Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Butler v. Buick Motor Co.

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S Sourt, U.S

91-400. [Sm mts

SEP 6 1991

si ' pean OF BE aut |

IN THE SUPREME COURT ™

OF THE UNITED STATES

( term, 19 )

GEORGE B. BUTLER and wife,

LEAH BEA BUTLER

Plaintiffs,

vs.

BUICK MOTOR COMPANY, A DIVISION

OF GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, and

STATE OF TENNESSEE,

Defendant

(Petition for review of a Final Decision of the State

Courts of Tennessee)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

ROBERT L. HUSKEY

(COUNSEL OF RECORD)

P.O. BOX 777

514 HILLSBORO BOULEVARD

MANCHESTER, TN 37355

(615) 728-1800

(a) QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

(1) Does a purchaser for value of a motor vehicle from

a recognized and licensed salvage dealer, who applies for

and obtains a certificate of title from the state have a

constitutionally protected property interest in that vehicle?

(2) Would the good faith purchaser for value of an

automobile from a recognized salvage dealer, who applied

for and obtained a certificate of title from the state of

Tennessee, which certificate of title was only issued by the

state after checking with the manufacturer to determine

that the vehicle was not stolen, have superior claim to the

vehicle over the manufacturer, General Motors Corporation,

if it developed that the vehicle had actually left General

Motors possession and control and their title surrendered

as a result of the dishonesty of its principal supervisory

official at the Milford Proving Ground to whom the vehicle

was specificaily entrusted for the purpose of scrapping?

(b) PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS: The only

parties to this proceeding are those reflected in the heading,

being George B. Butler and wife, Leah Bea Butler and Buick

Motor Company, division of General Motors Corporation.

(c) TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED BY

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. .......... Siidenaiccbessmbncns

REFERENCE TO THE OFFICIAL

AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS .............. eee

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.................2.0.

APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE

CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES ................

CONCISE STATEMENT

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RAISING OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND

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CONCISE ARGUMENT JUSTIFYING

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APPENDIX OF ORDERS

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(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution

Section 1, Fourteenth Amendment, United States

Constitution

42 U.S.C.S., Section 1983

42 U.S.C.S., Section 1985 (3)

Article 1, Section 17, Constitution of Tennessee

Article 1, Section 21, Constitution of Tennessee

Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 55-5-108, et seq.

iv.

(qd) REFERENCE TO THE OFFICIAL AND

UNOFFICIAL REPORTS:

The case references of official opinions in this case will be

Butler et ux., v. Buick, Coffee County Chancery Action No:

86-164 and Court of Appeals Docket No: 01-A-01-9003-CH-

00101; and George B. Butler, et ux, Leah Bea Butler vs.

Buick Motor Company, a division of General Motors Cor-

poration, Coffee Circuit No: 21,881 and U.S. District Court

for the Eastern District of Tennessee, Winchester Division,

CIV No: 4-87-088.

(e) STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

(1) The order, which is actually sought to be over-

turned is that of the Court of Appeals for the Western

Section of Tennessee, sitting for the Middle Section, entered

February 6, 1991.

(2) A timely petition to rehear was filed, which

petition was denied on February 27, 1991. Thereafter, a

timely application to appeal to the State Supreme Court

was filed, which application was denied by Order entered

June 10, 1991, which is the triggering date for the petition

for certiorari to this Honorable Court.

(3) Authority for the Writ of Certiorari in this case is

found in 28 U.S. Code Section 1257.

(4) The substance of the underlying cases involved in

this litigation is the taking of a motor vehicle, which the

Plaintiff, George and Lea Butler had purchased from Gaylen

Fann, a recognized and licensed dealer of automobiles, both

new and used and scraped, by the Defendant company,

through the aid of the state of Tennessee law enforcement

agency, without the providing of any due process hearing or

any other proceeding to protect their constitutional right of

property in the automobile. Two litigations came from this

1

circumstance, one filedin Chancery Court to recover posses-

sion of the automobile itself and a second action filed in

Circuit Court, both courts of Coffee County, Tennessee to

obtain damages for the wrongful taking of the property

through the aid of the state law enforcement authorities

without due process. The Circuit Court action was removed

to Federal District Court. An Agreed Order was entered in

the respective cases authorizing the taking and utilization

of discovery to apply in both cases. In other words, the

respective cases involve both parties and by agreed order,

all discovery taken in the respective cases would be subject

to utilization in both cases. Thereupon all discovery was

taken under the duplicate heading. A Motion for Summary

Judgement was made in Federal District Court contending

that the automobile constituted stolen property and as such

there could be no property interest in the vehicle. The case

proceeded to trial in Coffee County Chancery Court for

determination of who the proper owner of the vehicle was or

who had better title, the Plaintiff or the Defendant. The

Chancellor, after the trial on the merits in Coffee County

Chancery Court ruled that the vehicle was not stolen prop-

erty in the normal sense of the word and since a supervisory

official of General Motors, by his action, being entrusted

with vehicle had caused it to be placed in the stream of

commerce and ultimately sold to the Plaintiffs as good faith

purchasers for value. The Chancellor ruled that the Plain-

tiffs had superior title to the vehicle and ordered the return

of the vehicle from General Motors to George and Bea

Butler. The car had been taken in June of 1986, and it was

approximately a little over three (3) years later that the

Chancery Court ordered the return of the vehicle. It had

been sitting in storage in the possession of Buick ever since

its taking by the state of Tennessee. The District Judge,

after the ruling by the Chancellor, held that the determina-

tion was binding as to whether or not the vehicle was stolen

and concluded that issue in the Federal proceeding as well.

The Defendant appealed the case to the Court of Appeals of

the state of Tennessee, Middle Section and the Federal

2

District Judge in relation to the Federal case, entered an

Order continuing the case until the completion of the appel-

late process in the state action. The federal action is the

proceeding in which the Plaintiffs seek to recover for the

violation of their constitutional rights in relation to their

property, but by the order of the Federal District Judge, his

ruling will be contingent upon the outcome of the state case

for possession. The Court of Appeals for the Western Section

of Tennessee; apparently without the entrance of an order

as required by the rules, heard the case for the Middle

Section and entered an Order overturning the Chancellor.

The Plaintiffs filed a petition to Rehear, which was denied

and thereafter applied to the State Supreme Court for

review, which application was denied. Asa result, under the

current status of the rulings, this holding by the Court of

Appeals overturning the Chancellor will not only serve to

terminate the Plaintiffs claim for recovery of the vehicle, but

also his suit for damages for the violation of his Constitu-

tional Rights. Therefore, relief of this Court is necessary to

determine the application of constitutional rights and the

Plaintiffs property interest in the automobile as a bona fide

purchase for value of a vehicle properly titled in the state of

Tennessee.

(f) APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE

CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES

(1) "Criminal actions - Provisions concerning -

Due process of law and just compensation

clauses. - No person shall be held to answer for

a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless

on a presentment or indictment by the grand

jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval

forces, or in the militia, when in actual service

in time of war or public danger; nor shall any

person be subject for the same offense to be

twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

3

against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law: nor

shout j ae

Fifth Amendment

United States Constitution

(2) "Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal

protection. - All persons born or naturalized in

the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-

tion thereof, are citizens of the United States

and of the stete wherein they reside. No state

shall make or enforce any law which shall

abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens

ofthe United States; norshall any state deprive

Section 1, Fourteenth Amendment

United States Constitution

(3) "Civil action for deprivation of rights - Every

person who, under color of any statute, ordi-

nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any

State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States or »xther person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress. ..."

4

' 42 U.S.C.S., Section 1983

(4) "(3) Depriving persons of rights or privi-

leges. If two or more persons in any State or

Territory conspire, or go in disguise on the

highway or on the premises of another, for the

purpose ofdepriving, either directly orindirectly,

any person or class of persons of the equal

protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and

immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of

preventing or hindering the constituted au-

thorities ofany State or Territory from giving or

securing to all persons within such State or

Territory the equal protection of the laws;... in

any case of conspiracy set forth in this section,

if one or more persons engaged therein do, or

cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the

object of such conspiracy, whereby another is

injured in his person or property, or deprived of

having and exercising any right or privilege of

a citizen of the United States, the party so

injured or deprived may have an action for the

recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury

or deprivation, against any one or more of the

conspirators.”

42 U.S.C.S., Section 1985 (3)

(5) "Sec. 17. Open courts - Redress of injuries

Suits against the State. - That all courts shall be

open; and every man, for an injury done him in

his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall

have remedy by due course of law, and right and

justice administered without sale, denial, or

delay. Suits may be brought against the State

in such manner and in such courts as the

5

Legislature may by law direct."

Article 1, Section 17

Constitution of Tennessee

(6)"Sec. 21. Noman's services or property taken

without consent or compensation. - That no

man's particular services shall be demanded, or

property taken, or applied to public use, with-

out theconsent of his representatives, or without

just compensation being made therefor."

Article 1, Section 21

Constitution of Tennessee

(7) "55-5-108. Records to be kept - Inspections -

Contraband - Seizure of stolen property -

Reclamation - Forfeiture.

Tennessee Code Annotated

Section 55-5-108, et seq.

(g) CONCISE STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

General Motors is a huge corporate entity with

divisions making several different types of motor vehicles

one being Buick. General Motors or Buick has testing

facilities at Milford Proving Grounds in Michigan (Tr. 412-

413) (Tr. 441-443). The General Supervisor of those Buick

proving grounds at the time in question was a Jack

Clingingsmith, who had supervision over approximately

300 people, which included other supervisors under his

control and also drivers and those connected with the

testing and ultimate removal or elimination of vehicles (Tr.

425-426) (Tr. 419-421). According to Buick officials and

6

engineers, certain vehicles made by Buick were utilized for

testing purposes or also for yard cars in and around the

facilities. Other vehicles by them are utilized by Buick

officials to ride and try out when a new type vehicle is being

tested. According to Buick officials, the vehicle in question

was one that Buick officials were trying out and thus was

utilized by Buick officials for a period of time. After comple-

tion of such at Flint, Michigan, the fleet coordinator of

Buick, Mr. Barcome, sent the vehicle to the Milford Proving

Grounds to the attention of Jack Clingingsmith, Buick

general supervisor at Milford for the purpose of scrapping or

ultimately destruction of the vehicle (Tr. 419-421) (Tr. 425).

The practice of General Motors or Buick when they

scrap a vehicle as was the practice in this case, is that they

would do so only when they had completed all the utility

that they sought to obtain from the vehicle and would at that

time remove the VIN plate from the car, surrender the title

of the vehicle back to the Michigan Secretary of State and

then arrange for a private company to crush the vehicle and

remove the crushed scrapped parts or metal of the vehicle

from their facilities. Where and what the scrap man did

with the metal was not known or of no concern to Buick, but

the vehicle would be totally removed from Buick's posses-

sion and control and Buick would have nothing, no posses-

sion further of the vehicle or any of its parts. It appears in

this case, that the particular car as indicated above was sent

by the fleet coordinator, Mr. Barcome, who was located at

Flint, Michigan, to Milford Proving Grounds and in particular

to general supervisor, Jack Clingingsmith for such destruc-

tion. Mr. Clingingsmith had general supervision over the

operations at the proving grounds including the destruction

of the vehicles and the documentation for that destruction.

It was Buick's intention at this stage having completed their

utilization of the vehicle to have no longer possession of the

vehicle or any of its parts. The title to the vehizle was

surrendered to the state of Michigan. The VIN plate was

removed under the control and supervision of Jack

Clingingsmith, but apparently in this case, Mr.

7

Clingingsmith did dispose of the vehicle, but he this time

disposed of it. without first crushing the vehicle (Tr. 419-

421) (Tr. 425). Had he carried out what Buick officials

testified was their intent, the vehicle would have totally

parted from Buick's control, but would have been in a

crushed state, but in any event in whatever form it was in,

Buick would not have it anymore. It appears that the vehicle

was actually transferred from Buick under the direction of

Jack Clingingsmith in a whole state rather than a crushed

state. As Buick intended, it parted with possession of the

vehicle just in a different form. Investigation disclosed that

Mr. Clingingsmith transferred the vehicle to Mr. Holloway,

who was a salvage dealer in the Michigan area. Investiga-

tion disclosed that these three individuals, Clingingsmith,

Nicolay and Holloway worked together in that regard (Tr.

44'7-449).,

Test vehicles are often available for sale and are

acquired by dealers such as Mr. Fann, and test vehicles of

most type motor vehicles have been available in the Michigan

area for years (Tr. 109).

Gaylen Fann is a reputable automobile and salvage

dealer in the Coffee County area and has been in business

for many years buying and selling large quantities of late

model vehicles with anywhere from minor defects to need-

ing complete reconstruction. They buy cars from insurance

companies, where they have been wrecked or buy test

vehicles where they are available or buy fleets of vehicles

where there would be flood or disaster in the area with a

range of damage to the vehicles. Gene Taylor worked with

Fann over a period of sixteen (16) to eighteen (18) years.

Fann's operation is located in Coffee County, Tennessee,

and Gene Taylor while working with him would generally

work a particular state or states buying cars where there

were quantities available, such as Michigan or Louisiana

and then after buying the cars would ship them to Fann's

operation in Coffee County, from which they would be sold.

In the course of his transactions, it would be normal also to

buy cars from other salvage dealers. To indicate the size and

8

type of operation according to Mr. Taylor's testimony, he

had bought and sold through Fann's operation as many as

1,500 cars a year. On many of the transactions, Mr. Taylor

worked really as an employee of Gaylen Fann, but on a

number of the purchases throughout the years, they worked

as partners with the two working together and sharing

profits or losses associated with the transaction (Tr. 104-4).

During this period of time, Gene Taylor was working pn-

marily in Michigan and learned of the availability of some

approximately 20 late model test vehicles, that were prima-

rily Buicks. He learned of these from a friend or acquain-

tance that he knew in the car business by the name of Jack

Kruppa. Taylor checked with Fann to see if he would be

interested in acquiring the vehicles, and he was, and they

agreed to proceed on this venture together, sharing in the

profits or losses (Tr. 107-110). The transaction as herein

described was one that was just arelatively minor transaction

in the normal course of the salvage business that Fann

operated. Kruppa did not actually have the vehicles them-

selves, but could get them from Holloway. Holloway was a

recognized dealer. Kruppa confirmed the validity of the

vehicles to Taylor, and Taylor bought them on behalf of

himself and Fann's business. Kruppa then in turn would

actually make a profit on the transaction in that he would

obtain the vehicles from Holloway and transport them to

the state of Tennessee to Fann’s business operation in

Coffee County (Tr. 107-110). As indicated, there are ap-

proximately 20 vehicles total, one of which was the vehicle

ultimately purchased by the Butlers, which is subject of this

litigation, and it appeared from the proof and the investi-

gation that each of the vehicles passed through this same

process conducted by General Motors by which then the

vehicles were ultimately placed in the market by Jack

Clingingsmith, Buick's general supervisor at Milford Prov-

ing Grounds (Tr. 447-449). Acquisition of these vehicles and

the handling of these vehicles was carried on by Fann and

Taylor in the normal fashion for their type of business and

in accordance with the laws under which they operate. Once

9

a particular vehicle was brought to the state of Tennessee,

Fann made application to the state for the appropriate

documents of title utilized in his business for such vehicles.

These documents of title are technically labeled permits to

dismantle, but not only authorize him as a salvage dealer to

dismantle, the vehicle, or reconstruct them with other

vehicles, but also authorize him to transfer ownership of the

vehicles to a purchaser such as Mr. Butler (Tr. 151-9, 306-

7). Most vehicles obtained in this fashion will have a VIN

plate on them, however it is not unusuai for vehicles to be

obtained in some appropriate fashion such as this with the

VIN plate removed (Tr. 151-159). When this is the case,

there are provisions under the law of the state of Tennessee

for a new VIN plate to be issued. All proper course and

applications appropriate to be done in such a situation were

done by Fann to secure proper documents of title to the

vehicles (Tr. 306-307).

The vehicles were not all acquired at the same time

or not all sold at the same time, but once Fann started

submitting the normal applications to the Department of

Safety, the department and in particular Pat Ethridge

started investigating the vehicles to determine whether or

not to issue title. She acknowledged in her testimony that

before the department can issue title toa vehicle, they must

check to determine ifit is stolen, and they can only issue the

title after they have completed their investigation and

determined that it is not a stolen vehicl. (T.C.A. Section 55-

3-201, 55-3-207). In this case the Department of Safety went

above and beyond the normal to make sure that the vehicles

were not stolen. The state of Tennessee like the state of

Michigan has a process by which when a vehicle is scrapped,

the original title or old title to the vehicle is turned in if it is

scrapped and that title can never again be utilized (Tr. 307).

A new owner who receives or reconstructs the car may then

obtain a reconstructed title, which would be the new man-

ner and means of ownership of that vehicle, and the old title

has no more force and effect (T.C.A. 55-3-110, 55-3-112).

Not only did the state of Tennessee in this case check NCIC

10

to confirm that the vehicles were not listed as stolen, but

since these were General Motors’ product automobiles, and

in particular Buick's, Ms. Ethridge contacted Buick to make

sure that it had no claim to the vehicles. It was not until

after waiting an extended period of time, and Buick having

made no claim to the vehicles that the Department of Safety

then under the statute had determined that the vehicles

were not stolen and proceeded to issue titles on the various

vehicles which included a permit to dismantle to Fann on

each of the vehicles and subsequently respective titles to the

respective purchasers, such as Mr. and Mrs. Butler(Tr. 289-

294) (Tr. 300-303).

Plaintiffs, George and Bea Butler are residents of

Manchester, Coffee County, Tennessee, and have lived here

for a number of years. Mr. Butler is a lead designer with

Calspan Corporation working at Arnold Engineering De-

velopment Center at Arnold Air Force Base, Tennessee. Bea

Butler is an official at the People's Bank and Trust Com-

pany in Manchester. Mr. Butler was well familiar with

Fann's type of operation and knew his sound reputation for

honest and fair dealing in his line of business. Mr. Butler in

addition to his regular occupation is handy with mechanical

aspects of a vehicle and capable of doing reconstruction

work on vehicles. Prior to this transaction, he had pur-

chased nine (9) other vehicles from Fann, one of which was

a flood vehicle which he and his wife totally disassembled,

cleaned and reassembled (Tr. 23-31). When he learned that

Fann had acquired or was acquiring some test vehicles, he

went to his lot in Manchester and saw a 1985 Park Avenue

Buick, which on the surface was grubby and filthy and

jacked up in the back, but Mr. Butler saw its potential as a

diamond in the rough (Tr. 32). After purchasing the vehicle,

Mr. Butler and his wife completely went over the vehicle,

cleaning and repairing electrical contacts and relubricating

where it needed it, cleaning the upholstery and brought the

vehicle to the point where it was showroom perfect (Tr. 37-

40). They got it cleaned up so nicely that they put towels on

the seats so that they wouldn't get the seats dirty and kept

11

using those towels on the seats until the car was taken from

them. Mr. and Mrs. Butler paid $9,500.00 for the vehicle on

an "as is" condition, then spent a multitude of hours in time

making itinto the show vehicle they knew it could be(Tr. 37-

39).

Mr. Butler, then in the process of redoing the car and

caring foritin the fashion that he did, made several contacts

with Buick or Buick representatives to gain further infor-

mation about his car. He exchanged written correspondence

with Buick and made phone communications with a local

dealer and directly with the Buick Corporation Service

Center about finding the automatic key code in the trunk

and in the process providing them with the information

about his car. Still no claim by Buick (Tr. 45-49).

Ultimately and some time after the initial contacts

with the state of Tennessee which occurred first in about

March or April of 1985, Buick did an internal investigation

and came to the conclusion that Mr. Butler's car and, in fact,

some of these other cars that had been purchased and sold

by Fann were vehicies that had once been owned by Buick

and were supposedly scrapped, and the documentation |

showed that they were scrapped. Ultimately Buick officials

determined that although their agent and employee, who

was in fact their supervisor at the proving ground and head

of the operation and personnel who would see tothe scrapping

and disposal of the vehicles, had arranged for the disposal

of the vehicles but not in the form that Buick had intended.

It would appear that at first they were only concerned with

whether or not they would be liable in case any untested and

unapproved parts of the vehicle would be on the roadway

(Tr. 400-407). Contact was made with Gene Taylor, since he

was the one that acquired the vehicles, and they told him

that they might need to get some of the vehicles back, and

they wanted his help to reacquire the vehicles from the

purchasers. Mr. Taylor cooperated with them as to locate all

the vehicles. He was assured that if they needed toreacquire

the vehicles, they would go through him to do so (Tr. 110-

116). The security representative, Mr. Marler, made contact

12

in Tennessee with the District Attorney, serving this area,

about the vehicles and was allegedly concerned at the first

juncture about any liability that Buick might have if some

unsafe vehicles or part had gotten on the roadway. Buick

officials disclosed to Buck Ramsey, the district attorney,

that the man, Mr. Clingingsmith, who had apparently put

the vehicles into the stream of commerce had the authority

to dispose of the vehicles, but he just was not supposed to

have disposed of them in the manner that he did. Later,

apparently Buick officials changed their mind and wanted

to treat the vehicles as stolen vehicles and again approached

the District Attorney about the vehicles. The DA told Buick

officials that under che circumstances, he would not consider

the cars stolen vehicles and would not treat them as such

(Tr. 195-196). Don Duncan was the head of the Commercial

Enforcement Division also known as Motor Vehicle En-

forcement and State Auto Theft Units for the Department

of Safety holding the title of Colonel and was two levels

above Pat Ethridge. He in essence was the head of that

department. He confirmed that with the type of operations

that were included under his department was supervision

over salvage yards such as Gaylen Fann's operation, and

that in the course of such operations, one would acquire the

vehicles without VIN plates. He confirmed that Fann had

gone through all the proper channels to obtain documents of

title. T.C.A. 55-3-203. He likewise testified that under the

facts as they were presented to him, that the vehicles in

question would not constitute stolen vehicles (Tr. 151-159).

Billy Thomas was at that time head of the Regional Field

Office of the FBI serving a multi-county area including

Coffee County. At the request of the FBI in Michigan, he

opened an investigative file on the matter, and he in his

official capacity with the FBI did not consider the vehicles

as stolen vehicles (Tr. 208-232). When the officials at Buick

* wanted to treat the cars as stolen vehicles and just have

them picked up as opposed to having to purchase them from

the owners, and they were unsuccessful in getting the help

of the attorney general to treat them as stolen cars (Tr. 193-

13

196), they and law enforcement contacts in Michigan made

contact with lower level officials in the Tennessee Depart-

ment of Safety levels below Col. Duncan and requested the

state's aid in picking up the cars as stolen vehicles. These

officials then at the request of Buick sent J.C. Northcutt, an

official with the Department of Safety Auto Theft Division

to Coffee County with Buick officials, and Mr. Northcutt

proceeded to take possession of the various vehicles. In

regard to this particular vehicle, Mr. Northcutt came to Mr.

Butlers’ place.of employment at AEDC and told him that he

was driving a stolen car and that he had "come after” it. He

followed Mr. Butler to his residence to get the personal

property out of the vehicle including the towels that they

used to cover the seats. The car was now in show place

quality unlike it was when Mr. Butler purchased it. Agent

Northcutt testified that his basis of picking up the Butler

vehicle was it being listed as stolen in NCIC; but both he and

Pat Ethridge had both "lost" their copies of the NCIC report

and "couldn't find” them in their files, but they knew that it

was in the NCIC as stolen and that is why they picked it up

(Tr. 326-342). (It was later disclosed on cross examination of

a law enforcement witness from Michigan who did have a

copy of the NCIC report that in fact the NCIC report of Mr.

Butler's vehicle as being stolen was not made or in essence

the vehicle was not reported to the NCIC as stolen until

after Mr. Northcutt had taken the vehicle from Mr. Butler.)

In essence, what the proof disclosed was that Mr. Northcutt

along with others went to pick up the vehicle, checked in it

and got the identification data from the VIN number in-

stalled by the state in the car and then called Buick in

Michigan to give them that number so they could in turn

report it as stolen tojustify Northcutt picking it up (Tr. 389-

390, ex. 28). State officials acknowledge that Buick did not

have proper documentation on the Butler vehicle when they

came to the state of Tennessee (Tr. 326-342). In any event,

on June 12, 1986, agent Northcutt, acting on the power of

the state, confiscated and took Mr. Butler's car from him,

which he had purchased some ten (10) months prior. Im-

14

mediately Mr. Butler contacted counsel and the following

day appeared in Chancery Court to get a restraining order

to restrain the state from disposing of the vehicle or turning

it over to Buick before there could be a hearing to determine

the one with the right to possession; however, the very next

day, the 14th and supposedly before the Restraining Order

was served on the state, officials turned it, along with the

other vehicles, over to Buick officials, who in turn hustled

them out of the state and back to Michigan. Reportedly this

vehicle, which Mr. Butler and his wife paid on for approxi-

mately three (3) years, has been sitting in a Buick lot

somewhere in the state of Michigan waiting for the deter-

mination of its lawful owner. Mr. and Mrs. Butler have not

had the car since June 12, 1986, but they paid on it for ap-

proximately three (3) years to pay off the debt that they

made in purchasing it.

When Mr. Butler learned that the car had been

taken by Buick back to Michigan, he amended his complaint

and included Buick as party Defendant and has been liti-

gating for the past years, trying to get back the car for which

he has worked and paid. In addition the Butlers filed suit for

damages in Circuit Court against Buick whoin turn removed

the damage case to Federal Court.

(h) RAISING OF CONSITUTIONALAND FEDERAL

ISSUES 5

Constitutional issues were raised in the first inci-

dence in the litigation. The lawsuit was-first filed, merely to

restrain the state, then amended to get possession of the

vehicle. The unconstitutionality of the taking of the vehicle

was always a question, and was specifically set out in detail

in the Complaint for damages upon which the Plaintiff

relied upon certain statutes and in particular on the U.S.

Constitution and the State Constitution. These are set out

in detail under paragraph (f). Also the trial court by Order

entered December 4, 1986, in ruling upon a motion for

Summary Judgement filed by Buick, denied that Motion for

15

- Summary Judgement and in doing so found as a matter of

fact that the state of Tennessee, after titling this subject

vehicle to the Butlers, took that vehicle from the Butlers and

immediately after taking the vehicle turned the vehicle over

to Buick, who in turn removed the car from the state of

Tennessee; and that the Plaintiffs thereby, had no oppor-

tunity for a hearing or a proceeding with the state or

otherwise to prevent the removal of their car from the state.

As a result Plaintiffs had no alternative but to seek relief of

the Court for this taking.

Gj) NOT APPLICABLE

(j) CONCISE ARGUMENT JUSTIFYING

ISSUANCE OF WRIT

The Defendant in this case, a huge influential cor-

porate entity, used its power and influence with lower

officials of the state and secured the aid of the state in using

state action to obtain possession of that vehicle from Mr.

Butler without any due process hearing. Mr. Butler filed

two actions to remedy the wrongs done to him. At first a

Chancery Action for the recovery of the vehicle was filed,

and second a related Circuit Action for the damage to his

constitutional rights in the wrongful taking. The damage

action was removed from State Court to Federal Court so

two actions proceed, one through State channels and one

through Federal channels. Defendant has moved for Sum-

mary Judgement in the Federal action, contending that the

Plaintiffs could have no property interest in the vehicle,

which they purchased and for which they had title issued by

the state of Tennessee, because the vehicle was in fact

stolen, and thus they had no constitutiona! protection. The

Plaintiffs contend that he should have constitutional pro-

tection, because of the title to the vehicle which was issued

by the state to him, a good faith purchaser of value, and that

the title was issued only after checking with Buick and

receiving no claim. The state trial court held that this

16

vehicle was not stolen in the normal sense of the word, and

that the Plaintiff should have his vehicle returned to him.

The Federal District Judge has ruled that this determina-

tion will be binding on parties in the Federal action. The

Defendant appealed the Trial Judge's ruling and the Fed-

eral Judge stayed the damage action in Federal Court

pending the ultimate conclusion of the state action, deter-

mining whether or not the vehicle was stolen and the

entitlement to the vehicle. The Court of Appeals for the

Western Section of Tennessee heard the case, which was

appealed to the Middle Section Court and issued an opinion

overturning the Chancellor; Application to Appeal to the

State Supreme Court was denied. If this Court of Appeals

decision on the issue of whether or not the vehicle was stolen

is allowed to stand, it will be used as a bar by the Defendant

to prevent the Plaintiffs from obtaining recovery for the

damages sustained to their constitutional rights as sought

in the damage suit. As indicated, the two suits are tied

together and, even by Agreed Order, the discovery in one

was to be utilized in the other. A hearing of this matter by

this Honorable Court is essential to prevent further viola-

tion of the Plaintiffs constitutional rights in property as set

out by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

(k) APPENDIX OF ORDERS AND PLEADINGS

The following Orders and or documents are included

herein as an appendix to this petition for Certiorari.

Page

(1) Order of Chancellor Stewart, dated

December 2, 1986 20

(2) Complaint for Damages 23

(3) Agreed Order entered

January 3, 1989 34

(4) Final Order in Chancery Court

entered August 11, 1989 36

(5) Federal District Court Order

entered September 8, 1989 44

17

(6) Order of Western Section Court

of Appeals, entered

February 6, 1991

(7) Order by Court of Appeals on

Petition to rehear, entered

February 27, 1991

(8) Tennessee Supreme Court Order

entered June 10, 1991.

18

45

55

56

RESPECTFULLY SUBMIITED,

(eh? TRE

ROBERT L. aoatty

(Counsel of Record)

P.O. Box 777

514 Hillsboro Blvd.

Manchester, TN 37355

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the “em of Ble TaN 1991,

I have served three copies of the foregoing pleading upon

opposing counsel, the Honorable Albert F. Moore, Neal &

Harwell, 2000 One Nashville Place, 150 Fourth Avenue

North, Nashville, Tennessee 37219, first class mail, postage

prepaid.

63-22 Ze

ROBERT L. es

19

IN THE CHANCERY COURT OF COFFEE COUNTY,

TENNESSEE

DEC. 4, 1986

GEORGE B. BUTLER and wife, LEAH

BEA BUTLER,

Plaintiffs,

vs. CIVIL ACTION NO: 86-164

STATE OF TENNESSEE and BUICK

MOTOR COMPANY, A DIVISION OF

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,

Defendants.

IN RE:1985 Buick

VIN NO: 1G4AX69E6E1400109

ORDER

THIS MATTER CAME ON to be heard on the 30th

day of October, 1986, upon the Motion of the Defendant,

Buick Motor Company, a Division of General Motors Cor-

poration, to dismiss or in the alternative for summary

judgement, by which the said defendant contended that the

herein Court does not have jurisdiction or venue to try the

matter, contending that it must proceed administratively

under the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated, § 55-5-

108.

Upon the hearing of this matter, including the pre-

sentation by the representative of the State Attorney

General, and in consideration of the sworn answers to the

interrogatories filed by the State, and from consideration of

the entire file of this cause, from all of which the Court finds

that the said Motions of the Defendant, Buick Motor

Company, are not well taken and should be denied. In

particular, the Court finds that the State after taking the

20

car titled to Mr. Butler immediately turned that vehicle

over to Buick, who in turn removed the car from the State

of Tennessee; that the Plaixtiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Butler, had

no opportunity for any hearing or proceeding with the State

or otherwise to prevent the removal of the car from the

State, and no alternative but to seek reliefin this Court; and

finally the Court finds that it is the contention of the State

whether rightfully or wrongfully that the vehicle in fact was

not taken pursuant to the Code Section relied upon by

Buick, but rather was merely taken on the basis of it being

claimed to be astolen vehicle and returned to the party that

claimed to own it, Buick.

Based on all the foregoing, the said Motions of the

Defendant, Buick Motor Company, a Division of General

Motors Corporation, be and same hereby are denied. Based

upon the nature of the issue raised by the Defendant, the

Court will grant said Defendant an interlocutory appeal

should said Defendant choose to pursue same.

To which action of the Court, in overrulingits motion

to dismiss the Defendant, Buick Motor Company excepts

and reserves its exception to the final hearing on the merits

in this cause.

ENTER: this the 2nd day of December, 1986.

S-L.F. Stewart 3

L.F. Stewart, Chancellor

APPROVED FOR ENTRY

ROBERT L. HUSKEY

L, tee elrBectgater 6. cda enees toteerss SU

S-Robert L. Huskey mens OE

Attorney for Plaintiffs mc es “flo fs

Clerk & :

H.J. GARRETT

S-H.J. Garrett

Attorney for Buick Motor Company

21

JANE W. YOUNG

S-Jar.e W. Young

Attorney for State of Tennessee

CLATWICAIET OF St mwK

Tre uendersiqaed Rerrey certifies what © tiwe and see.

COPY Of IMIS ple-rding Ras Dees Ber west Ug Corre ert fee ol parties at

tmpereet fe tere Crete Oy Oe te uret a 4 tee a Hee omy FF woe

Oe Cet fer Pee Ofer es OF aE FO ete hy pie toy “i eeere

cory oft bl Die ding athe Ueto gs betes stad cate

CONS EE PE EG ee 5, eben Be Dele MN Berti am.* Len gte ony

‘ et

seme tn 1's Orale ala.

Tris the LV i oy : %

——T

aan gtacee

Sr ee ee ee |

-

22

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT

FOR THE FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, AT

MANCHESTER

GEORGE B. BUTLER and wife,

ed In Office "30, (AM PM,

LEAH BEA BUTLER, Fede Ome

CT ys

Chorlene J. Camp (J TY

Plaintiffs, Circuit Court Clerk

vs. CIVIL ACTION NO: 21,881

BUICK MOTOR COMPANY, A DIVISION OF

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, and

STATE OF TENNESSEE,

Defendants.

COMPLAINT

COME NOW THE PLAINTIFFS, George B. Butler

and wife, Leah Bea Butler, and would show unto this

Honorable Court the following:

I.

That the Plaintiffs are citizens and residents of

Coffee County, Tennessee. That the Defendant, Buick Motor

Company, a Division of General Motors Corporation, is a

non-resident corporate entity which is licensed to do busi-

ness in the State of Tennessee and which sells and distributes

motor vehicles within the State of Tennessee through its

authorized dealerships. The Defendant, State of Tennessee,

is a State governmental entity operating under recognition

of the U.S. Constitution and federal laws and the State of

Tennessee Constitution and appropriate state statutes.

II.

This litigation is brought pursuant to and in accor-

dance with the following authorities: :

23

(1) "Criminal actions - Provisions concerning

- Due process of law and just compensation

clauses. - No person shall be held to answer for

a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless

on a presentment or indictment by a grandjury,

except in cases arising in the land or naval

forces, or in the militia, when in actual service

in time of war or public danger; nor shall any

person be subject for the same offense to be

twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty,

_orproperty, without due process of law: nor shall

Fifth Amendment

United States Constitution

(2) “Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal

protection. - All persons born or naturalized in

the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-

tion thereof, are citizens of the United States

and of the state wherein they reside. No state

shall make or enforce any law which shall

abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens

of the United States; nor shall any state deprive

any person of life, liberty, or property, without

‘thin its jurisdiction t) on of

the lowe *

Section 1, Fourteenth Amendment

United States Constitution

(3) "Civil action for deprivation of nghts -

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any

24

State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be lable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C.S., § 1983

(4) "(3) Depriving persons of rights or privi-

leges. If two or more persons in any State or

Territory conspire, or go in disguise on the

highway or on the premises of another, for the

purpose of depriving, either directly orindirectly,

any person or class of persons of the equal

protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and

immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of

preventing or hindering the constituted au-

thorities of any State or Territory from giving or

securing to all persons within such State or

Territory the equal protection of the laws;....

in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section,

if one or more persons engaged therein do, or

cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the

object of such conspiracy, whereby another is

injured in his person or property, or deprived of

having and exercising any right or privilege of

a citizen of the United States, the party so

injured or deprived may have an action for the

recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury

or deprivation, against any one or more of the

conspirators.”

42 U.S.C.S., § 1985 (3)

25

(5) “Sec. 17. Open courts - Redress of injuries

- Suits against the State. - That all courts shall

be open; and every man, for an injury done him

in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall

have remedy by due course of law, and right and

justice administered without sale, denial, or

delay. Suits may be brought against the State

in such manner and in such courts as the

Legislature may by law direct.”

Article 1, Section 17

Constitition of Tennessee

(6) "Sec. 21. No man's services or property

taken without consent or compensation. - That

no man's particular services shall be demanded,

or property taken, or applied to public use,

without the consent of his representatives, or

without just compensation being made there-

for.”

Article 1, Section 21

Constitution of Tennessee

(7) "55-5-108. Records to be kept - Inspections

- Contraband-Seizure of stolen property - Recla-

mation - Forfeiture.

Tennessee Code Annotated

§ 55-5-108, et seq.

(8) Common law conspiracy and conversion

(9) Malicious and intentional tort

(10) Outrageous conduct

26

ITI.

Plaintiffs woulc show unto this Honorable Court

that in August of 1985 they purchased a subject automobile,

being a 1985 Buick, from Gaylen Fann Motor Company and

paid a fair and reasonable price for the vehicle in its state

and conditic . at the time of purchase. Pursuant thereto,

with Gaylen Fann being the proper title holder of the vehicle

at that time under the laws of the State of Tennessee, he

obtained and transferred title of said vehicle, pursuant to

proper authority and payment, to the Plaintiffs. Attached

hereto please find a photocopy of the Certificate of Title

number 34288740 issued by the State of Tennessee, Motor

Vehicle Division of the Department of Revenue, certifying

title to the subject vehicle in the Plaintiffs.

Gaylen Fann is a well knowri and recognized dealer

of motor vehicles in the Manchester, Coffee County area,

having been in business and maintaining a favorable

reputation for such business for a number of years and

known in the area to buy and sell new, used, damaged and

reconstructed vehicles. The vehicle in question as purchased

from Mr. Fann, although a new car with low mileage,

needed a great deal of repair and cleanup which was

performed by the Butlers providing many many hours of

labor in cleaning the vehicle. This vehicle was of a type and

style just as the Plaintiffs had desired and so they with love

spent many hours of work cleaning and repairing this car.

The car from general appearance at the time of purchase

was somewhat of a mess, in that it was covered inside and

out with an oily film and layers of a sandy substance; the

rear end was jacked out of place causing the car's front end

to be almost touching the ground; the upholstery was filthy

and the carpets were dirty and greasy. After obtaining the

vehicle, the Butlers, realizing its potential, then for the

most part disassembled and refitted the car from a layman's

point of view, and in essence they spent many many hours

making this car into the vehicle they knew it could be.

Plaintiffs actually owned and had possession of the

said vehicle from August of 1985 when they purchased it

27

from Fann Motor Company, and the Plaintiffs had legal title

to the vehicle on title issued by the State on a proper

Certificate of Title from the State of Tennessee since Feb-

ruary 3, 1986, being the date of the issuance of their current

Certificate of Title referenced above.

IV.

It developed that this vehicle, as well as other vehicles

which had been manufactured by the Defendant, Buick

Motor Company, a Division of General Motors Corporation,

herein referred to as Buick, had been sold or transferred by

a high corporate official of Buick by the name of Mr.

Clingingsmith, who was the corporate official in charge of

the proving grounds of Buick at Flint, Michigan. A practice

had been developed by Mr. Clingingsmith on behalf of Buick

over a period of time whereby either vehicles or parts of

vehicles that had been utilized in the testing process at the

Buick proving grounds were then sold by Buick or

Clingingsmith on behalf of Buick to certain distributors or

dealerships in the Michigan area and the funds utilized

then by Clingingsmith and others involved with the operation

at the proving grounds for public relation activities of Buick.

In addition to the sale of these such vehicles, some of them

were donated to driver training programs and other such

activities which would draw favorable public relations for

Buick. This general practice had been first developed by Mr.

Clingingsmith, who was the head Buick official of the

proving grounds at Flint, Michigan, and was known by and

accepted by the corporation itself and the benefits there-

from utilized to the benefit of Buick. The general practice in

such transaction where the cars had been utilized for test

purposes was to remove any test parts from the vehicles so

that the cars as delivered or parts as sold would be as the

normal dealership vehicles. As indicated above, it developed

that this vehicle, as well as other vehicles, passed in this

chain of transfer from Buick to a man named Nicolay and a

man named Holloway, and then in turn were ultimately

sold to Gaylen Fann Motor Company of Manchester, Coffee

28

County, Tennessee, and then in particular this vehicle, a

1985 Buick, being Vehicle Identification Number

1G4AX69E6E1400109, was then in turn sold through the

normal course of business to your Plaintiffs.

V.

It thereafter developed and was determined by other

officials of Buick that in addition to Mr. Clingingsmith and

others utilizing the practice of disposition of vehicles for the

benefit of Buick in its public relations, that he was also

keeping part of the proceeds for himself, and further that he,

in the course of carrying on this practice, had allowed

certain vehicles, including the one which was ultimately

sold to your Plaintiffs, to be sold, transferred or otherwise

with experimental equipment thereon. This prompted Buick

and its officials to seek to recover this vehicle at all costs,

including the deprivation of the rights, property and interest

of your Piaintiffs.

Meanwhile, your Plaintiffs who owned by proper

title and registration the subject vehicle, had made no secret

of their proud ownership of this vehicle and had in fact made

contact with the Buick dealership and direct contact with

the Buick corporation pertaining to some of the equipment

on their new Buick vehicle. Buick and its officials, however,

once they realizéd that not all of the test equipment had

been removed from the Butler vehicle before it was trans-

ferred or conveyed, sought to recover this and other vehicles

that might have similar equipment. Rather than contacting

your Plaintiffs directly, who had had individual contact

with Buick about the vehicle, Buick officials and in particular

officials of the security department of General Motors

Corporation who were well familiar with the practice by

which the vehicles were transferred into commerce, made

contact with officials of the State of Tennessee, claiming the

vehicles, and in particular your Plaintiffs’ vehicle, were

stolen vehicles and should be returned to Buick immediately.

The State of Tennessee accepted the contentions of the

Buick officials without proper verification of any ownership

29

or entitlement on the part of Buick officials, and in fact they

failed to have proper documentation or proper entitlement

to ownership and in turn went with Buick officials and on

behalf of Buick officials under the color and authority of the

State of Tennessee, using police authorities of the Depart-

mentof Safety andin particularJ.C. Northcutt, investigator

of the Tennessee Department of Safety, and L.D. Moiree of

the Department of Safety, and with the power and authority

of the State of Tennessee on behalf of Buick went tothe place

of employment of your Plaintiff, George B. Butler, without

any warrant or other official process as though Mr. Butler

were a criminal or a thief, and under the authority and

power of the State took physical possession of his new

vehicle from him on June 12, 1986, leaving your Plaintiff

only a pink copy of a Notice of Impoundment (copy attached

hereto) which reflected that the vehicle was impounded by

the State and advised Mr. Butler then where the vehicle

would be maintained at the State impoundment lot in

Tullahoma, Coffee County, Tennessee. Your Plaintiffs would

show that the Defendants and each of them conspired

together to obtain the personal property of your Plaintiffs

from them without proceeding through due process of law,

and thereby deprived your Plaintiffs of their right to property

under the Constitution of Tennessee and the Constitution of

the United States, that the State acted on behalf of the

Buick officials without proper authority and without proper

documentation and not following proper State procedures

for the obtaining of the property.

VI.

Following the taking of the property by the State

officials on behalfof Buick, your Plaintiffs immediately that

same night sought the aid of counsel and the next morning

filed an action in Chancery Court, being the 13th day of

June, 1986, and sought and obtained a Restraining Order

restraining the State of Tennessee from removing the vehicle

from the State or from turning it over to Buick or allowing

it to be disposed of or destroyed. Meanwhile, the very next

30

day before the process was actually served upon the State

formally, the State contrary to due process rights and equal

protection rights of the Plaintiffs and contrary to the stat-

utes of the State of Tennessee, delivered the Butler's vehicle

to the officials of Buick on the morning of Saturday, June the

14th, which officials immediately transported that vehicle

out of the State and jurisdiction of its courts. Although

action is pending for the return of that vehicle in the

Chancery Court of Coffee County, that vehicle has never

been returned to the State of Tennessee and your Plaintiffs

have been out their money and out their vehicle and the use

of their vehicle ever since, now for a period of which has been

nearly a year.

VII.

Your Plaintiffs would show unto this Honorable

Court that the Defendant, Buick, determined thatit wanted

to regain possession of the Butler's vehicle and was willing

to do so at whatever cost, including specifically the depri-

vation of the rights, both constitutional and statutory, of the

Butlers in and to that vehicle; that the Buick officials in

conjunction with the State officials wrongfully converted

property which was properly titled to the Butlers from them

and removed it from the State of Tennessee in violation of

statutory and constitutional rights of the Butlers; that this

action was taken by Buick with the aid of the State for the

purpose of recovering that vehicle at whatever cost; that the

vehicle in question was not a stolen vehicle, but rather was

one placed in the course of commerce by officials of Buick,

which corporation acts through its officials, and under a

practice that was known, that had been established and

existed at the proving grounds for a period of time and

carried on by Buick officials; that the Butlers were the

proper and legal owners of the vehicle in question under the

laws of the State of Tennessee, but that the Defendant,

Buick, by aid and conspiracy with officials of the State of

Tennessee influenced by the power, size and corporate

wealth of the said Defendant, aided the Defendant, Buick,

31

in obtaining possession of the subject vehicle from the

Butlers without due process by use of the power of the State.

Plaintiffs would show that the vehicle of the Plaintiffs

should never have been impounded by the State in the use

of the State's power, but even thatifthere was authority and

propriety for the impoundment, that the State law provides

a procedure for such impoundments, which procedure will

require that the State hold the vehicle for the protection of

all concerned and cannot turn that vehicle over toaclaimant

unless it appears that there is only one claimant to the

vehicle and then only upon making bond for twice its value,

while in this case it was clear and well xnown to the State

officials that there were at least two claimants to the

vehicle, that being Buick and your Plaintiffs and that under

that circumstance under State law the vehicle could not be

turned over to anyone; yet despite this the State officials

took the Butler vehicle which was properly titled to them

under the laws of this State andon a title issued by the State

itself, and after taking their vehicle less than 48 hours

thereafter turned that vehicle over to Buick contrary to

State law, whereupon Buick immediately rushed that vehicle

out of State before the Butlers could, through the court

process, block the removal of the car, while ail the time a

Restraining Order had been issued and was in circulation

for service upon the State preventing that very thing.

VIII.

Plaintiffs would show that the Defendant, State of

Tennessee, and the Defendant, Buick, intentionally and

willfully violated your Plaintiffs’ right to property, wrong-

fully converted their property, taking their property with-

out due process oflaw andin violation of the Equal Protection

Clause of the law, and removed and converted their prop-

erty in violation of the above referenced state and federal

constitution and state and federal statutes, and further in

violation of common law conversion and common law con-

spiracy, and that said action and conduct on their part, and

each of them, constitutes all the above and in addition

32

thereto an outrageous conduct whereby a huge wealthy

corporate entity such as the Defendant, Buick, by use of its

power and influence obtained the usage of the power and

authority ofthe State to wrongfully and intentionally deprive

the Plaintiffs of their property.

WHEREFORE AND FOR ALL, your Plaintiffs sue

the Defendants and each of them under the above said facts,

under the theories elucidated above and all other legal

theories applicable under those facts, and demand judg-

ment against them for all their entitlements at law, for the

value of the vehicle, loss of its use, for the deprivation of

their rights and for applicable punitive damages, and would

seek judgment against the Defendants in the amount of

ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS

($150,000.00) compensatory damages and TWENTY-FIVE

MILLION DOLLARS ($25,000,000.90) punitive damages,

and would respectfuily demand a jury to try this case.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

ROBERT L. HUSKEY

S-Robert L. Huskey

Attorney for Plaintiffs

P.O. Box 439

105 E. High Street

Manchester, TN 37355

33

IN THE CHANCERY COURT

OF COFFEE COUNTY, TENNESSEE

GEORGE B. BUTLER, and wife,

LEAH BEA BUTLER, cme

Plaintiffs, JAN. 3, 1989

CLERK & MASTER

si COFFEE COUNTY, TN

BUICK MOTOR COMPANY, mang

a division of General NO: 86-164

Motors Corporation

Defendant.

QRDER

This matter came on to be presented before the

Honorable L.F. Stewart, Chancellor, Chancery Court of

Coffee County, Tennessee, on the 9th day of December,

1988, upon the Motion of the Defendant, Buick Motor

Company, division of General Motors Corporation, to delay

this litigation until after the trial of the related suit in

Federal Court.

Upon the Presentation of the matter to the Court the

Court finds that the motion of the Defendant should be

denied; however, as an alternative, the Court grants a

continuance of the case from the presently scheduled trial

date of January 16, 1989, to a later date of May 16, 1989. It

is further ordered that the discovery taken in this and the

related case will be taken in such a manner that it can be

utilized in either case thus eliminating duplication of ex-

penses.

34

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED;

(1) That the motion of the Defendant stay

proceedings in this action is hereby denied.

(2) The trial of this case is continued from

January 16, 1989, and is hereby scheduled for

trial on May 16, 1989.

(3) Discovery taken in this case and in the

related Federal case by agreement may be uti-

lized in either of the actions pending between

these parties.

ENTER: This the 3lst day of December, 1988.

S-L.F. Stewart

L.F. Stewart

APPROVED FOR ENTRY

ROBERT L. HUSKEY 1, the undersi*ti2 Cicck and blaster do

he certily thet this is @ true and

S-Robert L. Huskey envest ye ihe »f 9

instrement this a 94

ATTORNEY FORPLAINTIFFS “2... 07, /2 —

Clerk & waster

NEAL & HARWELL

S-Albert F. Moore

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT

RERERAEAEES

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Robert L. Huskey, certify that I have served a copy

of the foregoing proposed Order, to the Honorable Al Moore

of the Firm of Neal & Harwell, 2000 One Nashville Place,

150 Fourth Avenue North, Nashville, TN 37219-2414, First

Class, Postage Pre-Paid, this the 21st day of December,

1988.

S-Robert L. Huskey

ROBERT L. HUSKEY

35

IN THE CHANCERY COURT OF COFFEE

COUNTY, TENNESSEE

GEORGEB. BUTLER and wife FUED

LEAH 5. BUTLER, AUG. 11, 1989

Plaintifts, CLERK & MASTER

a COFFEE COUNTY, TN

BUICK MOTOR COMPANY, Civil Action No: 86-164

a division of General Motors i: tho undersigned Clerk ond Master do

Corporation, et al. hereby certily Ur) thin ia eo twe aad

concct copy cl tha olgwal of this

Bee ul. Se La} 2

Defendant. tne

FINAL ORDER

This matter came on for trial before the Honorable

L.F. Stewart, Chancellor of the Chancery Court of Coffee

County, Tennessee on the 17th, 18th and 19th days of July,

1989, to determine which of the two parties were entitled to

possession of the subject Buick automobile. At the conclu-

sion of the trial of the case, including the presentation of

witnesses, exhibits and arguments of counsel, the Court

announced its finding, which findings and rulings have

been transcribed and filed with the Court and which are

adopted herein by reference; and based thereupon, the

Court holds that the Plaintiffs, George Butler and wife,

Leah Bea Butler, are entitled to the possession and return

of the subject Buick automobile; and IT IS, THEREFORE,

ORDERED, that the Defendant, General Motors Corpora-

tion, return the subject Buick automobile to the Butlers.

Court costs are adjudged against the Defendant for which

execution may issue if necessary.

ENTER: this the 11th day of August, 1989.

36

es

S-L.F. Stewart

L.F. STEWART, CHANCELLOR

APPROVED FOR ENTRY:

ROBERT L. HUSKEY

S-Robert L. Huskey

Attorney for Plaintiffs,

George and Leah Butler

37

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Robert L. Huskey, certify that I have served a copy

of the foregoing proposed order upon opposing counsel, the

Honorable Albert F. Moore, by mailing a copy to his law

offices of Neal & Harwell, 2000 One Nashville Place, 150

Fourth Avenue North, Nashville, Tennessee 37219-2417,

First Class Mail, Postage Pre-Paid, this the 10th day of

August, 1989.

S-Robert L. Huskey

ROBERT L. HUSKEY

38

TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC RECORDING OF

PROCEEDINGS

IN THE CHANCERY COURT FOR COFFEE COUNTY,

TENNESSEE AT MANCHESTER

GEORGE B. BUTLER, and wife,

LEAH BEA BUTLER,

Plaintiff

vs. NO. 86-164

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:

Robert L. Huskey, Esq.

514 Hillsboro Boulevard

Manchester, Tennessee

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

Albert F. Moore, Esq.

Neal & Harwell

2000 One Nashville Place

Nashville, Tennessee

39

This cause came on to be heard on the 17th, 18th and

19th days of July, 1989, before the Honorable L. F. Stewart,

Chancellor presiding over the Chancery Court in and for

Coffee County, State of Tennessee, at the Coffee County

Courthouse, Manchester, Tennessee, when the following

proceedings were had and evidence introduced, to-wit:

PROCEEDINGS

(Thereupon other proceedings were reported, but

are not transcribed herein.)

THE COURT: I think the facts of this case are pretty

well understood by all. Basically the facts that I need to find

are simply this: GM made a test vehicle and sent it to

Detroit. It became the property at that time --according to

Mr. Barcomb -- of the engineer. A number of people there

drove it testing it to complain about its functionings as a

vehicle just to be driven around. Then he ordered it sent to

Milford Proving Grounds where Mr. Jack Clingingsmith

was the general supervisor and took charge of the vehicle.

I'm not clear what all was done at that point, but Mr.

Barcomb said he ordered it crushed. Mr. Clingingsmith,

being the general supervisor, was the agent for General

Motors -- the corporation can't act otherwise -- and instead

of crushing it, he forged some papers or did something

fraudulent here and turned it over to a Mr. Nicholay, I

believe his name was, who, in turn, gave it to Mr. Holloway

who, in turn, soldit to Mr. Gene Taylor or through Mr. Gene

Taylor to Mr. Fann herein Manchester. Mr. Butler came by

Mr. Fann's place, looked at it, saw it, liked it and purchased

it. The VIN number had been removed by Mr. Clingingsmith's

mechanic in Detroit and had been turned into General

Motors headquarters. The title had been sent tothe Secretary

of State of Michigan surrendering it so when that vehicle

arrived here in Manchester it had no title and it had no VIN

number. Mr. Fann makes application for -- let's see, what do

you call those things he --

MR. MOORE: (Interposing) Permit to Dismantle.

40

THE COURT: On the back of that he had a right to

sell it to somebody else and he endorsed it over to Mr. and

Mrs. Butler and they made application for title and title was

issued to them. It had the same VIN number on it, as I

understand it, as the General Motors VIN number that was

removed from it. Now, if it were a situation where Mr.

Nicholay had gone over the fence at the Milford Proving

Grounds and cut a hole in it and driven this vehicle off, we

wouldn't be here right now because that would be clearly a

stolen vehicle that passes no title whatsoever. If Mr.

Nicholay had been in league with a night watchman or a

mechanic and gotten possession of it in that fashion, there

wouldn't be any question about it because no title could

pass.

Our problem in this case is that Jack Clingingsmith

was the general supervisor in charge to see that it was

crushed and then of disposing the crushed vehicle by selling

it tosomeone else. He had some authority and was the agent

of General Motors. It's not exactly the Jernigan case, Mr.

Huskey, because in the Jernigan case the owner actually

gave his authority to sell it. He gave his consent for the sale.

He was tricked out of it. Mr. Clingingsmith, on the other

hand, has repetitiously and fraudulently delivered the

vehicle to Mr. Nicholay covering his trail by turning in the

VIN number and doing the necessary paperwork that ap-

peared that that vehicle had been crushed.

In this situation we have a General Motors agent

disposing of the property illegally, fraudulently -- there's no

question about that -- embezzling. The question in our mind

comes, could title arise in a good faith purchaser. I don't

think there's any question about Mr. Butler or Mr. Fann

being good faith purchasers. They knew nothing of this.

They had no understanding of it whatsoever. Mr. Butler and

Mr. Fann both gave good money for the vehicle. Under these

circumstances I think we would invoke a rule of equity

which says that between two parties one must suffer a loss.

The ones who had suffered the loss who were not responsible

for the action or negligence that set about the loss. General

41

Motors certainly was responsible for Mr. Clingingsmith.

They had no check on him and allowed him through their

failure to dispose of this vehicle as he did to the detriment

of Mr. and Mrs. Butler and for that reason I think I'm going

to order General Motors to return the vehicle to Mr. and

Mrs. Butler.

MR. HUSKEY: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. MOORE: Your Honor, the vehicle, as I under-

stand it, is on a lot somewhere in Michigan and it's been

sitting there for about two and a half years so it's not in the

best of shape. I'm not sure what General Motors intends to

do in terms of the possibility of appealing the decision of the

Court, but I suppose just from my perspective in trying to

determine what your Honor wants to doin this case I think

that there's a good dispute, a fair dispute, an honest dispute

between the counse! here about what law applies and I

guess that I would ask your Honor's permission to stay any

order requiring us to bring the car down until the mattercan

be considered.

THE COURT: Post a bond, yes, sir. You have the

right to do that.

MR. MOORE: Shouid I file a motion or something to

that effect?

THE COURT: Well, I think you just have and I see

no reason why you shouldn't have that right.

MR. MOORE: Your Honor, it would be difficult to

put a value on a bond at this point.

MR. HUSKEY: That's what I was going to ask you

about.

MR. MOORE: Is that something that perhaps Mr.

Huskey and I could talk about and --

THE COURT: (Interposing) You all talk it over and

see if you can get to it. If you can't, I will. I'll give you two

minutes to do it.

MR. MOORE: Thank you.

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

STATE OF TENNESSEE:

COUNTY OF COFFEE :

I, Valerie P. Smith, being a Court Reporter and

Notary Public at Large for the State of Tennessee, do hereby

certify that I reported in machine shorthand the case of

GEORGE B. BUTLER and wife, LEAH BEA BUTLER vs.

BUICK MOTOR COMPANY, on the 17th, 18th and 19th

days of July, 1989, in the Chancery Court of Coffee County

before Chancellor L. F. Stewart; that the foregoing pages

constitute a true record of the Chancellor's Ruling in the

above-entitled case.

I further certify that I am not an attorney or counsel

of any of the parties, nor a relative or employee of any

attorney or counsel connected with the action, nor financially

interested in the action.

Witness my hand and seal in the City of Tullahoma,

County of Coffee, State of Tennessee, this 28th day of July,

1989.

S-Valerie P. Smith

Valerie P. Smith

Notary Public and

Court Reporter

My Commission Expires

April 21, 1993

43

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WINCHESTER DIVISION

GAYLEN FANN, GENE TAYLOR,

GAYLEN FANN ENTERPRISES,

t

FILED

GEORGE B. BUTLER and wife,

LEAH BEA BUTLER, aaah

lela

_— U.S. DISTRICT COURT

Plaintiffs yi } |

Oap. Clerk P

¥.

BUICK MOTOR COMPANY, Civ. 4-87-087

Da Civ. 4-87-088

a division of General Motors

Corporation, et al.,

Defendants

ORDER

This action is hereby CONTINUED from its present

trial date and STAYED pending resolution by a Tennessee

Court of Appeals of the pending state court action between

the Butlers and General Motors.

ENTER:

S-James H. Jarvis

James H. Jarvis,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

rill

ae

APPEAL BY PERMISSION FROM APPELLATE

COURT TO SUPREME COURT:

JUDGEMENT ENTERED ON THIS

RE: TIME DATE: FEB. 6, 1991

Application for permission to appeal shall be filed with the

Clerk of the Supreme Court WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS

after the date of entry of the judgement of the Court of

Appeals or Court of Criminal Appeals [Rule 11(b) Tennessee

Rules of Appellate Procedure].

7 01-A-01-9003-CH-00101

BUICK MOTOR COMPANY,

a division of GENERAL L. F. STEWART

MOTORS CORPORATION Chancellor

Defendant/Appellant.

ROBERT L. HUSKEY, Manchester, Attorney for Plaintiffs/

Appellees

ALBERT F. MOORE, of NEAL & HARWELL, Nashville,

Attorney for Defendant/Appelant

REVERSED AND DISMISSED

OPINION FILED: FEB. 6, 1991

TOMLIN, P.J., W.S.

George B. Butler and wife, Leah Butler, (hereafter

"Plaintiffs" or "Butler”) initiated this suite in the Chancery

Court of Coffee County against Buick Motor Company, a

division of General Motors Corporation, ("defendant” or

"Buick”). Plaintiffs sought to regain possession of a 1985

45

Buick Electra Park Avenue automobile they had purchased

from Gaylen Fann Auto Sales, Inc. ("Fann"), a used car and

auto salvage dealer in Manchester, after the vehicle had

been confiscated by a department of the state of Tennessee

and possession surrendered to Buick. Following a bench

trial, the chancellor held that Butler had acquired title to

the automobile and was entitled to its possession.

Buick raised three issues on appeal contending that

the chancellor erred in: (1) holding that plaintiffs acquired

good title to the automobile on the ground that as innocent

purchasers for value they bought the car from one holding

avoidable title; (2) incorrectly applying an equitable maxim

to the facts of this case; and (3) exercising jurisdiction and

thereby hearing the case prior to plaintiffs’ exhausting their

administrative remedies. Our resolution of the first issue

disposes of this litigation. We accordingly pretermit the

second and third issues and reverse and dismiss.

Many of the material facts are undisputed. We

would state parenthetically that inasmuch as we do not

address the issue pertaining to the exhaustion of adminis-

trative remedies, we will touch on those facts tangentially

as we relate the facts material to the primary issue.

The automobile which is the subject of this suit was

what the trade would consider a "prototype test vehicle” or

"pre-production" model. It was one of approximately 250

test vehicles similarly produced and tested by GM. These

vehicles could not be approved for sale to the public because

many of the parts on the cars had not been certified for

inclusion on a production model automobile by the Depart-

ment of Transportation. The automobile was built by General

Motors in August, 1983, and was originally shipped that

same month to its GM Buick Division in Flint, Michigan.

There it was used by management-level GM employees for

transportation on the public highways of Michigan. The

automobile was evaluated and critiqued by the various

employees who drove and used it. It was shipped with a

certificate of origin from the GM factory and was appropri-

ately titled and licensed for use on the public roads. It was

46

li

Heal

a style and series that was ultimately produced and sold to

the public in 1985

After abcut a year and one-half of testing, Buick

determined that the automobile had undergone an adequate

testing process at Flint, and on February 19, 1985, the

automobile in question was transported to GM's proving

ground in Milford, Michigan ("Milford"). Milford consists of

approximately 4,000 acres of GM-owned property, and

includes a variety of test facilities such as a test track, wind

tunnels, salt baths, robotics, and other testing procedures.

Current and future products are regularly tested for safety

and durability. The testing at Milford is done in order to

obtain federal certification of certain vehicles. None of the

vehicles used for testing is sold to the public.

At the time the automobile in question was delivered

to Milford, Buick requested that the plate bearing the

vehicle identification number ("VIN"), located on the

dashboard, be removed. The VIN plate was removed from

the subject automobile and returned to the appropriate

office in Flint. At the same time the certificate of title that

had been issued in the name of Buick engineering in Flint

was surrendered to the Secretary of State. The surrender of

the title certificate to the Michigan Secretary of State and

the removal of the publicly-displayed VIN plate prevented

and inhibited the possibility of unlawful transfer of title to

this vehicle.

Jack L. Clingingsmith ("Clingingsmith") was em-

ployed by GM as a supervisor in charge of driver training

and durability testing at Milford. In that capacity he was

permitted to use vehicles such as the subject automobile as

"yard cars" for transportation on and about the proving

ground itself but not on the public roads of Michigan. When

the cost of maintaining a “yard car" exceeded its usefulness,

it was destroyed in accordance with standing orders.

Standard scrapping orders accompanied the subject car

when it arrived in Milford. It was not part of Clingingsmith's

duties to scrap the car, but it was his responsibility to

witness the scrapping and to document its destruction.

47

From the time the subject vehicle was produced and deliv-

ered to the Buick Division in Flint, it was GM's intention

that it would end up as scrap.

Without GM's knowledge and authority,

Clingingsmith disposed of the subject automobile, along

with others, by selling it as an operating vehicle to Mr. Ingo

Nicolay, an employee of a used-car lot in Michigan.

Clingingsmith covered the transfer of the subject automo-

bile and others to Nicolay by a false paper trail. He supplied

false documents to Buick at Flint indicating that this

automobile had been reduced to scrap. Nicolay transferred

the vehicle to Donald Holloway, who operated an automo-

bile salvage yardin Michigan. Neither Nicolay nor Holloway

was employed by GM. Both of them were aware that

Clingingsmith did not have the authority to sell the subject

auto or the other vehicles, but they went ahead and accepted

the automobiles without properly endorsed certificates of

title or the required VIN plates in violation of state and

federal law.

Gene Taylor was a buyer and salesman for Fann.

Taylor and Fann formed a joint venture in connection with

the buying and selling of these untitled and non-VIN-plated

test vehicles. Taylor acquired the subject automobile and

others from Holloway, with only a bill of sale to document

the transfer. Holloway did not furnish Taylor with a cer-

tificate of title or other documents verifying his ownership,

but neither did he conceal the fact that the VIN plate had

been removed. Taylor testified that he never dealt with

Clingingsmith or anyone else at GM in connection with

purchasing these automobiles. He dealt only with Holloway.

Taylor further testified he understood that the cars were to

be used for parts and that he sold them for parts only. He

stated that he never made any investigation about the title

to the vehicle.

When this and other automobiles arrived in Ten-

nessee, Fann applied to the state of Tennessee for a "permit

to dismantle" each vehicle. The permit issued by the Depart-

ment of Revenue was required in order to disassemble a

48

ads

vehicle so that the component parts could be sold sepa-

rately.

Taylor testified he had purchased "test cars” from

other manufacturers, but he had never before purchased

test cars manufactured by GM. Taylor further testified he

“could have" told GM investigators that he did not "intend

to sell the cars to anyone to be driven around in Tennessee."

At the time Fann sold the subject automobile to the

plaintiffs, he endorsed over to them the certificate to dis-

mantle. Plaintiffs, however, did not intend to disassemble

the vehicle and sell its parts. To the contrary, on the day of

purchase in August, 1985, they applied to the Tennessee

Department of Revenue for a “reconstructed title," sub-

mitting the "permit to dismantle" as proof of ownership. In

October, following plaintiffs’ application for a certificate of

title, the state of Tennessee requested that plaintiffs take

the automobile to the Tennessee Highway Garage in

Tullahoma for inspection. In February of the following year

a certificate of title was issued to plaintiffs by the Depart-

ment of Revenue.

The inspection of the subject auto resulted from an

ongoing investigation that began in the fall of 1985. The

investigation involved automobiles Fann sought to have

titled that were not accompanied by necessary supporting

documents. The issuance of the title to Butler was delayed

somewhat during the investigation. The title was issued,

however, before the Tennessee Department of Revenue

ascertained with certainty that the automobile had been

stolen from GM.

Once the result of the investigation into the status of

this and similar automobiles became known to Taylor,

Fann, and the state of Tennessee, Taylor supplied infor-

mation to GM security officers that led to Clingingsmith.

Upon learning that he had stolen the test vehicles and

disposed of them, GM discharged Clingingsmith. Ultimately,

Clingingsmith, Nicolay, and Holloway were summoned to

appear in the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Michigan. There they pled guilty to and were

49

convicted of conspiracy to traffic in motor vehicles without

identification numbers.

As a result of this investigation, the Tennessee

Department of Safety impounded the subject automobile

and delivered it toa member of the Security Department of

GM, who returned it to Michigan. The Tennessee Depart-

ment of Revenue later revoked the plaintiffs’ "reconstructed

title." Following the impoundment, plaintiffs filed suit

against the state of Tennessee. They alleged that they had

proper title and were entitled to possession of the vehicle.

Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs amended their complaint to

include as defendant Buick Motor Company, a division of

GM, and asked the trial court to determine who was the

proper party entitled to the automobile. The state was later

dismissed from the lawsuit by an order agreed to and

entered by plaintiffs.

I, PLAINTIFFS' TITLE -- VOID OR VOIDABLE?

The trial court rejected the case of Jernigan v. Ham,

691 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn. App. 1984), as authority for ruling in

favor of plaintiffs. The chancellor ruled that plaintitfs were

good-faith purchasers from a seller who had a voidable title,

and they were entitled to claim title as well as possession.

Whether the title was void or voidable, however,

depends upon whether Clingingsmith had the authority to

dispose of the vehicles in the way he did. Necessarily, we

look to the actions of both GM and Clingingsmith to see if

such authority existed. First, the proof shows that GM

caused the VIN plate to be removed from the vehicle. GM

also delivered the vehicle's title certificate to the Michigan

Secretary of State, which prevented the lawful transfer of

the vehicle under the laws of Michigan. It is undisputed that

GM contemplated the destruction of this automobile at the

end ofits useful life and had taken appropriate steps to have

it destroyed. However, Clingingsmith's sale of the vehicle

thwarted its destruction.

50

i

Furthermore, plaintiffs failed to show that

Clingingsmith had the actual or ostensible agency author-

ity to do what he did--sell and dispose of GM property. Both

Butler and Taylor admitted they never dealt with

Clingingsmith or any other- GM employee in connection

with the purchase of this automobile. To the contrary,

Butler dealt exclusively with Gaylen Fann.

To establish their claim of good title as good faith

purchasers for value, plaintiffs rely upon a section of the

U.C.C., codified as T.C.A. § 47-2-403, which reads in perti-

nent part as follows:

47-2-403. Power to transfer -- Good |

faith purchase of goods -- "Entrusting." --

(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which

his transferor had or had power to transfer

except that a purchaser of a limited interest

acquires rights only to the extent of the interest

purchased. A person with voidable title has

power to transfer a good title to a good faith

purchaser for value. When goods have been

delivered under a transaction of purchase the

purchaser has such power even though:

(d) the delivery was procured through

fraud punishable as larcenous under

the criminal law.

Although itis not clear from the chancellor's opinion,

he may have had the above Code section in mind when he

made the following observation in his memorandum opin-

ion:

Now, if it were a situation where Mr. Nicholay

[sic (Nicolay)] had gone over the fence at the

Milford Proving Grounds and cut a hole in it

and driven this vehicle off, we wouldn't be here

right now because that would be clearly a stolen

51

vehicle that passes no title whatsoever. If Mr.

Nicolay had been in league with a night watch-

man ora mechanic and gotten possession of it in

that fashion, there wouldn't be any question

about it because no title could pass. .. . Mr.

Clingingsmith, oa the other hand, has repeti-

tiously and fraudulently delivered the vehicie

to Mr. Nicolay covering his trail by turning in

the VIN number and doing the necessary pa-

perwork that appeared that that vehicle had

been crushed.

In this situation we have a General

Motors agent disposing of the property illegally,

fraudulently -- there's no question about that -

-embezzling.

The principle of law that we find to be applicable is

well stated in 63Am.Jur.2d Property § 44, which reads in

part as follows:

§44. Theft of personal property as affecting

owner's title and rights.

The theft of goods or chattels does not

divest one whoowns, or has title to, such property

from his ownership of the property; the owner

may follow and reclaim the stolen goods wher-

ever he may find them, even if such goods have

been changed or improved.

This rule has long been applied by the courts of this

state. In Insurance Co. of North America v. Cliff Petit

Motors, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 785 (Tenn. App. 1974), it was

declared that the subsequent purchaser of stolen property,

however innocent he may be, does not acquire title to the

property (citing cases). In so holding the court stated:

52

cilia

The aforementioned rules remain the law in

Tennessee, therefore, it necessarily follows that

Judy Faye Woods [the ultimate purchaser] had

neither a legal or equitable interest in the

stolen vehicle; but rather, she had only a bare

possessory interest therein.

Id. at 787.

The proof is uncontradicted that Clingingsmith,

without GM's consent or authority, unlawfully and feloni-

ously misappropriated several GM automobiles, including

the one involved in this litigation. He unlawfully sold the

subject automobile, without a certificate of title or VIN

plate, to Nicolay, who in turn sold it to Holloway, who acted

as a distributor of this and other stolen automobiles. With-

out knowledge of these larcenous acts, Taylor purchased the

automobile, accompanied by a bill of sale, from Holloway.

Ultimately, the automobile appeared on the lots of Gaylen

Fann's Auto Sales and was sold to the plaintiffs under an

endorsed title to dismantle.

We find that Clingingsmith had no authority to

dispose of the automobile at all. Inasmuch as he was

without such authority, his actions constituted theft. All

purchasers of the subject automobile thus took possession

with void title. At all times GM remained the true owner.

Under these circumstances, we hold that plaintiffs acquired

neither a legal nor an equitable interest in the vehicle that

could prevail over the rights of GM. Plaintiffs acquired

nothing more than a possessory interest.

GM, being the true owner of the automobile, is

entitled to its possession. Accordingly, the decree of the

chancellor is reversed. Costs in this cause on appeal are

taxed to plaintiffs, for which execution may issue if neces-

sary.

S-Tomlin

TOMLIN, P.J., W.S.

53

S-Highers

HIGHERS, J. (Concurs)

S-Farmer

FARMER, J. (Concurs)

54

APPEAL BY PERMISSION FROM APPELLATE

COURT TO SUPREME COURT:

JUDGEMEN1 ENTERED ON THIS

RE: TIME DATE: FEB. 27, 1991

Application for permission to appeal shall be filed with the

Clerk of the Supreme Court WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS

after the date of entry of the judgement of the Court of

Appeals or Court of Criminal Appeals [Rule 11 (b) Tennes-

see Rules of Appellate Procedure].

COFFEE CHANCERY

be NO. 01-A-01-9003-CH-000101

BUICK MOTOR COMPANY, a division

of GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,

Defendant/Appellant

ORDER ON PETITION TO REHEAR

Appellant's Petition to Rehear is denied.

ENTER: This 27th day of February, 1991.

S-Tomlin

TOMLIN, P.J., W.S.

S- Highers

HIGHERS, J.

S-Farmer__

FARMER, J.

55

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE B. BUTLER AND WIFE,

LEAH B. BUTLER,

Plaintiffs-Appellants, FILED

JUNE 10, 1991

A.B. NEIL, JR., CLERK

V. Coffee County Chancery Court

Civil Action No. 86-164

Court of Appeals Docket No.

01-A-01-9003-CH-00101

BUICK MOTOR COMPANY, A DIVISION

OF GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the application for permission

to appeal filed by the Appellants, the answer of the Appel-

lee, the briefs of counsel and the entire record, it is the

decision of the Court that the application be and the same

is hereby denied.

PER CURIAM

Counsel, Trial Judge, c/c Trial Clerk

56

RESPECTFULLY SUBMIITED,

baa Fhe K

ROBERT L. HUSKEY “~~

(Counsel of Record)

P.O. Box 777

514 Hillsboro Blvd.

Manchester, TN 37355

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the day of Aperr~, 1991,

I have served three copies of the foregoing pleading upon

opposing counsel, the Honorable Albert F. Moore, Neal &

Harwell, 2000 One Nashville Place, 150 Fourth Avenue

North, Nashville, Tennessee 37219, first class mail, postage

prepaid.

Oe Meir he

ROBERT L.HUSKEY 7

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