Appendix — Manocchio v. Rhode Island
Supreme Court brief1983
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
la
Appendix.
STATE v. MANOCCHIO R.1. 761
Crte as, R.1., 448 A.2p 761
STATE
Luict MANOCCHIO.
No. 80-132-C.A.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
July 23, 1982.
The Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties, Rod-
gers, J., certified questions to the Supreme Court. The Su-
preme Court, Weisberger, J., held that: (1) defendant indict-
ed in 1969 cannot challenge composition of indicting grand
jury for alleged violation of Jenison rule that jury selection
system that entirely excludes identifiable and cognizable class
impermissibly offends fair cross-section requirement, and (2)
defendant was not entitied to benefit of retroactive application
of Jenison rule, even if he otherwise met federal or State
criteria for retroactive application of procedural due process
right enunciated in Jenison.
Questions answered.
762
OPINION
WEISBERGER, Justice.
This matter is before us pursuant to General Laws 1956
(1969 Reenactment) § 9-24-27 which permits a trial judge to
certify certain questions of law to this court. A justice of the
Superior Court has certified the following questions for our
determination.
“1. Does a defendant indicted in 1969 have a right,
whether it be contained in the fair and impartial jury
trial clause or the confrontation clause of the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, or in the
due process clauses of the Fifth and/or Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, or in the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, or in the provisions of Ar-
ticle I, section 10 of the Constitution of the State of Rhode
Island, to challenge the composition of the grand jury
that returned the indictment?
“2. If the defendant has such a right as described in
Question 1 above, to challenge the composition of the
grand jury that returned the indictment, does he waive
that right by voluntarily absenting himself from the juris-
diction prior to arraignment and trial?
“3. Is a defendant entitled to the benefit of the retroac-
tive application of this Court’s decision in the cases of
State v. Jenison and State v. Cory, notwithstanding this
Court’s decision in State v. O’Coin, if the defendant
otherwise meets Federal or State criteria for retroactive
application of a decision conferring substantive due proc-
ess rights upon defendants?”
3a
763
We answer the first in the negative. We do not reach the sec-
ond question because of our response to question No. 1. We are
unable to answer the third question without construing its
meaning. As construed, we answer it in the negative.
The facts of the case giving rise to the certification are as
follows. On August 14, 1969, a grand jury indicted defendant
on three charges connected with the 1969 murder of Anthony
Melei. In order to avoid arraignment and prosecution, de-
fendant absented himself from the jurisdiction for some ten
years. As a result, defendant was not arraigned until July 6,
1979, at which time he pleaded not guilty. On October 15,
1979,' he filed motions to dismiss the indictment. He alleged
that the grand jury that had indicted him had been un-
constitutionally constituted. Apparently the motions to
dismiss rest on the allegation that the grand jury had been
drawn from a jury pool from which members of the college
and university community had been impermissibly excluded.?
It was at this point in the criminal proceedings against defend-
ant that the Superior Court justice certified the three questions
now before us.
[1] Between the date defendant was arraigned and the date
the motions were docketed, we filed our opinion in State v.
Jenison, R.1., 405 A.2d 3 (1979). In Jenison we discussed the
right to a grand jury drawn from a “fair cross-section of the
‘Upon consideration of stipulations entered into by the state and defend-
ant, the presiding justice had enlarged the time in which these and other mo-
tions could be filed.
* At the time of the indictment, members of the college and university aca-
demic community were entitled to claim an exemption from jury duty.
General Laws § 9-9-3, as amended by P.L.1968, ch. 102, § 1.
4a
community.” Id. at 6-8. We acknowledged that the “fair
cross-section” requirement for petit and grand juries was man-
dated by the due-process and equal-protection clauses of the
Federal Constitution, the Sixth Amendment right to an impar-
tial jury, and common law. Id. at 6-7; see, e.g., Castanada v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 492-93, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 1279, 51
L.Ed.2d 498, 509 (1977); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
526-33, 95 S.Ct. 692, 696-99, 42 L.Ed.2d 690, 696-700 (1975);
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502, 92 S.Ct. 2163, 2168, 33
L.Ed.2d 83, 94 (1972); Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U.S.
320, 330, 99 S.Ct. 518, 523-24, 24 L.Ed.2d 549, 557-58
(1970). We concluded that
“a state electing to use the grand-jury system must abide
by the requirements of due process in assuring that the
selection process draws jurors from a fair cross-section of
the community.” State v. Jenison, R.1., 405 A.2d at 7.
Relying on the rule announced in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. at 530, 95 S.Ct. at 697 98, 42 L.Ed.2d at 698, we stated
that excluding a
“cognizable class playing a major role in the community,
without a rational reason therefor, impermissibly offends
the fair cross-section requirement * * *.” State v. Jeni-
son, R.1., 405 A.2d at 8,
Applying these principles, we determined that the system of
automatically excluding from the grand jury venire members
of the college and university academic community who were
entitled to exemption was unconstitutional as well as a viola-
tion of the pertinent statute. /d., 405 A.2d at 10. We further
held that indictments handed down “by a grand jury com-
posed in violation of constitutional requirements, cannot
stand.” Id,
5a
Less than one year after our decision in Jenison, we ad-
dressed its retroactive implications. In State v. O’Coin, R.I.,
417 A.2d 310 (1980), we stated that because Jenison was based
on federal constitutional law, and more specifically the princi-
ples enunciated in Taylor, supra, its retroactive effects must be
determined in compliance with federal law governing retroac-
tivity. Id., 417 A.2d at 312.
In 1975, the United States Supreme Court held that Taylor
may not be applied retroactively to convictions rendered by
juries impaneled prior to 1975, the date of Taylor. Daniel v.
Louisiana, 420 U.S.31,
764
32, 95 S.Ct. 704, 704, 42 L.Ed.2d 790, 792 (1975). In 1979 the
Court ruled that where there are “‘no new standards’ of con-
stitutional law not evident from the decision in Taylor v. Loui-
siana * * *”, a decision could be retroactively applied to juries
sworn after the date of the Taylor decision. Lee v. Missouri,
439 U.S. 461, 462, 99 S.Ct. 710, 711, 58 L.Ed.2d 736, 739
(1979) (per curiam). Because we determined in O’Coin that
Jenison “did not announce any ‘new standards’ of constitu-
tional law not evident from the decision in Taylor * * *,” we
held that
“the rule in Jenison shall apply in the cases of all defend-
ants who were indicted by grand juries impaneled after
* * * January 21, 1975, and whose convictions have not
become final by the date of this opinion [July 11, 1980].”
State v. O’Coin, R.I., 417 A.2d at 312.
The Jenison rule is not limited to grand juries drawn from a
pool that systematically excluded members of the college and
6a
university academic community. The rule, as we have dis-
cussed, is that a “jury selection system that entirely excludes an
identifiable and cognizable class * * * impermissibly offends
the fair cross-section requirement,” State v, Jenison, R.I., 405
A.2d at 8.
[2,3] We now turn to the question before us. We read the
first certified question as addressing the defendant's right to
the retroactive application of the requirement that grand
juries be drawn from a fair cross section of the community,
Our decision in O'Coin therefore controls our answer to this
question, As noted, O'Coin set forth a two-pronged test for
the retroactive application of Jenison. To avail oneself of a
Jenison challenge, a defendant must satisfy both prongs of the
test. The grand jury in question must have been impaneled
after 1975 and the conviction must not have been finalized
prior to 1980, It is not sufficient that defendant has not yet
been convicted. Our answer, therefore, is that a defendant
indicted in 1969, obviously prior to Taylor, cannot challenge
the composition of the indicting grand jury upon the grounds
alleged in this case,
We need not reach question No, 2 because of our negative
answer to question No, 1,
[4-8] Question No, 3, in effect, asks whether a defendant
can circumvent the retroactive rule of O'Coin by relying solely
on federal or state criteria for retroactive application of a deci-
sion conferring substantive due-process rights. The right to be
tried by a jury drawn from a fair and impartial cross section of
the community admittedly is a due-process right. See Peters
v. Kiff, 407 U.S, 493, 502, 92 S.Ct. 2163, 2168, 33 L.Ed.2d
83, 94 (1972). It is a fundamental aspect of the right to a jury
trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. See Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 530, 95 §.Ct. at 697-98, 42 L.Ed.2d at
698. As such, it seems clearly to be a procedural due-process
7a
right.’ See generally Nowak, Rotunda, & Young, Handbook
on Constitutional Law 380-83 (1978). We are unable to deter-
mine the relevance of the term “substantive” in the third ques-
tion as written; consequently question No, 3 essentially repli-
cates the issues posed by question No, 1. We find there is no
point in reanalyzing the retroactive effect of Jenison independ-
ent of O'Coin, In O'Coin we determined that the retroactiv-
ity of the Jenison principles was controlled by Daniel v, Louisi-
ana, supra,
765
We purposely rejected state retroactivity criteria, The O'Coin
rule was the product of the application of the federal retroac-
tivity ruling in Daniel v, Louisiana, supra, to the due-process
right articulated in Jenison and based on Taylor v, Louisiana,
supra, A reapplication of the principle of Daniel v, Louisiana,
supra, would necessarily yield the same result as that of the
* Generally substantive due process precludes or limits the ability of a legis-
lature or the Congress to enact legislation at all in areas involving certain
fundamental rights, See generally Roe v, Wade, 410 U.S, 113, 93 §.Ct, 705,
35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); Griswold v, Connecticut, 381 U.S, 479, 85 8.Ct,
1678, 14 L,.Ed.2d 510 (1965); Skinner v, Oklahoma, 316 U.S, 535, 62 S.Ct.
1110, 86 L.Ed, 1655 (1942); United States v, Carolene Products Co,, 304
U.S. 144, 58 S.Ct, 778, 82 L.Ed, 1234 (1938); Corwin, Liberty Against
Government passim (1948), On the other hand procedural due-process re-
quires certain minimal standards of notice, hearing, and opportunity to re-
spond adequately before a governmental agency may effectively deprive an
individual of life, liberty, or property, See generally Fuentes v, Shevin, 407
U.S, 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972); Duncan v, Louisiana, 391
U.S, 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968); Pointer v, Texas, 380 U.S,
400, 85 §.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed. 2d 923 (1965); Gideon v, Wainwright, 372 U.S,
335, 83 S.Ct, 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S, 86, 43
§.Ct, 265, 67 L.Ed, 543 (1923),
8a
O'Coin opinion, Construing the third question to address the
retroactive aspect of the procedural due-process right enunci-
ated in Jenison, we answer that question also in the negative.
To summarize, we answer questions Nos. 1 and 3 in the neg-
ative and do not reach question No, 2, The papers in the case
are remanded in the Superior Court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion,
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.