Appendix — Manocchio v. Rhode Island

Supreme Court brief1983

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Appendix.

STATE v. MANOCCHIO R.1. 761

Crte as, R.1., 448 A.2p 761

STATE

Luict MANOCCHIO.

No. 80-132-C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 23, 1982.

The Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties, Rod-

gers, J., certified questions to the Supreme Court. The Su-

preme Court, Weisberger, J., held that: (1) defendant indict-

ed in 1969 cannot challenge composition of indicting grand

jury for alleged violation of Jenison rule that jury selection

system that entirely excludes identifiable and cognizable class

impermissibly offends fair cross-section requirement, and (2)

defendant was not entitied to benefit of retroactive application

of Jenison rule, even if he otherwise met federal or State

criteria for retroactive application of procedural due process

right enunciated in Jenison.

Questions answered.

762

OPINION

WEISBERGER, Justice.

This matter is before us pursuant to General Laws 1956

(1969 Reenactment) § 9-24-27 which permits a trial judge to

certify certain questions of law to this court. A justice of the

Superior Court has certified the following questions for our

determination.

“1. Does a defendant indicted in 1969 have a right,

whether it be contained in the fair and impartial jury

trial clause or the confrontation clause of the Sixth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, or in the

due process clauses of the Fifth and/or Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution, or in the

equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to

the United States Constitution, or in the provisions of Ar-

ticle I, section 10 of the Constitution of the State of Rhode

Island, to challenge the composition of the grand jury

that returned the indictment?

“2. If the defendant has such a right as described in

Question 1 above, to challenge the composition of the

grand jury that returned the indictment, does he waive

that right by voluntarily absenting himself from the juris-

diction prior to arraignment and trial?

“3. Is a defendant entitled to the benefit of the retroac-

tive application of this Court’s decision in the cases of

State v. Jenison and State v. Cory, notwithstanding this

Court’s decision in State v. O’Coin, if the defendant

otherwise meets Federal or State criteria for retroactive

application of a decision conferring substantive due proc-

ess rights upon defendants?”

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763

We answer the first in the negative. We do not reach the sec-

ond question because of our response to question No. 1. We are

unable to answer the third question without construing its

meaning. As construed, we answer it in the negative.

The facts of the case giving rise to the certification are as

follows. On August 14, 1969, a grand jury indicted defendant

on three charges connected with the 1969 murder of Anthony

Melei. In order to avoid arraignment and prosecution, de-

fendant absented himself from the jurisdiction for some ten

years. As a result, defendant was not arraigned until July 6,

1979, at which time he pleaded not guilty. On October 15,

1979,' he filed motions to dismiss the indictment. He alleged

that the grand jury that had indicted him had been un-

constitutionally constituted. Apparently the motions to

dismiss rest on the allegation that the grand jury had been

drawn from a jury pool from which members of the college

and university community had been impermissibly excluded.?

It was at this point in the criminal proceedings against defend-

ant that the Superior Court justice certified the three questions

now before us.

[1] Between the date defendant was arraigned and the date

the motions were docketed, we filed our opinion in State v.

Jenison, R.1., 405 A.2d 3 (1979). In Jenison we discussed the

right to a grand jury drawn from a “fair cross-section of the

‘Upon consideration of stipulations entered into by the state and defend-

ant, the presiding justice had enlarged the time in which these and other mo-

tions could be filed.

* At the time of the indictment, members of the college and university aca-

demic community were entitled to claim an exemption from jury duty.

General Laws § 9-9-3, as amended by P.L.1968, ch. 102, § 1.

4a

community.” Id. at 6-8. We acknowledged that the “fair

cross-section” requirement for petit and grand juries was man-

dated by the due-process and equal-protection clauses of the

Federal Constitution, the Sixth Amendment right to an impar-

tial jury, and common law. Id. at 6-7; see, e.g., Castanada v.

Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 492-93, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 1279, 51

L.Ed.2d 498, 509 (1977); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,

526-33, 95 S.Ct. 692, 696-99, 42 L.Ed.2d 690, 696-700 (1975);

Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502, 92 S.Ct. 2163, 2168, 33

L.Ed.2d 83, 94 (1972); Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U.S.

320, 330, 99 S.Ct. 518, 523-24, 24 L.Ed.2d 549, 557-58

(1970). We concluded that

“a state electing to use the grand-jury system must abide

by the requirements of due process in assuring that the

selection process draws jurors from a fair cross-section of

the community.” State v. Jenison, R.1., 405 A.2d at 7.

Relying on the rule announced in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419

U.S. at 530, 95 S.Ct. at 697 98, 42 L.Ed.2d at 698, we stated

that excluding a

“cognizable class playing a major role in the community,

without a rational reason therefor, impermissibly offends

the fair cross-section requirement * * *.” State v. Jeni-

son, R.1., 405 A.2d at 8,

Applying these principles, we determined that the system of

automatically excluding from the grand jury venire members

of the college and university academic community who were

entitled to exemption was unconstitutional as well as a viola-

tion of the pertinent statute. /d., 405 A.2d at 10. We further

held that indictments handed down “by a grand jury com-

posed in violation of constitutional requirements, cannot

stand.” Id,

5a

Less than one year after our decision in Jenison, we ad-

dressed its retroactive implications. In State v. O’Coin, R.I.,

417 A.2d 310 (1980), we stated that because Jenison was based

on federal constitutional law, and more specifically the princi-

ples enunciated in Taylor, supra, its retroactive effects must be

determined in compliance with federal law governing retroac-

tivity. Id., 417 A.2d at 312.

In 1975, the United States Supreme Court held that Taylor

may not be applied retroactively to convictions rendered by

juries impaneled prior to 1975, the date of Taylor. Daniel v.

Louisiana, 420 U.S.31,

764

32, 95 S.Ct. 704, 704, 42 L.Ed.2d 790, 792 (1975). In 1979 the

Court ruled that where there are “‘no new standards’ of con-

stitutional law not evident from the decision in Taylor v. Loui-

siana * * *”, a decision could be retroactively applied to juries

sworn after the date of the Taylor decision. Lee v. Missouri,

439 U.S. 461, 462, 99 S.Ct. 710, 711, 58 L.Ed.2d 736, 739

(1979) (per curiam). Because we determined in O’Coin that

Jenison “did not announce any ‘new standards’ of constitu-

tional law not evident from the decision in Taylor * * *,” we

held that

“the rule in Jenison shall apply in the cases of all defend-

ants who were indicted by grand juries impaneled after

* * * January 21, 1975, and whose convictions have not

become final by the date of this opinion [July 11, 1980].”

State v. O’Coin, R.I., 417 A.2d at 312.

The Jenison rule is not limited to grand juries drawn from a

pool that systematically excluded members of the college and

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university academic community. The rule, as we have dis-

cussed, is that a “jury selection system that entirely excludes an

identifiable and cognizable class * * * impermissibly offends

the fair cross-section requirement,” State v, Jenison, R.I., 405

A.2d at 8.

[2,3] We now turn to the question before us. We read the

first certified question as addressing the defendant's right to

the retroactive application of the requirement that grand

juries be drawn from a fair cross section of the community,

Our decision in O'Coin therefore controls our answer to this

question, As noted, O'Coin set forth a two-pronged test for

the retroactive application of Jenison. To avail oneself of a

Jenison challenge, a defendant must satisfy both prongs of the

test. The grand jury in question must have been impaneled

after 1975 and the conviction must not have been finalized

prior to 1980, It is not sufficient that defendant has not yet

been convicted. Our answer, therefore, is that a defendant

indicted in 1969, obviously prior to Taylor, cannot challenge

the composition of the indicting grand jury upon the grounds

alleged in this case,

We need not reach question No, 2 because of our negative

answer to question No, 1,

[4-8] Question No, 3, in effect, asks whether a defendant

can circumvent the retroactive rule of O'Coin by relying solely

on federal or state criteria for retroactive application of a deci-

sion conferring substantive due-process rights. The right to be

tried by a jury drawn from a fair and impartial cross section of

the community admittedly is a due-process right. See Peters

v. Kiff, 407 U.S, 493, 502, 92 S.Ct. 2163, 2168, 33 L.Ed.2d

83, 94 (1972). It is a fundamental aspect of the right to a jury

trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. See Taylor v.

Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 530, 95 §.Ct. at 697-98, 42 L.Ed.2d at

698. As such, it seems clearly to be a procedural due-process

7a

right.’ See generally Nowak, Rotunda, & Young, Handbook

on Constitutional Law 380-83 (1978). We are unable to deter-

mine the relevance of the term “substantive” in the third ques-

tion as written; consequently question No, 3 essentially repli-

cates the issues posed by question No, 1. We find there is no

point in reanalyzing the retroactive effect of Jenison independ-

ent of O'Coin, In O'Coin we determined that the retroactiv-

ity of the Jenison principles was controlled by Daniel v, Louisi-

ana, supra,

765

We purposely rejected state retroactivity criteria, The O'Coin

rule was the product of the application of the federal retroac-

tivity ruling in Daniel v, Louisiana, supra, to the due-process

right articulated in Jenison and based on Taylor v, Louisiana,

supra, A reapplication of the principle of Daniel v, Louisiana,

supra, would necessarily yield the same result as that of the

* Generally substantive due process precludes or limits the ability of a legis-

lature or the Congress to enact legislation at all in areas involving certain

fundamental rights, See generally Roe v, Wade, 410 U.S, 113, 93 §.Ct, 705,

35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); Griswold v, Connecticut, 381 U.S, 479, 85 8.Ct,

1678, 14 L,.Ed.2d 510 (1965); Skinner v, Oklahoma, 316 U.S, 535, 62 S.Ct.

1110, 86 L.Ed, 1655 (1942); United States v, Carolene Products Co,, 304

U.S. 144, 58 S.Ct, 778, 82 L.Ed, 1234 (1938); Corwin, Liberty Against

Government passim (1948), On the other hand procedural due-process re-

quires certain minimal standards of notice, hearing, and opportunity to re-

spond adequately before a governmental agency may effectively deprive an

individual of life, liberty, or property, See generally Fuentes v, Shevin, 407

U.S, 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972); Duncan v, Louisiana, 391

U.S, 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968); Pointer v, Texas, 380 U.S,

400, 85 §.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed. 2d 923 (1965); Gideon v, Wainwright, 372 U.S,

335, 83 S.Ct, 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S, 86, 43

§.Ct, 265, 67 L.Ed, 543 (1923),

8a

O'Coin opinion, Construing the third question to address the

retroactive aspect of the procedural due-process right enunci-

ated in Jenison, we answer that question also in the negative.

To summarize, we answer questions Nos. 1 and 3 in the neg-

ative and do not reach question No, 2, The papers in the case

are remanded in the Superior Court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion,

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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