Appendix — Knight v. Minnesota Community College Faculty Ass'n

Supreme Court brief1983

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

pr

82-901 Nov 80 1982

No.

ALEXANDER tL. STEVAS.

IN THHe-

Supreme Court of the United States

OcroBerR TERM, 1982

Leon W. Kniaut, et al.,

Appellants,

v.

MINNESOTA COMMUNITY COLLEGE FACULTY ASSOCIATION,

et al.,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Minnesota

APPENDIX TO JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Dare F’, SWENSON

610 Twelve Oaks Center

15500 Wayzata Boulevard

Wayzata, Minnesota 55391

(612) 473-0474

EpwIn Vieira, JR., Counsel of Record

13877 Napa Drive

Manassas, Virginia 22110

(703) 791-6780

Attorneys for Appellants

1 December 1982

| NS RS TS ET

FANNON PRINTING CENTER, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22301 (703) 663-5600

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Memorandum Opinion and Order of the United States

District Court for the District of Minnesota,

DE MD becccccccesescevesesodovcsevese

Findings of Fact and Order of the United States

District Court for the District of Minnesota,

ME Sis cbs ciedebebesecvesseceses

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Eighth Circuit, 535 F.2d 466, 17 May 1976 ......

Memorandum Opinion and Order of the United States

District Court for the District of Minnesota,

Eb conc svdescbecscctéedecccsece

Clerk’s Notice of Judgment of the United States

District Court for the District of Minnesota,

EE cclubiebaebeess 00 60seceseeonees

Order of the United States District Court fer the

District of Minnesota, 13 August 1982 .........

Clerk’s Notice of Order of the United States District

Court for the District of Minnesota, 13 August

ee BES

Notice of Appeal, 4 October 1982 ............00000.

Text of constitutional and statutory provisions

DE CEG GebOneScebseseeswobcerseseccecece

Plaintiffs’ Objections to the Court’s Findings of Fact

and Motion to Amend the Court’s Findings of

Fact to Conform to the Law and to the Evidence,

SE Crchesehs ipeessebercccesstcovcese

Page

31

67

87

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

(31 March 1982)

3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

FOURTH DIVISION

4-74 Civ. 659

Leon W. Kniont, et at, Plaintiffs,

v.

Minnesota Community Cotiece Facuity AssoctaTion,

et AL, Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before Heaney, Circuit Judge, Atsop, District Judge, and

Larson, Senior District Judge.

Heaney, Circuit Judge.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs are community college faculty members who

challenge the constitutionality of the Minnesota Public

Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA) as applied

in the community colleges. Essentially two issues are

raised: whether the Minnesota Community College Faculty

Association (MCCFA) may act as an exclusive represent-

ative under PELRA, and whether the ‘‘meet and confer’’

provisions of PELRA are valid on their face and as ap-

plied. Following extensive proceedings and an independent

review of the exhaustive record, we entered findings of fact

on November 17, 1981, which are attached hereto. This

memorandum opinion incorporates our conclusions of law

and order for judgment.

I.

MCCFA As An Exclusive Representative

The structure of collective bargaining under PELRA and

MCCFA’s role thereunder may be summarized as follows.

4

PELRA provides several mechanisms by which an em-

ployee organization may be designated as the exclusive

representative of an appropriate bargaining unit. See Minn.

Stat. § 179.67. The MCCFA is an association of faculty

members of the community colleges in Minnesota. It is not

disputed that the MCCFA facially qualifies as an employee

organization, that community college [2] faculty are an

appropriate unit under PELRA,' and that the MCCFA

was properly certified as an exclusive representative in

1971.

Public employers have an obligation, under PELRA, to

‘*meet and negotiate’’* with respect to compensation and

other ‘‘terms and conditions of employment.’’ Jd., § 179.66,

subd. 2. When an exclusive representative has been certi-

fied, the employer may negotiate only through that repre-

sentative. Zd., § 179.66, subd. 7. The Minnesota State Board

for Community Colleges (MSBCC) has negotiated four

collective bargaining agreements with the MCCFA since

1971.

Employees are not required by statute to join the

MCOFA. Indeed, PELRA expressly provides that em-

ployees have ‘‘the right not to form [or] join’’ an employee

organization. Id., § 179.65, subd. 2. The contract negotiated

* The certification of community college faculty as a single, state-

wide bargaining unit was upheld in Minn. State College Bd. v.

Public Employment Relations Bd., 228 N.W.2d 551 (Minn. 1975).

*The duty to meet and negotiate is defined as:

the performance of the mutual obligations to meet at reason-

able times, including where possible meeting in advance of the

budget making process, with the good faith intent of entering

into an agreement with respect to terms and conditions of em-

ployment; provided, that by such obligation neither party is

compelled to agree to a proposal or required to make a con-

cession.

Minn, Stat. § 179.63, subd. 16.

5

by the MCCFA applies to all community college faculty

members and its economic benefits flow to all faculty re-

gardless of whether they are members of the MCCFA.

PELRA provides that a fair share fee may be collected

by an employee organization from nonmember employees

that it represents, not to exceed 85% of members’ regular

dues. Id. Such a fee has been collected from plaintiffs by

the MCCFA. Determination of the amount of the fee is

not in dispute, but we note that PELRA does provide a

procedure by which employees may challenge calculation

of the fair share fee. Id.

The foregoing describes a system of public sector col-

lective bargaining which is common to many states insofar

as it applies [3] to traditional subjects of collective bar-

gaining.’ See generally, Edwards, The Emerging Duty to

Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 885 (1973).

The essential character of such systems is implicated by

two claims which the plaintiffs advance here.

A.

Plaintiffs’ first contention is that because the MCCFA is

a private organization, it holds an impermissible power

under PELRA to make ‘‘economic laws”’ and its function

constitutes an impermissible delegation of state sovereign-

ty. Under this theory, only a quasi-state agency—some

branch of the public employer—may constitutionally serve

as the employee representative. We reject this theory.

The State of Minnesota has not impermissibly delegated

its sovereign power. The employer’s duty to negotiate

under PELRA ‘‘does not compel the public employer or

its representative to agree to a proposal or require the

making of a concession.’’ Minn. Stat. § 179.66, subd. 2.

* The ‘‘meet and confer’’ provisions of PELRA fall outside the

traditional scope of collective bargaining and are examined infra

at p. 9.

6

Negotiated agreements with state employees and even arbi-

tration awards must be ‘‘submitted to the legislature to be

accepted or rejected.’’ Id., § 179.74, subd. 5. Contract terms

successfully bargained by the MCCFA have been, in fact,

subsequently modified by the state legislature. The state

might well find it in its own interest to confer more au-

thority upon its employers or to afford public employees

more of the rights held by private employees, but we need

not speculate on modifications of PELRA that might occur.

It is clear that the present structure under PELRA does

not impermissibly abridge the state’s sovereign power.

In contending that the legislature’s retained authority

under PELRA is constitutionally inadequate, plaintiffs rely

heavily on Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936),

and Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495

(1935). Plaintiffs also rely on these cases for the proposi-

tion that PELRA confers upon the MCCFA an impermissi-

ble power to make [4] ‘‘economic laws.’’* The continuing

vitality of Schecter and Carter Coal, however, is doubtful

at best.’ Moreover, even if Schecter and Carter Coal might

have some vitality in another context, plaintiffs’ reliance

*The plaintiffs called several witnesses and devoted extensive

time and resources to develop the theory that PELRA is the func-

tional equivalent of both the legislation struck down in Schecter

and Carter Coal, and of the ‘‘corporate-state model of Italian

fascism.’’ These theories are without merit in light of the con-

trolling principles of Abood.

5 See e.g., Quincy College v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 328 F.

Supp. 808, 811 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (‘‘The Schecter and Panama cases

have been severely limited to their own facts’’) ; Simon v. Cameron,

337 F. Supp. 1380, 1382 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (Carter Coal ‘‘has

been distinguished and disregarded in recent years to such an ex-

tent that it is believed that the Carter non-delegation doctrine is

dead’’). See also, Davis, Administrative Treatise, §§ 3:2, 3:8, 3:12

(1980) (‘‘That the literal opinions in the Panama and Schecter

cases do not embody the effective law is entirely clear’’).

7

on them here is clearly foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s

decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S.

209 (1977). Abood squarely upholds the constitutionality of

exclusive representation bargaining in the public sector.

Abood is central to this case and warrants elaboration.

Abood involved a public employee bargaining statute simi-

lar to Minnesota’s PELRA.* The plaintiffs in Abood were

teachers who had not joined the private employee organi-

zation which served as their exclusive representative. Like

the plaintiffs here, the teachers objected to compulsory

fair share fees on First Amendment grounds. The Supreme

Court had previously rejected such claims in the private

sector, holding that agency shop arrangements were sup-

ported by compelling state interests. See Machinists v.

Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); I’atlway Employees Dept. v.

Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956). In Abood, the Court re-

affirmed that exclusive representation

avoids the confusion that would result from attempting

to enforce two or more agreements specifying different

terms and conditions of employment. It prevents inter-

union rivalries from creating dissension within the

work force and eliminating the advantages to the em-

ployee [5] of collectivization. It also frees the em-

ployer from the possibility of facing conflicting de-

mands from different unions, and permits the employer

and a single union to reach agreements and settlements

that are not subject to attack from rival labor organi-

zations.

Id. at 220-221 (citations omitted).

*The Michigan statute at issue in Abood provided for designa-

tion of an exclusive representative and for collection of fair share

fees from employees who were represented by, but not members of,

the employee organization. Abood, supra at 212-215.

Moreover, the Abood Court reiterated that the agency shop

arrangement has been found to ‘‘distribute fairly the cost

of [collective bargaining] among those who benefit, and it

counteracts the incentive that employees might otherwise

have to become ‘free-riders’—to refuse to contribute to the

union while obtaining benefits of union representation that

necessarily accrue to all employees.’’ Id. at 222.

These state policy interests are just as compelling in the

public sector. As the Court stated in Abood, supra at 224,

‘*[t]he desirability of labor peace is no less important in

the public sector, nor is the risk of ‘free riders’ any

smaller.’’ Although the agency shop in the public sector

necessarily impacts on First Amendment rights, the Abood

Court found such concerns outweighed by the compelling

state interests in orderly labor relations. Jd. at 222-223,

229-231.

The Abood decision is controlling here.’ The State of

Minnesota has expressly declared that the purpose of

PELRA is ‘‘to promote orderly and constructive relation-

ships’’ between public employers and employees and that

such a purpose ‘‘may best be accomplished’’ by the bar-

gaining structure provided under PELRA. Minn. Stat.

§ 179.61. As the Abood Court noted, such a determination

by the state is io be afforded great weight in the consti-

tutional balance. Abood, supra at 229. Moreover, such a

determination rests on a long tradition in Minnesota of

recognizing the importance of the agency shop in resolving

traditional subjects of collective bargaining. See e.g., Minn.

Stat. § 179.16 (providing for exclusive representation in

the private sector since the 1940’s) ; see also, Note, Certifi-

cation of a Bargaining Representative under the Minnesota

* The concurring opinion in Abood, supra at 254, 259 n.13, makes

clear that the majority holding forecloses the specific claim of

plaintiffs here. Even if we were not bound by Abood, however, we

would reject the plaintiffs’ claim for the reasons set forth herein.

9

Labor Relations Act, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 827 (1954); Note,

History and Provisions of the Minnesota Labor Relations

Act, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 217 (1940). Minnesota may provide

for exclusive representation by an employee association

[6] in the public sector and may require that nonmembers

of the association financially support its collective bargain-

ing efforts through a fair share fee. No constitutional in-

firmity arises merely because the employee association is

a private organization.

Plaintiffs’ second contention rests on a factual assertion

that the MCCFA, alone and in conjunction with its affili-

ates, constitutes a quasi-political party or predominantly

a political-action organization. The legal claim is that com-

pulsory fair share fees therefore result in forced associa-

tion with a political party contrary to Elrod v. Burns, 427

U.S. 347 (1976), and its progeny. Our resolution of this

claim is again guided by the Supreme Court’s decision in

Abood, supra.

The teacher-plaintiffs in Abood argued that bargaining

activity of a public sector union is inherently political and

that compulsory financial support of such activity therefore

violates First Amendment associational rights. The Su-

preme Court ackuowledged that ‘‘decisionmaking by a pub-

lic employer is above all a political process,’’ id. at 228,

and noted ‘‘[t]here can be no quarrel with the truism that

because public employee unions attempt to influence govern-

mental policymaking, their activities * * * may be properly

termed political.’’ Jd. at 231. The Court, however, made

clear that such ‘‘differences between public and private

sector collective bargaining simply do not translate into

differences in First Amendment rights.’’* Zd. at 232. Fol-

*The plaintiffs here argue that allowing a public sector union

to be politically active in any respect will confer an unconstitu-

10

lowing the precedent set in the private sector,’ the Court

held that public sector unions may collect compulsory fair

share fees notwithstanding the ‘‘political’’ character of

public bargaining—so long as the fees ‘‘are applied to col-

lective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance

adjustment purposes.’’ 7d. [7] at 232. The crucial distine-

tion is union political activity unrelated to collective bar-

gaining. The Abood Court held that persons opposing such

activity may not be compelled to support it through fair

share fees. Id. at 235-236.

In attempting to show that the MCCFA is predominantly

a political action organization, the plaintiffs have persist-

ently ignored the distinction between activities related and

those unrelated to collective bargaining. The plaintiffs have

instead insisted that activity of the MCCFA which is in any

sense ‘‘ political’? must be considered wholly separate from

collective bargaining activity.”° This approach paints with

a brush so broad as to obliterate the distinction that the

Abood Court found to be crucial for constitutional pur-

poses.

We emphasize that the plaintiffs do not advance a nar-

row claim that some part of their fair share fees are mis-

used for political activity unrelated to collective bargaining.

Calculation of the fair share fee is not in dispute here and

we note that there is a statutory procedure for resolving

tional political advantage upon public employees. The Abood Court

acknowledged that public employees might achieve additional in-

fluence through political activity. Jd. at 228. In upholding publie

sector bargaining and political activitiy related to such bargaining,

the Abood Court found no constitutional significance in this ‘‘poli-

tical advantage’’ theory. Nor do we.

*See Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Railway Em-

ployees Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).

1° See ¢.g., findings of fact at 12-13.

11

any such dispute.” The plaintiffs’ claim is that the MCCFA

and its affiliates are so overwhelmingly engaged in political

activity that they must be deemed to be the equivalent of a

political party for constitutional purposes. In light of

Abood, the factual inquiry turns on whether the activities

of MCCFA are related or unrelated to collective bargain-

ing. We have placed the burden on the defendant labor

organizations to establish that their activity properly re-

lates to collective bargaining.”

[8] Extensive evidence was adduced with respect to the

activities of the MCCFA and the other defendant labor or-

ganizations, the Minnesota Education Association (MEA),

the National Education Association (NEA) and IMPACE

(a political action committee affiliated with the MEA).

Hundreds of exhibits were introduced by plaintiffs and

defendants that relate to the character of activity under-

taken by the labor organizations. Numerous staff and offi-

cers of the organizations testified as to the extent and

character of their political activity. We have independently

reviewed the exhaustive record developed before the special

master. As our findings indicate,” the record establishes

beyond any doubt that the MCCFA, MEA and NEA are

properly characterized as public employee organizations

™ See Minn. Stat. § 179.65, subd. 2. In a challenge to the fair

share fee, the burden is on the employee association to justify the

determination of the fee amount. Id.

” The plaintiffs in a constitutional challenge ordinarily have the

burden of establishing that a constitutional violation exists. In

Abood, however, the Supreme Court indicated a special concern

for the difficulty that individual nonmembers of a union would

face in attempting to trace and account for the use of their fair

share fees. Accordingly, we have placed the burden on the de-

fendants here to establish whether their activities predominantly

relate to collective bargaining.

18 See findings of fact at 7-13.

12

whose political activities relate closely and directly to col-

lective bargaining.

Plaintiffs devoted extensive time and resources to a

theory that the MCCFA, MEA, NEA, IMPACE and NEA-

PAC (a political action committee affiliated with the NEA)

are a single, integrated organization that functions as a

quasi-political party. This theory is without merit as a

factual matter. IMPACE and NEA-PAC are indeed politi-

cal action committees, but even members of MEA and NEA

do not automatically give support to these committees.

These are independent political action committees or-

ganized under state and federal law for the purpose of

participating in partisan election contests; membership in

and support for IMPACE and NEA-PAC is wholly volun-

tary. MCCFA is affiliated with MEA and NEA and has

derived substantial assistance from the latter two organi-

zations during strikes and other collective actions. The

MCCFA, however, independently charts its course of col-

lective bargaining on behalf of community college faculty.

Finally, even if MCCFA, MEA and NEA were deemed

to be in some sense ‘‘integrated,’’ the outcome would not

change because each of these organizations is predomi-

nantly engaged in activities closely and directly related to

collective bargaining.

The MCCFA has engaged in legislative activity virtually

of necessity because collective bargaining agreements nego-

tiated by the MCCF'A must be submitted to the legislature

for approval or rejection. See slip op., supra at 3. There is

simply no basis in this record, however, on which the

MCCFA could be deemed anything other than a public

employee organization whose purpose [9] is to improve

through collective bargaining the terms and conditions of

employment for the college faculty it represents.

The plaintiffs’ claim therefore fails in two respects. To

the extent it rests on the notion that a public sector labor

organization cannot engage in political activity that relates

13

directly to collective bargaining, it is plainly wrong as a

matter of law. To the extent it rests on a factual claim that

the MCCFA is predominantly engaged in political activity

unrelated to collective bargaining, it is flatly contradicted

by the record. Such activity is not even a significant, much

less a predominant, part of the MCCF'A’s total activity.

Il.

Meet and Confer

PELRA distinguishes traditional subjects of collective

bargaining from all other issues that arise between em-

ployers and employees. The traditional matters—compen-

sation and other ‘‘terms and conditions of employment’’—

are subject to mandatory bargaining in which employers

and the exclusive representative of employees must negoti-

ate in good faith to reach an agreement. See Minn. Stat.

§§ 179.63, subd. 16, subd. 18; 176.65, subd. 4; 179.66, subd. 1,

subd. 2, subd. 7. On all matters not subject to this ‘‘meet

and negotiate’’ process, professional employees have the

express right to ‘‘meet and confer’’ with their employer.

Id., § 179.65, subd. 3. Similarly, PELRA imposes a duty

upon employers to meet and confer on such matters with

professional public employees. Id., § 179.66, subd. 3.

The state interest underlying the meet and confer pro-

cess is set forth in the statute:

The legislature recognizes that professional em-

ployees possess knowledge, expertise, and dedication

which is helpful and necessary to the operation and

quality of public services and which may assist public

employers in developing their policies. It is, therefore,

the policy of this state to encourage close cooperation

between public employers and professional employees

by providing for discussions and the mutual exchange

of ideas regarding all matters not specified under [the

meet and negotiate provisions]. ’

Id., § 179.73, subd. 1.

14

[10] As a general matter, the meet and confer concept

reflects enlightened labor policy and a legitimate state

interest in securing the insight of public employees on

questions outside the traditional scope of collective bar-

gaining. There is no constitutional infirmity in requiring

public employers to solicit and meaningfully consider the

views of public employees.

As applied to higher education, the meet and confer

process recognizes and codifies a longstanding tradition of

a faculty participation in college governance. In light of

this tradition of shared decisionmaking, the state has a

special interest in securing the views of faculty members

on questions of college governance. No college adminis-

trator needs this Court to describe the faculty response

to unilateral decisionmaking on issues of importance on

campus—the literature in the field is more than sufficient.

See e.g., Mayhew, L. B., Surviving the Eighties, p. 226

(1979) (‘‘It is really the faculty that grants administrators

the mandate to govern, and that mandate can be removed

by both overt and covert means’’); Ladd & Lipset, The

Divided Academy, pp. 243-299 (1975); D. Walker, The

Effective Administrator (1979); H. Mason, College and

University Government, pp. 44-99 (1972) (suggesting that

shared authority is ‘‘the mode of rapprochement between

bureaucracy and professionalism in institutions of higher

education’’).

Nothing in the Constitution would require that the state

abandon what appears to be an essential component of

college administration—involving the faculty in a broad

range of governance decisions. Thus, no infirmity whatso-

ever attaches to the threshhold meet and confer provisions

of PELRA—those which require administrators to meet

and confer with faculty and which declare the right of the

faculty to meet and confer with administrators. See Minn.

Stat. §§ 179.65, subd. 3; 179.66, subd. 3.

15

The state also requires that professional employees select

a representative for purposes of the meet and confer

process. Minn. Stat. § 179.73, subd. 2. This requirement is

separate from the selection of an exclusive representative

for purposes of mandatory bargaining.* Regardless of

whether a bargaining [11] representative has been selected,

PELRA requires some selection system for purposes of

the meet and confer process. As applied to higher educa-

tion, this effectively compels the establishment of a faculty

governance system to function in the meet and confer

process.

The meet and confer committees that presently operate”

are in fact the exclusive formal governance system for

resolving issues outside the scope of mandatory bargaining.

The collective bargaining agreement provides, for example,

that the meet and confer committees ‘‘will have full au-

thority in the assigned area to present the views of the

employees * * * .’’ The testimony of college administrators

confirms that, although persons may still express their

individual views outside the formal process, the ‘‘official’’

view of the faculty is the position adopted by the meet

and confer committees. Thus, the weight and significance

of individual speech interests have been consciously dero-

gated in favor of systematic, official expression. On any

issue that has campus-wide impact, it is difficult to imagine

that isolated individual views would have any weight when

Minn. Stat. § 179.73, subd. 2, is a one-sentence requirement

that is silent as to the method of selecting meet and confer repre-

sentatives. In contrast, elaborate procedures are set forth elsewhere

for selecting an exclusive representative for purposes of collective

bargaining. See Minn. Stat. § 179.67.

** The committees are called ‘‘exchange of views’’ committees at

the local campus level and ‘‘meet and confer’’ committees at the

statewide level. Use of the term ‘‘meet and confer’’ herein refers

to both levels of committees.

16

compared to the ‘‘official’’ view of the faculty. If some

faculty members are excluded from participation and de-

liberation in the meet and confer process, they are effeec-

tively denied any meaningful expression on the issues re-

solved through that process.

The subjects considered by meet and confer committees

at the community colleges have included the college budget,

curriculum reviews, new course proposals, college organi-

zation and campus faccilities. Moreover, the scope of the

meet and confer process in community colleges sweeps

across all issues in college governance that are not subject

to mandatory bargaining. These issues in higher education

have a special character as a matter of tradition, public

policy and constitutional law.

Traditionally, the subjects of meet and confer have been

resolved through governance systems in which all faculty

members have an opportunity to participate. In the present

case, governance at community colleges prior to passage of

PELRA consisted of faculty senates and committees, se-

lected through elections in which every faculty member was

eligible to both vote and seek election.

[12] Public policy supports the tradition of participation

by all faculty members. The free and full exchange of ideas

lies at the core of academia’s contribution to our society.

To protect these values, our society has attempted to in-

sulate institutions of higher education from the orthodoxies

of life outside the campus—be they commercial, religious

or political orthodoxies that might inhibit the marketplace

of ideas.

The right of expression by faculty members also holds a

special place under our Constitution, as the Supreme Court

has broadly declared. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents of

New York, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967), the Court stated:

Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding

academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to

17

all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.

That freedom is therefore a special concern of the

First Amendment.

In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 480, 487 (1960), the Court

emphasized that ‘‘[t]he vigilant protection of constitu-

tional freedoms is no where more vital than in the com-

munity of American schools.’’ Similarly, in Sweezy v. New

Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957), the Court declared:

The essentiality of freedom in the community of

American universities is almost self-evident. * * * To

impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders

in our colleges and universities would imperil the fu-

ture of our Nation.

These cases do not directly control the present matter,”

but they illustrate that the Frist Amendment has a special

significance in higher education. The vital concern for aca-

demic freedom warrants a heightened standard of scrutiny

when, as here, the state regulates the forum for academic

speech.

We must weigh these constitutional values against the

state interest in making the meet and confer process an

orderly one. The state has provided that the right to meet

and confer may only be exercised through selection of

representatives in a governance system. It vigorously con-

tends that requiring some selection process is essential if

the meet and confer process [13] is to be effective. We

are inclined to agree. Absent such a requirement, adminis-

trators in the community college system would be expressly

**The issue here is whether faculty members may be excluded

from participating in selection of meet and confer representatives

and from serving as such representatives, which is a question of

first impression.

18

compelled to meet regularly’ with each faculty member

and group of members that desired to so confer. The result

could well be that no meaningful faculty expression would

emerge and that both faculty and administrators would be

deprived of the benefits from an orderly, systematic ex-

change of views.

We cannot ignore, however, that the state has created a

forum for the exchange of views between faculty and ad-

ministrators on all issues outside the scope of mandatory

bargaining. The meet and confer process may not be a gen-

eral public forum,” but it is an important academic forum.

Indeed, it is the only significant forum for the faculty to

resolve virtually every issue outside the scope of mandatory

bargaining. This structure effectively blocks any meaning-

ful expression by faculty members who are excluded from

the formal process. If the state is going to intervene in

this manner, we think it must afford all faculty members a

fair opportunity both to serve as and to participate in the

selection of meet and confer representatives, Thus, Minn.

Stat. § 179.73, subd. 2, which requires faculty members to

select such representatives, is constitutionally valid so long

as every faculty member is afforded a fair opportunity to

participate in the selection process.

We emphasize the narrowness of this holding.” We are

not confronted with a faculty governance system developed

** PELRA requires that formal meet and confer sessions he held

at least three times a year. See Minn. Stat. § 179.73, subd. 2. The

spirit and practice, however, have been to meet more often than

this, generally on a monthly basis.

8 If the meet and confer sessions were a public forum, an abso-

lute free speech right would attach in terms of access to that

forum. See City of Madison v. Wisc. Empl. Comm., 429 U.S. 167

(1976). See also, Finkin, The Limits of Majority Rule in Collec-

tive Bargaining, 64 Minn. L. Rev. 183, 245-249 (1980).

* This holding, of course, applies only to higher education.

19

independent of state compulsion, which would present dif-

ferent considerations. We are not confronted with ad hoc

committees or other temporary governance mechanisms

which might present special needs for [14] expediency.

Nor have we yet addressed what role a faculty union might

play in a governance system. We hold only that when the

state compels creation of a representative governance

system in higher education and utilizes that forum for on-

going debate and resolution of virtually all issues outside

the scope of collective bargaining, it must afford every

faculty member a fair opportunity to participate in the

selection of governance representatives.”

The State of Minnesota has gone one step further in

structuring the meet and confer process. PELRA provides

that the employer may meet and confer ‘‘only through the

exclusive representative,’’ if there be one. See Minn. Stat.

§ 179.66, subd. 7. Pursuant to this provision, the collective

bargaining contract confers upon the MCCFA the sole

authority to select the meet and confer representatives.

The MCCFA has held this exclusive power since the pas-

sage of PELRA, and has exercised it to exclude nonmem-

bers of the MCCFA from serving on the meet and confer

committees.

This practice of systematically excluding nonmembers of

the MCCFA obviously deprives such persons of a fair

opportunity to participate in the meet and confer process.

It also infringes the First Amendment associational rights

of faculty members who do not desire to join the MCCFA.

2° Selection of the present meet and confer committee members,

for example, might be conducted under MCCFA auspices in fully

open elections—such that members and nonmembers of MCCFA

could both vote and seek election, We could not find that such a

system deprived anyone of a fair opportunity to participate. To

precisely define ‘‘fair opportunity,’’ however, would require that

we speculate on governance structures that are not before us. We

decline to do so.

20

Moreover, the MCCFA’s exclusive authority to select

the committee representative—regardless of how it is actu-

ally exercised—inherently creates a chilling effect on the

associational and speech interests of faculty members. The

scope of the meet and confer committees reaches many

issues that are integral to the professional function of a

college professor. If one risks exclusion from these com-

mittees by not joining or speaking out against the MCCFA,

it seems self-evident that one’s freedom not to join or to

so speak out is seriously impaired. This risk of exclusion

is inherent in the MCCFA’s sole authority to select the

committee [15] members. The actual practice only bears

out that the risk of exclusion is a real one.

Because these effects infringe fundamental First Amend-

ment guarantees, the MCCFA’s exclusive selection author-

ity can be upheld only if it is supported by compelling,

legitimate state interests which cannot be furthered by

less intrusive means. We find no such interests here.

The state does not contend that it has a legitimate in-

terest in excluding nonmembers of the MCCFA from serv-

ing on meet and confer committees. Indeed, the state in-

terest expressly underlying the meet and confer process—

obtaining the views of employees on matters outside the

scope of collective bargaining—argues for hearing the

views of all employees not just those that are union mem-

bers. The state does contend that the meet and confer

process must be an orderly, systematic one, but this in-

terest can be fully served without excluding nonmembers

of the MCCFA. The process would be no less orderly, for

example, if both members and nonmembers of the MCCFA

participated in electing committee members.

The core issue is whether the rationale for the agency

shop in traditional collective bargaining applies with the

same force to the meet and confer process in higher educa-

tion. We think it does not.

21

A fundamental element of the agency shop rationale is

that, absent collective representation, the employees as a

whole could not effectively participate in decisions that

are the subject of representation. This, indeed, is a key

factor in making union security a legitimate interest of

the state. In higher education, however, faculty members

have long enjoyed substantial formal and informal par-

ticipation in college governance—present here in the form

of faculty senates prior to PELRA. Such a tradition of

shared decisionmaking has not been generally true in other

areas of employment or even at other levels of public

education. In these other contexts, the state may properly

seek to balance labor relations by providing the strongest

possible role for a union, but the same state interest is

simply not as strong in higher education. If college admin-

istrators excluded faculty from matters of governance, there

would be a more compelling justification for exclusive union

control of faculty governance selection.

[16] Another crucial factor involves the largely economic,

tangible nature of traditional collective bargaining. Joining

a union cannot constitutionally be made a condition of em-

ployment and it is thought that because the tangible benefits

of bargaining flow to both members and nonmembers alike,

no coercion to join will result in practice. The subjects of

meet and confer, however, are generally intangible issues

of governance, such as curriculum proposals and academic

standards. It simply cannot be said that the benefits of

conferring on such issues flow equally to persons who are

excluded from conferring. Indeed, the record shows that at

least one faculty member joined the MCCFA because he

considered participation in the meet and confer process

essential to his particular position. Several others also

testified that they considered such participation to be an

essential part of serving on the faculty. This is precisely

the kind of impermissible ‘‘joining as a condition of em-

ployment’’ which results from the unique character and

tradition of governance in higher education. It does not

22

result, however, from exclusive representation on matters

within the traditional scope of collective bargaining because

the tangible fruits of such bargaining flow to all employees

regardless of whether they are members of the labor

organization.

A third factor involves the union’s legitimate need for

security, which is generally promoted by excluding rival

unions from representing segments of the same bargaining

unit and by requiring nonmembers of the union to pay their

fair share of the costs of collective bargaining, contract

administration and grievance processing. Union security

will not be jeopardized by allowing nonmembers of the

MCCFA to participate in selection of meet and confer

representatives. The MCCFA remains the exclusive repre-

sentative for all matters subject to the mandatory bargain-

ing provisions. No rival unions could simultaneously repre-

sent community college faculty. The MCCFA continues to

have sole control over mandatory bargaining, contract ad-

ministration and grievances. It continues to collect fair

share fees from ronmembers to defray the costs of such

efforts. No one therefore gets a free ride on the important

efforts expended in these areas.

Another facior in the agency shop rationale is that, ab-

sent such a system, the employer would be subject to

irreconcilable conflicting demands from rival unions. Much

of this concern [17] arises because the employer is under

a mandatory duty to bargain. Here, however, the manda-

tory bargaining process remains under the sole control of

the MCCFA. In no event would the employer be forced

to bargain with more than one group.

The subject matter of meet and confer committees and

the scope of mandatory bargaining are mutually exclusive.

Of course, it is difficult to draw a line between the two

jurisdictions, but this is inevitable unless all issues are

subject to just one process or the other. This line drawing

has already reached the Minnesota Supreme Court three

23

times since PELRA was enacted. See General Drivers

Union Local 346 v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 704, 283 N.W.2d 524

(Minn. 1979) ; Mpls. Fed. of Teachers v. Mpls. Special Sch.

Dist. No. 2, 258 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 1977); Int’l Union of

Operating Engineers v. City of Mpls., 233 N.W.2d 748

(Minn. 1975). Although there may be an added dimension

to the line drawing if the meet and confer committees are

open to nonmembers of the MCCFA, the line drawing itself

is essentially unchanged. The question remains one that

frequently arises in labor law—whether a particular issue

is subject to mandatory bargaining.

We thus conclude that the rationale which properly

supports the agency shop generally does not justify the

MCCFA’s sole authority to select meet and confer repre-

sentatives in the community colleges.

The MCCFA contends that the present practice is not

different in any material way from the faculty senate sys-

tem which preceded PELRA. The argument is that majority

selection of a labor organization is the equivalent of ma-

jority selection of a faculty senate. Despite its superficial

appeal, this contention glosses over constitutional differ-

ences between the two systems. The plain fact is that all

faculty members formerly had the right to vote for in-

dividual representatives that would deal with issues of

college and faculty governance. All faculty members could

also seek to serve in such roles. These rights are now com-

pletely lost unless one joins the MCCFA. The right to even

speak out on such issues is further impaired by the knowl-

edge that one could be excluded from serving in the process

if the MCCFA should desire to retaliate for protected

speech activity. The former faculty senate system did not

impair these First Amendment interests, interests which

are paramount in the context of higher education.

[18] We hold that the First Amendment interests of

faculty members are infringed if the labor organization has

sole authority to select meet and confer representatives

24

and that such infringement, in the context of higher educa-

tion, is not supported by overriding state interests.” The

contract provision establishing such exclusive selection is

therefore void and section 179.66, subd. 7, of PELRA is

declared unconstitutional insofar as it requires or allows

such a practice in the meet and confer context.

In so holding, we do not suggest that a labor organiza-

tion cannot play a major role in the meet and confer pro-

cess. To the contrary, the state has an obvious interest in

harmonizing the meet and negotiate process with the meet

and confer process. Moreover, the MCCFA, as the repre-

sentative of a majority of the faculty, has a legitimate

claim to a significant role in the meet and confer process.

If, for example, the present structure were operated under

the auspices of the MCCFA, but committee memberships

were open to and elected by all faculty, including nonmem-

bers of the MCCFA, legitimate state interests could be

served without the constitutional impairments of the pres-

ent system.

We again emphasize the narrowness of our holding. We

are not confronted with a faculty union’s role in ad hoc

governance mechanisms which might arise from time to

time. The need for administrative expedience and potential

for impairment of associational rights might well lead to a

different result. We will not speculate, however, on the

constitutionality of governance mechanisms that are not

before us.

Summary

1. The Minnesota Community College Faculty Associa-

tion (MCCFA) may act as an exclusive representative pur-

suant to PELRA, Minn. Stat. § 179.61 et seq.

** Nothing in our holding should be viewed as if it also applies

outside the context of higher education.

25

[19] (a) The provisions of PELRA that allow for an

exclusive representation system of collective bargaining

and that impose duties to ‘‘meet and negotiate’’ with re-

spect to compensation and other terms and conditions of

employment are constitutionally valid on their face and as

applied in the community colleges ;

(b) No constitutional violation arises from the

MCCFA’s status as a private organization. PELRA, on its

face and as applied, does not impermissibly delegate sov-

ereign state power nor impermissibly confer any power to

make ‘‘economic laws;’’

(c) No constitutional violation arises from the MCCFA

engaging in limited political activity which relates directly

to its collective bargaining efforts. MCCFA’s function as

an exclusive representative under PELRA does not result

in any compelled association with a quasi-political party.

The MCCFA and the organizations with which it is affiliated

(The Minnesota Education Association and National Edu-

cation Association) do not together constitute a single

integrated organization nor are they, alone or in conjunc-

tion, a quasi-political party.

2. The present practice of having the MCCFA select all

representatives on meet and confer committees is unconsti-

tutional. Such practice has an inherent chilling effect on

the associational and speech interests of nonmembers of the

MCCFA and, unlike exclusive control over the ‘‘meet and

negotiate’’ process, is not supported by compelling state

interests.

(a) The meet and confer provisions of PELRA are

valid insofar as they impose upon employers the duty to

meet and confer and provide employees the right to meet

and confer. Nothing in the Constitution requires that the

state abandon what appears to be essential in college ad-

ministration—involving the faculty in college governance;

(b) The provisions requiring employees to select meet

and confer representatives, Minn. Stat. § 179.73, subd. 2, as

26

applied to the community colleges, effectively requires and

has resulted in the establishment of a formal governance

system which is the primary mechanism for expressing

faculty views on all issues outside the mandatory bargain-

ing process. This provision is valid as applied to community

colleges only if all faculty members have a fair opportunity

both to select and serve as governance representatives.

[20] (c) The clause of the collective bargaining contract

which gives the MCCFA sole authority to select meet and

confer representatives is void, and the statutory provision

which requires the employer to meet and confer only

through such organization is invalid insofar as it allows or

requires the present practice. See Minn. Stat. 4 179.66,

subd. 7.

(d) The foregoing would not preclude conducting the

meet and confer process under the auspices of the MCCFA,

so long as both members and nonmembers have a fair

opportunity to select and serve on the meet and confer

committees.

ORDER FOR JUDGMENT

The constitutional infringements caused by the present

meet and confer process in the community colleges clearly

occur under color of state law. The Minnesota State Board

for Community Colleges, in its official capacity, and the

Minnesota Community College Faculty Association must

equally share liability inasmuch as they together negotiated

the aspects of the present structure which we have found

violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. There is no basis

for individual liability or for finding any defendants liable

other than the MSBCC and the MCCFA,

The parties have stipulated to nominal money damages

of one dollar and we find that no other money damages

are appropriate. The plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory

and injunctive relief in accordance with this opinion. There-

fore, PELRA as applied to the community colleges is de-

clared valid in all respects, except

27

(1) Minn. Stat. § 179.73, subd. 2, is declared valid so

long as all community college faculty members are pro-

vided a fair opportunity both to select and serve as meet

and confer representatives;

(2) Minn. Stat. § 179.66, subd. 7, is declared unconstitu-

tional only insofar as it allows or requires an exclusive

representative in the community colleges to have sole

authority to select meet and confer representatives;

(3) The clause of the collective bargaining contract con-

ferring sole selection authority upon the MCCFA is de-

clared invalid, and the MCCFA is enjoined from making

any further selections of meet and confer representatives

pursuant to such clause.

[21] The defendants shall bear their own costs in this

proceeding and 20% of plaintiffs’ costs shall be taxed to

the MSBCC and the MCCFA, to be borne in equal shares.

Judgment shall be entered in accordance with this order.

/s/ Gerald W. Heaney

Geratp W. Heaney

United States Circuit Judge

/8/ Donald D. Alsop

Donatp D. ALsop

United States District Judge

Larson, Senior District Judge, concurring and dissenting.

I am in substantial agreement with the Memorandum

Opinion and Order but dissent as to paragraphs (1), (2),

and (3) in the Order for Judgment.

/s/ Earl R. Larson

Ean R. Larson

U.S. Senior District Judge

Darep: March 31, 1982

FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER OF THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

(16 November 1981)

31

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

FOURTH DIVISION

4-74 Civ. 659

Leon W. Kwniont, er at, Plaintiffs,

v.

Minnesota Community Couiece Facuury Association,

et aL, Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER

Pursuant to the Order of this Court dated December 13,

1979, the parties have presented extensive evidence before

Special Master Leonard E. Lindquist. Proceedings before

the Special Master involved 41 hearing days, 6,000 pages

of transcript, the introduction of over 500 exhibits and the

filing by each party of various briefs and elaborate pro-

posed findings of fact. The Special Master filed his recom-

mended findings of fact with this Court on March 13, 1981.

The following constitutional issues remain for this Court

to determine:

(1) Whether it is constitutional, under the First and

Fourteenth Amendments, for the Minnesota Community

College Faculty Association (MCCF A) to act as ‘‘exclusive

representative’’ of plaintiffs pursuant to the collective bar-

gaining provisions of the Minnesota Public Employment

Labor Relations Act (PELRA), Minn. Stat. § 179.61 et

seq.; and

(2) Whether the ‘‘meet and confer’’ provisions of

PELRA, Minn, Stat. §§ 179.63, subd. 15, 179.65, subd. 1, and

179.66, subd. 3, 7, are constitutional on their face and as

applied to plaintiffs under the First and Fourteenth

Amendments.

32

Before adopting findings of fact, we carefully reviewed

the trial record, the stipulations of fact, the parties’ pro-

posed findings of fact and the briefs in support thereof.

The findings herein represent our independent judgment

based upon that review.

[2] In making these findings, we have allocated the bur-

den of proof as follows: plaintiffs must establish that ex-

ercise of a specific constitutional right is impaired by the

challenged statute or practice and that such a right is

deemed a fundamental one. If plaintiffs meet this burden,

the defendants must then demonstrate that there is a com-

pelling legitimate state interest served by the challenged

statute or practice which outweighs the impairment of the

protected right, and that no less restrictive means are rea-

sonably available to pursue such compelling interest.’ See

generally Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S.

209 (1977); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).

Based upon the foregoing, the Report of the Special

Master is adopted as modified and set forth herein.

I. Parties

1. Plaintiffs are residents of Minnesota, ‘‘public em-

ployees’’ under Minnesota law,’ and are employed by the

Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges (MSBCC)

as follows:

‘ As to plaintiffs’ claim that defendant labor organizations are

predominantly political in character, we have placed the burden

upon the defendants to show that their activities predominantly

relate to collective bargaining. See Abood v. Detroit Board of Edu-

cation, 431 U.S. 209, 239 n.40 (1977); ef. Finkin, The Limits of

Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 64 Minn. L. Rev. 183, 241-

249 (1980).

* See Minn, Stat. § 179.63, subd. 7.

33

a. Leon Knight and Morgan Kjer are faculty members

of North Hennepin Community College, located in Brook-

lyn Park, Minnesota;

b. James D. Wallace, Terrence D. Florin, Harold J.

Gardner, Eugene D. Mielke, Joan M. Farkas and Ronald

Lievense are faculty members of Normandale Community

College, located in Bloomington, Minnesota; and

c. Ralph G. Powell and Cresston Gackle are or were

faculty membere at Anoka-Ramsey Community College,

[3] located in Coon Rapids, Minnesota.’

2. Plaintiffs are represented collectively in the negotia-

tion of collective bargaining agreements, grievance adjust-

ment, and arbitration issues in dispute with MSBCC by

defendant Minnesota Community College Faculty Associa-

tion (MCCFA) which is certified as their exclusive repre-

sentative pursuant to PELRA. Minn. Stat. § 179.61 et seq.

3. Certain of the plaintiffs are not and do not desire to

become formal members or supporters, financial or other-

wise, of defendants * MCCF'A, Minnesota Education Asso-

ciation (MEA), Independent Minnesota Political Action

*The defendant labor organizations assert, and the plaintiffs

have not challenged, that the following plaintiffs are no longer

employed as community college faculty members: William B. Bau-

man, Thomas J. Patin, Dr, Richard A. Thompson, Gary Nelson,

Lucille Johuson, Virginia Lanegran and Richard Isenhart. In

addition, three plaintiffs, Donald A. Dahlin, David R. Grout and

Max A. Malmquist, had previously expressed a desire to withdraw

their participation in the case, which request was denied together

with other matters in this Court’s Order dated April 24, 1980. The

plaintiffs’ proposed findings did not include these three persons as

identified plaintiffs.

* The following plaintiffs are presently members of the MCCFA:

Harold J. Gardner, Eugene D. Mielke, Joan M. Farkas and Cress-

ton Gackle. Ralph G. Powell has become a faculty member at

Minneapolis Community College and thereafter joined the MCCFA.

34

Committee for Education (IMPACE) or National Educa-

tion Association (NEA), nor do they desire to be repre-

sented either individually or collectively by said organiza-

tions with respect to terms and conditions of employment,

other personnel or educational policies subject to the ‘‘meet

and confer’’ provisions of PELRA, or any other matter

in which defendant labor organizations are involved.

4. Defendant labor organizations are the MCCF'A, MBA,

NEA and IMPACE, the structures of which are described

infra at pp. 4-7.

5. Defendant state officials are as follows:

a. The Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges

(MSBCC) is an agency of the State of Minnesota, a ‘‘pub-

lic employer’’ under PELRA, and is responsible for man-

aging the [4] public community colleges of Minnesota, in-

cluding those which employ plaintiffs ;

b. Phillip C. Helland is the chancellor of the com-

munity college system and is the chief executive officer of

the MSBCC;

c. Dale A. Lorenz is the president of Normandale

Community College, John Helling is the president of North

Hennepin Community College ;

d. The Minnesota State Treasurer and Commissioner

of Finance are involved in the implementation of PELRA

for purposes of this action only to the extent that their

duties include withholding ‘‘fair share fees’’ from em-

ployees’ wages and transmitting such fees to the exclusive

representative; and

e. The director of the Bureau of Mediation Services’

only involvement in this action was his certification of the

MCCFA as the exclusive representative of the bargaining

unit in 1971 and his subsequent refusal to change that

certification in 1974.

35

II. Structure and Activities of Defendant Labor Organizations

A. Structure

1. NEA. NEA is a national voluntary organization of

teachers, governed by its Representative Assembly, Board

of Directors and Executive Committee, that has both state

and local affiliates. Through reciprocal membership re-

quirements as a condition of affiliation, members of a local

or state affiliate must become members of the NEA and of

both the state and local affiliates.

The principal policymaking body of the NEA is its

Representative Assembly, comprised of members of the

national, state and local associations, NEA’s program

budget, constitution, bylaws and standing rules, and resolu-

tions with respect to issues and goals are all voted upon

by the Representative Assembly. It also elects the pvresi-

dent, vice president, secretary, treasurer, at-large members

of the Board [5] of Directors, and the at-large members

of the Executive Committee.

Only the NEA may amend its constitution and bylaws,

which are separate from those of MEA or MCCFA. The

NEA is the exclusive employer of its professional staff and

such staff are not subject to supervision by any staff of

MEA or MCCFA. No sta‘e or local affiliate has any au-

thority over any collective bargaining agreement entered

into by the NEA with its professional staff. NEA sets its

own budget and no affiliate has authority to interfere with

such determinations.

2. MEA. The MEA is a statewide voluntary organization

of teachers that operates under the direction of its own

Representative Assembly, Board of Directors and Execu-

tive Committee, all of which are separate from the repre-

sentative or delegate assemblies, boards and committees

of the NEA and MCCFA. The MEA has divided the state

into various geographic regions and other units known as

UniServ units, each of which serves one or more local asso-

36

ciations. Every UniServ unit, including the MCCFA, is en-

titled to representation on the MEA’s Board.

MEA has its own constitution and bylaws, which it alone

may amend. Such amendment does not require approval by

the NEA or any local affiliate.

MEA’s staff operate under the direction of MEA’s ex-

ecutives and is separate from the staff of NEA and

MCCFA, although some MEA staff may be assigned to

assist affiliates, including MCCFA.

MEA’s boards, committees and assemblies determines its

program budget and other expenditure decisions, without

any power of review by the NEA or local affiliates.

3. MCCFA. The MCCFA is a voluntary organization of

community college faculty members operating under the

direction of its own Delegate Assembly, Board of Directors

and Executive Committee. As an affiliate of the MEA and

NEA, MCCFA requires its members to become members of

MEA and NEA.

[6] MCCFA’s relationship with the NEA and MEA is

set forth in the affiliation agreement between these orga-

nizations. Under this agreement, MCCFA members pay

‘unified dues’’ to the MCCFA, MEA and NEA. The dedi-

cation of a portion of such dues to MEA and NEA is in

exchange for staff, office and other assistance to MCCFA.

Extensive evidence was submitted with respect to account-

ing for the budgets and allocations between the organiza-

tions. The evidence established that at least 75% of

MCCFA member dues are expended by or on direct behalf

of MCCFA. The portion allocable to the MCCFA is higher

if regular indirect MEA and NEA assistance, or emergency

aid such as strike assistance, is included.

The authority of MCCFA to maintain the autonomy

specified under its constitution, to conduct its own meet-

ings, to elect its own officers and to adopt its own policies,

are also provided for in the affiliation agreement.

37

MCCFA’s constitution and bylaws are separate from

those of MEA and NEA. MCCFA’s bylaws may be

amended only by its membership. MCCFA’s board of di-

rectors, officers and member assemblies are all separate

from those of MEA and NEA.

MCCFA alone determines the scope, content, subject

matter and direction of its collective bargaining with the

MSBCC. NEA and MEA have no authority to determine

or participate in the determination of such matters by

MCCFA.

4. IMPACE. IMPACE is a voluntary, nonprofit com-

mittee of individual educators which may be characterized

as MEA’s political action arm. Its Board of Directors are

appointed by the MEA Board of Directors. The IMPACE

board exercises general supervision and control of its orga-

nization, including all determinations of financial contri-

butions to the campaigns of candidates for public office in

Minnesota.

Membership in and contributions to IMPACE are wholly

voluntary and distinctly separate from membership in or

contributions to MEA, NEA or MCCFA.

IMPACE has sole authority over its funding decisions

and other activities. IMPACE contracts and pays for the

services of certain MEA staff members together with pay-

ing MEA for IMPACE’s office space and other support

services. [7] IMPACE has no authority to participate in

or exercise influence over budget, program, collective bar-

gaining or other regular operations of NEA, MEA or

MCCFA.

5. NEA-PAC. NEA-PAC is not a defendant. It is a na-

tional voluntary, nonprofit committee of teachers which

may be characterized as NEA’s political action arm. It is

governed by its own Steering Committee which determines

which campaigns of candidates for federal office shall re-

ceive financial contributions. The NEA-PAC Steering Com-

38

mittee and NEA officers and directors are separate entities.

IMPACE Chairman, Roger Johnson, is a member of the

NEA-PAC Council by virtue of his IMPACE chairmanship.

Membership in or contribution to NEA-PAC is wholly

voluntary and distinctly separate from membership in or

contribution to NEA, MEA or MCCFA.

NEA-PAC has no authority to participate in or exercise

influence over budget, program, collective bargaining or

other regular operations of NEA, MEA or MCCFA.

6. INTERRELATIONSHIPS. In limited circumstances,

NEA, MEA, MCCFA, NEA-PAC and IMPACE provide

to or share with one another various services and facilities.

Such sharing of services, facilities or staff is generally fi-

nanced by each separate organization to the extent such

organization directly benefits from the particular sharing

arrangement. Officials, staff personnel and representatives

of NEA, MEA, MCCF'A, NEA-PAC and IMPACE regu-

larly attend meetings with one another, plan certain co-

operative programs, report to their respective organiza-

tions concerning the activities of the other organizations,

and maintain continuous channels of communications

among themselves. In special cases, the degree of support

for an affiliate may be quite substantial (see p. 10, infra,

regarding strike assistance).

MCCFA, MEA and NEA are related by their agreement

of affiliation, by having certain common goals and by oc-

casional sharing arrangements. They are not and do not

function or operate, however, as a single integrated unit.

In making this finding, we have considered the testimony

of Professors Schneier and Morgan, presented by plain-

tiffs, and the record [8] as a whole. Each organization has

a separate board of directors, officers, committees, consti-

tution and bylaws. Each organization maintains exclusive

control over its budget, program activity and general pol-

icy-setting process. Each organization maintains separate

39

and exclusive control over its professional staff and man-

agement operations. Each organization maintains separate

and exclusive control over its collective bargaining deter-

minations. The record thus shows that MCCFA, MEA and

NEA are not a single integrated organization. The record

also establishes that IMPACE and NEA-PAC are separate

political action committees of MEA and NEA, respectively.

Because membership in or contribution to IMPACE and

NEA-PAC are wholly voluntary and separate from any

participation in MCCFA, MEA or NEA, IMPACE and

NEA-PAC are also not part of any single integrated

organization.

B. General Activities of Defendant Labor Organizations

1. MCCFA. Since 1971, MCCFA has been the certified

exclusive bargaining agent for the faculty of Minnesota’s

community colleges. MCCFA was actively engaged for over

a year negotiating the 1973-75 collective bargaining con-

tract with MSBCC. This accord was reached without strike

or arbitration. The 1975-77 and 1977-79 contracts were

also negotiated by MCCFA for approximately one year

each; both resulted in arbitration proceedings and awards;

and, in both cases, the Minnesota Legislature failed to fully

fund the arbitration award. MCCFA also negotiated the

1979-81 contract for nearly a year. In this case, a three-

week strike resulted from a refusal by MSBCC to arbitrate

the dispute.

The subject matter of these negotiations by MCCFA has

included teaching loads, work assignments, salaries, leave

policies, grievance procedures, seniority rights, fringe

benefits, grounds for dismissal and the scope of arbitration.

Roughly one-half of MCCFA’s annual budget is ex-

pended on the costs of operating its 22-person Board of

Directors, its Executive Committee and the salary of its

president. The president chairs meetings of the Board and

Executive Committee, which take place at least monthly;

appoints members and serves as an ex officio member of

40

standing committees (Negotiations [9] Committee, Meet

and Confer Committee, Legislative Committee, Profes-

sional Growth Committee, Resolutions Committee and oth-

ers); chairs the negotiation teams and serves generally as

the chief spokesperson of MCCFA.

The MCCFA Executive Director is salaried by the MEA,

pursuant to the affiliation agreement, but is primarily in-

volved in grievance of MCCFA claims, MCCFA contract

interpretation and negotiations and other MCCFA matters.

Roughly one-fifth of the MCCFA budget is expended on

its committee activities in such areas as negotiations, meet

and confer, legislative matters and professional growth,

The testimony and exhibits relating to MCCFA activities

clearly establish that nearly all such activities relate di-

rectly to collective bargaining, formulation of a bargaining

position, contract administration or closely related orga-

nizational and professional growth.

2. MEA. MCCFA is affiliated with MEA, a statewide

organization of local teacher affiliates that represent more

than half of the public school teachers in Minnesota.

MEA assists its affiliates in virtually all areas in which

they are active. MEA has departments (paid staff of MEA)

and councils (volunteer teacher members who receive only

expenses) in the following areas, on which well over half

of the MEA budget is expended: Negotiations, Teacher

Rights, Field Services (including UniServ), Instructional

and Professional Development, Communications, Economic

Services, and Governmental Relations. The activities of

these departments and councils include training of teachers

in grievance procedures, legal defense or promotion of

teacher rights, research and consultation on the broad

range of subjects treated in negotiations, consultation on

arbitration matters, investigation of unfair labor practice

charges, direct field staff assistance to local affiliates in all

of the foregoing areas, researching and organizing teacher

41

education programs dealing with classroom skills and other

professional development, and assembling insurance, travel

and other group benefits. Roughly one-third of MEA’s

budget is expended on administration, governance and

physical facilities, including offices, equipment, officer sal-

aries and costs of Board [10] meetings and Representative

Assemblies.

The testimony and exhibits relating to MEA activities

clearly establish that all bnt an insignificant portion of

such activities relate directly to collective bargaining issues

such as teacher salaries, fringe benefits, size of classes, job

security and other aspects of teacher welfare.

The MEA directly assisted the MCCFA during the latter

organization’s 1979 strike action. MEA granted MCCFA

$200,000 to maintain strike facilities, paid $100 per week

to striking faculty members after the tenth day of the

strike, and, together with NEA, guaranteed approximately

$300,000 in loans to the strikers. This strike aid alone ex-

ceeded three years of MCCFA dues to MEA.

3. NEA. The NEA is a national teacher organization

which engages in a variety of activities aimed at promoting

public education, teacher welfare and improving the bar-

gaining ability and position of its members and affiliates.

The overwhelming majority of NEA’s budget expendi-

tures relate to training teachers in grievance procedures,

professional growth and skill development of teachers, tech-

nical management and other organizational assistance to

its affiliates, extensive research support relating to collec-

tive bargaining issues, and direct assistance to affiliates

engaged in collective bargaining.

C. Political Activity of Defendant Labor Organisations

1. NEA-PAC and IMPACE are political action arms of

NEA and MEA, respectively. NEA-PAC makes contribu-

tions to the campaigns of federal candidates, and IMPACE

42

makes contributions to state and local candidates. The

funds for such contributions are independent of dues-

money and are raised through separate voluntary contribu-

tions, primarily from teachers.

2. There is some overlap of NEA-PAC activity with

regular NEA organizational activity and staff, and some

NEA political activity that may be only incidentally re-

lated to collective bargaining. The NEA has a rebate pro-

cedure which refunds, to each member who desires, the

portion of [11] regular dues expended on political activity

which does not bear directly on collective bargaining,

grievance procedures and teacher welfare. Rebated costs

include those related to any overlap with NEA-PAC, the

preparation or dissemination of candidate ratings or any

other indication of candidate preference, certain ideologi-

cal or charitable activity, and other lobbying not related

directly to collective bargaining or terms and conditions of

employment. The rebatable amounts, as determined by

NEA, have always aggregated to less than 10% of NEA

dues. There was no evidence introduced showing that NEA

expended more than the rebatable amounts on political

activity unrelated to collective bargaining matters.

Separate from NEA-PAC and rabatable activity, NEA

does engage in political activity at the federal level that the

record shows relates directly to collective bargaining, edu-

cation funding and other issues that are integral to teacher

welfare,

3. There is some overlap between IMPACE activity and

the regular MEA organizational activity and staff. For ex-

ample, local government relations councils participate in

screening local candidates, as does IMPACE. In addition,

some MEA staff members participated in political activity

on behalf of the 1976 Carter-Mondale campaign, but the

evidence showed that such partisan activities, taken as a

whole, would be less than 2% of MEA’s total budgeted

activities.

43

Separate from any IMPACE overlap, MEA regularly

engages in political activity at the state and local levels in

the ureas of education funding, teacher tenure rights, class-

size policy, retirement benefits and other teacher welfare

concerns affected by state or local budget decisions.

Through its government relations committee and depart-

ment and through a coordinated program of local volunteer

members, MEA organizes lobbying efforts directly related

to the foregoing teacher concerns, The record establishes

that such political activities relate closely and directly to

the collective bargaining efforts of MEA.

4. MCCFA has engaged in political activity that the

record shows relates chiefly to securing legislative approval

of the employment contracts negotiated or arbitrated with

the MSBCC and to other collective bargaining issues,

{12} 5. Taken as a whole, the record establishes that

MEA and NEA are properly characterized as public em-

ployee organizations actively engaged in improving through

collective bargaining the terms and conditions of employ-

ment for teachers, and that MCCF'A is organized and affi-

liated with MEA and NEA to pursue similar efforts on

behalf of the community college faculty it represents. All

three organizations engage in a wide range of legislative,

governmental and public relations activities that are closely

and directly related to furtherance of each organization’s

collective bargaining activities. IMPACE and NEA-PAC

are separate from the regular operations of MCCFA, MEA

and NEA and engage in partisan political activity financed

by the independent, voluntary contributions of individual

teachers and others.

This finding is based on the testimony of numerous offi-

cers and staff of MCCFA, MEA and NEA concerning the

character of their political activity and the proportion of

their time spent on political activity of any kind, in addi-

tion to the many exhibits relating to budget allocations of

each organization.

44

There were two types of affirmative evidence presented

by the plaintiffs to show that the defendant organizations

are predominantly political action organizations: (1) writ-

ten or oral statements made by the defendant organizations

to the effect that political action is an integral, essential

element of their activities; and (2) a ‘‘content analysis’’ of

selected publications and meeting minutes of various de-

fendant organizations, from which it was inferred that 50-

100% of each organization’s activity is ‘‘political’’ as op-

posed to ‘‘collective bargaining.’’ We find this affirmative

evidence unpersuasive. It fails to distinguish between activ-

ity related to collective bargaining and political activity

unrelated to that end. The content analysis in particular

treats all ‘‘lobbying, organizing and litigation’’ matters as

separate from ‘‘collective bargaining.’’ Lobbying, organiz-

ing and litigation activities that directly relate to collective

bargaining issues are thus excluded from the ‘‘collective

bargaining’’ category of the analysis. The content analysis

also assumes that the publications analyzed accurately re-

flect the range of activities actually undertaken by the

organizations, an assumption unsupported by the record

as a [13] whole. The analysis of organizational publica-

tions was also outweighed by the firsthand testimony of the

officers and staff of such organizations and the budgetary

and other records of their activity.

Ill, Faculty-Employer Relations

A. The Structure of PELRA

Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 179.67, the MCCFA has been

certified as the exclusive representative of community col-

lege faculty for purposes of collective bargaining and has

negotiated four such employment contracts since 1971.

PELRA imposes upon the employer a duty to ‘‘meet and

negotiate’ with an exclusive representative with respect

to ‘terms and conditions of employment,’’ as defined in

the Act, and imposes a duty to ‘‘meet and confer’’ with

45

‘*professional employees’’ with respect to employee con-

cerns that fall outside the definition of ‘‘terms and condi-

tions.’’ See Minn. Stat. 44 179.66, subds. 2 & 3, and 179.63,

subds. 15, 16 & 18. PELRA further provides that, when an

exclusive representative has been certified, ‘‘[t]he em-

ployer shall not meet and negotiate or meet and confer with

any employee or group of employees * * * except through

the exclusive representative.’’ Minn, Stat. 4 179.66.

Public employees under PELRA have a right not to join

any labor organization which may be certified as their ex-

clusive representative, but a ‘‘fair share fee’’ may be de-

ducted from nonmembers and paid to the representative.

Minn. Stat. § 179.65, subd. 2.

Public employees have the right to communicate with

their employer with respect to terms and conditions of em-

ployment so long as such activity ‘‘does not circumvent the

rights of the exclusive representative if there be one.’’

Minn. Stat. § 179.65, subd. 1.

Professional public employees, such as plaintiffs, have

the right to ‘‘meet and confer’’ with the employer regard-

ing matters other than ‘‘terms and conditions’’ of employ-

ment, Minn. Stat. § 179.65, subd. 3.

[14] B. The Effects of PELRA in Practice

1. The 1979-81 employment contract between MCCFA

and MSBCC provides inter alia that:

a. ‘*The Employer will not interfere with the rights of

employees to become or not to become members of

[MCCFA] and there shall be no discrimination or inter-

ference, restraint, or coercion by the Employer * * * against

any employee because of [MCCFA] membership or non-

membership[ ;]’’

b. The MCCFA has the sole right to ‘‘establish’’ up to

six faculty committees at each campus for the purpose of

holding ‘‘exchange of views’’ meetings with the college

46

administration in the areas of ‘‘Personnel, Student Affairs,

Curriculum, Facilities, Fiscal Matters, and General Mat-

ters;’’ and ‘‘[e]ach committee will have full authority in

the assigned area to present the views of the employees’’

in such meetings;

c. Alternative structures for exchanging views may be

agreed to by the campus chapter of MCCFA but ‘‘such

agreement shall not in any way regulate or control the

right of selection or participation by the local [MCCFA]

association ;’’

d. A statewide-level ‘‘meet and confer’’ committee

shall also be established by the statewide MCCFA, shall

meet with the MSBCC at least three times per year, and

shall include as subjects ‘‘all items submitted by the State

[MCCFA];’’

e. Statewide and campus faculty representatives for

contract administration matters are designated by the

statewide or local MCCFA;

f. Class-size issues shall be resolved ‘‘through the ex-

change of views process ;’’

g. The academic year and summer school calendar

shall be established by a committee comprised of the college

president, student body president and campus MCCFA

president;

h. The designation of academic departments and the

responsibilities of ‘‘department coordinators’’ shall be de-

termined through the exchange of views process;

[15] i. Employee ‘‘complaints’’ may be presented to

administrators with or without participation of the MCCFA

grievance representative; formal grievances must be

signed by the affected employee and the MCCFA grievance

representative ; and

j. The employer ‘‘will not during the life of this con-

tract meet and negotiate or meet and confer relative to

47

terms and conditions of employment with any employee or

group of employees * * * except through the exclusive bar-

gaining representative.’’

2. Prior to the implementation of PELRA, the faculty

of at least some community college campuses were orga-

nized in ‘‘faculty senates or councils,’’ with various com-

mittees thereof focusing on such subject areas as new

course proposals and other curriculum matters, degree re-

quirements, student activity budgets, academic standards

and related discipline procedures for students, teacher

evaluation and general budget and planning issues at each

such campus.

The faculty senates or councils and committees thereof,

together with general faculty assemblies, were the primary

formal mechanism for formulating faculty views and com-

municating such views to the administration. Faculty repre-

sentatives in this formal system were selected by election

processes in which every faculty member was eligible to

vote and seek election.

3. Since PELRA was adopted, ‘‘meet and confer’’ and

‘*exchange of views’’ committees (hereafter, meet and con-

fer) have replaced faculty senates and councils and are the

principal formal mechanisms, at the campus and statewide

levels, for formulating faculty positions on their concerns,

The subjects covered by the meet and confer system in-

clude new course proposals and other curriculum matters,

budgetary planning, development of facilities, student

rights and student affairs generally, evaluation of adminis-

trators, selection of college presidents, academic accredita-

tion of the community colleges, and other matters.

4. The degree and effectiveness of faculty organization

varied from campus to campus prior to PELRA. The duty

to ‘‘meet and confer,’’ however, requires administrators at

each [16] campus to listen to and consult with the faculty

on policy questions other than ‘‘terms and conditions of

48

employment.’’ Together with the establishment of ‘‘meet

and confer’’ committees, the duty imposed by PELRA has

made the formal meet and eonfer process the primary me-

chanism for any significant faculty-administration com-

munication on such policy questions,

5. The views of a faculty meet and confer committee are

considered by administrators to be the official faculty posi-

tion on matters discussed in meet and confer sessions, but

the administrators recognize that there are other positions

held by individual faculty members.

6. No community college administrator or MSBCC mem-

ber plays any role in the selection of the members on the

faculty’s meet and confer committees.

7. Pursuant to the employment contract, the MCCFA

has exclusive control over designation of all faculty mem-

bers on meet and confer committees at the campus and

statewide level. Although there is no express policy against

including nonmembers of MCCFA on such committees, in

practice nonmembers have not been designated to serve in

such roles.

8. Regardless of membership or nonmembership in

MCCFA, all faculty have the right to informally com-

municate their individual views to administrators and the

MSBCC and MCCFA have never attempted to deny or

abridge such rights. The exclusive formal process for for-

mulating and communicating a collective faculty position

on policy questions, however, is through the meet and con-

fer committees.

9. There are few formal rules with respect to determin-

ing which faculty members may appear before or present

proposals to the meet and confer committees, In practice,

however, committee members determine the agenda and

focus of faculty expressions and committee meetings are

not a general forum for individual faculty members or

others to discuss matters of interest to them.

49

[17] IV. First Amendment and State Interests

A. Associational Interests

1. The decision to join or contribute to IMPACE or

NEA-PAC is wholly an individual, voluntary one, This

record is devoid of any evidence that the plaintiffs have

been required or in any manner coerced into supporting,

joining, or refraining from opposing the efforts of 1M-

PACE or NEA-PAC.

2. The only statutorily-imposed relationship between

plaintiffs and MCCFA, MEA and NEA involves the deduc-

tion of a fair share fee from the plaintiffs that is paid to

MCCFA as the exclusive bargaining representative of com-

munity college faculty, a portion of which is paid to MEA

and NEA for various collective bargaining and related

assistance the latter groups provide to MCCFA.

3. To obtain or retain their faculty positions, or to derive

the economic, job security and other benefits under the

‘*terms and conditions’’ (as defined by PELRA) of their

employment, the plaintiffs have not been and are not re-

quired or coerced into joining, or refraining from opposing,

MCCFA, MEA or NEA. Such rights and benefits flow

equally to ali faculty members regardless of their member-

ship or nonmembership in MCCFA.

4. The ability of the plaintiffs to participate in the meet

and confer process, and to serve on meet and confer com-

mittees, is impaired by nonmembership in MCCFA as fol-

lows: The employment contract provides MCCFA with ex-

clusive control over the selection of faculty members on

meet and confer committees; such committee members have

principal control over formulating the agenda of faculty

concerns and the adoption of faculty views; and nonmem-

bers of MCCFA have not been, in practice, selected for

participation on such committees.

5. Having the opportunity to fully participate in the

meet and confer process is viewed by some plaintiffs as

50

essential to their role on the faculty. Some plaintiffs felt

pressure to join the MCCFA in order to have such an

opportunity and at least one plaintiff joined MCCFA for

this reason.

[18] 6. No evidence was introduced demonstrating that

service on meet and confer committees was available

equally to members and nonmembers of MCCFA.

B. Free Speech Interests

1. The right of all faculty, both members and nonmem-

bers of MCCFA, to communicate informally and individu-

ally with administrative officials has not been impaired by

the MCCFA, MEA, NEA or the MSBCC.

2. Certain rights that might be characterized as elements

of academic freedom are expressly protected by the em-

ployment contract, e.g., the right of faculty members to

select their course materials and text books, to choose their

methods of teaching, to research and publish their work, to

evaluate student performance and to select library ma-

terials.

3. There is a potential for impairing free speech rights

arising from MCCF'A’s exclusive control over selection of

faculty members on the meet and confer committees, as

follows: A faculty member could be inhibited from speak-

ing out against MCCFA generally or against particular

issue positions strongly held by MCCFA because it might

be feared that such action could result in exclusion from

serving on the meet and confer committees.

The plaintiffs have not demonstrated that MCCFA selec-

tions of meet and confer committee members have in any

way been conducted to ‘‘retaliate’’ in such a manner, nor

that any faculty member’s exercise of free speech has been

impaired in practice by virtue of this potential inhibition.

4. The plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate any direct,

indirect, actual or potential impairment of their associa-

51

tional and free speech rights, except as indicated in Find-

ings IV(A) (4-5) and (B)(3).

C. State Interests

1. The parties have stipulated to a number of state in-

terests that independent review of the record establish as

true and relevant to these proceedings:

[19] a, The State of Minnesota has a legitimate inter-

est in promoting orderly and constructive relationships

between public employers and employees. Unresolved dis-

putes between public employers and their employees are

detrimental to the public interest as well as to the interests

of the involved parties.

b. The State of Minnesota has determined that enact-

ment of the Public Employment Labor Relations Act is the

means by which it can best deal with its employees in a fair,

efficient and peaceful fashion.

ce. A statutory system which permits employees in a

unit to be represented by an exclusive representative re-

sults in the avoidance of confusion, conflicting demands,

and dissension that would result from more than one repre-

sentative claiming to represent all the employees in an

employee unit.

d. The State of Minnesota has a legitimate interest in

maintaining ‘‘labor peace’’ by entering into agreements

with an exclusive representative for each employee unit,

which agreements are not subject to direct challenge by

rival employee organizations claiming to represent the

same employees in each unit.

2. Creating a procedure for systematic expression of

faculty views on a broad range of campus policy questions

furthers each of the foregoing state interests.

3. The record does not demonstrate, nor does the State

of Minnesota assert, any state interest in allocating the

52

benefits and obligations of the exclusive representation

collective bargaining system in a manner which discrimi-

nates between members and nonmembers of the employee

organization.

4. Additional state interests appear on the face of and

by inference from the PELRA statute, which therefore

need not be set forth here.

[20]

ORDER

1. Each party to this proceeding shall submit proposed

conclusions of law based upon the facts as found herein on

or before December 9, 1981.

2. Each party may submit a memorandum of points and

authorities in support of their position, together with their

proposed conclusions. Such memorandum shall not exceed

twenty-five (25) pages in length.

3. Final oral argument will be December 16, 1981 at 2:30

o’clock p.m.

/s/ Gerald W. Heaney

Geratp W. Heaney

United States Circuit Judge

/s/ Donald D. Alsop

Donatp D. ALsop

United States District Judge

/s/ Earl R. Larson

Kart R. Larson

U.S. Senior District Judge

Datep: November 16, 1981.

OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT,

535 F.2d 466

(17 May 1976)

55

Leon W. Knicut, et au., Petitioners,

we

Tue Honoraste Donan D. Atsop, District Judge,

United States District Court for the District of Minnesota,

Respondent.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,

EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

No. 76-1051

Submitted March 11, 1976.

Decided May 17, 1976.

Faculty members employed by community colleges

brought action challenging constitutionality of state’s Pub-

lice Employee Labor Relations Act. Following denial of

motion to convene three-judge court, faculty members

sought mandamus. The Court of Appeals, Stephenson, Cir-

cuit Judge, held that mandamus was proper remedy; that

the complaint raised sufficiently substantial constitutional

questions to require convening of three-judge court; and

that complaint formally alleged basis for equitable relief.

Writ granted.

[467] Before Lay, Ross and Stepnenson, Circuit Judges.

SrepHenson, Circuit Judge.

The critical issue raised in this case is whether a three-

judge court should have been convened under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 2281 and 2284. Petitioners request a writ of manda-

[468] mus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651 and Fed.R.App.P.

56

21 directing the district court’ to convene a three-judge

court. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the

district court exceeded its jurisdiction in denying pctition-

ers’ motion to convene a three-judge court and grant the

petition for writ of mandamus.

Twenty faculty members (petitioners) employed by vari-

ous Minnesota community colleges initiated this action con-

tending that the Minnesota Public Employee Labor Rela-

tions Act (PELRA), Minn.Stat.Ann. § 179.61 et seq., con-

travenes the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1983, 1985(3), 1986 and 1994. In particular, the petition-

ers assert that the exclusive representation® and fair

share® provisions of the PELRA, on their face and as

applied, are violative of the First, Ninth, Tenth, Thirteenth

and Fourteenth Amendments. The amended complaint

named as defendants, respondents, the Minnesota Commu-

nity College Faculty Association (MCCF'A), an employee

organization certified as the exclusive representative of

petitioners under the PELRA; its affiliates, the National

Education Association (NEA), the Minnesota Education

Association (MEA) and the Independent Minnesota Po-

litical Action Committee for Education (IMPACE) ; vari-

ous officers and former off.cers of the unions; and officials

of the state of Minnesota who administer the PELRA.

None of the petitioners is either a member or supporter

of the unions nor desires any representation by them.

Ostensibly, the MCCFA through the PELRA has the au-

thority to act as the petitioners’ exclusive representative

*The Honorable Donald D. Alsop, United States District Judge

for the District of Minnesota.

2 Minn.Stat.Ann. §§ 179.63(1)-(7), (15)-(18) ; 179.64(7) ; 179.-

65(1)-(2), (4)-(5), (7); 179.66(2), (7)-(10) ; 179.67; 179.68(1),

(2), (5)-(6), (9), (11); 179.69; 179.70; 179.71(2)-(4), (5), (6)-

(7); 179.72(3), (6)-(7), (9), (12); 179.74(3)-(5).

*Minn.Stat.Ann. § 179.65(2).

57

in collective bargaining with the Minnesota State Board for

Community Colleges (Board) concerning terms and condi-

tions of employment in the community college system.

Essentially, the petitioners allege that the PELRA denies

the right to bargain with the Board on an individual level

and prohibits an individual from petitioning the Board

with regard to employment matters.

Furthermore, during the academic years 1973-1974, 1974-

1975, and 1975-1976, the MCCFA apparently has caused

fair share fees to be deducted by the Board from the peti-

tioners’ wages in amounts equal to 94-97% of the formal

membership dues levied by the MCCFA during those years.

The petitioners in this regard further contend that such

fees have been deducted or checked off without notice or

hearing and without a determination that expenditure of

the fees confers any benefit on the petitioners. It is also

asserted that some of the fees have been transferred by

the MCCFA to the NEA, the MEA and IMPACE.

[1] The amended complaint requested a declaration that

the exclusive representation and fair share schemes are

constitutionally invalid and injunctive relief restraining the

unions and state officials from enforcing the applicable pro-

visions of the PELRA. In their amended complaint, the

petitioners also requested that a three-judge court be con-

vened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284. On Decem-

ber 22, 1975, after oral argument the district court issued

a memorandum opinion and order denying the motion for

a three-judge court. The district court held that the peti-

tioners’ aliegations concerning the exclusive representation

aspect of the PELRA failed to constitute a substantial

federal constitutional question.* Although the petitioners’

*On a motion to convene a three-judge court, a single district

judge may determine whether the constitutional question is sub-

stantial, whether the complaint formally alleges a basis for equita-

ble relief, and whether the case otherwise comports with the

58

[469] contention surrounding the fair share fee was found

to present a substantial constitutional question, the district

court determined that injunctive relief against state officials

was not necessary with respect to that claim.

[2-4] A threshold consideration is whether the district

court’s refusal to convene a three-judge court is reviewable

through a petition for writ of mandamus.’ The remedy of

mandamus is typically available only in circumstances in

which the district court exceeds ‘‘the sphere of its discre-

tionary power.’’ Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 104,

88 S.Ct. 269, 278, 19 L.Ed.2d 305, 315 (1967). See In re

Cessna Aircraft Antitrust Litigation, 518 F.2d 213, 216-17

(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947, 96 S.Ct. 363, 46 L.Ed.

2d 282 (1975); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 545, 547-48

(8th Cir. 1972). The writ is an extraordinary remedy that

is to be granted when the lower court has committed a

‘‘clear abuse of discretion.’’ Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379

U.S. 104, 110, 85 S.Ct. 234, 238, 13 L.Ed.2d 152, 159 (1964).

See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612, 614-15 (8th Cir. 1975).

Despite the limited availability of the mandamus remedy,

we conclude that the ruling of the district court is review-

able through mandamus. In Gonzalez v. Automatic Em-

ployees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 100 n. 19, 95 S.Ct. 289,

295, 42 L.Ed. 2d 249, 258 (1974), the Supreme Court clearly

indicated that ‘‘Where a single judge refuses to request

requirements for a statutory three-judge court. See Idlewild Bon

Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 (1962). A single

judge may also determine whether there is a statutory claim that

is dispositive of the case. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 543-

44, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1382, 39 L.Ed.2d 577, 591 (1974).

5 Since the district court retained jurisdiction, this is not a case

arising from an appealable order. Cf. Majuri v. United States,

431 F.2d 469, 472 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943, 91 S.Ct.

245, 27 L.Ed.2d 248 (1970). Further, petitioners did not request

certification for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) of the district

court’s order.

59

the convention of a three-judge court, but retains juris-

diction, review of his refusal may be had in the court of

appeals * * * through petition for writ of mandamus

** * 9 See Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein,

370 U.S. 713, 715, 82 S.Ct. 1294, 1296, 8 L.Ed.2d 794, 796

(1962) ; see also Schackman v. Arnebergh, 387 U.S. 427, 87

S.Ct. 1622, 18 L.Ed.2d 865 (1967). In this particular in-

stance, judicial economy can be served by exercising the

‘*supervisory control of the District Courts * * * necessary

to proper judicial administration in the federal system.’’

La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259-60, 77 S.Ct.

309, 315, 1 L.Ed.2d 290, 299 (1957). See J. Moore & B.

Ward, 9 Moore’s Federal Practice J 110.-28, at 312-13 (1975

& Supp.). The writ of mandamus is an appropriate method

‘‘to confine [the district court] to a lawful exercise of its

prescribed jurisdiction.’’ Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n,

319 U.S. 21, 26, 63 S.Ct. 938, 941, 87 L.Ed. 1185, 1190 (1943).

Accordingly, we must proceed to determine whether the

district court acted in excess of its jurisdiction or com-

mitted a clear abuse of discretion in refusing to convene

a three-judge court under the circumstances of the instant

case.

The district court, relying on Railway Employees’ Dep’t

v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 76 S.Ct. 714, 100 L.Ed. 1112 (1956),

concluded that the petitioners’ constitutional claims con-

cerning the exclusive representation scheme failed to pre-

sent a substantial federal constitutional question. We, how-

ever, disagree with its holding that Hanson rendered peti-

tioners’ claims wholly insubstantial.

[5] It is well established that a three-judge court need

not be convened when the issues presented have been set-

tled beyond question. The Supreme Court in Bailey v. Pat-

terson, 369 U.S. 31, 33, 82 S.Ct. 549, 551, 7 L.Ed.2d 512, 514

(1962), has expressly stated that 28 U.S.C. § 2281 ‘‘does not

require a three-judge court when the claim that a statute

is unconstitutional is wholly insubstantial, legally speaking

nonexistent.’’ Moreover, in Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512,

60

518, 93 S.Ct. 854, 858, 35 L.Ed.2d 36, 42 (1973), the Court

equated ‘‘constitutional insubstantiality’’ with such con-

cepts as ‘‘essentially fictitious,’’ ‘‘wholly insubstantial,’’

‘‘obviously frivolous,’’ and ‘‘obviously without merit.’’? The

Supreme Court concluded:

[470] The limiting words ‘‘wholly’’ and ‘‘obviously’’ have

cogent legal significance. In the context of the effect

of prior decisions upon the substantiality of constitu-

tional claims, those words import that claims are con-

stitutionally insubstantial only if the prior decisions

inescapably render the claims frivolous; previous de-

cisions that merely render claims of doubtful or ques-

tionable merit do not render them insubstantial for the

purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2281. A claim is insubstantial

only if ‘‘ ‘its unsoundness so clearly results from the

previous decisions of this court as to foreclose the

subject and leave no room for the inference that the

questions sought to be raised can be the subject of

controversy.’ ”’

Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518, 93 S.Ct. 854, 859, 35

L.Ed.2d 36, 42 (1973), quoting from Ex parte Poresky,

290 U.S. 30, 32, 54 S.Ct. 3, 4, 78 L.Ed. 152, 153 (1933).

See also Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103,

105-06, 53 S.Ct. 549, 550, 77 L.Ed. 1062, 1064 (1933) ; Hannis

Distilling Co v. Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285, 288, 30 S.Ct. 326,

327, 54 L.Ed. 482, 483 (1910); McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U.S.

70, 80, 30 S.Ct. 27, 31, 54 L.Ed. 95, 101 (1909). Under the

test announced in Goosby v. Osser, supra, we conclude that

Hanson is not a prior decision of the Supreme Court that

‘*foreclose[s] the subject’’ of petitioners’ constitutional

attack upon the Minnesota exclusive representation scheme.

Similarly, it is not a decision that ‘‘leave[s] no room for

the inference that the questions sought to be raised [by

petitioners] can be the subject of controversy.’’

In Railway Employees’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225,

76 S.Ct. 714, 100 L.Ed. 1112 (1956), the Supreme Court

61

confirmed the validity of union shop agreements negotiated

according to congressional authorization in the Railway

Labor Act of 1926 (RLA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63, against

challenges grounded on the First and Fifth Amendments.

Under the RLA, union shop agreements could condition

union membership on the payment of ‘‘ periodic dues, initi-

ation fees, and assessments.’’ 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh.

The Supreme Court held that such a condition, on its face,

neither denied union employees of their right to work as

ensured by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment

nor interfered with their right of free speech or freedom

of association as secured by the First Amendment. Jd. at

227-38, 76 S.Ct. at 715-721, 100 L.Ed. at 1128-1134. In so

holding, however, the Court predicted:

[Ilf the exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assess-

ments is used as a cover for forcing ideological con-

formity or other action in contravention of the First

Amendment, this judgment will not prejudice the deci-

sion in that case. * * * We only hold that the require-

ment for financial support of the collective-bargaining

agency by all who receive the benefits of its work * * *

does not violate either the First or the Fifth Amend-

ments.

351 U.S. at 238, 76 S.Ct. at 721, 100 L.Ed. at 1134. The

Cupreme Court in Hanson emphasized that it was approv-

ing exclusively union shop agreements which condition

union membership on the payment of union dues, fees and

assessments utilized to defray the costs of collective bar-

gaining. Id.

[6, 7] The petitioners’ constitutional challenge to the

exclusive representation scheme of the PELRA is distinct

from Hanson. The essence of petitioners’ allegation® con-

° The existence of a substantial constitutional question is deter-

mined by the contentions of the complaint, and the allegations of

the complaint are assumed true. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 US.

371, 373, 91 S.Ct. 780, 783, 28 L.Ed.2d 113, 116 (1971).

62

cerning exclusive representation relates to their unwilling-

ness to accept a union organization as their sole bargaining

representative for the purpose of negotiating and adminis-

tering collective agreements with the Minnesota Commu-

nity Faculty Association. Correspondingly, the petitioners

contend that the PELRA prohibits an individual from peti-

tioning the Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges

with regard to employment conditions. In contrast, the Su-

preme Court in Hanson was confronted with an attack on

the RLA, which allows [471] for exclusive representation

similar to that of the PELRA, but it did not resolve the

validity of such a scheme. See 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth.

Furthermore, the Court’s decision in Hanson was rendered

in a private rather than public sector collective bargaining

context. Collective bargaining in public employment has

been considered different from collective bargaining in

private employment.’ See Winston-Salem/Forsyth County

Unit v. Phillips, 381 F.Supp. 644, 647 (M.D.N.C.1974). See

Generally Blair, Union Security Agreements in Public Em-

ployment, 60 Cornell L.Rev. 183 (1975); Summers, Public

Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 Yale L.J.

1156 (1974).*

We conclude that the district court acted beyond its juris-

diction in denying petitioners’ motion to convene a three-

judge court under 28 U.S.C. § 2281. Hanson does not ‘‘fore-

close the subject’’ of petitioners’ challenge to the exclusive

representation scheme of the PELRA. There is ‘‘room for

the inference that the questions sought to be raised [by

7The district court recognized but rejected the distinction be-

tween public and private collective bargaining.

® We note that the Supreme Court has granted review in a case

involving a constitutional challenge to the validity of a Michigan

publie collective bargaining statute. See Abood v. Detroit Board

of Education, 60 Mich.App. 92, 230 N.W.2d 322 (1975), prob. juris.

noted, US. , 96 8.Ct. 1723, 48 L.Ed.2d 192, 44 U.S.L.W.

3603, 3608, (U.S. April 27, 1976).

63

petitioners] can be the subject of controversy.’’ Goosby v.

Osser, supra, 409 U.S. at 518, 93 S.Ct. at 859, 35 L.Ed.2d

at 42. We, of course, neither decide not express any view

on the merits of this case.

[8, 9] In summary, we are satisfied that all formal

requirements for a three-judge court which are determina-

ble by a single judge exist with regard to the exclusive

representation scheme of the PELRA.® Since it has been

determined that a substantial federal constitutional ques-

tion has been presented and that a three-judge court should

be convened, it is unnecessary to reach the remaining ques-

tion of whether the complaint formally alleges a basis for

equitable relief with respect to the fair share provision of

the PELRA. The petitioners’ allegation concerning the

fair share provision may be considered by the three-judge

court as a pendent claim.”

The petition for writ of mandamus to compel the con-

vention of a three-judge court is granted.

® Although the district court did not reach the issue of whether

the complaint formally alleges a basis for equitable relief with

regard to the exclusive representation scheme, we have necessarily

decided the question in the affirmative.

© Following the district court’s order of December 22, 1975, the

Minnesota Supreme Court held that the fair share provision of

the PELRA was not violative of due process. See Robbinsdale

Education Ass’n v. Robbinsdale Federation of Teachers, Local 872,

239 N.W.2d 437 (Minn. 1976). On March 31, 1976, the Minnesota

Legislature enacted Minn.H.F. No. 2244, amending Minn.Stat.Ann.

§ 179.65(2), which significantly alters the manner in which fair

share fees are assessed and possibly renders this claim moot.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

(22 December 1975)

67

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

FOURTH DIVISION

4-74 Civ. 659

Leon W. Kniont, er av, Plaintiffs,

v.

Minnesota Community Couiece Facuury Association,

eT AL, Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiffs are faculty members employed by several

Minnesota community colleges and have instituted the

present action alleging that the Minnesota Public Employee

Labor Relations Act of 1971, Minn. Stat. Ch. 179, (PELRA)

violates the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1983, 1985(3), 1986 and 1994. Specifically, plaintiffs at-

tack the exclusive representation’ and fair share* provi-

sions of the PELRA on the grounds that they violate the

First, Ninth, Tenth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-

ments to the United States Constitution.

[2] Defendants are the Minnesota Community College

Faculty Association, which is an employee organization

certified as the ‘‘exclusive representative’’® of the plain-

tiffs under M.S.A. § 179.67; its affiliates, the National Edu-

*M.S.A. §§ 179.63, Subds. 1-7, 15-18; 179.64, Subd. 7; 179.65,

Subds, 1-2, 4-5, 7; 179.66, Subds. 2, 7-10; 179.67; 179.68, Subds. 1,

2, 5-6, 9, 11; 179.69; 179.70; 179.71, Subds. 2-4, 5(a-e, g-j), 6-7;

179.72, Subds. 3(b), 6-7, 9, 12 and 179.74, Subds, 3-5.

*M.S.A. § 179.65, Subd. 2

°M.S.A. § 179.63, Subd. 6.

68

cation Association, the Minnesota Education Association,

and the Independent Minnesota Political Action Committee

for Education; various officers and former officers of the

latter union defendants; and principal officials of the State

of Minnesota.

In their complaint, plaintiffs request that a three-judge

court be convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 and 2284,

Presently before the court are motions by the plaintiffs

and the defendants relating to that request. Defendants

have made a motion to stay or dismiss, and in response,

plaintiffs have moved for the convening of the statutory

three-judge court.

None of the plaintiffs are members or supporters of any

of the defendant organizations and do not desire any form

of representation by them. Nonetheless, the Minnesota

Community College Faculty Association (hereinafter ‘‘ As-

sociation’’), under color of the PELRA, allegedly claims

the authority to act as the exclusive representative for the

plaintiffs in collective bargaining with the Minnesota State

Board for Community Colleges (hereinafter ‘‘Board’’)

with respect to terms and conditions of employment in the

community college system, Plaintiffs contend that under

color of the PELRA, they have been and will be denied

any right, power, or privilege to bargain or to contract

with the Board on their own behalf, or to petition the

Board on employment matters within the purportedly ex-

clusive jurisdiction of the Association.

During the academic years 1973-74 and 1974-75, the As-

sociation has allegedly caused ‘‘fair share’’ fees to be de-

ducted by the Board from the plaintiffs’ wages in amounts

equal to 94-97% of the formal membership dues levied by

the Association during those years. Such fees have been

checked-off without notice, hearing, or any form of govern-

mental oversight or review. It is further alleged that some

of the fees have been transferred by the Association to

the National Education Association, the Minnesota Educa-

69

tion Association and the Independent Minnesota Political

Action Committee for Education.

[3] It is well established that when an application for a

statutory three-judge court is addressed to a district

court, the single judge’s inquiry is limited to determining,

(1) whether the constitutional question is substantial,

(2) whether the complaint at least formally alleges a basis

for equitable relief, and (3) whether the case otherwise

comes within the requirements of the three-judge statute.

Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713,

715 (1962); Potter v. Meier, 458 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1972) ;

Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121, 1125 (2d Cir. 1971); See

Nielsen, Judge, Three-Judge Courts: A Comprehensive

Study, 66 F.R.D. 495, 506 (1975).

A recently developed exception to this general rule arises

when a statutory claim is appended to the constitutional

claim. In that circumstance, the district court judge must

make a determination of the statutory claim and if it is

dispositive of the case he need not invoke the machinery

of a three-judge court. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528,

543-44 (1974); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403 (1970).

Of course, if the single judge rejects the statutory claim,

a three-judge court must be called to consider the consti-

tutional issue. Wagans v. Lavine, supra at 544.

No statutory claim is made which could dispose of the

present case,

The enjoining of the enforcement of a state statute by

a three-judge court is an ‘‘. . . extraordinary step ....’’

Toomer v. Whitsell, 334 U.S, 385, 391 (1948). The serious-

ness of this procedure has led to the ‘‘. . . oft-repeated

admonition that the three-judge court statute is to be

strictly construed.’’ Board of Regents v. New Left Educa-

tion Project, 404 U.S. 541, 545 (1972) (citing Allen v. State

Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) ; Phillips v. United

States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941)).

70

Defendants’ motion to stay or dismiss on the grounds of

abstention becomes necessarily intertwined with the request

for a three-judge court and is considered in examining the

requisites for a three-judge court.‘

[4] Substantial Constitutional Question

Federal courts are without power to entertain claims

otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are ‘‘so attenu-

ated and insubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,’’

Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579

(1904); ‘‘wholly insubstantial,’’ Bailey v. Patterson, 369

U.S. 31, 33 (1962); ‘‘obviously frivolous,’’ Hannis Dis-

tilling Co. v. Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285, 288 (1910) ; ‘‘plainly

unsubstantial,’? Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289

U.S. 103, 105 (1933); or ‘‘no longer open to discussion,’’

McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U.S. (0, 80 (1909).

The general test as applied to the convening of a three-

judge court was set forth in Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512

(1973), where the Court stated:

‘Title 28 U.S.C. § 2281 does not require the conven-

ing of a three-judge court when the constitutional

attack upon the state statutes is insubstantial. ‘Con-

stitutional insubstantiality’ for this purpose has been

equated with such concepts as ‘essentially fictitious,’

Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S., at 33, 82 S.Ct. at 551,

‘wholly insubstantial,’ ibid.; ‘obviously frivolous,’

Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285, 288,

30 S.Ct. 326, 327, 54 L.Ed. 482 (1910); and ‘obviously

without merit,’ Ea parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 32, 54

8.Ct. 3, 4-5, 78 L.Ed. 152 (1933). The limiting words

‘wholly’ and ‘obviously’ have cogent legal significance.

In the context of the effect of prior decisions upon the

*Defendant state officials have made an additional argument

concerning the necessity of enjoining state officials. This argument

is likewise considered in examining the requisites of a three-judge

court,

71

substantiality of constitutional claims, those words im-

part that claims are constitutionally insubstantial only

if the prior decisions inescapably render the claims

frivolous; previous decisions that merely render claims

of doubtful or questionable merit do not render them

insubstantial for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2281. A

claim is insubstantial only if ‘its unsoundness so

clearly results from the previous decisions of this court

as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for the

inference that the questions sought to be raised can be

the subject of controversy.’ Ex parte Poresky, supra,

at 32, 54 S.Ct. at 4, quoting from Hannis Distilling Co.

v. Baltimore, supra, 216 U.S. at 288, 30 S.Ct. at 327;

see also Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S.

103, 105-106, 53 S.Ct. 549, 550, 77 L.Ed. 1062 (1933) ;

McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U.S. 70, 80, 30 S.Ct. 27, 31, 54,

L.Ed. 95 (1909).’’

Td, at 518.

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint alleges three separate

federal claims, which may be fairly summarized as

follows :°

[5] I. That the system of exclusive representation created

by the PELRA (including the ‘‘fair-share’’ scheme) is

repugnant, on its face and as applied, to the First, Ninth,

Tenth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution.

II. That the ‘‘fair share’’ provision, considered inde-

pendently, is repugnant, on its face and as applied, to the

latter Amendments.

III. That even if the entire system of exclusive repre-

sentation is constitutional on its face in all its particulars,

and could be applied to the plaintiffs in a constitutional

5 Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support

of Their Motion to Convene a Statutory Three-Judge Court, pp. 6-7.

72

manner, nevertheless its past and threatened application

by the defendant organizations violates federal statutes

which protect plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

Specific issues raised by plaintiffs’ claims are as follows:

A. Plaintiffs allege that a portion of their ‘‘fair

share’ fees are being expended for political activities.

(Amended Complaint, {If 22, 30, 34 (B,G,H.(3))). The un-

ambiguous language of the statute clearly does not permit

the collecting of fees for those purposes. M.S.A. § 179.65,

Subd. 2 provides in relevant part:

‘In no instance shall the required contribution [fair

share fee] exceed a pro rata share of the specific

expenses incurred for services rendered by the repre-

sentative in relationship to negotiations and adminis-

tration of grievance procedures.’’

Plaintiffs are challenging the statute on grounds of un-

constitutionality. 28 U.S.C. § 2281. Such attack is clearly

insubstantial where the statute itself does not permit the

conduct complained of. Plaintiffs would be able to recover

any contribution which was collected and used contrary to

the terms of the statute.

B. Plaintiffs allege that the ‘‘fair share’’ fee is being

deducted :°

1) without notice;

2) without a timely hearing before judicial officers

or tribunals;

([6] 3) without timely judicial review;

4) in an amount determined by the Association’s

arbitrary criteria of necessity and propriety; and

5) without reference to any objective or rational

standards.

* Amended Complaint {| 38.

73

The authorities cited by defendants do not foreclose the

plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge on due process grounds.

On the contrary, the procedural due process questions

raised by the plaintiffs are substantial. The assessment of

fees under such circumstances, without any notice or hear-

ing raises serious constitutional questions. See Fuentes v.

Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadich v. Family Finance

Corp., 305 U.S. 327 , 1905).

C. Plaintiffe assert that exclusive representation in

public employment viclate:. “heir constitutional rights un-

der the First asd You: «ih Amendments. The constitu-

tionality of a similar provision was challenged in Railway

Employees’ Department v. Hanson, 251 U.S. 225 (1956).

In Hanson, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the

union shop provision of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C.

§ 152, Eleventh), which permitted the execution of collec-

tive bargaining agreements containing clauses requiring

both that employees become members of the exclusive bar-

gaining agent within 60 days, and that those employees

subsequently pay the periodic dues, initiation fees and

assessments uniformly required as a condition of acquiring

or retaining membership. The Court held that the require-

ment for financial support of the collective-bargaining

agency by all who received the benefits of its work was

within the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause

and did not violate either the First or Fifth Amendments.

Td. at 238.

Likewise, the PELRA only assesses a fee for specific

limited services provided by the exclusive representative.

M.S.A. § 179.65, Subd. 2 provides in pertinent part:

‘*Tn no instance shall the required contribution [fair

share fee] exceed a pro rata share of the specific ex-

penses incurred for services rendered by the repre-

sentative in relationship to negotiations and adminis-

tration of grievance procedures.’’

74

[7] Moreover, the PELRA does not require the employees

to become members of any labor or employee organizations.

It specifically provides that employees ‘‘. . . shall have the

right not to form and join such [labor or employee] or-

ganizations.’’ M.S.A. § 179.65, Subd. 2. Rather, the PELRA

only seeks to impose a requirement of financial support of

the representative by all who receive the benefits of its

efforts.

Although the facts of Hanson, supra, indicate that those

challenging the provisions were employed by the private

sector (the Union Pacific Railroad Co.) and not by the

public sector (e.g. State of Minnesota) the court is con-

vinced that such distinction does not lessen its precedential

nature to the existing case. The arguments advanced in

Hanson and the rationale of the Court are revealing. The

Court stated:

‘*Wide ranged problems are tendered under the

First Amendment. It is argued that the union shop

agreement forces men into idealogical and political

associations which violate their right to freedom of

conscience, freedom of association, and freedom of

thought protected by the Bill of Rights. It is said that

once a man becomes a member of these unions he is

subject to vast disciplinary control and that by force

of the federal Act unions now can make him conform

to their idealogy. On the present record, there is no

more an infringement or impairment of First Amend-

ment rights than there would be in the case of a lawyer

who by state law is required to be a member of an

integrated bar.’’ [Footnotes omitted] 351 U.S. at

236-238.

The court concludes that the PELRA is legislation well

within the dictates of Hanson and plaintiffs’ constitutional

attack based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments is

‘obviously without merit’’ and does not present a sub-

stantial constitutional question.

75

That Hanson was decided under the Fifth, and not under

the Fourteenth Amendment is inconsequential. The Su-

preme Court has stated, ‘‘The restraint imposed upon

legislation by the due process clauses of the two amend-

ments is the same.’’ Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 326

(1932), citing Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582, 596 (1931).

[8] D. Plaintiffs’ claims also seek to raise substantial

constitutional questions under the Ninth,’ Tenth* and

Thirteenth® Amendments. After carefully reviewing plain-

tiffs’ claims and the authorities cited by both plaintiffs

and defendants the court concludes that such claims are

‘‘obviously without merit’’ and do not raise a substantial

constitutional question.

Basis for Equitable Relief

Plaintiffs contend that the Amended Complaint sets forth

an adequate basis for equitable relief on the grounds that

irreparable injury necessarily arises from statutory im-

positions upon First Amendment freedoms. The court has

concluded that a substantial constitutional question is not

presented by plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims.

The court still must determine whether there is a basis

for equitable relief on the ‘‘fair share’’ claim which does

present a substantial constitutional question.

* Such Amendment states : ‘‘The enumeration in the Constitution,

of certain rights, shall not be construed as to deny or disparage

others retained by the people.’’

* The Tenth Amendment provides: ‘‘The powers not delegated to

the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the

States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.’’

® The Thirteenth Amendment states:

‘*Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a pun-

ishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly

convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place

subject to their jurisdiction.’’

76

A single judge is empowered to determine whether an

application for injunctive relief alleges facts which, if taken

as true, adequately demonstrate irreparable injury and

an inadequate remedy at law. Pierre v. Jordan, 333 F.2d

951 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 974 (1965);

Harrington v. Arceneauz, 367 F. Supp. 1268, 1270 (W.D.

La. 1973); Hill v. Nelson, 272 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Calif.

1967) ; Duncombe v. State of New York, [9] 267 F. Supp.

103 (S.D. N.Y. 1967). Although the judge’s role is limited,

it is not merely ministerial. The language of Idlewild (‘‘at

least formally allege a basis for equitable relief,’’ 370 U.S.

at 715) is not necessarily overly restrictive. It is still the

single judge’s duty

... . to examine the complaint for substantial allega-

tions which would support a claim for injunctive relief,

and not to look merely at the prayer for relief and the

conclusive allegation of irreparable injury. Majuri v.

United States, 431 F.2d 469, 473 (3rd Cir.) cert. denied,

400 U.S. 943 (1970).

See also Pederson v. Brier, 327 F. Supp. 1382, 1385 n.3

(E.D. Wis. 1971). In addition, since the refusal to convene

a three-judge court is an order reviewable by the Court of

Appeals, Gonzalez v. Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90,

100 (1974), the single judge need not respond with a

‘conditioned reflex’’ everytime an application is made.

Majuri, supra at 474.

It is well established that the basis of injunctive relief

in the federal courts has always been irreparable injury

and inadequacy of legal remedies. Younger v. Harris, 401

U.S. 37 (1971) ; Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500

(1959).

Plaintiffs’ allegation that the deduction of the ‘‘fair-

share’’ fee violates their procedural due process rights

presents a substantial constitutional question. However, the

facts do not indicate that the plaintiffs are suffering ~x

77

will suffer irreparable injury and that there is an inade-

quate remedy at law.

Plaintiffs’ injury is pecuniary. Such injury can be com-

pensated by an award of money damages. See Frischman v.

Durand, 350 F. Supp. 79 (S.D. N.Y. 1972). A remedy at

law does exist for the plaintiffs by which they can recover

the fees collected in violation of their constitutional rights.

Cf. 11 Wright & Miller § 2944, p. 396 (1973).

[10] Plaintiffs have not indicated that the defendant As-

sociation is not financially responsible so as to preclude

the recovery of money damages.

Since there is no basis for granting equitable relief be-

cause of the lack of irreparable injury and the existence of

an adequate remedy at law, the jurisdiction to maintain a

three-judge court is lacking, even though a substantial con-

stitutional question exists on the deduction of the ‘‘fair-

share’’ fee. See Majuri v. United States. supra, at 472;

Three-Judge Courts: A Comprehensive Study, supra, at

501-502.

The court has further concluded that a substantial con-

stitutional question is not presented by any of the other

claims asserted by the plaintiffs, hence it need not examine

the basis for equitable relief for those claims as they relate

to the three-judge court motion.

Requirements of the Statute

28 U.S.C. § 2281 provides in relevant part:

An interlocutory or permanent injunction restrain-

ing the enforcement, operation or execution of any

State statute by restraining the action of any officer

of such State in the enforcement or execution of such

statute ..., shall not be granted by any district court

or judge thereof upon the ground of unconstitutionality

of such statute unless the application therefor is heard

78

and determined by a district court of three judges

under section of 2284 of this title. [emphasis added]

Even assuming that plaintiffs’ claim for relief of the

‘‘fair-share’’ provision did state a basis for equitable re-

lief, such relief could be granted without resorting to the

extraordinary remedy of enjoining state officials. The de-

fendant Association could be enjoined from collecting the

fees, thereby protecting the rights of the plaintiffs without

needlessly interfering with the activities of the state

officials.

The court has determined that the other claims advanced

by the plaintiffs do not present a substantial constitutional

question. Thus it need not rule on the necessity of enjoining

state officials with regard to those claims.

Since proper relief could be rendered without enjoining

state officials, the plaintiffs have failed to comply with the

terms of § 2281, a necessary requisite in convening a three-

judge court.

[11] Abstention Issue

Defendants have moved for a stay or dismissal of the

proceedings on the grounds that appropriate and effective

remedies for authoritative interpretation of the statutes

may be obtained in the state courts. Defendants contend

that a state court interpretation might alter or modify the

federal constitutional questions before the federal court.

A number of actions are pending in Minnesota State

District Courts challenging the constitutionality of various

aspects of the PELRA, particularly the ‘‘fair-share’’ pro-

vision. Recently appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court

was a decision by a Hennepin County District Court Judge

declaring that the ‘‘fair-share’’ provision as contained in

M.S.A. § 179.65, Subd. 2 violates due process of law and is

therefore unconstitutional under both the State and Fed-

eral Constitutions. (Robbinsdale Education Association

et al v. Robbinsdale Federation of Teachers Local 872; and

79

Independent School District 281, File No. 710101 (Henne-

pin County District Court, Aug. 13, 1975)).

It is possible that the ‘‘fair-share’’ provision could be

declared unconstitutional under the State Constitution by

the Minnesota Supreme Court. Such determination would

obviate the necessity of ruling on the provision under the

Constitution of the United States. See Askew v. Hargrave,

401 U.S. 476, 478 (1971); Wisconsin v. Costineau, 400 U.S.

433, 440 (1971) (dissenting opinion); Reetz v. Bozanich,

397 U.S. 82 (1970).

However, the decision of whether or not to abstain is not

to be made by the single judge court. Its inquiry upon

application for a three-judge court is limited to the juris-

dictional criteria. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v.

Epstein, supra, at 715.

Judge Nielsen, in his article on three-judge courts stated:

Unlike the decision of the three-judge panel, the

single judge’s review is preliminary and limited to

applying the prerequisites for convening a three-judge

court. The issue of abstention ‘‘per se’’ is not directly

before the single judge, since his consideration is

purely a jurisdictional and more limited one.

_ Three-Judge Courts: A Comprehensive Study, supra,

at 503.

[12] The court is not persuaded by the rationale of

Cooper v. Meskill, 376 F. Supp. 731 (D. Conn. 1974). In the

present case, the court has considered only the jurisdic-

tional criteria and finds that not all the requisites have

been met. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion to convene a

statutory three-judge court is denied.

Upon the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED That plaintiffs’ motion to convene a

three-judge court be, and the same hereby is denied.

80

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That defendants’ motion

to stay or dismiss be, and the same hereby is denied.

Dartep: December 22, 1975.

/s/ Donald D. Alsop

Donaxtp D. ALsop

United States District Judge

CLERK’S NOTICE OF JUDGMENT OF THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA *

(31 March 1982)

* The Court’s Order for Judgment appears in its Memorandum

Opinion and Order (31 March 1982), ante, pp. 3-27.

83

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

FOURTH DIVISION

No. Civil 4-74-659

Leon W. Kyicut, er at, Plaintiff,

vs.

Minnesota Community Cotiece Facuity Association,

ET aL, Defendant

Clerk’s Notice under Rule 77 (d) F. R. Civil Procedure

or Rule 49 (c) F. R. Criminal Procedure

You are hereby notified that in the above-entitled cause,

on the 31st day of March, 1982, we filed Judge Heaney’s,

Judge Alsop’s and Judge Larson’s Memorandum Opinion

and Order that the constitutional infringements caused by

the present meet and confer process in the community col-

leges clearly occur under color of state law. The Minnesota

State Board for Community Colleges, in its official ca-

pacity, and the Minnesota Community College Faculty As-

sociation must equally share liability inasmuch as they to-

gether negotiated the aspects of the present structure which

we have found violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

There is no basis for individual liability or for finding any

defendants liable other than the MSBCC and the MCCFA.

The parties have stipulated to nominal money damages

of one dollar and we find that no other money damages

are appropriate. The plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory

and injunctive relief in accordance with this opinion.

Therefore, PELRA as applied to the community colleges

is declared valid in all respects, except

(1) Minn. Stat. § 179.73, subd. 2, is declared valid so long

as all community college faculty members are provided a

84

fair opportunity both to select and serve as meet and con-

fer representatives.

(2) Minn. Stat. § 179.66, subd. 7, is declared unconstitu-

tional only insofar as it allows or requires an exclusive

representative in the community colleges to have sole

authority to select meet and confer representatives.

(3) The clause of the collective bargaining contract con-

ferring sole selection authority upon the MCCFA is de-

clared invalid, and the MCCFA is enjoined from making

any further selections of meet and confer representatives

pursuant to such clause.

The defendants shall bear their own costs in this proceed-

ing and 20% of plaintiffs’ costs shall be taxed to the

MSBCC and the MCCFA, to be borne in equal shares.

Judgment was entered accordingly.

Rosert EB. Hess, Clerk

By:/s/ Merle M. Nelson

Deputy Clerk

ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

(13 August 1982)

87

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

FOURTH DIVISION

File No, 4-74 Civ. 659

Leon W. Kniout, et at, Plaintiffs,

Vv.

Minnesota Community Cotiece Facutty Association,

et AL, Defendants.

ORDER

Before Heaney, Circuit Judge, Ausor, District Judge, and

Larson, Senior District Judge.

This Court issued its Findings of Fact in the above-

captioned matter on November 16, 1981 and its Memoran-

dum Opinion on March 31, 1982. Plaintiffs have filed ob-

jections to the findings and conclusions therein and have

moved, under Rules 52, 59 and 60, to amend such findings,

for relief from judgment and for a new trial. Plaintiffs also

have moved for a hearing on the calculation of attorneys’

fees to which they may be entitled. Defendants have moved

to amend the Court’s judgment insofar as it taxes 20 per

cent of plaintiffs’ costs against the MCCFA and MSBCC.

We deny all of these motions.

Defendants’ motion to reduce the proportion of costs

taxed against them is grounded on their contention that no

more than 5-6 per cent of plaintiffs’ efforts were expended

on the ‘‘meet and confer’’ issue, the one issue on which

plaintiffs prevailed. Plaintiffs have not disputed that the

‘*meet and confer’’ issue was largely a discrete question of

law and fact. Nor have they challenged defendants’ asser-

tions that the ‘‘meet and confer’’ issue was addressed in

only 3 per cent of plaintiffs’ exhibits, 6 per cent of the trial

transcripts, .004 per cent of plaintiffs’ proposed stipula-

88

tions and by none of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses. Nonethe-

less, we recognize that there is some overlap between the

First Amendment claim as to meet and confer practices

and the other practices challenged by plaintiffs. The de-

termination of costs is not a mechanical matter and courts

are afforded broad discretion in making such determina-

tions. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Caliaway, 497

F.2d 1340, 1342 (8th Cir. 1974). The determination here

that the MCCFA and MSBCC shall bear 20 per cent of

plaintiffs’ costs is a reasonable one and we, therefore, deny

the motion to alter that aspect of the judgment.

[2] Plaintiffs’ 380 pages of post-trial motions raise nu-

merous detailed issues, nearly all of which were clearly

resolved in the Findings of Fact, Memorandum Opinion or

other prior rulings of this Court. One claim, for example,

is that the findings are false, resting on fraud and ‘‘cover-

ups’’ by the defendants. This was raised before the Special

Master and was rejected previously by the Master and this

Court. Nothing has been proferred which would give merit

to the claim at this stage of the proceedings.

The central objection raised by plaintiffs relates to the

conclusion that the defendant labor organizations do not

constitute a single, integrated, political-action organization

or quasi-political party. It is asserted that this conclusion

rests on a misapplication of the burden of proof, miscon-

struction of the controlling law, misrepresentation of the

record evidence, insufficiently detailed findings and a fail-

ure to accept the purportedly ‘‘conclusive’’ opinions of

plaintiffs’ expert witnesses. Most of these objections are

simply an attempt to relitigate the case as a whole, but

some clarification may facilitate appellate review of this

Court’s decision.

The Memorandum Opinion fully sets forth how Abood

v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977) con-

trols much of the present case. See Mem. Op. at 3-7. A

major difficulty in this protracted litigation has been the

89

plaintiffs’ consistent refusal to acknowledge Abood and its

impact here. A crucial distinction in Abood is whether an

exclusive representative’s challenged ‘‘political’’ activities

are related or unrelated to collective bargaining—only the

latter cannot constitutionally be supported by compulsory

fair share fees.’ Here, however, plaintiffs have repeatedly

ignored this distinction and in so doing, have obscured the

factual issues and the evidence relating thereto. For ex-

ample, the plaintiffs offered an expert ‘‘content analysis’’

of selected publications which purportedly showed that

from 50-100 per cent of the defendants’ activities were

‘*nolitical’’ and did not involve ‘‘collective bargaining.’’

This analysis rested on sub- [3] jective judgments which

in turn were predicated on the assumption that all ‘‘orga-

nizing, litigation and lobbying’’ activities were something

separate from ‘‘collective bargaining.’’ Apart from other

flaws in the content analysis, the fundamental error is the

refusal to acknowledge that, consistent with the Constitu-

tion, certain organizing and lobbying may be related to

collective bargaining and may also, in some broad sense,

be deemed ‘‘political.’’ Accordingly, the content analysis

could be afforded little weight in the face of overwhelming

record evidence that the MCCFA is not a quasi-political

party but rather is a typical public employee bargaining

association.

Plaintiffs’ refusal to recognize the effect of Abood has

needlessly consumed extensive resources. Abood squarely

* This case is not a dispute over calculation of fair share fees,

nor does it turn on line-drawing as to activities at the margin of

what may be characterized as collective bargaining. When plain-

tiffs’ assertions are viewed in their totality, it becomes clear that

under their theory, any private bargaining organization will in-

evitably constitute an impermissible ‘‘ political action’’ organiza-

tion, Throughout this case, plaintiffs’ characterization of MCCFA

as a ‘‘political’’ organization has included as a predicate those

government-related activities which are inherent in public sector

bargaining.

90

upheld the constitutionality of exclusive representation

bargaining in the public sector, yet plaintiffs have elabo-

rately developed a theory under which such bargaining is

unconstitutional unless the public employees’ representa-

tive is actually some branch of the government. This theory

is frivolous in light of Abood, but in any ease, could have

been fully presented in a cogent manner as a legal question

turning on largely undisputed facts. Instead, the develop-

ment of this theory was muddled with plaintiffs’ theory

that MCCFA, and probably any public sector union, is the

constitutional equivalent of a political party, and was fur-

ther blurred with repeated incantations that the arrange-

ment under PELRA is the functional equivalent of Italian

fascism and the National Industrial Recovery Act. Indeed,

the presentation of plaintiffs’ case has hindered rather

than helped the Court to resolve the issues raised in their

complaint.

We recognized, however, that important First Amend-

ment interests were implicated and accordingly, placed the

burden upon the defendants to establish that they were not

quasi-political parties but instead were public employee

bargaining organizations whose activities were predomi-

nantly related to collective bargaining. Consideration of

this issue was unaided by plaintiffs’ insistent and exhaust-

ive attempts to construe as unconstitutional virtually all

activity which in any sense may be labeled ‘‘political.’’

This again reflects an unwillingness [4] to accept the hold-

ing of Abood.* Notwithstanding this, we closely examined

* The plaintiffs’ post-trial motions in part reveal, for the first

time, a nominal recognition that the issue is not whether the

MCCFA is predominantly ‘‘political,’’ however that may be de-

fined, but whether its activities are predominantly related to col-

lective bargaining, as illuminated in Abood. Belated recasting of

part of its claim, however, does not change the record evidence

nor the only conclusion which is supported by the record. Moreover,

plaintiffs’ adamant resistence to Abood is still reflected in the

post-trial assertion that this Court erred by finding the MCCFA

91

the record as a whole and found that the defendants clearly

met their burden. Plaintiffs’ contrary assertions at this

stage are simply another attempt to litigate matters on

which they did not prevail for factual and legal reasons

clearly set forth in the Findings of Fact and Memorandum

Opinion.

The discussion here should remove any doubt as t® the

Court’s resolution of issues which were also addressed by

plaintiffs’ expert witnesses. Plaintiffs insist that the opin-

ions of organizational science experts, political science ex-

perts and political economy experts, whea unrebutted by

similar experts, must be accepted as binding upon the

Court. We disagree. The questions addressed by such ex-

perts raise factual and legal issues well within the province

of any court. The effect of PELRA on ‘“‘ political equality

and state sovereignty,’’ for example, is not a question for

binding determination by mechanical rules of science, de-

spite plaintiffs’ suggestion to the contrary. Whether

PELRA is the functional equivalent of any other piece of

legislation is similarly a mixed question of law and fact not

subject to supposedly dispositive ‘‘scientific’’ testimony.

Nor is a ‘‘scientific’’ analogy to fascism binding upon a

court. Plaintiffs also emphasize the expert opinion that the

defendants constitute an ‘‘integrated’’ entity. The ‘‘inte-

gration’’ issue, however, is not a talisman, as plaintiffs

would have us believe. The Findings of Fact clearly show

certain affiliations between MCCFA and the other defend-

to be a ‘‘non-political’’ organization, Whatever the proper defini-

tion might be for the term ‘‘non-political,’’ no one has contended,

and we have never found, that the MCCFA is ‘‘non-political.’’

Indeed, as the Abood Court noted, the core functions of any public

sector union can be characterized as inherently political in some

sense of that term. Plaintiffs’ true objection is to the holding of

Abood that exclusive representation bargaining in the public sector

is constitutional notwithstanding the inherently political dimension

of such activity. Much of the present litigation has been a wasteful

attempt to obfuscate and circumvent that clear holding.

92

ants and also show that MCCFA independently charts the

collective bargaining course it will pursue. Integration is

only relevant as it [5] relates to plaintiffs’ contention that

the defendants are a monolithic ‘‘political action’’ orga-

nization, a claim clearly resolved in favor of the defend-

ants. Here again, plaintiffs contend that the opinion of

their political science expert is conclusive on the ‘‘ political

action’’ characterization, notwithstanding that the primary

foundation for such testimony, like plaintiffs’ case as a

whole, utterly fails to account for permissible activity

which may in some sense be ‘‘political’’ but which also re-

lates to collective bargaining under the principles of

Abood.

These expert opinions thus are not binding upon the

Court and indeed, in most part were not even helpful to

resolution of the issues presented. Such opinions were

given as much weight as appropriate and the weight of the

record as a whole explains why they generally were not

accepted.

The motions of plaintiffs and defendants are hereby de-

nied. The request for a hearing on attorneys’ fees is also

denied as premature. Plaintiffs are directed to submit a

written request for such fees and defendants are directed

to file any objections they may have to such request within

thirty days after it is served upon them. The Court will

then consider whether a hearing or further submissions

may be necessary to its disposition of any fee questions.

/s/ Gerald W. Heaney

Geratp W. Heaney

United States Circuit Judge

/s/ Donald D. Alsop

Donavtp D. ALsop

United States District Judge

/s/ Earl R. Larson

Kart R. Larson

Dated: August 13, 1982. U.S. Senior District Judge

CLERK’S NOTICE OF ORDER OF THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

(13 August 1982)

95

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

FOURTH DIVISION

No. 4-74 Civil 659

Leon W. Kniont, er au, Plaintiff,

vs.

Minnesota Community Coutiece Facuuty Association,

ET AL, Defendant

Clerk’s Notice under Rule 77(d) F. R. Civil Procedure

or Rule 49(c) F. R. Criminal Procedure

You are hereby notified that in the above-entitled cause,

on the 13th day of August, 1982 we filed Judge Heaney,

Judge Alsop and Judge Larson’s Order dated 8-12-82 that

Plaintiffs’ motion to amend findings, for relief from judg-

ment, for a new trial and a hearing on the calculation of

attorneys’ fees and defendants’ motion to amend Court’s

judgment insofar as it taxes 20 per cent of plaintiffs’ costs

against the MCCFA and MSBCC are all denied.

Rosert E. Hess, Clerk

WOE Tesch ewisdeoteebasdve

Deputy Clerk

NOTICE OF APPEAL

(4 October 1982)

99

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

FOURTH DIVISION

No. 4-74 Civ. 659

Leon W. Knicut, Morcan Kyser, Donan A. Dann, JAMES

D. Watuace, Terrence D. Fionn, Wituiam B. Bauman,

Harotp J. Garpner, Tuomas J. Patin, Evcene D. Mrevke,

Dr. Ricnarp A. THompson, Davin R. Grout, Joan M. Far-

Kas, Gary Lee Netson, Ronatp Lievense, Lucittz Joun-

son, Virornta BE. Lanecran, Max A. Matmaguist, Rautpeu G.

Powe t, Ricnarp D. Isennart, Cresston Gack.e, Plaintiffs,

Vv.

Minnesota Community CoLuece Facutty Association;

Minnesota Epucation Association; InpEPENDENT MINNE-

sorta PoiiticaL Action ComMITTEE For Epucation ; NATIONAL

Epucation Association; James A. Norman, individually

and in his former officia! capacity as President, Minnesota

Community College Faculty Association; James K. Dunnam,

individually and in his official capacity as Vice President,

Minnesota Community College Faculty Association; Ropert

Bett, individually and in his official capacity as Secretary,

Minnesota Community College Faculty Association; CaLv1n

Minkg, individually and in his official capacity as Treas-

urer, Minnesota Community College Faculty Association;

Raten §. Cueseproven, individually and in his official

capacity as Executive Secretary, Minnesota Community

College Faculty Association; DonaLp Hotman, individually

and in his official capacity as Minnesota Education Asso-

ciation Representative, Minnesota Community College

Faculty Association; Wimi1am M. Monpatez, individually

and in his former official capacity as President, Minnesota

Education Association; James Rosasco, individually and in

his former official capacity as President, 1973-1974, Minne-

sota Education Association; Atrrep F’. Provo, individually

100

and in his former official capacity as Treasurer, Minnesota

Education Association; Atsert L. Gatvopr, individually and

in his official capacity as Executive Director, Minnesota

Education Association; Futon B. Kiinkerrves, individu-

ally and in his former official capacity as President, In-

dependent Minnesota Political Action Committee for

Education; Janet R. Moroan, individually and in her

former official capacity as Vice President, Independent

Minnesota Political Action Committee for Education; Jonn

W. Scuurt, individually and in his official capacity as

Treasurer, Independent Minnesota Political Action Com-

mittee for Education; James A. Harris, individually and in

his former official capacity as President, National Educa-

tion Association; Heten D. Wise, individually and in her

former official capacity as President, 1973-1974, National

Education Association; Catnertne O’C. Barrett, individu-

ally and in her former official capacity as President, 1972-

1973, National Education Association; Terry E. Hernpon,

individually and in his official capacity as Executive Secre-

tary, National Education Association; Sam E. Lampert,

individually and in his former official capacity as Executive

Secretary, 1972-1973, National Education Association;

Raymonp Crippen, Rosemary McVay, Joun Sonrorovicn,

Hvucn V. Puunxettr III, Arteene Nyckiemor, Dovcias

Avan Bruce, Ronatp H. Denison, Epwarp G. Zircver, Va

Bsornson, Cuartes Swanson, individually; Pamur C.

He.uanp, individually and in his official capacity as Chan-

cellor of the Minnesota Community Colleges; Joun F.

Heine, individually and in his official capacity as Presi-

dent, North Hennepin Community College; Date A. Lorenz,

individually and in his official capacity as President, Nor-

mandale Community College; Nem Curistenson, in his

official capacity as President, Anoka-Ramsey Community

College; Wayne S. Buracraarr, in his official capacity as

Minnesota Commissioner of Finance; James Lorp, in his

official capacity as Minnesota State Treasurer; Peter Oser-

MEYER, in his official capacity as Director of the Minnesota

101

State Board of Mediation Services; Witt1am H. McGuire,

in his official capacity as President, National Education

Association; Rocer Jounnson, in his official capacity as

Chairman, Independent Minnesota Political Action Com-

mittee for Education; Donatp C. Huu, in his official ca-

pacity as President, Minnesota Education Association,

Toyse Kyie, Eima Ponto, JosepH Norquist, Napine Cuase,

Pau. Brinkmay, in their official capacities as members of

the Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges,

Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS’ NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Plaintiffs Leon W. Knight, et alia, hereby give notice

that they appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States

the judgment of this Court entered on 31 March 1982, and

the findings of fact of this Court entered on 16 November

1981, both of which the Court re-affirmed in its order of

13 August 1982, denying Plaintiffs’ motion for rehearing.

In particular, Plaintiffs appeal the Court’s determination

of law that the exclusive-representation provisions of

Minnesota’s Public Employment Labor Relations Act are

constitutional as applied.’ In addition, Plaintiffs appeal

the Court’s findings of fact to which Plaintiffs have pre-

viously objected.’

1 Memorandum Opinion and Order (31 March 1982), Pt. I, §§ A

and B, pp. 1-9; id., Pt. III, §1(a-c), pp. 18-19; id., Order for

Judgment, {| 1 (‘‘There is no basis for individual liability or for

finding any defendants liable other than the MSBCC and the

MCCFA.’’) and 2 (‘‘Therefore, PELRA as applied to the com-

munity colleges is declared valid in all respects * * *.’’), p. 20.

? Plaintiffs’ Objections to the Court’s Findings of Fact and

Motion to Amend the Court’s Findings of Fact to Conform to the

Law and to the Evidence (1 April 1982), at 1-2 (identifying the

findings at issue).

102

Plaintiffs appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253 and

2101(b) (1976).

Dare. F’. Swenson

610 Twelve Oaks Center

15500 Wayzata Boulevard

Wayzata, Minnesota 55391

(612) 473-0474

Epwin Virerra, Jr., Counsel of Record

13877 Napa Drive

Manassas, Virginia 22110

(703) 791-6780

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Filed with the Clerk of the United States District Court

for the District of Minnesota on 4 October 1982.

TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

105

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Amendment I. Congress shall make no law respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise

thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the

press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,

and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Amendment XIV. * * * No State shall make or enforce

any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities

of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive

any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process

of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws. * * *

MINNESOTA PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

LABOR RELATIONS ACT

Sec. 179.61. Public policy.—It is the public policy of this

state and the purpose of Secs. 179.61 to 179.77 to promote

orderly and constructive relationships between all public

employers and their employees, subject however, to the

paramount right of the citizens of this state to keep invio-

late the guarantees for their health, education, safety and

welfare.

The relationships between the public, the public em-

ployees, and their employer governing bodies imply degrees

of responsibility to the people served, need of cooperation

and employment protection which are different from em-

ployment in the private sector. So also the essentiality and

public desire for some public services tend to create imbal-

ances in relative bargaining power or the resolution with

which either party to a disagreement presses its position,

so that unique approaches to negotiations and resolutions

of disputes between public employees and employers are

necessary.

Unresolved disputes between the public employer and its

employees are injurious to the public as well as to the par-

106

ties; adequate means must therefore be established for

minimizing them and providing for their resolution. Within

the foregoing limitations and considerations the legislature

has determined that overall policy may best be accom-

plished by:

(1) granting to public employees certain rights to orga-

nize and choose freely their representatives ;

(2) requiring public employers to meet and negotiate

with public employees in an appropriate bargaining unit

and providing for written agreements evidencing the result

of such bargaining; and

(3) establishing special rights, responsibilities, proce-

dures and limitations regarding public employment rela-

tionships which will provide for the protection of the rights

of the public employee, the public employer and the public

at large.

Sec. 179.62. Citation—Secs. 179.61 to 179.77 shall be

known and may be cited as the public employment labor

relations act of 1971.

Sec. 179.63. Definitions.—(1) For the purposes of Secs.

179.61 to 179.77 the terms defined in this section have the

meanings given them.

(2). ‘‘Director of mediation services’’ or ‘‘director’’

means the director of the bureau of mediation services

established by Sec. 179.02.

(3). ‘‘Board’’ means the Minnesota public employment

relations board unless otherwise clearly stated.

(4). ‘*Public employer’’ or ‘‘employer’’ means (a) the

state of Minnesota in respect to employees of the state not

otherwise provided for in this subdivision or Sec. 179.74

for executive branch employees; (b) the board of regents

of the University of Minnesota in respect to employees

thereof; and (c) the governing body of a political subdi-

vision or agency or instrumentality thereof which has final

107

budgetary approval authority, in respect to employees of

that subdivision, agency or instrumentality. When two or

more units of government subject to the provisions of See.

179.61 to 179.77 undertake a project or form a new agency

of government under Minnesota Statutes Ch, 402, or See,

471.59, or other law authorizing common or joint action,

the employer for purposes of Secs. 179.61 to 179.77 shall

be the governing person or board of the created agency

and the governing official or body of the cooperating gov-

ernmental units shall be bound by an agreement entered

into by the created agency pursuant to the procedures of

Minnesota Statutes, Secs. 179.61 to 179.77. The term does

not include a ‘‘charitable hospital’? as defined in See.

179.35(2). Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to

diminish the authority granted pursuant to law to an ap-

pointing authority in respect to the selection, direction,

discipline or discharge of an individual employee insofar

as such action is consistent with general procedures and

standards relating to selection, direction, discipline or dis-

charge which are the subject of an agreement entered into

pursuant to Secs. 179.61 to 179.77. (As amended by Ch.

776, L. 1978)

(5). ‘* Employee organization’’ means any union or orga-

nization of public employees whose purpose is, in whole or

in part, to deal with public employers concerning griev-

ances and terms and conditions of employment.

(6). ‘‘Exelusive representative’? means an employee or-

ganization which has been designated by a majority of

those votes cast in the appropriate unit and has been certi-

fied pursuant to Sec. 179.67. (As amended by Ch. 635, L.

1973)

(7). ‘*Public employee’’ or ‘‘employee’’ means any per-

son appointed or employed by a public employer except:

(a) elected public officials ;

(b) election officers ;

108

(c) commissioned or enlisted personnel of the Minnesota

national guard;

(d) emergency employees who are employed for emer-

gency work caused by natural disaster;

(e) part time employees whose service does not exceed

the lesser of 14 hours per week or 35 percent of the normal

work week in the employee’s bargaining unit; (As amended

by Ch. 127, L. 1974)

(f) employees who hold positions of a basically tempo-

rary or seasonal character for a period not in excess of

100 working days in any calendar year;

The exclusions of clauses (e) and (f) of this subdivision

shall not apply to:

(1) an employee hired by a school district to replace an

absent teacher who at the time of his absence is a ‘‘ public

employee’’ not within the other exclusions of this subdi-

vision where the replacement employee is employed more

than 30 working days as a replacement for that teacher;

and

(2) an employee hired by a school district for a teaching

position created by increased enrollment, curriculum ex-

pansion, courses which are a part of the curriculum whether

offered annually or not, or other appropriate reasons,

Employees included as ‘‘public employees’’ pursuant to

clauses (1) and (2) shall not be included under master con-

tracts expiring June 30, 1981, for purposes of salary or

fringe benefits ;

(g) employees of charitable hospitals as defined by sec-

tion 179.35, subdivision 3;

(h) full time undergraduate students employed by the

school which they attend under a work study program or

in connection with the receipt of any financial aid, irrespec-

tive of number of hours of service per week. (Sec. 179.63(7),

as amended by S8.F". 2085, L. 1980, effective April 25, 1980)

109

(8). ‘Confidential employee’? means any employee who

works in the personnel offices of a public employer or who

has access to information subject to use by the public em-

ployer in meeting and negotiating or who actively partici-

pates in the meeting and negotiating on behalf of the public

employer. Provided that when the reference is to executive

branch employees of the state of Minnesota or employees

of the regents of the University of Minnesota, ‘‘confidential

employee’’ means any employee who has access to informa-

tion subject to use by the public employer in collective bar-

gaining or who actively participates in collective bargain-

ing on behalf of the public employer. (Sec. 179.63(8), as

amended by S.F. 2085, L. 1980, effective April 25, 1980)

(9). ‘*Supervisory em

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.

Appendix — Knight v. Minnesota Community College Faculty Ass'n · 460 U.S. 1048 | Frix