Appendix — Lins v. United States

Supreme Court brief1983

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APPENDIX

Table of content:

1) Decision by the Court of Claims,

No, 594-81-C, Sept. 8, 1982

2) Notices by Federal Reserve Bank

3) Subpoena by the District Court for

the Southern District of New York,

Sept. 6, 1974

4) Decree by the Swiss Prosecutor (excerpt),

Aug. 4, 1978

5) Time-Table

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Gn the Gnited States Court of Glaims

No. 594-81C

(Decided September 8, 1982)

RENE E. LINS

v. THE UNITED STATES

Rene E. Lins, pro se.

Charles L. Schlumberger, with whom was Assistant

Attorney General J. Paul McGrath, for defendant.

Before FrigepMAN, Chief Judge, KasHiwA and Smirtn,

Judges.

ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE

PLEADINGS

FRIEDMAN, Chief Judge, deliverd the opinion of the

court:

This is a suit to recover on a $1,000,000 United States

Treasury Bill. We hold that the statute of limitations bars

the suit.

The Treasury Bill was a bearer bill redeemable on July

30, 1974. It was one of a number of securities which

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disappeared from the vaults of Chase Manhattan Bank

(“Chase”) in New York during November 1973. Chase

notified the Treasury Department, which issued warning

notices about the bills and also issued replacements to

Chase. In return for the replacements, Chase had to acquire

indemnification coverage for the United States in case the

Treasury had to redeem both the original and replacement

bills. 31 U.S.C. §738a(b) (1976); 31 C.F.R. §§ 306.110,

309.12(a) (1981).

The plaintiff, appearing pro se, is a Swiss banker who

acquired possession of the bill in November or December

1973 in Switzerland. In December, the plaintiff checked

with the Swiss office of Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &

Smith, Inc. (“Merrill Lynch”) to see if the bill was valid.

Merrill Lynch gave only a “neutral” answer, saying it had

to check with its Protection Service in New York. In

January 1974, Merrill Lynch told the plaintiff the bill was

stolen.

In July 1974, when the bill became due, the plaintiff was

in Thailand, fighting extradition proceedings to Switzer-

land. Through various agents, the last of which was Irving

Trust Company, the plaintiff eventually presented the bill

to the Federal Reserve Bank in New York on September 5,

1974. United States securities issued for a term of one year

or less are overdue if presented a month or more aft-y

maturity. 31 C.F.R. § 306.25(b\1) (1981). Section 306.25(b)

provides that: “If a bearer security . . . is presented and

surrendered for redemption after it has become overdue,

the Secretary of the Treasury will ordinarily require

satisfactory proof of ownership. (Form PD 1071 may be

used).” Accordingly, the bank refused to redeem the bill

until Form PD 1071 was completed. Irving Trust took the

bill and the form back to the office, intending to complete

the form and present the bill again shortly. The next day,

however, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which had

discovered the bill was stolen, subpoenaed it from Irving

Trust.

A long investigation followed to determine how the bill

had gotten to Switzerland and whether the plaintiff had

received stolen goods. In 1978, the Swiss prosecutor decided

there was not enough evidence to prosecute the plaintiff. In

February 1979, the plaintiff finally presented his Form PD

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1071, known also as a certificate of ownership. This form

requires proof that the bearer acquired the bill for value,

before the maturity date, and without notice of any defect

in title. The Department requires this proof to avoid the

possibility of double liability, because insurers might not

indemnify it if the United States redeems an overdue bond

from an illegitimate bearer.

In February 1980, the Treasury refused again to pay the

plaintiff. It said that the plaintiff's certificate of ownership

showed he acquired the bill before maturity, but that “it

does not show firmly and unequivocally that you purchased

the bill in good faith, without any notice of defect in title or

that you paid value for the bill.” Both before and after the

plaintiff presented his certificate of ownership, the Trea-

sury indicated that a valid court decree establishing the

plaintiff's ownership would be accepted in lieu of a proper

certificate of ownership.

In February 1981, the plaintiff sued the Treasury Depart-

ment in the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia for a declaratory judgment that he owned the

bill. The Treasury impleaded the indemnitors. In Septem-

ber, the district court transferred the case to this court

under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(c) (1976), because the plaintiff was

seeking money damages in an amount beyond the court’s

jurisdiction. Id. § 1346(a\2) (Supp. IV 1980).

In his petition in this court, the plaintiff seeks the

$1,000,000 face value of the bill, interest from September 5,

1974, and consequential damages of up to $10,000,000. The

government has moved for summary judgment. The plain-

tiff has cross-moved for partial judgment on the pleadingsor,

alternatively, for partial summary judgment for $1,000,000.

We grant the government’s motion.

II.

The statute of limitations provides that: “Every claim of

which the Court of Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred

unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after

such claim first accrues.” 28 U.S.C. §2501 (1976). The

statute is jurisdictional. Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S.

270, 273-74 (1957); Nager Electric Co. v. United States, 177

Ct. Cl. 234, 249, 368 F.2d 847, 857 (1966).

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A claim first accrues ‘‘when all events have occurred to

fix the Government's alleged liability, entitling the claim-

ant to demand payment and sue here for his money.”

Nager, 177 Ct. Cl. at 240, 368 F.2d at 851 (footnote omitted).

Therefore, when the plaintiff has done all he must do to

establish his entitlement to payment, e.g., perform on his

contract, the claim accrues. /d. at 240-41, 368 F.2d at 851-

52; International Potato Corp. v. United States, 142 Ct. Cl.

604, 161 F. Supp. 602 (1958). If disputes are subject to

mandatory administrative proceedings, then the claim does

not accrue until their conclusion. Crown Coat Front Co. v.

United States, 386 U.S. 503, 511 (1967); Nager, 177 Ct. Cl. at

242-44, 368 F.2d at 853; Friedman v. United States, 159 Ct.

Cl. 1, 8-9, 310 F.2d at 381, 385-86 (1962), cert. denied, 373

U.S. 932 (1963). Pursuit of permissive administrative

remedies, however, does not toll the statute of limitations.

Soriano, 352 U.S. at 274-75; Clyde v. United States, 80 U.S.

(13 Wall.) 38 (1871); Camacho v. United States, 204 Ct. Cl.

248, 259, 494 F.2d 1363, 1369 (1974); Friedman, 159 Ct. Cl.

at 11-12, 310 F.2d at 388.

It.

A. Plaintiff's claim accrued on September 5, 1974, when

the bill was presented to the Federal Reserve Bank.

A contract claim accrues “when the contractor could

ordinarily demand his money and bring his suit if payment

was not made.” Nager, 177 Ct. Cl. at 240-41, 368 F.2d at

852. It is the completion of the contractor’s work and the

resulting entitlement to payment, not the failure to pay

which creates the claim. In personnel cases, the claim

accrues when the employee is entitled to payment, not

when the government fails to pay him. Sauer v. United

States, 173 Ct. Cl. 642, 354 F.2d 302 (1965); Friedman, 159

Ct. Cl. at 20-24, 310 F.2d at 393-95. Similarly, in the

present case, the critical question is when the plaintiff first

had an enforceable right to payment.

The bill provided that it would be paid on presentation to

the Treasurer of the United States or to any Federal

Reserve Bank. The general regulation governing United

States securities provides for payment upon presentation

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and surrender in the regular course of business. 31 C.F.R.

§ 306,.25(a) (1981).

The plaintiff became entitled to redeem the bill on July

30, 1974, when the bill matured. The bill required the

plaintiff to present it as a condition of payment, however,

and the plaintiff was not entitled to payment until Septem-

ber 5, 1974, when Irving Trust presented the bill. See

United States, v. Taylor, 104 U.S. 216, 221-22 (1881). On

that date, however, the plaintiff had done everything he

had to do to establish his right to payment. Therefore, his

claim accrued on that date.

The plaintiff himself recognizes he was entitled to

payment on September 5, 1974, since he seeks interest from

that date. Interest is due when money owed is not paid, For

the plaintiff to seek interest from September 5, 1974, he

must contend that he was entitled to payment then. If he

was entitled, he could have enforced the claim and the

statute began to run.

B. The plaintiff makes six arguments to avoid this

conclusion. We reject them all,

1. The plaintiff contends that because the bill was

overdue, the regulations required him to present his

certificate of ownership. 31 C.F.R. § 306.25(b). He says that

he was not entitled to payment until he presented the form

and hence that the claim did not accrue until the govern-

ment refused to pay him after he filed the certificate.

There are situations when a plaintiff must demand

payment from the government before the claim accrues.

Eg., Taylor, 104 U.S, at 221-22; B-W Construction Co. v.

United States, 100 Ct. Cl. 227, 235 (1943); Austin Engineer-

ing Co, v. United States, 88 Ct. Cl. 559, 562-63 (1939), In

those circumstances, the demand is required either by

statute or by contract. In this case, the demand for payment

took the form of presentation of the bill. When, however,

performance of a contract is complete and the exact amount

due is known, even the presentation of the final voucher is

not essential to the accrual of a claim. Henry Products Co. v.

_ United States, 180 Ct. Ct. 928, 931-32, 932 n.2 (1967), Pink

v. United States, 85 Ct, Cl. 121, 124-25 (1937), cert, denied,

303 U.S. 642 (1938),

Presentation of the certificate of ownership for an

overdue bill is not an element of accrual of the claim for

payment of the bill under the statute of limitations, The

requirement is merely an administrative procedure de-

signed to protect the Treasury from double liability. The

regulation requiring the certificate so indicates. It states:

"(Tjhe Secretary .. . will ordinarily require satisfactory

proof of ownership.” 31 C.F.R. § 306,.25(b), It also authorizes

the Secretary to waive the requirement. /d. § 306.126.

Throughout the plaintiff's protracted attempts to obtain

payment of the bill, the Treasury took the position that

instead of supplying the certificate, the plaintiff could file

suit and thereby establish his right to payment. Filing the

certificate pursuant to the regulations was a permissive

administrative remedy which did not affect the creation of

the plaintiffs rights. “In this case no more than in any

other would the mere fact that the Government could

conceivably refuse to pay the sum due ... delay the

running of limitations once the plaintiff was in a position to

ask for its money.” Henry Products, 180 Ct. Cl, at 932.

To hold otherwise would be to say that the plaintiff could

delay the running of the statute, after his rights had

matured, by postponing his administrative claim. In this

case, the delay was four-and-a-half years from when the

bond matured. “The purpose of a statute of limitation

requires that it should not leave the time at which it is to

attach at the control of the creditor.” Battelle v. United

States, 7 Ct. Cl. 297, 301 (1871).

2. The plaintiff argues that his right to payment did not

mature until the Swiss prosecutor dropped the criminal

investigation of him. The prosecutor's action did nothing to

establish the plaintiff's rights under the bill and did not

affect those rights.

3. The plaintiff says that section 306.25 of the regula-

tions requires a bill to be presented and surrendered before

payment is due. He contends that Irving Trust never

surrendered the bill because it took the bill back to its

office. Irving Trust’s presentation for redemption, however,

necessarily was an offer to surrender the bill upon pay-

ment. The Federal Reserve Bank refused to accept the bill

because it refused to redeem it. The plaintiff had done

everything he could and the fact that he retained the bill

did not prevent his claim from accruing.

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4. The plaintiff argues next that the criminal investiga-

tion tolled the statute of limitations. He cites three cases for

this proposition. Two, First Beverages, Inc. v. Royal Crown

Cola Co., 612 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S, 924

(1980), and Wager v. Pro, 195 U.S. App. D.C, 423, 603 F.2d

1005 (1979), have nothing to do with statutes of limitations.

The third, Leigh v. MeGuire, 613 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1979),

vacated, 446 U.S. 962 (1980), dismissed, 507 F. Supp. 458

(S.D.N.Y. 1981), was an action under the Civil Rights Act,

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980), in which the parties had

already litigated the same issues in state civil and criminal

proceedings. The court of appeals held that, under the

special circumstances, the interests of federalism required

the statute of limitations to be tolled during the state

proceedings, particularly the civil proceedings. The Su-

preme Cour! vacated the decision for reconsideration in

light of Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S, 478 (1980), in

which the Court held that when a federal court berrows a

state statute of limitations for section 1983 actions, it must

borrow also the state tolling rules unless they are inconsis-

tent with the purposes of section 1983. The Second Circuit

remanded the case to the district court, which held that the

section 1983 action was not tolled. The case is thus of no

help to the plaintiff.

In /nternational Potato, even a pending indictment of the

plaintiff did not toll the statute of limitations. Although the

criminal investigation might have prevented the plaintiff

from obtaining a judgment, it did not prevent him from

filing suit. It did not toll the statute of limitations.

5. The plaintiff argues that the government fraudulent-

ly concealed relevant facts from him because it did not tell

him of the indemnity bond until June 1981. The existence

of the bond, however, had no bearing on the plaintiff's

rights. It was designed to protect the government, not the

plaintiff, and his knowledge of it is irrelevant.

6. Finally, the plaintiff claims the government acknowl-

edged the debt on February 26, 1980, when it wrote him

that his certificate of ownership “clearly establishes that

you acquired $1,000,000 Treasury Bill No. 130331B before

maturity.” An acknowledgment will start the limitations

clock running again. The letter, however, was not an

acknowledgment of indebtedness. It merely recognized

8

that the plaintiff had acquired the bond before maturity.

The very next sentence stated: “However, it does not show

firmly and unequivocally that you purchased the bill in

good faith, without any notice of defect in title or that you

paid value for the bill.”

The letter does not recognize the plaintiffs right to

payment, but denies that right. There is, moreover, no

promise, not even an implied promise, to pay the plaintiff.

See Elliott v. United States, 134 Ct. Cl. 197, 198-99, 138 F.

Supp. 873, 874-75 (1956),

C. The plaintiff's complaint in the district court was

filed on February 25, 1981. That was almost six-and-a-half

years after Irving Trust presented the bill. The suit is tuo

late.

CONCLUSION

The defendant's motion for summary judgment is grant-

ed, the plaintiff's motion is denied and the petition is

dismissed.

t US. Government Printing Office: 361-518/1015

9

A) «Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Telephon call memorandum

C2

Problem or question:

Irving Trust C. received from ***Bank in Hng. Cng.

Called Agent Jares Brown (LE 5-7700 X 249)

Security was returned to Irving

with request for c/o. Sept. 5, 1974» *)

B) «Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Date: 9/5/74 T-bill

Please complete Part II. of form PD 1071» **)

*) R. Deft’s motion, filed Feb. 26, 1982, App. at 14

**) R. Exhibit, lit. Y-1

10

United States District Court

Southern District of New York

(Grand Jury Subpoena)

To: Any officer, Irving Trust Co. 1 Wall Street New York

We command you . . . appear and attend before the Grand

Inquest . . . to be held at Room 1401 in the United States Court

House, Foley Square . . . on the 6.th day of September 1974, at

10 o'clock in the forenoon, to testify and give evidence in

regard to an alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371(...)

and that you produce at the time and place aforesaid the

following:

1 United States Treasury bill in the denomination of $ 1000000

(one million dollars) serial No. 130221B, due 7/30/74.

Paul J. Curran Raimond F. Burghard

US Attorney Clerk

Note: (...)

Assistant Joel N. Rosenthal, Room 421, Telefone 264 - 6421

Compliance with this sulypoena will be satisfactory if the above-

mentioned Treasury bill 1; delivered forthwith to Special Agent

Robert Kaminski F.B.I.

R. Exhibit, lit. Y-1

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Decree of Department of Prosecution, Ziirich

(dated: August 4, 1978)

R. E. Lins, defendant

R. Ruch, defendant

Page 4:

«Treasury bill Nr. 130.331.B»

«According to Sec. 935 of Civil Code, bearer securities or

government bonds cannot be claimed against a credulous re-

ceipient. The file of investigation does not show a knowledge

by Lins of the origin of Treasury bill. In other words: a male-

volence according to the law mentioned, is not existing. Because

acts of business, which are protected by Civil Code, must be

excluded from penal prosecution — by reasons of surety of

rights — the case must be dropped (see decision of Federal

Court 90.1V.19).»

Page 5:

«As result of the investigation shows there is not to find a

legally sufficient indice for malevolence by the alleged person

(like in case of the person of Lins). In other words: it is not

possible to prove that he knew his employer (Lins) as a male-

volent receipient of the Treasury bill Nr. 130.331.B.»

Page 6:

«Regarding the further proceeding with the Treasury bill,

neither him (Lins) nor Ruch can be reproached an objec-

tionable or inconsiderate behaviour.»

(Costs therefore to be burdened on Treasury of State).

R. Exhibit, lit. P

Oct.9, 1973

Nov. 5,

Dec. 12,

Dec. 17,

Dec. 17,

Dec. 27,

Jan. 10, 1974

Jan. 14,

Jan. 17,

July 29,

Aug. 20,

Aug. 22,

Aug. 29,

Aug. 30,

Sept. 5,

Sept. 6,

Sept. 12,

Sept. 13,

Sept. 24,

Jan. 16, 1976

Jan. 30,

Mar. 17,

July 30,

Nov. 5,

Aug. 4, 1978

Sept. 10,

Feb. 14, 1979

Feb. 26, 1980

Jan. 21, 1981

Feb. 25,

Sept. 8, 1982

12

Time-Table

Execution of Treasury bill 130.331.B

Treasury bill 130.331.B «missed»

Plaintiff's inquiry at Merrill Lynch

Execution of the Bond of Indemnity

Acquisition of Treasury bill by plaintiff

US Embassy, letter to Swiss Federal Police

Telex Swiss Fed. Pol. to Cant. Pol. Ziirich

Swiss Fed. Pol. to Cant. Pol. Ziirich

Report by Cant. Pol. Ziirich

Israel Nat. Police activities

Report to F.B.1, New York

Swiss Fed. Police to US Embassy Bern

Report Questura di Roma to Min, of Interior

US Dept. of Justice (F.B.1.)

Presentation of bill (whitout surrender)

Subpoena by District Court, Seizure of title

Interpol Roma Italy to Swiss Fed. Pol.

US Embassy to Swiss Fed. Police

Swiss Dept. of Justice to Cant. Pol. Ziirich

US Embassy to Swiss Fed. Police

Swiss Dept. of Police to Cant. Pol. Ziirich

Report by Cant. Police Ziirich

Request by Distr. Attorney to Thailand

Interlocutory decree by States Attorney Zch.

Discharge of the plaintiff

Demand for payment of the bill

Certificate of Ownership submitted

Acquisition of title by plaintiff acknowledged

by respondent

Respondent's last demand for compliance with

the regulations «as a matter of law»

Commencement of suit against respondent

Dismissal of action by Court of Claims

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