op — Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey

Supreme Court brief1991

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(3) FILED

; No. 91-397 NOY 12 198

OFSIGE OF THE CLEKK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1991

Citizens Against Burlington, Inc., William Reuter

Daniel Kasch, Carol Vaughan, and

Richard VanLandingham, ITI,

Petitioners,

Vv.

James B. Busey, IV, Administrator

Federal Aviation Administration

Toledo-Lucas County Port Authority,

and Burlington Air Express, Inc.,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR

A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

JIM J. MARQUEZ JOHN W. SIMPSON

McNAIR LAW FIRM KELLEY, DRYE & WARREN

1155 15th Street, N.W. 2300 M Street, N.W

Suite 400 Washington, DC 20037

Washington, DC 20005 (202) 9§5-9600

(202) 659-3900 BRIAN E. COLE

Counsel for Respondent, 18200 Van Karman Avenue

Toledo-Lucas County Port Irvine, CA 92715

Authority (714) 752-1212

Counsel for Respondent,

Burlington Air Express

Inc.

L/i

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The threshold question presented is whether this

Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction on a

writ of certiorari to review a decision of the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia where that

court, after thorough review of a complete administra-

tive record compiled by the Federal Aviation Adminis-

tration, concluded that the agency fulfilled the require-

ments of the National Environmental Policy Act and the

Airport and Airway Improvement Act, and that the

agency acted reasonably and did not commit a clear

error of judgment. If this Court determines further

review is necessary, the substantive questions which

should be considered by the Court are (a) whether the

D.C. Circuit acted unreasonably when, on review, it

approved of the FAA’s definition of reasonable alterna-

tives, which definition excluded alternatives which

could not achieve the agency’s defined project goals;

and (b) whether the D.C. Circuit properly concluded

that the discussion of mitigation contained in the Final

Environmental Impact Statement (“FEIS”’) complies

with the requirements of AAIA.

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

The petitioners in the court of appeals and in this

Court are Citizens Against Burlington, Inc., an organi-

zation of property owners residing near Toledo Express

Airport, and four members of the group, William Reuter,

Daniel Kasch, Carol Vaughan, and Richard VanLan-

dingham, III.

The respondents in this Court are James B. Busey,

IV, Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administra-

tion, who was the respondent in the court of appeals; the

Toledo-Lucas County Port Authority, a political subdivi-

sion organized and existing pursuant to Chapter 4582 of

the Ohio Revised Code which operates Toledo Express

Airport and which was an intervenor in the court of

appeals; and Burlington Air Express Inc., which was an

intervenor in the court of appeals.

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Ee 1

ES . il

i ED ces ec e sete wneseeeeeseees Vv

ee 1

SES OC eee eee ee Tee eee 2

I EE ee 2

EE UM pci cece cree ccecereevcees 4

poeemoes Sor Rrermyime Wee Writ... .. 2... ccc eceeees 11

I. This Court Should Not Grant Certiorari Be-

cause the D.C. Circuit Properly Reviewed the

FAA’s Definition of Reasonable Alternatives

and Because its Decision is Not in Conflict

with the Seventh Circuit ................... 11

A. The Decision Below Is In Accord with the

Courts Limited Authority on Review ...... 11

B. The D.C. Circuit Decision Is Not in Conflict

with Seventh Circuit Precedent ........... 14

C. The Decision Below Does Not Authorize

Agencies to Abdicate the Responsibility to

EPOUEED PARUGEUUMRIVES 6c ccc ccc recevecess 17

D. An Agency May Consider the Goals of a

SE 19

II. The FEIS Discussion of Mitigation Complies

with Requirements of AATA................ 2a

a as le 30

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS — (Continued)

Page

APPENDIX

A. Letter, dated June 27, 1990 from David L.

Marshall, Chairman, Burlington Air Express to

Peter A. Serini, Manager, Detroit Airports Dis-

trict Office, Federal Aviation Administration ... A-1

B. Affidavit of David L. Marshall................ B-1

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources

Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). . 22-23

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401

fr TE ks cea 1D, Ze, 2 O27

Crosby v. Young, 512 F. Supp. 1363 (E.D.

Ms . } Peer nos nen ar RoraeEt a Cees 21

Kleppe_ v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390

CREE 6a sacs ncaa can denna ees Li, de

Loutsiana Wildlife Federation v. York, 761

ee ge Se a |. re 20

National Small Shipments v. CAB, 618 F.2d

a Car eee EE 65.6 ban cee 8 eae beeen 13

North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589

ay EE teh bea ncacaneacemanwand 18

Robertson v. Methow Valley, 490 U.S. 332

(Ss £55 veaaicca eee anes wie eaKens 26, 27

Roosevelt Campobello International Park Com-

mission v. U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency, 684 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1982) ..... 20

Strvcker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v.

Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) .............. 11

Suburban O’Hare Commission v. Dole, 787

Fee BOD C7URE CAE. Bc ccc ckscssevescvin 13

Van Abbema v. Fornell, 807 F.2d 633 (7th Cir.

a ara ape peerage ge A Fenn hh an 7 Parle giao oe 14-17

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.

NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978)....:.... ia, 37, a2

Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605

eo Se AR Pr ee ee 27-28

Vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — (Continued)

Statutes: Page

PE Rieti PASTA Avec vececcesauccesavesens 2

Ce ee OEE 6 kav Cheese see ndeese neds wes 2

49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(4) and (b)(2)........... 13

49 U.S.C. app. § 2201(a)(7) and (11).... 3 12-13

49 U.S.C. app. § ZZ0B(O)(S) ... ccc ceccee 3-4, 22

Regulations:

eG Ea ak kcsavw deme ece kee wae ibid

CEQ Guidance Regarding NEPA Regulations,

48 Fed. Reg. 34263 (July 28, 1983)...... 19-20

No. 91-397

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1991

Citizens Against Burlington, Inc., William Reuter

Daniel Kasch, Carol Vaughan, and

Richard VanLandinghan,, III,

Petitioners,

Vv.

James B. Busey, IV, Administrator

Federal Aviation Administration

Toledo-Lucas County Port Authority,

and Burlington Air Express, Inc.,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR

A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals is

reported at 938 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1991) and appears in

the Petitioners Appendix A (“Pct. App. A”) at pages

la-46a.

The Record of Decision (“ROD") and Order issued

by the Federal Aviation Administration on July 12, 1990

.

are not reported. They are, however, reproduced at Pet.

App. C, pp. 49a-134a.

JURISDICTION

The Judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered

on June 14, 1991. (Pet. App. B at 47a-48a) Petitioners

have invoked this Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTES INVOLVED

Section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental

Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332, provides:

The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the

fullest extent possible: ... (2) All agencies of the

federal government shall —

(C) include in every recommendation or report on

proposals for legislation and other major Federal

actions significantly affecting the quality of the

human environment, a detailed statement by the

responsible official on —

(i) the environmental impact of the proposed

action,

(ii) any adverse environmental effects which

cannot be avoided should the proposal be

implemented,

(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,

(iv) the relationship between local short term

uses of man’s environment and maintenance

and enhancement of long-term productivity, and

(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commit-

ments of resources which would be involved in

the proposed action should it be implemented.

2

Section 502(a) of the Airport and Airway Improve-

ment Act (AAIA), 49 U.S.C. app. § 2201(a)(7) and (11),

provides:

(a) In general, the Congress hereby finds and de-

clares that— ;

ba * ba

(7) cargo hub airports play a critical role in the

movement of commerce through the airport and

airway system and appropriate provisions should

be made to facilitate the development and en-

hancement of such airports;

~ ~ sd

(11) airport construction and improvement

projects which increase the capacity of facilities

to accommodate passenger and cargo traffic,

thereby increasing safety and efficiency and re-

ducing delays, should be undertaken to the max-

imum feasible extent;....

Section 509(b)(5) of the AAIA, 49 U.S.C. app. §

2208(b)(5), provides:

It is declared to be national policy that airport

development projects authorized pursuant to this

chapter shall provide for the protection and enhance-

ment of the natural resources and the quality of the

environment of the Nation. In implementing this

policy, the Secretary shall consult with the Secretary

of the Interior and the Administrator of the Environ-

mental Protection Agency with regard to any project

included in a project grant application involving

airport location, a major runway extension, or run-

way location which may have a significant impact on

natural resources including, but not limited to, fish

and wildlife, natural, scenic, and recreation assets,

water and air quality, and other factors affecting the

environment, and shall authorize no such project

found to have significant adverse effect unless the

4

Secretary shall render a finding, in writing, following

a full and complete review, which shall be a matter

of public record, that no feasible and prudent alter-

native exists and that all reasonable steps have been

taken to minimize such adverse effect.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondents’ Statement of the Case will focus pri-

marily on correcting certain inaccuracies, omissions or

misstatements in the Statement of the Case as presented

by petitioners.

In April, 1988, the Toledo-Lucas County Port Au-

thority (“Port Authority”), which operates Toledo Ex-

press Airport, began to develop a Master Plan Update

Study which included the development of a new airport

layout plan (“ALP”) (Pet. App. C [the ROD] at 49a-50a).

At the same time, the airport commenced a Noise

Compatibility Planning Study pursuant to 14 C.F.R. Part

150 (the “Part 150 Study”) the purpose of which was to

identify a program of noise reduction measures and land

use controls. (Pet. App. C [ROD] at 49a-51a). The Part

150 Study was completed and submitted to the FAA in

August 1991, two months after the D.C. Circuit decided

the case below.

Subsequent to the initiation of the master plan

update, the Port Authority was approached by Burling-

ton Air Express (“Burlington”) which was seeking to

establish a permanent air cargo hub. (Pet. App. C [ROD]

at SOa) Since 1985, Burlington had been operating from

temporary facilities at Baer Field in Fort Wayne, Indi-

ana. (/d.) After examining 17 sites in four midwestern

states, Burlington chose Toledo Express Airport to es-

tablish its permanent hub. (/d.) Toledo Express was

chosen for a number of reasons, including its proximity

to major geographic and industrial markets (mainly

Detroit and Chicago), its excellent access to major

highways, the quality of its work force and base of skilled

labor, the condition of the airport’s existing facilities,

5

maintenance record and operating efficiency, and the

Port Authority’s commitment to work with Burlington to

secure funding and competitive financing for the new

permanent hub. (FEIS 2-1 through 2-2)

For its part, the Port Authority served as sponsor of

the project by asking the FAA to approve its revised ALP

which depicted the facilities necessary to construct the

hub. The Port Authority made this request in its role as

the lead agency for economic development in the Toledo

metropolitan area, and to ensure that the economic

benefits which accompany the project will benefit the

Toledo area. The Toledo metropolitan area particularly

needs those benefits.!

On February 2, 1989, the Port Authority submitted

to the FAA its ALP revisions for approval. The FAA

immediately commenced the necessary studies to deter-

mine the acceptability of the ALP revisions from an

airspace utilization standpoint, and commenced the

preparation of an environmental impact statement.

Throughout that process, the FAA painstakingly ana-

lvzed all environmental aspects of the project, and

responded to voluminous comments from interested

individuals, organizations, and governmental agencies.

1. Since 1980, over 50 major companics have ceased opcra-

tions in Toledo and/or closed thcir facilitics resulting in a loss of over

7.000 jobs. Toledo is ranked in the bottom third of the nation’s 75

largest citics in job creation and retention, and currently ranks last

among the major Ohio urban arcas in cconomic devclopment. Up to

1.150 new tull and part time jobs will be created for Toledo

residents by the project. An annual cconomic impact of over

$42.000,000.00, growing to over $67,000,000.00 will be injected

into the depressed Toledo cconomy. (Pct. App. C [ROD] at 74a)

The majority of funding for the project will come directly from

uscr fees and/or lease agreements, and the sale of land not necded

for airport purposes after it has been made compatible, or rcim-

bursed ata later date from such sources, after borrowing moncy for

tront cnd costs. In fact, of the 64.5 million dollars designated for

costs other than for mitigation, over 46 million dollars will be

derived trom bond issucs to private investors, and only a very small

percentage will be derived from local and state participation for

economic devclopment.

6

In response to comments on the draft environmental

impact statement by the EPA, the FAA conducted

supp!emental studies in the area of noise analysis and

wetlands delineation, and obtained assurances that mit-

igation measures would be carried out expeditiously.

(FEIS E-39)

The Final Environmental Impact Statement

(“FEIS”) was issued May 11, 1990, and the FAA issued

its Record of Decision (“ROD”) on July 12, 1990.

Chapter two of the FEIS contains an extensive discus-

sion of alternatives to the proposal. The FEIS gave

detailed consideration both to the proposed action of

expanding Toledo Express and to the “no action” alter-

native. (FEIS 2-2 through 2-6, and Chapter 4) In

addition, the FAA considered alternative designs and

runway configurations at the airport, and alternative

distributions of projected air traffic. (FEIS 2-7 through

2-13) The FAA also considered alternative airports, both

in and outside of the Toledo area. (FEIS 2-14 through

2-16)

Petitioners claim that the FAA “[r]efus[ed] to [a]na-

lvze the Fort Wayne [a]lternative” (Pet. 6), but a review

of the record shows that is simply not true. To the

contrary, the FAA analyzed the Fort Wayne alternative,

but found it to be unreasonable. Specifically, the FAA

made the following findings:

Since 1985, Burlington has operated an interim hub

at Baer Field in Fort Wayne, Indiana. ... However,

the air cargo facility at Fort Wayne is antiquated and

was not designed specifically as an air cargo hub. ...

Fort Wayne is 163 miles from Detroit, involving 3

hours of ground travel distance to Burlington’s au-

tomotive markets. The major highway does not

connect with the airport. There is a limited available

labor pool, and Burlington has experienced difficulty

attracting skilled workers and part time employees.

At Baer Field, a new building, ramp, and other

airport improvements are needed. Fort Wayne was

7

unable to put together a competitive funding pack-

age and development plan for a permanent hub.

Given these negative factors at Fort Wayne and the

advantages of the Toledo Express Airport... Fort

Wayne is not a reasonable alternative to Toledo for

Burlington. Burlington officials have indicated their

intention to renew their search for another location

should the Toledo Express Airport prove to be un-

available to them. For these reasons, an expanded air

cargo facility at Fort Wayne was not evaluated

further as an alternative in this document. (em-

phasis added)

(FEIS 2-14; see also Pet. App. C [ROD] at 56a-64a).

These findings were supported by substantial evidence

in the record. (FEIS B-94 through B-96, E-21 through

E-33, E-62 through E-64)

Petitioners mischaracterize the record when they

assert that Burlington selected Toledo “primarily be-

cause Toledo offered it millions of dollars in local, state

and federal funds to locate its hub there”, without

mentioning other important considerations. (Pet. 6) Of

course, the package of state, local and private funding

designed by Toledo was a factor in Burlington's choice of

Toledo, but the FEIS and ROD also made specific

findings based on record evidence as to Toledo's prox-

imity to major industrial markets, particularly the auto-

motive industry which accounts for a substantial part of

Burlingtons business, the inadequacy of the Fort

Wayne facilitics, Toledo's superior work force including

part time college students, the major north-south and

cast-west highways that cross in Toledo, the forcign

trade zone in Toledo and strong community support.

(Pet. App. C at 62a) Based on all of this evidence in the

record — not just financing — the FAA madc the

findings cited above.

It is equally incorrect for petitioners to claim that

Fort Wayne was Burlington's “backup alternative if its

plans for Toledo fell through”. (Pet. 8) A dispassionate

8

review of the record and Burlington’s own evaluation of

Fort Wayne indicates that Fort Wayne was simply not a

practical or reasonable alternative for a number of rea-

sons. Establishing a permanent facility for Burlington at

Fort Wayne would require the construction of essen-

tially the same new facilities as those required for Phase

I of the construction at Toledo, i.e., a new sortation

facility, an aircraft parking ramp, a fuel farm and related

infrastructure and other airport improvements. (FEIS

2-15, B-93) It is the responsibility of the airport, not the

carrier, to pay for some of these improvements, and the

FAA cannot direct any airport to make necessary im-

provements in its infrastructure to accommodate an

airline. There has never been a financial program in

place, or even proposed, that would provide a basis for

establishing these improvements which are necessary

for a permanent hub in Fort Wayne. (FEIS B-93)

Petitioners claim that the Director of the Fort Wayne

Airport represented in a letter dated April 25, 1990 that

locating a facility there was feasible, and even claim that

in an extra-record letter the Chairman of Burlington

admitted Fort Wayne was its “backup alternative”. (Pet.

7-8)- In fact, meetings on financing between Burlington

and Fort Wayne officials never proceeded beyond a very

general stage. At no time during the course of many

discussions did any representative of the Chamber of

Commerce, the Airport Authority or its investment bank-

ing company ever offer any specific package for the

financing of a permanent hub facility at Fort Wayne.

(FEIS B-93, E-28)

2. Those letters are not a part of the FAA record in this casc

and therefore were not properly before the court below or this Court.

Since the issuc as to these Ictters was not raised before the FAA,

Section 1006(c) of the Federal Aviation Act (49 U.S.C. § 1486(c))

prohibits consideration of them. Nevertheless, if those Ictters are

rclicd upon, Burlington's response to them in Burlington's Answer

to Petitioners’ Request for a Stay and Burlington's Surreply should

also be considercd.

9

In short, the evidence before the FAA indicated that

while it was possible for Burlington to remain in Fort

Wayne temporarily — which might be accomplished

with the continuing goodwill and support of both the Air

National Guard and Fort Wayne, albeit at a great cost —

it was not feasible to establish a permanent hub at Fort

Wayne for the reasons set forth in the FEIS (FEIS 2-15),

and in Mr. Marshall’s June 27, 1990 letter. (Respon-

dent's Appendix (Resp. App.”) A; see also Resp. App. B)

The May 2, 1990 letter from Burlington’s Chairman

(Pet. App. E), at most, only recognizes that Burlington

might need Fort Wayne’s help to remain there on a

temporary basis a while longer. The vague and indefinite

statements contained in the letter can hardly be inter-

preted as an admission that “Fort Wayne was Burling-

tons backup alternative”. (Pet. 8)

In addition to the discussion of alternatives, the

FEIS also contained a full and fair discussion of the

noise impacts, including impacts on sleep, that the

project would produce. (FEIS Chapter 4) That docu-

ment and the ROD also presented a detailed plan for

mitigating the noise impacts of the proposal by eliminat-

ing “almost all existing noncompatible land uses within

the 65 L,y,, noise contour.” (Pet. App. C [ROD] at 69a)

The ROD stated that a total of approximately 100

residences and two nursing homes within the 75 L,,,

contour will be acquired and residents will be relocated.

(Pet. App. C [ROD] at 68a) Further, the ROD states that

the Port Authority will assemble a relocation team to

accomplish the process with as little disruption as pos-

sible to the residents. The Port Authority has committed

to implement a sound attenuation or casement acquisi-

tion program for houses within the 65-75 Ly,,, corridor.

(Pet. App. C [ROD] at 69a) The Port Authority has

committed to take appropriate actions within its powers

to implement the mitigation program with or without

federal funds. (FEIS E-39)

The mitigation program described in the FEIS and

ROD is now well underway. The Part 150 Study, which

10

is intended to help flesh out the details of the mitigation

plan, was completed and submitted to the FAA in

August of 1991, before the completion of the hub and

the commencement of flight operations, which occurred

in September 1991. The Port Authority has been in-

formed by the FAA of an allocation of $7.4 million of

Airport Improvement Program discretionary grant funds

to be used for property acquisitions. This amount is an

increase of approximately $2.6 million in FAA grant

funds since the case was argued before the court below.

Even before flight operations commenced, the Port

Authority, through its relocation consultant, had made

many offers to purchase properties, and had received

numerous written acceptances. The process of obtaining

property appraisals and making offers is on-going at the

time this brief is being written.

1]

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I. This Court Should Not Grant Certiorari Because

the D.C. Circuit Properly Reviewed the FAA’s

Definition of Reasonable Alternatives and Be-

cause its Decision is Not in Conflict with the

Seventh Circuit

A. The Decision Below Is In Accord with the

Court's Limited Authority on Review

The D.C. Circuit’s review of the Record of Decision

(“ROD”) issued by the FAA on the question of “alterma-

tives” was fully consistent with the requirements for

review established by this Court. This Court has held

that “once an agency has made a decision subject to

NEPA’s procedural requirements, the only role for a

court is to insure that the agency has considered the

environmental consequences; it cannot “ ‘interject itself

within the area of discretion of the executive as to the

choice of the action to be taken’””. Strycker’s Bay

Netgehborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223,

227-28 (1980), citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S.

390 and 410 n.21 (1976)). In Kleppe, this Court empha-

sized that neither NEPA nor its legislative history con-

template that a court may substitute its judgment for

that of the agency as to the cnvironmental consequences

of its action. (Aleppe, supra, at 410 n.21)

Review of an agency's discussion of alternatives in

an FEIS is made pursuant to a “rule of reason”, by

Which a court determines whether the FEIS contains

sufficient discussion of the relevant issues and opposing

viewpoints to permit the decision maker to take a “hard

look” at the environmental factors, and to make a

reasonable decision. (See id)

Obviously, a discussion of alternatives cannot be

limitless. CEQ regulations obligate agencies to discuss

only “reasonable” alternatives. In much the same way,

AAIA only requires a finding that no “feasible and

prudent’ alternative cxists to the proposed project. This

Court recognized that it is senseless to require more of

12

an agency when it observed in Vermont Yankee Nuclear

Power Corp v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978) that

“the concept of alternatives must be bounded by some

notion of feasibility.” Thus, the D.C. Circuit correctly

recognized in this case that the FAA was required only

to discuss feasible, prudent, and reasonable alternatives.

(Pet. App. A [the D.C. Circuit Opinion (D.C. Op.”)] at

9a-13a) The court below concluded that the FAA’s FEIS

met those requirements — a conclusion fully borne out

by an examination of the FEIS and ROD.

The record shows, as the D.C. Circuit noted, that

five alternatives to the proposal were identified in the

FEIS. Three alternatives, which were identified and

discussed, were rejected for more detailed analysis as

unreasonable alternatives, including the alternative of

locating the hub outside of Toledo. Specifically, the FAA

found that “Ft. Wayne is not a reasonable alternative to

Toledo for Burlington.” (FEIS 2-1, 2-2, 2-15)° After

examination of the ROD and FEIS, the D.C. Circuit

concluded that the FAA’s reasoning as set forth in the

FEIS “fully supports this decision to evaluate only the

preferred and do nothing alternatives.” (Pet. App. A

[D.C. Op.] at 15a)

The D.C. Circuit explained that the FAA reviewed a

variety of factors before making this decision. In partic-

ular, the FAA examined Congress’ expressed views on

how the nation is to build civilian airports. Congress has

declared that cargo hub airports play a critical role in the

movement of commerce throughout the airport and

airway system and appropriate provisions should be

3. The FAA's decision to climinate the alternative of Burling-

ton remaining in Fort Wayne was supported by substantial evidence

in the FEIS, and was reinforced and amplified in the ROD. (sce

FEIS 2-14: Pet App. C [ROD] at 56a-64a; and p.7, supra) These

findings of fact arc supported by substantial evidence in the record

(FEIS B-94 through B-96, E-21 through E-33, E-62 through E-64),

and thus are conclusive as provided in Section 1006(c) of the

Federal Aviation Act. (49 U.S.C. § 1486(c))

13

made to facilitate the development and enhancement of

such airports. (AAIA § 502(a)(7); 49 U.S.C. app. §

2201(a)(7)) Further, airport construction and improve-

ment projects which increase the capacity of facilities to

accommodate passenger and cargo traffic “should be

undertaken to the maximum feasible extent”. (AAIA §

502(a)(11); 49 U.S.C. app. § 2201(a)(11))

The D.C. Circuit further explained “[c]ongress has

also said that the free market, not an ersatz Gosplan for

aviation, should determine the siting of the nation’s

airports’. (Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at 15a) Prior to the

deregulation of air cargo transportation, the Federal

Aviation Act regulated every aspect of air transportation,

including the routes a cargo carrier could operate and

the cities it could serve. (See National Small Shipments

v. CAB, 618 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Under deregu-

lation, Congress decreed that such matters should be

decided by private management pursuant to “compet-

itive market forces.” (/d. at 823; see also Section

102(a)(4) and (b)(2) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49

U.S.C. § 1302(a)(4) and (b)(2)). Therefore, as the Court

stated in Suburban O'Hare Commission v. Dole, 787

F.2d 186, 196 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 847

(1986), “[t]he decision to make O'Hare, or any other

airport a ‘hub’ belongs to the airlines, and not to the

government.” These Congressional policies clearly limit

the extent to which the federal government can exert

authority over hub placement decisions and, thus, were

important considerations for the FAA when determining

the scope of alternatives which were feasible, prudent

and reasonable.

In addition, the FAA took into consideration the Port

Authority's reasons for proposing that the cargo hub be

built in Toledo. The information in the FEIS established

that the Port Authority pushed for development of the

hub at Toledo Express in order to reinvigorate the

Toledo economy. The project was expected to create

hundreds of jobs, pump millions of dollars into the local

economy, and attract spin-off business to the area.

14

Based upon these considerations and other informa-

tion in the FEIS, the FAA defined the goal for its action

as the establishment of a new cargo hub for Burlington

Air Express in Toledo. (Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at 17a)

The agency eliminated from detailed discussion those

alternatives which would not accomplish this goal, in-

cluding alternatives of locating the hub airport else-

where. (/d.) The D.C. Circuit found that the FAA’s

decision making process was valid and that the agency

acted reasonably in defining the purpose of its action, in

eliminating alternatives that would not achieve that

purpose, and discussing the alternative that would

achieve that purpose. (Pet. App. C [D.C. Op.] at 18a)

Given the policy directives of Congress, the limited

scope of review authority vested in the Court of Appeals,

and the analysis engaged in by the agency, that decision

was Clearly correct and need not be reviewed here.

B. The D.C. Circuit Decision Is Not in Conflict with

Seventh Circuit Precedent

In requesting that this Court review the decision of

the D.C. Circuit, petitioners primarily rely upon the

Seventh Circuit's decision in Van Abbema v. Fornell, 807

F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1986). Van Abbema involved the

review, by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, of the

environmental impact of the construction and operation

of a facility designed to “transload” coal from trucks to

barges along the Mississippi River. During the course of

this review by the Corps, several parties raised specific

objections concerning the false, misleading and inaccu-

rate data provided by the project sponsor concerning the

economic viability of alternatives to the proposed project.

Van Abbema, 807 F.2d at 640. The Corps, without any

regard for these objections or any investigation into the

accuracy of the disputed data, accepted the factual

assertions made by the project sponsor as true and, after

reversing the decision of the local district engineer that

the project was not in the public interest, granted a

15

permit for the construction and operation of the trans-

loading facility.

The Van Abbema court found fault in the Corps’

evaluation of alternatives to the proposal, stating that:

the Corps, in considering alternative sites, relies

upon a record replete with important and factual

inconsistencies and ambiguities that the Corps did

not attempt to resolve.

(Jd. at 642) When specifically addressing the issue of

whether the Corps adequately evaluated the alternative

of utilizing the temporary facility at Quincy, the court

further statea:

[a] review of the record reveals that the Corps never

adequately evaluated Quincy, the “no build” alterna-

tive. The only comments directed to Quincy were

based on false data or unexplained assumptions.

(Jd. at 640) In further expounding upon the issue of

false data, the Van Abbema court noted that “no one now

contends that these mileage figures are right.” (/d. at

641) The D.C. Circuit did not find any such errors of fact

in this case.

It was the Corps’ blind reliance upon factually

deficient data which was the focus in the Seventh

Circuit's decision to reverse the district court’s endorse-

ment of the Corps’ analysis of alternatives in Van

Abbema. The Corps’ duty to conduct an independent

investigation into the adequacy of an evaluation of

alternatives, which petitioners contend extends from

Van Abbema to all cases in which an agency utilizes

information provided by a project sponsor or other

outside party (Pet. 20), was imposed in Van Abbema

because the Corps relicd upon false facts in the record

after the validity of those facts had been specifically

challenged.

Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit, in Varr Abbema,

clearly delineated the court’s role in reviewing an

agency s evaluation of alternatives when it stated:

16

Here the Corps did undertake a serious review of

alternatives to the proposal. . . [and] [s]uperficially at

least there appears to be record evidence to support

the Corps’ decision that no preferable alternatives

exist. ... Generally, that would end the matter, and

we would agree with the district court that the

Corps decision was not arbitrary or capricious and

would uphold the issuance of the permit. However,

the attorney general, in particular, contends that the

Corps based its conclusions on evidence so inade-

quate and misleading that we must undertake a

closer scrutiny. The plaintiffs and the intervenor

have a point to the extent that the Corps’ conclusions

must find some reasonable support in the record.

(emphasis added)

(Van Abbema at 639 (citations omitted)) Therefore,

according to the Van Abbema court, in instances where

the data underlying an agency's decision is not false, the

agency's “scrious review of alternatives” should be given

deference, and an “arbitrary and capricious” standard,

under which the agency's determination must merely

“find some reasonable support in the record”, should be

the rule of law. (/d.)

The D.C. Circuit, in holding that the FAA’s

“judgment [in evaluating alternatives] was not unin-

formed” (Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at 20a, citing Robertson

v. Methow Vallev, 490 U.S. 332 (1989)), made no

finding that the FAA relicd on false, misleading or

inaccurate data. Therefore, the decision by the D.C.

Circuit not to second-guess the reasoned evaluation of

alternatives by the FAA does not conflict with the

Seventh Circuit's holding in Van Abbema.,

ban Abbema and the present case turn primarily on

the facts unique to cach situation. For this reason, each

courts analysis is equally unique. The D.C. Circuit's

determination that the language of Van Abbema was too

broad (Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at 19a) is correct. The

Seventh Circuit's assertion that an agency must evalu-

ate alternatives to achieve the “general goal” of a project

17

is so broad that it would require examination of imprac-

tical, unfeasible and irrelevant alternatives. Such a re-

sult would undermine this Court’s holding in Vermont

Yankee, supra, and thus was rightfully criticized by the

D.C. Circuit. In any event, it is not necessary for this

Court to examine the broad language of Van Abbema

because the undisputed factual errors in that case

clearly required the Seventh Circuit to reverse the

decision of the district court so that the Corps could

reexamine the alternatives based on the correct facts.

When the two cases are properly read, based on their

unique facts, there is no conflict of legal principle which

requires resolution by this Court.

In short, petitioners are asking the Court to grant

certiorari in this case so that this Court may resolve a

nonexistent conflict among the circuits. The practical

implication of petitioners’ request is that they are asking

this Court to review the opinion of the D.C. Circuit so

that the Court can impose a broad, burdensome duty

upon federal agencies that no court in this country,

including the Seventh Circuit, has said it would be

willing to impose.

C. The Decision Below Does Not Authorize Agen-

cies to Abdicate the Responsibility to Define

Alternatives

Petitioners also claim that the D.C. Circuit holding

authorizes agencies to abdicate the role of defining

reasonable alternatives to private project sponsors. (Pct.

19) A careful reading of the Opinion below and the ROD

reveal, however, that the D.C. Circuit did no such thing.

To the contrary, the FAA, and not the Port Authority, or

even Burlington, made the final decision as to the scope

of reasonable alternatives that required discussion in the

FEIS, and it was that decision making process which

the Court below approved.

The D.C. Circuit repeatedly emphasized throughout

its Opinion that the responsibility for deciding what

alternatives to consider in an FEIS belongs to the

|

18

agency. (“An agency bears the responsibility for decid-

ing which alternatives to consider in an FEIS.” (Pet.

App. A [D.C. Op.] at 1la, citing North Slope Borough v.

Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). In fact, the

D.C. Court stressed “... it [an agency] must evaluate

alternative ways of achieving its goals, shaped by the

application at issue and by the function that the agency

plays in the decision process.” (Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at

19a (emphasis in the original)) Given this kind of

language, it is clear that the D.C. Circuit decision does

not create precedent permitting applicants to define the

goals and scope of alternatives to be included in an

impact statement. Rather, the D.C. Circuit specifically

recognized that this responsibility remains vested in the

agency. Therefore, petitioners’ stated reason for review

in this Court — that the decision allows nonfederal

applicants to define and control the alternatives ana-

lyzed in an impact statement — is without foundation.

In this case, the Port Authority’s status as the

applicant seeking approval of a specific project, and the

Congressional limitations placed on federal government

involvement in private decisions regarding the develop-

ment of hub airports, defined the limits of the reasonable

alternatives which the FAA believed should be consid-

ered. The FAA in its expertise made this discretionary

decision itself after consideration of the nature of the

project involved. It did not, as petitioners’ contend,

abdicate the responsibility for developing of alternatives

to either the project sponsor, or the project beneficiary.

When the D.C. Circuit refused to second-guess the

agency s decision regarding the scope of alternatives

requiring full examination, it did not sanction the aban-

donment of the responsibility for defining alternatives to

the project sponsor. Instead, as the Opinion makes clear,

it merely refused to criticize an agency decision-making

process which included consideration of the nature of

the project, the identity of the applicant, and the extent

of permitted federal involvement in the proposed project.

19

D. An Agency May Take Into Account the Goals of

a Project Sponsor

In essence, petitioners object to the FAA’s decision

to take into account the needs and goals of the sponsor.

(But see Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at 12a, 16a (holding that

FAA may take such considerations into account)). The

FAA’s decision to take into account the needs of the Port

Authority when defining the scope of alternatives and

goals for the project is clearly not in violation of any

regulatory or statutory mandate. It actually represents

the proper understanding of the limited role agencies

play in such projects. Petitioners’ argument is nothing

more than an attempt to have the D.C. Circuit and now

this Court, substitute their judgment on the weight

given this factor for that of the agency, a standard

repeatedly rejected by this Court. (E.g., Citizens to

Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416

(1971))

Petitioners assert that the Council on Environmen-

tal Quality (“CEQ”) has stated, in defining which alter-

natives are feasible, “[n]Jeither NEPA nor CEQ regula-

tion make a distinction between actions initiated by a

federal agency and by applicants.” (Pet. 16, citing CEQ

Guidance Regarding NEPA Regulations [48 Fed. Reg.

34263. 34266 (July 28, 1983)]). In fact, the CEQ actu-

ally pointed out, in that same document, that an agency

should consider an applicant's purposes and needs when

defining the goals of a project. The CEQ said:

NEPA has never been interpreted to require exami-

nation of purely conjectural possibilities whose im-

plementation is deemed remote and speculative.

Rather, the agency's duty is to consider “alternatives

as they exist and are likely to exist”

* - *

There is, however, no need to disregard the appli-

cants purposes and needs and the common sense

realities of a given situation in the development of

alternatives. (emphasis added)

20

The CEQ made these comments in response to a

decision by the First Circuit in Roosevelt Campobello

International Park Commission v. U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency, 684 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1982), which

recognized that an agency’s choice of alternatives may

be focused by the primary objectives of the permit

applicant. In that case, the court stated:

EPA's evaluation of alternatives was explicitly based

on the premise that its role in reviewing privately

sponsored projects “is to determine whether the

proposed site is environmentally acceptable”, and

not, as in the case of a publicly funded project, “to

undertake to locate what EPA would consider to be

the optimum site for a new facility”...

We are unable to fault EPA’s reasoning. .. No pur-

pose would be served by requiring EPA to study

exhaustively all environmental impacts at each al-

ternative site considered once it has reasonably

concluded that none of the alternatives will be

substantially preferable to the proposed site. More-

over, the guideline adopted by EPA to limit its study

of alternatives appears, in this case, to be consistent

with the “rule of reason” by which a court measures

federal agency compliance with NEPA’s procedural

requirements.

(Roosevelt Campobello at 1046-7) The CEQ refused to

criticize the Roosevelt Campobello holding in its subse-

quent discussion of the selection of alternatives in

licensing and permitting situations. (48 Fed. Reg.

34263. 34266 (July 28, 1983); see also Louisiana Wild-

life Federation v. York, 761 F.2d 1044, 1048 (Sth Cir.

1985))* Thus, while NEPA or CEQ regulations may not

muke a formal distinction between actions initiated by a

4. As the Louisiana Wildlife and Roosevelt Campobello dcci-

sions demonstrate, the D.C. Circuit was hardly the first court to

recognize that the goals of private project sponsors must be

considered. or to use Petitioners’ charactcrization, to “create a

distinction between pure and hybrid federal actions.” (Pct. 16)

21

federal agency and by private applicants, as a practical

matter, the CEQ has acknowledged that the applicant’s

purposes and needs and the common sense realities of a

given situation inevitably play a role in the definition of

reasonable alternatives and project goals. Therefore, it

was not improper for the FAA to consider the applicant's

purposes here.

Petitioners contend that the D.C. Circuit Opinion

creates a “subclass” of EISs for “hybrid federal actions”.

(Pet. 16) Petitioners claim that under the D.C. Circuit’s

decision, once the applicant states its preferred alterna-

tive, the feasibility of other possible alternatives become

irrelevant. (/el. at 17) Nowhere in its decision does the

D.C. Circuit go this far. At most, the D.C. Circuit merely

acknowledged that the definition of goals must be

shaped by the nature of the application at issue and the

function the agency plays in the decision-aking process

the very considerations the CEQ has instructed should

not be disregarded in developing alternatives.

To prohibit agencies from considering the goals and

desires of a private project sponsor when defining the

scope of alternatives to be studied would be to ignore

realitv and force an agency to consider alternatives that

are simply not feasible. That kind of futile exercise is

unnecessary under NEPA, as this Court and others have

repeatedly acknowledged. (E.g., Vermont Yankee, su-

pra, at 435 U.S. at 551; Crosby v. Young, 512 F. Supp.

1363, 1373 (E.D. Mich. 1981))*

S. Expounding on this point, this Court observed: “Common

sense also atcuches us that the ‘detailed statement of alternatives’

cannot be found wanting simply because the agency failed to

include every alternative device and thought conccivable by the

mind of man. Time and resources are simply too limited to hold that

an impact statement fails because the agency failed to ferret out

every possible alternative... .°) (Vermont Yankee, supra, at 551)

Similarly another Court has stated: “T cannot perccive of a morc

useless requirement than one that would require an agency to

consider alternatives in detail that are not workable... 2” Crosby v.

Your, supra, at L373)

22

Even if the D.C. Circuit opinion could be read to

create a subclass of EISs composed of projects which are

privately sponsored, as petitioners contend, that result

would be of no consequence unless it resulted in a

violation of the agency’s duty to take a “hard look” at the

environmental consequences of its action. (Kleppe, su-

pra, 427 U.S. at 410 n. 21) In light of the record created

by the FAA and reviewed by the Court below, there can

be no doubt that a “hard look” occurred here.

II. The FEIS Discussion of Mitigation Complies

with the Requirements. of AAIA

Section 509 of the Airport and Airway Improvement

Act of 1982 (AAIA) provides that the FAA shall not

authorize a project which involves a major runway

extension or runway location and which has a signifi-

cant adverse environmental effect unless it first finds

that all reasonable steps have been taken to minimize

adverse effects. (49 U.S.C. app. § 2208(b)(5)). Petition-

ers contend that the FEIS’ program of mitigation, as

approved by the D.C. Circuit, did not meet that statutory

requirement of the AAIA. (Pet. 22) Petitioners also ask

that this Court substitute its judgment for that used by

the FAA and require mitigation to be actually completed

and/or fully funded prior to commencement of flight

operations. (/d.) Such a substitution of judgment would

be crroncous.

In reviewing the FEIS and ROD, a reviewing court

considers “whether the decision was based on a consid-

cration of the relevant factors and whether there has

been a clear error of judgment”. (Citizens to Preserve

Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (cita-

tions omitted)). The D.C. Circuit's duty in this case was

to determine whether the FAA committed a “clear error

of judgment” when it determined that all “reasonable

steps’ had been taken. “Reasonable steps” is not defined

in the AAIA. Therefore, as this Court stated in Chevron

U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467

U.S. 837, 842-844 (1984):

23

[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to

the specific issue, the question for the court is

whether the agency’s answer is based on a permis-

~sible construction of the statute ... [A] court may

not substitute its own construction of a statutory

provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the

administrator of an agency.® (emphasis added)

The D.C. Circuit found that the FAA’s FEIS and

ROD contained a full and complete discussion of the

mitigation efforts that will be undertaken over a three-

year period to bring the project within the government's

established land use compatibility guidelines and that

the FAA had obtained unequivocal assurances from the

Port Authority that the efforts will be carried out. Briefly

summarized, the FEIS describes the following mitiga-

tion commitments:

3.

No

2

6.

Acquisition of dwellings subjected to noise ex-

ceeding 75 Ly, and a portion of the dwellings

within the 70-75 Lg, range and relocation of

residents at an estimated cost of $10 million;

Acquisition and relocation of two nursing homes

impacted by noise exceeding 75 L,,, at an esti-

mated cost of $6.2 million;

The priority basis on which acquisition will

occur;

Inclusion of a detailed relocation plan as a

companion document to the FEIS;

A description of a sound attenuation program

and noise and avigation casement purchase

program recommended for dwellings in the 65-

75 Ly, area, including the number of homes

affected, the nature of attenuation efforts, and

the mobile home and nursing homes excluded;

A description of typical sound attenuation im-

provements;

6.

See Overton Park, supra, 401 U.S. at 416 (The court is not

empowered to substitute its pudgment for that of the agency.”)

hasnt

24

7. A discussion of the suitability of sound attenu-

ation to the Toledo site;

8. A description of the alternative of noise and

avigation easement acquisitions and the advan-

tages of this alternative; and

9. Cost estimates for sound attenuation.

Reviewing the FEIS, the D.C. Circuit found that it

contained a detailed and specific program of mitigation.

(Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at 34a) The Court specifically

found: ;

[Mitigation] measures include buying out the own-

ers of every private house and nursing home within

range of more than Ly, 75 decibels, insulating doors

and windows in homes subjected to noise between

L,,, 70 and 75 decibels, and buying easements from

the owners of homes within the reach of Ly,, 65 to 70

decibels.

Likewise, the D.C. Circuit found that the FEIS and

its supporting documents clearly reflected the Port

Authority's commitment to undertake mitigation. (Pet.

App. A [D.C. Op.] at 36a) The FEIS contains correspon-

dence from the Port Authority’s Director of Ports which

assured the FAA that:

The Toledo-Lucas County Port Authority is very

seasitive to the need of establishing appropriate

mitigation measures to accompany the development

of an air cargo hub at Toledo Express Airport. The

Port Authority wants to be as flexible as possible, in

order to work with all local, state and federal inter-

ests... The Port Authority will take appropriate

action within its powers to implement, with or with-

out federal funds, the Mitigation measures identified

in the final environmental impact statement for the

establishment of an air cargo hub at Toledo Express.

We are also prepared to provide for all local share

funding portions of federal or state grants to be used

to accomplish the mitigation.

25

The Port Authority intends to comply with all appli-

cable regulations regarding mitigation and will en-

deavor to. accomplish the mitigation as expeditiously

as possible.

(FEIS E-39) The FAA, thus, obtained a strong and

unequivocal commitment from the Port Authority to

complete mitigation. Moreover, as the D.C. Circuit

found, the FAA will ensure that mitigation is carried out

by imposing special conditions to that effect in its grant

agreements. (Pet App. A[D.C. Op.] at 35a; FEIS at 4-31)

Based on these findings, the D.C. Circuit properly held

that the FAA reasonably concluded that a detailed

mitigation plan, coupled with grounds to believe that the

plan will be implemented, is enough of a ‘reasonable

step.” (Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at 36a) The D.C. Circuit

also concluded that the FAA did not commit a “clear

error of judgment” and the “FAA has therefore met its

obligations under the statute.” (Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at

36a-37a)

The Petition does not allege that the mitigation

program is inadequate or ineffective.” Petitioners assert

that the FAA violated the AAIA because it did not require

all mitigation, including the Part 150 Study, to be

completed prior to commencement of flight operations.

(Pet. 22) Petitioners also contend that the FAA violated

the AAIA because it did not require the Port Authority to

have assembled all funds necessary to implement the

recommended mitigation measures and/or have a fixed

timetable for completion of mitigation prior to com-

mencement of flight operations. (/d.)

As stated by the D.C. Circuit, petitioners “read [sic]

too much into... section 509(b)(5).” (Pet. App. A [D.C.

7. If the cryptuc and largely unintelligible footnote on p. 11 of

the Petition ts intended to assert that the FAA violated the DOT Act

because it approved the cargo hub without adcquatcly cvaluating

mecusures to mitigate the project's adverse cffects, it should be

disregarded. Petitioners did not address this point in their argu-

ment. so it must be considered waived.

26

Op.] at 36a) Significantly, petitioners do not cite a single

case from any court requiring that mitigation be com-

pleted before service begins. The Ninth Circuit imposed

such a requirement in one case, but that decision was

reversed by this Court in Robertson v. Methow Valley,

490 U.S. 332 (1989). Petitioners seek to distinguish

Methow Valley by arguing that this Court left open the

issue of mitigation where there is a “substantive” statute

requiring mitigation measures. The issue is not whether

AAIA is a substantive statute since the District Circuit

held the FEIS complied completely with the terms-of

AAIA.’ The D. C. Circuit correctly noted that “Section

509(b)(S) does not order agencies to take all steps to

lessen environmental trauma, just all reasonable ones.

(Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at 36a)

The FAA has the statutory authority to determine

that all reasonable steps have been taken to minimize

adverse environmental effects before it authorizes a

project under § 509(b)(5) of the AAIA. The mitigation

plan contained in the FEIS is a detailed, comprehensive,

three-vear plan. In interpreting § 509(b)(5), the D.C.

Circuit concluded that FAA’s determination that a de-

tailed mitigation plan combined with grounds to believe

that the mitigation plan will be implemented constituted

enough of a reasonable step for purposes of AAIA

compliance, and that the FAA did not commit a clear

error of judgment. (Pet. App. A[D.C. Op.] at 36a) Insofar

as the D.C. Circuit properly determined that the FAA’s

mitigation determination was reasonable, it is unneces-

sary for this Court to review and reiterate the D.C.

Circuit's holding.

S. Petitioners give no citation for their claim at Pet. 20-21 that

“the decision below holds, in cffect, that “substantive” mitigation

requirements are no different from “procedural” ones, and therefore

robs substantive requirements of their action forcing character.”

The D. C. Circuit made no such holding but merely held that the

FEIS complicd with AAIA in full.

27

Petitioners’ assertion that mitigation must be com-

pleted or fully funded before Burlington begins opera-

tions from Toledo is unreasonable because petitioners

attempt to impose an environmental standard which

exceeds the requirements of the AAIA. The statute

requires completion of all reasonable steps prior to

authorization of a project. By requiring completion of a

detailed mitigation plan combined with assurances that

the plan will be competed within a specified time frame,

the FAA assured that all reasonable steps had been

taken prior to authorizing the project to proceed. Requir-

ing completion of mitigation prior to authorization of the

project is unreasonable because it would have unneces-

sarily delayed the project for three years, despite Toledo

and Burlington’s compelling need for the hub which

could not wait that length of time.

This Court in Robertson v. Methow Valley, stated:

“[b]ecause NEPA imposes no substantive requirement

that mitigation measures actually be taken, it should not

be read to require agencies to obtain an assurance that

third parties will implement particular measures.” (490

U.S. at 353 n.16) This language implies that where a

statute does contain a substantive requirement, such as

the AAIA, that requirement can be met where an agency

has obtained assurances from third parties that particu-

lar measures will be implemented, as is true in this

case.”

9. In Methow Valley, this Court also cited statutes imposing

substantive cnvironmental obligations such as the Lndoangered

Species Act (ESA). (490 U.S. at 351 n.14) An example of a

substantive statute referred to by this Court was before the Ninth

Circuit in Millage of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d GOS (Oth Cir

1984). The Fisherics Service in that case issucd a final Biological

Opinion, making several rcasonable suggestions by which the

Seerctary could censure that a proposed sale of oil leases did not

jeopardize the continucd existence of any endangered species. The

court of appeals noted that the gencrality of the recommendations

implied that the Seerctary could choose the appropriate method

after the lease saic. Nonetheless, the court held that the Secretary

ot the Interior did not abuse his discretion under the ESA by

28

The FEIS provides a detailed mitigation plan that

will be implemented over a three-year period. Signifi-

cantly, the Port Authority has already been informed by

the FAA of an allocation of $7.4 million of Airport

Improvement program discretionary grant funds that

are available for use in property acquisitions and reloca-

tion assistance.'° The mitigation is well underway. Ac-

tual implementation of mitigation demonstrates that the

FAA reasonably relied on the Port Authority's commit-

ment to implement the detailed mitigation plan con-

tained in the FEIS and that the Port Authority’s com-

mitment satisfies the AAIA.

Petitioners also contend that the FAA violated the

AAIA because it did not require completion of the Part

150 Noise Compatibility Study prior to commencement

of flight operations. (Pet. 22) While the FAA did not

require the Part 150 Study to be completed prior to

commencement of flight operations, the Study was, in

fact. completed and submitted to the FAA in August

1991 — a full month prior to commencement of Bur-

lington’s flight operations. The fact that the study is now

Fn. 9 (Cont.)

deferring imposition of specific protections for cndangered whales

until after the proposed sale of oil Icascs.

In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that the Fishcrics

Service had reached an agreement with the Secretary providing for

the continucd monitoring activity after the Icase sale and that the

Secretary had placed special disclaimers in the Final Notice of Sale

specifying “his continuing control of any post-sale drilling.” (733

F.2d at 611) While appcliants charactcrized these factors as “only a

plan for later actica”™, the court concluded that by choosing this

plan, the Secretary recognized his obligation under the ESA to

implement the plan. (/d.) Significantly, the court found that the

monitoring agreement with the Fishcrics Service would “help the

Seerctary take these steps and diligently pursuc ESA compliance

atter the Icase sale.” (/d.)

10. This amount is an increase of approximatcly $2.6 million

in FAA grant funds since this case was argucd before the court

below.

29

complete also shows that the FAA reasonably relied on

the Port Authority's commitment to implement mitiga-

tion plans.

The D.C. Circuit properly concluded that “the Port

Authority's Part 150 study will be detailed, as the law

requires, and we do not think that the agency committed

a ‘clear error of judgment in deciding to use the study to

perfect the timing of an otherwise concrete proposal.”

(Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at 36a, citing Citizens to Preserve

Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971))

A proper understanding of the function that this

Study will serve in relation to the mitigation plan dem-

onstrates that it was reasonable for the FAA to issue its

ROD prior to completion of the Part 150 Study. The Part

150 Study is not the commitment to engage in mitiga-

tion or even the description of the nature of that mitiga-

tion. Those matters are included in the FEIS. Rather,

the Part 150 Study is the document which fine-tunes the

defined steps described in the FEIS that will aciually be

undertaken. As the court below found, the Part 150

Study “will help flesh out the details of the mitigation

plans.” (Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at 35a)

The D.C. Circuit properly concluded that “section

509(b)(5) does not order agencies to take all steps to

lessen environmental trauma, just all reasonable ones.”

(Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at 36a (emphasis in original)).

The court below properly held that the FAA has taken all

reasonable steps and has met its obligations under the

Statute. Accordingly, review of this case by writ of

certiorari is unwarranted.

30

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Petition for a writ of certiorari

to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit should be denied.

November, 1991

Respectfully Submitted:

JIM J. MARQUEZ

McNAIR LAW FIRM

1155 15th Street, N.W.

Suite 400

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 659-3900

Counsel for Respondent,

Toledo-Lucas County Port

Authority

and

JOHN W. SIMPSON

KELLEY, DRYE & WARREN

2300 M Street, N.W

Washington, DC 20037

(202) 9§5-9600

BRIAN E. COLE

18200 Van Karman Avenue

Irvine, CA 92715

(714) 752-1212

Counsel for Respondent,

Burlington Air Express

Inc.

APPENDIX

A-1

APPENDIX A

BURLINGTON David L. Marshall

AIR EXPRESS CHAIRMAN

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

June 27, 1990

Mr. Peter A. Serini

Manager

Detroit Airports District Office

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

Willow Run Airport, East

8820 Beck Road

Belleville, MI 40111

Dear Mr. Serini:

During the course of the Environmental Impact State-

ment (EIS) process in relation to the creation of a

permanent air cargo hub at the Toledo Express Airport,

I have had the opportunity to review comments submit-

ted to the record by numerous parties. The purpose of

this letter is to respond to comments submitted by Mr.

Thomas E. Frank on May 15, 1990, which I have

become aware of only this week, concerning discussions

Burlington has held with the Fort Wayne-Allen County

Airport Authority, and remarks attributed to me which

appeared in the Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette on May 12,

1990. With this letter I intend to set the record straight

that Burlington Air Express remains committed to the

establishment and utilization of an air cargo hub at

Toledo Express Airport.

Mr. Frank alleges that Burlington has a “siandby second

choice to Toledo”, with those views apparently based on

a newspaper article which suggested that Burlington

would consider staying in Fort Wayne if it were unable

to move to Toledo. Mr. Frank also stated that Burlington

and Fort Wayne are “already actively dismissing Fort

A-2

Wayne as an alternative to Toledo.” Apparently these

statements are also based on the same newspaper arti-

cle.

I wish to affirm for the record that Burlington Air

Express does not have any existing viable alternative to

the proposed new hub project in Toledo. Very simply,

the Fort Wayne-Allen County Airport Authority has not

been able to develop sources of financial support for the

extensive airport improvements required in connection

with our hub project. Specifically, Fort Wayne lacks the

necessary aircraft parking ramp, fuel farm, related infra-

Structure and other airport improvements. Despite the

continuing good will of the Fort Wayne airport manage-

ment, funding for these improvements has not been

achievable in Fort Wayne. On the other hand, adequate

funding and planning for this major project has been

created in Toledo with the assistance of the Toledo-

Lucas County Port Authority. There are other very

important reasons for our need to relocate to Toledo,

including location closer to our primary market, the

existence of a preferred highway network and the avail-

ability of an expanded labor pool. These factors, together

with the lack of financial support for the project in Fort

Wayne, lead to the necessary decision to relocate to

Toledo.

Burlington's recent discussions with Fort Wayne have

related to a temporary extension of our existing hub

agreement pending completion of the delayed Toledo

project. Throughout those discussions with Fort Wayne,

Burlington maintained very openly its continued com-

mitment to its permanent hub facility Toledo.

A-3

As Chief Executive Officer of Burlington Air Express I

am pleased to re-affirm for the record that our company

is absolutely counting on the new Toledo hub as the

most critical element in our future operating plan. For

an air Cargo company, its hub is its heart in every sense.

We are facing “heart transplant surgery” and I cannot

over-stress how fundamental it is for the future of our

company that our new hub in Toledo be developed,

completed and operated as set forth in the Environmen-

tal Impact Statement.

Sincerely,

/s/

David L. Marshall

DLM/tp

! B-1

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CITIZENS AGAINST

BURLINGTON, INC.

et al. -

Petitioners,

V.

JAMES BUSEY, No. 90-1373

Administrator,

Federal Aviation

Administration

Respondent.

AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID L. MARSHALL

I, David L. Marshall, Being duly sworn, depose and

State:

1. I am the Chairman of Burlington Air Express,

Inc. (“Burlington”).

2. When I received Mr. Koslosky’s letter dated April

25, 1990 (Petitioners’ Exhibit J) I responded with a letter

dated May 2, 1990 (Petitioners’ Exhibit M). In my letter

I stated as follows:

“Burlington remains committed to the Tolcdo

project in exactly the same manner as vou and |]

discussed last February, though the necessary ‘kick-

off time for this major event has now drawn much

closer. There are many risks ahead, and there con-

tinue to be major uncertainties. In this environment,

I remain deeply grateful for the continuing support

of the Fort Wayne/Allen County Airport Authority

and for your own leadership. I accept the spirit and

purpose of your letter, and I want to assure you that

iene

B-2

I will look to Fort Wayne for support and solutions as

and if our Toledo commitment is altered by any of

the risks or uncertainties that lie ahead.” (Emphasis

added.)

3. Those statements were true when written and are

still true today. Burlington was and is “deeply grateful

for the continuing support of the Fort Wayne/Allen

County Airport Authority” in extending the Burlington

lease and thus allowing Burlington to remain at Fort

Wayne for 15 months pending the development of the

Toledo project. By the same token Burlington may need

a further extension of its Fort Wayne lease in the event

of further delays and thus would have to “look to Fort

Wayne for support and solutions as and if our Toledo

commitment is altered by any of the risks or uncertain-

ties that lie ahead.”

4. Mr. Koslosky’s letter of April 25, 1990 (Petitioners’

Exhibit J, p.3) also indicated that financing might be

available for a permanent Burlington hub at Fort Wayne.

Burlington's prior dealings with Fort Wayne gave Bur-

lington no reason to believe that the hopeful statements

in the April 25, 1990 letter reflected a dramatic change

in the existing situation in Fort Wayne. Nevertheless, I

took this letter very seriously. I believed it highly desir-

able to maintain the good relationships which had

facilitated the previous lease extension covering Bur-

lington’s temporary hub. As a matter of courtesy and

prudent due diligence, therefore, I instructed Glen Bee-

cher to meet with the Fort Wayne Authorities which he

did with the results described in Glen Beecher’s Affidavit

(Burlington’s Exhibit C). As stated in Beecher’s Affidavit

those meetings and conversations took place after my

letter of May 2, 1990. They confirmed the prior situation,

i.e., that there was no viable financial plan in prospect

for establishing a permanent hub and related airport

improvements at Fort Wayne.

B-3

5. My letter to the FAA dated June 27, 1990, which

is attached to the ROD, was written after those meetings

and correctly confirmed that no viable alternative had

been developed for a permanent hub at Fort Wayne. The

statements in my letter dated May 2, 1990, to Mr.

Koslosky and my letter to the FAA dated June 27, 1990,

are both true and are mutually consistent.

6. There is also no basis in fact for the Petitioners’

claim (p.9) that “Burlington itself says it can even

accommodate a project cancellation by remaining in

Fort Wayne Pet. Ex. M.” As indicated at length in

Burlington’s Answer, pp.1-8, Petitioners confuse the

possibility of remaining at Fort Wayne temporarily —

which might be accomplished with the continuing good-

will and support of the Fort Wayne Airport Authority,

albeit at a great cost — with establishing a permanent

hub at Fort Wayne which is not feasible for the reasons

set forth in my letter to the FAA dated June 27, 1990.

7. The top of Petitioners’ Exhibit M indicates that it

was faxed to them by “FWAC Airport Authority,” i.e., the

Fort Wayne Allen County Airport Authority. It is there-

fore significant that Petitioners’ Reply contains nothing

which refutes or even takes issue with Glen Beecher’s

Affidavit stating that Fort Wayne never offered “any

specific package for the financing of a permanent hub

facility at Fort Wayne” and that Burlington would be

faced with significant environmental issues at Fort

Wayne (Exhibit C to Burlington’s Answer).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746, I declare under penalty

of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on July 31, 1990

/s/

David L. Marshall

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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