carriers to

use that price in setting forth the dollar value of the War-

saw limitation on their tickets; and

(iii) the entire aviation industry has consistently con-

formed its conduct to Order 74-1-16; and, in light of that

uniform practice, both shippers and carriers alike, includ-

ing the parties hereto, adopt the last official price of gold

as the Warsaw conversion factor in their contracts of

carriage.

In addition to its application by the district court in chis case,

other courts, both before and after the Second Circuit's decision,

have applied the last official price of gold as the conversion factor.

See, In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14,

24. In liewof setting forth its reasons in detail, the district court

dopted TWA's on gow Aen “to the extent that they support” its vet

ere the last officia of gold is the proper conversion ee facta (A-2

$25 F. Supp. at 1289). "

16

1980, 535 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Electronic Memories

& Magnetics Corp. v. The Flying Tiger Line, Inc., Index No.

784512 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco Aug. 25, 1982)

(reprinted at A-60); and Deere & Co. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG,

Index No. 8! C 4726 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 40, 1982) (reprinted at A-

61). In Deere, the court referred to the Second Circuit's decision

in Franklin Mint and stated: “The [method of converting] which

seems most nearly to effectuate the intention of the treaty to limit

the liability of air carriers is to employ the last official United

States Price of gold.” A-63 (emphasis in original).

Although the Second Circuit concurred with the district court's

finding that the Warsaw signatories intended to fix uniform and

stable limits of liability, it rejected the use of the last official price

of gold, notwithstanding the fact that the use of that conversion

factor would effectuate the purposes of the Convention. In mak-

ing this determination, the court of appeals placed primary reli-

ance upon the repeal in 1976 of Section 2 of the Par Value

Modification Act, 31 U.S.C. § 449 (1976) (the “Par Value

Act”), ® which required the Secretary of the Treasury to set a par

value of the dollar in terms of gold. Based upon that repeal, the

court of appeals concluded ihat “Congress . .. abandoned the unit

of conversion specified by the Convention and did not substitute a

new one” (A-19, 690 F.2d at 311); that the CAB Order upon

which the district court relied had in effect lost its vitality; and

that it could properly ignore the CAB’s most recent policy deter-

mination that “the last official price is the best available

standard.””

25. Section 2 of the Par Value Act was repealed by Section 7 of the

Bretton Woods Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 94-564, 90 Stat. 2660

(1976) (the “1976 Act”), whose pucnene was to amend financial legis-

lation to reflect amendments to the IMF Articles of Agreement. The

Senate commented upon the limited purpose of Section 7 by calling it a

“technical amendment” whose 3 arm was to “delete language that is

inconsistent with the new [IMF] Articles.” S. Rep. No. 94-1148, 94th

— Na 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News

26. The most recent CAB staff memorandum to consider the con-

version question, the Golden Memorandum, supra, at A-86, recom-

mends that “the Board should take no action which would disturb the

(footnote continued on next page)

17

However, far from reflecting a clear congressional intent to

abandon the use of the last official price of gold as a medium of

conversion under the Warsaw Convention, neither the 1976 Act

itself nor the legislative history of that Act contains any reference

to the Warsaw Convention.” Indeed, the Second Circuit com-

mented that “Congress may not have focused explicitly upon the

Convention in repealing [the Par Value] Act.” A-18, 690 F.2d

at311. Asa result, the Second Circuit's inference that Congress

intended to abandon the Convention's unit of conversion is in

direct contravention to this Court's admonition that “the inten-

tion to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to

the Congress” (Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v.

Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934)), “but must

appear clearly and distinctly from the words used in the statute”

(United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 221 (1902)).

Moreover, as the CAB is the administrative agency charged

with the regulation of the United States airline industry, its

(footnote continued from previous page)

conversion formula now contained in [Order 74-1-16] of the regula-

tions.” /d. at A-92. Furthermore, the CAB is continuing to endorse

che continued use of the last official price of gold as a conversion factor.

All United States air carriers are required to file their international

tariffs with the CAB, see Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 403, 49 U.S.C.

§ 1373 (1976), and they have continued to file using the last official

price of gold. The CAB has ordered this procedure, has not modified

that er, and has not oojected to the carriers’ filings.

27. If anything, the legislative history of the repeal statute contem-

plates a continued role for gold, particularly in the international sphere,

during the transition to SDRs as the unit of account. Thus, the Senate

Committee on Foreign Rela wons noted: “While it is the expressed intent

of the IMF to move = out of the international monetary system, there

are vast numbers of ~ and psychological mechanisms still in evidence

in the system that will perpetuate some role for gold.” S. Rup. No. 94-

1148, supra, at 5947.

18

orders and regulations are entitled to deference from the judici-

ary,” particularly with respect to the enforcement of existing

treaty provisions.” The court of appeals improperly ignored the

CAB's policy determination to employ the last official price of

gold as the unit of conversion.

B. Special Drawing Rights Are a Viable Alternative Con-

version i actor

Aithough the district court found the last official price of gold

to be the most appropriate conversion factor for the Warsaw

Convention's limitation of liability provisions, it noted that were it

“writing on a clean slate” (A-27, 525 F. Supp. at 1289), it would

have found TWA’s arguments in favor of employing SDRs to be

“most persuasive” (id.).

As stated above, SDRs are a stable international unit of

account and indeed “have become the cornerstone of the new

international system of finance.” P. Samuelson, Economics 612

(11th ed. 1980); see Sir Joseph Gold, Gold in International

Monetary Law: Change, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity, 15 J. Int'l

L. & Econ. 323 (1981). Thus, their use as a medium of conver-

sion would fully comply with the intent of the framers of the

Convention since they would result in predictable and stable lim-

its of liability.”

In rejecting SDRs the Second Circuit clearly demonstrated a

misunderstanding of their role as a conversion factor. TWA did

28. See, ¥ Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. | (1965); Malrite T.V. of

New York v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140, 1149 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,

454 U.S. 1143 (1982). Anagency regulation must be affirmed un.oss it

is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion (see Administrative

Procedure Act § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A)); and “a reviewing

court .. . ‘is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the

' mis). (FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 594 n. 30

29. See Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 102 S. Ct.

2374, 2379-80 (1982); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961).

See also Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,

333 US. 103, 111 (1948).

30. SDRs have been adopted as the basis for converting Warsaw

francs into national currencies by legislation or administrative acts

in several foreign countries including the Federal Republic of Germany,

Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and the United Ki . SeeS ;

Silard, A Comment on Franklin Mint v. TWA (Dec. 7, 1982) (unpub-

lished manuscript presente’ .o the Transportation Law Committee of

the Federal Bar Associatiun, Washington, D.C.).

19

not suggest that the court of appeals “set the [treaty] level of the

limitaticn” (A-17, 690 F.2d at 310) either by selecting the

number of SDRs which, in the Court’s view, would result in an

appropriate limitation of liability, or by adopting the number of

SDRs employed in the as yet unratified Montreal Protocols.

Rather, TWA pointed out that SDRs, as the present-day interna-

tional unit of account, may be used to convert the original War-

saw limit of liability provisions, as expressed in gold francs, into

dollars, in total compliance with the intent of the drafters and

without any “legislative selection” on the part of the courts.”

The ease with which SDRs are employed as a conversion factor

is demonstrated by the widely accepted international method for

converting Warsaw gold francs to local currency, which is as

follows:”

(1) On March 31, 1978, SDRs were an international

unit of account with a gold value, and on that date Warsaw

gold francs were easily convertible into SDRs.

3}. - Indeed, Second Circuit's rejection of SDRs because they are “a

creature of an international body, the IMF” (A-17, 690 F.2d at 310),

and because their value can change “at the whim of an international

body distinct from the parties to the Convention” (A-17, 690 F.2d at

31 1) is demonstrative of a particularly narrow view. This view is rather

surprising since the United States has ratified the multilateral treaty

creating the IMF and has taken the lead in suggesting the adoption of

SDRs as the Montreal Protocols’ unit of conversion. Moreover, the

Second Circuit overlooked the fact that a “seventy percent majority of

the total voting power” of the 146 member nations is necessary to

change the valuation of the SDR and an eighty-five percent we | is

necessary to make a fundamental change in valuation. Art. XV, § 2 of

the IMF's Articles of Agreement. Even rion-members of the IMF,

including Switzerland, agree that the SDR should be used as the best

monetary unit of account to express limitations of liability in treaties.

32. See The Netherlands v. Giants Shipping a we Rechtspraak

van de Week 321 (May 30, 1981) (Sup. Ct. of The Netherlands May l,

1981), discussed infra. The United Kingdom has adopted SDRs as the

unit of account for purposes of converting the gold value clause of the

Convention into sterling. Pursuant to Statutory Instrument 1980 No.

281, the gold franc is converted into SDRs using the gold value of an

SDR in effect on April 1, 1978. SDRs are then converted to sterling at

the current SDR/sterling rate. Other nations which convert Warsaw

gold francs through the use of SDRs are listed supra note 30.

J

—s al

20

(2) On April 1, 1978, the IMF member nations,

including the United States, severed the link between gold

and the SDR as well as between gold and their national

currencies. The value of SDRs was measured according

to the value of a weighted basket of currencies,” and

national currencies were convertible into SDRs.

(3) On one day, April 1, 1978, the basket value of the

SDR was precisely the same as its gold value had been the

day before. As a result, it is possible to convert Warsaw

gold francs into SDRs.™

(4) Therefore, the SDR performs the function of a

Rosetta stone and can translate original Warsaw gold

francs into current U.S. dollars, since there is an unbroken

line of value between gold, SDRs, and national currencies.

This is precisely the method used by the Supreme Court of the

Netherlands in a case involving a conversion issue virtually identi-

cal to this one. The Netherlands vy. Giants Shipping Corp.,

Rechtspraak van de Week 321 (May 30, 1981) (Sup. Ct. of

33. See supra note |1.

34. The mathematical computation converting French gold francs

into US. dollars would be as follows. The value of the SDR on March

23, 1979, the date the cargo was delivered to TWA, has been used for

illustrative purposes.

| Poincare franc (90% fine gold) “ aay t ay of

fine gol

| Poincare franc (100% fine gold) = 0,05895 gram of

fine gold

| SDR (gold value on March 31, 1978) = 0.888671 gram of

fine gold

The number of francs in one = 0.888671 = 15.075 rounded to

SDR TUS” is

The Warsaw limit of 250 , 359 ™ ,16.67 SDRs per

francs per kilogram con- “re kilogram, rounded

verted to SDRs to 17 SDRs

Dollar value of | SDR on March 23,1979 = ™_-:1,28626

17 SDRs per kilogram times 1.28626 = $21.87 per kilo-

gram,

2)

The Netherlands May |, 1981) (reprinted in English at A-65).”

The Giants Shipping case is the only decision on point rendered

by the highest court of any Warsaw signatory. And since uni-

formity of international law is a primary purpose of the Conven-

tion, this Court should give great weight to the interpretation of

the highest courts of other adherents. See Pigeon River

Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v, Charles W. Cox, Lid., 29|

U.S. 138 (1934), where this Court looked to the interpretation of

a treaty given by the Supreme Court of Canada.”

Finally, the use of SDRs as a unit of conversion is totally

consistent with fundamental tenets of treat, construction, It has

been uniform'y held that treaties are to be interpreted liberally:

(i) to effectuate the intent of the drafters; (ii) in light of

35, In Giants Shipping, the Dutch court calculated that fifteen gold

Poincare francs had the equivalent gold weight of one SDR on April |,

1978, It was then a simple matter to convert from SDRs to Dutch

currency for my hey day ” merely looking at a financial publication

similar to The Wall Street Journal. The Giants Shipping court con-

strued a limitation of my p provision set forth in the Convention

Relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Sea-going Ships

( Brussels, 1957) (the “Brussels Convention”). The Brussels Conven-

tion is strikingly similar to the Warsaw Convention in many respects,

including the fact that the limitation of liability provisions in both are

expressed in French Poincare gold francs.

36, See also Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d

323, 337-38 (Sth Cir. 1967), cert, denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968) ("A

wiultilateral treaty is rather like a “uniform law” within the United

States, The Court has an obligation to keep interpretation as uniform

as ible.”); gooey v. British oe Awan, $72 F.2d 913,

919 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979) (“We do find

the opinvon of our sister signatories to be entitled to considerable

weight.”).

37. See, eg. Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 US, 47, $1-$2 (1929)

(“Treaties are to be liberally construed so as to effect the apparent

intention of the parties.”); Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc,, 360 F.2d

804, 812 (2d Cir. 1966); Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31,

35 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).

22

changed circumstances;” and (iii) in accordance with the subse-

quent conduct of the parties.”

In sum, gold no longer performs the function of an interna-

tional unit of account. That function is now performed by SDRs.

Because the SDR's gold value on March 31, 1978 was the same as

its new basket of currencies value on April 1, 1978, there is an

unbroken line of value which a court should use to effectuate the

intent of the parties to the treaty and convert the Warsaw gold

francs into U.S. dollars. The Second Circuit failed to effectuate

the framers’ intent. Instead, it abrogated a major provision of

the treaty,

38. See Missour' v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (In the

words of Mr. Justice Holmes concerning Constitutional construction,

which are equally a oye to treaty interpretation: “[(W)hen we are

dealing with words that also are a constituent act... we must realize

that they have called into life a being the development of which could

not have been foreseen muy by the most # ted of its begetters.”);

Day, 528 F.2d at 35; Eck, 360 F.2d at 812 (The language of a treaty

should not become a “verbal prison.” A change in circumstances may

not be permitted to defeat a a original purposes “even if this

requires departing in some measure from the letter [of the treaty provi-

ret and reading the language in a practical rather than literal

ashion,”).

39, +o River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Cox. 291 US.

138, 158-63 (1934); Day, $28 F.2d at *8 (“The conduct of the parties

subsequent to ratification of a treaty may, thus, be relevant in ascertain-

ing the proper construction to accord the treaty's various provisions”).

In this case, the subsequent conduct of the parties would support the use

of the last official price of gold or SDRs as conversion factors. When

the Warsaw parties met in 1971 and drafted the Guatemala City Proto-

col (the terms of which were later incorporated into the Montreal

Protocols), they discussed limits of liability oased on the official price of

Id. In 1974, the Legal Committee of the International Civil Aviation

ganization (“ICAU”), an affiliate of the United Nations, su

the use of the official price of gold, condemning the use of the free

market a. Legal Committee, 21st Sess., Minutes 84, ICAO Doc.

9131-LC/173-1, Resolution Concerning the Conversion of Poincare

Francs to National Currencies in the Warsaw and Rome Conventions, at

2 (1974), And wes in 1975 the drafters of the Montreal Protocols

chose a limit of liability for cargo which had the same value as the

Warsaw limit converted according to the official price of . The

Montreal Protocols limit of 17 SDRs per kilogram is worth approxi-

mately $20 per kilogram. The Warsaw limit of 250 gold francs per

ram, converted into dollars according to the last official price of

, is $20 per kilogram. See CAB 74-1-16, at A-38,

Pr

|

23

CONCLUSION

Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN N. ROMANS

ROBERT S. LIPTON

101 Park Avenue

New York, New York 10178

(212) 696-6000

Counsel for Petitioner,

Trans World Airlines, Inc.

CurRTIS, MALLET-PRevost,

Coit & MOSLE

Scott J. MCKAy WoLas

MICHAEL L. M. QuINTTUs

Of Counsel

January 15, 1983

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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