Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc.

Supreme Court brief1991

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Text

/ Bupremo Court, U.S.

& WY) P FILED

L* § 0 .

ae, SEP 20 1997

OFFI@E OF THE CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 199]

ands - > en Ae

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC..

Petitioner,

—_V —

WHEELABRATOR TECHNOLOGIES INC. and

WESTCHESTER RESCO COMPANY, L.P..

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Leon M. Despres Of Counsel:

(Counsel of Record)

R. Edward Wilhoite, Jr. Karen Florini

DESPRES, SCHWARTZ & ENVIRONMENTAL

GEOGHEGAN DEFENSE FUND

77 W. Washington Street 1616 P Street, N.W.

Suite 711 Suite 150

Chicago, IL 60602 Washington, D.C. 20036

(312) 372-2511 (202) 387-3500

Attorneys for Petitioner

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Does section 3001(i) of the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act (“RCRA”) exempt a resource recovery facility

from the obligations imposed on generators of hazardous

waste by Subtitle C of RCRA where the ash generated by such

a facility from the mass burning of household waste and com-

mercial and industrial non-hazardous waste routinely exhib-

its a characteristic of hazardous waste?

2. Ifso, does a resource recovery facility remain exempt

from the requirements of Subtitle C of RCRA in spite of the

fact that the resource recovery facility receives and burns

hazardous waste from small quantity generators of hazardous

waste?

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

py.) 8 Be why 8 fy) SS ree Vv

eo see ee eer ee ee eee l

PR 6 oc cp tccn tp eeesereeveces 2

ye vei. Bs Bs re ire 2

STATERGEIe) OF THRE CAGE 2 .w i cc ctcces. 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ...... 5

I. The Court of Appeals For The Second

Circuit Wrongly Concluded That A

Resource Recovery Facility Is Exempt

From The Obligations Imposed On

Generators Of Hazardous Waste By Section

3001(i) Of The Resource Conservation And

ge ree eae eee 5

A. The Plain Language Of Section 3001(i)

Does Not Exempt A Resource

Recovery Facility From Federal

Hazardous Waste Management

Requirements As A Generator Of

eT eT error 5

B. The Environmental Protection Agency

Has Consistenuy Interpreted Section

3001(i) Not To Exempt A Resource

Recovery Facility From The

Requirements Of Subtitle C If The Ash

Generated By Mass Burning Exhibits A

Characteristic Of Hazardous Waste . . 11

II.

Hl.

The Court Of Appeals Has Construed

Section 3001(i) Inconsistently With The

Policy Underlying The Management Of

Hazardous Waste And In A Manner That

Renders RCRA’s Entire Regulatory

Se Eww kt tee ce

A. The Judgment Of The Court of Appeals

Is Fundamentally Inconsistent With

The Policy Underlying RCRA’s

Hazardous Waste Management

EE

B. The Judgment Below Renders RCRA’s

Entire Post-Generation Hazardous

Waste Regulatory Scheme Inoperable

As It Applies To Ash ............

The Court Of Appeals Wrongly Concluded

That A Resource Recovery Facility May

Accept Hazardous Waste From A Small

Quantity Generator Of Hazardous Waste And

Remain Exempt Under Section 3001(i) ...

EE

EE eee

3

JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND

Es es Cb ae oes cee veces re

OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND

ER ae

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT

RE, bee cee ct were eee

14

15

18

A-3

iV

4. TEXT OF RELEVANT PORTIONS OF

.

THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND

pi wa, 3 ty RP ee eee

TEXT OF RELEVANT PORTIONS OF

FEDERAL REGULATIONS ..........

JULY 15, 1985 REGULATORY

PREAMBLE

ee ele SS ee Ce OC Ries 2.2.9 8.9.5

PAGE

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases PAGE(S)

American Fed’n of Musicians of the United States &

Canada v. Wittstein, 379 U.S. 171 (1964) ..... 14

Burlington Northern R.R. v. Oklahoma Tax

Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454 (1987) ............. 9

Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) .. 8, 10

Chemical Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, 470 U.S. 116 (1985).............. 12, 14

Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979)....... 8, 18

Crandon v. United States, 110 S.Ct. 997 (1990)... 16

Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n vy.

Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107

NE ne re re ee a ee oe wo 11

E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46

ee Sere a Od hs eine oh 560 0 12

Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.

A ares ah Sa) ea a arene oe We * 8 10

Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl.

Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986) ............ 15, 17

Morton v. Ruiz, 329 U.S. 296 (1974) .......... 14

Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana,

See MT EU og 6 6 6a hos cece eaccese 18, 20

In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989) .... 10

United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985)...... 9

United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822 (1984) .... 18

United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235 (1989) 8

Statutes and Regulations

28 USC. ee ences

42 U.S.C. 60008 deitida ee eee.

42 U.S.C. CURRIES 0 es eek

42 US.C. § GUM SR ee eect

42 U.S.C. CGRRIIE coe eee. sss

42 U.S.C. 6 GRR es eae

42 U.S.C. § CUR a poe wae des

42 U.S.C. § OR tence

42 U.S.C. § ORRMII res eae nase

42 U.S.C. (QRGREE ik cee eee dss

42 U.S.C. § 6921 note

42 U.S.C. (GE... 2 eee ss

42 U.S.C. $ @ORRR eae sss:

42 U.S.C. RORMMIE seater ce. ow

42 U.S.C. (@RGBMA. Banaras oe oes os

40 CER. § 260GMR Do es ews se

40 CER. § EG ee ee

40 CER. § SE es

40 C.F.R. § 262.20-23

40 C.F.R. § ZO. : 5 a0 sete ees twee ces eess:

Legislative and Administrative Materials

S. Rep. No. 284, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 61 (1983). .

S. Rep. No. 988, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1976) ..

PAGE(S)

17, 20

passim

9

19

Vii

PAGE(S)

H.R. Rep. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1984) 15

H.R. Rep. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976) 5

50 Fed. Reg. 28,/25-26 (July 15, 1985)........ *, $4, 83

51 Fed. Reg. 21648-49 (June 13, 1986) ........ 6

Congressional Testimony

Statement of J. Winston Porter before the

Subcommittee on Hazardous Waste and Toxic

Substances of the Senate Committee on

Environment and Public Works (December 3,

EE SR eae SN ee Da 13

Regulation of Municipal and Solid Waste

Incinerators: Hearing Before the Subcommittee

on Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the

House Committee on Energy and Commerce,

101st Cong., Ist Sess. (May 11, 1989) (testimony

of Sylvia Lowrance, Director, EPA Office of Solid

NS SR Oe es i eee aos oe eee ew ek ws 13

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

>

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC.,

Petitioner,

—)—

WHEELABRATOR TECHNOLOGIES INC. and

WESTCHESTER RESCO COMPANY, L.P..,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Petitioner Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. (““EDF’’)!

respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the

judgment and decision of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit, entered in this proceeding on April 24,

1991.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit is reported at 931 F.2d 211, and is includ-

ed in the Appendix at A-2. The memorandum opinion and

order of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York is reported at 725 F. Supp. 758, and is

included in the Appendix at A-14.

| EDF is a not-for-profit public benefit membership corporation.

EDF has no stockholders or subsidiaries and is not a subsidiary of any

corporation.

re eT Te

2

JURISDICTION

On April 24, 1991, the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit entered judgment affirming the district

court’s entry of summary judgment against petitioner EDF.

EDF did not petition for rehearing or suggest rehearing in

banc. This Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment

below by writ of certiorari pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTES INVOLVED

The statute involved in this case is the Resource Conser-

vation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., and regula-

tions promulgated thereunder. Specifically, this case involves

section 3001(i) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i), which provides that:

A resource recovery facility recovering energy from

the mass burning of municipal solid waste shall not

be deemed to be treating, storing, disposing of, or

otherwise managing hazardous wastes for the pur-

poses of regulation under this subchapter [Sub-

title C], if —

(1) such facility —

(A) receives and burns only —

(i) household wasie (from single and multiple

dwellings, hotels, motels, and other residential

sources), and

(ii) solid waste from commercial or industrial

sources that does not contain hazardous waste identi-

fied or listed under this section, and

(b) does not accept hazardous wastes identified or

listed under this section, and

3

(2) the owner or operator of such facility has established

contractual requirements or other appropriate notifi-

cation or inspection procedures to assure that hazard-

ous wastes are not received at or burned in such

facility. Additional relevant statutory provisions and

regulations are included in the Appendix, beginning at

A-79.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondents Wheelabrator Technologies Inc. and West-

chester Resco Company, L.P. (collectively ““Wheelabrator’’)

own and operate the Westchester Resource Recovery Facility

(“Facility”) in Peekskill, New York. The Facility is a resource

recovery facility that receives and burns municipal solid

waste, including household waste and non-hazardous com-

mercial and industrial waste, for the purpose of generating

electricity. The Facility processes approximately 650,000

tons of waste annually. As a result of the mass burning of this

waste, the Facility generates approximately 500 tons of ash

daily. Over 4 million tons of ash are generated annually by

resource recovery facilities nationwide.

Under the relevant testing method promulgated by the

Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), the ash generat-

ed by the Facility is a hazardous waste. However, the Facility

does not comply with the obligations imposed on a generator

of hazardous waste by Subtitle C of the federal Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”). For example,

Wheelabrator does not prepare a manifest designating the ash

as a hazardous waste. Nor is the ash otherwise handled and

disposed of in a manner consistent with the hazardous waste

requirements of RCRA.

On January 27, 1988, petitioner EDF brought this action

in the United States District Court for the Southern District

of New York. EDF alleged that Wheelabrator was violating

RCRA by its failure to handle the ash generated at the Facility

ee ee ee

4

as a hazardous waste. Wheelabrator did not dispute that it

was not handling the ash as a hazardous waste, but argued

that it was exempt from the requirements of Subtitle C by

section 3001(i) of RCRA.

The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.

On November 21, 1989, the district court denied both mo-

tions. The court concluded that the ash generated by the

Facility is exempt from the requirements of Subtitle C by

section 3001(i). The court further concluded that Whee-

labrator had in place adequate procedural safeguards to in-

sure that the Facility did not receive hazardous waste and

that, as a matter of law, a resource recovery facility could

receive hazardous waste from a small quantity generator

without forfeiting the exemption provided under section

3001(i). However, the district court denied summary judg-

ment on Wheelabrator’s motion in order to determine wheth-

er the Facility actually received hazardous waste on more

than an inadvertent and occasional basis.

After further discovery on this issue, EDF stipulated to

the entry of summary judgment against it. On May 4, 1990,

EDF timely filed notice of appeal.

On April 24,1991, the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit entered judgment affirming the grant-

ing of summary judgment by the district court for the reasons

stated by the district court in its opinion dated November 21,

1989.

On July 12, 1991, EDF applied to the Honorable

Thurgood Marshall for an extension of time to file the peti-

tion for writ of certiorari on the ground that a companion

case was pending in the United States Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit. Oral argument was had in that case on

May 10, 1991. Because that case involves the same issue, its

disposition could potentially conflict with the ruling below or

further elucidate the issue involved. By order dated July 16,

the Court granted EDF’s application. On August 6, 1991,

5

EDF again applied for an extension of time to file the petition

on the ground that judgment still had not entered in the

companion case. By order dated August 13, 1991, the Court

extended EDF’s time to file the petition for writ of certiorari

to September 20, 1991.2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The Court Of Appeais For The Second Circuit

Wrongly Concluded That A Resource Recovery Facility

Is Exempt From The Obligations Imposed On

Generators Of Hazardous Waste By Section 3001(i) Of

The Resource Conservation And Recovery Act.

A. The Plain Language Of Section 3001(i) Does Not

Exempt A Resource Recovery Facility From

Federal Hazardous Waste Management

Requirements As A Generator Of Hazardous

Waste.

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42

U.S.C. § 6901, et seqg., imposes on persons comprehensive

hazardous waste management requirements regulating the

handling and disposal of hazardous waste in order to protect

the public health and the environment from waste that is

potentially harmful, toxic or lethal. H.R. Rep. No. 1491, 94th

Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad-

min. News 6238, 6241. Under Subtitle C of RCRA, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 6921-6939b, solid waste that is specifically listed by the

EPA as a hazardous waste or that exhibits a characteristic

(ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity or toxicity) of hazardous

waste, and that is not otherwise exempt, must be managed as

? As of the date this petition was filed, the companion case was still

pending in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Thus, the

possibility that there will be a conflict between the circuits on this

significant issue of federal environmental law remains.

ee

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a hazardous waste. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3a.° Solid waste that is not

“hazardous” is regulated under subtitle D of RCRA, 42

U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949a, which merely forbids disposal of such

waste in open dumps. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6944(a), 6945(a).

In 1984, Congress enacted, as part of the Hazardous and

Solid Waste Amendments (“HSWA”), section 3001(i) of

RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i), to clarify the household waste

exclusion promulgated by the EPA in 1980.‘ Section 3001(i)

provides that a resource recovery facility shall not be deemed

to be treating, storing, disposing of, or otherwise managing

hazardous wastes for the purposes of regulation under Subti-

tle C if such facility receives and burns only household waste

and non-hazardous commercial and industrial waste. Ac-

cordingly, a qualifying resource recovery facility is exempt

3 “(T]he characteristics define broad classes of wastes that are clearly

hazardous, while the listing process defines some wastes that may pass

the characteristic, but are nonetheless hazardous wastes.” 51 Fed. Reg.

21648, 21649, Col. 1 (June 13, 1986).

4 The household waste exclusion provided simply that household

waste, including the residue remaining after incineration, was not haz-

ardous waste. In enacting RCRA, Congress was concerned that the

hazardous waste permit program not be used “to control the disposal of

hazardous substances used in households cr to extend control over

general municipal wastes based on the presence of such substances.”

S. Rep. No. 988, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1976). Congress did not

intend that individual households be deemed generators of hazardous

waste subject to the requirements of Subtitle C, which would have

imposed on households and municipalities a comprehensive regulatory

scheme both unworkable and unnecessary. If households were to be

deemed not to generate hazardous waste, then logically the subsequent

management activities, which, under Subtitle C, are initiated by the —

generator, would similarly be deemed not to be hazardous waste man-

agement. Concern for the burden imposed on individual households

and municipal management of household waste, however, says nothing

about congressional intent as to the generation of ash with the charac-

teristic of a hazardous waste by the incineration of household waste and

commercial and industrial non-hazardous waste at a resource recovery

facility. Nor would imposing the requirements of Subtitle C on the

generators of such ash affect the exemption Congress intended for

households and household waste.

7

from the hazardous waste management requirements of Sub-

title C in its management activities.

Rather than simply ratify the existing EPA regulation,

however, Congress clarified the household waste exclusion as

it applied to a resource recovery facility in several significant

respects. First, the exemption codified in section 3001(i) ap-

plies specifically, and exclusively, to a resource recovery facil-

ity, not a waste stream. Second, section 3001(i) provides that

a resource recovery facility may receive and burn non-haz-

ardous waste from commercial and industrial sources. Prior

to 1984, waste from commercial and industrial sources was

not exempt from the requirements of Subtitle C by the house-

hold waste exclusion.’ Thus, if a resource recovery facility

received such waste, it also would have been subject to these

requirements. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, section

3001(i) limits the scope of the household waste exclusion by

making explicit that a resource recovery facility that receives

and burns qualified municipal solid waste only “shall not be

deemed to be treating, storing, disposing of, or otherwise

managing hazardous wastes for the purposes of regulation

under [Subtitle C].” 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i).

Section 3001(i) does not provide, either explicitly or

implicitly, that a resource recovery facility shall not be

deemed to be generating hazardous waste. Nor does section

3001(i) provide that ash generated by a resource recovery

facility that routinely exhibits a characteristic of hazardous

waste shall be exempt from the requirements of Subtitle C. It

is the absence of the term “generating” in section 3001(i) that

is fatal to the construction of section 3001(i) adopted by the

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. “[WyJhere, as here,

‘the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts

5 The EPA has indicated that ash from the incineration of household

waste and commercial and industrial non-hazardous waste had a/ways

been subject to regulation under Subtitle C: “These residues would be

hazardous wastes under present [1980] EPA regulations if they exhibit-

ed a characteristic.” 50 Fed. Reg. 28,725 (July 15, 1985).

ne |

8

is to enforce it according to its terms.’ ”” United States v. Ron

Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 {quoting Caminetti v. United

States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). Not otherwise exempt, like

any other generator of hazardous waste, a resource recovery

facility must comply with the requirements of Subtitle C as to

the ash generated by the incineration process.

Under RCRA, both “management” and “generation”

are terms of art with statutorily defined, non-overlapping,

meanings. Hazardous waste generation is defined as “the act

or process of producing hazardous waste.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 6903(6). Hazardous waste management is defined as “the

systematic control of the collection, source separation, stor-

age, transportation, processing, treatment, recovery, and dis-

posal of hazardous wastes.” 42 U.S.C. § 6903(7).

Thus, the scope of the exemption in section 3001(i) is

precisely ascertainable. First, hazardous waste management

necessarily presumes the prior generation of hazardous waste.

One cannot manage what does not exist. For this reason, the

referent in section 3001(i) cannot be ash, which is generated

after incineration. Rather, it is the systematic control of the

municipal solid waste received by the resource recovery facili-

ty that is deemed not to be the management of hazardous

waste. Second, section 3001(i) lists “treating,” “sorting,”

“disposing of,” and “or otherwise managing” as activities not

attributable to a qualifying resource recovery facility for pur-

poses of Subtitle C regulation. “Managing”, of course, is

merely the act of management. Accordingly, “or otherwise

managing” can only mean what is left of the statutorily de-

fined term: the collection, source separation, transportation,

processing and recovery of the municipal solid waste received

by a resource recovery facility. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439

U.S. 379, 392 n. 10 (1979) (“definition which declares what a

term ‘means’... excludes any meaning that is not

stated’’).°

6 Significantly, a resource recovery facility engages in none of these

management activities relative to ash.

3

Nothing in the plain language of section 3001(i) suggests

that a resource recovery facility cannot be a generator of

hazardous waste. Indeed, Congress clearly recognizes the siz-

nificant difference between the management and generation

of hazardous waste. Where Congress intends that a particular

recovery process, in its entirety, be exempt from regulation

under Subtitle C, it recognizes the necessity that it state so

specifically. For example, RCRA also provides that “the own-

er and operator of equipment used to recover methane from a

landfill shall not be deemed to be managing, generating, trans-

porting, treating, storing, or disposing of hazardous or liquid

wastes.” 42 U.S.C. § 6921 note. The Court of Appeals inexpli-

cably ignores this critical statutory comparative. Yet, the in-

escapable conclusion from Congress’ failure to include the

term “generating” in section 3001(i) is that Congress did not

intend so to extend the statutory exemption.

The Court of Appeals also relied on legislative history to

support its conclusion. The Senate Report that accompanied

the HSWA, in discussing section 3001(i), stated that “{aJll

waste management activities of such a [resource recovery]

facility, including the generation, transportation, treatment,

storage, and disposal of waste shall be covered by the exclu-

sion.” S. Rep. No. 284, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 61 (1983). Re-

gardless of the meaning of this language, section 3001(i)

expressly does not exempt either a resource recovery facility

as a generator, or the ash generated by such a facility, from the

requirements of Subtitle C. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred

in resorting to legislative history at all to contradict the unam-

biguous statutory language. See Burlington Northern R.R. vy.

Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987); United

States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95-96 (1985).

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In fact, the legislative history is in direct conflict with

section 300i(i).’? To that extent, of course, it must be disre-

garded. It is an obvious rule of statutory construction that

when a conflict exists between a statute and its legislative

history, the statute prevails. Caminetti v. United States, 242

U.S. 470, 490 (1917) (“the [statutory] language being plain,

and not leading to absurd or wholly impracticable conse-

quences, it is the sole evidence of the ultimate legislative

intent”). Legislative history “is not a source of legal rules

competing with those found in the U.S. Code.” Jn re Sinclair,

870 F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1989). This notion of statutory

primacy is particularly apt here. RCRA is a highly reticular

statute, regulating the complex problem of solid and hazard-

ous waste in the United States. Accordingly, a court should be

particularly wary of departing from its statutory schema. Cf.

Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144

(1985) (where Congress has carefully crafted an enforcement

scheme with express remedies, a court must be chary of read-

ing others into it).

The unsoundness of the tortured construction adopted

by the Court of Appeals is made more evident by the alterna-

tive. If Congress really had intended to accomplish what re-

spondents argue, it could easily have provided simply that a

resource recovery facility that receives or burns only house-

hold or commercial or industrial non-hazardous waste, or the

ash residue, shall not be subject to the requirements of Sub-

title C. It did not. Moreover, nowhere does section 3001(i)

state that the mass burning of municipal solid waste shall not

be deemed to be generating hazardous waste. On its face, the

section 3001(i) exemption only extends to those activities

7 This fact is confirmed by subsequent statements of the very Con-

gressman involved in drafting section 3001(i) and the committee report

on which the Court of Appeals relies. All six senator signatories to a

letter to the EPA stating that section 3001(i) was not intended to ex-

empt a resource recovery facility or ash from the requirements of Sub-

title C, for example, were conferees and members of the Senate

Committee that wrote the committee report. (See R-11 at Exh. 9.)

1]

that can be deemed hazardous waste management. And

under RCRA, the term “managing” does not include the term

“generating.”

B. The Environmental Protection Agency Has

Consistently Interpreted Section 3001({i) Not To

Exempt A Resource Recovery Facility From The

Requirements Of Subtitle C If The Ash Generated

By Mass Burning Exhibits A Characteristic Of

Hazardous Waste.

It is axiomatic that the interpretation of a statute by the

agency having primary enforcement responsibility for that

statute is entitled to deference. Equal Employment Opportu-

nity Comm'n v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S.

8 Loose draftsmanship is perhaps the best explanation for the lan-

guage used by the committee, but, even assuming that it was proper for

the Court of Appeals to consider legislative history in construing sec-

tion 3001(i), the committee report does not necessarily contradict the

plain meaning of section 3001(i). Although the report includes the term

“generation” among waste management activities, the report signifi-

cantly refers only to “waste,” not toxic ash residue or hazardous waste,

and is discussed in the context of incoming waste, and prior to incinera-

tion. This language is necessary to ensure a comprehensive exclusion

for a resource recovery facility’s management of the incoming munici-

pal solid waste. For example, some waste received at the resource

recovery facility that should be rejected at the gate could nonetheless

inadvertently be accepted. If that waste is subsequently removed from

the tipping floor, rather than put in the burning chamber, this could be

regarded as waste “generated” at the facility. For the same reason, the

committee report includes the term “disposal,” although a resource

recovery facility is obviously not a disposal facility. In fact, a significant

portion of the solid waste received at any resource recovery facility

either cannot be processed (5-15%) or must be bypassed. (R-40 at App.

26, p. 21.) For example, construction rubble, automobile parts and

household appliances received by a resource recovery facility must be

directly landfilled. (/d.) Further, waste received in excess of recovery

capacity or during shutdown for maintenance or repairs must also be

disposed of directly. (/d.) Without the deeming provision of sec-

tion 3001(i), a resource recovery facility might have to dispose of this

waste pursuant to the requirements of Subtitle C.

12

107, 115 (1988) (agency interpretation need not be the best

one by grammatical or any other standards, it need only be

reasonable). As this Court has previously stated, to sustain

the view of the agency charged with administering the statute,

a court “need not find that it is the only permissible construc-

tion that EPA might have adopted but only that EPA’s under-

standing of this very ‘complex statute’ is a sufficiently rational

one to preclude a court from substituting its judgment for that

of EPA.” Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985). Moreover, a contempora-

neous agency construction is entitled to great weight. E. /.

duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 55 (1977).

Contemporaneously with the enactment of section

3001(i), the EPA published a regulatory preamble interpret-

ing Congress’ clarification of the household waste exclusion.

See 50 Fed. Reg. 28,725-26 (July 15, 1985) (“1985 Pream-

ble”). The EPA recognized congressional intent to promote

the development of resource recovery facilities, and that “the

principal purpose of Section 3001 [(i)] was to prevent resource

recovery facilities that may inadvertently burn hazardous

waste, despite good faith efforts to avoid such a result, from

becoming subject to the Subtitle C regulations” applicable to

a hazardous waste treatment, storage or disposal (“TSD”)

facility. 1985 Preamble at 28,726.

The EPA also recognized, however, that ash generated

by a resource recovery facility from the burning of household

and commercial and industrial non-hazardous waste “could,

in theory, exhibit a characteristic of hazardous waste even if

no hazardous wastes are burned, for example, if toxic metals

become concentrated in the ash. Thus, the requirement of

scrutiny of incoming wastes would not assure non-hazardous-

ness of the residue.” Jd. (emphasis added.) Recognizing the

fundamental difference between incoming waste and the ash

generated from the mass burning of that waste, the EPA un-

equivocally concluded that by the language of section 3001(1)

13

Congress did not intend “‘to exempt the regulation of inciner-

ator ash from the burning of non-hazardous waste in resource

recovery facilities if the ash routinely exhibits a characteristic

of hazardous waste.” /d.’

The EPA further concluded, however, that it then had

“no evidence” as to whether the ash generated by a resource

recovery facility would exhibit a characteristic. Because the

EPA did not “believe the HSWA impose new regulatory bur-

dens on resource recovery facilities that burn household and

other non-hazardous waste,” it therefore indicated that “the

Agency has no plans to impose additional responsibilities on

these facilities.” Jd. Thus, the EPA did not intend additional-

ly to regulate ash generated by a resource recovery facility by

listing that ash as a hazardous waste regardless of characteris-

tic. As noted previously (supra, p. 7 n. 5), under existing

regulations, ash displaying a characteristic would not be ex-

empt from the requirements of Subtitle C.'°

Significantly, the EPA had before it the legislative histo-

ry that the Court of Appeals found so compelling. In spite of

* In 1987, one EPA official stated that the EPA was re-evaluating its

1985 interpretation, which “may have been in error.” Statement of J

Winston Porter, Assistant Administrator for Sotid Waste and Emergen-

cy Response before the Subcommittee on Hazardous Waste and Toxic

Substances of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public

Works (December 3, 1987) 16-17. However, the EPA subsequently

reaffirmed its contemporaneous interpretation. See Regulation of Mu-

nicipal and Solid Waste Incinerators: Hearing Before the Subcomm. ttee

on Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the House Committee on

Energy and Commerce, 10\st Cong., Ist Sess. (May 11, 1989) (testimo-

ny of Sylvia Lowrance, Director, EPA Office of Solid Waste). Thus.

although the EPA has indicated, from time to time, that it considers the

language of section 300 1(i) ambiguous or that it wishes further congres-

sional clarification, as a matter of interpretative policy, the EPA has

never revised its 1985 interpretation.

'” EDF has offered undisputed evidence that the ash generated by

the Facility routinely exhibits a characteristic of toxicity due to the

concentration of lead and cadmium.

14

the language in the committee report, however, which includ-

ed the term “generation,” the EPA determined that section

3001(i) did not exempt toxic ash residue, or a resource recov-

ery facility as the generator of that ash, from the hazardous

waste regulatory scheme. Mindful of the purpose of RCRA

generally and section 3001(i) specifically, the EPA, unlike the

courts below, properly disregarded, or interpreted, the seem-

ingly contradictory language in the legislative history.

Courts are not in the business of assessing the relative

wisdom of competing statutory interpretations. The EPA’s

interpretation of section 3001(i) is not only reasonable, which

is all that it must be, it is required by the statutory language

and congressional intent. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals

erred in rejecting the EPA’s interpretation.

II. The Court Of Appeals Has Construed Section 3001(i)

Inconsistently With The Policy Underlying The

Management of Hazardous Waste And In A Manner

That Renders RCRA’s Entire Regulatory Scheme

Inoperable.

The Court of Appeals has wrongly construed the lan-

guage of a significant federal statute. This Court has frequent-

ly granted a petition for writ of certiorari for that reason

alone. See, e.g., Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985) (certiorari granted

to resolve a conflict and to decide an important question of

environmental law); Morton v. Ruiz, 329 U.S. 296, 301-02

(1974) (certiorari granted because of the significance of the

issue and the assertion that the appellate court judgment was

inconsistent with long-established administrative policy);

American Fed’n of Musicians of the United States & Canada v.

Wittstein, 379 U.S. 171, 175 (1964) (certiorari granted be-

cause federal question important and one of first impression).

That said, this Court typically does not act as a reviewing

court to correct every wrong appellate decision. Here, how-

ever, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not

15

simply misconstrue section 3001(i) of RCRA, itself the statu-

tory linchpin of hazardous waste management in the United

States. The hoiding of the Court of Appeals is fundamentally

inconsistent with, indeed vitiates, the policy underlying the

management of hazardous waste codified by Congress in

RCRA. Moreover, the effect of the appellate court’s judgment

is to render the entire post-generation regulatory scheme of

Subtitle C inoperable as it applies to toxic ash residue. For

these additional reasons, the Court should grant this petition.

A. The Judgment Of The Court of Appeals Is

Fundamentally Inconsistent With The Policy

Underlying RCRA’s Hazardous Waste

Management Requirements.

Section 3001(i) was enacted as part of the Hazardous

and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984. The primary purpose

of the HSWA was to fill ‘serious gaps” in RCRA’s regulatory

scheme that allowed significant amounts of hazardous waste

to escape control. H.R. Rep. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.

19-20, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News

5576, 5578-79. The HSWA “broadened the scope of [RCRA]

and tightened the regulatory restraints.” Midlantic Nat’!

Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494,

506 (1986). In so doing, Congress intended to “minimize the

present and future threat to human health and the environ-

ment’ caused by the improper management of hazardous

wastes. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b); see also Midlantic, 474 U.S. at

505 (HSWA indicative of repeated congressional emphasis

on its goal of protecting the environment against toxic

pollution).

It is undisputed that Congress also intended to promote

the development of “resource recovery and resource conser-

vation systems which preserve and enhance the quality of air,

water and land resources.” 42 U.S.C. § 6902(7) (emphasis

added). From this language, however, it is clear that any

attempt to construe section 3001(i) must be consistent with

the overarching policy objective to protect human health and

16

the environment. Cf. Crandon v. United States, 110 S.Ct. 997,

1001 (1990) (courts should look to object and policy of statute

in construing statute).

In order to encourage the development of commercially

viable resource recovery facilities, Congress excluded such

facilities from, among other requirements related to the man-

agement of hazardous waste, the substantial requirements

imposed on a hazardous waste treatment, storage or disposal

facility. Section 3001(i) makes clear that a qualifying resource

recovery facility will not be deemed to be a TSD facility.''

However, recognizing the fundamentally transformed char-

acter of ash generated by the mass burning of municipal solid

waste, Congress chose not to exclude that ash, or the resource

recovery facility that generates the ash, from the require-

ments of Subtitie C. Because the regulatory burden imposed

on generators of hazardous waste under Subtitle C is far less

onerous than that imposed on managers of hazardous waste,

Congress could thus still encourage the development of re-

source recovery facilities while ensuring that management of

'! The Court of Appeals misapprehends the purpose and structure of

the “deemed to be” phrase in section 3001(i). The Court of Appeals, in

adopting the reasoning of the district court, concluded that if a resource

recovery facility only accepts non-hazardous waste (as household waste

is defined, for example), it could not be designated a TSD facility

anyway, and if it did accept hazardous waste, the facility would lose the

exemption. Thus, the district court reasoned that section 3001(i) must

apply to the ash generated by a resource recovery facility, otherwise

there would be no benefit to the statutory exemption. (A-30 n. 12.) The

argument, however, is circular: to the extent this is true, it is true

because of section 3001(i). Household waste contains material, such as

paints, waste oils, pesticides, solvents and cleaning agents, that, reading

RCRA literally, could require that household waste be identified as a

hazardous waste. In order to avoid this result, section 3001(i) provides

that a resource recovery facility, although perhaps literally doing so,

shall not be deemed to be managing hazardous waste. Without ‘his

exclusion, a resource recovery facility would be subject to the require-

ments of Subtitle C upon receipt of municipal solid waste. This is

precisely the reason Congress enacted, and the benefit of,

section 3001(1).

17

the ash is accomplished in a manner consistent with the pri-

mary objective of RCRA to protect human health and the

environment.

“In the face of Congress’ undisputed concern over the

risks of the improper storage and disposal of hazardous and

toxic substances” (Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 506), it is remarka-

ble to suggest that Congress, in an effort to encourage resource

recovery from waste, would be indifferent to the generation of

hundreds of tons of ash each day (at only one facility, see

R-11 at p. 6) with a characteristic of toxicity that exceeds the

legal limit by as much as five times for lead and seven times

for cadmium. (R-34 at § 23.)!2

In fact, as of 1988, there were 111 resource recovery

facilities in operation in the United States, with more than

200 additional facilities in the planning or construction stage.

(R-16 at App. 21, p. 6.) These facilities generate approximate-

ly 4 million tons of ash residue annually. (/d., p. 1.) It defies

logic to conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that Congress

would exempt this staggering quantity of toxic ash residue

from regulation as hazardous waste when, in fact, the HSWA

amended RCRA so that a person who generates hazardous

waste only in excess of ]00 kilograms per month, rather than

the previous 1000 kilograms per month, is subject to the

requirements of Subtitle C. See 42 U.S.C. § 6921(d). Indeed,

it is NO Overstatement that such a construction of section

3001(1i) vitiates the policy underlying RCRA that hazardous

waste shall be properly managed. Fundamental to this policy

surely is the notion that millions of tons of hazardous waste

cannot be simply landfilled alongside newspapers and soda

bottles.

'2 References to the record below are cited by record index number

as “R- at

18

The Court of Appeals improperly disregarded the careful

balance of benefits and controls struck by Congress in enact-

ing section 3001(i). That balance should not be disturbed by

mere judicial fiat, especially where the result is so demonstra-

bly at odds with Congress’s effort safely to control the han-

dling and disposal of hazardous waste. Therefore, this Court

should reject the appellate court’s conclusion that ash with

the characteristic of toxicity, and the facility generating that

ash, are exempt from the requirements of Subtitle C.'°

B. The Judgment Below Renders RCRA’s Entire

Post-Generation Hazardous Waste Regulatory

Scheme Inoperable As It Applies To Ash.

It is “the elementary canon of construction that a statute

should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoper-

able.” Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana,

472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985) (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439

U.S. 379, 392 (1979)). The Supreme Court does not “con-

strue statutory phrases in isolation; [it] read[s] statutes as a

whole.” United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984).

It is undisputed that the ash generated at the Facility

routinely exhibits a characteristic (toxicity) of hazardous

waste. The appellate court concluded that pursuant to section

3001(i) a resource recovery facility generating this identifi-

able hazardous waste is nonetheless exempt from the require-

ments of Subtitle C. Recall, however, that section 3001(i) is

specifically limited to a resource recovery facility. Section

3001(i) provides only that a resource recovery facility shall

not be deemed to be managing hazardous waste. Section

300 1(i) says nothing about the ash residue itself, which, if a

'3 Numerous states have recognized that section 3001(i) does not

exempt ash residues from hazardous waste regulations, including Ala-

bama, California, Maine, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Wis-

consin. (R-12 at p. 3.)

19

hazardous waste, remains subject to the handling and Jispo-

sal requirements of Subtitle C. Nor does it provide, for exam-

ple, that a transporter who transports ash shail not be deemed

to be transporting a hazardous waste.

Under RCRA, it is the generator that must determine

whether a particular solid waste is a hazardous waste. 40

C.F.R. § 262.11. If the waste is identifiable as a hazardous

waste, the generator must then prepare a manifest “to identi-

fy the quantity, composition, and the origin, routing and

destination of hazardous waste during its transportation from

the point of generation to the point of disposal, treatment or

storage.” 42 U.S.C. § 6903(12). The generator is also required

to designate on the manifest a licensed disposal facility to

receive the hazardous waste. 40 C.F.R. 262.20-.23. Thus, the

entire hazardous waste management scheme depends upon

the generator’s “gatekeeper” function and the preparation of

the manifest.

Even assuming that the Court of Appeals properly con-

strued section 3001(i), as indicated above, section 3001(i)

applies only to the resource recovery facility generating the

ash. Under Subtitle C, a transporter, for example, still may

not accept hazardous waste unless it is accompanied by a

manifest. 40 C.F.R. § 263.20. Nor can a disposal facility

regularly accept ash not accompanied by a manifest. See 42

U.S.C. § 6924. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded

that a resource recovery facility need not prepare a manifest.

In other words, no transporter could transport, no disposal

facility could dispose, no storage facility could store the ash

received from a resource recovery facility without violating

Subtitle C! This statutory “catch-22” highlights the basic flaw

in the appellate court’s construction of section 3001(i).

Transporters and TSD facilities are in violation of

RCRA each time they accept unmanifested ash identifiable as

a hazardous waste from a resource recovery facility, and are

subject to criminal and civil penalties. But there literally is no

way they can comply with RCRA’s requirements so long as

|

20

the resource recovery facility that generates the ash is not

required to prepare a manifest. It is obviously undesirable to

construe a statute to impose obligations on a person where

that person lacks the ability to comply with those obligations

by virtue of a provision within the same statute. Yet this is

precisely the result of the judgment below: hazardous waste in

a regulatory vacuum.

Not surprisingly, respondents and the courts below have

“offered no reason for attributing this futile design to... .

Congress.”” Mountain States, 472 U.S. at 249. There is none.

The on/y construction that renders all the parts of Subtitle C,

as it applies to ash that exhibits a characteristic, a compatible

whole is that adopted by the EPA in 1985 and advanced by

EDF in the court below, and which treats a resource recovery

facility as a potential generator of hazardous waste. There-

fore, this Court must correct the unworkable construction of

section 3001(i) adopted by the Court of Appeals.

III. The Court of Appeals Wrongly Concluded That A

Resource Recovery Facility May Accept Hazardous

Waste From A Small Quantity Generator Of

Hazardous Waste And Remain Exempt Under Section

3001(i).

Hazardous wastes generated by small quantity genera-

tors are identified as hazardous wastes under section 3001(d)

of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6921(d). However, small quantity gen-

erator hazardous waste is expressly exempt from much of the

regulato-ry scheme imposed on hazardous waste under

RCRA. For example, a small quantity generator is generally

authorized to deliver its waste to a non-hazardous waste man-

agement facility. 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.5(a), 261.5(g)(3)\iv).

Section 3001(i), however, specifically provides that a re-

source recovery facility is exempt from the requirements of

Subtitle C if it receives and burns on/y household waste and

non-hazardous solid waste from commercial and industrial

21

sources. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i)1 (A).'* Consequently, if the Fa-

cility knowingly or regularly receives and burns small quanti-

ty generator hazardous waste, it is not exempt under section

300 1(1).'5

Only by fundamentally rewriting section 3001(i) could

the Court of Appeals construe section 3001(i) to allow the

Facility routinely to receive hazardous waste from small

quantity generators. Section 3001(i) does not read “house-

hold waste, non-hazardous commercial or industrial waste or

small quantity generator hazardous waste.”’ Indeed, its terms

could not be plainer. Nor does the straightforward reading of

section 3001(i) significantly limit the ability of a small quanti-

ty generator to dispose of its waste. A small quantity genera-

tor can still dispose of its waste virtually unfettered (the vast

majority of waste in the United States is disposed of in land-

fills). Section 3001(i) only provides that a resource recovery

facility may not accept such waste without foregoing its

exemption.

In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals appar-

ently ignored the fundamental transformation that takes

place when municipal solid waste is incinerated to ash. The

fact that heavy metals concentrate in ash residue only under-

scores why Congress was so stringent at the “front end” by

'4 The legislative history indicates that the language in section

3001(1i) is not as absolute as it seems. Even assuming this is true, receipt

by a resource recovery facility of hazardous waste can only be inadver-

tent and occasional, not routine. See S. Rep. No. 284, 98th Cong., Ist

Sess. 61 (1983).

'5 Because the district court concluded that a resource recovery facil-

ity may accept waste from a small quantity generator without losing its

exemption under section 3001(i), and granted Wheelabrator motion for

summary judgment on this issue, EDF did not conduct discovery on

Wheelabrator’s actual receipt of small quantity generator hazardous

waste.

22

providing that resource recovery facilities shall not burn haz-

ardous wastes. The Court of Appeals’ conclusion to the con-

trary is inconsistent with section 3001(i) and must be

rejected.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the requested writ of Certiora-

ri should issue.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/

Leon M. Despres

(Counsel of record )

R. Edward Wilhoite, Jr.

DESPRES, SCHWARTZ &

GEOGHEGAN

77 W. Washington Street

Chicago, IL 60602

(312) 372-2511

Attorneys for petitioner

Of counsel

Karen Florini

ENVIRONMENTAL

DEFENSE FUND

1616 P Street, N.W.

Suite 150

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 387-3500

APPENDIX

' *

See eee ee ee

amd

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT

At a Stated Term of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,

held at the United States Courthouse in the

City of New York, on the 24th day of April,

one thousand nine hundred and ninety-one.

Present: HON. THOMAS J. MESKILL

HON. ROGER J. MINER

HON. FRANK X. ALTIMARI

Circuit Judges,

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

-V=

WHEELABRATOR TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

WESTCHESTER RESCO COMPANY, L.P.,

Defendants~-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of New

York.

This cause came on to be heard on the

transcript of record from the United States

District Court for the Southern District of

New York and was argued by counsel.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now

hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that

the appeal from a judgment of said district

court be and it hereby is affirmed in

accordance with the opinion of this court

A-2

with costs to be taxed against the

appellant.

A TRUE COPY Elaine B. Goldsmith,

ELAINE B. GOLDSMITH Clerk

By:

/sl

/38/

Edward J. Guardaro,

Deputy Clerk

A-3

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

*

No. 1219--August Term, 1990

(Argued March 18, 1991

Decided April 24, 1991)

*

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

-V.-

WHEELABRATOR TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

WESTCHESTER RESCO COMPANY, L.P.,

Defendants-Appellees.

*

Before

MESKILL, MINER and ALTIMARI,

Circuit Judges.

*

Appeal from a judgment entered in the

United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York, Haight, J.,

granting summary judgment in favor of the

defendants.

Affirmed.

A-4

R. EDWARD WILHOITE, JR., Despres,

Schwartz & Geoghegan, Chicago,

IL (Robert L. Graham, Laura A.

Kaser, Gretchen M. Livingston,

Robert L. Denby, Jenner & Block,

Chicago, IL, Karen Florini,

Environmental Defense Fund,

Washington, D.C., of counsel),

for Appellant.

JOHN G. KOELTL, New York, NY (Daniel

G. Murphy, Ted Ss. Ward,

Debevoise & Plimpton, New York,

NY, Harold Himmelman, David M.

Friedland, Stanley S. Sokul,

Beveridge & Diamond, Washington,

D.Ce, of counsel), for

Appellees.

*

MESKILL, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from a judgment

entered in the United Sates District Court

for the Southern District of New York,

Haight, J., on April 16, 1990, granting

summary judgment in favor of the defendants

Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc. and West-

chester Resco Company, L.P. (collectively

"“Wheelabrator"), and dismissing plaintiff

Environmental Defense Fund's (EDF) com-

plaint with prejudice. Judgment was

A-3S

entered pursuant to Judge Haight's order of

April 9, 1990. Prior to ordering entry of

judgment, Judge Haight had issued an

opinion dated November 21,1989, which

examined EDF's claims. See Environmental

Defense Fund v. Wheelabrator Tech., Inc.,

725 F.Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). In that

opinion, Judge Haight fully set forth his

findings of fact and conclusions of law.

See id. The district court, however,

delayed ordering the entry of final judg-

ment pending further discovery. The

district court's findings and conclusions

of November 21, 1989 provide the basis for

this appeal. Assuming the reader's famil-

iarity with that opinion, we offer only a

limited discussion of the relevant back-

ground.

Wheelabrator operates a resource

recovery facility, popularly known as a

"trash-to-energy" facility, where solid

waste generated in Westchester County is

an

A~6

delivered and incinerated. The end-product

of this incineration process is residue

ash. The manner in which Wheelabrator

disposes of this residue ash provides the

underlying basis for the instant controver-

sy. EDF contends that this residue ash is

a "hazardous waste" which must be disposed

of in accordance with the provisions of

Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) (often called

the "Solid Waste Disposal Act"), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 6921-39b. Wheelabrator maintains that

the ash, under the existing statutory and

regulatory scheme, can be disposed of as

non-hazardous solid waste under Subtitle D

of the _ RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-49a.

Wheelabrator argues that Section 3001(i) of

the RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i), which was

adopted in 1984, specifically grants an

exclusion from the hazardous waste regula-

tions to the ash that is the end-product of

A~-7

a resource recovery facility's incineration

process.

EDF also advances an alternative

argument. EDF contends that even assuming

Section 3001(i) grants an exclusion to the

residue ash, Wheelabrator cannot avail

itself of the benefits of that exclusion

because it has taken inadequate steps to

ensure that hazardous wastes are not being

incinerated and it accepts small amounts of

hazardous waste from "small quantity

generators." See 40 C.F.R. § 261.5(a)

(defining the term). In response, Wheela-

brator asserts that "small quantity genera-

tors" are authorized by federal regulation

to deliver their hazardous waste for

disposal to any waste facility that is

"(pjermitted, licensed, or registered by a

State to manage municipal or industrial

solid waste." 40C.F.R. § 261.5(g) (3) (iv).

Wheelabrator also claims that its contrac-

tual arrangements with those who deliver

a ET ee

A-8

solid waste for incineration adequately

ensure against the receipt of hazardous

wastes.

The threshold question that we must

address is whether Congress, in adopting

the Clean Air Act, [sic] Amendments of

1999, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399

(1990), intended to preclude the enforce-

ment of existing environmental laws and

regulations as they relate to the disposal

of incinerator ash, thereby mooting the

controversy currently before us. We note

that this legislation was enacted after the

district court's decision.

Our review of the relevant statutory

provision and the accompanying legislative

history convinces us that Congress did not

intend to erect a bar to the enforcement of

pre-existing environmental statutes and

regulations. Section 306 of the Clean Air

Act Amendments of 1990 provides:

A-9

For a period of 2 years after the

date of enactment of the Clean Air

Act Amendments of 1990, ash from

solid waste incineration units burn-

ing municipal waste shall not be

regulated by the Administrator of the

[EPA] pursuant to section 3001 of the

Solid Waste Disposal Act. Such ref-

erence and limitation shall not be

construed to prejudice, endorse or

otherwise affect any activity by the

Administrator following the 2-year

period from the date of enactment of

the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.

Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399, 2584

(1990). The plain language of the statute

precludes the EPA from "regulating" incin-

erator ash for two years. The precise

meaning of the term "regulate," however, is

in our view at best ambiguous. We, there-

fore, look to the statute's legislative

history for guidance.

The legislative history provides us

with a rather clear indication of Congress'

intent. The House and Senate Conferees

offered the following explanations:

The conferees do not intend to preju-

dice or affect in any manner ongoing

litigation, including Environmental

Defense Fund v. Wheelabrator Inc.,

A-10

725 F. Supp. 758 (2d Cir.) [sic] and

Environmental Defense Fund v. City of

Chicago, Appeal No. 90-3060 (7th

Cir.), or any State activity regard-

ing ash.

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 952, 101st Cong., 2nd

Sess. 335, 342 reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code

Cong. & Admin. News 3867, 3874. The plain

import of this statement is that Congress

consciously made a decision not to express

an opinion regarding the instant case and

a companion case being litigated in the

Seventh Circuit. Indeed, it is obvious

that Congress had no intention of rendering

judicial review of the instant case moot.

Moreover, the statement is consistent with

a congressional intention to see that the

applicable regulatory scheme currently in

existence is not rendered null and void as

it relates to the regulation of incinerator

ash. Finally, by imposing a two year

moratorium on any new EPA regulatory

activity concerning incinerator’ ash,

Congress simply may have desired to main-

A-1l1

tain the status quo pending judicial

resolution of the issues presented here and

in City of Chicago. Once the courts have

spoken, Congress will be in a better

position to evaluate its options regarding

the treatment of incinerator ash and to

direct its future legislative efforts

accordingly.

Having concluded that the case is

properly before us, we now direct our

attention to the district court's decision.

The district court rejected EDF's arguments

and ultimately ordered that judgment be

entered in favor of Wheelabrator. Specifi-

cally, in its November 21, 1989 decision,

the district court held that Section

3001(i) of the RCRA grants an exclusion

from the hazardous waste regulations to the

residue ash which is produced by the

incineration of solid municipal waste. The

district court also concluded that applica-

ble federal regulations permit "small

A-12

quantity generators" of hazardous waste to

dispose of that waste at any facility,

including a resource recovery facility,

that is "{p]jermitted, licensed, or regis-

tered by a State to manage municipal or

industrial solid waste." 40 C.F.R.

§ 261.5(g) (3) (iv). Finally, the court held

that Wheelabrator, through its contractual

arrangements for the delivery of solid

municipal waste, had in place legally

sufficient controls to ensure that unautho-

rized hazardous wastes would not be deliv:

ered to the resource recovery facility for

disposal.

After carefully reviewing Judge

Haight's thorough and well reasoned opin-

ion, we agree with his analysis of the

legal issues. Accordingly, we affirm the

April 16, 1990 judgment of the district

court for the reasons stated by Judge

Haight in his opinion dated November 21,

1989. Environmental Defense Fund v.

A-13

Wheelabrator Tech., Inc., 725 F.Supp. 758

(S.D.N.Y. 1989).

A-14

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-_-_ -— = = -—-— = = — = -—-& = =— =— =— =—- =—& —_— = x

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC., : 88-

: CV.-

Plaintiff, : 0560

>: (CH)

-against- :

WHEELABRATOR TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

and WESTCHESTER RESCO COMPANY,

LcPes 3

Defendants. :

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC., 257

Park Avenue South, New York, New York

10010, Michael E. Herz, Esq., of counsel.

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC., 1616

P Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036,

Karen Florini, Esq. and Kathie A. Stein,

Esq., of counsel.

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON, 875 Third

Avenue, New York, New York 10022, John G.

Koeltl, Esq., Daniel G. Murphy, Esq., and

Terry E. Thornton, Esq., of counsel.

BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND, 1333 New Hamp-

shire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036,

Harold Himmelman, Esq., Karl S. Bourdeau,

Esq., and David M. Friedland, Esq., of

counsel.

aA~i5

KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, 1500 Oliver

Building, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222,

Joseph A. Katarincic, Esq., of counsel.

COUNSEL FOR AMICI CURIAE

NEW YORK LAWYERS FOR THE PUBLIC

INTEREST, 135 East 15th Street, New York,

New York 10003, Herbert Semmel, Esq., of

counsel.

Attorneys for the American Public

Health Association.

DISTRICT COUNCIL 37, 125 Barclay

Street, New York, New York 10007, Joel

Giller, Esq. and Leonard Shrier, Esq., of

counsel.

Attorneys for American Federation of

State, County & Municipal Employees.

NITKIN, ALKALAY, HANDLER, ROBBINS &

KORN, 122 East 42nd Street, New York, New

York 10168, Henry Korn, Esq., of counsel.

CROWELL & MORING, 1001 Pennsylvania

Avenue N.W., Washington, D.C., 20004,

Ridgway M. Hall, Jr., Esq., Robert C.

Davis, Jr., Esq., and B. Michael Hodge,

Esq., of counsel.

Attorneys for Tricil, Inc.

ROSENMAN & COLIN, 575 Madison Avenue,

New York, New York 10022, Marvin R. Lange,

Esq., of counsel.

Attorneys for County of Westchester.

A-16

ROBERT ABRAMS, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE

STATE OF NEW YORK, 120 Broadway, New York,

New York 10271, Marc S. Gerstman, Esq., of

counsel.

Attorneys for New York State Depart-

ment of Environmental Conservation.

WILSON, ELSER, MOSKOWITZ, EDELMAN &

DICKER, 420 Lexington Avenue, New York, New

York 10170, David L. Wong, Esq., of coun-

sel.

NATIONAL SOLID WASTES MANAGEMENT

ASSOCIATION, Officer of the General Coun-

sel, 1730 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W., Suite

1000, Washington, D.C. 20036, Bruce J.

Parker, Esq., of counsel.

Attorneys for The Institution of

Resource Recovery.

NIXON, HARGRAVE, DEVANS & DOYLE, 30

Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York

10112, Frank H. Penski, Esq., Philip F.

Cronin, Jr., Esq., Richard M. Cogen, Esq.,

and Dexter Ewel, Esq., of counsel.

THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF

MAYORS, Office of the General Counsel, 1620

Eye Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006,

Gerard L. Lederer, Esq., of counsel.

Attorneys for The United States

Conference of Mayors and The National

Resource Recovery Association.

This important environmental case

raises issues of the proper construction of

a federal statute governing hazardous

waste, and defendants' compliance with the

statutory and regulatory scheme.

The case is now before the Court on

defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to

Rule 12(b) (6), Fed. R. Civ. P., or in the

alternative, for summary judgment pursuant

to Rule 56(b), and plaintiff's cross-motion

for summary judgment pursuant to Rule

56(a). V

i/ = By leave of Court, briefs amici curiae sup-

porting plaintiff were filed by the American Public

Health Association, the American Federation of

State, County & Municipal Employees, and Tricil,

Inc.

Briefs supporting defendants were filed by

the County of Westchester, the New York State

Department of Environmental Conservation, the

Institution of Resource Recovery, and the National

Resource Recovery Association and the United States

Conference of Mayors (joint brief).

Plaintiff the Environmental Defense

Fund, Inc. ("EDF") contends that defendants

have violated certain portions of the

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of

1976 ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seg.,

and the regulations promulgated thereunder

both by the federal Environmental Protec-

tion Agency ("EPA") and the New York

Department of Environmental Conservation

("DEC") .¥/

Subtitle C of the RCRA "established a

‘cradle to grave' regulatory scheme govern-

ing the treatment, storage, and disposal of

hazardous wastes." vi e-

&/ EDF does not allege an independent violation

of state law, but rather claims that "[v]jiolation

of the New York regulations . . . constitutes

violation of regulations that have become effective

pursuant to Subtitle C of RCRA.” Complaint at

q ll.

3/ ‘The EPA promulgated regulations pursuant to the

RCRA dealing with the classification of solid

wastes as either hazardous or non-hazardous.

Certain wastes are listed as per ge hazardous. 40

(continued...)

A-19

fense Fund v. E.P.A., 852 F.2d 1316, 1318

(D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.

1120 (1989). Solid wastes not classified

as hazardous are regulated under Subtitle

D of the statute.

Pursuant to Section 3006(b) of

the RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b), a state may

seek authorization from the EPA to adminis-

ter and enforce a hazardous waste program

in that state. If the Administrator of the

EPA accepts the state's proposed program as

in keeping with the strictures of federal

law, the state is authorized to administer

its program in place of a federal program.

The EPA, however, retains responsibility

for overseeing the hazardous waste programs

of the states.

3/ (...continued)

C.F.R. 5 261.30-261.33(f£). Those wastes not listed

by the EPA as per se hazardous are deemed such only

if they exhibit one of the following four charac-

teristics: corrosivity, ignitability, reactivity,

Or toxicity, 40 C.F.R. § 261.21-261.24, and are not

otherwise exempt from classification as a hazardous

waste. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(1).

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On May 29, 1986, New York's applica-

tion to operate a hazardous waste program

in lieu of the federal program was granted.

The New York regulations, which mirror

those promulgated by the EPA, are codified

at 6 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. Parts 370-

374 ("NYCRR").

Factual Background

Plaintiff EDF is a "non-profit, public

benefit membership corporation organized

under the laws of the State of New York."

Complaint at ¢¥ 4. EDF characterizes itself

as "a national environmental advocacy

organization supported by approximately

60,000 dues-paying members." Id.

Defendants Wheelabrator Technologies

Inc. ("WTI") and Westchester Resco Company,

L.P. ("Resco") own and operate the West-

chester Resource Recovery Facility’ ("the

‘/ A resource recovery facility "refers generally

to facilities that burn solid waste in order to

recover useful thermal energy (as steam or elec~

tricity) and to reduce the weight and volume of

(continued... )

A-21

Facility") in Peekskill, New York. Resco

designed the Facility pursuant to a 1981

agreement entered into by the County of

Westchester and Wheelabrator-Frye Inc.¥

The Facility processes approximately

650,000 tons of solid waste, both household

and non-hazardous municipal waste, annual-

ly. In processing that amount cf solid

waste, the Facility generates roughly 330

million kilowatt hours of electricity each

year. A byproduct of the waste recovery

process is ash. Approximately 500 tons of

ash are produced by the Facility daily.

EDF contends that the ash is a hazardous

/ (...continued)

waste requiring landfill disposal.” Affidavit of

Ronald J. Broglio sworn to on March 19, 1988 at

q 4.

2/ Wheelabrator-Frye Inc. is a predecessor of WTI.

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waste” and must therefore be disposed of

as such.

Specifically, EDF contends’ that

defendants are in violation of federal

regulations requiring that generators of

hazardous waste apply for and receive a

United States EPA number before engaging in

the treatment, storage, disposal, transpor-

tation, or offering for transportation of

hazardous waste. 40 C.F.R. § 262.12. An

analogous requirement is found in the New

York state framework. 6 NYCRR § 371.3.

It is uncontested that the ash pro-

duced by the Facility is not dealt with

pursuant to the regulations governing the

handling and disposal of hazardous wastes.

§/ The ash produced at the Facility failed the EP

toxicity test, Procedure set forth at Appendix II

to 40 C.F.R. § 261.33, nine out of the past ten

times samples have been tested. Exhibit 2 attached

to Plaintiff’s Memorandum; Defendants’ Exhibit 24

at B-6. The EP toxicity test is a measure of the

hazardous qualities of solid waste. See Al Tech

Specialty Steel Corp. v. E-P.A., 846 F.2d 158, 160

(2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (waste is subject to

regulation as hazardous where it fails the EP

toxicity test, a characteristic of hazardous

wastes).

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The Westchester County Refuse Disposal

District No. 1 ("District") owns and

operates an ashfill where the Facility’s

ash is brought for disposal. That ashfill,

the Sprout Brook Residue Disposal Site

("Sprout Brook"), located in Cortlandt, New

York, is not a licensed hazardous waste

disposal facility./ Defendants have

further not complied with those regulations

governing the transportation and disposal

of hazardous waste.

L/ Disposal facilities dealing with hazardous

waste must also obtain an EPA identification

number. 40 C.F.R. § 262.12. Again, an analogous

regulation is found in the New York state scheme.

6 NYCRR § 371.3.

8/ Generators of hazardous waste are required to

prepare a shipping manifest designating a licensed

disposal facility. The generator is to maintain a

copy of the manifest on file. 40 C.F.R. § 262.20-

-23. 6 NYCRR § 372.2(a), 372.2(b)(5) (iii).

Before shipping, hazardous waste must be

packaged, labelled, marked, and placarded according

to specific regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 262.30-.33,

6 NYCRR § 372.2(a)(4)-(7). Hazardous waste must

further be accumulated in labelled containers. 40

C.F.R. § 262.34, 6 NYCRR § 372.2(a) (8).

A generator of hazardous waste must also

maintain certain records and is required to submit

an annual report to the state DEC. 40 C.F.R.

§ 262.40-.43, 6 NYCRR § 373.2(c).

A-24

EDF contends that defendants' genera-

tion of ash which fails the EP toxicity

test subjects the handling of that ash to

federal regulations governing the genera-

tion, management and disposal of hazardous

wastes. Defendants do no contest that they

are not in compliance with those regula-

tions, but rather argue that the RCRA

itself exempts resource recovery facilities

from the strictures of Subtitle C.

Plaintiff argues that the regulatory

"EP [toxicity] test governs as a matter of

law", citing Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp.

v. _E.P.A., supra; and, "since defendants

have admitted that their ash fails the EP

toxicity test and that they do not comply

with the hazardous waste laws, plaintiff is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum at 3-4, l.

The argument assumes its basic prem-

ise: that defendants are subject to hazard-

ous waste regulation under Subtitle C, of

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which the EP toxicity test forms a part.

But if a proper construction of the statute

excludes defendants from compliance with

hazardous waste laws, their conceded non-

compliance has no legal significance. The

Second Circuit's opinion in A] Tech does

not change this analysis, since the corpo-

rate defendant in that case, a specialty

steel maker which constructed a collection

basin on its property to deal with toxic

precipitations, did not claim a statutory

exclusion from hazardous waste regulation,

and could not have done so.

I turn then to the statutory and

regulatory scheme.

Discussion

In May 1980, after the 1976 passage of

the RCRA, the EPA implemented a regulatory

provision termed the "household waste

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exclusion."2/ In the preamble to the 1980

household waste exclusion, the EPA made

clear that the ash residue produced as a

byproduct of the incineration of household

waste was exempt from regulation under

Subtitle C of the RCRA.

The Senate language makes it clear

that household waste does not lose

the exclusion simply because it has

been collected. Since household

waste is excluded in all phases of

its management, residue remaining

after treatment (e.g., incineration,

thermal treatment) are not subject to

regulation as hazardous waste. Such

wastes, however, must be transported,

stored, treated and disposed in ac-

2/ That exclusion provided as follows:

§ 261.4 Exclusions

(b) Solid wastes which are not hazardous

wastes.

The following solid wastes are not hazardous

wastes:

(1) Household waste, including household

waste that has been collected, transported,

stored, treated, disposed, recovered (e.g.,

refuse-derived fuel) or reused. "Household

waste” means any waste material (including

garbage, trash and sanitary wastes in septic

tanks) derived from households (including

single and multiple residences, hotels and

motels. )

45 Fed. Reg. 33,120 (May 19, 1980) (codified as

amended at 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(1) (1987)).

ee

A~37

cordance with applicable State and

federal requirements concerning man-

agement of solid waste (including any

requirements specified in regulations

under Subtitle D of RCRA.) ....

45 Fed. Reg. 33,099 (May 19, 1980). The

EPA went on to note that when "household

waste is mixed with other hazardous wastes,

. . . the mixture will be deemed hazardous"

and thus subject to the regulations of

Subtitle Cc. Id. It is common ground that

the ash resulting from the incineration of

household waste is not subject to regula-

tion as a hazardous waste. 1!

In 1984 Congress sought to "clarify"

the household waste exclusion in respect of

its applicability to municipal wastes

generally, including non-hazardous commer-

12/ Although the parties are in agreement that the

1980 exclusion extends to ash residue, EDF takes

exception to the EPA’s judgment that Congress

intended such an exemption. Plaintiff’s Memorandum

at 25 n. 14 (“plaintiff considers the application

of the pure household waste exclusion to ash

residues inconsistent with the statute”); Plain-

tiff’s Reply Memorandum at 12 ("EPA’s justification

for applying the household waste exclusion to ash -

- itself of doubtful validity -- was the perceived

Congressional intent to exclude an entire waste

stream").

A-28

cial and industrial wastes. Congress

therefore enacted the following provision:

(i) Clarification of household waste

exclusion

A resource recovery facility re-

covering energy from the mass burning

of municipal solid waste shall not be

deemed to be treating, storing, dis-

posing of, or otherwise managing

hazardous wastes for the purposes of

regulation under this subchapter

if --

(1) such facility --

(A) receives and burns only --

(i) household waste (from single

and multiple dwellings, hotels,

motels, and other residential

sources), and

(ii) solid waste from commer-

cial or industrial sources that

does not contain hazardous waste

identified or listed under this

section, and

(2) the owner or operator of such

facility has established contractual

requirements or other appropriate

notification or inspection procedures

to assure that hazardous wastes are not

received at or [sic] burned in such facili-

ty.

A-29

RCRA Section 3001(i), 42 U.S.C.

§ 6921(i) .v The instant controversy

i/ The equivalent regulation is found in the New

York scheme.

(2) Solid wastes which are not hazardous wastes.

The following solid wastes are not hazardous

wastes:

(i) household waste, including household

waste that has been collected, transported,

stored, treated, disposed, recovered (e.g.,

refuse-derived fuels) or reused. Household

waste means any waste material (including

garbage, trash and sanitary wastes in septic

tanks) derived from households (including

single and multiple residences, hotels and

motels, bunkhouses, ranger stations, crew

quarters, campgrounds, picnic grounds and

day-use recreation areas). A resource

recovery facility managing municipal waste

shall not be deemed to be treating, storing,

disposing of, or otherwise managing hazardous

waste for the purpose of regulation, if such

facility:

(a) receives and burns only:

(1) household waste (from single and

multiple dwellings, hotels, motels and

other residential sources); and

(2) solid waste from commercial or

industrial sources that does not con-

tain hazardous waste; and

(b) does not accept hazardous waste and the

Owner or operator of such facility has

established contractual requirements or other

appropriate notification or inspection proce-

dures to assure that hazardous wastes are not

received at or burned in the facility.

NYCRR § 371.1(e)(2)(i) (1987) (emphasis in origi-

nal).

ae

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centers on the proper construction and

scope of the 1984 clarification.

Defendants contend that Section

3001(i) exempts the Facility from those

regulations, codified at 40 C.F.R. Part

262, governing the generation of hazardous

waste. Plaintiff argues that Section

3001(i) does not exempt resource recovery

facilities accepting commercial wastes from

regulations governing the generation of

hazardous waste, but only from those

regulations, codified at 40 C.F.R. Parts

264-68 and 270, concerning the management

of hazardous waste.l%/

12/ EDF contends that Section 3001(i) merely

exempts the Facility from regulation as a treat-

ment, storage and disposal ("TSD") facility (fa-

cilities that manage, rather than produce hazardous

waste). However, by its own terms Section 3001(i)

does not apply to resource recovery facilities that

accept hazardous waste for incineration, and

plaintiff argues that if a resource recovery

facility should ever accept hazardous waste, even

accidentally, it would not be eligible for exemp-

tion even from regulation as a TSD facility. Under

plaintiff’‘s construction of Section 3001(i) it is

difficult to understand what, if any, benefit the

Facility derives from the exemption. Plainly, if

the Facility never accepts hazardous waste for

processing, it would not be subject to regulation

as a TSD facility even absent the exclusion.

A. Plain Language of the Statute

Defendants contend that Section

3001(i) is clear in its intent to exclude

the ash generated by the waste recovery

process from regulation under Subtitle C.

Arguing that this Court need not look

beyond the pleadings and the plain meaning

of Section 3001(i), the defendants move for

dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6).

Defendants argue that the "otherwise

managing" language in Section 3001(i)

"applies to all the waste management

activities of a facility, including manag-

ing and disposing of the ash residue."

Defendants' Memorandum at 15. Therefore,

any waste resource recovery facility that

"burns only residential and other non-

hazardous waste and establishes the requi-

site contractual or other specified safe-

guards is not subject to regulation under

A-32

Subtitle c." Id. I do not think the

meaning of the statute so clear.

Section 3001(i) does not, in plain

words, exclude the Facility from those

regulations regarding the generation of

hazardous waste; that term is nowhere

mentioned in the statutory language.

Further, the ash produced as a byproduct of

the resource recovery process is not

specifically exempted from regulation under

the terms of Section 3001(i). The “otner-

wise managing" language of the statute

could arguably be read as that sort of

general catchall provision often included

in involved statutory frameworks.’ The

13/ =r EDF argues that the plain language of the

statutory exclusion, when read in conjunction with

the definitional section of the statute, establish-

es its construction of Section 3001(i). The

definitional section of the statute sets forth the

meaning of “disposal”, “hazardous waste genera~-

tion", and “hazardous waste management” separately.

EDF contends that the separate definition of these

terms is dispositive of Congress’ intent in enact-

ing Section 3001(i).

(3) The term “disposal” means the discharge,

deposit, injection, dumping, spilling,

(continued...)

A-33

precise meaning of the phrase is not

43/ (...continued)

leaking, or placing of any solid waste into

Or on any land or water so that such solid

waste or hazardous waste or any constituent

thereof may enter the environment or be

emitted into the air or discharged into any

waters, including ground waters.

(6) The term "hazardous waste generation”

means the act or process of producing haz-

ardous waste.”

(7) The term “hazardous waste management”

means the systematic control of the collec-

tion, source separation, storage, transpor-

tation, processing, treatment, recovery, and

disposal of hazardous wastes.

42 U.S.C. § 6093(3), (6), (7).

Although the statute does not define

“otherwise managing hazardous wastes, the defini-

tion most on point is that of “hazardous waste

management". Plaintiff concludes that the Facility

cannot argue exemption from those regulations

governing the generation of hazardous waste and the

disposal of the waste it generates because the term

generation is defined separately from management

and is not specifically mentioned in Section

3001(i). I do not agree.

The definition of “management” is suffi-

ciently broad, particularly in view of the fact

that the term disposal is specifically enumerated

in Section 3001(i), to warrant examination of the

legislative history on the point. I say this also

in view of the fact that Section 3001(i) is explic-

itly termed a clarification of the 1980 household

waste exclusion which is understood by the parties

to extend to the ash byproduct generated by the

waste recovery process. Further, Subtitle C as a

whole is captioned “HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT,” a

fact which lends support to defendants’ argument

that the “otherwise managing” language of the

exclusion is meant to exempt the Facility from all

regulation under that subtitle.

A-34

ascertainable without turning to the legis-

lative history.

B. Legislative History

The legislative history of the 1984

exclusion makes clear Congress' intent to

exclude ash generated by an excluded

facility from regulation under Subtitle C

of the RCRA. Commenting on Section

3001(i), the Report of the Senate Committee

on Environment and Public Works, which

accompanied the proposed legislation, said

the following:

The reported bill adds a subsec-

tion (d) [sic] to section 3001 to

clarify the coverage cf the household

waste exclusion with respect to re-

source recovery facilities recovering

energy through the mass burning of

municipal solid waste. This exclu-

sion was promulgated by the Agency

[EPA] in its hazardous waste manage-

ment regulations established to ex-

clude waste streams generated by

consumers at the household level and

by sources whose wastes are suffi-

ciently similar in both quantity and

quality to those of households.

Resource recovery facilities

often take in such "household wastes"

mixed with other, non-hazardous waste

streams from a variety of sources

A-35

other than "“households," including

small commercial and _ée industrial

sources, schools, hotels, municipal

buildings, churches, etc. ze (O48

important to encourage commercially

viable resource recovery facilities

and to remove impediments that may

hinder their development and opera-

tion. New section 3001(d) [sic]

Clarifies the original intent to

include within the household waste

exclusion activities of a resource

recovery facility which recovers

energy from the mass burning of

household waste and non-hazardous

waste from other sources.

Ww ivities

of such a facility, including the

generation, transportation, treat-

ment, storage and disposal of waste

shall be covered by the exclusion, if

the limitations in paragraphs (1) and

(2) of subsection (d) [sic] are met.

S. Rep. No. 284, 98th Cong., lst Sess. 61

(1983) ("Senate Report") (emphasis added).

The Conference Committee adopted,

without change, the provision proposed by

the Senate:

SECTION 223 == CLARIFICATION OF

HOUSEHOLD WASTE EXCLUSION

House Bill. -- No provision.

Senate amendment. -- The Senate

amendment clarifies that an energy

recovery facility is exempt from haz-

ardous waste requirements if it burns

A-36

only residential and non-hazardous

commercial wastes and establishes

procedures to assure hazardous wastes

will not be burned at the facility.

- e The

Conference substitute is the same as

the Senate amendment.

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1133, 98th Cong., lst

Sess. 79, 106 (1984), reprinted in 1984

U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5649, 5677.

The report of the relevant Senate

Committee, delivered contemporaneous with

the provision at issue, makes clear that

the exclusion was meant to extend to ash

and other wastes generated in the process

of resource recovery, so as long as the

particular facility does not accept hazard-

ous waste for ‘ncineration and has in place

the appropriate mechanisms for ensuring

that no such waste is accepted. The Senate

report could not be more explicit. ps 4

includes the term "generation", the term

upon which EDF places so much emphasis.

While it is true that the legislation

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itself does not include the term generation

and that it is the legislation with which

we are concerned, the legislative history

is probative on the issue of Congress'

intent, given that the scope of the statute

is unclear on its face.

Moreover, I think it important to

note, as does the report of the Senate

committee, that the 1984 statutory provi-

sion "clarifies" a previously existing

regulatory exclusion, which clearly extend-

ed to ash. See supra at n.10. Nowhere in

the 1984 exclusion, nor in the Committee

report which accompanied it, is there any

hint of a congressional intent to limit the

scope of that earlier exclusion. EDF

argues that the ash resulting from the

incineration of household waste remains

exempt from regulation under Subtitle S,

pursuant to the 1980 exclusion, but that

ash generated by a facility that accepts

municipal as well as household waste is not

A-38

so exempt. I do not think that a fair

reading of the statute. More important,

neither, according to its declarations,

would Congress.

Congress clearly knew of the EPA's

interpretation of the 1980 regulation, and

had it disagreed, would have made clear its

disagreement. See Young v. Community

Nutrition Institute, 476 U.S. 974 983

(1986) (quoting NLRB _v. Bell _ Aerospace,

Co., 416 US.. 267, 275 (1974)) (“congres-

sional failure to revise or repeal the

agency's interpretation is persuasive

evidence that the interpretation is the one

intended by Congress"). Instead Congress

clarified its "original intent to include

within the household waste exclusion

activities of a resource recovery facility

-which recovers energy from the mass burning

of household waste and non-hazardous waste

from other sources." Senate Report at 61.

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C. Agency Interpretation

In 1985, the EPA promulgated a regula-

tion that mirrored Section 3001(i). 40

C.F.R. § 261.4(b) (1). Ina preamble to the

regulation, the EPA interpreted the clari-

fication as follows:

The statute is silent as to

whether hazardous resides from burn-

ing combined household and non-house-

hold, non-hazardous waste are hazard-

ous waste. These residues would be

hazardous wastes under present EPA

regulations if they exhibited a char-

acteristic. The legislative history

does not directly address this ques-

tion although the Senate report can

be read as enunciating a general

policy of non-regulation of these

resource recovery facilities if they

carefully scrutinize their incoming

wastes. On the other hand, residues

from burning could, in theory, exhib-

it a characteristic of hazardous

waste even if no hazardous wastes are

burned, for example, if toxic metals

become concentrated in the ash.

Thus, the requirement of scrutiny of

incoming wastes would not assure non-

hazardousness of the residue. EPA

believes that the principal purpose

of section 3001(g) [{sic] was to pre-

vent resource recovery facilities

that may inadvertently burn hazardous

waste, despite good faith efforts to

avoid such a result, from becoming

subject to the Subtitle C regula-

tions. EPA does not see in this

A-40

provision an intent to exempt the

regulation of incinerator ash from

the burning of non-hazardous waste in

resource recovery facilities if the

ash routinely exhibits a characteris-

tic of hazardous waste. However, EPA

has no evidence to indicate that

these ash residues are hazardous

under existing rules. EPA does not

believe the HSWA (Hazardous and Solid

Waste Amendments of 1984] impose new

regulatory burdens on resource recov-

ery facilities that burn household

and other non-hazardous waste, and

the Agency has no plans to impose

additional responsibilities on these

facilities. Given the highly benefi-

cial nature of resource recovery

facilities, any future additional

regulation of their residues would

have to await consideration of the

important technical and policy issues

that would be posed in the event

serious questions arise about the

residues.

50 Fed. Reg. 28,725-26 (July 15, 1985).

Although at the time of issuing the

Preamble, the EPA was manifestly of the

view that Section 3001(i) did not wholly

exempt ash exhibiting characteristics of

hazardousness from regulation as such, that

view rests on a questionable reading of the

statute and the legislative history. For

this reason, the EPA's interpretation,

Nl

A-41

normally entitled to substantial deference,

carries little weight with this Court. See

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,

Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985) ("[{ajn

agency's construction of a statute it is

charged with enforcing is entitled to

deference if it is reasonable and not in

conflict with the expressed intent of

Congress") (citations omitted). The EPA's

interpretation of Section 3001(i) is in

direct conflict with the expressed intent

of Congress as that intent is manifested in

the legislative history.

Deference to an agency's construction

of the statute which it administers “is

appropriate only when Congress has not

directly addressed the precise question at

issue, Chevron U.S.A. v. N.R.D.C., 467 U.S.

837, 843 (1984), a circumstance that arises

if it can fairly be said that Congress ‘did

not actually have an intent' regarding the

point at issue." New tate Mot

A-42

Truck Association, Inc. v. City of New

York, 654 F. Supp. 1521, 1536 (S.D.N.Y.),

aff'd. per curiam, 833 F.2d 430 (2nd Cir.

1987). In the case at bar, the congressio-

nal intent with respect to the statutory

exemption at issue appears with sufficient

clarity from the legislative history.”

Even the EPA appears to have recog-

nized the questionable basis for its

determination that ash is subject to

regulation as a hazardous waste. On

December 3, 1987, J. Winston Porter, the

Assistant Administrator for the Office of

Solid Waste and Emergency Response, who was

then responsible for the implementation of

i4/ = Moreover, the EPA’s views on the subject are

internally inconsistent, even in the 1985 Preamble.

To the extent the EPA thought ash exhibiting

characteristics of hazardousness should be regulat-

ed, it appears to have left open the question of

how such regulation should be accomplished.

Specifically, the EPA seems to have left for

another day the issue of whether a new set of

regulations, taking into account existing technolo-

gy for the treatment of ash, should be promulgated,

or whether regulation should proceed under Subtitle

C of the RCRA. Of course, whether such regulation

would be in violation of Section 3001(i) is a

question not before me.

A-43

the RCRA at the EPA, testified before the

Senate Subcommittee on Hazardous Waste and

Toxic Substances of the Committee on

Environment and Public Works. He did so in

response to a letter invitation of the

Subcommittee in which it was requested that

he address nine separate issues, including

the status of incinerator ash. On that

question, Porter said the following:

Currently, EPA's regulations

merely restate the statutory lan-

guage. In the preamble codifying

this statutory language, however, EPA

advanced an interpretation of the

statute that would subject ash resi-

due's [sic] from energy-recovering

MWC's [Municipal Waste Combustors] to

Subtitle C regulation if the ash

exhibited a characteristic of hazard-

ous waste. The Agency has reexamined

that interpretation and now concludes

that it may have been in error. The

Agency believes that the language and

legislative history of Section

3001(i) were probably intended to ex-

clude these ash residues from regula-

tion under Subtitle Cc.

| It seems clear that Congress'

interest in Section 3001(i) was to

encourage energy recovery. Under the

section, the reach of the household

exclusion was to be extended for

facilities that recover energy. The

Agency's prior interpretation of the

A-44

section would restrict the exclusion

with respect to ash residue for fa-

cilities that recover energy as well

as those that do not. This appears

inconsistent with the reach of the

household exclusion itself (which

Clearly covers ash). It also appears

inconsistent with the expressed leg-

islative intent that "[a]ll waste

management activities of such a fa-

cility, including the generation,

transportation, treatment, storage,

and disposal of waste shall be cov-

ered by the exclusion. ..." S.

Rep. at 61 (emphasis added).

December 3, 1987 testimony of J. Winston

Porter at 16-17. Thus, in 1987, the EPA

official responsible for the implementation

of the RCRA questioned whether the agency's

1985 interpretation of the statute was

consistent with Congress' intent as ex-

pressed in the Senate Report. Although

Porter did not officially announce a

reversal in agency policy on the mat-

A-45

ter,’ he clearly indicates the EPA's

confusion on the point.

On May 11, 1989, Congressman Thomas A.

Luken, Chairman of the House Subcommittee

on Transportation and Hazardous Materials,

called a hearing on H.R. 2162, a proposal

to regulate ash as a "special waste" under

Subtitle D of the RCRA. In his opening

comments, Congressman Luken~ said _ the

following:

A statutory ambiguity has caused

a great deal of uncertainty with

respect to how this ash should be

regulated.

The very basic question of

whether or not ash should be regulat-

13/s porter’s testimony calls into question the

finality with which the EPA views its own 1985

interpretation of Section 3001(i). Porter says the

following:

First, in the near term we [EPA] are

planning to develop the following items:

* Technical guidance for the proper

handling for MWC ash; and

* Our legal interpretation of the

status of MWC ash with respect to

Subtitle C (hazardous waste) and Sub-

title D (solid waste) portions of the

RCRA.

After taking comment on those above aspects,

our intent is to develop a regulation for MWC

ash as a “special waste” [under Subtitle D}.

December 3, 1987 testimony of J. Winston Porter at

14-15.

nn

A-46

ed under Subtitle D, as a solid

waste, or under subtitle C as a haz-

ardous waste, remains ambiguous in

the statute.

x *

This uncertainty has been exac-

erbated by conflicting signals sent

by the EPA. That is not a criticism

of EPA.

Originally the EPA stated that

incinerator ash must be tested for

toxicity, and managed accordingly,

but more recently the EPA has made

various pronouncements which conflict

with that original policy.

It has become clear that legis-

lative action is needed.

x * ®

The bill which we will consider

today . . . clarifies once and for

all that municipal solid waste incin-

erator ash is to be regulated under

subtitle D, and not subtitle C, of

RCRA.

Regulation of Municipal Solid Waste Incin-

erators: Hearings on H.R. 2162 before the

Subcommittee on Transportation and Hazard-

ous Materials of the House Committee on

Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.

1-2 (May 11, 1989) (emphasis added).

In that May 11, 1989 hearing, Sylvia

Lowrance, the then Director of the Office

A-47

of Solid Waste, offered the fcllowing

comments:

In our codification of it [Sec-

tion 3001(i)] we stated that, in our

view, the provision excludes energy

recovery facilities burning household

waste along with nonhazardous waste

from commercial and industrial sourc-

es from regulation under subtitle Cc.

With regard to the ash, however,

produced from such facilities, we

said in a 1985 notice that the ash

generated by these facilities which

exhibits a characteristic of the haz-

ardous waste must be managed as a

hazardous waste.

We continue to follow that 1985

policy, and that is our current in-

terpretation. However, there is

substantial controversy surrounding

that interpretation. We are in liti-

gation challenging the EPA's inter-

pretation of section 3001(i). We

believe the law is ambiguous given it

is silent with regard to treatment of

ash under that section.

We *do believe it needs to be

clarified. What we believe is of

paramount importance is that ash be

safely managed in a technically sound

matter.

Until this legal controversy is

resolved, there is going to continue

to be uncertainty on the part of

communities trying to deal with their

garbage crisis with regard to what

ultimate requirements and costs will

be for their municipal solid waste

management.

We very much support an approach

such as the one taken in H.R. 2162,

xO

A~-48

which would provide clear authority

to the EPA to regulate municipal

combustor ash as a special waste

under subtitle D of RCRA.

Id. at 33 (emphasis added); see also id. at

44 ("a special waste program under Subtitle

D, tailored to ash, could be consistent,

practical, and environmentally safe"). It

is clear from Ms. Lowrance’s testimony that

although she regards official EPA policy to

have remained unchanged since 1985, the

agency regards the statute as ambiguous on

the issue of ash and is desirous of clari-

fication on the point.

Although the EPA's official position

has arguably remained unchanged since the

agency first interpreted the exclusion in

1985, the agency has certainly called the

validity of its own views into doubt,

calling for legislative clarification of

the issue. Indeed, in the 1987 hearings

before the Senate Subcommittee on Hazardous

Waste and Toxic Substances, the finality of

OO

A-49

that 1985 interpretation was called into

question. See supra note 15 ("in the near

term we [EPA] are planning to develop. .

. [oO)ur legal interpretation of the status

of MWC ash with respect to Subtitle C

(hazardous waste) and Subtitle D (solid

waste) portions of the RCRA"). In these

circumstances, an additional reason for

rejecting the agency interpretation urged

upon this Court by EDF!” is the "incon-

i8/ Of course, the EPA’s interpretation, even if

it were entitled to deference in these proceedings,

would not be binding on this Court. As an "inter-

pretative rule”, the agency’s views would at most

carry a heightened power of persuasion, but not the

force of law.

As a starting point, .. . the agency’s

characterization of a rule is “relevant,”

although not necessarily “dispositive.” °

- “An interpretative rule simply states what

the administrative agency thinks the [(under-

lying) statute means, and only ‘"reminds”

affected parties of existing duties.’ On the

other hand, if by its action the agency

intends to create new law, rights or duties,

the rule is properly considered to be a

legislative rule.”

- «

Stated slightly differently, "’interpretative

rules are statements as to what the adminis-

trative officer thinks the statute or regula-

tion means, ‘"“whereas legislative rules have

"effect(s} completely independent of the

statute.”

(continued...)

A-50

sistency of the positions the [EPA] has

taken through the years." Immigration and

Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonesca,

480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1986).

An agency interpretation of a rele-

vant provision which conflicts with

the agency's earlier interpretation

is "entitled to considerably less

deference" than a consistently held

agency view.

Id. (citations omitted).

D. Subsequent Congressional Views

EDF submits two letters of October 2,

1987, one signed by six Senators and the

other by a member of the House of Represen-

tatives, in support of its construction of

Section 3001(i). The first letter, signed

by Senators Stafford, Durenberger, Chafee,

Burdick, Baucus, and Mitchell ("Senators'

Letter"), addressed to Lee Thomas of the

EPA, said the following:

is/ Ss (.... continued)

Vv PA

ronmental Protection Agency, 821 F.2d 714, 718

(D.C. Cir. 1987) (citations omitted) (emphasis in

Original).

a-S3

We are writing to urge that the

Agency [EPA]) refrain from issuing any

policy statements or legal interpre-

tations of the Resource Conservation

and Recovery Act as it relates to the

management of ash generated by munic-

ipal solid waste incinerators pending

further consultation and coordination

with the Congress. We are concerned

that the Agency may be on the verge

of interpreting these requirements,

possibly in a manner inconsistent

with the law, at a time our Committee

is considering legislation specifi-

cally resolving this issue.

In our view, section 3001(i) of

the Solid Waste Disposal Act, often

known as RCRA, as amended in 1984

does not exempt owners or operators

of municipal solid waste incinerators

from their obligations: 1) to deter-

mine whether the ash residues gener-

ated by the incineration process are

hazardous wastes, and 2)~’to handle

ash exhibiting hazardous waste char-

acteristics as hazardous wastes in

accordance with the requirements of

Subtitle C of RCRA. Thus, we concur

in the Agency's statement in the

preamble to the July 15, 1985 codifi-

cation rule that in the 1984 amend-

ments Congress did not “exempt the

regulation (sic) of incinerator ash

from the burning of non-hazardous

waste in resource recovery facilities

if the ash routinely exhibits a char-

acteristic of hazardous waste."

Senators' Letter at l.

A-52

A similar theme is echoed in the

letter of Representative James J. Florio,

then Chairman of the House Subcommittee on

Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competi-

tiveness.

While such an exclusion obvious-

ly lacks any justification on envi-

ronmental grounds, it is equally

clear that there is no statutory

basis for such an exclusion. Al-

though those seeking an exclusion

have focused on the "household waste

clarification" contained in the 1984

Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments,

this provision does not exempt owners

or operators of municipal solid waste

incinerators from their obligations:

1) to determine whether the ash resi-

dues generated by the incineration

process are hazardous wastes and

2) to handle ash exhibiting hazardous

waste characteristics as hazardous

: wastes in accordance with the re-

quirements of Subtitle C of RCRA.

Letter of Representative Florio to Lee

Thomas dated October 2, 1987 at 1 ("Florio

Letter").

EDF argues that the views expressed in

these letters are entitled to "significant

weight .. . particularly .. . when the

precise intent of the enacting Congress is

_

A-53

obscure." Plaintiff's Memorandum at 23.

In support of that proposition, plaintiff

cites Seatrai ipbuilding Corp. v. She

Qil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980). Howev-

er, that was a case dealing with a commit-

tee report which accompanied the legisla-

tion at issue. Such is not the case here.

The letters on which plaintiff relies were

written a full three years after the

passage of Section 3001(i). They are not

even the contemporaneous views of the

authors, much less of Congress as a whole.

See Consume roduct Safety Comm'n v. GTE

Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117 (1980)

("'the views of a subsequent Congress form

a hazardous basis for inferring the intent

of an earlier one'") (citation omitted).

Thus the Senators' and Florio letters,

while certainly not "waste", are "“hazard-

cus" to the present purpose of statutory

construction.

A-54

Moreover, the intent of the enacting

Congress is not obscure. The legislative

history makes clear that at the time of its

passage, Congress intended Section 3001(i)

to exempt ash from regulation under Subti-

tle C in order to pave the way for in-

creased use of the resource recovery

process. It may well be true that such an

exclusion “Lecks ‘any justification on

environmental seaeeal , Florio Letter atl,

but that is a judgment made with the

benefit of hindsight and one that can be

acted upon only by Congress, not by this

Court.

E. New York Exclusion

It is common ground that the DEC

interprets the state exclusion, codified at

6 NYCRR § 371.1(e)(2)(i), to extend to ash

residue. However, because "no State...

may impose any requirements less stringent

than those authorized by [Subtitle C]", 42

U.S.C. § 6929, plaintiff argues that New

A-55

York's interpretation of its own regula-

tions is invalid under the federal scheme.

Of course, that argument turns on the

proper construction of Section 3001(i), and

for the reasons discussed above I conclude

that to be the one set forth by the defen-

dants and not that argued for by EDF.

Although the DEC's interpretation of

its own exclusion, which contains language

virtually identical to that of the federal

statute, could be considered probative of

the meaning of Section 3001(i), I need not

look to such far removed evidence for a

proper construction of the federal statute.

II. Defendant's Compliance with Section

3001(1)

EDF further argues that even if

defendants' construction of Section 3001(i)

is correct, the Facility cannot advantage

itself of the exclusion. That is so,

plaintiff contends, because the Facility

does not comply with the requirements of

A-56

Section 3001(i) (1) (A) (ii) and 3001(i) (2).

Specifically, EDF maintains that WTI and

Resco have not established that they do not

accept hazardous commercial or industrial

waste for processing, and that the requi-

site contractual provisions are in place

for ensuring that no such waste is accept-

ed. Plaintiff contends that the lack of

such compliance, or defendants [sic]

failure to demonstrate such compliance on

the present record, precludes the grant of

summary judgment in defendants' favor.

A. Contractual Requirements

EDF argues that defendants do not have

in place the required mechanisms for

ensuring that no "solid waste from commer-

cial or industrial sources", RCRA Section

3001(i) (1) (A) (ii), is accepted for process-

ing by the Facility. Plaintiff concedes

that defendants have in place a series of

procedural safeguards for guarding against

the acceptance of hazardous waste, but it

A-57

questions the adequacy of those safeguards.

Additional factual background is required

at this juncture to understand the contrac-

tual provisions at issue.

In 1974, the Westchester County Board

of Legislators instituted a Solid Waste

Disposal Plan for the County. Pursuant to

that plan the County assisted municipali-

ties within the County in their efforts to

deal with disposal of municipal solid

waste. Resource recovery was emphasized in

those efforts. Affidavit of Ronald J.

Broglio dated March 19, 1988 at 45

("Broglio Affidavit").

The County subsequently entered into

Inter-Municipal Agreements ("IMA's") with

35 municipalities in the County. Those

municipalities generate approximately 90%

of the municipal solid waste in Westchester

county. Id. at ¢ 6. The IMA's provide

that each municipality deliver a minimum

amount of the solid waste collected by the

A-58

municipality to the County's solid waste

disposal system.

A fee is paid for the

disposal services. Id. The County's waste

disposal system is operated through the

District.

In 1981, Westchester County, the

Westchester County Industrial Development

Agency ("Agency"), and Wheelabrator-Frye

Inc. entered into a Solid Waste Disposal

Agreement ("Agreement"). That Agreement

i)

i// The County’s disposal system includes, but is

not limited to the Facility and Sprout Brook. Also

included in the County System are five waste

transfer stations, all of which are located within

the County itself. Broglio Affidavit at q 7.

A-59

governs the disposal of waste at the Facility.Y

The Agreement states that the Facility

is not designed to "store or process toxic,

pathological, biological or other hazardous

wastes which by law require special han-

dling in their collection, treatment or

disposal." Agreement at 2.03(b)(i). The

Agreement further provides that Resco

"operate the Project in compliance with all

applicable federal, state and local laws

and regulations .. . relating to envircn-

mental control .. . and other regulatory

requirements." Id. at 5.04. Section 5.04

of the Agreement makes clear that Resco can

i8/ Resco consented to be bound by the Agreement

pursuant to an Assignment and Assumption Agreement

dated September 30, 1982.

On October 1, 1982, the County withdrew as a

party to the Agreement. The Agency and the Dis-

trict then entered into a separate agreement, the

Solid Waste Disposal Service Agreement ("Service

Agreement"), which requires the District to deliver

the solid waste received from the municipalities

pursuant to the IMA’s to the Facility for disposal.

Under the Service Agreement, the District is

essentiallytssubject to the same requirements as is

the Agency under the Agreement. Furthermore, the

IMA’s were assigned by the County to the District.

Broglio Affidavit at q 3l.

A-60

refuse to take certain actions if in its

judgment such actions would amount to a

violation of any statute or governmental

rule, including the RCRA.’ That same

provision requires the County to use its

best efforts to ensure that the Facility is

not classified as a hazardous waste facili-

42/ The relevant portion of Section 5.04 reads as

follows:

Notwithstanding any other provisions of this

Agreement, Resco shall not be obligated

hereby to take any action which, in its

reasonable judgment, would result in the

violation of any statute or governmental

rule, regulation or requirement, including,

without limitation, the Resource Recovery

[sic] Conservation Act of 1976, or adversely

affect the operation of the Facility. The

Agency agrees to use its best efforts to take

all necessary or appropriate action to ensure

that the Facility does not become classified

as a hazardous or toxic materials storage or

processing facility and, without limiting the

generality of the foregoing, the Agency

agrees that it will not, and will use its

best efforts to cause the Municipalities not

to, contract for the disposal by the Facility

of any Special Handling Waste .. . or of any

other Solid Waste which Resco reasonably

determines and notifies the Agency is likely

to cause damage to or adversely affect the

operation of the Facility . . . provided that

neither the Agency nor any Municipally

Collected Solid Waste any Special Handling

Waste included therein during normal munici-

pal collections.

(emphasis in original).

A-61

ty, and that it will not contract for the

delivery of or itself deliver special

handling waste,*” which includes hazard-

ous waste, to the Facility. Analogous

restrictions are found in the Service

Agreement, the IMA's, and the contracts

with the outside operator of the County's

five transfer stations.

20/ Special Handling Waste is defined by the

Agreement as follows:

(a) radioactive, toxic, pathological, bio-

logical and other hazardous wastes which

according to federal, state or local rules or

regulations from time to time in effect

require special handling in their collection,

treatment or disposal; (b) explosives and

hazardous chemicals which are likely to cause

damage to or adversely affect the operation

of the Facility; (c) dirt, concrete and other

nonburnable construction material and demoli-

tion debris; (d) large items of machinery and

equipment, such as motor vehicles and major

components thereof (transmissions, rear ends,

springs, fenders), agricultural equipment,

trailers and marine vessels, and other

oversize items, including tree trunk sections

and branches in excess of six feet in length

and eight inches in diameter, which are

likely to interfere with the operation of the

Facility; and (e) other materials which are

likely to cause damage to or adversely affect

the operation of the Facility.

Agreement, Article I at ll.

A-62

Furthermore, the truck drivers of

those private carters who are authorized to

deliver to the Facility for the County's

account, are required to sign a certifica-

tion as to the type of waste being deliv-

ered. In essence, the certification states

that no hazardous waste or other prohibited

substance is contained in the load.

Although the terms of 8 Section

3001(i)(2) are clear in that only contrac-

tual requirements or notification or

inspection procedures are required to

—comply with the statute, the Facility also

has in place notification procedures.

Specifically, a sign is posted in plain

view of the trucks as they enter the

Facility, the substance of which is a

statement as to what types of waste the

Facility will and will not accept for

processing. Broglio Affidavit at gq 14.

The trucks arriving at the Facility are

subject to random inspection at any time.

A-63

Id. at Q@ 16. Trucks arriving at the

station must pass through a weigh station

at which point their loads are checked with

a radiation detective device. Id. at | 15.

Defendants represent that any load failing

the radiation test is not accepted for

processing. Id.

i. ia enerators

Plaintiff argues that defendants'

contractual safeguards are inadequate

because they do not account for hazardous

waste produced by individuals or entities

known in the regulatory’ scheme as "small

quantity generators. "2/ It is common

ground that the hazardous waste produced by

these small quantity generators is not

exempted from classification as hazardous.

See 40 C.F.R. § 261.4. However, it is

exempt from many of the regulations govern-

2i/ The regulations promulgated by the EPA provide

that “{a]) generator is a conditionally exempt small

quantity generator in a calendar month if he

generates no more than 100 kilograms of hazardous

waste in that month.” 40 C.F.R. § 261.5(a).

A-64

ing the management of hazardous wastes.

EDF argues that Section 3001(i) requires a

resource recovery facility to refrain from

accepting hazardous wastes, including that

produced by small quantity generators, and

to maintain contractual safeguards which

ensure that no such waste is accepted for

processing.

Specifically, EDF contends that the

provision regarding Special Handling Waste,

supra at n.20, does not ensure that hazard-

ous waste from small quantity generators

will not be accepted for processing. That

is so, plaintiff maintains, because hazard-

ous waste produced by small quantity

generators does not require special han-

dling and therefore would not come within

the category of waste prohibited by the

Agreement. Defendants maintain that a

proper reading of the regulations reveals

that the Facility is not required to turn

away hazardous waste produced by small

A-65

quantity generators, but that if it is so

required under law, the proper procedural

safeguards are in place.

I thus address whether, as a matter of

law, hazardous waste produced by small

quantity generators may be accepted by a

resource recovery facility without that

facility losing its exempt status under

Section 3001(i). The pertinent regulation

provides that the small quantity hazardous

waste generator may deliver its waste to an

off-site facility for disposal where such

facility is "[{p]ermitted, licensed, or

registered by a State to manage municipal

or industrial solid waste." 40 C.F.R.

§ 261.5(g)(3) (iv). It would make no sense

to allow small quantity generators to

dispose of their waste in a facility

licensed to deal with municipal or indus-

trial waste and then to deem that facility

a hazardous waste disposal site subject to

regulation as such. Such a construction

A-66

would vitiate the right of the small

quantity generator to contract for the

disposal of its waste with a non-hazardous

waste facility, which perforce would become

a hazardous waste facility upon acceptance

of the small generator's waste.

I therefore hold that the Facility may

accept hazardous waste from small quantity

generators without subjecting itself to

regulation as a hazardous waste disposal

facility.&

2. Requirement to Reject Haz-

ardous Waste

The second argument EDF makes in

support of its contention that the proce-

dural safeguards are inadequate is that

22/ This conclusion is consistent with the EPA’s

determination that "‘[a] sanitary landfill that

receives household wastes .. . and only those

hazardous wastes generated by small-quantity

generators will not be considered a hazardous waste

disposal facility and will not require a RCRA

permit.’” Defendants’ Reply Memorandum at 27-28

n.* (quoting U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,

Questions and Answers on Hazardous Waste Regula-

tions at New Facilities -- Sanitary Landfills

(1980), quoted in, J. Stensvaag, Hazardous Waste

Law & Practice § 6.32 at 6-103 & n.29 (1986)).

A-67

defendants are nowhere required to reject

hazardous waste it it is brought to the

Facility for disposal. EDF relies princi-

pally on that portion of Section 5.04 of

the Agreement, supra at n.19, that states

as follows: "neither the Agency nor any

Municipality shall be required to separate

out from Municipally Collected Solid Waste

any Special Handling Waste included therein

during normal municipal collections." Of

course, that provision deals with what the

municipalities must do in respect of

separating out hazardous from non-hazardous

waste.

However, the County and the Agency

clearly remain under contractual obligation

to use their best efforts to ensure that no

Special Handling Waste, including hazardous

waste, is delivered to the Facility.

Agreement Section 5.04 and 5.06. No

absolute guarantee is present in these

precautions, and as a practical matter

A-68

probably could not be given. In any event,

none is required by the statute. 1985

Preamble, 50 Fed. Reg. at 28,725 ("the

statutory language contains no exception

(from the Section 3001(i) exemption] for

facilities that, in spite of their best

efforts, receive hazardous waste").

Consistent with the statute, the 1985

preamble requires only that "good faith

precautionary" measures against the accep-

tance of hazardous waste be in place.

Nowhere is an absolute guarantee required.

Moreover, while the County and the

Agency have made no absolute guarantees not

to deliver hazardous waste for disposal,

the operating permit obtained from the DEC

expressly prohibits the processing of such

waste. That permit provides as follows:

Facility shall accept for incinera-

tion only municipally and commercial-

ly collected residential and commer-

cial refuse. The following waste

shall not be accepted at this facili-

ty: septage; sewage sludge less than

20% solids by weight; industrial

A-69

waste (unless approved by this De-

partment); liquid wastes, industrial

sludges, explosive or other type of

hazardous waste as listed in 6 NYCRR

Part 366.

Permit at ¢ 1,2

In sum, the contractual provisions in

place are adequate under the statute.

Consequently, plaintiff's objection to the

procedural safeguards maintained by the

defendants fails.

B. Actual Receipt of Hazardous Waste

EDF next argues that judgment cannot

enter in favor of defendants on account of

their failure to establish that hazardous

waste is not actually accepted by the

Facility. Plaintiff further maintains that

23/ EDF argues that little comfort can be taken in

the terms of the operating permit because Part 366

has been repealed. However, the DEC adopted

successor Part 371 concurrent with the repeal of

Part 366. Resco thus remains responsible for

operating the Facility in compliance with Part 371

and "all applicable laws, rules or regulations,

including rules and regulations of the department

promulgated pursuant to subdivision one of section

27-0703 and taking effect after the date applica-

tion [for the operating permit] was made to the

department.” N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 27-

0707(5).

A-70

even if defendants have made out a paper

case on point, judgment should not enter in

advance of EDF's taking discovery pursuant

to Rule 56(f).

In order to qualify for the resource

recovery exemption, a facility must not

only have in place the appropriate proce-

dural safeguards, Section 3001(i)(2), but

must also not accept hazardous waste from

commercial or industrial sources’ for

processing. Section 3001(i)(1)(A)(ii). In

other words, the Facility must show that

the procedural safeguards it has in place

work in keeping out hazardous waste.

The statute does not require a showing

that absolutely no hazardous waste from the

municipal waste stream is ever accepted for

processing. Rather, the Senate Report says

the following:

[SJjuch facilities cannot accept haz-

ardous waste identified or listed

under section 3001 from commercial or

industrial sources, and must estab-

lish contractual requirements or

A-71

other notification or inspection

procedures to assure that such wastes

are not received or burned. This

provision requires precautionary

measures or procedures which can be

shown to be effective safeguards

against the unintended acceptance of

hazardous waste. If such measures

are in place, a resource recovery

facility whose activities would nor-

mally be covered by the household

waste exclusion should not be penal-

ized for the occasional, inadvertent

-

ee A ges

industrial sources. Facilities must

monitor the waste they receive and,

if necessary, revise the precaution-

ary measures they establish to assure

against the receipt of such hazardous

waste.

Senate Report at 61 (emphasis added) .%

Defendants represent that the Facility

does not "knowingly accept or burn hazard-

ous commercial oor industrial waste."

Supplemental Affidavit of Ronald J. Broglio

sworn to on June 2, 1988 at § 1. Defen-

dants further state that "Resco would not

24/ The EPA is also of the view that “resource

recovery facilities do not become Subtitle Cc

facilities when they inadvertently burn hazardous

waste if they have taken good faith measures to

avoid burning such waste.” 1985 Preamble, 50 Fed.

Reg. 28,725.

A-72

in fact accept or process any such waste of

which it was aware," id. at § 4, and that

"(ijf hazardous commercial or industrial

waste were discovered at the Facility,

Resco would not process [it]." Id. at q 8.

Accepting these statements as true, they

focus on whether the Facility would know-

ingly burn hazardous waste, and the defen-

dants state that they would not. Nowhere

do defendants directly address the issue of

the frequency with which hazardous waste is

processed, however inadvertent such pro-

cessing may be. The statute protects the

Facility from regulation under Subtitle C

only if the acceptance of hazardous waste

is not only inadvertent, but occasional.

Senate Report at 61.

Of course, the implication of defend-

ants' statements is that the Facility does

not process hazardous waste. That implica-

tion is not sufficient to carry the day on

the affirmative defense. See United States

A-73

Vv. irst Ci Nat' a ouston, 286

U.S. 361, 366 (1967) (party claiming

"benefits of an exception to the prohibi-

tion of a statute" carries the burden of

establishing that it comes within the

exception).

Although EDF makes no particular

showing that hazardous waste is in fact

accepted by the Facility, it could not have

done so as the facts necessary to that

showing are within the exclusive control of

defendants, and discovery has not yet been

taken. Therefore, plaintiff argues that

even if the representations of defendants

are sufficient to establish that the

Facility is deserving of protection under

the statutory exclusion, discovery should

proceed on that point prior to the entry of

judgment. I agree. Rule 56(f) was created

for just such a situation. The plaintiff

cannot "present by affidavit facts essen-

tial to justify [its] opposition" as those

A-74

facts are uniquely within the possession of

the defendants.

Moreover, although plaintiff has made

no particular showing that hazardous waste

has been accepted by the Facility, there is

some reason to believe that a possibility.

Specifically, EDF asserts that "typical

municipal wastestreams contain hazardous

wastes contributed to the wastestreams by

small quantity generators, as well as

hazardous wastes illegally contributed by

other generators." Affidavit of Richard A.

Denison sworn to on May 2, 1988 at 4 30.

I therefore make the direction that discov-

ery proceed in this case on an expedited

basis, Limited to the questions of whether

and with what frequency the Facility

accepts hazardous waste for processing.

III. Primary Jurisdiction

Finally, defendants argue that the

case should not be decided in this Court,

but rather should be decided initially at

A-75

the administrative level. Defendants state

that the EPA is addressing the question of

ash management in two separate agency

actions and a decision by this Court should

await determination of those proceedings.

Specifically, defendants point to the EPA's

review of New York's application for final

approval of various provisions of its

hazardous waste program, including the

household waste exclusion;*/ and the

EPA's expected issuance of technical

&3/ Although New York has received final approval

for its state hazardous waste program generally, it

has not yet been authorized to enforce any of the

requirements or prohibitions of the 1984 amend-

ments, including the household waste exclusion.

Pursuant to Section 3006(g)(1), the strictures of

the 1984 amendments are to be administered by the

EPA pending final authorization of the state

program. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(g)(1).

On December 28, 1987, EPA granted approval of

New York’s draft application concerning the house-

hold waste exclusion and gave New York until May 7,

1988 to submit its final application. The prelimi-

nary approval of the state’s exclusion endorses the

wording of the exclusion, which is identical to

that promulgated by the EPA, but cannot fairly be

read to sanction the DEC’s interpretation of that

exclusion. That imprimatur would come only with

final approval of the application, which has not

yet happened. To date, final approval has not been

granted.

A-76

guidance for the handling, transportation

and disposal of ash.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction

is recognized as a "flexible concept,

concerned with 'promoting proper relation-

ships between the courts and administrative

agencies charged with particular regulatory

duties.'" Board of Educ. of City School

Dist. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 599, 606 (2d Cir.

1979) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 449

U.S. 1124 (1981). On the subject of

invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdic-

tion, the Second Circuit has said:

The exercise of the court's discre-

tion is guided in this situation by a

desire for uniformity of regulation

and the need for initial consider-

ation by a body possessing special

expertise on the issue presented.

Id. (citations omitted). In exercising

that discretion, the court of appeals has

further said that "(i]t is well established

that the courts need not defer to an agency

where the issue involved is strictly a

A-77

legal one, involving neither the agency's

particular expertise nor its fact finding

prowess." Id. at 607 (citations omitted) ;

see also General Elec. Co. v. MV Nedlloyd,

817 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir. 1987) ("courts

ordinarily do not defer when the issue

involved is purely a legal question, one

not involving agency expertise or experi-

ence") (citation omitted), . nied,

108 S. Ct. 710 (1988). The case at bar

presents precisely such a situation.

The instant controversy centers on the

proper construction of Section 3001(i), a

purely legal issue. The policies underly-

ing the primary jurisdiction doctrine would

not be furthered by awaiting agency deci-

sion on that point. Moreover, the status

of the administrative actions referred to

is unclear. The EPA is clearly of the view

that guidance on the proper construction of

the exclusion is necessary. See Letter of

Lee M. Thomas Administrator of the EPA to

A-78

tion on this issue would be very desir-

able").

Conclusion

Plaintiff's motion for summary judg-

ment is denied.

Defendants' motion to dismiss in favor

of an agency determination is denied.

Defendants' motion for summary judg-

ment is denied for the reasons stated

herein. Expedited discovery is to proceed

in accordance with the terms of this

Opinion. An order of reference to a

supervising Magistrate is being entered

concurrent with this Opinion.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: New York, New York

November 21, 1989

Lsl

CHARLES S. HAIGHT, JR.

Ue Bs Be So

A-79

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

42 U.8.C. § 6903

(3) The term "disposal" means the

discharge, deposit, injection, dumping,

spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid

waste or hazardous waste into or on any

land or water so that such solid waste or

hazardous waste or any constituent thereof

may enter the environment or be emitted

into the air or discharged into any waters,

including ground waters.

(5) The term "hazardous waste" means

a solid waste, or combination of solid

wastes, which because of its quantity,

concentration, or physical, chemical, or

infectious characteristics may -

(A) cause, or significantly con-

tribute to an increase in mortality

or an increase in serious irrevers-

ible, or incapacitating reversible,

illness; or

A-80

(B) pose a substantial present or

potential hazard to human health or

the environment when’ improperly

treated, stored, transported, or

disposed of, or otherwise managed.

(6) The term "hazardous waste genera-

tion" means the act or process of producing

hazardous waste.

(7) The term "hazardous waste manage-

ment" means the systematic control of the

collection, source separation, storage,

transportation, processing, treatment,

recovery, and disposal of hazardous wastes.

(12) the term "manifest" means the

form used for identifying the quantity,

composition, and the origin, routing, and

destination of hazardous waste during its

transportation from the point of generation

to the point of disposal, treatment, or

storage.

(24) The term “resource recovery

facility" means any facility at which solid

A-81

waste is processed for the purpose of

extracting, converting to energy, or

otherwise separating and preparing solid

waste for reuse.

(33) The term "storage", when used in

connection with hazardous waste, means the

containment of hazardous waste, either on

a temporary basis or for a period of years,

in such a manner as not to constitute

disposal of such hazardous waste.

(34) The term "treatment", when used

in connection with hazardous waste, means

any method, technique, or process, includ-

ing neutralization, designed to change the

physical, chemical, or biological character

or composition of any hazardous waste so as

to neutralize such waste or so as to render

such waste nonhazardous, safer for trans-

port, amendable for recovery, amenable for

storage, or reduced in volume. Such term

includes any activity or processing de-

Signed to change the physical form or

A-82

chemical composition of hazardous waste so

as to render it nonhazardous.

42 U.8.C. § 6921(d)

Small quantity generator waste

(1) By March 31, 1986, the Adminis-

trator shall promulgate standards under

sections 6922, 6923, and 6924 of this title

for hazardous waste generated by a genera-

tor in a total quantity of hazardous waste

greater than one hundred kilograms but less

than one thousand kilograms during a

calendar month... .

(6) Standards promulgated as provided

in paragraph (1) shall, at a minimun,

require that all treatment, storage, or

disposal of hazardous wastes generated by

generators referred to in paragraph (1)

shall occur at a facility with interim

status or a permit under this subchapter,

except that onsite storage of hazardous

waste generated by a generator generating

a total quantity of hazardous waste greater

A-83

«

- than one hundred kilograms, but less than

one thousand kilograms during a calendar

month, may occur without the requirement of

a permit for up to one hundred and eighty

days. Such onsite storage may occur

without the requirement of a permit for not

more than six thousand kilograms for up to

two hundred and seventy days if such

generator must ship or haul such waste over

two hundred miles.

42 U.8.C. § 6921(i)

Clarification of household waste exclusion

A resource recovery facility recover-

ing energy from the mass burning of munici-

pal solid waste shall not be deemed to be

treating, storing, disposing of, or other-

wise managing hazardous wastes for the

purposes of regulation under this subchap-

ter, if-

(1) such facility-

(A) receives and burns only-

A-84

(i) household waste (from single

and multiple dwellings, hotels, mo-

tels, and other residential sources),

and

(ii) solid waste from commercial or

industrial sources that does not

contain hazardous waste identified or

listed under this section, and

(B) does not accept hazardous wastes

identified or listed under this sec-

tion, and

(2) the owner or operator of such

facility has established contractual

requirements or other appropriate notifica-

tion or inspection procedures to assure

that hazardous wastes are not received at >

or burned in such facility.

A-85

42 U.8.C. § 6922

Standards applicable to genera-

tors of hazardous waste

(a) In general

Not later than eighteen months after

October 21, 1976, and after notice and

opportunity for public hearings and after

consultation with appropriate Federal and

State agencies, the Administrator shall

promulgate regulations establishing such

standards, applicable to generators of

hazardous waste identified or listed under

this subchapter, as may be necessary to

protect human health and the environment.

Such standards shall establish requirements

respecting-

(1) recordkeeping practices that

accurately identify the quantities of

such hazardous waste generated, the

constituents thereof which are sig-

nificant in quantity or in potential

harm to human health or the environ-

A-86

ment, and the disposition of such

wastes;

(2) labeling practices for any

containers used for the _ storage,

transport, or disposal of such haz-

ardous waste such as will identify

accurately such waste;

(3) use of appropriate containers

for such hazardous waste;

(4) furnishing of information on

the general chemical composition of

such hazardous waste to persons

transporting, treating, storing, or

disposing of such wastes;

(5) use of a manifest system and

any other reasonable means necessary

to assure that all such hazardous

waste generated is designated for

treatment, storage, or disposal in,

and arrives at, treatment, storage,

or disposal facilities (other than

facilities on the premises where the

A-87

waste is generated) for which a per-

mit has been issued as provided in

this subchapter, or pursuant to title

I of the Marine Protection, Research,

and Sanctuaries Act (86 Stat. 1052)

[33 U.S.C. 1411 et seq.]; and

(6) submission of reports to the

Administrator (or the State agency in

any case in which such agency carries

out a permit program pursuant to this

subchapter) at least once every two

years, setting out-

(A) the quantities and nature

of hazardous waste identified or

listed under this' subchapter

that he has generated during the

year;

(B) the disposition of all

hazardous waste reported under

subparagraph (A);

(C) the efforts undertaken

during the year to reduce the

A-88

volume and toxicity of waste

generated; and

(D) the changes in volume and

toxicity of waste actually

achieved during the year in

question in comparison with

previous years, to the extent

such information is available

for years prior to November 8,

1984.

(b) Waste minimization

Effective September 1, 1985, the

manifest required by subsection (a) (5) of

this section shall contain a certification

by the generator that-

(1) the generator of the hazardous

waste has a program in place to re-

duce the volume or quantity and tox-

icity of such waste to the degree

determined by the generator to be

economically practicable; and

A-89

(2) the proposed method of treat-

ment, storage, or disposal is that

practicable method currently avail-

able to the generator which minimizes

the present and future threat to

human health and the environment.

42 U.8.C. § 6923

Standards applicable to trans-

porters of hazardous waste

(a) Standards

Not later than eighteen months after

October 21, 1976, and after opportunity for

public hearings, the Administrator, after

consultations with the Secretary of Trans-

portation and the States, shall promulgate

regulations establishing such standards,

applicable to transporters of hazardous

waste, identified or listed under this

subchapter, as may be necessary to protect

human health and the environment. Such

standards shall include but need not be

limited to requirements respecting -

A~90

(1) recordkeeping concerning such

hazardous waste transported, and

their source and delivery points;

(2) transportation of such waste

only if properly labeled;

(3) compliance with the manifest

system referred to in section 6922(5)

of this title; and

(4) transportation of all such

hazardous waste only to the hazardous

waste treatment, storage, or disposal

facilities which the shipper desig-

nates on the manifest form to be a

facility holding a permit issued

under this subchapter, or pursuant to

title I of the Marine Protection,

Research, and Sanctuaries Act (86

Stat. 1052) [33 U.S.C. 1141 et seq.].

A-91

42 U.8.C. § 6924

Standards applicable to owners

and operators of hazardous waste

treatment, storage, and disposal

facilities

(a) In general

Not later than eighteen months after

October 21, 1976, and after opportunity for

public hearings and after consultation with

appropriate Federal and State agencies, the

Administrator shall promulgate regulations

establishing such performance standards,

applicable to owners and operators of

facilities for the treatment, storage, or

disposal of hazardous waste identified or

listed under this subchapter, as may be

necessary to protect human health and the

environment. In establishing such stan-

dards the Administrator shall, where

appropriate, distinguish in such standards

between requirements appropriate for new

facilities and for facilities in existence

on the date of promulgation of such regula-

A-92

tions. Such standards shall include, but

need not be limited to, requirements

respecting-

(1) maintaining records of all

hazardous wastes identified or listed

under this chapter which is treated,

stored, or disposed of, as the case

may be, and the manner in which such

wastes were treated, stored, or dis-

posed of;

(2) satisfactory reporting, moni-

toring, and inspection and compliance

with the manifest system referred to

in section 6922(5) of this title;

(3) treatment, storage, or disposal

of all such waste received by the

facility pursuant to such operating

methods, techniques, and practices as

may be satisfactory to the Adminis-

trator;

(4) the location, design, and con-

struction of such hazardous waste

A-93

treatment, disposal, or storage fa-

cilities;

(5) contingency plans for effective

action to minimize unanticipated

damage from any treatment, storage,

or disposal of any such hazardous

waste;

(6) the maintenance of operation of

such facilities and requiring such

additional qualifications as to own-

ership, continuity of operation,

training for personnel, and financial

responsibility (including financial

responsibility for corrective action)

as may be necessary or desirable; and

(7) compliance with the require-

ments of section 6925 of this title

respecting permits for treatment,

storage, or disposal.

No private entity shall be precluded by

reason of criteria established under

paragraph (6) from the ownership or opera-

A-94

tion of facilities providing hazardous

waste treatment, storage, or disposal

services where such entity can provide

assurances of financial responsibility and

continuity of operation consistent with the

degree and duration of risks associated

with the treatment, storage, or disposal of

specified hazardous waste. { Footnote

emitted.) « « «

42 U.8.C. § 6925

Permits for treatment, storage,

or disposal of hazardous waste

(a) Permit requirements

Not later than eighteen months after

October 21, 1976, the Administrator shall

promulgate regulations requiring each

person owning or operating an existing

facility or planning to construct a new

facility for the treatment, storage, or

disposal of hazardous waste identified or

listed under this subchapter to have a

permit issued pursuant to this section.

A-95

Such regulations shall take effect on the

date provided in section 6930 of this title

and upon and after such date the treatment,

storage, or disposal of any such hazardous

waste and the construction of any new

facility for the treatment, storage, or

disposal of any such hazardous waste is

prohibited except in accordance with such

a permit. No permit shall be required

under this section in order to construct a

facility if such facility is constructed

pursuant to an approval issued by the

Administrator under section 2605(e) of

title 15 for the incineration of polychol-

orinated biphenyls and any person owning or

operating such a facility may, at any time

after operation or construction of such

facility has begun, file an application for

a permit pursuant to this section autho-

rizing such facility to incinerate hazard-

ous waste identified or listed under this

subchapter. [Footnote omitted.] .

A-96

40 C.F.R. § 261.3

Definition of hazardous waste.

(a) A solid waste, as defined in

§ 261.2, is a hazardous waste if:

(1) It is not excluded from regulation

as a hazardous waste under § 261.4(b); and

(2) It meets any of the following

criteria:

(i) It exhibits any of the charac-

teristics of hazardous waste identi-

fied in subpart C except that any

mixture of a waste from the extrac-

tion, beneficiation, and processing

of ores and minerals excluded under

§ 261.4(b)(7) and any other solid

waste exhibiting a characteristic of

hazardous waste under subpart C of

this part only if it exhibits a char-

acteristic that would not have been

exhibited by the excluded waste alone

if such mixture had not occurred or

if it continues to exhibit any of the

A-97

characteristics exhibited by the non-

excluded wastes prior to mixture.

Further, for the purposes of applying

the Extraction Procedure Toxicity

characteristic to such mixtures, the

mixture is also a hazardous waste if

it exceeds the maximum concentration

for any contaminant listed in table I

to § 261.24 that would not have been

exceeded by the excluded waste alone

if the mixture had not occurred or if

it continues to exceed the maximum

concentration for any contaminant

exceeded by the nonexempt waste prior

to mixture.

(ii) It is listed in Subpart D and

has not been excluded from the lists

in subpart D under §§ 260.6 and

260.22 of this chapter. .

A-98

40 C.F.R. § 262.20

General Requirements

(a) A generator who transports, or

offers for transportation, hazardous waste

for offsite treatment, storage, or disposal

must prepare a Manifest OMB control number

2050-0039 on EPA form 8700-22, and, if

necessary, EPA form 8700-22A, according to

the instructions included in the Appendix

to Part 262.

40 C.F.R. § 263.20

The manifest systen.

(a) A transporter may not accept hazard-

ous waste from a generator unless it is

accompanied by a manifest signed in accor-

dance with the provisions of 40 CFR 262.20.

In the case of exports, a transporter may

not accept such waste from a primary

exporter or other person (1) if he knows

the shipment does not conform to the EPA

Acknowledgement of Consent; and (2) unless,

A-99

in addition to a manifest signed in accor-

dance with the provisions of 40 CFR 262.20,

such waste is also accompanied by an EPA

Acknowledgement of Consent which, except

for shipment by rail, is attached to the

manifest (or shipping paper for exports by

water (bulk shipment)).

1985 Preamble

4. Household Waste

New section 3001(g) adds a clarifica-

tion to the household waste exclusion

contained in § 261.4(b)(1). That regula-

tion stats that household wastes are not

hazardous wastes. The preamble accompany-

ing that regulation states that residues

remaining after treating household wastes

also are not hazardous wastes. 45 FR 33099

(May 19, 1980).

The legislative clarification is that

a resource recovery facility recovering

energy from burning municipal waste is not

A-100

considered to be managing hazardous waste,

provided the facility meets two conditions:

(a) the facility receives and burns

only household waste, and solid waste from

other sources that contains no [sic]

hazardous wastes; and

(b) the facility cannot accept hazard-

ous wastes from any non-household sources,

and must adopt precautionary measures

- such as contractual arrangements of other

notification procedures - to assure that

hazardous wastes are not received or

burned.

EPA has codified this provision in

§ 261.4(b), repeating the statutory lan-

guage. The statutory provision appears to

raise two principal issues: Aas

(1) The statute of facilities that, in

spite of good faith efforts, receive and

burn hazardous wastes; and

(2) The status of residues from

burning household waste and non-hazardous

A-101

solid waste if the residue exhibits a

characteristic of hazardous waste.

As to the first issue, the statutory

language contains no exception for facili-

ties that, in spite of their best efforts,

receive hazardous wastes. The legislative

history indicates, however, that if good

faith precautionary measures are in place

and a resource recovery facility still

receives and burns a hazardous waste, that

the "facility * * * should not be penalized

for the occasional, inadvertent receipt of

hazardous waste * * *" S, Rep. No. 284 at

61. Thus EPA believes that resource recov-

ery facilities do not become Subtitle Cc

facilities when they inadvertently burn

hazardous waste if they have taken good

faith measures to avoid burning such waste.

The statute is silent as to whether

hazardous residues from burning combined

household and non-household, non-hazardous

waste are hazardous waste. These residues

eee eee eSSSaeaaxxxxQx42Q2Q50:0

A-102

would be hazardous wastes under present EPA

regulations if they exhibited a character-

istic. The legislative history does not

directly address this question, although

the Senate report can be read as enunciat-

ing a general policy of non-regulation of

these resource recovery facilities if they

carefully scrutinize their incoming wastes.

On the other hand, residues from burning

could, in theory, exhibit a characteristic

of hazardous waste even if non hazardous

wastes are burned, for example, if toxic

metals become concentrated in the ash.

Thus, the requirement of scrutiny of

incoming wastes would not assure non-

hazardousness of the residue. EPA believe

that the principal purpose of section

3001{[i] was to prevent resource recovery

facilities that may inadvertently burn

hazardous waste, despite good faith efforts

to avoid such a result, from becoming

subject to the Subtitle C regulations. EPA

A-103

does not see in this provision an intent to

exempt the regulation of incinerator ash

from the burning of non-hazardous waste in

resource recovery facilities if the ash

routinely exhibits a characteristic of

hazardous waste. However, EPA has no

evidence to indicate that these ash resi-

dues are hazardous under existing rules.

EPA does not believe the HSWA impose new

regulatory burdens on resource recovery

facilities that burn household and other

non-hazardous waste, and the Agency has no

plans to impose additional responsibilities

on these facilities. Given the highly

beneficial nature of resource recovery

facilities, any future additional regula-

tion of their residues would have to await

consideration of the important technical

and policy issues that would be posed in

the event serious questions arise about the

residues.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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