Amicus Brief — Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

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Supreme Court of the United States

Octoser Term, 1982

* ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMEN-

a TAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

5 Petitioner,

.

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE

COUNCIL, INC., ef al.

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

— —

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2225

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8 22

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No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1982

ADMINISTRATOR,

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Petitioner,

V.

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, et al.

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF OF

MID-AMERICA LEGAL FOUNDATION AS AMICUS CURIAE

SUPPORTING THE POSITION OF PETITIONER

Mid-America Legal Foundation ("Mid-America")

moves the Court for leave to file the accompanying

Brief as amicus curiae in support of the captioned

petition for a writ of certiorari, as well as the related

petitions filed by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. in Docket No.

82-1005 and by American Iron and Steel Institute et al.

in Docket No. 82-1247,

.

3

Ys “77.

The Solicitor General, counsel to petitioner, has

consented to this filing. His written consent is filed

with the Clerk of the Court. Counsel to certain

respondents have not consented, thereby necessitating

this motion. )

Mid-America was organized in 1975 to engage in

legal research, study and analysis for the benefit of

the general public as to the effect of evolving concepts

of law on our democratic institutions. Mid-America

takes special interest in issues of a national scope that

originate in or have a direct effect on the mid-America

region, namely Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan,

Minnesota, Ohio and Wisconsin. Mid-America has an

interest in this case because the region is one of the

most important manufacturing areas of the Nation.

In the accompanying brief, Mid-America as amicus

curiae presents data from the Harvard Business School

case study of an air pollution control program utilizing

the bubble“ concept at the Middletown, Ohio steel

plant of Armco, Inc. In announcing the expected

approval of the plan by former Administrator, Douglas

M. Costle, EPA stated that, "Armco's bubble! dust

control plan would eliminate 4,000 tons per year of

particulate as compared to 652 tons per year under

existing regulations."

Amicus presents the empirical evidence and analy-

sis set out in the Harvard study to advance two points

in support of the petitions for a writ of certiorari.

? First, there is no inconsistency between the

"bubble" concept and either the language of the Clean

Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seg. (the "Act") or the

purpose of Congress in bringing all air quality regions

of the United States into compliance with the national

ambient air quality standards pursuant to Part D of

the Act. In fact, as the Harvard study demonstrates,

considerably greater improvement in air quality may be

achieved with the bubble concept than without it.

Second, altvsent such inconsistency, the policy

decision of the Administrator of the Environmental

Protection Agency to approve state implementation

plans which permit use of the bubble concept and

otherwise meet the requirements of the Act, as re-

flected in the challenged reguletion, must be sus-

tained. .

In the brief, Mid-America urges the Court to

grant the petitions for a writ of certiorari because the

court of appeals has decided an important question of

federal law which has not been, but should be, settled

by this Court and has done so in a way in conflict

with Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977), and

Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975).

Accordingly, Mid-America requests leave to file

the accompanying brief as amicus curiae.

Respectfully submitted,

onn M. Cannon

Susan W. Wanat

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

OF COUNSEL:

Ann P. Sheldon

William H. Link, Jr.

Mid-America Legal Foundation

Suite 842

20 North Wacker Drive

Chicago, Illinois 60606

(312) 263-5163

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE „ ew setae eee

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT „ eee R tr b

ARGUMENT * 7 * * * * * * * * * eee 3

I. Use of the bubble“ concept is

consistent with the improvement

Of etm / . CS

II. The policy judgment of the

Administrator was rejected

in a way in conflict with

Batterton and Train. ......... Il

CONCLUSION ....2cceeveves 6 as. eae

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,

8 C. ir. 9) 2

ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F. 2d 319

0

Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977)...

Baur v. Mathews, 578 F.2d

D

Train v. NRD C, 421 U.S. 60, (1975)

Statutes

N ae CeCe? vas 2 6 8 ee

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.§ 7401 et seq.

Section 111, ed 17411

Part C, * § 7470 et seq.

Part D, n 17501 et seq.

Other

A. Kantrow, D. Dyer and J. Fox,

Armco and the Bubble Policy, (1981)

(distributed by HBS Case Services,

Harvard Business School, Boston,

Mass. G16)

(1976)

Comment, An Overview of the Bubble Concept,

8 Colum., J. Envtl. L.

46 Fed. Reg. 8683 (January 27, 1981)

46 Fed. Reg. 19468 (March 31, 1981)

4-9

10

10

No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1982

ADMINISTRATOR,

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL ae ae AGENCY >

Petitioner,

Vv *

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., et al.

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF OF MID-AMERICA LEGAL FOUNDATION

AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING THE

~~POSTTION OF PETITIONER

INTEREST OF AMICUS

The interest of amicus is set out in the accompa-

nying motion for leave to file this brief.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The court of appeals has invalidated regulations

of the Environmental Protection Agency which allowed

the application of a "bubble" concept to new source

review requirements in areas which have not attained

the national ambient air quality standards under the

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (the "Act").

It did so by ruling that the bubble“ concept is

incompatible with those provisions of the Act which

have the purpose of improying rather than maintaining

air quality. The court of appeals thereby decided an

important federal question which has not been, but

should be, settled by this Court and did so in a way

in conflict with Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416

(1977), and Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975).

First, there is no inconsistency, between the

"bubble" concept and either the language of the Act or

the purpose of Congress in bringing all air quality

regions of the United States into compliance with the

national ambient air quality standards pursuant to Part

D of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7501 et seq. in fact, as

the Harvard Study presented herein demonstrates,

considerably greater improvement in air quality may be

achieved with the bubble concept than without it.

Second, absent such inconsistency, the policy

judgment of the Administrator of the Environmental

Protection Agency, reflected in the challenged regu-

lation, must be sustained. Contrary to the decision of

the court of appeals in this case, ASARCO, Inc. v.

EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978), did not hold

otherwise and cannot be controlling here,

ARGUMENT

I. Use of the "bubble" concept is consistent with the

improvement of air quality.

There is no incompatibility between the "bubble"

concept and either the language of the Clean Air Act

or the legislative purpose of bringing all air quality

regions of the United States into compliance with the

national ambient air quality standards pursuant to Part

D of the Act. In fact, use of the bubble“ concept in

nonattainment areas not only may achieve greater air

quality improvemenf than the stack by stack approach,

but may also speed up the achievement of clean air

standards in nonattainment areas. This was

demonstrated in the case study of an air pollution

control program at the Middletown, Ohio steel plant of

Armco, Inc. which was prepared for class discussion

at the Harvard Business School.

The Middletown plant site produced 3

million tons of steel yearly, covered 2,600

acres, employed roughly 7,000 people, and

stockpiled (depending on the season) some-

thing on the order of 670,000 tons of raw

materials. Its various operations were well

monitored by the EPA. Even though mea-

surements at only one of the monitoring

stations on the periphery and in the vicinity

of the plant exceeded the primary TSP

ambient air standard of 75 ug/m (micro-

grams per cubic meter, a measure of densi-

ty), that single station resulted in the

Middletown area's being designated a "nonat-

tainment“ area.

Harvard Study Part A, at 1 (exhibits and footnotes

omitted).

To deal with Armco's problem and others like it,

Congressional hearings and a White House conferefice

were held. In addition, Anthony Solomon,

Undersecretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs,

chaired a special task force on industry problems

whose recommendations appeared in 3 December, 1977

1. Kantrow, D. Dyer and J. Fox, Armco and the

Bubble Policy, (1981) (distributed By ABS Case

Services, wave Business School, Boston,

Massachusetts 02163) (hereinafter cited as the

"Harvard Study").

report, A Comprehensive Program for the. Steel

Industry. Seeking a middle ground between

"environmental animus and industry complaint," the

Solomon Committee recommended that government and

industry cooperate in a study of new solutions to the

probleme of pollution control. Harvard Study at 2.

Emissions standards, as then fixed by

legislation, generally applied on a process-

by-process basis to each individual stage of

the steelmaking operations. They also

applied, on a point-by-point basis, to indi-

vidual sources of pollution. As a result,

plants in violation of ambient air standards

for total emissions could not remedy the

situation merely by undertaking that mix of

corrective actions that would have the great-

est immediate effect on overall ambient air

quality. Even though the problem had to do

with the general level of TSP emissions,

corrective action had to be addressed to

specific contributory sources - whether or

not they were responsible for the bulk of

the problem.

Id. at 5.

Several flaws were thought to be implicit in the

logic of this existing environmental regulation. For

example:

To those who, following the technology-

forcing legislation, viewed abatement activity

primarily in terms of individual process- or

point-TSP emissions, the only appropriate

measure of success was the absolute level of

TSP reduction per individual source. If 80%

of a given smokestack's emission could be

*

kept out of the atmosphere, 90% was even

better, and 100% ("zero emissions") was best

of all. At one level, of course, this was

pure common sense; at another, however, it

was profoundly misleading, for to think in

these terms was to ignore the fact that each

additional increment of pollution reduction

costs a good deal more than the previous

one. In other words, to achieve the last

tiny marginal improvement in ambient air

quality for a given smokestack - an improve-

ment which, when measured in absolute TSP

reduction, is insignificant - is far more

expensive than to achieve gross TSP re-

ductions for other pollution sources. For

example, the first 95% of TSP reduction for

an electric furnace cost 3.5¢/Ib.; the next

4%, 30¢/Ib.; and the final 1%, $35/Ib.

Also implicit in the accepted regulatory

logic, Armco felt, was the notion that all

forms of pollution control employ roughly

equivalent amounts of energy. In other

words, the specific EPA standards, as they

stood, made no allowance at all for the

differential consumption of energy. [Armco's

director of environmetnal engineering!

thought this both narrow-minded and self-

defeating: narrow-minded because energy,

like clean air, was a finite good, meriting

conservation; self-defeating because the

production of usable energy itself-entailed a

certain predictable level of air pollution.

There was a law of diminishing returns in

control activity, a point beyond which the

production of energy needed for incremental

control created more emissions than it

removed. For example, "To produce the

electricity to run the fans and motors to

clean up the scarfing machine [at the Kansas

City plant] meant that the local power plant

would produce more pollution than we will

capture."

Id. at 6-7 (exhibits and footnotes omitted).

In seeking alternatives to this type of

self-defeating regulation, EPA hired the Midwest

Research Institute to develop a scientific basis for

accurately estimating pollution from open dust sources.

By 1978, the Institute had perfected a series of

emissions factor equatiors for. doing so. These

equations made possible for the first time a full

inventory of pollution sources. This test, using a

methodology called "exposure profile sampling“ yielded

the following results at Armco's Middletown plant.

Contrary to expectations, roughly 60%

of particulates came neither from stack nor

process emissions but, instead, from open

dust sources. Even when differential parti-

cle size was taken into account, the result

remained pretty much the same. For all

particulates less than 30 um (microns), open

dust emissions were six times greater than

process fugitive emissions, which were the

focus of EPA concern. For particulates less

than 5 um (the size most responsible for

ambient air quality more than 1 mile from an

industrial site), open dust emissions were

still three times greater than process fugi-

tive emissions.

Given these figures [Armco officials]

realized that "there [was] very little room

for further reduction [in TPS levels] from

presently controlled sources by adding more

efficient controls." To attack the remaining

smokestack or process emissions would be to

direct Armco's efforts toward a relatively

minor part of the problem... .

.. To cite the most striking example,

controlling windblown emissions from raw

materials piles would remove 284 tons of

particulates from the air each year (a re-

duction of some 60%) at a capital cost of

$200,000 - or $704 per ton - and with an

energy expenditure of 46 KWH per ton. By

contrast, controlling fugitive emissions from

open hearth operations would remove only 64

tons of particulates from the air each year

(a reduction of 80%) at a capital cost of

$4,000,000 - or $63,992 per ton - and with

an energy expenditure of 179,700 KWH per

ton. These were staggering numbers in-

deed. By focusing efforts on open dust

instead of process fugitive sources, Armco

could get more particulates out of the air at

1/89th the cost per ton and with 1/3906th

the energy.

Id. at 8-9 (exhibit and footnote omitted).

After much study and on-site monitoring of a

pilot project at the Middletown plant, EPA announced

the expected approval of Armco's specific bubble plan

by EPA Administrator, Douglas M. Costle. In a press

release issued on October 20, 1980, EPA stated:

It is our judgment that Armco will be

able to satisfy the "bubble" requirements

and EPA will be able to act favorably on

Ohio's State Implementation Plan for the area

affected by the plant when it is submitted

by the State,' Costle said.

.. A joint air monitoring study bv federal,

state and local governments and Armco has

confirmed in a pilot project that this bubble

is effective and has resulted in significant

improvements in ot oun 58

rmco's ubble ust control plan

would eliminate 4,000 tons per year of

particulates as compared to 652 tons per

year under existing regulations.

Harvard Study, Part D, Ex. 2, p.2-3 quoting EPA

"Environmental News." (emphasis added).

Following submission of the required technical

support documents, EPA formally proposed the

conditional approval of the Ohio plan on January 27,

1981, 46 Fed. Reg. 8683, and gave that approval on

March 31, 1981, 46 Fed. Reg. 19468. The Harvard

Study and the data obtained by EPA in support of the

Ohio plan illustrate that a policy which allows use of

the bubble“ concept may provide significantly greater

improvement in air quality than a contrary policy

which precludes it.

In addition to providing greater improvements in

air quality, the bubble policy may speed up the

achievement of clean air standards because it enables

firms operating the sources of air pollutants to revise

their control policies to achieve the most cost effective

method of meeting the requirements of the Act. Plant

enginsers may turn their sights to inventing new and

more effective pollution control devices.

Traditional command and control“ regulations

may actually deter the development of new

technology because firms, fearing that new

items of capital equipment will be specifically

required, may hide information about more

effective means of pollution reduction. By

contrast, the bubble would serve as an

incentive for developing cost-effective pol-

lution control technology since, when not

forced to use particular technologies, a

buyer will choose the least expensive means

of satisfying emissions limitations. Comment,

An Overview of the Bubble Concept, 8

Colum. J. Envtl. L. 137, 1 :

Some have voiced concern that use of the bubble

might allow the reduction of less harmful emissions as

a tradeoff for not reducing more hazardous air pollu-

tants. This objection is not well-founded. The equiv-

alence of tradeoffs may be addressed directly. Limita-

tions designed to ensure that the facility-wide defini-

tion of stationary source is used to improve air quality

and meet other requirements of the Act are not

incompatible with the bubble concept. See EPA's

Widening Embrace of the Bubble Concept: The Legality

and Availability of Intra-Source Trade-Offs, 9 Envtl.

L. Rep. 10027, 10029 (1979).

Thus, since the use of the bubble concept has

been shown to be capable of improving air quality, use

of the bubble in nonattainment areas is not

10

inconsistent with the purpose of Congress in enacting

Part D of the Act.

II. The policy judgment of the Administrator was

rejected in a way in conflict with Batterton and Train.

It is well established both by principles of admin-

istrative law and the decisions of this Court that in

the absence of a conflict between the policy judgment

of an agency administrator charged with responsibility

for implementing a federal statute and either the

language or purpose of that act, the agency decision

must be sustained. See Administrative Procedure Act,

5 U.S.C. § 706; Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416

(1977); and Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, (1975). In

the decision below, that principle was turned on its

head when the court of appeals substituted its judg-

ment for the policy decision of the EPA Administrator

to approve state implementation plans allowing the use

of a bubble concept which is based on the language of

the Act itself. A facility-wide definition of "stationary

source" in the verbatim language of Section 111 of the

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411, was the regulatory mechanism

11

utilized by EPA to authorize the "bubble" concept for

the nonattainment provisions of Part D of the Act.

The presumption in favor of the agency's policy

judgment is based on practical concerns about the

proper utilization of agency expertise. As noted in

Baur X. Mathews, 578 F. 2d 228, 233 (9th Cir, 1978):

The administrative agency clothed with

responsibility for implementing congressional

pronouncements is generally well acquainted

with the policy of the statute it administers.

This is particularly true when the agency

has long been involved in the construction

and administration of a given statute or its

predecessors. Where, as here, the agency

has extensive experience, has relied on the

common meaning of the relevant statute's

specific language, and can point to important

congressional purposes furthered by its

interpretation, only a clear showing of a

contrary intent by Congress will justify

overruling the agency's regulations.

The special competence of EPA to interpret its

mandate under the Clean Air Act is well recognized.

In Train, this Court sustained an EPA regulation as

"sufficiently reasonable" without going so far as to

hold that such construciion was "the only one it

permissibly could have adopted,” 421 U.S. at 75.

This Court also noted that judicial review should

allow d proper degree of flexibility for administrative

proceedings:

12

.

:

5

ay

.

OF,

we,

The fact that the interpretation placed on

the section by the Agency may on occasion

require administrative flexibility and ingenu-

ity to a greater degree than would a more

rigid alternative is not, of course, a reason

for rejecting the Agency's otherwise reason-

able construction.

421 U.S. at 94 n. 28,

The limitations on judicial review of administrative

action were reiterated by this Court in Batterton.

The Secretary, similar to the EPA Administrator, was

delegated authority by Congress to prescribe stan-

dards in order to accomplish the purposes of the Act.

This Court stated the applicable principle of law as

follows:

In a situation of this kind, Congress en-

trusts to the Secretary, rather than the

courts, the primary responsibility for inter-

preting the statutory term. In exercising

that responsibility, the Secretary adopts

regulations with legislative effect. A

reviewing court is not free to set aside those

regulations simply because it would have

interpreted the statute in a _ different

manner.

432 U.S. at 426.7

2Here, the court of appeals noted specifically that

"EPA, it is not disputed, has authority to define the

constituent terms of source enumerated in the statute

‘("building, structure, facility or installation“) in a

13

17

Under these circumstances, where there is no

conflict with the language of the Act, the legitimate

inquiries a reviewing court should make are whether

the administrator "exceeded his statutory authority“

and whether the "regulation is ‘arbitrary, capricious,

an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance

with law.“ Id. at 426. The decision below clearly

failed to do so. As a result, the court of appeals

substituted its judgment for the policy judgment of the

EPA Administrator in the absence of any conflict with

either the language or the purpose of the Act. It did

so by relying solely on the prior decision in ASARCO,

Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C.Cir. 1978), as having

established that the bubble concept is inconsistent with

the improvement of air quality. AS ARCO, however,

manner that will dest effectuate the expressed

2 of the Act.“ 685 F.2d at 723 n. 22; Chevron

et. Cert. Appx. at A-9 n. 22.

3685 P. 2d at 727-28; Chevron Pet. Cert. Appx. at

A-16-17. "We express no view on the decision we

would reach if the line drawn in Alabama Power and

ASARCO did not control our judgment.” 685 F.2d at

720 nn. 7; Chevron Pet. Cert. 17 4 at A-4 n. 7.

Alabama Power Co, v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D. C. cir.

» man a bu concept under Part C of the

14

es

did not hold that the bubble concept is incompatible

with improving air quality.

The regulation involved in ASARCO sought to

redefine the statutory term "facility" in Section 111 of

the Act to mean "a combination of such units.“ 578

F.2d at 327. This was rejected as "inconsistent with

the language of the Act.“ Ibid. The ASARCO court

clearly stated that its consideration of "the purpose of

the Clean Air Act and Section 111“ merely "reinforced"

the decision which was based on this conflict between

the language of the regulation involved in that case

and the language of the Act. Ibid. No such conflict

is present in this case. The regulation here at issue

incorporates the relevant statutory language verbatim.

It does not redefine "facility" or any other statutory

&

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7470 et „ for areas which have

attained the national ambient dir quality standards.

4 amicus here assumes arguendo that ASARCO was

y decided on its own terms. The alternative

argument that ASARCO should not be controlling here

because it was Incorrectly decided and conflicts with

Alabama Power, must also be noted. See Chevron Pet.

Cert. pp. 7-10.

15

term. Accordingly, since the basis of the AS ARCO

decision is completely inapplicable to this case, it

cannot be controlling here.

The reinforcing dictum of ASARCO ‘that the

bubble concept is inconsistent with "the purpose of the

Clean Air Act and Section 111," could not and did not

hold that the different application of the differently

worded bubble concept which the Administrator here

adopted for Part D of the Act is inconsistent with the

improvement of air quality. By ruling otherwise, the

court below failed to make even one of the rulings or

findings required to set aside the action of the

Administrator under the Administrative Procedure Act,

5 U.S.C. § 706. Policy decisions of an agency are

"entitled to more than mere deference or weight" and

5ASARCO expressly noted that, in proper

circumstances, the statutory term „facility“ could cover

an entire plant. 578 F.2d at 324 n. 17.

6578 F.2d at 327-30 (emphasis added). Even if it had

done 80, such a conclusion would be subject to

reconsideration as inconsistent with the factual data

subsequently developed by EPA, including the

measurement techniques developed for EPA by the

Midwest Research Institute and the joint monitoring

study at Middletown. See pp.6-8 supra.

16

3

can be set aside only if the Administrator "exceeded

his statutory authority or if the regulation is

‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with law.'" 432 U.S. at

426.

CONCLUSION

The Court below has decided an important ques-

tion of federal law which has not been, but should be,

settled by this Court and has done so in a way in

conflict with the decisions of this Court in Batterton

and Train.

For these reasons and the reasons set forth in

the petitions, a writ of certiorari should issue to

review the judgment and opinion of the Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

OF COUNSEL: Respectfully submitted,

Ann P. Sheldon

William H. Link, Jr.

Mid-America Legal Foundation

Suite 842 N M.

20 North Wacker Drive usan W. Wanat

Chicago, Illinois 60606 Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

We wish to acknowled the assistance of Mary

Jane Chapman and Paul J. Cummiskey, law students at

DePaul University College of Law.

17

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