Opposition Brief — Davis v. Rice
Supreme Court brief1992
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
- =
ps Supreme Court, U.S.
(2) eit. Bae
No. 91-721 JAR ? 1931
OfflGe OF THe Cithh
Gu the Supreme Cont of the United
OCTOBER TERM, 1991
JAMES DAVIS, PETITIONER
Vv.
DONALD RICE, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT
IN OPPOSITION
KENNETH W. STARR
Solicitor General
STUART M. GERSON
Assistant Attorney General
MARLEIGH D. DOVER
FRED P. PHILLIPS IV
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the district court properly rejected peti-
tioner’s claim that he was disciplined more severely
than white employees because of his race.
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
an conanicieenowenntonniiinamnenenaanuiaees
es aasinpusssaselaainelionmnnee
I a Ie cntesilabcsbsvunoliemeioone
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Henson Vv. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982) ..
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
ssi de emnbiuneadesodionsion
Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
ie sciiastiaeenboaedbaionbupecacee
Statutes and regulations:
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e
co scincindinonnedsiaiberebuainioimeresiencs 3,
a acanbeomeieanctmnbenOheubuiies
oa pes nammmnontideabientiaiet
ed UID ED oo oticccececsnccencecesevavowvseseusbaies
(IIT)
_
*
~
2
>
’
.
Lat
= — = .
:
oe
"oe 4 — e
~ ae
“ | :
5 + =
a
- 5 oe
ayet i
=< } << — = |i, fed
i _
Iu the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1991
No. 91-721
JAMES DAVIS, PETITIONER
Vv.
DONALD RICE, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT
IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. Al-
A17) is unpublished, but the judgment is noted at
932 F.2d 975 (Table). The opinion of the district
court (Pet. App. B1-B30) is unpublished.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on May 15, 1991. A petition for rehearing was denied
on August 1, 1991. Pet. App. Dl. The petition for a
writ of certiorari was filed on October 30, 1991. This
Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
1254(1).
(1)
2
STATEMENT
1. Petitioner, a black American, was a supervisory
operating accountant employed by the Department of
the Air Force. Following an investigation, the In-
spector General determined that petitioner had en-
gaged in sexual harassment of women employees over
an eight-year period. Two of the women complained
that they had been subjected to harassment in April
1989, the month in which the Inspector General began
his inquiry. Pet. App. A3.
Respondent initially notified petitioner that he
would be removed from his job on account of the
harassment. Petitioner then submitted affidavits from
other employees stating that they were not aware of
any sexual harassment. The Chief of Accounting and
Finance considered these affidavits and notified peti-
tioner that he would be allowed to remain in federal
service, but would be demoted from GS-12 to GS-11
and assigned nonsupervisory duties. Pet. App. A4.
At the same time, respondent also disciplined a
similarly situated Caucasian employee, Donald Fair-
better, for sexually harassing two female subordi-
nates. Fairbetter, like petitioner, had been a super-
visory operating accountant. Fairbetter was also de-
moted to GS-11 and deprived of supervisory duties.
Pet. App. A4-A5.
2. Petitioner appealed his demotion to the Merit
Systems Protection Board (MSPB), alleging that he
had been discriminated against because of his race.
The Administrative Judge held that (1) petitioner
had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrim-
ination, (2) the agency had proved that petitioner
sexually harassed three female employees, (3) there
was no harmful error in the processing of the pro-
posed removal and ultimate demotion action, and
3
(4) the demotion was “within the limits of reason-
ableness and promote[d] the efficiency of the service.”
Pet. App. A5-A6, B9. Petitioner did not pursue an
administrative appeal to the MSPB. 7d. at A6.
3. Petitioner then filed a complaint in the district
court for the Western District of Oklahoma under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
2000e et seq., alleging racial discrimination and viola-
tion of due process and equal protection. The district
court granted summary judgment for respondent.
Pet. App. B1-B30. The court held that petitioner had
failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination,
and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over his constitutional claims.
4. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. A1-
A17. The court concluded that petitioner had “failed
to present sufficient evidence of discrimination” to
make out a prima facie case. Jd. at A9. The court
rejected petitioner’s contention that the entry of sum-
mary judgment deprived him of his right to trial de
novo on his discrimination claim. 7d. at Al1l1-A14.’
ARGUMENT
Petitioner contends (Pet. 8, 12-12) that the sexual
harassment charges were legally insufficient under
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
Petitioner fails to explain the nature of this alleged
insufficiency. In Meritor, the Court held that Title
VII is violated when “discrimination based on sex has
created a hostile or abusive work environment.” Id.
at 66. The court of appeals’ decision in this case is
fully consistent with Meritor. Petitioner engaged in
1TIn addition, the court of appeals affirmed the district
court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction over peti-
tioner’s constitutional claims. Pet. App. A15-A17. Petitioner
does not challenge that ruling.
4
repeated, unwelcome harassment of female employees.
For example, he admits that he “complimented” a
subordinate by saying that she was “looking like a
white girl,” Pet. App. B12, and told another subordi-
nate “she was going to have to quit wearing that
dress and showing off her legs,” id. at B15-B16. In
light of these admissions, and of the additional evi-
dence of sexual harassment, see id. at B11-B21, in-
cluding testimony under oath by a female subordi-
nate “that Davis had commented on her rear over the
past three years, had told her it was looking good,
and compared it with those of other women,” id. at
B20, there is no basis for petitioner’s assertion that
the charges of sexual harassment were legally inade-
quate. See Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902
(11th Cir. 1982) (“Sexual harassment which creates
a hostile or offensive environment for members of one
sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equal-
ity at the workplace that racial harassment is to
racial equality.” ).
Petitioner also suggests (Pet. 8) that he should not
have been disciplined for sexual harassment because
the victims did not file sexual harassment charges
within 30 days, as required by 29 C.F.R. 1613.214
(a) (i). Petitioner misinterprets Section 1613.214
(a) (i), which refers to the period within which an
individual must file a complaint in order to preserve
a Title VII claim against the agency.* Although the
2 The regulation states:
An agency shall require that a complaint be submitted in
writing by the complainant * * *. The agency may accept
the complaint for processing in accordance with this sub-
part only if:
(i) The complainant brought to the attention of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor the matter
causing him/her to believe he/she had been discriminated
5
victims in this case could not have brought a claim
against the agency because the 30-day period had ex-
pired, it does not follow that the agency is barred
from disciplining petitioner for his misconduct.
Petitioner next contends (Pet. 13) that the courts
below erred in holding that he failed to state a prima
facie case of disparate treatment. But the court of
appeals correctly noted that petitioner ‘can point to
no one who was not a member of a protected group
and whose circumstances were similar to his who re-
ceived more favorable treatment than he did.” Pet.
App. Al0. Indeed, the uncontradicted evidence shows
that a similarly situated Caucasian supervisor re-
ceived an identical demotion for his sexual harass-
ment of women subordinates. See id. at All, B18-
B19. Thus, the courts below correctly concluded that
petitioner failed to carry the initial burden of proving
his Title VII claim.
Finally, petitioner contends (Pet. 9-10) that ap-
plication of the “arbitrary and capricious” standard
of review to his nondiscrimination claims deprived
him of his right to a trial de novo on his discrimina-
tion claim. The governing statute provides that a re-
viewing court may overturn the MSPB’s findings and
conclusions only if they are arbitrary and capricious,
obtained without procedures required by law, or un-
supported by substantial evidence, ‘except that in the
case of discrimination brought under [Title VII], the
employee * * * shall have the right to have the facts
subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.” 5
U.S.C. 7703 (c).
against within 30 calendar days of the date of the alleged
discriminatory event.
29 C.F.R. 1613.214 (a) (i).
6
Petitioner thus is correct that his discrimination
claim was subject to trial de novo, while his proce-
dural claims were subject to review under the arbi-
trary and capricious standard. But petitioner is in-
correct in asserting that he received something less
than a trial de novo of his discrimination claim. The
court of appeals held (Pet. App. Al4-A15) that the
right to trial de novo did not preclude the entry of
summary judgment, and petitioner does not challenge
that holding. Nor was petitioner denied de novo re-
view of his discrimination claim simply because the
district court considered the administrative record of
the sexual harassment claims. As the court of appeals
explained (id. at A11-A13), the district court re-
viewed the administrative reccrd to determine
whether—assuming petitioner made out a prima facie
case of discrimination—respondent had a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for demoting him. Because
petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, the court had no occasion to consider
respondent’s reasons for demoting petitioner. See
Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 254-255 (1981). Accordingly, petitioner’s
right to a de novo trial was not infringed.*
3 Petitioner also asserts (Pet. 18) that the MSPB’s decision
should have been set aside as arbitrary and capricious under
5 U.S.C. 7703(c) (1). Petitioner does not explain what aspects
of the MSPB’s decision constitute an abuse of discretion, and
the record provides ample support for the Board’s findings.
See Pet. App. B11-B16.
7
CONCLUSION
The petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
KENNETH W. STARR
Solicitor General
STUART M. GERSON
Assistant Attorney General
MARLEIGH D. DOVER
FRED P. PHILLIPS IV
Attorneys
JANUARY 1992
$Y VU. &. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFicE; 1992 312324 45226
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.