Opposition Brief — Davis v. Rice

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ps Supreme Court, U.S.

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No. 91-721 JAR ? 1931

OfflGe OF THe Cithh

Gu the Supreme Cont of the United

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

JAMES DAVIS, PETITIONER

Vv.

DONALD RICE, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT

IN OPPOSITION

KENNETH W. STARR

Solicitor General

STUART M. GERSON

Assistant Attorney General

MARLEIGH D. DOVER

FRED P. PHILLIPS IV

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the district court properly rejected peti-

tioner’s claim that he was disciplined more severely

than white employees because of his race.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Henson Vv. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982) ..

Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57

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Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450

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Statutes and regulations:

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e

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Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

No. 91-721

JAMES DAVIS, PETITIONER

Vv.

DONALD RICE, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT

IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. Al-

A17) is unpublished, but the judgment is noted at

932 F.2d 975 (Table). The opinion of the district

court (Pet. App. B1-B30) is unpublished.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered

on May 15, 1991. A petition for rehearing was denied

on August 1, 1991. Pet. App. Dl. The petition for a

writ of certiorari was filed on October 30, 1991. This

Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

1254(1).

(1)

2

STATEMENT

1. Petitioner, a black American, was a supervisory

operating accountant employed by the Department of

the Air Force. Following an investigation, the In-

spector General determined that petitioner had en-

gaged in sexual harassment of women employees over

an eight-year period. Two of the women complained

that they had been subjected to harassment in April

1989, the month in which the Inspector General began

his inquiry. Pet. App. A3.

Respondent initially notified petitioner that he

would be removed from his job on account of the

harassment. Petitioner then submitted affidavits from

other employees stating that they were not aware of

any sexual harassment. The Chief of Accounting and

Finance considered these affidavits and notified peti-

tioner that he would be allowed to remain in federal

service, but would be demoted from GS-12 to GS-11

and assigned nonsupervisory duties. Pet. App. A4.

At the same time, respondent also disciplined a

similarly situated Caucasian employee, Donald Fair-

better, for sexually harassing two female subordi-

nates. Fairbetter, like petitioner, had been a super-

visory operating accountant. Fairbetter was also de-

moted to GS-11 and deprived of supervisory duties.

Pet. App. A4-A5.

2. Petitioner appealed his demotion to the Merit

Systems Protection Board (MSPB), alleging that he

had been discriminated against because of his race.

The Administrative Judge held that (1) petitioner

had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrim-

ination, (2) the agency had proved that petitioner

sexually harassed three female employees, (3) there

was no harmful error in the processing of the pro-

posed removal and ultimate demotion action, and

3

(4) the demotion was “within the limits of reason-

ableness and promote[d] the efficiency of the service.”

Pet. App. A5-A6, B9. Petitioner did not pursue an

administrative appeal to the MSPB. 7d. at A6.

3. Petitioner then filed a complaint in the district

court for the Western District of Oklahoma under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

2000e et seq., alleging racial discrimination and viola-

tion of due process and equal protection. The district

court granted summary judgment for respondent.

Pet. App. B1-B30. The court held that petitioner had

failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination,

and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

over his constitutional claims.

4. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. A1-

A17. The court concluded that petitioner had “failed

to present sufficient evidence of discrimination” to

make out a prima facie case. Jd. at A9. The court

rejected petitioner’s contention that the entry of sum-

mary judgment deprived him of his right to trial de

novo on his discrimination claim. 7d. at Al1l1-A14.’

ARGUMENT

Petitioner contends (Pet. 8, 12-12) that the sexual

harassment charges were legally insufficient under

Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).

Petitioner fails to explain the nature of this alleged

insufficiency. In Meritor, the Court held that Title

VII is violated when “discrimination based on sex has

created a hostile or abusive work environment.” Id.

at 66. The court of appeals’ decision in this case is

fully consistent with Meritor. Petitioner engaged in

1TIn addition, the court of appeals affirmed the district

court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction over peti-

tioner’s constitutional claims. Pet. App. A15-A17. Petitioner

does not challenge that ruling.

4

repeated, unwelcome harassment of female employees.

For example, he admits that he “complimented” a

subordinate by saying that she was “looking like a

white girl,” Pet. App. B12, and told another subordi-

nate “she was going to have to quit wearing that

dress and showing off her legs,” id. at B15-B16. In

light of these admissions, and of the additional evi-

dence of sexual harassment, see id. at B11-B21, in-

cluding testimony under oath by a female subordi-

nate “that Davis had commented on her rear over the

past three years, had told her it was looking good,

and compared it with those of other women,” id. at

B20, there is no basis for petitioner’s assertion that

the charges of sexual harassment were legally inade-

quate. See Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902

(11th Cir. 1982) (“Sexual harassment which creates

a hostile or offensive environment for members of one

sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equal-

ity at the workplace that racial harassment is to

racial equality.” ).

Petitioner also suggests (Pet. 8) that he should not

have been disciplined for sexual harassment because

the victims did not file sexual harassment charges

within 30 days, as required by 29 C.F.R. 1613.214

(a) (i). Petitioner misinterprets Section 1613.214

(a) (i), which refers to the period within which an

individual must file a complaint in order to preserve

a Title VII claim against the agency.* Although the

2 The regulation states:

An agency shall require that a complaint be submitted in

writing by the complainant * * *. The agency may accept

the complaint for processing in accordance with this sub-

part only if:

(i) The complainant brought to the attention of the

Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor the matter

causing him/her to believe he/she had been discriminated

5

victims in this case could not have brought a claim

against the agency because the 30-day period had ex-

pired, it does not follow that the agency is barred

from disciplining petitioner for his misconduct.

Petitioner next contends (Pet. 13) that the courts

below erred in holding that he failed to state a prima

facie case of disparate treatment. But the court of

appeals correctly noted that petitioner ‘can point to

no one who was not a member of a protected group

and whose circumstances were similar to his who re-

ceived more favorable treatment than he did.” Pet.

App. Al0. Indeed, the uncontradicted evidence shows

that a similarly situated Caucasian supervisor re-

ceived an identical demotion for his sexual harass-

ment of women subordinates. See id. at All, B18-

B19. Thus, the courts below correctly concluded that

petitioner failed to carry the initial burden of proving

his Title VII claim.

Finally, petitioner contends (Pet. 9-10) that ap-

plication of the “arbitrary and capricious” standard

of review to his nondiscrimination claims deprived

him of his right to a trial de novo on his discrimina-

tion claim. The governing statute provides that a re-

viewing court may overturn the MSPB’s findings and

conclusions only if they are arbitrary and capricious,

obtained without procedures required by law, or un-

supported by substantial evidence, ‘except that in the

case of discrimination brought under [Title VII], the

employee * * * shall have the right to have the facts

subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.” 5

U.S.C. 7703 (c).

against within 30 calendar days of the date of the alleged

discriminatory event.

29 C.F.R. 1613.214 (a) (i).

6

Petitioner thus is correct that his discrimination

claim was subject to trial de novo, while his proce-

dural claims were subject to review under the arbi-

trary and capricious standard. But petitioner is in-

correct in asserting that he received something less

than a trial de novo of his discrimination claim. The

court of appeals held (Pet. App. Al4-A15) that the

right to trial de novo did not preclude the entry of

summary judgment, and petitioner does not challenge

that holding. Nor was petitioner denied de novo re-

view of his discrimination claim simply because the

district court considered the administrative record of

the sexual harassment claims. As the court of appeals

explained (id. at A11-A13), the district court re-

viewed the administrative reccrd to determine

whether—assuming petitioner made out a prima facie

case of discrimination—respondent had a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for demoting him. Because

petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination, the court had no occasion to consider

respondent’s reasons for demoting petitioner. See

Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450

U.S. 248, 254-255 (1981). Accordingly, petitioner’s

right to a de novo trial was not infringed.*

3 Petitioner also asserts (Pet. 18) that the MSPB’s decision

should have been set aside as arbitrary and capricious under

5 U.S.C. 7703(c) (1). Petitioner does not explain what aspects

of the MSPB’s decision constitute an abuse of discretion, and

the record provides ample support for the Board’s findings.

See Pet. App. B11-B16.

7

CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

KENNETH W. STARR

Solicitor General

STUART M. GERSON

Assistant Attorney General

MARLEIGH D. DOVER

FRED P. PHILLIPS IV

Attorneys

JANUARY 1992

$Y VU. &. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFicE; 1992 312324 45226

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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