Appendix — Gumby v. General Public Utilities Corp.
Supreme Court brief1992
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
In the ; OCT 23 122
Supreme Court of the United States Bl
OCTOBER TERM, 1991
JOHN W. GUMBY, SR.., et al.,
Vv.
Petitioners,
GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION, METRO-
POLITAN EDISON CO., JERSEY CENTRAL POWER AND
LIGHT CO., PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC CO., BABCOCK
& WILCOX CO., McDERMOTT INC., U.E. & C.-CATA-
LYTIC, INC.,
BURNS & ROE ENTERPRISES, INC., AND
DRESSER INDUSTRIES INC.,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
APPENDIX
Arnold Levin’
Fred S. Longer
LEVIN, FISHBEIN, SEDRAN
& BERMAN
320 Walnut Street
Suite 600
Philadelphia, PA 19106
(215) 592-1500
and
Lee C. Swartz
Harrisburg, PA
and
John R. O'Donnell
Philadelphia, PA
and
*Counsel of Record
October 23, 1991
Joseph D. Shein
Philadelphia, PA
and
Louis M. Tarasi, Jr.
Pittsburgh, PA
and
James R. Adams
Lancaster, PA
and
Peter J. Neeson
Philadelphia, PA
and
William E. Chillas
Lancaster, PA
Attorneys for Petitioners
John W. Gumby, Sr., et al.
I ELL ELA: ALDI EEL EDIE AE LEELA.
SMITH-EDWARDS-DUNLAP COMPANY 2867 F ALLEGHENY AVENUE. PHILADELPHIA, PA !9134 (215) 425-8800
TABLE OF CONTENTS
APPENDIX
Page
Raat OE TOUNUIOITE FIONN |S oo as ec cc cece ce ceess A-]
Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, July 26, 1991 (940 F.2d 832).......... A-23
Opinion of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania, March 16, 1990 (735
cE Se EN eo Pe are te ee A-139
Opinion of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania, June 14,1990 ...... A-159
United States Constitution, Article III, §2, Clause 1 .. A-162
ee es ED ic cies vo he ee de ed ewew anaes A-162
ee NT 2) ces suck Sooke case eves. A-162
See ee ne ee eee eee ees A-163
AR SiR ee ee ee A-163
A-]
Estate of Henra Abrams; Fred Abrams; Estate oi
Michael Abromitis; Joy Ann Abromitis; Georgine Adams;
Henrietta B. Adams; Jeanette M. Adams; Patricia A. Adams;
Blanche G. Albright; Estate of Ruth E. Alder;
Dorothy L. Aldrich; William A. Aldrich; Faith Alleman;
Gerald Alleman, Sr.; Byron L. Almoney;
Georgia S. Almoney; Kyle M. Almoney, a minor;
Denise Altigieri; Denise Altigieri; Victor J. Altigieri;
Gary E. Altland; Miriam E. Altland; Annabelle Anderson;
Carl M. Anderson; Estate of Patrick Anderson;
George W. Anderson; Geraldyne EF. Anderson;
Gilbert C. Anderson; Pearl FE. Anderson; Johanna Angeli;
Philip Angeli; Michael Anoka; Ruth Anoka;
Donald S. Anthony; Estate of Marian Anthony; Betty Apple;
Edward R. Apple; Nathan D. Apple, D.D.S.; Salle Appleby;
Joan Armstrong; John Armstrong; Miles Armstrong;
Sybil Armstrong, a minor; Walter O. Armstrong;
Edward P. Arndt, Jr.; Kathy J. Arndt; D. Jean Arnold;
James K. Arnold; Rodney C. Arnold; Jayne L. Aucker;
Ben Aungst, a minor; Sandra Aungst; Estate of
Juanita Austin; John FE. Austin, Estate of Judith C. Bair;
Ronald Bair; Nicholas G. Bakaric; Estate of Margaret Baker;
Richard Baker; Kay L. Balchunas; Ralph EF. Balchunas;
Catherine Balinosky; Lauri A. Balinosky; Fugene T. Balog;
Loraine A. Balog; Joseph W. Baltozer; Kathy S. Baltozer;
Terry L. Bangert; Florence KE. Banks; Shirley J. Banks;
Joann Barbush; Sistino R. Barbush, III:
Todd Joseph Barbush; Jacque T. Barninger;
John T. Barninger, a minor; Alen E. Barr; Estate of
Baby Barr, a minor; Kenneth Barr; Ryan Barr, a minor;
Sally Barr; Belle Ek. Barry; Estate of Burrell H. Barry;
Estate of Burrell Harp Barry; Ruth J. Barry;
I:dward P. Batchelder; Margaret Batchelder; Floyd Baturin;
Kersti Baturin; Walter J. Baughman; Julia Beam;
Leo Roland Beam; Madell E. Bear; Robert E. Bear;
Linda J. Beard; Ronald L. Beard; Beatrice C. Beasley;
Regis Edward Beasley; Elverson Beatty; David Beaver,
Estate of Rita Evelyn Beaver; James Jerome Beaver;
Jane Beaver; Shannon Beaver, a minor; Sharon Beaver:
A-2
Alfred T. Beck; Amelia D. Beck; Debra K. Beck:
Earl J. Beck; Grace L. Beck; Janie D. Beck; Roger D. Beck;
Estate of Mae L. Behney; William H. Behney; Estate of
Marie Mae Bell; Thomas Bell; John Bender;
Suzanne Bender; Cassa L. Bennie; Richard K. Bennie;
Aara Jeannette Bentz, a minor; Juanita Vilma Bentz;
Guilda Berez; Harry H. Berez; Estate of Harry L. Berger;
Jane A. Berger; Jerry Bernstein; Natalie R. Bernstein;
Charles E. Berry; Gloria Elaine Berry;
Charles Linwood Beshore; Judy Heilig Beshore;
Thelma Ann Beshore; Walter A. Beshore;
Michael R. Bickle, a minor; Anna Bigler; Ruth Bingaman,;
Deidre Bishop; David H. Bitner; Susan L. Bitner;
Geoffrey L. Black; Lynn B. Black; Susan Black;
Timothy J. Black; Paul J. Blair, Jr.; Sherry A. Blair;
Nathan Bloom; Rosalind Bloom; Jane M. Blough;
Oscar Blough; Louise Bodan; Stanley C. Bodan;
John C. Boglovits; Suzanne W. Boland; Paula FE. Bolen;
Santo J. Bonetti; Stephanie Bonetti; Betty Jeanne Book;
Catharine M. Borda; Jennie C. Borda; Louis Borda;
Rodney Borda; Ann F. Borden; William S. Borden;
Klaine Bordner; Carol L. Borrelli; John A. Borrelli;
Raymond L. Bosworth; Ruth Marie Bosworth; Debra Botts;
Nicole Botts, a minor; Doris Jean Boyer; A. Jean Boyles:
Betty M. Boylestein; George L. Boylstein; John M. Bower;
Elizabeth G. Bracale; Kathleen F. Braddock;
Randi B. Braderman; Rosyln S. Braderman;
Sari A. Braderman; James T. Brannon; Theresa Brannon;
Diane M. Brautigan; Robert EF. Brautigan;
Robert E. Brautigan, II], a minor; Estate of
Mae E. Breckenmaker; Barbara A. Brenneman;
Lenard A. Brenner; Rona Katzen Brenner;
Delores Jeanne Breski; Irene Brezitski; Christine Briggs:
Estate of Connie T. Briggs; Charles V. Brinser;
Harold W. Brinser; Helen E. Brinser; Estate of
Gerald A. Brockman; Jacqueline Brockman; Larry Brody;
Verna L. Brody; Catherine R. Brooks; Sharon R. Brooks;
Sonya Brooks; Betty R. Brown; Cheryl O. Brown;
Christine M. Brown; Claude Brown; Estate of
A-3
Elmer B. Brown; Patricia E. Brown; Thomas E. Brown;
Wanda Brown; Estate of Gene Brubacher; Estate of
Howard E. Brubacher; Peggy L. Brubacher;
Teresa Brubacher; Harold Bruetsch; Jean Bruetsch:
Karen E. Brunner; Nancy Bruno-Cohen;
Darla M. Brussese; Steven A. Brussese;
Michael A. Brussesse, a minor; Estate of Zola Bryan;
Theordore Bryan; Debra Brydon; John D. Bryner, Jr.,
a minor; John Bryner, Sr.; Tammy Bryner;
Ronald E. Buchart; Antoinette Buck; Barry Paul Buck;
Nathan Buck, a minor; Rebecca Buck, a minor;
Richard Buehler; Sharon Buehler; Mary L. Bullock;
Robert C. Bullock; Marie K. Buntin; William M. Buntin;
Katherine R. Burdick; Lann K. Burdick; Anna M. Burger;
Vernon E. Burger; Charles H. Burhanan, Sr.;
Shirlean Burhanan; Karl Norman Burkhardt;
Patricia L. Burkhardt; Gerald Burkholder;
Patricia Burkholder; Estate of Margaret E. Busser;
Marshall C. Busser; Estate of Milton Butler; Ruth E. Butler;
Helen E. Byers; Henry W. Byers; Terry L. Byers;
Susan Diane Cairo; Albert W. Caka; Estate of Frank Caka:;
Carl Campbell; Jason Allen Campbell, a minor;
Patricia Campbell; Shirl Campbell; Walter Campbell;
Carol Canoy; Debra R. Carnes; Mark P. Carnes:
John E. Carretti; Mary Jane Carretti; Bonnie L. Carrigan;
James D. Carrigan; Megan Lee Carrigan, a minor;
John W. Carruthers; Faye E. Carter; John T. Carter;
Karen Sue Carter; Ronald Richard Carter; Anna L. Caruso:
Josephine M. Casper; Linda Cassaday; Marjorie Cassatt;
Patricia A. Cassel; Robert L. Cassel, Sr.; Cliff Cerce:
Sandra Cerce; William D. Challenger; Estate of
Frank Chambers; Kathleen Chambers;
Samuel Chandler, Jr.; Elizabeth M. Chavey;
Manuel S. Chavey; Cherry Lane Motor Inc. Corp.;
Sarah M. China; Wallace W. China; William H. Christine:
Robert J. Christoff; Ellen C. Chugg; James W. Chugg;
Daniel Chynoweth; Kristopher Chynoweth, a minor;
Susan Chynoweth; Estate of Jean C. Cicak; Joseph Cicak;
Rudolph Cigic; Vladimir M. Cini; Debra Clark;
A-4
Jennifer Clay; Estate of Thomas E. Clipp;
Bernard L. Coates, Sr.; Marie C. Coates; Kimberly L. Cobb;
Carl A. Coble; Marie Coble; Dorothy J. Coburn; Estate of
Harry M. Coburn; Daniel D. Cohen; Estate of
Leonard M. Cohen; Florence L. Cohen; Jean S. Cohen;
Paul J. Cohen; Rene B. Cohen; Rose Cohen; Roslyn Cohen;
Samuel S. Cohen; Sheri Cohle; Estate of Beverly A. Cole;
William E. Cole; Peter M. Colello; Daniel A. Coleman;
James G. Coleman; Margaret E. Coleman; Charlene Collier;
Tiffany Collier, a minor; Estate of Jean H. Collins;
Patrick M. Collins; Anna Comfort; Estate of Lee F Comfort;
Gary P. Conahan; Mary S. Conahan; Donald H. Conley;
Estate of John I. Conley, Sr.; Patricia E. Conley; Estate of
Carl Conrad; Constance M. Conrad; Rosemary Conrad;
Continental Inns of America (t/a Continental Inn);
Alexander Contract; Estate of Sylvia Contract;
Eveline Cooksey; Thomas P. Cooksey; Shirley M. Coombe;
Beason Cooper; Ben A. Cooper; Estate of Adail Cooper;
Theodore Cooper; Victoria B. Cooper; Kim Corbin;
Leroy Corbin; Estate of Shauna Cormack;
Jacynthia Cormack; James Cosgrove (d/b/a Revere
Tavern and Best Western Revere Motor Inn);
Catherine Marrico Costello; John Thomas Costello;
Martha A. Costik; Richard N. Costik; Rebecca Cotton;
Willie Cotton; Willie Cotton, Jr.; Patricia Coutts;
E. James Craig; Harry L. Cramer; M. Mae Cramer;
Karen L. Crawford; Stephen M. Crawford;
Tanya M. Cronin; Estate of Floyd H. Cross, Sr.; Mary Cross;
Dorothy Cunningham; Jordan Benjamin Cunningham,
a minor; Jordan D. Cunningham;
Kimberly B. Cunningham; Richard M. Cunningham;
Carolyn Curtis; Estate of Debra Ann Curtis;
Christine B. Cushner; Michael R. Cushner;
Anthony A. Cywinski; Sharon L. Czaplewski; Estate of
Elizabeth R. Dacheux; Robert Dacheux; Thomas Dacheux;
Margery Dadamo; Olga E. Dagenhart; Emil Danko;
Marjorie M. Danko; Bonnie Danner;
Constance Kay Danner; Diane M. Danner;
James Michael Danner; Samuel C. Danner;
A-5
Sherry A. Danner; Peggy J. Darby; Daniel D. Darrow;
Kleanor Darrow; Cathy A. Daugherty; Andrew Grot! Davis,
a minor; Brenda K. Deaven; William EE. Deaven;
Guy J. DePasquale; Jean DePasquale; Amy R. DeStito;
Daniel Salvatory DeStito, Jr; state of George L. Deibert;
Philip Deibert; James Deibler; Karen Louise Deibler;
Kimberly Kay Deibler, a minor; Alice k.. Deimler;
John EF Deimler; Marlene R. Deimler;
Larry Richard Demmy; Pearl Irene Demmy;
Albert W. Dengler; Hilda M. Dengler; Sharyn G. Denham:
William S. Denham; Nora Denoncour; Vincent Denoncour;
Chrystal L. Deshner, a minor; Faye Deshner;
Louis Deshner; Estate of Carol A. Desso; Estate of John A.
Desso; Margaret Desso; Thomas Desso;
Parker J. and Marge O. Dewalt; Dorothy W. Dice;
kav fk. Dickerson; Nancy Diehl; Robert Diehl; Estate of
George Dimoff; Margaret Dimoff; Robyn Diven;
Scott Alan Diven; Scott Alan Diven, Jr., a minor;
Delores Dix; Estate of Arthur W. Dix; Estate of
Ivester Dobson; Myrtle C. Dobson; Alta D. Donley;
Deborah L. Donley; Harold M. Donley;
Harold M. Donley, Jr.; Jodie M. Dorazio; Estate of
Harold Linn Dorman; Harold Leroy Dorman;
Larry A. Douglas; Pearl EF. Douglas; Nellie M. Doyle;
Frederick Drake, Nancy Drake; Robert £. Drake, a minor;
Christine Marie Drapala; Holly Drapala, a minor;
Robert Drapala; Sandra Drapala; Edward C. Drumheller;
Barbara Dudek; Edward C. Dudek; Annette Dunleavy:
Thomas Dunleavy; Joseph R. Durbin; Ruth Ann Durbin;
Joseph Durborow; Karen Durborow;
Mary Marguerite Earhart; Curtis N. Edwards, Jr.; Estate of
Florence A. Edwards; Estate of Theodore k. kdwards;
Andrew Ehrlich, a minor; Carl Ehrlich; Margery Ehrlich:
Georgia Eichelberger; Gilbert Eichelberger; Carol Kicherly:
Frank Kicherly; Sandra L. Fisler;
Christine Michelle Eisner; Gerald L. Eisner;
Louella FE. Eisner; Estate of Thomas W. Elhajj;
Nancy Ethajj; Tammy R. Elhajj; Thomas Elhajj;
William Elhajj; Joyce L. Elia, a minor; Karen Elia;
A-6
Vincent Elia; Frances M. Elliott; Theodore J. Elhiott:
Doris Mae Ellis; Estate of Howard D. Ellis; Kay bk. Elhs;
Debra J. klslager; Edward S. Elslager; Estate of
Raymond B. kmerick; Mary Alice Emerick;
William H. Emerick; Keith EF. Enders; Estate of
C. Daniel Hygle, kva K. Engle; David Ensminger;
Doris Jeannie Erwin; Estate of Norman L. Erwin;
Charles Espenshade; Estate of Gladys Espenshade,;
Lloyd kttinger; Margaret kttinger; Christ Evanoff, Jr.;
Velda B. Evanoti; Harry J. kvans; Jay W. Evans;
Jeannine k Evans; Loretta M. Evans; Katerina Fabian;
Martina G. Falcone; Joseph N. Fantine; Linda Kay kantine;
Iistate of Alda J. Feeser; Lloyd T. Feeser; state of
Robert J. Fegley; Mary Lou kegley; Corrine bk. kelty;
Kenneth H. Felty; Estate of John C. Ferentz;
Ruth [. Ferentz; Edward T. Ferguson; Daniel Fernandez,
Millie Fernandez; Joseph J. Ferrer; Mary kk. kerrer,
Donald R. Fetrow; Estate of Helen k. Fetrow;
Marilyn ketrow; Sandy kettro; David J. Fields; estate of
Morris k:. Fields; Albert Fine; Beth Ann Fine; Jody kink;
Linda L. Fink; Michael C. Fink; Michael C. Fink, Jr.
a minor; Roy M. Fishel; Susan M. Fishel;
Dorothy E. Fisher; Jane L. Fisher; Steven B. Fisher;
Sue Fitting; C. James Fitzgerald; Kathleen M. Flanagan;
Candis Fleming; Estate of Violet Foor; Estate of
Lois A. Ford; Russell C. Ford; Dolores koreman:
Lauryn M. Foreman; Richard Foreman;
Anna Elizabeth Forney; J. Edgar Forney;
Michelle L. Forney; Donald R. kortna; tstate of
Christopher M. kortna; Linda Ek. Fortna; Mildred bk. Foster;
Shirley Ann Fox; Carole A. Foy; Estate of John kb. boy, Jr.;
John R. Frazier; Patricia V. Frazier; bstate of
Margaret Frederick; Robert Frederick; Charles J. Frey:
Debra M. Frey; Estate of Rikki Jo Frick;
Richard Franklin Frick, Jr; Ann L. Friedman;
Benjamin Friedman; Charles k. Friedman; Estate of
1. George Friedman; C. David Fritz; Karen Marie Fritz:
Linda Kay Fritz; Emma Fry; kstate of Lester Fry;
Dorothy Frye; Richard L. Frye; Anna M. Fulkerson,
A-7
Connie Ann Fultz; Russell FE. Fultz; Estate of
Catherine Furjanic; Michael P. Furjanic; Lynn Furlow;
Betty [. Garman; Frank Garman, Jr.; Karl Garman,
Michael R. Garman; Albert L. Gaskin; Virginia Gaskin;
Dorothy Gaughan; Harold Gaughan; Joseph Gaughan,
a minor; Helen J. Gaw; Kenneth H. Gaw; Edward EF. Gay;
Charles E. Geesey; Scharley A. Geesey; Dawn E. Geopfert;
Barbara George; Helen S. George; Ralph W. George;
Wilson George; I. Ward Geraldine; Gettysburg Tours, Inc.;
Alfred F. Giehler; Joann C. Giehler; Rayanne E. Gifford;
Edward A. Gilbert; Estate of Eric Scott Gingrich;
JoAnn A. Gingrich; William FE. Gingrich;
Theodore G. Giovanis, a minor; Linda Irene Glad;
Marco George Glad, Jr.; Kenneth D. Glaser;
Rosemary A.L. Glaser; Glass Kitchens of Lancaster, inc.;
Mary L. Glassmoyer; Walter I. Glassmoyer, Jr.;
Anthony Goepfert; Carole Goldstein; Deena Goldstein,
a minor; Dorothy Goldstein; Estate of Evelyn G. Goldstein;
I. Alan Goldstein; Nason Goldstein; Nathan Goldstein;
Mary M. Goles; Estate of Helen Gondek; Estate of
John A. Gondek; John C. Gondek; Linda Marie Gontz;
Melissa A. Gonzalez, a minor; Pedro T. Gonzalez;
Sharon R. Gonzalez; Eloise Gordon; Estate of
Constance D. Gordon; Wayne Gordon; Estate of
Leon Gottesman; Rita Gottesman; Robert Grad;
Barbara Grandon; Meyer A. Grant; Thelma Grant;
Ashby L. Graves; Charles E. Graves; Charles J.K. Graves,
a minor; Kelly R. Graves; Mary S. Graves;
David Allen Green, a minor; Donald E. Green:
Joseph L. Green; Monique R. Green, a minor;
Nancy L. Green; Romaine R. Green; Susan Ann Green;
Estate of Mary Jane Greenawalt; Frank Greenawalt;
Gary Grenoble; Charles E. Griff; Tracy A. Griffith; Estate of
Donna Q. Grim; James H. Grim, Sr.; Frances P. Grosky;
Jeffrey L. Grove; Matthew R. Grove, a minor; Ned E. Grove;
Ruth M. Grove; James W. Grumley, Jr.; Estate of
Robert M. Grunden; Mildred A. Grunden; Daniel Ray Guhl:
Estate of Elmer R. Guhl; Estate of Gladys Guistwhite;
Lloyd Guistwhite; John W. Gumby, Sr.; Estate of
A-8
Charles L. Gummo; Elizabeth A. Gustin; Estate of
Rudolph R. Gustin; Anna Guyer; Estate of Carl A. Guyer;
Stella D. Guyer; Deborah A. Hacker; Diana L. Hahn;
Norman L. Hahn; James S. Haines; Sylvia Haines;
Estate of Dorothy L. Halbleib; Walter Halbleib; Estate of
Alfred T. Hall, Jr.; Gary A. Hall; Margaret R. Hallock:
Wanda Halterman; Earl Hammaker;
Kleanor Kay Hammaker; Irene Elizabeth Hammaker;
Estate of Grace Dorothy Hammer; Ann Louise Hammond;
James Woodrow Hammond; Estate of Helen M. Hank;
Harold C. Hank; Funice A. Hansard; Roy E. Hansard;
Denise Hanson; Robert Hanson; Donald E. Harper;
Sandra Harper; Alvin Harrell; Anna Harrell;
Thomas R. Harris; Estate of Donald Haskins;
Gloria Haskins; Betty Hatter; Harold Baucum Hawck;
Cheryl Hawkins; Marilyn S. Hayes; Scott P Hayes, a minor:
Virginia L. Hayes; Warren William Hayes;
Albert L. Heckman, Jr.; Ryan Lloyd Heckman, a minor;
Fred M. Heddinger; Lillian M. Heddinger; Bertha Heisey;
state of Emma M. Helman; Paul C. Helman;
Karl Lamar Helwig; Violet Mae Helwig;
A. Shelly Hennessy; Mark Casey Hennessy;
Heritage Inns, Inc.; George J. Hernjak; Mary Jane Hernjak:
Patria A. Herrold; Scott Ek. Herrold; Edward John Hertzog:
Marie H. Hertzog; Estate of Charles J. Hess. Sr.;
Kathryn Hess; Gary H. Heuer; Gary H. Heuer, Jr.. a minor:
Judith M. Heuer; Kenneth B. Hickernell,
Pearl M. Hickernell; Charlaine Hickman, Estate of
Frank D. Hickmon; Ruth N. Hileman; Betty Hill; Estate of
Edward T. Hill; Estate of Kern Hill; Evelyn Hill:
Lee N. Hill; June A. Hill; Daniel R. Hilt; Estate of
Ethelda V. Hilt; Diane Hindermyer; Estate of
Thomas E. Hines, Sr.; Leverta M. Hines; Estate of
George V. Hitz; Marjorie B. Hitz; Debbie Ann Hobaugh:
Matthew Kyle Hobaugh, a minor; Robert Elwood Hobaugh:
Caryl C. Hoch; Louis A. Hoch; Estate of Carl Hocker,
John D. Hocker; Nancy Hocker; Arlene M. Hoffman,
James F. Hoffman; Phillip W. Hoffman:
Estate of Marilyn L. Hoffmaster; S. Robert Hoffmaster:
A-9
Estate of Franklin C. Hoffmeier; Estate of
Martha Hofftmeier; Thomas E. Hoffmeier; Estate of
Robert P. Holmes; Annie A. Holowka; Marie J. Holowka;
Estate of Harry S. Hommel; Estate of Clyde D. Hoover, Jr.;
Henry H. Hoover; Margaret E. Hoover;
Host Enterprises, Inc.; Howard G. Houck, Jr.;
Martha E. Houck; Gertrude Houser; Herbert H. Houser;
Kathleen M. Houser; Robert A. Houser, Jr.;
Terry Lee Huffman, Sr.; AnnMarie Huggins;
James R. Huggins; Frank S. Hughes, Sr.;
L. Catherine Hughes; Estate of Frank C. Hummert, Sr;
Arthur L. Hunt; Sylvia L. Hunt; David W. Hunter;
Madeline J. Hunter; Jodi Huntzinger, a minor;
Josephine Huntzinger; Larry Huntzinger;
Robert Huntzinger; Sharon Huntzinger; Dorothy E. Husic;
Joseph Husic; Glenna Hyde; William R. Hyde; Estate of
Clarence L. Intrieri; Pearl M. Intrieri; Helen Isaac:
Edward P. Jackson; Estate of Virginia Jackson;
Larry Jackson, a minor; Larry Jackson, Sr.; Amos James;
Estate of Kameeiah A. James; Estate of
Richard Robert James; Linda J. James; Kichard W. James;
Gregory A. Jarrett; Katherine J. Jarrett; Carol F Jensen;
Estate of Edward Jensen; Nancy E. Jeszenka;
Claudette Johnson; Estate of Arthur Johnson;
Hilda C. Johnson; John M. Johnson; Karen E. Johnson:
Raela Johnson; Scott Farrell Johnson, a minor; Estate of
James F Johnston; Joan B. Johnston; Elaine Jones;
Estate of Clarence L. Jones; James R. Jones; Mae I. Jones:
Wallace M. Jones; Richard J. Jordan; Jacqueline L. Jumper;
Robert EF. Jumper; Edith Kabakow; Jeanne H. Kalina;
Joseph Edward Kalina; Wilhelmena Kamarar:
Richard L. Kamarer; Shelby Kamarer;
Jacqueline Kaminsky; Rujiporn Kanthatham, a minor;
Helen Katzen; Estate of Dale R. Kaylor; Robert T. Kaylor;
Ruth E. Kaylor; Patricia Keammerer; Richard Keammerer;
Sara C. Keammerer, a minor; Harold J. Keating;
Paula J. Keating; Anna M. Keefer; Roy M. Keefer;
Dennis A. Keen; Suzanne L. Keen; Grace Kepp;
Richard Kepp; Howard P. Kerns; Nancy A. Kerns;
A-10
Carol R. Kershner; Ronald Kershner; Ronald C. Kershner;
Ruth B. Kesselring; Thomas L. Kesselring; Estate of
Deloris Kessler; Henry Kessler; Charles C. Kichman;
Joan A. Kichman; Kandice M. Kichman;
Matthew C. Kichman; Estate of Daniel C. Kiely;
Loretta J. Kiely; James P. Kiernan, Jr.; Louise M. Kiernan;
Linda Lou Kilmore; Debra A. Kimmel; Jeffrey T. Kimmel,
a minor; Josef H. Kimmel, a minor; Joseph H. Kimmel;
Michelle M. Kimmel; Larry J. King, a minor;
Dale B. Kinsey; Estate of Dorothy A. Kinsey; Estate of
Frank M. Kiren; Margaret L. Kiren; Alan Kireta;
Dale E. Kirkwood; Estate of Daniel Kirkwood;
JoAnn M. Kirkwood; Diane E. Kirsch; Francis L. Kirsch,
Lisa Kislov; Estate of Derek John Kitner; Vicki C. Kitner;
Estate of Raymond Kleiman; Leah Kleiman; Joel Klein;
Joshua Klein, a minor; Marilyn Klein; Selma Ruth Klein;
Charlaine H. Kline; Jill K. Kline; Martha J. Kline;
Robert A. Kline; Robert A. Kline, Jr.; David Klinetob;
Estate of Ruth E. Klinetob; Richard Alan Klingel;
Steven R. Klinger; Lydia Ann Knight; Estate of
Josephine Knoll; Joseph Knoll; Estate of Mary Louise Kohr;
Carol B. Kolarac; Abigayle Amanda Koller, a minor;
JoAnn Koller; Terry L. Koller; Doreene Koons; Estate of
Louis A. Koons; Florence S. Koons; Lyle M. Koons, Jr.;
Mark C. Koons, a minor; Ira FE. Koser, Sr.; Ruth F. Koser;
Drusilla L. Kosiba; Peter Kosiba, Jr.; Barbara A. Kosko;
Robert G. Kosko; Lisa Koslov; Steven Koslov; Estate of
James J. Kostelec; Linda J. Kostelec;
Caleb Cain Kostenbauder, a minor; Julie A. Kostenbauder;
Lamar S. Kostenbauder; Cynthia J. Kott; Estate of
Amy Marsh Kott; Kenneth H. Kott; Margaret Krafft;
George M. Krasevic; Louise Krasevic; Chester Kreiser;
Mae L. Kreiser; Martin L. Kreiser; Sandra Jean Kreiser;
Sheila Marie Kreiser, a minor; Joan R. Krell;
Staci Renee Krell, a minor; Estate of Betty Kriner:
Fred Krom, Jr.; Terry L. Krom; Stephen Krone;
Denise E. Kuhn; Emory L. Kuhn; Estate of Felix Kulbacki;
Patsy Kulbacki; Barbara A. Kuzma; Richard FE. Kuzma;
Estate of Antonia C. LaBoy; Martin Cadiz LaBoy; Estate of
A-1i
Matthew Lacey; Scott S. Lacey; Sandra L. LaMarca;
Estate of Claire W. Lamade; John Lamade;
Lewis M. LaMarca; Charles W. Lamason;
Darlene D. Lamason; Fay I. Lambert; Lisa G. Landis;
Timothy C. Landis; Keith Lanser; Marilyn Jean Lanser;
Estate of John Y. Lantz; Mary Lantz; Nancee FE. Laster;
Jennifer H. Laubach; Janice Elaine Laudermilch;
Robert L. Laudermilch; Gale L. Laughman;
Glenn FE. Laughman; Gregg A. Laughman;
Jane Ek. Laughman; Jennifer H. Laughman:
Nellie E. Laughman; Quay L. Laughman;
Dorothy C. Lawrence; Frank H. Lawrence;
Delma Eugene Layne; Estate of Florence S. Layne;
Hiram Leader; Dennis Lebo; Janice A. Lebo;
Annette EF. Lee; Estate of Alice Elizabeth Lee; James Lee;
Jane T. Lee; Shirlanne I. Lee; Rosemary Leggore; Estate of
Harold Lehmer; Jean Lehmer; David Lehrman; Estate of
Cory S. Lehrman; Lynn S. Lehrman; Ryan Lehrman;
Estate of Wanda M. Leiter; Jack A. Leiter; June L. Lengjel:;
Catherine S. Lenyo; Estate of Daniel Lenyo;
Barry A. Leonard; Carrie R. Leonard; Isolina Leoni;
Sparto Leo Leoni; Estate of Ida Levine; Reuben Levine;
Estate of Ozzie L. Lewis; Dorothy S. Liddick;
Helen J. Liddick; Christopher Lighty, a minor;
Irvin D. Lighty; Ruth Denise Lighty; Tracey Lighty,
a minor; William Lighty, a minor; Lincoln Heritage, Inc. ;
Carole M. Lindenberger; Estate of Paul N. Lindenberger;
Florence R. Lingle; George Linsey; Cathy Linta; Estate of
Joseph Lipiec; Ruth Lipiec; Benjamin Lipsky;
Pearl P. Lipsky; Betsy L. Little; J. Michael Little;
Naomi S. Livingston; William H. Livingston;
Jayne C. Lloyd; Llewellyn Lloyd; Delores Lomman;
Paul Lomman; Carolyn D. Lorenzo; Estate of baby Lorenzo;
Nicholas Lorenzo; Estate of Elder A. Love:
Madeline T. Love; Margaret E. Love; Merrill E. Lower, Jr.;
Alex Lowy; Estate of Henrietta Lowy; Nalda Ludwig;
James Edward Lutz; Michele L. Lutz; Barbara J. Lyons;
Estate of Delbert Lyons; Jeffrey D. Lyons; Ruth Lyons;
Harry Joseph Machita; Susanne Machita; Cecelia Macri;
Margaret L. Madden; William R. Madden;
A-12
Tammy K. Madonna; Beverly Magdule; Stuart Magdule;
Barbara Magill; Diana R. Maglin; Edward R. Maglin:
Doris J. Mahady; Estate of Daniel A. Mahady;
Mickey D. Mahone, Sr.; Estate of Frank Manfred, Jr.:
Ethel Manfred; Jane Elizabeth Manning;
Neal Wilson Manning, Jr.; Margaret R. Mans;
Walter R. Mans; Charles Mansberger;
Pauline R. Mansberger; Betty J. Marinaro;
Frank F Marinaro; Stephen A. Marinello;
Kimberly D. Markey; Robin Markey; Dorothy Marks;
Harold Marks; Debra Foglesanger Martin;
Gregg Eugene Martin; Leanna Martin;
Noah N. Martin Company; Dora Martini; Arvin Maskin;
Marie Massare; Barbara Mae Massie; James Robert Massie:
Martha B. Mastriania; Fabiola T. Matalonis:
Robert L. Matalonis; Dorothy M. Mathers; Estate of
Raymond Mathers; John Matriccino; Linda Lou Matriccino;
Nancy Maurer; Jill Maus; Rodney Dennis Maus;
Todd Dennis Maus, a minor; Charles J. Maxwell;
Lois Maxwell; Estate of Edith Mazurik; Joseph Mazurik;
Michael Mazzaccaro; Mamie McArthur; -
Kenneth C. McCann, Jr.; M. Colleen McCann;
Helen McCartney; Robert C. McCartney;
Doris N. McCreary; Lester FE. McCreary;
Douglas A. McDade; Marlene McDade;
Donna Lee McDermott; Harriet Lynn McDermott;
Larry Lee McDermott; James R. McEachern;
Kathleen C. McEachern; Dorothy McE]wain;
Earl McElwain; Kathryn J. McFann; Carl McHugh:
Carol McHugh; Maxilee McInnis; Estate of
Arvilla C. McKee; William G. McKee; Dorothy McMurray:
Jill Benfer McPherson; Randolph McPherson; Estate of
Thomas McVey; Nancy McVey; Charles Fillmore Mebus, II;
Arthur R. Medeiros; Mary Jane Medeiros;
Ginie Lee Medillin; Ramona Medillin, a minor;
Alton J. Meminger; Barbara J. Meminger;
Patricia D. Mendenhall; William H. Meredith; Estate of
Daniel Mescall; Andrew B. Meyers, a minor;
Ellyn M. Meyers; Harry Meyers; Jonathan B. Meyers,
A-13
a minor; Andrew M. Mickola; Rita M. Mickola; Estate of
Stella E. Midas; King F. Midas; John J. Milkovich;
Thelma D. Milkovich; Cecelia Parsons Miller;
Christopher Layne Miller; Cynthia Miller; Delores J. Miller;
Dr. Herbert Miller; Earl E. Miller; Ellen M. Miller;
Erin Kathleen Miller; Estate of Henry Lionel Miller;
Estate of Irvin S. Miller; Estate of Irvin S. Miller, II;
Estate of Paul L. Miller; Estate of Paul R. Miller; Estate of
Violet W. Miller; Estate of William S. Miller;
Gayle O. Miller; Ivan M. Miller; Mary E. Miller;
Mary L. Miller; Mildred Miller; Myrtle Miller;
Preston H. Miller; Ronald E. Miller; Rosemarie Miller;
Thomas B. Miller; Timothy Miller; Violet E. Miller;
Rosemary Milspaw; Harry Minnich; Marion F. Minnich;
Estate of Ida Minns; William E. Minns; James H. Mitchell:
Estate of Gisella Mohar; Edward G. Montgomery;
Jacqueline Ann Montgomery; Daniel Allen Montville,
a minor; Harry Montville; Virginia Montville; Estate of
Ernest Morrison; Dale W. Morrow; Elizabeth Mosby;
James Mosby; Joan A. Moss; Marvin D. Moss;
Eleanor Mosteller; Estate of Karl E. Mosteller;
Barry R. Mroczka; Mary Beth Mroczka; Leonard Mudry;
Maureen Mudry; Timothy Mudry, a minor;
Barbara J. Mulholland; James J. Mulholland; Estate of
Betty A. Mumma; Kenneth FE. Mumma; Lelani Mumma;
John Mummert; Joyce M. Mummert; Nancy L. Mummert;
Corrina Smith Munar; Estate of Anthony L. Murlin;
Myrtle E. Murlin; James J. Murphy; Jeremy M. Murphy,
a minor; Jesse G. Murphy, a minor; Sherry Dawn Murphy;
Beverly A. Murray; Estate of V. Marlene Murray;
Gilbert F Murray; John Ernest Murray, Sr.;
Jeune M. Murren; Joseph Murren; Charles E. Musser;
Janet I. Musser; Audrey W. Muth; Raymond F. Muth, Jr.;
Estate of Alvin L. Myers; Thelma May Nagy;
Robert F. Napiltonia; Sheila Napiltonia;
Samuel Michael Naples, a minor; Joseph M. Naples;
Mary L. Naples; Pamela F. Naples; Pamela F. Naples;
Catherine Neidert; Estate of Henry Neidert, Jr.;
Richard Neidinger; James Boyd Nesbit; Sheila Nesbit;
Ce ee ee ee ee
— ee ae eee ee N( (O(V030 0G ee eee LeeeeeeeEEeeeeEeEeEeEEEeeEeEeEeEeEEEEeEeEeEeEeEeEE———eEeEeEeE—————————s
A-14
Nick Nicholas; Sophie Nicholas; Kim B. Nichols;
Donna Marie Nissley; Estate of Timothy M. Nissley;
Daniel E. Nordfors, a minor; Patricia A. Nordfors;
William E. Nordfors; Charles D. O’Brien; Helen D. O’Brien:
Jennifer C. O’Brien, a minor; John F. O’Hara;
Lois J. O'Hara; Lawrence T. O'Neill; Mary Kay O'Neill:
Donna Obercash; Estate of Barry Obercash;
Paula C. Obercash, a minor; Carl E. Oross; Sandra J. Oross;
Marian Rornaine Ort; Estate of Bernard Ostroski:;
Theresa C. Ostroski; Frances Ouellette; Ralph Ouellette;
Ronald J. Ouellette; Overview Limited Partnership;
David E. Pace; Estate of Emily A. Paczkowski;
Eva O. Palmeri; Gui S. Palmeri; Estate of Boyd Pannebaker;
Kathryn Pannebaker; Jerry L. Parker; Sara Parker;
Barbara Ann Parrish; James G. Parrish; Janice A. Parson:
Christine I. Patrick; John D. Patrick; Catherine D. Patton;
Robert M. Patton; Keith A. Paup; Susan A. Paup;
Dorothy J. Pavlick; Rudolph R. Pavlick:
Stanley R. Pearson, Jr.; David Q. Pechart;
Diane K. Pechart; Stephen C. Pechart, a minor;
Lois J. Peffley; Wayne D. Peffley; Betty J. Peifer;
Carol Peifer; Douglas Piefer; Marlin J. Peifer;
Lavetta D. Penn;
Pentidatillo Corp. (d/b/a Italian Villa East); Anna Peters:
Darla Peters; Estate of George Peters; Esther Peters;
William Peters; Glenn Peterson; Jolene Peterson;
Dennis D. Petrina; Nancy Petrina; Mildred Petrovich;
Estate of Helen Petrucci; Estate of John P. Petrucci, Sr.;
John P. Petrucci, Jr.; Barbara Ann Pettey; Estate of
Edward Bruce Pettey; Anna V. Phillips; Betty Snow Phillips;
John W. Phillips; Lawrence B. Phillips; Leonard F. Picciotti;
Brenda Pickett; Maria I. Pierce; Estate of Michael F. Pinko,
Sr.; Marlene L. Pinko; Kenneth A. Pipher, Sr.;
Anna T. Placey; Estate of Anthony S. Placey;
Christine L. Plank; Samuel E. Plank; Karen A. Plappert;
Michael L. Plappert, a minor; William F. Plappert:;
Leonor Platkin; Mildred B. Plattner; Samuel E. Plattner;
George Pleasant; Elizabeth R. Pluta; John David Pluta,
a minor; Estate of Yvonne W. Poe; Louis R. Poe;
A-15
Robert H. Polsky; Beulah N. Popp; Sylvia J. Posey;
Daniel Potteiger; William L. Potts, Jr.; Lamar F. Powell;
Marjorie J. Powell; Richard Power; Estate of
Robert A. Pratt; Estate of Janelle Price; Jan Price:
Jesse A. Price, Jr.; Patricia L. Prin; William A. Prin;
Angela M. Prince; Sarah Jo D’Oro Prince, a minor;
Georgann Pristello; Jaime Lynn Pristello, a minor;
James J. Pristello; Maurice P. Procopio; Fannie Mae Proctor;
Lawrence H. Proctor; Myron Pronko; Estate of
William Prosperi; Joan Prosperi; Herman H. Prosser;
Estate of Charles C. Pugliese; Lisa D. Pugliese;
Frances G. Purcell: John Purcell; Kenneth Putt; Ruth Putt;
Laura E. Quante; Robert D. Quante; Estate of
Edythe M. Quenzer; Richard C. Quenzer;
Erin Lee Quigley, a minor; Lawrence D. Quigley;
Mary M. Quigley; Phyllis J. Quigley; Timothy L. Quigley;
Cornelius E. Quinn; Sheila M. Quinn; Estate of
Helen Rachelson; Norman Rachelson; Delores Anne Rad;
Thomas Rad; Donna Marie Radabaugh;
George William Radabaugh; Estate of Anthony John Rados;
Matthew Ronald Rados, a minor; Robert A. Rados;
Ronald R. Rados; Susanne C. Rados; Marlene Rafaj;
Jennifer A. Rafy, a minor; Robert W. Rafy; Sandra K. Rafy;
Helen M. Railing; Earl M. Ramage; Joan M. Ramage;
David E. Rambler; Karen E. Rambler; Rosemary Ramos;
Michael P. Raynock; Estate of Mary L. Razzis;
Herman A. Razzis; Dorothy Reamer; Estate of
Walter H. Reamer; Albert Reap; Eleanor Reap;
Janet Redfern; Blossom B. Reed; Estate of Edward G. Reed;
Margaret Reed; Samuel L. Reese; Sandra Y. Reese;
Yvonne Reeser; Berneice Reigle; Estate of
Kenneth Aaron Reigle; Florence E. Remsnyder;
Orin F. Remsnyder; Gina Renshaw; Jane Renshaw;
W. Richard Renshaw; Hyman Resnick; Ida Resnick;
Joyce Resnick; Marvin E. Resnick; John Edward Rettinger;
Miriam P. Rettinger; Estate of Charles H. Reynolds;
Mary Catherine Reynolds; Thomas FE. Reynolds;
Kathlene Ann Rhoads; Ronald Eugene Rhoads;
Dennis R. Richie; Kathleen L. Richie;
A-16
Sharon L. Rickabaugh; Donna Ricker; Roy Ricker;
Raymond Rider; Florence C. Riordan;
William Joseph Riordan; Todd Anthony Risser, a minor:
Carl F. Ritchey; Elizabeth F. Ritchey; Lynn Ritchey;
Edward EF. Ritter, Jr.; Sonda Ritter; Jane M. Roberts:
Estate of Lillian L. Robinson; Estate of Wilbur F Robinson:
Izola B. Robinson; Jeanne N. Robinson:
Louise A. Robinson; John B. Roche III:
Nancy Elaine Roche; Harriet Rochman;
Herbert B. Rochman; Dolores M. Rockey; Estate of
David D. Rockmore; Mary EF. Rockmore; Estate of
Agnes M. Rogers; Paul P. Rogers; Elizabeth L. Rolko:
George P. Rolko; Gerald R. Romberger:
Amanda C. Rorapaugh, a minor; Dale Rorapaugh:;
Daniela Rorapaugh; Edith Z. Rose; Estate of
Bernard Z. Rose; Estate of Leonard L. Roseman:
Ruth Roseman; Coral Rosen; Estate of Zellman Rosen:
Jack Ira Rosen; Ralph Rosen; Robert Samuel Rosen:
Doris E. Rosi; Joseph August Rosi; Virginia Ross; Estate of
Edward H. Roth, Jr.; John Roth; Linda Roth:
Sarah M. Roth; Estate of Rose Rothberg; Mary A. Rounsley:
Millard E. Rounsley; Estate of Evelye Nicole Rowe:
Evelye Rowe; Fetus Rowe; Randall Rowe; Beth Rozman.
a minor; Frank Rozman; Lugenia Rozman; Lewis Rubin:
Nancy Rubin; Elizabeth R. Rudy; Estate of Isaac C. Rudy:
Susan L. Rudy; Richard M. Rutt (d/b/a Rutt’s Tours):
Debra Rutter; Gregory Dane Rutter; Alda R. Ryan;
Donald B. Ryan; Joyce M. Rymer; Juergen Rymer;
Mary Margaret Safranek; Emily Beth Sajeski, a minor:
Eugene A. Sajeski; Nancy C. Sajeski; Hugo Salazar:
Kenneth L. Salov; Nancy J. Salov; Estate of
Stephanie A D Sanden; Jeffrey Allan Sanden; John Santoro:
Melissa Susan Santoro, a minor; Susan Santoro:
Subhash Sarda; Randolph Saunders; Sharon Saunders:
Carol A. Saytar; Steve W. Saytar; Salvator Scali:
Ruth Schaffhauser; Barbara A. Schaffner:
Robert L. Schaffner; Dervis Scheib; Nancy L. Scheib:
James E. Schell; Kimberly Ann Schell; Marilyn E. Schell:
Kriste S. Schoppert; Wendy Schotzberger:
A-17
Barry L. Schrade; Joyce M. Schrade; Terry L. Schrade,
a minor; Estate of Harold G. Schroll; Helen Schroll;
Beth Ann Schuchman; Harry L. Schwartz;
Jan M. Schwartz; Patricia H. Schwartz; Deobrah Sczypta;
Ronald L. Sczypta, a minor; Dale P. Searer;
Susan M. Searer; Angela Sedeshe; Eva A. Seigh;
Kenneth Seigh; Sylvia Selkirk; William E. Selkirk; Estate of
Frances J. Sennett; Lester D. Sennett; Arthur Philip Shade;
Estate of Mary Anna Shade; Harold L. Shaeffer;
Nancy E. Shaeffer; Catherine J. Shaffer; Darrel Shaffer;
Estate of Allan L. Shaffer; Estate of Donna L. Shaffer;
Frances May Shaffer; Gerald A. Shaffer; Janet L. Shaffer;
Joseph A. Shaffer; Michael Shaffer; Richard P. Shaffer;
Thelma Shaffer; Estate of Arlene Shanaman;
Paul Shanaman; Eugene Shaner; Ida Shaner;
Lawrence W. Shank; Nancy L. Shannon; Albert Shapiro;
Estate of Milton Shapiro; Gayle D. Shapiro;
Marcia P. Shapiro; Doris Sharar; James Sharar;
Linda Share; Carol A. Sheaffer; John G. Sheaffer;
Roxanne Sheaffer; Mary Ann Sheetz;
Michael Richard Sheetz; Debra W. Shepler;
Jody Lee Shepp; Sarah Sherman; Sidney Sherman;
Lee Shields; Estate of Charles J. Shipe; Raymond C. Shirk;
Sue Ann Shirk; Estate of E. Maxine Shriver;
Cecilia Shuller; Diana Shuller; Estate of Harry B. Shuller;
Elaine L. Shultz; Harold M. Shultz; Estate of
Evelyn Shumaker; Estate of Raymond W. Shumaker;
Estate of Ella J. Simmons; Whitney Simmons, a minor;
Richard P. Simonton; Theresa Simonion; Donna Sine;
Welbie Sine; David Singer; Diane F. Singer; Edwin Singer;
Rena Singer; Carla F Sipe; Stephen J. Sipe; Evelyn Siple;
Howard C. Sipling; Crystal Sites; Joseph Skasko;
Skiadas Brothers Enterprises, Inc.; Ronald H. Skubecz;
James M. Slee; Jeromy F. Slee, a minor; Eileen Slesser;
Cheryl L. Smerick; SMG Investments; Jeffrey Allen Smith;
Joan L. Smith; Catherine Smith; Christin Lynn Smith,
a minor; Deborah A. Smith; Estate of Charles R. Smith, Jr.;
Estate of Donald Leroy Smith; Gloria A. Smith:
Jennifer Marie Smith, a minor;
A-18
L.f. Smith Wholesale Distributors; Lydia Smith;
Mary Ellen Smith; Matthew John Smith, a minor;
Michelle Smith; Raymond B. Smith; Richard Lee Smith;
Robert Smith; Robert K. Smith; Robert M.Smith;
Ross D. Smith; Sharon A. Smith; Shawn Smith, a minor;
Shawnee Dee Smith; Shirley Smith; Steven Lee Smith,
a minor; Terry FE Smith; Reverend Wayne L. Smith;
William Robert Smith, a minor; Odis D. Sneed;
Peggy J. Sneed; S.N.G. Investments, Inc.; Harry W. Snow;
Donald E. Snyder; Esther Snyder; James E. Snyder;
Kenneth R. Snyder; Patricia A. Snyder;
Ricky L. Snyder, Sr.; Sandra L. Snyder; Estate of
Helen J. Sohn; Ruby B. Sollenberger; Betty S. Solomon;
Edward Solomon; Estate of Ruth A. Sommerville;
George H. Sommerville; Sharon Sonni; Thomas Sonni;
Marie A. Sotack; Thomas R. Sotack; Daniel Soto;
Roberto Soto; Eugene L. Southard; Patricia Southard;
John P. Soutner, Jr.; Kelly B. Soutner; Mary Spanitz;
Michael Spanitz; Gail KE. Speese; Grace Spencer;
Robert H. Spencer; Charles W. Spiroff; David Von Spiroff;
Estate of JoAnn Spiroff; Natalie Spiroff;
Margaret S. Spoljaric; William J. Spoljaric; Jacob N. Spong;
Patty A. Spong; Barbara Spotts; Harry H. Spotts;
Fred J. Sprowls; Raymond Winston Sprowls;
Thomas O. Sprucebank; Goldie L. Staab; Pia Stadiem;
Joyce FE. Stare; Edmond Francis Frick Starr; James Siarr;
Robin Kaye Starr; Jo Ann Staub; Rachael L. Stauffer;
Rachel Stauffer; Robert A. Stauffer; Victoria A. Stauffer;
Betty Y. Steinruck; Estate of Carl L. Steltzer; Mary Steltzer;
Estate of Clair Stephenson; Florence E. Stephenson;
Tammy M. Stephenson, a minor; Cheryl Claire Sterner;
David Anthony Sterner; C. Evelyn Stewart;
Charlotte Stewart; Estate of Joseph Stewart; Alberta Stoak;
Diane Stoddart; Matthew A. Stofanak; Lee M. Stofanek;
Barbara A. Stone; J. Michael Stone; M. David Stone,
a minor; Robert C. Stone, III; Wesley Stonesifer, a minor;
William Stoufer; Magdalena Stout; Richard Stout, a minor;
E.. Gladys Strange; Robert W. Strange;
Thomas E. Strauss, Inc.; Mary Jane Stretch;
A-19
James K. String; Estate of Dorothy L. Strohm;
Marlin E. Strohm; Carey Stroman, a minor; Debra Stroman;
Lowell Stroman; Lyle Stroman; Dennis L. Stuart;
Jennifer K. Stuart; Clarence L. Stuck; Irene R. Stuck;
John W. Stump; Margaret E. Stump; Beryl Ann Sullivan;
Estate of Jeffrey E. Sullivan; Estate of William Sullivan;
John William Sullivan; Kevin Sullivan, a minor;
June C. Sunday; Michael D. Sunday; Jacob Louis Susskind;
Clifford J. Sutton; Ruth E. Sutton; Erek Swanson, a minor;
Janelle W. Swanson; Kara Swanson, 2 minor;
Steven W. Swanson; Estate of Stephen G. Szabo;
Phyllis Szabo; Helen Szollosy; Louis Szollosy;
Donald Leroy Tadych; Judy Faye Tadych; Barbara Taylor;
Gail C. Taylor; James Taylor; John O. Taylor; Lisa C. Taylor;
Marian E. Taylor; Richard E. Taylor; Kermit E. Thames;
Martha Ann Thames; Ruby N. Thames; Estate of
Linda Sue Thomas; Estate of Norman A. Thomas;
James E. Thomas; Janet M. Thomas; Mary E. Thomas;
Michael James Thomas; Cora M. Thompson;
Frank Thompson, a minor; Fred E. Thompson;
Inman Thompson; Leah Thompson; Lisa Thompson;
Mary E. Thompson; Elwyn FE. Tilden;
Mary Margaret Tilden; Estate of Arthur Tilly;
Gertrude Tilly; Phillip G. Tomko; Sterling E. Toomey;
Gladys E. Topper; Theresa Torau; Alice Polly Torchia;
David E. Towsen; Lori K. Towsen; Dorothy M. Triest;
Corbin S. Trimmer, a minor; Jean Trimmer;
Ronetta J. Trimmer; Steven R. Trimmer; Estate of
Elaine H. Troland; Sophia Troutman; Estate of
Jared T. Troxell; Sandra Louise Troxell; Thomas Troxell;
Brenda D. Updegraff; Glenn D. Updegraff, Jr.;
Lucy Updegraff; Gerald J. Urban; James T. Urban;
Anthony Vasco, Jr.; Dorothy G. Vasco; Estate of
Caroline Vasco; John Vasco; Donna Vasquez;
Gabriel Vasquez; Gabriel Vasquez, a minor;
Margaret E. Vaughn; Estate of Frank L. Verbos;
Rosemary Elizabeth Verbos; Gary Villella; Estate of
Clayton R. Vogel; Frances F Vogel; Angeline M. Vulich;
Joseph S. Vulich, Carol Wagner; Charles Edward Wagner,
a minor; Charles W. Wagner; Jack E. Wagner;
A-20
Beverly E. Walker; Lori Thompson Walker;
Rosa Lee Walker; William M. Walker;
Camille Donna Walters; Lester H. Walters; Lois Walters;
Richard Arnold Walters; Ronald A. Ward; Ronald A. Ward,
a minor; Estate of Mamie Lou Warren; Peter Washinko;
Aubrey L. Watkins; Darryl Watkins, a minor;
Dierdra Watkins, a minor; Sandra L. Watkins;
Leila Mae Watson; Milton Watson; Eleanor B. Webb:
Estate of Lewis E. Webb; Theordore B. Webb;
Diane T. Weber; William J. Weber; Carol L. Weirich;
Leonard J. Weishner, Jr.; Estate of Walter A. Weit;
Virginia Irene Weit; Estate of Amy Sarah Weller;
Marian Weller; Robert Weller; Catherine M. Wendolowski:;
Paul Wendolowski; Paul Wendolowski, a minor;
Gilbert D. Werner; Shirley M. Werner; Halfred W. Wertz;
Karen Ann Wertz; Ruth P. Wertz; Daniel Wevodau;
Estate of Linda Wevodau; Charlene G. White;
Dennis White; Donna White; John P. White, Jr.;
Justin Edward White, a minor; Shawn Patrick White:
Estate of Clarence Whitebread; Magdalene N. Whitebread;
James O. Whittaker; Sandra Whittaker;
Eleanor S. Wililams; Barbara Wilkerson;
Andrew F. Williams; Archie L. Williams;
Arthur Ray Williams, Jr.; Audrey Mae Williams, a minor;
Barbara Williams; Curtis Williams; Kileen Williams:
Frances L. Williams; Guy Ronald Williams;
Harry E. Williams, Jr.; Harry J. Williams, III, a Minor;
Judy E. Williams; Nancy Williams; Shery! L. Williams;
Walter T. Williams; Leslie S. Williams; Barbara Wilson;
Clarence L. Wilson; Donna J. Wilson; Estate of
Janet Wilson; Sandra Lee Wilson; Gloria Ann Wingert:
Thomas R. Wingert, Sr.; Eleanor W. Wise; Estate of
Frank E. Wise; Kathleen J. Wise; Rosalyn A. Wise;
Theda A. A. Wise; Estate of Irene E. Wisegarver;
Richard Wiseyarver; Carol Wish; Joel Wish;
Helen Wisniewski; Estate of Stanley J. Wisniewski;
Donna Jean Witeof; Frank Witeof; Audrey Wolf; Estate of
John Wolf; Esta Wolfe; Lawrence Wolfe; Donna Wood;
Gary Wood; Mildred Woolf; Irwin P. Woolfson;
A-21
Patricia Woolfson; Aldona M. Yeager; Eugene Yentsch;
Patricia Yentsch; Cheryl J. Yespy; Estate of
Chester L. Yinger; Joseph Yinger; Ronald Yingling;
Deanna Yocum; James Yocum; Paul E. Yoder;
Shirley Yoder; Goldie F. Yoffee; Estate of Samuel H. Yoffee;
Arline H. Yohn; James R. Yohn; Estate of
Katherine Ann Yohn; Ross Yohn; Deborah York; Estate of
Mark York; Estate of Matthew York; Robert C. York, Jr.;
Estate of Eleanor Yost; Melinda Yost; Beryl S. Young;
Estate of Lewis T. Young; Agnes A. Zapcic;
James S. Zapcic; Pauline Zarkin; Estate of Samuel Zarkin;
Colin Kelley Zeager; Ruby Carol Zeager; Colby M. Zeiders,
a minor; Deborah S. Zeiders; K. Richard Zeiders;
Charles M. Zeigler; Mary E. Zeigler; Estate of Brian Zeller;
Estate of Eric E. Zeller; Joanne Zeller; Barbara Zendal;
Estate of Donald N. Zendal; Betty J. Zerbe; Floyd B. Zerbe;
Estate of Leon R. Zerbe; Donald R. Zimmerman;
Marion A. Zimmerman; Estate of Sara Zuckerman;
Chris Zuna, a minor; Gizella R. Zuvich; Estate of
Louis G. Zuvich
A-22
A-23
Filed July 26, 1991
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 90-5312/13/14/15/16/17/18, 90-5562,
90-5671/72/73
IN RE: TMI LITIGATION
CASES CONSOLIDATED II
Brannon, James T., et al,
vs.
Babcock & Wilcox Company, Inc., et al.
General Public Utilities Corporation,
Metropolitan Edison Company, New Jersey
Central Power & Light Company,
Pennsylvania Electric Company, Babcock &
Wilcox Company, McDermott Incorporated,
U.E.&C.- Catalytic, and Burns & Roe
Enterprises, Inc., Dresser Industries,
Appellants in Nos. 90-5312 and 90-5672
(D.C. Civ. Nos. 426 S 1985, 771/72/73/74S
1985, 861 S 1985, 1052 S 1985, 1147/48 S 1985,
1175 S 1985, 1220/21/22 S 1985, 1224 S 1985,
1402/03 S 1985, 1465 S 1985, 1565/66 S 1985,
1649 S 1985, 1674 S 1985, 1677/78 S 1985,
1681 S 1985, 1694 S 1985, 1742 S 1985,
1748/49/50 S 1985, 1793 S 1985, 3890 S 1985,
3892 S 1985, 3929 S 1985, 4179 S 1985, 4188 S
1985, 4314 S 1985, 194 S 1986, 327/28 S 1986,
1827 S 1985, 1929 S 1985, 2016 S 1985, 2087 S
A-24
2
1985, 2096 S 1985, 2239 S 1985, 2294 S 1985,
2364 S 1985, 2481 S 1985, 2507/08 S 1985,
2536 S 1985, 2679 S 1985, 2796 S 1985,
2837/38 S 1985, 2873 S 1985, 2994 S 1985,
3004 S 1985, 3056 S 1985, 3117 S 1985, 3337 S
1985, 543 S 1986, 739 S 1986, 853 S 1986,
976/77 S 1986, 1149 S 1986, 1531 S 1986, 1768
S 1986, 1780 S 1986, 2012 S 1986, 2110 S 1986,
2967/68 S 1986, 3764 S 1986, 359 S 1987, 368
S 1987, 421 S 1987, 728 S 1987, 995 S 1987,
1080 S 1987, 1874 S 1987, 0009 S 1988, 481 S
1988, 88-1452/53/54/55/ 56/57/58/59/60/61,
88-1466/67/68/69/70/71/72/73/74/75/76/77
/78/79/80/81/82/83/84/85/86/87/88/89/90/91
/92/93/94, 88-1496/97/98/
99/1500/01/02/03/04/05/06/07/08/09/10/11/1
2/13/14/15/16/17/18/19/
20/21/22/23/24/25/26, 88-1540, 88-
1546/47/48/49, 88-1551, 88-
1553/54/55/56/57/58, 88-1570, 88-1670, 88-
1706, 88-1807, 89-0049, 89-0105, 89-0271, 89-
0332, 89-0660, 89-1208, 89-1204, 89-1503, 88-
01538)
ANDREA LEWINTER,
Personal Representative of
the Estate of MARK LEWINTER;
vs.
GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.;
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY;
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.;
PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY;
BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY;
J. RAY MCDERMOTT & COMPANY;
CATALYTIC, INC.; and
BURNS & ROE, INC.
A-25 *
General Public Utilities Corporation,
Metropolitan Edison Company, New Jersey
Central Power & Light Company,
Pennsylvania Electric Company, Babcock &
Wilcox Company, McDermott Incorporated,
Burns & Roe Enterprises, Inc., and
U.E.&C.- Catalytic,
Appellants in No. 90-5313
(D.C. Civil No. 88-01550)
PERRI C. KIICK; and
EDWARD KIICK, husband and wife
vs.
METROPOLITAN EDISON CO.;
GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.; and
BABCOCK AND WILCOX COMPANY
General Public Utilities Corp., Metropolitan
Edison Company, and Babcock & Wilcox
Company,
Appellants in No. 90-5314
(D.C. Civil No. 88-01552)
JOHN W. GUMBY, SR.
vs.
GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.;
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY;
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CoO.;
PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY;
BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY;
J. RAY MCDERMOTT & COMPANY;
CATALYTIC, INC.;
BURNS & ROE ENTERPRISES, INC.
A-26
4
General Public Utilities Corporation,
Metropolitan Edison Company, New Jersey
Central Power & Light Company,
Pennsylvania Electric Company, Babcock &
Wilcox Company, McDermott Incorporated,
Burns & Roe Enterprises, Inc., and
U.E.&C.-Catalytic,
Appellants in No. 90-5315
(D.C. Civ. No. 90-00098)
HARRY MONTVILLE;
VIRGINIA MONTVILLE, in their own right and
as parents and natural guardians of plaintiff:
DANIEL ALLEN MONTVILLE
vs.
GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.;
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY;
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.;
PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY;
BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY;
J. RAY MCDERMOTT & COMPANY;
CATALYTIC, INC.;
BURNS & ROE ENTERPRISES, INC.
General Public Utilities Corporation,
Metropolitan Edison Company, New Jersey
Central Power & Light Company,
Pennsylvania Electric Company, Babcock &
Wilcox Company, McDermott Incorporated,
Burns & Roe Enterprises, Inc., and
U.E.&C.-Catalytic,
Appellants in No. 90-5316
(D.C. Civ. No. 90-00370)
JOHN B. ROCHE, III;
NANCY ELAINE ROCHE;
A-27
5
ERIN KATHLEEN MILLER;
TIMOTHY MILLER;
CATHY DAUGHERTY;
KIM DAUGHERTY;
RACHEL L. STAUFFER;
NED E. GROVE,
individually and as personal representative
of the Estate of Sylvia K. Grove, deceased;
ROBERT L. CASSELL, SR.;
PATRICIA A. CASSELL;
PAUL D. WALTERICK;
LINDA D. WALTERICK,
individually and on behalf of their
minor child, Paul D. Walterick, Jr.;
PAUL M. WALTERICK;
HELEN G. WALTERICK;
JENNIFER M. WALTERICK
vs.
GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.,;
U.E. & C. CATALYTIC CORPORATION;
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY;
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CoO.;
PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY;
BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY;
J. RAY MCDERMOTT & COMPANY;
BURNS & ROE, INC.
General Public Utilites Corporation,
Metropolitan Edison Company, New Jersey
Central Power & Light Company,
Pennsylvania Eiectric Company, Babcock &
Wilcox Company, McDermott Incorporated,
Burns & Roe Enterprises, Inc., and
U.E.&C.-Catalytic,
Appellants in No. 90-5317
(D.C. Civ. No. 90-00530)
A-28
MARGARET KRAFFT
vs.
GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.;
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY,’
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CoO.;
PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY;
BABCOCK & WILCOX CO.;
J. RAY MCDERMOTT & COMPANY;
CATALYTIC, INC.;
BURNS & ROE ENTERPRISES, INC.
General Public Utilities Corporation,
Metropolitan Edison Company, New Jersey
Central Power & Light Company,
Pennsylvania Electric Company, Babcock &
Wilcox Company, McDermott Incorporated,
Burns & Roe Enterprises, Inc., and
U.E.&C.-Catalytic,
Appellants in No. 90-5318
(D.C. Civ. No. 90-00531)
IN RE: TMI LITIGATION
CASES CONSOLIDATED II
Brannon, James T., et al,
vs.
Babcock & Wilcox Company, Inc., et al.
General Public Utilities Corp., Metropolitan
Edison Company, New Jersey Central Power
& Light Company, Pennsylvania Electric
Company, Babcock & Wilcox Company,
McDermott Incorporated, U.E.&C.- Catalytic,
and Burns & Roe Enterprises, Inc., Dresser
Industries,
Appellants in Nos. 90-5562
A-29
7
(D.C. Civ. Nos. 426 S 1985, 771/72/73/74 S
1985, 861 S 1985, 1052 S 1985, 1147/48 S 1985,
1175 S 1985, 1220/21/22 S 1985, 1224 S 1985,
1402/03 S 1985, 1465 S 1985, 1565/66 S 1985,
1649 S 1985, 1674 S 1985, 1677/78 S 1985,
1681 S 1985, 1694 S 1985, 1742 S 1985,
1748/49/50 S 1985, 1793 S 1985, 3890 S 1985,
3892 S 1985, 3929 S 1985, 4179 S 1985, 4188 S
1985, 4314 S 1985, 194 S 1986, 327/28 S 1986,
1827 S 1985, 1929 S 1985, 2016 S 1985, 2087 S
1985, 2096 S 1985, 2239 S 1985, 2294 S 1985,
2364 S 1985, 2481 S 1985, 2507/08 S 1985,
2536 S 1985, 2679 S 1985, 2796 S 1985,
2837/38 S 1985, 2873 S 1985, 2994 S 1985,
3004 S 1985, 3056 S 1985, 3117 S 1985, 3337 S
1985, 543 S 1986, 739 S 1986, 853 S 1986,
976/77 S 1986, 1149 S 1986, 1531 S 1986, 1768
S 1986, 1780 S 1986, 2012 S 1986, 2110 S 1986,
2618 S 1986, 2967/68 S 1986, 3764 S 1986, 359
S 1987, 368 S 1987, 421 S 1987, 728 S 1987,
995 S 1987, 1080 S 1987, 1874 S 1987, 0009 S
1988, 481 S 1988, 88-1452/53/54/55/
56/57/58/59/60/61, 88-
1466/67/68/69/70/71/72/73/74/75/76/77/78/7
9/80/81/82/83/84/85/86/87/88/89/90
/91/92/93/94, 88-
1496/97/98/99/1500/01/02/03/04/05/06/07/08
/09/10/11/12/13/14/15/16/17/18/19/20/21/22
/23/24/25/26, 88-1540, 88-1546/47/48/
49/50/51/52/53/54/55/56/57/58, 88-1570, 88-
1670, 88-1706, 88-1807, 89-0049, 89-0105, 89-
0271, 89-0332, 89-0660, 89-1028, 89-1204, 89-
1503, 90-98, 90-370, 90-530/31, 88-01538)
IN RE: TMI LITIGATION
CASES CONSOLIDATED II
A-30
8
Brannen, James T., et al.,
VS.
Babcock & Wilcox Company, Inc., et al.
United States of America,
Defendant-Intervenor
Appellant in Nos. 90-5671 and 90-5673
(D.C. Civ. Nos. 426 S 1985, 771/72/73/74 S
1985, 861 S 1985, 1052 S 1985, 1147/48 S 1985,
1175 S 1985, 1220/21/22 S 1985, 1224 S 1985,
1402/03 S 1985, 1465 S 1985, 1565/66 S 1985,
1649 S 1985, 1674 S 1985, 1677/78 S 1985,
1681 S 1985, 1694 S 1985, 1742 S 1985,
1748/49/50 S 1985, 1793 S 1985, 3890 S 1985,
3902 S 1095, 3929 S 1985, 4179 S 1985, 4188 S
1985, 4314 S 1985, 194 S 1986, 327/28 S 1986,
1793 S 1985, 1827 S 1985, 1929 S 1985, 2016S
1985, 2087 S 1985, 2096 S 1985, 2239 S 1985,
2294 S 1985, 2364 S 1985, 2481 S 1985,
2507/08 S 1985, 2536 S 1985, 2679 S 1985,
2796 S 1985, 2837/38 S 1985, 2873 S 1985,
2994 S 1985, 3004 S 1985, 3056 S 1985, 3117 S
1985, 3337 S 1985, 543 S 1986, 739 S 1986, 853
S 1986, 976/77 S 1986, 1149 S 1986, 1531 S
1986, 1768 S 1986, 1780 S 1986, 2012 S 1986,
2110 S 1986, 2618 S 1986, 2967/68 S 1986,
3764 S 1986, 359 S 1987, 368 S 1987, 421 S
1987, 728 S 1987, 1874 S 1987, 0009 S 1988,
481 S 1988, 88-1452/53/54/55/
56/57/58/59/60/61, 88-
1466/67/68/69/70/71/72/73/74/75/76/77/
78/79/80/81/82/83/84/85/86/87/88/89/90/91/
92/93/94, 88-1496/97/ 98/99/ 1500/01/02/03/
04/05/06/07/08/09/ 10/11/12/13/14/15/16/17/
18/19/20/21/22/23/24/25/26, 88-1540. 88-
AS)
9
1546/47/48/49, 88-1551, 88-
1553/54/55/56/57/58, 88-1570, 88-1670, 88-
1706, 88-1807, 89-0049, 89-0105, 89-0271, 89-
0332, 89-0660, 89-1028, 89-1204, 89-1503, 88-
1550, 88-1552, 90-98, 90-370, 90-530/31, 995 S
1987, 1080 S 1987, 88-01538)
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
Argued
February 7, 1991
Before: MANSMANN, SCIRICA and
HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion filed: Juiy 26, 1991)
John R. O'Donnell, Esq.
Zarwin & Baum
1616 John F. Kennedy Boulevard
Four Penn Center Plaza
Philadelphia, PA 19103
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES, Estate Arthur
Tilly, Gertrude Tilly, Vincent Denoncour,
Nora Denoncour
Joseph D. Shein, Esq.
235 South 17th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, Perri C. Kiick
A-32
10
Louis M. Tarasi, Jr., Esq.
Tarasi & Johnson
510 Third Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES, GROUP A
See Docket Entry in No. 90-5312
for List of Parties
Arnold Levin, Esq. (ARGUED)
Fred S. Longer, Esq.
Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman
Suite 600, 320 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Lee C. Swartz, Esq.
Sandra L. Meilton, Esq.
Hepford, Swartz, Menaker & Morgan
111 North Front Street
P.O. Box 889
Harrisburg, PA 17108
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES, GROUP B
See Docket Entry in No. 90-5312
for List of Parties
James R. Adams, Esq.
Barley, Snyder, Cooper & Barber
126 East King Street
Lancaster, PA 17602
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES, Family Style
Restaurant, Skiadas Brothers, Thomas E.
Strauss, Inc., Gettysburg Tours, Inc.,
Heritage Inns, Inc., Le Smith Wholesale,
Lincoln Heritage Inc., Overview Limited,
SMG Investments
A-33
1]
Peter J. Neeson, Esq.
LaBrum & Doak
1700 Market Street, Suite 700
Philadelphia, PA 19103-3997
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES, Joan A.
Kichman, Charles C. Kichman,
Matthew C. Kichman, Kandice M. Kichman
William E. Chillas, Esq.
Joseph F. Roda, Esq.
36 East King Street
Lancaster, PA 17602
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES, Earl Realty,
Inc., Amish Homestead, Inc., One Room
Schoolhouse, Homestead Gift Shop, Two
Twenty-Two Corp., James Cosgrove, Glass
Kitchens, Cherry Lane Mtr. Inn, Richard
M. Rutt, Noah N. Martin Co., Cont. Inns of
America, Pentidatillo Corp.
John G. Harkins, Jr., Esq. (ARGUED)
A. H. Wilcox, Esq.
Ellen Kittredge Scott, Esq.
Pepper, Hamilton & Scheets
3000 Two Logan Square
Philadelphia, PA 19103-2799
Of Counsel:
Paul J. Mishkin, Esq.
Berkeley, California
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS, General
Public Utilities Corporation, Metropolitan
Edison Company, Jersey Central Power &
Light Company, Pennsylvania Electric
Company, Babcock & Wilcox Company,
McDermott Inc., UE&C - Catalytic, Inc.,
Burns & Roe Enterprises Inc., Dresser
Industries, Incorporated
Stuart M. Gerson
Assistant Attorney General
James J. West
United States Attorney
William Kanter, Esq.
Peter R. Maier, Esq. (ARGUED)
Appellate Staff
Civil Division, Room 3617
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, United
States of America
OPINION OF THE COURT
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge.
In this matter growing out of the 1979 incident
at the Three Mile Island nuclear facility near
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, we are asked once again
to resolve a confrontation between an assertion of
federal jurisdiction over public Hability actions by
defendants and a challenge to that jurisdiction by
plaintiffs who wish to be in the state court system.
We previously visited a similar issue in Klick v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 784 F.2d 490 (3d Cir.
1986), and Stibitz v. General Pub. Util. Corp., 746
F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1214 (1985), and concluded there that Congress
did not intend that there be a federal cause of
A-35
13
action arising under’ the terms’ of the
Price-Anderson Act (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
Our focus here is on the constitutionality of the
Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988, 42
U.S.C. § 2100 et seq. In the Amendments Act,
Congress expressly created a federal cause of
action for nuclear accident claims and is alleged
to have worked major changes in the landscape of
public liability law.
Specifically, our review centers upon a district
court order remanding certain public liability
actions to the state courts in which they were
originally filed or in which they might have been
filed. The district court concluded that it lacked
federal subject matter” ‘jurisdiction over these
claims and that remand was appropriate under the
terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).' The district court
reached this decision despite the fact that the
Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988, which
created the federal public liability action, specifies
that the federal courts have original jurisdiction
over these actions and that public liability actions
filed in state courts, which have concurrent
jurisdiction, are subject to removal upon the
motion of a defendant, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, or the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2).
The district court's determination with respect
to subject matter jurisdiction rested not on any
failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of
the Amendments Act but upon the court's
conclusion that the Amendments Act itself was
1. This section provides, in pertinent part, that, “If at any
time before final judgment it appears that the district court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”
|
A-36
14
unconstitutional. Underlying the remand order was
the district court's holding that Congress, in
purporting to create a federal forum for public
liability actions through the Amendments Act,
exceeded the authority granted to it by Article III,
Section 2 of the United States Constitution.
Because it believed that its order granting the
plaintiffs’ motion to remand involved a “controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from this order may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,”
the district court stayed execution of the remand
and certified for immediate appeal, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b), the following question:
Whether Congress exceeded the scope of Article
III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution
by granting federal courts’ subject matter
jurisdiction over public liability actions through
the Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988.
The defendants, in an abundance of caution, filed
petitions for permission to appeal, notices of appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 129} and petitions for a
writ of mandamus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1651.
The petitions for permission to appeal were granted
and the appeals arising from these petitions were
then consolidated with the direct appeals. (We refer
to these consolidated matters as “the appeal.”)
The procedural posture of this case raises a
serious threshold question concerning our
jurisdiction, under any of the three bases asserted,
to hear this appeal. The district court's remand
order, although it was stayed pending the outcome
of this appeal, arguably implicates a statutory bar
to our consideration of any aspect of the remand
A-37
15
order, including the constitutional determination
upon which it was based. 28 U.S.C. § 1447{(d)
provides that except for civil rights cases removed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443, “[aJn order
remanding a case to the State court from which
it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or
otherwise... .”
Because we are convinced that the bar of section
1447(d) was not intended to preclude appellate
consideration of a_ section 1292(b)_ certified
question concerning the constitutionality of an Act
of Congress, (here, the Price-Anderson
Amendments Act of 1988), we will address the
merits of the question certified. We find that the
grant of federal jurisdiction set forth in the
Amendments Act does not transgress the limits of
Article Ill, Section 2 of the United States
Constitution, and thus we will vacate the order of
the district court.
I.
The procedural history of many of the public |
liability actions before us in this appeal has
followed the course of a pendulum as statutory
and constitutional interpretation has operated to
move these actions back and forth between the
state and the federal courts. We recount this
history in detail since it bears directly on the
jurisdictional issues to be resolved.
These eleven consolidated appeals have their
origin in suits filed in the Pennsylvania state
courts and in the Mississippi state and federal
courts as a result of radiation leaks alleged to have
occurred on March 28, 1979 at the Three Mile
Island nuclear energy electric generating plant in
Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. In these suits,
approximately two thousand plaintiffs who resided
aE aa eae
A-38
16
near the Three Mile Island facility at the time of
the incident allege’ clinical and _ subclinical
conditions resulting from exposure to radiation
released from the facility; mumerous plaintiffs
assert claims based on fear of the effects of
radiation. Other claims, based upon loss of trade,
were filed by seventy-two tourist-related
businesses operating in nearby counties.
The defendants in these suits were, at the time
of the Three Mile Island incident, the owners and
operators of the nuclear facility, companies which
had provided design, engineering or maintenance
services, and those vendors of equipment or
systems installed in the facility. The defendants
deny that the March 28, 1979 release of radiation
caused any harm.
Some of the cases now pending were originally
filed in the early 1980's in several Pennsylvania
Courts of Common Pleas and state courts in
Bergen County, New Jersey and Jackson County,
Mississippi, and were removed by the defendants
to the United States District Courts. in
Pennsylvania and in Mississippi. The defendants
asserted as grounds for removal that the plaintiffs’
claims arose under the Price-Anderson Act, Pub.
L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified as
amended in various sections of 42 U.S.C.).?
2. The Price Anderson Act was enacted in 1957 as an
amendment to the Atomic Energy Act. Recognizing a
substantial federal interest in regulating the safety aspects of
the nuclear power industry, Congress sought to encourage the
involvement of the private sector in the development of
nuclear power by limiting the liability which might be
associated with a nuclear incident. In order to encourage
private participation in the nuclear energy industry and to
ensure that those who might be injured would be adequately
A-39
17
Following our rulings in Stibitz v. General Pub. Util.
Corp., 746 F.2d 993, 997 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985); and Klick ov.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 784 F.2d 490, 493 (3d
Cir. 1986), that the Price-Anderson Act created no
federal tort cause of action and was not intended
to confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts, the
actions originally filed in the state courts were
remanded and those few which had been brought
originally in the federal court were transferred to
the state courts via state law procedure. New
claims arising out of the same incident continued
to be filed in the state courts.
In August of 1988, Congress enacted the
Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988. Pub. L.
No. 100-408, 102 Stat. 1066 (1988). By this Act,
Congress expressly created a federal cause of
action for “public liability actions” which were
defined as “any suit asserting public liability.” 42
U.S.C. § 2014(hh).° The Amendments also
provided, in 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh), that public
compensated, Congress established a system of private
insurance and government indemnity.
Under the Act, nuclear facilities operators were required to
purchase a_ specified amount of insurance from_ private
carriers. Provision was made for government indemnification
above the insurance amounts to an established aggregate limit
on liability. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2210(a)-(c), (e).
3. “Public liability” had been defined in the Price-Anderson
Act prior to the Amendments as “any legal liability arising out
of or resulting from a nuclear incident or precautionary
evaluation.~ 42 U.S.C. § 2014(w). This definition was not
affected by the Amendments. Also not affected was _ the
definition of “nuclear incident” which appears at 42 U.S.C
§ 2014(q):
A-40
18
liability actions shall be deemed to arise under the
Price-Anderson Act. Thus the federal courts were
granted original jurisdiction over these actions;
any public liability actions pending or filed in the
state courts were subject to removal. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2210(n)(2).
Following enactment of the Amendments Act on
August 20, 1988, the defendants removed the
actions underlying these appeals to the United
States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania. On October 7, 1988, the plaintiffs
filed a petition seeking to have the removed actions
remanded to the state courts on the ground that
Congress lacked authority to create a_ federal
forum for public liability actions inasmuch as
these actions, despite Congress’ explicit statemeni
to the contrary, did not “arise under” federal law.
The defendants opposed this petition; the United
States government intervened in the proceedings
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403 and also opposed
the petition.
On March 16, 1990, the district court granted
the petition for remand. Holding that Congress’
grant of federal jurisdiction over public liability
actions would require that the federal courts apply
the same law which a state court would have
applied in an action under state common law, the
The term ‘nuclear incident’ means any occurrence,
including an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, within
the United States causing, within or outside the
United States, bodily injury, sickness, disease, or
death, or loss of or damage to property, or loss of use
of property, arising out of or resulting from the
radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous
properties of source, special nuclear, or byproduct
material... .”
A-41
19
district court concluded that the Amendments Act
accomplished only the creation of a federal forum
for the public liability actions. In the district
court's view, the Amendments Act did not change
the fact that the plaintiffs’ rights arose under state
law rather than under the federal statute. Because
it did not believe that the Amendments Act's grant
of federal jurisdiction over public liability actions
could withstand constitutional attack, the district
court concluded that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims and was
required to remand the actions to the state courts
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447{(c). In so holding,
the district court recognized that there was a
substantial ground for difference of opinion
regarding the constitutionality of the Amendments.
The district court, therefore, certified the
constitutional question for immediate appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
The United States and the defendants filed
timely petitions for permission to appeal. The
plaintiffs and the United States filed motions for
partial reconsideration and for reconsideration,
respectively. The defendants also filed a notice and
an amended notice of appeal.
By order entered June 14, 1990, the district
court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for partial
reconsideration and the motion filed by the United
States for reconsideration. All of the defendants
filed timely notices of appeal from the district cox
orders filed June 14, 1990 and March 16, 1990.
Petitions for a Wr't of Mandamus were also filed.
On July 12, 1990, we granted the petitions for
permission to appeal, consolidating the permissive
appeals with the direct appeals.
A-42
The threshold question before us is whether we
have jurisdiction to consider any aspect of the
district court order in view of the bar to appellate
review of remand orders set forth in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(d). The jurisdictional issue is substantial
and has been ably briefed and argued. Our task
is to determine whether Congress intended to
insulate from review those remand orders which
rest on the district court's finding that it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction because the statute
containing the grant of federal jurisdiction is,
itself, unconstitutional.
The defendants argue that there are three
separate bases upon which we might rely in order
to review the district court order. The first involves
the permissive appeal provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b). The defendants also assert that the
district court order is final within the meaning of
the collateral order exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1291
and contend that the district court order is
properly reviewable pursuant to aé_ writ of
mandamus authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1651.
The plaintiffs respond with a number of
conclusions’ respecting our jurisdiction, all
centering on 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d): 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(d) bars this court from hearing an appeal
by permission under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) from a
district court decision holding the Price-Anderson
Act Amendments of 1988 to be unconstitutional;
28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) prohibits this court's review
of a direct appeal; and issuance of a writ of
mandamus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651, is also
barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1447{(d).
A-43
21
Although we have been invited to bypass direct
consideration of the reach of the Section 1447(d)
bar,* we are convinced that this case requires
head-on confrontation. We turn, therefore, to the
language and history of section 1447{(d).
4. The defendants have argued that the 42 U.S.C. § 1447(d)
bar to review applies only to remand orders entered pursuant
to section 1447(c) and that the remand provisions of section
1447(c), in turn, apply only to those actions removed pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1441. Despite the district court's explicit
statement that “the decision to remand the case at bar is
based on § 1447(c),” the defendants argue that section 1447(c)
has no application to cases removed under the Price-Anderson
Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n), rather than
under the general removal provision of § 1441.
This argument appears to have its origins in our decision
in Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1984j. In
Pacor, we held that the general removal provisions of 28
U.S.C. §§ 1441-1447 had no application to cases removed to
the bankruptcy court under the provisions of former 28 U.S.C.
§ 1478 (amended and now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1452). We
reasoned that section 1478(a) authorized a type of removal
not contemplated by section 1441. Where the general removal
provisions provided only for removal from a state court to a
federal distriet court, section 1478(a) authorized rernoval of a
proceeding from any other court to the bankruptcy court.
Under the former bankruptcy law, the bankruptcy and district
courts were separate entities. We also noted that while section
1478 provided that any party could initiate removal to the
bankruptcy court, section 1441 permitted defendants alone to
seek removal. Relying upon these differences in the provisions
for removal, we concluded that the statutory conflicts and
inconsistencies which resulted from attempting to reconcile
the general removal provisions with the terms of section
1478(a) demonstrated that these general provisions could not
have been intended to apply to bankruptcy removals.
The narrow holding in Pacor was read broadly by the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in In re Federal Sav. and
Loan Ins. Corp., 837 F.2d 432 (11th Cir. 1988). The court
held that the section 1447(d) bar did not apply to review of
A-44
Section 1447(d) states clearly that, except for
civil rights cases removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1443, “[aJn order remanding a case to the State
court from which it was removed is not reviewable
on appeal or otherwise. . . .” This statutory bar to
remand orders in cases removed pursuant to 12 U.S.C.
§ 1730(k)(1), the statutory provision which authorizes the
FSLIC, when acting as receiver for a federal savings and loan
association, to remove to federal court any state court suit to
which it is a party. The remand provision of section 1447(c)
was intended to apply only to cases removed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1441, and not to cases removed pursuant to statutes
with special grants of federal jurisdiction and removal rights,
The defendants invite us to apply the rationale of In re
FSLIC and to hold that section 1447(d} does not operate to
bar review of cases removed under the provisions of the
Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988 rather than under
section 1441. This approach is not viable in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Rice, 327 U.S.
742 (1946). In Rice, the Supreme Court interpreted the
statutory forerunner of section 1447(d) to bar review of a
remand order even where removal had been effected pursuant
to a statute creating federal jurisdiction in cases involving
federally restricted land interests of an Indian. The Supreme
Court held that the bar to review was “intended to be
applicable not only to remand orders made in suits removed
under [the general removal statutes], but to orders of remand
made in cases removed under any other statutes, as well.”
Id. at 752.
Citing Rice, at least one other court has declined to follow
the ruling in In re FSLIC. See Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n
v. Frumenti Dev. Corp., 857 F.2d at 669. We find the
reasoning in Frumenti persuasive and conclude that Rice
prevents our holding that section 1447(d) does not extend to
review of remand orders in cases removed pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 2210{n).
A-45
23
appellate review of remand orders was first codified
in Section 2 of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1887
(24 Stat. 552, reenacted to correct errors in
enrollment, August 13, 1988, 25 Stat. 443):°
Whenever any cause shall be removed from any
state court into any circuit court of the United
States, and the circuit court shall decide that the
cause was improperly removed, and order the
same to be remanded to the State court from
whence it came, such remand _= shall be
immediately carried into execution, and no
appeal or writ of error from the decision of the
circuit court remanding such cause shall be
allowed.
Section 2 was reenacted in the Judicial Code of
1911, 36 Stat. 1094 as 28 U.S.C. § 71. “These
provisions for the disposition of removed cases
where jurisdiction was lacking or removal was
otherwise improper, together with the prohibition
of appellate review . . . endured until 1948 when
28 U.S.C. § 1447 was enacted — minus, however,
the prohibition against appellate review. The
omission was corrected in 1949 when _ the
predecessor of the present subsection (d) came into
being.” Thermtron Prod., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423
U.S. 336, 347-48 (1976) (footnotes omitted). As
adopted in 1948, and amended in 1964, section
1447(c) provided, in pertinent part, that:
5. The history of what is now section 1447(d) is set forth in
United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 748-49 (1946). Prior to
“the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470, 472, an
order of remand was deemed to be not reviewable by appeal
or writ of error because the order was not final... . But § 5
of the Act of 1875 expressly authorized the review of an order
of remand by appeal or writ of error ‘in any suit’ removed
from a state court. This provision was repealed by § 6 of the
Act of 1867... .” Rice, 327 U.S. at 748.
———— <—o
a ee
re
A-46
24
If at any time before final judgment it appears
that the case was removed improvidently and
without jurisdiction, the district court shall
remand the case, and may order the payment of
just costs.®
As amended in 1949, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) read,
“An order remanding a case to the State court from
which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal
or otherwise. . . .” “Thliis] subsection took its
present form in 1964, when Congress amended the
subsection to provide for review of cases removed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443.” Thermtron, 423
U.S. at 348 n.13.
With the brief exception, then, of the period
between 1875 and 1887, Congress, by adopting
section 1447(d) and its statutory predecessors,
“established the policy of not _ permitting
interruption of the litigation of the merits of a
removed cause by prolonged litigation of questions
of jurisdiction of the district court to which the
cause is removed. This was accomplished by
denying any form of review of an order of remand,
anc, before final judgment, of an order denying
remand.” United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. at 751.
One commentator describes the policy underlying
section 1447(d) as “[Congress’'] . . . explicit
legislative choice . . . that avoiding delay in court
proceedings caused by lengthy appellate review of
remand decisions merits’ sacrificing appellate
6. This section was amended in 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
Title X, § 1016(c), 102 Stat. 4670, to provide in pertinent part
that, “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall
be remanded.” It is the amended provision which controls
here.
A-47
25
review to correct occasional errors in remand
orders.” Herrmann, Thermtron Revisited: When and
How Federal Trial Court Remand Orders are
Reviewable, 19 Arizona St. L. J. 395, 413
(1987-88) (footnote omitted) (hereinafter
“Herrmann’).’ In furtherance of this policy, section
1447(a) was interpreted, until 1976, to preclude
review of all remand orders, regardless of the
reasons underlying the decision to remand.
C.
In 1976, the Supreme Court decided Thermtron
Prod., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. at 336.
There, Kentucky residents filed a personal injury
action against Indiana residents in a Kentucky
state court. The action was removed to the United
States District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1441 and 1446. The district court reviewed ‘the
crowded state of its docket and held that although
the plaintiffs had the statutory right to litigate
their claims in the federal court, that right had to
be “balanced against the plaintiffs’ right to a forum
of their choice and their right to a speedy decision
on the merits of their cause of action.” Id. at 340.
Because it concluded that the matter could be
brought to more efficient resolution in the state
courts and that the petitioners had failed to
demonstrate that they would be prejudiced by
having their case heard in that forum, the district
court ordered the matter remanded. The plaintiffs
sought a writ of mandamus. or _ prohibition
compelling the district court to exercise
jurisdiction over the properly-removed action. The
similar statements of the purpose underlying the
section 1447(d ir to review of remand orders, see the cases
at 413 n.105.
A-48
26
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied the
petition, relying on the statutory bar to review set
forth in section 1447(d).
Reversing, the Supreme Court clarified that the
section 1447(d) bar operates to preclude review of
only those remand orders issued pursuant to
section 1447(c). The Court held that these sections
must be construed together and that “only remand
orders issued under § 1447(c) and invoking the
grounds specified therein . . . are immune from
review under § 1447(d).” Thermtron, 423 U.S. at
346. The district court in The,mtron had
questioned neither the propriety of the removal nor
the jurisdiction of the federal court; the terms of
section 1447(c) were not mentioned in the remand
order and could not have’ been applicable.
Recognizing that it was creating an exception to
what had been interpreted as an absolute bar to
review, the Court wrote:
There is no doubt that in order to prevent delay
in the trial of remanded cases by protracted
litigation of jurisdictional issues, . . . Congress
immunized from all forms of appellate review any
remand order issued on the grounds specified in
§ 1447(c), whether or not that order might be
deemed erroneous by an appellate court. But we
are not convinced that Congress ever intended to
extend carte blanche authority to the district
courts to revise the federal statutes governing
removal by remanding cases on grounds that
seem justifiable to them but which are not
recognized by the controlling statute ;
Because the District Judge remanded a properly
removed case on grounds that he had no
authority to consider, he exceeded his statutorily
defined power; and issuance of the writ of
mandamus was not barred by § 1447(d).
A-49
27
Id. at 351. Mandamus was held to be “an
appropriate remedy to require the District Court to
entertain the remanded action.” Id. at 352.
Although the rule that most remand orders are
not subject to review remains, Thermtron made
clear that the seemingly unequivocal language of
section 1447(d), may, in extraordinary
circumstances, give way to permit appellate
consideration of certain categories of remand
orders. Mandamus has been invoked in a number
of cases since Thermtron to require federal courts
to adjudicate claims not remanded _— on
jurisdictional grounds. See, e.g., Air-Shields, Inc. v.
Fullam, 891 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1989) (petition for
writ of mandamus was granted directing the court
to vacate a remand order based upon procedural
defects not contemplated by section 1447(c)); and
Nasutt v. Scannell, 906 F.2d 802 (lst Cir. 1990)
(review by mandamus was appropriate where the
district court’s remand order lacked statutory
basis and was clearly contrary to congressional
policy as expressed in the Westfall Act).
Another detour around the absolute bar of
section 1447(d) has been fashioned by the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Pelleport
Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theaters, Inc., 741
F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1984), and The Clorox Co. v.
United States District Court, 756 F.2d 699 (9th
Cir.), rev'd on reh’g, 779 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1985).
In Pelleport the plaintiff sued in a California
state court for the recovery of rental fees. The case
was removed to the federal court on diversity
grounds. The defendant filed a motion to remand
the case to the state court, relying on a
contractual forum selection clause. Although. it
found that diversity existed and that the federal
court, therefore, had subject matter jurisdiction
over the actions, the district court granted the
motion for remand on the ground that the forum
| selection clause was valid and enforceable. The
plaintiff appealed from the remand order and filed
a petition for mandamus. The court of appeals
addressed the applicability of section 1447(d),
concluding that it did not operate to bar review of
the remand order. Recognizing that the case did
not fall within the narrow exception to section
1447(d) carved out by Thermtron, the court of
appeals nonetheless determined that review was
appropriate. Because the remand order at issue
| was mandated by a substantive decision on the
merits apart from the jurisdictional determination,
the court concluded that section 1447(d) did not
apply. In reaching this result, the court relied on
the Supreme Court's decision in Waco v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 293 U.S. 140 (1934).
Waco involved a Texas state court action which
was removed to the federal court on diversity
grounds by a third party defendant. When the
district court dismissed the third party action,
diversity was destroyed and the case was
remanded to the state court. Holding that the
dismissal of the third party action was not
immune from review, the Supreme Court wrote:
| True, no appeal lies from the order of remand;
but in logic and in fact the decree of dismissal
preceded that of remand and was made by the
District Court while it had control of the cause.
Indisputably this order is the subject of an
| appeal; and, if not reversed or set aside, is
conclusive upon the petitioner.
Waco, 293 U.S. at 143.
teen
A-51
29
The court of appeals in Pelleport read Waco as
“stand[ing] for the proposition that although the
final determination that diversity is lacking is not
reviewable, the earlier determination that a third
party defendant must be dismissed from the action
is.” Pelleport, 741 F.2d at 277. Reasoning that the
case before it also involved a substantive issue of
contract law which preceded and formed the basis
of the remand order, the court concluded that:
Like the dismissal in Waco, the court's decision
that the contract clause is enforceable, if not
reversed or set aside, is conclusive upon [the
defendant], and, therefore, must be reviewed. To
hold otherwise would deprive [the defendant] of
its right to appeal a substantive determination of
contract law. We cannot believe that Congress
intended to immunize such decisions from
review.
Id.
The court also reviewed the strong policy
underlying section 1447(d) but found that
Any delay caused by an appeal of the contract
issue is a delay that must be countenanced. To
apply section 1447(d) to the district court's
decision on the enforceability of the forum
selection clause would extend the scope of
section 1447(G) far beyond its’ intended
parameters and would leave’ matters’ of
substantive contract law unreviewable. We refuse
to impute such an intent to Congress.
Id. Thus the district court’s order was held to be
reviewable as a collaterally final order within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Following review on
the merits of the district court's forum selection
A-52
30
ruling, the order remanding the case to the
California state court was affirmed.
Again, in The Clorox Co. v. United States District
Court, 779 F.2d at 517, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that an appeal would lie
from a remand order which had been preceded by
a substantive decision on the merits. In Clorox,
the defendant employer had _ granted to its
employees, via an employee benefits handbook, the
right to file suit to recover benefits in either a state
or federal court. When claims were filed in the
state court, however, Clorox removed the actions
to the federal court. The plaintiffs filed a motion
for remand arguing that the handbook provision
constituted a waiver of Clorox’s removal rights. The
district court accepted this argument ard
remanded the case pursuant to section 1447{(c).
While the court of appeals originally declined
jurisdiction, holding that review of the remand
order could be secured only through appeal rather
than mandamus, on rehearing the court construed
the petition for writ of mandamus as a notice of
appeal and granted Clorox’s request for relief. The
court again addressed the reach of section 1447(d):
When a district court's remand order is based
on a resolution of the merits of some matter of
substantive law “apart from any jurisdictional
decision,” section 1447(d) does not foreclose
appellate review of that decision.
Clorox, 779 F.2d at 520 (quoting Pelleport, 741 F.2d
at 276-77). Concluding that the district court had
remanded on the basis of Clorox’s waiver of the
right to remove and that a remand on this basis
did not fall within the purview of section 1447(c),
the court held that the remand order was
appealable as a collateral final order pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
A-53
31
What has come to be’ known as_ the
Clorox/Pelleport doctrine has been invoked in other
cases to support the reviewability of remand orders
in cases where the decision to remand was based
on a prior determination of substantive law. See
Foster v. Chesapeake Insurance Co., No. 90-1752
(3d Cir. May 20, 1991) (order of remand based on
contractual forum selection elause is not rendered
unappealable by section 1447(d)); Regis Assoc. v.
Rank Hotels (Management) Ltd., 894 F.2d 193, 194
(6th Cir. 1990) (remand order based on forum
selection clause is reviewable on appeal because it
is based upon a substantive decision on the merits
of a collateral issue); In Re Delta America Re Ins.
Co., 900 F.2d 890, 892 (6th Cir. 1990) (same); and
Karl Koch Erecting Co., Inc. v. New York Convention
Center Dev. Corp., 838 F.2d 656, 658 (2d Cir.
1988) (same).
D.
With the _ historical background of section
1447(d) and the caselaw interpreting and limiting
the reach of that section in mind, we turn to the
appeal now before us. This case, presenting as it
does the question of whether section 1447(d) bars
all review of a district court's determination that
it lacks federal subject matter jurisdiction because
the Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988
which explicitly authorize removal is
unconstitutional, is unique. No case interpreting
the reach of section 1447(d) has addressed the
particular constitutional dilemma presented here.
The plaintiffs argue that the section 1447(d) bar
absolutely prevents our reviewing the district
court's conclusion that the Amendments Act is
unconstitutional because, as a result of that
A-54
32
ruling, the district court concluded that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction and ordered that the
cases at issue be remanded to the state court. We
cannot agree. We are convinced that in enacting
section 1447(d), Congress did not intend to vest
the district courts with the authority to make final
determinations regarding the constitutionality of
federal statutes. In thus contracting the reach of
the section 1447(d) bar, we are acutely aware that
we are charting virgin territory in that this case
does not fall neatly into either of the previously
recognized exceptions to the bar of section 1447(d).
The exception created in Thermtron permits
review of those remand orders which do not rest
upon the grounds specified in section 1447(c).
Here the district court relied specifically on section
1447(c) in reaching the determination to remand
and it would be impossible for us to deny the fact
that the district court’s’ conclusions’ of
constitutional law ultimately implicated subject
matter jurisdiction.
The Pelleport/Clorox exception to the section
1447(d) bar developed by the Ninth Circuit also
fails to address directly the issue posed here. The
Pelleport/Clorox line of cases have allowed appeal
from an order of remand where that order was
preceded by a substantive decision on the merits
apart from any jurisdictional issue. This doctrine
is superficially attractive but we do not believe that
we can analyze this case solely by reference to it.
In each of the cases applying the Pelleport/Clorox
doctrine, there was an undisputed statutory basis
for federal jurisdiction; there was no question that
the federal courts had jurisdiction to hear the
types of case presented. One of the parties in each
of these cases, however, argued that provisions of
A-55
33
a contractual nature, ¢.g., a forum selection clause
or a statement in an employment benefits plan,
operated to place the litigation properly in the
state courts. It was the resolution of these
underlying substantive issues, rather than of basic
jurisdictional issues, which supported remand in
Pelleport and Clorox. The basis for subject matter
jurisdiction was unaffected.
While the district court’s decision in this case
that the Amendments Act was_ unconstitutional
was a substantive decision preceding the remand
order, the heart of this decision was jurisdictional;
unless the statute were found to be constitutional,
there could be no _ federal subject matter —
jurisdiction. Despite its magnitude, we cannot say
that the district court's constitutionality ruling was
a “substantive decision on the merits apart from
any jurisdictional decision” within the meaning of
Pelleport and its progeny. Pelleport, 741 F.2d at
276 (emphasis added). We conclude nonetheless
that the seeds for appropriate resolution of this
matter were sown in Thermtron and in_ the
reasoning underlying the Pelleport/Clorox doctrine.
We reiterate Thermtron’s admonition that section
1447(d), in and of itself, is not dispositive of all
remand issues and should be interpreted to bar
review of only those remand orders which are
jurisdictional in nature. Under the terms of section
1447(c), a removal which is made _ without
jurisdiction has been consistently interpreted to
mean one noi authorized by Congress. Congress
“made the district courts the final arbiters of
whether Congress intended that specific actions
were to be tried in a federal court.” Thermtron, 423
U.S. at 355 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (latter
emphasis added). The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Rothner v. City of Chicago, 879
A-56
34
F.2d 1402, 1408 (7th Cir. 1989), clarified the
scope of the jurisdictional determination when it
wrote: “The Thermtron Court strongly indicated
that it viewed the phrase ‘improvidently and
without jurisdiction’ to mean noncompliance with
the procedural and jurisdictional requirements
stated by Congress.” (Emphasis in original.)
The jurisdictional issues most often resolved by
decisions to remand thus involve “the presence or
absence of diversity of citizenship or a ‘case
arising’ [and] are threshold questions that can
generally be readily resolved by reference to a
well-established body of law.” Herrmann, supra, at
414. See also Hansen v. Blue Cross of California,
891 F.2d 1384, 1388 (9th Cir. 1989) (in deciding
whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, district
court reaches conclusions concerning the presence
of diversity or a federal question). While not every
federal subject matter jurisdictional issue is easily
resolved, the fact that the same types of issue
arise’ repeatedly results in a fairly well-developed
body of governing law. Herrmann, supra at 414-15
n.110.
The Thermtron holding that section 1447(d) bars
review only of remand orders issued pursuant to
1447(c) thus has beneficial consequences. It
respects Congress’ decision to avoid the delay
that would be caused by the bulk of remand
orders, but restricts that limitation to the
category of cases where review is least necessary.
Id. at 415. me
The’ district court's ruling holding’ the
Amendments Act to be unconstitutional, despite its
jurisdictional component, is not the type of
determination routinely and_ regularly made
A-57
35
pursuant to section 1447(c). The district court's
decision that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
did not in any way involve a determination that
Congress did not intend to confer federal
jurisdiction over public liability actions nor did it
result from the conclusion that there had been a
failure to satisfy the procedural requirements of
the Amendments Act or any of the general removal
provisions. It could not be clearer that Congress
intended that there be federal jurisdiction over
claims removed pursuant to the Amendments Act;
the statutory language is explicit.* Furthermore, it
is undisputed that the actions at issue fall within’
the statutory terms of the Amendments Act and
were properly removed. The _ district court's
conclusion that it lacked subject § matter
jurisdiction over the removed claims rested solely
on its determination that Congress exceeded its
constitutional authority in enacting the
Amendments Act.
8. The Amendments Act was, at least in part, a response to
our decisions in Stibitz and Ktick. See S. Rep. No. 218, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1988 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 1476, 1488 (referencing Stibitz, the Committee
on Environment and Public Works noted that “the bill expands
existing law to allow for the consolidation of claims arising
out of any nuclear incident in federal court"); and H. R. Rep.
No. 104, lst Sess. pt. 1, 18 (noting our holding that the
district court did not have jurisdiction over claims arising
from the Three Mile Island incident and referring to language
in H.R. 1414 in which Congress expressly stated that any suit
asserting public liability shall be deemed to be a cause of
action arising under the Price Anderson Act). Thus, in 42
U.S.C. § 2014(hh) Congress states that “[a] public liability
shall be deemed to be an action arising under section 2210
of this title... .,” and in 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) that “[u]pon
motion . . . any [public liability] action pending in any State
court ... shall be removed. . .. (Emphasis added.)
A-58
36
The plaintiffs characterize this constitutional
ruling and the resulting remand as_ purely
jurisdictional in nature and argue that the bar of
section 1447(d) absolutely prevents our review of
the district court’s ruling with respect to the
constitutionality of the Amendments Act. “No
merits issues .. . occurred below. In fact, the
lower court only made a é__ jurisdictional
determination and found it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction.” We do not believe that the section
1447(d) question is as easily resolved as_ the
plaintiffs — indeed, all of the parties — might
wish.
While we recognize that the district court's
ruling on the constitutionality of the Amendments
Act has’ obvious consequences for federal
jurisdiction and, unlike the rulings prior to
remand in the Pelleport/Clorox cases, may be said
to have a truly jurisdictional component, we
cannot conclude that, in the situation presented
here, Congress intended that section 1447(d)
operate to prevent appellate review of the district
court order. We _ are confident that the
jurisdictional determination of the district court,
resting as it did upon the conclusion that the
entire statutory scheme authorizing removal is
unconstitutional, was not the type of federal
subject matter jurisdictional decision intended to
be governed by the terms of or the _ policy
underlying section 1147(c). Section 1447(d),
therefore, has no application. In order to fall
within sections 1447(c) and 1447(d), a remand
order must be based upon a finding that removal
was not authorized by Congress.
In analyzing the scope of the determinations to
be made under section 1447(c) and the resultant
applicability of the section 1447(d) bar to review,
A-59
37
we begin with the Supreme Court's axiom
reiterated in Website v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603
(1988), that congressional intent to bar judicial
review of a constitutional claim must be clearly
expressed, and with our own holding in Pacor, Inc.
v. Higgins, 743 F.2d at 992, that courts will not
impose restrictions on access to appellate review
unless Congress has expressed that intent by clear
and convincing evidence. We do not find clearly
expressed congressional intent which would
preclude review in the circumstances presented
here. To hoid otherwise would require that we
reach a result wholly at odds with the policy
underlying section 1447(d) and_ with the
established general principles applicable to
appellate review of constitutional questions.
Reading the finding of subject matter jurisdiction
required under section 1447(c) so broadly as to
encompass a district court's determination that a
statute authorizing removal is itself
unconstitutional would produce an unacceptable
and unintended shift in the allocation of judicial
power between federal and state courts. Because
remand orders premised upon section 1447(c) are
absolutely unreviewable, on appeal or otherwise, a
district court's constitutional determination, if
couched in terms of section 1447(c) and followed
by a remand order, could never be _ reviewed.
Remand orders which are unreviewable under
section 1447(d) remain unreviewable even on
appeal from the final judgment of a state court.
In Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 312
U.S. 563, 568-69 (1941), the Supreme Court wrote
that
{T]he issue of removability is closed if the federal
district court refuses to assume jurisdiction and
A-60
38
remands the cause. Section 28 of the Judicial
Code [now section 1447] precludes review of the
remand order directly or indirectly after final
judgment in the highest court of the state in
which decision could be had... .
. . For the reasons already stated, we are not
at liberty to review the remand order.
(Citations omitted.) In United States v. Rice, 327
U.S. at 751, the Supreme Court reiterated the
nonreviewability of orders of remand falling within
section 1447(c):
Congress . . . established the policy of not
permitting interruption of the litigation of the
merits of a removed cause by prolonged litigation
of questions of jurisdiction of the district court
to which the cause is removed. This was
accomplished hy denying any form of review of
an order of remand, and, before final judgment,
of an order denying remand.
(Emphasis added.) Those state cases addressing
the reviewability of remand orders have reached a
similar conclusion. See Ramahi v. Hobart Corp., 47
Or. App. 607, 614, 615 P.2d 348, 352 n.7 (1980)
(citing absolute bar of section 1447(d)); Johnson
Publishing Co. v. Davis, 271 Ala. 474, 493, 124
So.2d 441, 456 (1960) (“appellant now seeks to
have this court do what a federal appellate court,
including the Supreme Court of the United States,
is powerless to do, namely, review the order of
remandment”); Wewoka Petroleum Corp. v. Gilmore,
319 P.2d 285 (Okla. 1957) (order of remand for
lack of diversity is not reviewable on appeal).
To read sections 1447(c) and 1447(d) as applying
to jurisdictional determinations based upon the
A-61
39
constitutionality of a statute authorizing removal
would vastly expand the holding in Thermtron.
While the Court in Thermtron made it clear that
“the district courts [are] the final arbiters of
whether Congress intended that specific actions
were to be tried in a federal court,” the reading
which the plaintiffs give to the sections in question
would make district courts the final arbiters of the
constitutionality of federal statutes. Thermtron, 423
U.S. at 355. (Emphasis in original).
If we interpret constitutionality rulings as falling
within the subject matter jurisdictional
determination to be made pursuant to section
1447(c), a district court order refusing remand and
sustaining the constitutionality of the statute
authorizing removal could be reviewed under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 or under the permissive appeal
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). If, however, a
district court were to find the statute authorizing
removal to be unconstitutional and would enter an
order of remand based upon lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, its decision with regard to the
constitutionality of a statute could never be
reviewed. Each district court would thus be free
to reach its own conclusions regarding the
constitutionality of statutes authorizing removal.
Thus inconsistent results would be completely
insulated from review; the party asserting federal
jurisdiction and defending the constitutionality of
the statute would never be able to secure appellate
review of a district court's determination of
unconstitutionality.
It is inconceivable to us that Congress intended
that a party be entitled to review of a district
court's order remanding a case to the state courts
on the ground that its own docket is overcrowded,
EE
A-62
40
or on the ground that a contractual provision is
valid and enforceable, but be unable to challenge
a district court ruling that the statute which
specifically provides for federal jurisdiction is
unconstitutional. Reading sections 1447(c) and
1447(d) so broadly as to mandate this result
assaults the orderly review process of the federal
courts which Congress established so long ago.
In support of this broad reading of the subject
matter jurisdiction inquiry under section 1447(c),
the plaintiffs cite as authority a single sentence
from the two paragraph per curtlam opinion in
Richards v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 812 F.2d
211 (5th Cir. 1987): “The Thermtron court does not
say that we cannot review orders purporting to
remand on this basis on certain grounds, or for
certain faults; for constitutional infirmities, but not
for statutory ones; it says that we cannot review
them at ali.” (Emphasis in original.) The Supreme
Court in Thermtron, of course, did not address the
question presented here and said nothing whatever
concerning the application of the section 1447(d)
bar to remand orders resting on constitutional
determinations.
The recognized exceptions to section 1447(d) and
the policy underlying that section establish that
the subject matter jurisdictional inquiry
contemplated by section 1447(c) is limited to the
question of whether Congress intended that the
types of actions at issue be subject to removal.
The question before us is not whether Congress
intended that public liability actions be subject to
removal but whether the Constitution requires that
the clear removal provisions in the Amendments
Act be invalidated. To hold that district court
decisions with respect to such questions are
A-63
° 41
unreviewable would have serious jurisprudential
consequences.
Should we find, as the plaintiffs would have us
do, that constitutional determinations of the type
made here fall within the purview of sections
1447(c) and 1447(d), district courts facing difficult
issues on which guidance might be critical could
find themselves’ constrained to uphold the
constitutionality of a federal statute in order to
preserve the possibility of appellate review. Such
extraneous considerations were never intended to
influence judicial decisionmaking.
The district court in this case struggled with the
section 1447(d) bar to appellate review and how
the court might best position the issues to be
decided in order to insure the availability of review.
Noting that the Supreme Court had yet to address
specifically the question of whether appellate
review of remand orders issued pursuant to
section 1447(c) could be’ obtained’ through
certification under section 1292(b), the district
court held that certification was warranted.
[Plerhaps the most compelling [reason] for
considering the issue at bar a_ controlling
question of law is because the constitutionality
of an Act of Congress is being challenged. Thé:
final determination on this issue will impact not
only the parties in the instant cases but also the
parties to any similar cases that may arise in
the future. This jurisdictional issue requires
more than a simple determination of whether
public liability actions “arise under” the Act. See
Herrmann, Thermtron Revisited: When and How
Federal Trial Court Remand Orders are
Reviewable. 19 Ariz. St. L.J., 395, 414 & n.10
(1987-88). Rather, it involves a determination as
re |
A-64
42
to whether the grant of ‘arising under”
jurisdiction itself is constitutional. Certainly, the
issue is “serious to the conduct of the litigation,
[both] practically [and] legally.” Katz, 496 F.2d at
755.
In re TMI Coordinated Proceedings, 735 F. Supp.
640, 647 (M.D. Pa. 1990). Also important from our
point of view is the district court's belief that:
there is a substantial ground for difference of
opinion as to the correctness of its decision. The
defendants and the United States presented
strong and logical arguments for upholding the
Act's jurisdictional grant. This court is not so
bold as to state that its opinion or the
constitutionality of an Act of Congress not
previously reviewed by the courts is so plainly
correct that ft should not be reviewed by the
appellate court.
Id. at 648.
We do not believe that Congress, in enacting
sections 1447(c) and 1447(d), intended to leave the
district ccurt and the litigants in the quandary
created by the procedural posture of this case. We
cannot read section 1447(d) to bar appellate review
of a district court's decision that the statute which
purports to confer’ federal jurisdiction is
constitutional, where the district court, recognizing
the complexity and magnitude of the constitutional
question before it, certifies that question for
immediate appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
We emphasize that our conclusion is a narrow
one and should in no way frustrate the policy
underlying section 1447(d). “[Our view] respects
Congress’ decision to avoid the delay that would
be caused by review of the bulk of remand orders,
A-65
43
but restricts that limitation to the category of
cases where review is least necessary.” Herrmann,
supra at 415.
We are presented here with a situation where
the delay and disruption of on-going state
proceedings normally associated with orders of
remand are not factors. Where the district court,
in order to maximize the opportunity for appellate
review, has stayed the order of remand, there is
no interference with the expenditure of state
judicial resources.°®
The district court specifically addressed the
policy underlying the section 1447(d) bar to review
of remand orders and concluded that delay and
disruption in the resolution of this matter might
best be minimized by permitting rather than
precluding appellate review:
If the court's determination that the Act's grant
of jurisdiction exceeds the scope of article III is
reviewed and found to be erroneous, the cases
at bar will be tried in this court and the harm
to defendants of denying them the right granted
by Congress to be in federal court will be
avoided. Review of this issue may also save the
parties time and money. Although the decision
reached by the court of appeals most likely will
result in a petition for writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court, if the result of all review of this
9. In recognizing that the policy concerns underlying section
1447(d) are not compromised where a stay has been entered,
we do not suggest that the exception to the section 1447(d)
bar which we articulate here has no application in cases
where remand orders have not been stayed. The policy
implications stemming from the procedural posture of other
appeals involving constitutionality rulings and section 1447(d)
must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
A-66
44
issue places the cases back in this court for trial,
the termination of the litigation will be in sight.
If this issue is not reviewed, however, given the
history of these cases following the decisions in
Stibitz v. General Pub. Utils. Corp., 746 F.2d 993
(3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214
(1985), . . . and Kiick v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
784 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1986), and defendants’
strong desire to be in federal court, it is highly
likely that there will be another amendment to
the Price-Anderson Act to provide for federal
jurisdiction over these cases. That undoubtedly
would result in another battle for remand which
would involve great expenditures of time and
money.
735 F. Supp. at 647 (footnote and _ citations
omitted). The district court also noted that:
[In this regard . . . review of the issue will not
necessarily defeat the goal of § 1447(d) to
prevent delay in the trial of remanded cases .. .
[T]he history of these cases gives every indication
that there will be further delay in the trial of
these cases despite remand to state court.
Id. at n.6.
In sum, we are convinced that Congress could
not have intended that sections 1447(c) and
1447(d) be construed so broadly as to prevent our
consideration of a section 1292(b) appeal which
certifies an unsettled question of constitutional
proportion. Such constitutional determinations
could not have been intended by Congress to fall
within the category of routine subject matter
jurisdiction determinations contemplated by
section 1447(c) and, consequently, are not immune
A-67
45
from review under section 1447(d).'° We believe,
therefore, that we have jurisdiction, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), to hear this appeal.'' This
holding is derived from and is fully consistent with
the holding of Thermtron: under section 1447(d),
Congress “made the district courts the final
arbiters of [only] whether Congress intended that
specific actions were to be tried in a federal court.”
423 U.S. at 355 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (latter
emphasis added).
Having determined that we have jurisdiction to
hear this appeal, we turn to the substance of the
question certified.
We believe that the constitutional issue of whether
these cases “arise under” the laws of the United
States is at the core of these proceedings and will
10. We are not swayed from this view by the plaintiffs’
argument that because Congress did not set forth a specific
_exception to section 1447(d) in the Amendments Act which
would permit appellate review of all remand orders in cases
arising under the statute, no remand order may be reviewable.
While we recognize that Congress may specifically exempt all
remand orders resulting from interpretation of a particular
statute, see The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989, 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(C), the fact
that Congress chose not to exempt all such orders arising
from removal under the Amendments Act is not dispositive.
As well, the fact that some remand orders with origins in the
Amendments Act would fall within the bar of section 1447(d)
does not alter our view that the remand order in this case,
based as it was upon the determination that Congress lacked
the power to confer federal jurisdiction over public liability
actions, is amenable to review.
11. Thus we need not reach the question of whether appeal
would have been proper under 12 U.S.C. § 1291 or whether
this would have been an appropriate case for issuance of a
writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
A-68
46
thus focus upon the history and content of the
comprehensive statutory scheme of which the
Amendments Act is a part. We begin with the
critical constitutional provision and the caselaw
which defines it.
lil.
Article III, § 2, cl. 1 of the United States
Constitution provides that:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority. . . .!?
“Congress cannot confer upon the lower federal
courts a jurisdiction beyond the cases to which the
12. The federal statute which authorizes district courts to
hear cases involving federal questions also incorporates an
“arising under” requirement. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The scope
of “arising under” jurisdiction is different from and broader
than the federal question inquiry under section 1331.
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 496
(1983). See also Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807 (1986), where the Court wrote
that “[ajlthough the constitutional meaning of ‘arising under’
may extend to all cases in which a federal question is ‘an
ingredient’ of the action, . . . we have long construed the
statutory grant of federal-question jurisdiction as conferring a
more limited power.” Most of the caselaw which does address
the “arising under” concept has been developed in the
statutory context and is, therefore, not necessarily dispositive
here. Although it is clear that Article III] and Section 1331 are
not co-extensive, we have not been directed to a single case
which discusses the substantive difference in the “arising
under” requirements of section 1331 and Article III. The outer
parameters of Article Ill are largely unexplored.
A-69
47
judicial power of the United States extends under
Art. Hl. . . .” International Brotherhood’ of
Teamsters v. W.L. Mead, Inc., 230 F.2d 576, 579
(1st Cir. 1956). See also Verlinden B.V. v. Central
Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491 (1983) (". . .
Congress may not expand the jurisdiction of the
federal courts beyond the bounds established by
the Constitution”). In order, then, for Congress to
confer a valid grant of federal jurisdiction, the
cause of action must be one which “arises under”
the laws of the United States.
The starting point of any discussion of the scope
of Article III “arising under” jurisdiction must
certainly be Osborn v. Bank of the United States,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738 (1824). In Osborn the Court
explored the constitutional reach of “arising under”
jurisdiction in evaluating a statute which granted
federal jurisdiction over all cases — including
those filed pursuant to state law — to which the
Bank of the United States was a party. The facts
of Osborn are straightforward. The Bank of the
United States, a federally created entity, filed suit
in a federal court to enjoin the State of Ohio from
levying a tax on the Bank. The Supreme Court
held that the congressional act creating the Bank,
granting it powers and authorizing it “to sue and
be sued in any circuit court of the United States,”
was sufficient to confer Article III “arising under”
jurisdiction. Congress may properly extend “arising
under” jurisdiction to any case in which a federal
issue “forms an ingredient of the original cause.”
22 U.S. at 823. The Court found such an
ingredient in the provision of the Act which, in
incorporating the Bank, granted it the right to sue
and be sued. “Every act of the Bank grows out of
this law and is tested by it. To use the language
A-70
48
of the Constitution, every act of the bank arises
out of this law.” Id. at 827. The Court then
formulated a test to be applied in determining
whether “arising under” jurisdiction has been
established:
If it be a sufficient foundation for jurisdiction,
that the time or right set up by the party, may
be defeated by one construction of the
Constitution or law of the United States, and
sustained by the opposite construction, provided
the facts necessary to support the action be
made out, then all the other questions must be
decided as incidental to this, which gives that
jurisdiction.
Id. at 822. The central teaching of Osborn,
therefore, is that a case cannot be said to arise
under a federal statute where that statute is
nothing more than a jurisdictional grant. In order
to confer “arising under” jurisdiction, “the act [may]
not stop with incorporating the Bank;” it must do
more. Id. at 826-27.
The broad holding of Osborn was clarified in
Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 480, where the Court
addressed a constitutional challenge to the Federal
Sovereign Immunities Act. There the Court was
required to determine “whether Congress exceeded
the scope of Art. III of the Constitution by granting
federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction over
certain civil actions by foreign plaintiffs against
foreign sovereigns where the rule of decision may
be provided by state law.” Id. at 491 (emphasis
added). In concluding that the “arising under”
clause of Article III “provide[d] an appropriate basis
for the statutory grant of subject-matter
jurisdiction” the Court referred to the _ test
A-71
49
formulated in Osborn and stated that “Osborn . . .
reflects a broad conception of ‘arising under’
jurisdiction, according to which Congress may
confer on the federal courts jurisdiction over any
case or controversy that might call for the
application of federal law.” Id. at 492. The Court
in Verlinden found it unnecessary to fix the precise
limits of Article III because the Federal Sovereign
Immunities Act contained a comprehensive set of
legal standards to be applied to claims of
immunity. The statute codified the rule that a
foreign state was generally immune from suit,
subject to specific exceptions. The existence of
these exceptions was said to have “inject[ed] an
essential federal element into all suits brought
against foreign states.” Id. at 484. The Court
observed that while, “taken at its broadest, Osborn
might be read as permitting ‘assertion of original
federal jurisdiction on the remote possibility of
presentation of a federal question,” the case before
it in Verlinden involved more than a “speculative
possibility” that a federal question would arise.
480 U.S. at 492.
At the threshold of every action in a district court
against a foreign state, . . . the court must
satisfy itself that one of the exceptions [to
sovereign immunity] applies — and in doing so
it must apply the detailed federal law standards
set forth in the Act. Accordingly, an action
against a foreign sovereign arises under federal
law, for purposes of Artlicle] III jurisdiction.
Id. at 493-94.
In so holding, the Court reaffirmed the Osborn
rule that a statute which merely confers federal
jurisdiction cannot constitute the federal law
A-72
50
under which an action arises. Id. at 496. The
Court concluded, however, that where
jurisdictional provisions of an Act constitute one
part of a comprehensive scheme and do not
“merely concern access to the federal courts,” there
is no constitutional infirmity. Id. With respect to
the constitutionality of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, the Court stated:
Congress, pursuant to its unquestioned Artlicle]
I powers, has enacted a_ broad statutory
framework governing assertions of foreign
sovereign immunity. In so doing, Congress
deliberately sought to channel cases against
foreign sovereigns away from the state courts and
into federal courts, thereby reducing’ the
potential for a multiplicity of conflicting results
among the courts of the 50 States. . . . [Elvery
action against a foreign sovereign necessarily
involves application of a body of substantive
federal law. .. .
Id. at 497. We take from Verlinden the proposition
that where Congress has the authority to legislate
in a given area and substantively does so, a grant
of federal subject matter jurisdiction will survive
an Article III] challenge.
The fact that pure jurisdictional statutes cannot
withstand scrutiny under Article III was reiterated
recently in Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121 (1989).
There the Court determined that the federal officer
removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a), required the
averment of a federal defense.'* The contrary view,
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) provides, in pertinent part that:
(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced
in a State court against any of the following persons
may be removed by them to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing
A-73
51
i.e., reading section 1442(a) so broadly as to confer
jurisdiction with no allegation of a federal defense,
raises serious doubts whether, in enacting
§ 1442(a), Congress would not have “expand[ed]
the jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the
bounds’ established by the Constitution.”
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461
U.S. 480, 491 (1983). In Verlinden, we discussed
the distinction between “jurisdictional statutes”
and “the federal law under which [an] action
arises, for Art. III purposes,” and recognized that
pure jurisdictional statutes which seek “to do
nothing more than grant jurisdiction over a
particular class of cases” cannot support Art. III
“arising under” jurisdiction. . .. Section 1442(a),
in our view, is a pure jurisdictional statute,
seeking to do nothing more than grant district
court jurisdiction over cases in which a federal
officer is a defendant. Section 1442(a), therefore,
cannot independently support Art. III “arising
under” jurisdiction.
Id. at 136.'4
the place wherein it is pending: (1) Any officer of the
United States . .. for any act under color of such
office . .
14. The Supreme Court has, in the past, “rejected
congressional attempts to confer jurisdiction on federal courts
simply by enacting jurisdictional statutes.” Verlinden, 461 U.S.
at 495-96. See Mossman v.Higginson, U.S. 4 (Dall.) 12 (1800)
(statute granting federal jurisdiction over actions in which “an
alien is a party” would exceed the scope of Article III if
interpreted to permit an action between two aliens); and The
Propeller Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443,
451-53 (1852) (court upheld statute granting maritime
jurisdiction over vessels on the Great Lakes as an exercise of
maritime jurisdiction but held that the statute alone could
not support “arising under” jurisdiction).
A-74
52
The district court carefully applied these
precedenis and concluded that Congress exceeded
the scope of Article III in enacting the Amendments
Act because the Amendments Act, like the federal
officer removal statute, was purely jurisdictional,
creating only a federal forum for the litigation of
public liability actions.’®
15. The district court found that the Amendments Act was
deficient under the holdings of Verlinden and Osborn:
[T]he Act does not satisfy the standard set forth in
Osborn; here, “the right . . . set up by the party [will
not] be defeated by one construction of the . . . law
. and sustained by the opposite construction.”
Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) at 822. In Osborn, . . .
[the federal Bank] chartering act . . . provided the
cause of action and that cause of action could be
defeated depending upon construction of the federal
law. Similarly, in Verlinden, . . . [iJn cases brought
pursuant to .. . [the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act], if a court determined that none of the exceptions
to sovereign immunity embodied in the _ federal
standard were applicable, “the plaintiff [would] be
barred from raising his claim in any court in the
United States.” Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 497 (emphasis
added). Here, the right at issue is the right to bring
an action for recovery of damages for alleged tortious
injuries resulting from nuclear incidents. That right is
created by state law and exists regardless of the
provisions of the Act. Differing constructions of the
Act would only affect the forum in which such an
action is maintained. For example, if a federal court
determined that a case did not qualify as a “public
liability action,” the case still could be brought in state
court. The state court would apply the same
substantive law that the federal court would have
applied. The only difference would be the forum in
which the case was tried. Quite simpiy, the right at
issue here is not susceptible to defeat by differing
constructions of the Act.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
A-75
53
Critical to the district court's constitutionality
determination was the fact that the rules of
decision for public liability actions filed in or
removed to a federal court are, according to the
Amendments Act, to be “derived from the law of
the State in which the nuclear incident .. .
occurs.” 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh). Because principles
of state law were to be applied, the district court
found that Congress had not “codifie[d] the
standards’ governing personal injury actions
resulting from nuclear incidents ‘as an aspect of
substantive federal law.” 735 F. Supp. at 644
(quoting Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 497). The district
court concluded that Congress had not set forth
a comprehensive codified standard to be applied
in all public liability actions, but instead had
relied upon standards developed by the states. The
“arising under” requirement of Article III, section
2 of the United States Constitution had not,
therefore, been satisfied and the Amendments Act
was constitutionally infirm.
Recognizing that there was “a_ substantial
ground for difference of opinion as to the
correctness of the decision,” the district court
concluded that the grant of “arising under”
jurisdiction set forth in the Amendments Act was
unconstitutional. Our resolution of the question
certified depends entirely upon the accuracy of the
district court's characterization of the Amendments
Act as purely jurisdictional. We turn, therefore, to
the Act itself and begin with its history.
IV.
Congressional regulation of the nuclear power
industry was initiated with the enactment of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946. While that statute
A-76
54
reflected Congress’ determination that the nuclear
industry would be a government monopoly, see Act
of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755, Congress
later concluded that it would be in the national
interest to permit private sector involvement in
that industry under a system of federal licensing
and_ regulation. This policy decision was
implemented in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296. The private
actors entering the nuclear power industry were
still required to confront the risks associated with
potentially devastating liability which might be
imposed in the event of a major nuclear accident.
“[W]hile repeatedly stressing that the risk of a
major nuclear accident was extremely remote,
spokesmen for the private’ sector informed
Congress that they would be forced to withdraw
from the field if their liability were not limited by
appropriate legislation.” Duke Power Co. ov.
Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S.
59, 64 (1978).'®
In 1957, Congress enacted the Price-Anderson
Act for the purpose of “protect[ing] the public and
. encouragling] the development of the atomic
energy industry.” 42 U.S.C. § 2012. This Act
contained three central elements. First, the Act set
a ceiling on the aggregate liability which could be
imposed upon those engaged in the use and
handling of radioactive material “either through
contract with the Federal Government or under a
license issued by the Federal Government for the
private development of such activities.” S. Rep. No.
218, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1988 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 1476, 1477.
16. The background of the _ Price-Anderson Act, and
consequently of the Amendments Act, is set forth in Duke
Power, 438 U.S. at 63-67.
A-77
55
The second important feature of the Act involved
the “channeling of liability.” Under this provision,
any entity exposed to potential liability for activity
resulting in a nuclear incident, even if it were not
a direct participant in the activity, was entitled to
indemnification. Id.
Finally the Price-Anderson Act established that
all public liability claims above the amount of
required private insurance “protection would be
indemnified by the Federal Government, up to the
aggregate limit on liability.” Id.
In 1966, prior to the scheduled expiration of the
Price-Anderson Act, the liability limitation portions
of the Act were extended for an additional ten
years and a new provision was added which
required that those indemnified waive the defenses
of negligence, contributory negligence, charitable
or governmental immunity, and assumption of the
risk in the event of an action arising as the result
of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence.-42 U.S.C.
§ 2210(n)(1).'° The 1966 Amendments also
provided for the transfer, to a federal district court,
of all claims arising out of an _ extraordinary
nuclear occurrence. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2). These
provisions grew out of
congressional concern that state tort law dealing
with liability for nuclear incidents was generally
unsettled and that some way of insuring a
17. An extraordinary nuclear occurrence was defined as “any
event causing a discharge or dispersal of source, special
nuclear, or byproduct material from its intended place of
confinement in amounts offsite, or causing radiation levels
offsite, which the . . . Commission . . . determines to be
substantial, and which the . . . Commission determines has
resulted or probably will result in substantial damages to
persons offsite or property offsite. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2014(j).
A-78
56
common standard of responsibility for all
jurisdictions — strict liability — was needed. A
waiver of defenses was thought to be the
preferable approach since it entailed less
interference with state tort law than would the
enactment of a federal statute prescribing strict
liability. See S. Rep. No. 1605, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess., 6-10 (1966).
Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 65-66 (footnote omitted).
In 1975, the Price-Anderson Act was amended a
second time. These amendments extended the
Act’s coverage and made certain liability limitation
adjustments. Provision was made to phrase out the
federal indemnity portion of the Price-Anderson
scheme.
On August 29, 1988, Congress amended the
Price-Anderson Act for a third time, enacting the
Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988. The
decision to amend and _ to~ extend_ the
Price-Anderson Act grew out of the congressional
conclusion that
The Price-Anderson System, including the waiver
of defenses provisions, the omnibus coverage,
and the predetermined sources of funding,
provides persons’ seeking compensation for
injuries as a result of a nuclear incident with
significant advantages over the procedures and
standards for recovery that might otherwise be
applicable under State tort law. The Act also_
provides a mechanism whereby the federal
government can continue to encourage private
sector participation in the beneficial uses of
nuclear materials.
S. Rep. No. 218, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted
in 1988 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1476,
!
A-79
57
1479. The Amendments Act extended the authority
for the Price-Anderson indemnification system,
increased the aggregate level of indemnification
payments, established a mechanism for expedited
congressional action’ relating to additional
compensation, and altered the breadth of the
compensation system to cover activity related to
disposal of nuclear waste. See S. Rep. No. 70,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1988 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 1424. The Amendments
Act also contained provisions imposing criminal
and civil penalties upon contractors who violate
Department of Energy rules, regulations or orders
respecting nuclear’ safety and _ creating an
independent panel to advise Congress regarding the
appropriate means of fully compensating nuclear
accident victims was created. Two provisions of
the Amendments Act are critical to the appeals now
before us. In addition to the provisions already
detailed, the Amendments Act included = an
expansion of the reach of section 2210(n)(2) to
provide for removal of, and _ original federal
jurisdiction over, claims arising from any “nuclear
incident.”'® Section 2210(n)(2) was amended to read
as follows: ‘
18. Prior to the_Amendments Act, the grant of federal
jurisdiction and rights of removal were available only in
actions resulting from an extraordinary nuclear occurrence.
The decision to expand the jurisdictional grant was based
upon the fact that “[t]he experience with claims following the
TMI accident demonstrate|d] the advantages of the ability to
consolidate claims after the nuclear incident. Attorneys
representing both plaintiffs and defendants in the TMI
litigation testified . . . that the ability to consolidate claims
in federal court would greatly benefit the process for
determining compensation for claimants .. . . The availability
of the provisions for consolidation of claims in the event of
A-80
58
With respect to any public liability action arising
out of or resulting from a nuclear incident, the
United States district court in the district where
the nuclear incident takes place, or in the case
of a nuclear incident taking place outside the
United States, the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, shall have original
jurisdiction without regard to the citizenship of
any party or the amount in controversy. Upon
motion of the defendant or of the Commission,
or the Secretary, as appropriate, any such action
pending in any State court (including any such
action pending on [the date of the enactment of
the Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988] ) or
United States district court shall be removed or
trarsferred to the United States district court
having venue under this subsection. Process of
such district court shall be effective throughout
the United States... .
42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2).
Also important to this appeal is the Amendment
Act's addition of section 2014(hh) to the definition
section of the _ Price-Anderson Act. Section
2014(hh) defines a public liability action as “any
suit asserting public liability”'? and also contains
any nuclear incident . . . would avoid the inefficiencies
resulting from duplicative determinations of similar issues in
multiple jurisdictions that may occur in the absence of
consolidation.” S. Rep. No. 218, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 13,
reprinted in 1988 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1476,
1488.
19. Public liability, a concept unchanged by the Amendments
Act, was defined in the Price Anderson Act as “any legal
liability arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident or
precautionary evacuation... .” 42 U.S.C. § 2014(w).
A-81
59
the provision upon which this constitutional
debate centers:
A public liability action shall be deemed to be
an action arising under section 2210 of this title,
and the substantive rules for decision in such
action shall be derived from the law of the State
in which the nuclear incident involved occurs,
unless such law is_ inconsistent with the
provisions of such section.
42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh). It was these two Amendment
Act provisions which formed the basis for the
district court’s conclusion that the Act could not
withstand constitutional scrutiny.
In addition, we note that following the 1988
Amendments, the Price-Anderson Act contained
provisions which created a federal cause of action,
42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh); set a limitations period to
govern the newly-created cause of action, 42
U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1); provided for venue, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2210(n)(2); provided for choice of law, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2014(hh); placed limits on the availability of
punitive damages, 42 U.S.C. § 2210(s); channeled
liability to licensees, 42 U.S.C. § 2014(t); adopted
a rule of industry-share liability, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2210(b); mandated that normally-available
defenses be waived in the cases of an
extraordinary muclear occurrence, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2210(n)(1); and established an upper limit of
aggregate liability, 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e).
V.
It is clear that “cases in which federal and state
law elements are mixed present very difficult
subject matter jurisdiction problems for the federal
court.” Hirshman, Whose Law Is It, Anyway? A
A-82
60
Reconsideration of Federal Question Jurisdiction
Over Cases of Mixed State and Federal Law, 60
Ind. L. J. 17 (1984). The same is no less true of
the “arising under” determination to be made in
construing Article Ili. See Amar, A Neo-Federalist
View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial
Code, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205, 265 n.195 (1985) (the
scope of federal question jurisdiction granted by
Article III “has long perplexed even the most
eminent of jurists and scholars”). These difficulties
arise because “Congress rarely enacts a complete
and self-sufficient body of federal law. The federal
statutes are full of references, both explicit and
implicit, to the law of some state. As a result, legal
problems repeatedly fail to come wrapped up in
neat packages marked “‘all federal’ or ‘all state.”
Hirshman, supra at 18.
The Amendments Act is no exception. It, too,
contains both federal and state elements. While
the public liability cause of action itself and
certain elements of the recovery scheme are
federal, the underlying rules of decision are to be
derived from state iaw. This is not fatal to “arising
under” jurisdiction because we find that Congress
intended to — and did — create a federal cause
of action which will implicate substantive aspects
of federal law.
Under the terms of the Amendments Act, the
“public liability action” encompasses ~ any legal
liability” of any “person who may be liable” on
account of a nuclear incident. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2014(hh) (emphasis added). Given the breadth of
this definition, the consequence of a determination
that a particular plaintiff has failed to state a
public liability claim potentially compensable
under the Price-Anderson Act is that he has no
A-83
61
such claim at all. After the Amendments Act, no
state cause of action based upon public liability
exists. A claim growing out of any nuclear incident
is compensable under the terms of the
Amendments Act or it is not compensable at all.
Any conceivable state tort action which might
remain available to a _ plaintiff following the
determination that his claim could not qualify as
a public liability action, would not be one based
on “any legal liability” of “any person who may be
liable on account of a nuclear incident.” It would
be some other species of tort altogether, and the
fact that the state courts might recognize such a
tort has no relevance to the _ Price-Anderson
scheme. At the threshold of every action asserting
liability growing out of a nuclear incident, then,
there is a federal definitional matter to be resolved:
Is this a public liability action? If the answer to
that question is “yes,” the provisions of the
Price-Anderson Act apply; there can be no action
for injuries caused by the release of radiation from
federally licensed nuclear power plants separate
and apart from the federal public liability action
created by the Amendments Act.
The district court’s narrow interpretation of the
Amendments Act was founded, not upon an
analysis of congressional intent, but upon its
concern that because Congress directed that the
rules of decision governing public liability actions
were to be derived from state law, Congress had
failed to rule substantively and thus had exceeded
the established boundaries of Article III. We do not
find any support in the caselaw for the proposition
that Congress may not constitutionally rely upon
state rules of decision as a foundation for a
particular statutory scheme. Congress has, at
A-84
62
various times and in various contexts, enacted
statutes authorizing federal courts to decide
nondiversity cases turning on state law rules of
decision. Note, Over-Protective Jurisdiction?: A
State Sovereignty Theory of Federal Questions, 102
Harv. L. Rev. 1948, 1950 (1989) (footnote omitted).
Examples of statutory schemes adopting state
rules of decision include the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1819 (1950); the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2549
(1978); 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151.326 (1978); 16
U.S.C. § 457 (1982) (subjecting claims of wrongful
death within a_ federal enclave to _ federal
jurisdiction); the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq.; and the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). In these statutes,
as in the Amendments Act, Congress relied upon
state law as a foundation and effectuated its
purposes by creating an overlay of federal law.
At other times Congress has not been explicit as
to the role which state law is to play in a
particular statutory scheme. Courts, in that
circumstance, have been required to determine
whether state law was intended to operate as state
law or whether state law should be read to form
the content of new federal law, filling interstitial
statutory gaps. Courts evaluating these mixed
state/federal schemes have focused primarily upon
congressional intent and have formulated decisions
accordingly. See, e.g., Reconstruction Finance Corp.
v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946)
(congressional intent underlying the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act supported
reliance on state law definitions of “real property”
for tax purposes); United States v. Little Lake
Misere Land Co., Inc., 412 U.S. 580 (1973) (Court
A-85
63
refused to apply state law as the rule of decision
under the Migratory Bird Conservation Act). See
also Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills
of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (sustaining
jurisdictional grant of section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act as impliedly directing
that state law be absorbed as federal law). These
cases demonstrate that courts, in order to honor
the presumption in favor of a_ statute's
constitutionality, may be required to adopt a
flexible approach to a particular state/federal mix.
In this case, congressional intent is not an
issue. In explicitly providing that the “substantive
rules for decision” in public liability actions “shall
be derived from” the law of the state in which the
nuclear incident occurred, we _ believe that
Congress expressed its intention that state law
provides the content of and operates as _ federai
law. The legislative history of the Amendments Act
supports this view by clarifying that Congress
adopted the approach to state law embodied in the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. Reporting on
H.R. 1414, the House version of the Amendments
Act, the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
made specific reference to the Lands Act:
The Committee recognizes, of course, that Article
Ill of the Constitution limits the type of cases
that federal courts created under the Article may
hear. For this reason, H.R. 1414 expressly states
that any suit asserting public liability shall be
deemed to be an action arising under the
Price-Anderson Act, thereby making — suits
asserting public liability “Cases .. . arising
under . . . the laws of United States” within the
meaning of Article III. Rather than designing a
new body of substantive law to govern such
A-86
64
cases, however, the bill provides that the
substantive rules for decision in such actions
shall be derived from the law of the state in
which the nuclear incident involved occurs,
unless such law is inconsistent with the
Price-Anderson Act. The Committee believes that
conferring on the Federal courts jurisdiction over
claims arising out of all nuclear incidents in this
manner is within the constitutional authority of
Congress and notes that the Congress has used
this approach in the Cuter Continental Shelf
Lands Act.
H.R. Rep. No. 104, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., Pt. 1,
at 18 (1987).
In the Lands Act, Congress declared “the civil
and criminal laws of each adjacent state to be the
law of the United States” on the Outer Continental
Shelf “[tlo the extent that they are applicable and
not inconsistent with” the Lands Act. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1333{a)(2). Congress also provided that the
district courts would have “jurisdiction of cases
and controversies arising out of, or in connection
with . . . any operation conducted on the outer
Continental Shelf. . . .” 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1).
While the Lands Act has been the subject of
frequent litigation, the power of Congress to confer
federal jurisdiction in these cases and to give
content to the federal law by adopting state rules
of decision has never been questioned. See
Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S.
352, 357 (1969) (the Lands Act provided for
exclusive regulation by federal law with state law
adopted as_ surrogate federal law); Tidelands
Royalty “B” Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 804 F.2d 1344,
1347 n.1l (5th Cir. 1986) (district court had
A-87
65
jurisdiction over claim involving mineral lessee’s
rights under’ state law); Laredo Offshore
Constructors, Inc. v. Hunt Oil Co., 754 F.2d 1223,
1225 (5th Cir. 1985) (district court had subject
matter jurisdiction over a_ contract dispute
governed by state law rules; Hughes v. Lister
Diesels, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 233 (E.D. La. 1986)
(district court had subject matter jurisdiction to
resolve personal injury action governed by state
law rules).
We recognize that the language respecting state
law in the Amendments Act is not identical to that
of the Lands Act. While the Lands Act provides
that the laws of adjacent states are “to be the law
of the United States” on the outer continental
shelf, the Amendments Act refers to substantive
rules for decision as “derived from state law.” We
believe that the language adopted in_ the
Amendments Act supports our view that Congress
intended that the rules of decision constitute
federal law.
Even if we were to find that it is state law itself,
rather than state law operating as federal law,
which forms the basis for decision in public
liability actions, our conclusion regarding
congressional authority to confer federal
jurisdiction over these public liability actions
would be unaffected. In Verlinden, the very issue
to be decided was whether Congress had authority
to grant jurisdiction to the federal courts over
causes of action when those actions were governed
by pure state law rules of decision. The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act did not, as does the
Amendments Act, affect substantive state tort law.
The sole objective of the Immunities Act was to
specify those instances in which sovereign
A-88
immunity would and would not apply. This federal
element was sufficient to allow the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act to withstand an Article
Ill challenge in spite of the fact that all substantive
issues were to be resolved in accordance with state
law.
The federal elements’ involved’ in _ the
Price-Anderson scheme are similarly sufficient. The
federal ingredients here are as substantial as those
in Verlinden and are more substantial than those
found sufficient in Osborn. The Amendments Act
creates a federal cause of action which did not
exist prior to the Act, establishes federal
jurisdiction for that cause of action, and channels
all legal liability to the federal courts through that
cause of action. By creating this federal program
which requires the application of federal law,
Congress sought to effect uniformity, equity, and
efficiency in the disposition of public liability
claims. With the federal jurisdiction and removal
provisions set forth in the Amendments Act,
Congress ensured that all claims resulting from a
given nuclear incident would be governed by the
same law, provided for the coordination of all
phases of litigation and the orderly distribution of
funds, and assured the preservation of sufficient
funds for victims whose injuries may not become
manifest until long after the incident. See H.R.
Rep. No. 104, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 3, at 18
(1987). Thus, Congress’ clearly intended _ to
supplant all possible state causes of action when
the factual pre-requisites of the statute are met.
Examining the Price-Anderson scheme _ as
completed by the Amendments Act, we are
convinced that the Act, while relying for definition
upon state law elements, contains the federal
components necessary to survive the constitutional
A-89
67
challenge mounted here. Our conclusion is
unaffected by those pre-Amendments Act cases in
which we determined that the Price-Anderson Act
did not create a federal cause of action. Those
cases, which evaluated the statutory rather than
the constitutional “arising under” requirement,
rested principally on the finding that Congress had
not specifically created a federal tort and did not
intend to create a federal cause of action. See, e.g.,
Ktick v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 784 F.2d at 490,
(legislative history of Price-Anderson Act replete
with indications that Congress never intended to
displace state tort law with respect to the issues
of liability and recoverable damages for nuclear
accidents); Stibitz v. General Pub. Util. Corp., 746
F.2d at 993 (legislative history of the
Price-Anderson Act belies any contention that
Congress intended to create federal common law
causes of action) and Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania v. General Pub. Util. Corp., 710 F.2d
117, 122 (3d Cir. 1983) (nothing in statute or
legislative history which would warrant adoption
and application of undeveloped federal common
law).
With the Amendments Act, however, the entire
Price-Anderson landscape’ was __ transformed.
Congress clearly considered the decisions of our
court holding that Congress had not intended to
create a federal cause of action for cases not based
upon an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, that
federal question jurisdiction would attach to
actions resulting from an extraordinary nuclear
occurrence, that federal questions would arise in
the defense of nuclear accident claims but would
not appear in the _ plaintiffs case, and_ that
Congress had not directed that a body of federal
A-90
68
common law be created. Congress then provided,
in the Amendments Act, the clearest expression of
intent that there be a federal cause of action
arising directly under the Act. Despite’ the
plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary, Kilick, Stibitz,
and the other pre-Amendments Act cases provide
no support for the Article III challenge made
here.”°
We are also not persuaded by the plaintiffs’
argument that the Amendments Act exceeds the
scope of Article III because the public liability
action, now a_ federal tort, was_ previously
actionable under state law. Where Congress
creates a right of action, and _ formulates
substantive federal provision applicable to that
action, the action arises under federal law despite
the fact that the same wrong may previously have
been actionable under state law. Were the rule
otherwise, actions which today may be brought
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act and other federal
20. In fact, while the pre-Amendments Act cases conclude
that Congress did not intend to create a federal cause of
action, none of these eases so much as suggests that
Congress lacked the power to do so. In Ktick, we concluded
that had Congress intended to create a federal cause of action
applicable to “nuclear incidents, the statutory grant of
jurisdiction for extraordinary nuclear occurrences would have
been superfluous. “This statutory grant of jurisdiction
[pursuant to pre-amendment act section 2210(n)| would not
have been’ necessary had Congress’ intended _ the
Price-Anderson Act to ‘replace’ state tort law; instead,
jurisdiction over ail nuclear accidents, ‘extraordinary’ or not,
would have been available under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 or
1337(a).-” 784 F.2d at 494 (emphasis added). See also
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 240-41 (1984)
(the federal government occupies the entire field of nuclear
safety concerns).
A-91
69
statutes would not arise under federal law
because, prior to enactment of the federal statute,
actions based on the identical occurrence could
have been brought in a state court. The federal
nature of the right to be established is decisive.
Here, the right to control the safety aspects of
nuclear power is exclusively federal. Congress,
therefore, is authorized to create a federal tort
which may have had its origins in state law. The
basis of the public liability action no longer stems
from state law. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
464 U.S. 238, 240-41 (1984) (the federal
government occupies the entire field of nuclear
safety concerns).
Through the Amendments Act, Congress has
placed an overlay of federal law upon the rights
and remedies previously available under state law.
Once a federal court is satisfied that a particular
suit is a public liability action, additional
questions under the Amendments Act may need to
be addressed. Under certain circumstances
licensees may be required to waive defenses which
would have been viable under state law. Punitive
damage awards available under state law also may
be precluded. Furthermore, in every case alleging
public liability, courts will be required to
determine whether state law principles conflict
with other parts of the Price-Anderson scheme.
Two Supreme Court cases indicate that the duty
the defendants owe the plaintiffs in tort is dictated
by federal law.”' In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
21. The two district court cases on point hold that federal
law does preempt state law. See O'Conner v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., 748 F. Supp. 672 (C.D. Ill. 1990) (certifying the
question to the court of appeals). These cases are discussed
infra.
A-92
70
State Energy Conservation and Development
Commission, 461 U.S. 190 (1983), the Court
considered the question of whether a California
statute, which prohibited the construction of
nuclear plants until technology for safe disposal of
nuclear waste was developed, was preempted by
federal law. See id. at 198. The Court held that
preemption is found in three circumstances: where
there is an explicit statement of preemption by
Congress; where there is_ pervasive federal
regulation in the field; and where state law
“actually conflicts with federal law.” Id. at 204.
With regard to nuclear energy, the Court found that
“Congress .. . intended that the Federal Government
should regulate the radiological safety aspects involved
in the construction and operation of a nuclear plant,
but that the States retain their traditional
responsibility in the field of regulating ... for
determining questions of need, reliability, cost, and
other related state concerns.” Id. at 205. The Court
concluded that “the safety of nuclear technology was
the exclusive business of the Federal Government,” id.
at 208, and that Congress, by permitting the states to
regulate “for purposes other than for protection against
radiation hazards,” id. at 210, reemphasized the state
and federal governments’ respective spheres.
Accordingly, ps
the Federal Government maintains complete
control of the safety and “nuclear” aspects of
energy generation. ....
State safety regulation is not pre-empted only
when it conflicts with federal law. Rather, the
Federal Government has occupied the entire field
of nuclear safety concerns, except the limited
powers expressly ceded to the States. When the
Federal Government completeiy occupies a given
A-93
71
field ... as it has done here, the test of
pre-emption is whether the “matter on which the
State asserts the right to act is in any way
regulated by the Federal Act.”
Id. at 212-13 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
The California statute was held to be _ not
preempted because the Court found a “non-safety
rationale” for its implementation.
The holding in Pacific Gas & Electric was
reaffirmed one term later in Silkwood: “states are
precluded from regulating the safety aspects of
nuclear energy.” 464 U.S. at 240-41. In Silkwood,
a decedent's estate brought suit, based on state
common law _ tort’ principles, against a
manufacturer of plutonium. The Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a verdict in the
plaintiffs favor for property damage, based on a
strict liability theory, but reversed an award of
punitive damages. In light of Pacific Gas & Electric,
and the legislative history, the Court concluded:
If there were nothing more, this concern over the
state’s inability to formulate effective standards
and the _ foreclosure of the States from
conditioning the operation of nuclear power
plants on compliance with state-imposed safety
standards arguably would disallow resort to
state-law remedies... .
Id. at 250-51. However, the Court found that there
was a clear congressional intent to leave state
remedies intact, “notwithstanding the NRC's
exclusive
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.