Petition — Pennsylvania v. Lovette

OCTOBER TERM,

NO,

COMMONWEALTH OF

Ve

ANDRE LOVETTE, AND

Representative of

Andre Lovette,

R2 -918

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

1982

PENNSYLVANIA,

Petitioner

SIMONA LOVETTE,

the Estate of

Respondents

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ERIC B. HENSON

Deputy District Attorney

Law Division

(Counsel of Record)

MARK S. GUREVITZ

Assistant District Attorney

GAELE McLAUGHLIN BARTHOLD

Assistant Chief

Appeals Division

EDWARD G. RENDELL

District Attorney

Philadelphia County

1300 Chestnut St.

Phila., Pa. 19107

(215) 875-6010

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments prohibit the brief and limited

movement of individuals reasonably sus-

pected of criminal activity, absent prob-

able cause to arrest?

2. Whether it is constitutionally

permissible and reasonable for police to

transport an individual properly detained

under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), a

short distance for a valid and reasonable

investigative purpose?

3. Whether a Writ of Certiorari

should be issued to resolve these ques-

tions on which conflicting decisions have

been rendered by the Circuit Courts of

Appeals and by the highest state courts

of the nation?

INDEX

Opinions Below

Statement of Jurisdiction

Constitutional Provisions Involved

Statement of the Case

Reasons for Granting the Writ

The Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments do not require that

the brief and limited movement

of a lawfully detained suspect

be supported by probable cause

to arrest. No constitutional

violation occurs if a person

validly stopped and. detained

under Ter v. Ohio, 392 U.S.

1 (1968), 5 moved a short dis-

tance for a valid and reason-

able investigative purpose.

Conclusion

APPENDICES

Appendix A; Judgment and Opinion

of the Supreme Court

of Pennsylvania

Appendix B: Opinion of the Super-

ior Court of Pennsyl-

vania

42

10-20

21

1A-15A

1LB-12B

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Federal Cases

Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325,

96 S. Ct. 579 (1976)

Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,

99 S. Ct. 2248 (1979)

Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301,

84 S. Ct. 391 (1964)

Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692,

101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981)

Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. #4,

94 S. Ct. 2655 (1974)

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. l, 88 S.

Ct. 1868 (1968)

United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d

583 (5th Cir. 1982)

United States v. Hill, 626 F.2d 429

(Sth Cir. 1980)

United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d

717 (6th Cir. 1977)

United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d

45 (2d Cir. 1977)

United States v. Post, 607 F.2d

847 (9th Cir. 1979)

United States v. Salter, 521 F.2d

1326 (2d Cir. 1975)

iii

PAGE

18

United States v. Short, 570 F.2d

1051 (D.C. Cir. 1978)

United States v. Thevis, 469 F.

Supp. 490 (D. Conn.), aff'd,

614 F.2d 1293 (2a Cir. 1979),

cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908,

100 S. Ct. 1834 (1980)

United States v. White, 648

F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert.

denied, 454 U.S. 924, 102 S.

Ct. 424 (1981)

United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d

62 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.

denied, 435 U.S. 944, 98 S.

Ct. 1527 (1978)

Pennsylvania Cases

Commonwealth v. Lovette, Pa.

, 450 A.2d 975 (1982)

Commonwealth v. Lovette, 271 Pa.

Superior Ct. 250, 413 A.2d 390

(1979)

Commonwealth v. Walker, 447 Pa. 146,

288 A.2d 741 (1972)

Other Cases

District of Columbia v. M.M., 407

A.2d 698 (D.C. App. 1979)

iv

PAGE

16

16

16

16

passim

17

1087, 126 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1976)

People v. Brnja, 70 App.Div.2d 17,

419 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1979), aff'd

on other grounds, 50 N.¥.2d 306,

429 N.Y. oS TTS , 406 N.E.2d 1066

(1980)

People v. Harris, 15 Cal.3d 384,

124 Cal. Rptr. 536, 540 P.2d 632

(1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.

934, 96 S. Ct. 1664 (1976)

People v. Herron, 89 I1l.App.3d

1048, 412 N.E.2d 1365 (1980),

cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1080,

102 S. Ct. 633 (1981)

People v. Hidalgo, 78 Cal.App.3d

675, 144 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1978)

People v. Hines, 94 I11.App.3d

1041, 419 N.E.2d 420 (1981)

People v. Holdman, 73 I11.2d 213,

383 N.E.2d 155 (1978), cert.

denied, 440 U.S. 938, 99 S. Ct.

1979)

Singletary v. United States, 383

A.2d 1064 (D.C. App. 1978)

State v. Gardner, 28 Wash. App.

721, 626 P.2d 56 (1981)

State v. Isham, 70 Wis.2d 718,

235 N.W.2d 506 (1975)

PAGE

19

17

19

17

19

17

17

17

17

17

State v. Watson, 165 Conn. 577,

345 A.2d 532 (1973)

Wilkerson v. United States, 427

A.2d 923 (D.C. App.), cert.

denied, 454 U.S. 852, 102 S.

Ct. 295 (1981)

Constitutional and Statutory

Provisions

U.S. Const. amend. IV

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1

28 U.S.C. §1257(3)

Pa.R.A.P. 502(a)

Other Authorities

ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment

Procedure §110.2, Comment (Pro-

posed Official Draft 1975)

W. LaFave, Search and Seizure

§9.21 (1978)

vi

PAGE

16-17

17

wo Ho wo Ww

15

15

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

NO.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Petitioner

Ve

ANDRE LOVETTE, AND SIMONA LOVETTE,

Representative of the Estate of

Andre Lovette, Respondents

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Petitioner, the Commonwealth of Penn-

sylvania, respectfully requests that a Writ

of Certiorari issue to review the Judgment

and Opinion of the Supreme Court of Penn-

sylvania entered in this case on October 5,

1982.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Opinion below and Judgment of the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which is unoffi-

cially reported at 450 A.2d 975 (Pa. 1981),

but which nas not yet been officially

reported, is set forth in full in Appendix

A, infra at 1A-15A. The Opinion below of

the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which is

officially reported at 271 Pa. Superior

Ct. 250 (1979), and unofficially reported

at 413 A.2d 390 (Pa. Superior 1979), is

set forth in full in Appendix B, infra at

1B-12B.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court was entered on October 5,

1982. The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1257(3).>

lpecause an actual case and controversy

is here presented, Richardson v. Ramirez,

418 U.S. 24, 37, 94 S. Ct. 2655, 2662

(1974) (Court limited by Article III "to

adjudication of actual disputes between

adverse parties"), this Court's jurisdic-

tion is not defeated by respondent Andre

Lovette's death shortly after the Pennsyl-

vania Supreme Court granted discretionary

review of his case.

(Footnote 1 continued on next page.)

(Footnote 1 continued from previous page.)

When petitioner, the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania, learned of Mr. Lovette's

death two years later, shortly after oral

argument of the case, it immediately peti-

tioned to abate the appeal. Respondent's

counsel and respondent's mother, as repre-

sentative of his estate, opposed the peti-

tion, however, and respondent's mother

petitioned to be substituted for her

deceased son "as a party before [the Penn-

sylvania Supreme] Court." See Pa.R.A.P.

502(a). Thereafter, the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court denied the Commonwealth's

petition. See Commonwealth v. Walker,

447 Pa. 146, 288 A.2d 741 (1972) ("... it

is in the interest of both a defendant's

estate and society that any challenge

initiated by a defendant to the regularity

or constitutionality of a criminal proceed-

ing be fully reviewed and decided by the

appellate process."). The interests of

the Estate and of the Commonwealth are

therefore affected by the judgment of the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

While the question of mootness is a

federal one, Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375

US. 301, 304, 84 S. Ct. 391, 393 (1964),

a continuing controversy, between adverse

parties, leading to a judgment determin-

ing the parties' legal interests, was

resolved in the state court system and

is now before this Court. This is the

essence of a live controversy.

(Footnote 1 continued on next page.)

(Footnote 1 continued from previous page.)

In this instance, unlike Dove v. United

States, 423 U.S. 325, 96 S. Ct. 579 (1976),

where the death of the petitioner during

the pendency of a petition for certiorari

resulted in its dismissal, there is no

changed circumstance which defeats this

Court's review. In Dove there was no

showing that either party had an interest

which continued beyond defendant's death.

Here, respondent Andre Lovette's mother

and personal representative willingly

chose to substitute for her son, so as to

protect his estate and insure that the

validity of his conviction was justicia-

ble. Respondents, therefore, may not

defeat this Court's jurisdiction and cut

off further appellate review, in deroga-

tion of public and state interests, simply

because they achieved a "favorable" result

in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

INVOLVED

United States Constitution, Amendment Four,

which provides:

The right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seiz-

ures, shall not be violated, and

no Warrants shall issue, but upon

probable cause, supported by Oath

or affirmation, and particularly

describing the place to be searched,

and the persons or things to be

seized.

United States Constitution, Amendment Four-

teen, Section One, which provides:

All persons born or naturalized

in the United States, and subject

to the jurisdiction thereof, are

citizens of the United States and

of the State wherein they reside.

No State shall make or enforce any

law which shall abridge the priv-

ileges or immunities of citizens

of the United States; nor shall

any State deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law; nor deny to

any person within its jurisdiction

the equal protection of the laws.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On December 15, 1976 at 5:15 p.m.,

Philadelphia Police Officer James McCoy

was dispatched to investigate an anonymous

report of men inside a deserted house with

stolen property. At the vacant building,

Officer McCoy and his partner discovered

stereo equipment, wrapped Christmas gifts,

clothing, pottery, and other items, Fur-

ther investigation revealed that a nearby

house had been burglarized and that the

burglars took the stolen items to the

deserted premises leaving trails of foot-

prints in a muddy plot of ground which

separated the buildings (N.T. 4-7) .°

Ten minutes after the officers'

arrival, the owner of the burglarized

premises returned. He told police that

when he left his home at approximately

NAT. refers to the Trial Notes of

Testimony.

10:30 a.m., the property was secured. The

owner identified the property in the aban-

doned building as his (N.T. 8-9).

Within twenty minutes of the radio

call Officer McCoy began to patrol the

immediate area. A minute later and a

block and a half away he spotted three

men; they attracted his attention because

each had mud on his shoes, Respondent,

An‘?re Lovette, a member of the trio, had

a paper bag in his hand (N.T. 9-11).

‘When stopped by Officer McCoy, none

of the men was able to produce any identi-

fication (N.T. 10-l1l, 19). Meither could

they initially explain the source of the

mud on their shoes, although they later

said they must have walked through a field

at some time during the day. Officer

McCoy next asked Lovette what was in the

paper bag. He responded by showing the

officer a camel-colored hat which he

Claimed was just obtained from an unspeci-

fied friend (N.T. 12-13).

Based on the trio's muddy shoes and

evasive answers, Officer McCoy transported

them to the burglary scene, one and one-

half blocks away, for possible identifica-

tion of the hat by the victim. Before

placing the men in the police vehicle,

the officer conducted a “pat down" search;

this revealed a gold ring and a silver

dime of numismatic value. At the burglar-

ized house, less than a minute later, the

complainant identified the hat, ring and

silver dime as items taken from his house.

The three men were then placed under

arrest and Lovette was charged, in the

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia

County, with burglary and theft by unlaw-

ful taking (N.T. 13-16).

After the denial of a pre-trial

suppression motion, which alleged that

physical evidence was obtained in viola-

tion of Lovette's constitutional rights

and the product of an arrest based on less

than probable cause, respondent waived

trial by jury and was convicted as

charged. The trial court denied post-

verdict motions and imposed a sentence of

four to twenty-three months imprisonment.

The conviction was affirmed by the Penn-

sylvania Superior Court sitting en banc.

Commonwealth v. Lovette, 271 Pa. Superior

Ct. 250, 413 A.2d 390 (1979) (Appendix B,

infra at 1B-12B). Following the grant of

a petition for allowance of appeal, the

Supreme Court Of Pennsylvania reversed

the conviction in an opinion issued on

October 5, 1982 (Appendix A, infra at lA-

15A). The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

now seeks this Court's review of that

decision.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMEN” -

MENTS DO NOT REQUIRE THAT THE

BRIEF AND LIMITED MOVEMENT OF A

‘LAWFULLY DETAINED SUSPECT BE SUP=-

PORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST.

NO CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION OCCURS

IF A PERSON VALIDLY STOPPED AND

DETAINED UNDER TERRY V. OHIO, 392

U.S. 1 (1968), TS MOVED A SHORT

DISTANCE FOR A VALID AND REASON-

ABLE INVESTIGATIVE PURPOSE.

The question presented here is whether

police constitutionally may transport a

suspect properly detained under Terry v.

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968),

a short distance so that the known victim

of a recent burglary may determine promptly

whether property found on the suspect was

stolen in the burglary.

In this case, a Philadelphia police

officer who knew that the perpetrators of

a recent burglary had trekked through mud

with the stolen goods, stopped three men

On a city sidewalk a short distance away

10

because the shoes of all three were cov~

ered with mud. When the trio gave evasive

answers about. the mud and were unable to

produce identification, this officer pre-

pared to transport them to the victim to

determine if he could identify a hat which

respondent carried in a bag and said was

given to him by an unspecified friend.

A frisk then revealed a gold ring and a

dime of numismatic value in the pocket of

one of respondent's companions. The offi-

cer then transported the trio one and one-

half blocks to the burglary site to see if

the victim could identify the hat, ring

and dime. When the victim positively

identified all three items as his, the

three men were arrested.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, on

these facts, held that “the added element

of a transportation of the suspects from

the place of the initial encounter without

exigent circumstances to support that

1l

action" constituted an arrest requiring

probable cause, despite the legitimate

investigative purpose of the transporta-

tion. Appendix A at 12A-13A.° Relying on

this Court's Fourth Amendment decisions,

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded

that movement of suspects was not encom-

passed in the exception to the requirement

of probable cause enunciated by this Court

in Terry v. Ohio, supra, and its progeny.

Appendix A at 9A-LIA.

3The Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowl-

edged the reasonableness of the stop and

the further detention for identification:

The police had the option of

detaining the suspects at the

site of the initial encounter

and either bringing the com-

plainant to the site for his

identification of the questioned

articles or taking those items

to him. Either situation would

present a much stronger case for

the position the Commonwealth

presently urges.

Appendix A at 12A.

12

The mere fact that an individual who

is reasonably suspected of criminal behav-

ior has been moved a short distance, for

a valid investigative purpose, is not

determinative of whether the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments have been violated.

Rather, the question, as in any Fourth

Amendment case, is whether the length and

intrusiveness of the investigation was

reasonable.

Where, as here, detention of an indi-

vidual for identification is proper, his

brief transportation to a nearby known

victim is not an unreasonably greater

intrusion or violative of his constitu-

tional rights. Transport does not unduly

Or unreasonably delay the decision to

release or arrest the suspect. Indeed,

it may take longer to have witnesses

brought to the site of the stop. This

would defeat many prompt releases and

13

prevent police from expeditiously resuming

their investigations when criminals are

most likely to be apprehended.

Contrary to the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court's conclusion, the brief detention

and transportation here of the unidenti-

fied individuals suspected of a nearby,

recent burglary was reasonable.” The time

spent in transporting respondent was less

than a minute. Less than a half hour

elapsed between Lovette's initial contact

with police and his arrest. This delay

4ohe Pennsylvania Supreme Court's reli-

ance On Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,

99 S. Ct. 2246 (1979), to support its con-

Clusion that movement of a suspect neces-

sarily constitutes an arrest for which

probable cause must be present, is obvi-

ously misplaced. In Michigan v. Summers,

452 U.S. 692, 101 Ss. Ct. x57 (1981), this

Court expressly stated that Dunaway applies

only to detentions designed to provide an

opportunity for custodial interrogation.

452 U.S. at 702 n.15, 101 S. Ct. at 2593

n.15.

14

was no greater than that contemplated by

Terry.” As Professor LaFave has noted, a

stop remains reasonable in length so long

as ",.. the police are diligently pursuing

a means of investigation which is likely

to resolve the matter one way or another

very soon and ... it is rather essential

to the investigation that the suspect's

presence be continued during that interval."

3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure §9.21, at

40, quoted in Michigan v. Summers, supra,

452 U.S. at 701-02 n.14, 101 S. Ct. at

2593 n.14.

>the ALI Code suggests that any detention

of under twenty minutes is per se reason-

able in duration. See ALI Model Code of

Pre-Arraignment Procedure §110.2 Commen-

tary, at 283 (Proposed Official Draft 1975).

This Court, however, has recently said that

the investigative purpose of Terry is best

served in some circumstances police are

able to detain for longer than the brief

period involved in the Terry case. Michi-

gan _v. Summers, supra, -S. at 7

Ne ’ . Ce at 593 n.1l2.

15

The vast majority of the federal

courts of appeal and state courts that

have considered this issue have held that

the brief transportation of suspects a

short distance for identification is rea-

sonable during an investigative detention

6

premised on reasonable suspicion, Two

Ssee, e e.g., United States v. White, 648

F.2d 29, (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454

U.S. 924, 102 S. Ct. 424 TIS81)” ("courts

have routinely allowed officers to insist

on reasonable changes of location when

carrying out a Terry stop"); Un-ted States

v. Short, 570 F. 051 (D.C.

police may, pursuant to Terry sate, take

mrp ye to nearby rey oe scene) ;

United States v. Hyd e, 569 F.2d 62 (D.C.

Ze , cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944, 98

S. Ct. 1527 (1578) (officer could bring

defendant back into bank for Ter inves-

tigation where suspect had no identifica-

tion); United States v., Oates, 560 F.2d

45 (2a Cir. 1577) (removal into nearby

office); United States v. Thevis, 469 F.

Supp. 490° (D. Conn.) , afttd, 614 F.2d

1293 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. ert, denied, 446

U.S. 908, 100 S. ct. 1834 (I580) (having

defendant accompany police officer into

bank manager's office did not transform

investigative stop into full arrest);

State v. Watson, 165 Conn. 577, 345 A.2d

(Footnote 6 continued on next page.)

16

federal circuit courts of appeals have held,

however, that requiring an individual to

(Footnote 6 continued from previous page.)

532 (1973) (where during Terry stop credit

cards and watches are observed on floor of

vehicle, transport of all four occupants

to police station was not an arrest); Wilk-

erson v. United States, 427 A.2d 923 (D.C.

App.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 852, 102 S.

Ct. 295 (1981) (transporting suspect to

crime scene one-half block away after sus-

picious answers held to be investigatory

detention); District of Columbia v. M.M.,

407 A.2a 698 (D.C. App. 1979) (during valid

investigatory stop, proper to transport

suspects to scene as well as frisk them for

weapons and look in bag one carried prior

to placing pair in police cruiser); Single-

tary v. United States, 383 A.2a 1064 (D.C.

App. 1978) (same; placed in police car and

returned to robbery scene one block away) ;

People v. Hines, 94 I11.App.3d 1041, 419

N.E.2d 420 (1961) (where police could tem

porarily detain suspect for investigation,

it was reasonable to transport him one-

half block back to scene to see whether

he was involved); People v. Herron, 89 Ill.

App.3d 1048, 412 NE Da T5635 (15 80) » cert,

denied, 454 U.S. 1080, 102 S. Ct. 633

(brief transportation of defendants

to proximate crime scene for identifica-

tion by known eyewitness proper); People

v. Holdman, 73 I1l1.2d 213, 383 N.E.2d 155

» cert. denied, 440 U.S. 938, 99 S.

Ct. 1285 (1979) (return of passengers

(Footnote 6 continued on next page.)

17

go against his will from an airport con-

course to an office for further interro-

gation constitutes a seizure equivalent

(Footnote 6 continued from previous page.)

fleeing car proper under Terry); People v.

Brnja, 70 App.Div.2d 17, cheer S51

), aff'd on other grounds, 50 N.Y.2d

366, 429 N.Y.S.2d 173, doe NE. 24 1066

(1980) (defendant stopped, frisked, hand-

cuffed, put in car and driven one-half

mile to store for identification by owner

fifteen minutes to one-half hour after

robbery; held reasonable without probable

cause); State v. Gardner, 28 Wash. App.

721, 626 P.2d 56 (1981) (where police had

report of two males in woods, reasonable

to stop two males at roadside next to woods

and return them to abandoned vehicle less

than a mile away; held not an arrest but

an investigative stop); State v. Isham, 70

Wis.2d 718, 235 N.W.2da 506 (1975) (reason-

able under Ter to transport suspect two

and one-hal ocks for voice identifica-

tion by victim). See also United States

v. Post, 607 F.2d 847 (Sth Cir. 1979) (if

an officer is justified in stopping a

person for questioning, the stop does not

become an arrest if, in the absence of

protest or “coercive” circumstances, the

officer directs that the questioning occur

in a less public place); United States v.

Salter, 521 F.2d 1326 (2a Cir. 1975).

18

to an arrest that must be justified by

probable cause. ’ California permits move-

ment of the suspect to the crime for iden-

tification purposes only where exigent

circumstances exist.” Review by this

Court is crucial to resolve these con-

flicts and to provide guidance to police.

When, as here, Terry v. Ohio, supra,

permits police to detain a suspect for an

"united States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583,

802° (5th Cir. Lode); United States v.

Hill, 626 F.2d 429, 433-37 (5th Cir.

; United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d

Tove on th Cir. °

8see People v. Barris, 15 Cal.3d 384,

124 Cal. Rptr. P.2d 632 (1975),

cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934, 96 S. Ct.

T664 (1976) (transport of suspect to crime

scene for possible identification proper

only where victim incapacitated, suspect

consents, or there are other unusual cir-

cumstances which the court did not specify);

In re Lynette G., 54 Cal.App.3d 1087, 126

Cal. Rptr. 896 (1976) (transport of defen-

dant to injured victim proper under Harris) ;

People v. Hidalgo, 78 Cal.App.3d 675, 144

Cal. Rptr. 515 175 78) (transport unreason-

able under Harris guidelines).

19

identification, a one minute ride to the

crime scene does not convert an otherwise

reasonable stop into an arrest without

probable cause.

20

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania respectfully

requests that a Writ of Certiorari issue

to review the decision below.

1300 Chestnut St.

Phila., Pa. 19107

(215) 876-6010

Respectfully submitted,

© 8. Dern

ERIC B, HENSON

Deputy District Attorney

Law Division

(Counsel of Record)

MARK S. GUREVITZ

Assistant District

Attorney

GAELE McLAUGHLIN BARTHOLD

Assistant Chief

Appeals Division

EDWARD G. RENDELL

District Attorney

Philadelphia County

21