Petition — Borough of Sayreville v. Middlesex County Utilities Authority

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8 2 sas 1 l 5 ah, Supreme Court, U.S,

FILED

NO. WAN ‘2 1993

ALEXANDER L. STEVAS

CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocrosrr Term, 1982

BOROUGH OF SAYREVILLE, JOHN E. CZERNIKOW-

SKI, RANIERO TRAVISANO, KENNETH W. BU-

CHANAN, SR., WILLIAM JACKSON, JOSEPH M.

KEENAN, JR., THOMAS R. KUBERSKI and FELIX

WISNIEWSKI, :

Petitioners,

vs.

MIDDLESEX COUNTY UTILITIES AUTHORITY and

WILLIAM FRENCH SMITH, UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.,

Respondents.

—- — —————————ee

———— —

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

THIRD CIRCUIT

WruuM S. Greensere,

Counsel of Record,

GREENBERG, Kevuey & Prior,

Attorneys for Petitioners,

196 West State Street,

Trenton, New Jersey 08608.

(609) 989-9800

James F’. ScHwerin,

On the Petition.

Adams Press Corp., 50 Park Place, Newark, New Jersey 07102—(201) 623-8611

Questions Presented

1. Whether the Tenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution is violated by the federal government requir-

ing a municipality to enact a particular tax.

Parties to the Proceedings

Borough of Sayreville; John E. Czernikowski, Mayor;

Raniero Travisano, Kenneth W. Buchanan, Sr., William

Jackson, Joseph M. Keenan, Jr., Thomas R. Kubkerski,

Felix Wisniewski, as members of the Borough Council of

the Borough of Sayreville, petitioners-defendants-third

party plaintiffs.

Middlesex County Utilities Authority, respondent-plain-

tiff.

William French Smith, United States Attorney General;

Anne M. Gorsuch, Administrator, United States Environ-

mental Protection Agency; Jacqueline Schafer, Regional

Administrator, Region II, United States Environmental

Protection Agency and W. Hunt Dumont, United States

Attorney, respondents-third party defendants.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions PRESENTED i

Parties TO THE PROCEEDINGS

TasLeE OF AUTHORITIES

Oprnions BeELow

CONSTITUTIONAL Provisions INVOLVED

ii

Vv

2

JURISDICTION 2

2

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Reasons ror GRANTING THE Writ—Certiorar: should

be granted to determine whether the Tenth Amend-

ment is violated when the federal government re-

quires a municipality or other unit of local gov-

ernment to enact a tax to raise monies not needed

by the municipality 5

ConcLUsION 18

APPENDIX:

A—Opinion of the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Third Circuit la

B—Judgment of the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Third Circuit 20a

C—Order of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Cireuit Denying Motion for

Stay of Mandate and Affirming Judgment

of the District Court 22a

D—Transcript of Opinion of Debevoise, U.S.D.J.,

dated November 16, 1981 24a

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

E—Order of Debevoise, U.S.D.J., Dismissing the

Third Party Complaint on Summary Judg-

ment and for Remand to the Superior Court

of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Middle-

sex County, dated December 1, 1981 ............

PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Vv

PAGR

Cases Cited

Table of Authorities

Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), va-

cated and remanded per curiam, 431 U.S. 99

(1977) 16,17

Charles C. Steward Machine Company v. Davis, 301

U.S. 548, 57 S.Ct. 883, 81 L.Ed. 1279 (1937) ........ 6

City of New Brunswick v. Borough of Milltown, 519

F. Supp. 878 (D.N.J. 1981), aff’d 686 F.2d 120

(3rd Cir. 1982) 12

City of Sault Ste. Marie v. Andrus, 458 F.Supp. 465

(D.D.C. 1978) 10

District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C.

Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded per curiam snh

nom EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977)... 16

FERC v. Mississippi, —— U.S. ——, 102 S.Ct. 2126,

72 L.Ed. 2d 532 (1982) 10, 17

Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 95 S.Ct. 1792,

44 L.Ed. 2d 363 (1975) 6, 16

Greater St. Lous Health Systems Agency v. Teas-

dale, 506 F.Supp. 23 (E.D. Mo. 1980) ...................... 15

Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation

Association, Inc., 452 U.S. 265, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69

L.Ed. 2d 1 (1981) 7, 8,17

Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall 71, 19 L.Ed. 101

(1869) 8, 10

Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 94 S.Ct. 786, 39 L.Ed.

2d 1 (1974) 7

vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE

Maryland vy. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975), va-

cated and remanded per curiam sub nom EPA v.

Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) 15-17

Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 888 S.Ct. 2017, 20

SX FR So 6, 16

National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96

S.Ct. 2465, 49 L.Ed, 2d 245 (1976) 20. 5, 6, 8 16, 17

Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,

451 U.S. 1, 101 8.Ct. 1531 ..7, 10, 11, 18

Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974) 16

Snow v. Dixon, 66 Til, 2d 443, 363 N.E. 2d 1052

(1977), cert. den. 434 U.S. 939, 98 S.Ct. 429, 52

L.Ed. 2d 298 10

State of North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano,

445 F.Supp. 532 (18.D.N.C. 1977), aff’d 435 U.S, 962,

98 S.Ct. 1597 (1978) 14, 15

State of Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service

Commission, 330 U.S. 127, 67 S.Ct. 544, 91 L.Ed.

794 (1947) 14

State Water Control Board v. Train, 559 1'.2d 921

(4th Cir. 1977) 12,13

Texas Landowners Rights Association v. Harris,

453 F.Supp. 1025 (D.D.C, 1978), aff’d 598 F.2d 311

(D.C, Cir.) cert. den. 444 U.S. 927 (1979)... 15

United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 56 S.Ct. 421,

80 L.Ed. 567 (1936) 6

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES vii

PAGE

United States Constitution Cited

Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 6

Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 5

Re ID cevisniccsnssscentsssiniastnnensstnssiones i, 2, 4, 7, 10, 15-17

Statutes Cited

Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA):

See. 204(b)(1) ...... 4

See. 301(b) (1) . 1

18 U.S.C. (Hatch Act):

See. 61 a . 14

28 U.S.C.:

See. 1254(1) 2

See. 1441(a)

Sy EN casiitaciehaeseisdebiebcibieicaiee

29 U.S.C. (Fair Labor Standards Act):

See. 201 5

33 U.S.C.:

See. 1284(b) (1) 4

See. 1311(b) (1) . 12

42 U.S.C. (National Health Planning and Resources

Development Act, 1974) :

See. 300k 14

Secs. 4001-4128 (National Flood Insurance Pro-

gram) 15

NO.

IN THE

Supreme Cowt of the United States

October ‘erm, 1982

in

see os

BOROUGH OF SAYREVILLE, JOHN E. CZERNIKOW-

SKI, RANIERO TRAVISANO, KENNETH W. BU-

CHANAN, SR., WILLIAM JACKSON, JOSHPH M.

KEENAN, JR., THOMAS R. KUBERSKI and FELIX

WISNIEWSKI,

Petitioners,

vs.

MIDDLESEX COUNTY UTILITIES AUTHORITY and

WILLIAM FRENCH SMITH, UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

THIRD CIRCUIT

Petitioners, Borough of Sayreville, John E. Czernikow-

ski, Raniero Travisano, Kenneth W. Buchanan, Sr., Wil-

liam Jackson, Joseph M. Keenan, Jr., Thomas R. Kuberski,

and Felix Wisniewski respectfully pray that a writ of

certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit entered in this pro-

ceeding on October 12, 1982,

Opinions Below

Petitioners request review of a portion of the decision of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cireuit

reported at 690 F.2d 358 (1982).

The decision of the United States District Court for the

District of New Jersey was a bench opinion and unre-

ported. The transcript of the District Court’s opinion is

reproduced in the Appendix at p. 24a, infra, and the Judg-

ment Order at p. 3la, infra.

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Third Cireuit was entered on October 12, 1982, This

petition for certiorari has been filed within 90 days of the

date of said judgment. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked

pursuant to 28 U.S.C, §1254(1), which states:

“cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by

the Supreme Court...

(1) by writ of certiorari granted upon a petition of

any party to any civil or criminal case, before or

after rendition of judgment or decree... .”

Constitutional Provisions Involved

The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

provides:

“The powers not delegated to the United States by

the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,

are reserved to States respectively, or to the people.”

Statement of the Case

This is an action instituted by the Middlesex County

Utilities Authority (MCUA) in New Jersey Superior Court

alleging breach of contract by defendant Borough of Sayre-

ville and seeking injunctive relief to compel action by the

individual defendants in their capacity as the voting mem-

bers of the Borough Council with authority to enact ordi-

nances, It was alleged that the Borough had breached a

contract with MCUA under which it was required to obey

all pertinent federal regulations necessary for MCUA to

obtain funding for the building of a waste water treatment

facility which would handle the sewerage from Sayreville

and numerous other municipalities in the region.

Defendants filed a third party Complaint against Wil-

liam French Smith, Attorney General of the United States,

and various other federal defendants alleging that the re-

quirement that recipients of federal funds utilize a special

tax solely for the purpose of raising the funds needed to

meet its obligations to provide adequate funding for the

operation of a waste water facility built with federal monies

was unconstitutional in that it violated the Tenth Amend-

ment reservation of powers to the States. The third party

federal defendants then had the matter removed to the

United States District Court for New Jersey pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §1441(a) and 28 U.S.C. §1446.

The Borough of Sayreville has never contested its obli-

gation to pay its fair share of MCUA’s costs of operating

the facility. Unlike other municipalities, Sayreville has

more than adequate funds available to it from already ex-

isting taxes to meet its obligation in full without imposing

additional, unneeded levies on its citizens, and has in fact

always made its payments in a timely fashion. Neverthe-

less, although the administrator of the Environmental Pro-

tection Agency (EPA) in 1976 approved MCUA’s grant

4

application, four years later, after advancing 80% of the

promised funds, EPA suspended further payments, The

reason given was that Sayreville and one other munici-

pality serviced by MCUA, Milltown, had not adopted ordi-

nances providing for user charges as per 33 U.S.C, §1284

(b)(1) [§204(b)(1) of the Federal Water Pollution Con-

trol Act (FWPCA)]}.

Both the federal third party defendants and plaintiff

MCUA made motions for summary judgment in the United

States District Court. Judge Debevoise granted the third

party defendants’ motion, upholding the constitutionality of

the FWPCA requirement and thereby dismissing the case

as to them, However, he refused to rule on the motion by

MCUA and remanded that portion of the case to New Jer-

sey Superior Court. Judgment was subsequently rendered

in the New Jersey court requiring Sayreville to pass the

appropriate ordinance, and the Appellate Division of Su-

perior Court affirmed. Sayreville has filed a petition for

certification with the New Jersey Supreme Court.

On appeal from that portion of the District Court Order

granting summary judgment in favor of the third party

defendants, the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment of the

District Court.”

* Apart from the Tenth Amendment argument presented by this

petition, Sayreville also raised the claim of denial of equal protection

of the law. That claim is not being urged before this Court.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Certiorari should be granted to determine whether

the Tenth Amendment is violated when the federal

government requires a municipality or other unit of

local government to enact a tax to raise monies not

needed by the municipality,

It is well settled that Congress is not in possession of

unbridled authority to exercise its powers in a manner

which will unduly interfere with powers reserved to the

States under the Tenth Amendment. That limitation has

been clearly expressed by this Court in its decision in

National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S.Ct.

2465, 49 L.Ed, 2d 245 (1976). At issue therein was the

constitutionality of 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor

Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §201 et seq. In those amend-

ments, Congress extended minimum wage and maximum

hour provisions to virtually all public employees of the

States and their political subdivisions. The amendments

were passed as an exercise of Congress’ powers granted

by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, Article I, See-

tion 8, Cl. 3.

The Court, recognizing that the Commerce Clause is “a

grant of plenary authority to Congress,” nonetheless fur-

ther agreed with the appellants in National League of Cities

that the commerce power is limited by other affirmative

expressions of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 96

S.Ct. at 2469:

This Court has never doubted that there are limits

upon the power of Congress to override state sover-

eignty, even when exercising its otherwise plenary

powers to tax or to regulate commerce which are

conferred by Art. I of the Constitution. 96 S.Ct. at

2470.

The Court specifically rejected dicta from United States

v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 56 S.Ct. 421, 80 Lied, 567

(1936) which totally denied the authority of a State to chal-

lenge an exercise of Commerce Clause authority. 96 8.Ct.

at 2475-2476. This led the Court to overrule its earlier deci-

sion in Maryland vy. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 888 S.Ct, 2017, 20

L.Ed, 2d 1020 (1968) which had upheld extension of the

Fair Labor Standards Act to employees of state hospitals,

institutions and schools,

In Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 95 S.Ct. 1792, 44

L.Ed, 2d 363 (1975), it was stated:

While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized

as a ‘truism,’ stating merely that ‘all is retained

which has not been surrendered,’ United States v.

Darby, 312 U.S, 100, 124, 61 8.Ct, 451, 462, 885 L.Ed,

609 (1941), it is not without significance, The

Amendment expressly declares the constitutional

policy that Congress may not exercise power in a

fashion that impairs the States’ integrity or their

ability to function effectively in a federal system...

95 S.Ct. at 1795-1796, n.7.

Because the Court in National League of Cities concluded

that the amendments impaired the ability of the States to

effectively function in a federal system, they were held to

not be within the authority granted Congress by the Com-

merce Clause, The Court expressly declined to render an

opinion as to whether such limitation might be imposed

under the authority granted to Congress as the Spending

Power, Article I, Section 8, Clause 1. 96 S.Ct. at 2474, n.

17. However, other decisions have explicitly recognized

that the Spending Power is also subject to limitations. In

Charles C, Steward Machine Company v. Davis, 301 U.S.

548, 57 S.Ct. 883, 81 L.Ed, 1279 (1937), the Court upheld

provisions of the Social Security Act under which in States

7

choosing to enact unemployment compensation legislation,

a state taxpayer contributing to an unemployment fund

may receive credit against federal taxation, Although find-

ing that there was no contravention of the Tenth Amend-

ment in that case, the Court did declare that it would be

possible for Congress to enact taxing legislation designed

to stimulate or discourage certain conduct which would un-

duly intrude upon the powers reserved to the States and

exceed the bounds of power granted to Congress, 57 S.Ct.

at 892, That expression of limitation on the power of

Congress has been repeatedly reiterated by the Court, Lau

v. Nichols, 414 U.S, 563, 94 S.Ct. 786, 39 L.Ed, 2d 1 (1974);

Pennhurst State School and Hospital vy, Halderman, 451

U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct, 1531, 1540 n, 13,

It is thus apparent that whether the challenged portions

of the FWPCA be deemed to have been enacted under the

Commerce Clause or under the Spending Power, they are

subject to challenge as being beyond the proper boundaries

of either of those powers as granted to Congress in the

Constitution. It is submitted that by requiring a munici-

pality to enact a particular form of tax, in this instance a

user fee, Congress and the EPA, through its regulations

implementing the statute, have impermissibly infringed

upon the rights reserved to the States by the Tenth

Amendment,

Recently, this Court articulated the standards to be ap-

plied in determining whether federal legislation violates

the Tenth Amendment in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min-

ing and Reclamation Asscciation, Inc., 452 U.S. 265, 101

§.Ct, 2352, 69 L.Ed, 2d 1 (1981). These requirements were

enunciated :

First, there must be a showing that the challenged

statute regulates the ‘States as States.’ Second, the

federal regulation must address matters that are in-

8

disputably ‘attributes of state sovereignty.’ And,

third, it must be apparent that the States’ compli-

ance with the federal law would directly impair their

ability ‘to structure integral operations in areas of

traditional functions,’

101 S.Ct. at 2366 (citations omitted),

All of these requirements were taken by the Court from

language in the National League of Cities decision,

In its decision below, the Third Cireuit did not really dis-

pute that Sayreville had met the first two of the Hodel

requirements :

Because the challenged condition relates to the ways

in which Sayreville and other affected state sub-

entities are to raise and allocate revenues, it argu-

ably addresses ‘States as States’ and in relation to

‘attributes of state sovereignty.’

690 F.2d at 364,

That the user fee requirement regulates the “States as

States,” and addresse “attributes of state sovereignty,”

seems beyond challenge. The power to tax has been re-

served to the States without any limit except those ex-

pressed in the Constitution such as lack of power to tax

exports. In National League of Cities, the Court had ocea-

sion to cite to Lane County vy. Oregon, 7 Wall, 71, 19 L.Ed.

101 (1869) for its statement on the federal structure of our

govenment, That decision also establishes that the power

to tax is one of the powers contemplated by the Tenth

Amendment as having been reserved to the States.

Now, to the existence of the States, themselves, ne-

cessary to the existence of the United States, the

power of taxation is indispensable, It is an essen-

tial function of government. It was exercised by the

Colonies; and when the Colonies became States, both

before and after the formation of the Confederation,

it was exercised by the new governments. Under the

Articles of Confederation the Government of the

United States was limited in the exercise of this

power to requisitions upon the States, while the whole

power of direct and indirect taxation of persons and

property, whether by taxes on polls, or duties on im-

ports, or duties on internal production, manufac-

ture or use, was acknowledged to belong exclusively

to the States, without any other limitation than that

of non-interference with certain treaties made by

Congress. The Constitution, it is true, greatly

changed this condition of things. It gave the power

to tax, both directly and indirectly, to the National

Government, and subject to the one prohibition of

any tax upon exports and to the conditions of uni-

formity in respect to indirect and of proportion in

respect to direct taxes, the power was given without

any express reservation. On the other hand, no power

to tax exports or imports, except for a single pur-

pose and to an insignificant extent, or to lay any

duty on tonnage, was permitted to the States, In

respect, however, to property, business and persons,

within their respective limits, their power of taxa-

tion remained and remains entire. It is, indeed, a

concurrent power, and in the case of a tax on the

same subject by both governments, the claim of the

United States, as the supreme authority, must be

preferred; but with this qualification it is absolute.

The extent to which it shall be exercised, the sub-

jects upon which it shall be exercised, and the mode

in which it shall be exercised, are all equally within

the discretion of the Legislatures to which the States

10

commit the exercise of the power. That discretion is

restrained only by the will of the people expressed

in the state constitutions or through elections, and

by the condition that it must not be so used as to bur-

den or embarrass the operations of the National

_ Government, There is nothing in the Constitution

which contemplates or authorizes any direct. abridge-

ment of this power by national legislation.

7 Wall. 76-77 (emphasis added).

The conclusions drawn in the Lane County decision have

never been overturned, and in fact recent court decisions

have reiterated that the power to tax is protected by the

Tenth Amendment. In City of Sault Ste. Marie v. Andrus,

458 F.Supp. 465 (D.D.C. 1978), it was held that “the power

to levy a property tax is one of those powers reserved to

the states by the Tenth Amendment” and that such power

may be delegated to a municipality. 458 F.Supp. at 473.

In Snow v. Dixon, 66 Til. 2d 448, 363 NE 2d 1052 (1977),

cert. den. 434 U.S. 939, 98 S.Ct. 429, 52 L.Ed. 2d 298, it was

recognized that matters of state taxation are reserved to

the States by the Tenth Amendment and are unrestricted

if not otherwise unconstitutional. 362 NE 2d at 1062.

The Third Cireuit rejected Sayreville’s claim on the basis

of its conclusion that there was no interference with the

freedom to “structure integral operations in areas of tra-

ditional governmental functions” because Sayreville need

not apply for federal funds. 690 F.2d at 364. This con-

clusion was reached in reliance upon the generally ac-

cepted rule that the federal government may fix the terms

on which it disperses money to the States. Pennhurst

State School and [Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101

8.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1981); FERC v. Mississippi,

— US. —, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 72 L.Ed. 2d 532 (1982).

It is submitted that while the above cited cases do in-

IL

dicate that Congress may normally attach conditions to

grants of federal money, they also recognize that such

power is not without limits, and this case presents facts

which call for an application of those limits.

In the Pennhurst decision, Justice Rehnquist noted the

limits on Congress’ Spending Power:

. .« legislation enacted pursuant to the Spending

Power is much in the nature of a contract: in re-

turn for federal funds, the States agree to comply

with federally imposed conditions. The legitimacy

of Congress’ power to legislate under the Spend-

ing Power thus rests on whether the State volun-

tarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘con-

tract.’ 101 S.Ct. at 1539.

The key word for the purpose of this case is “volun-

tarily.” It is submitted that the Third Circuit erred

in accepting at face value the argument that it is en-

tirely up to municipalities to reject federal funds or ac-

cept them and therefore agree to comply with the user

fee requirements. In Pennhurst State School and the

cases cited therein, the statutes in question involved the

government offering money to States who met certain con-

ditions as an incentive to meet those conditions. How-

ever, if the States chose not to accept the money, they

were under no obligations. That is not the case under

the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Theoretically, a

State or local governmental entity could avoid the need

for instituting a user charge by not seeking federal grant

funds for construction of treatment works. This pos-

sibility exists in theory only and is in no way representa-

tive of reality.

Totally apart from whether federal grant funds are

sought, this statute imposes obligations on States and

municipalities which must be met. In State Water Con-

trol Board vy. Train, 559 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1977), it was

argued that publicly owned sewage treatment plants which

have not received any federal grants need not meet ef-

fluent limitations imposed by §301(b)(1) of the FWPCA

[83 U.S.C. §1311(b)(1)]. That notion was completely

rejected by the court.

. effluent limitations are, on their face, uncon-

ditional; and no other provision indicates any link

between their enforceability and the timely receipt

of federal assistance.

559 F.2d at 924.

This conclusion was echoed by Judge Debevoise in City

of New Brunswick v. Borough of Milltown, 519 F. Supp.

878 (D.N.J. 1981), aff’d 686 F. 2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1982):

Its [MCUA] obligation to comply with the treat-

ment and discharge requirements of the Clean Water

Act is completely independent of the receipt of any

financial assistance from the government.

519 F.Supp. at 885.

The court in State Water Control Board went on to

discuss the difficulties in financing construction of needed

water treatment facilities:

To assist in financing the facilities necessary to ac-

complish the effluent reduction mandated by Section

301, Title II of the Act establishes a program of

federal grants to states, municipalities and intergov-

ernmental agencies for the construction of publicly

owned treatment plants. Section 202(a) provides

that the amount of any grant made under this pro-

gram shall be 75% of approved construction costs;

13

and Section 207 authorizes the appropriation of $18

billion for fiscal years 1973 through 1975 for such

grants.

Unfortunately, however, the grant program’s ef-

fectiveness in facilitating compliance with the 1977

effluent limitations has been limited. Grants have

not been available for many construction projects

because the money authorized by Section 207 is in-

sufficient to finance 75% of the cost of every needed

sewage treatment plant in the country. Moreover,

disbursement of the authorized funds has been sub-

stantially delayed by Presidential impoundment and

by the time consumed by administrative processing

of grant applications. These problems, together with

the fiscal difficulties now confronting most State

and local governments, have made it economically

impossible for many localities to accomplish the

required effluent reductions by the 1977 deadline.

559 F.2d at 923-924 (emphasis added) (footnotes

omitted).

It is clear from the above quotation that it has been diffi-

cult if not impossible for many States and municipalities

to meet the requirements imposed by the FWPCA even with

federal grant money, and so to argue that it is realistic for

Sayreville, MCUA or any other State or local government

to comply with the statute without applying for grant

money is to ignore all notions of practicality. The FWPCA

simply does not allow a municipality such as the Borough

of Sayreville to evade the currently existing clean water

standards in the statute by declining to request federal

funds.

Given the conclusion in the State Water Control Board

decision, it would be grossly unfair to apply the doctrine

that the federal government may freely tie conditions to

14

the disbursement of federal money. The case most gener-

ally relied upon for that proposition is State of Oklahoma

v. United States Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127,

67 S.Ct. 544, 91 L.Ed. 794 (1947). At issue therein was

the constitutionality of the Hatch Act, 18 U.S.C. §61 et seq.

Specifically questioned was the provision which barred any

officer or employee of a State or locality whose principal

employment was in connection with an activity financed in

whole or part by loans or grants from the United States

from taking an active part in political management or poli-

tical campaigns. There was a total lack of any affirmative

obligations placed on a recipient of federal funds, Okla-

homa was totally free to reject federal funds and keep the

particular employee involved as Highway Commissioner.

The only penalty was the loss of highway grant funds equiv-

alent to the salary payments to this employee. That situ-

ation is a far ery from deciding whether or not to meet

the conditions for receipt of federal funds needed to com-

ply with binding requirements which involve the expendi-

ture of untold millions.

Other cases which may be cited in support of this prin-

ciple are equally distinguishable. State of North Carolina

ex. rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F.Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C.

1977), aff’d 435 U.S. 962, 98 S.Ct. 1597 (1978) dealt with

the National Health Planning and Resources Development

Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §300k et seq. That statute made fed-

eral funds available to States which agreed to establish a

health planning and development agency to administer a

state health program requiring usage of a certificate of

need. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that such a

program could not be implemented in North Carolina with-

out an amendment to the state constitution. North Carolina

then challenged the statute arguing that it was being co-

erced to comply. It did not challenge the general rule that

the federal government may attach conditions to the grant-

15

ing of funds, but argued that the need to amend its state

constitution constituted coercion “under the unique circum-

stances applicable to it.” 445 F.Supp. at 535, The court re-

jected this argument noting that its acceptance would al-

low states to evade otherwise valid conditions by obtaining

a state court decision similar to the one in North Carolina

thus leaving enforcement of the conditions to the quirks of

local law. What is significant is that the federal statute

was one devoid of any compulsion in the form of action

that a State must take even if it chooses to do without any

federal funding. See Greater St. Louis Health Systems

Agency v. Teasdale, 506 F.Supp. 23 (E.D. Mo. 1980).

Texas Landowners Rights Association v. Harris, 453 F.

Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1978), aff’d 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.)

cert, den, 444 U.S. 927 (1979) dealt with the National Flood

Insurance Program, 42 U.S.C. 44001-4128. Under that stat-

ute, federal assistance for a program of flood insurance

would be denied unless localities participated in the federal

program, which meant adoption of local flood plain manage-

ment measures. The argument against the constitutionality

of Uiat statute amounted to no more than the statement that

the plaintiffs would lose more by not participating than

they would gain by becoming part of the program and so

they were being unlawfully coerced. Once again, the stat-

ute made no demands on any local goverment which chose

to forego receipt of a federal grant.

Nor can reliance be placed on the fact that protection of

the environment is an important and legitimate federal con-

cern. In the past, when the EPA has sought to order States

to establish particular programs to meet federal specifica-

tions, three different Circuit Courts, all citing to the Tenth

Amendment, found such action unconstitutional. Maryland

v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated and re-

manded per curiam sub nom EPA vy. Brown, 431 U.S. 99

16

(1977) ; District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C.

Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded per curiam sub nom

EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); Brown v. EPA, 521

F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded per curiam,

431 U.S. 99 (1977).* The only contrary decision, Pennsyl-

vania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974), relied on the

decision in Maryland v. Wirtz, supra, which was overruled

in National League of Cities.

In Brown v, EPA, it was accepted by all parties and the

court that Congress had full power to regulate air pollu-

tion, and from that the EPA argued that the power existed

to direct a State to incorporate in its laws regulations

designed to control air pollution properly promulgated by

the Administrator of EPA. This was rejected on the

grounds that the Commerce Power does not allow Congress

to require a State to undertake governmental tasks. Re-

liance was placed on the language in Fry v. United States,

supra, regarding the limitations on congressional power

expressed in the Tenth Amendment. See 521 F.2d at 837-

842.

In considering the same issue in District of Columbia

v. Train, the District of Columbia Circuit addressed the

language in Fry regarding the ‘fashion” in which Congress

exercises power that has been granted to it by the Con-

stitution:

In other words, the Tenth Amendment may pre-

vent Congress from selecting methods of regulating

* The three decisions vacated and remanded in EPA v. Brown

were all on the basis of the controversies having become moot

due to the repeal of certain EPA regulations and the concession

that those remaining in controversy would be invalid unless modi-

fied.

17

which are ‘drastic’ invasions of state sovereignty

where less intrusive approaches are available.

521 F.2d at 994.

Requiring a State to enact statutes and regulations was

found to be a “drastic” intrusion on state sovereignty.

In State of Maryland v. EPA, the court technically did

not reach the constitutional issue, premising its decision

on a statutory construction that EPA lacked the authority

to require a State to pass legislation. Nonetheless, Brown

v. EPA was cited approvingly, and commenting upon

EPA regulations requiring Maryland to adopt statutes

and regulations, the court said that “we are of opinion

their constitutional validity is very doubtful at the very

best . ..” 530 F.2d at 226.

In his concurring opinion in National League of Cities,

Justice Blackmun indicated that an overriding federal

interest such as environmental protection may outweigh

what would otherwise be an impermissible infringement

on the powers reserved by the Tenth Amendment. It is

submitted that the three Circuit Court decisions which

reached this Court in EPA v. Brown, supra, subsequent

to National League of Cities, indicate that interest in

environmental protection is not enough to allow the federal

government to impose on the States in violation of the

Tenth Amendment. While in Hodel this Court cited to

Justice Blackmun’s statement, it did so only for the gen-

eral proposition that some federal interests might justify

State submission notwithstanding the Tenth Amendment.

See 101 S.Ct. at 2366, n. 29. As Justice O’Connor noted

in her dissent in FERC v. Mississippi, the Court has not

yet explored the circumstances that might justify an ex-

ception to the standards set forth in Hodel, 102 S.Ct. at

2147, n. 4.

18

A writ of certiorari should issue so that the Court can

give content to Justice Rehnquist’s indication in the Penn-

hurst case that there are limits to the constitutional ability

of Congress to place conditions on a grant of federal

funds. This case presents facts which call for the Court

to indicate to the lower federal courts that they must not

automatically uphold all Congressional action simply be-

cause it deals with federal funds.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully urged

that this Court issue a writ of certiorari to review the

judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

WituuM S. Greensera,

Counsel of Record,

Greenserc, Keviey & Prior,

Attorneys for Petitioners,

196 West State Street,

Trenton, New Jersey 08608.

(609) 989-9800

Dated: January 6, 1983

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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