Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Imperial Irrigation District v. State Water Resources Control Board

Supreme Court brief1991

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No. 91-

JUL 11 198?

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7

In the Supreme Court

OF THE

United States

OCTOBER TERM 1990

IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT,

sitioner,

V.

STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD,

Respondent,

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC.,

Intervenor.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL,

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE

JOHN P. CARTER

REGINALD L. KNox, JR.

HORTON, KNOX, CARTER & FOOTE

895 Broadway, Suite 101

El Centro, California 922438

PAUL D. ENGSTRAND

COUNSEL OF RECORD

GEORGE J. BERGER

DEARING D. ENGLISH

JENNINGS, ENGSTRAND & HENRIKSON

A Professional Law Corporation

501 West Broadway, Suite 1400

San Diego, California 92101

(619) 557-7800

Bowne of Los Angeles, Inc., Law Printers. (213) 627-2200

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Questions Presented for Review

1. Does the Boulder Canyon Project Act delegate to

the Secretary of Interior primary or exclusive jurisdiction

coneerning what are reasonable uses and methods of use

of Colorado River water by entities with Section 5

contracts?

2. Despite the Secretary’s approval of uses and meth-

ods by Petitioner, does California’s State Water Re-

sources Control Board' have jurisdiction to order

Petitioner, who executed a contract in 1932 for permanent

service of water with the Secretary of Interior under

Section 5 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act (“BCPA”),”

to fund construction of extensive works to crea‘e con-

served water for the sole benefit of coastal plain urban

users with similar Section 5 contracts of lower priority?

3. Does such an order violate the “swpremacy given the

Secretary's contracts...’ by Congress “and thwart full

realization of the benefits Congress intended this national

project to bestow[?]’”*

‘Herein “SWRCB” or “Board.”

*Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 1057, 43 U.S.C.

§$§ 617 et seg. (1986 & Supp. 1991).

‘Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 580 (1963) (“Arizona I’)

Emphasis added in all cases herein unless otherwise noted.

*Id. at 590.

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Questions Presented for Review ................. i

I

GONE GUNN o's k vad cece sand decseeeencereeeen 1

Il

Statement of Jurisdiction ..............ceeeeeees 2

Ill

Ee Pe re er ny aE ey: 2

IV

I OG Se GD fic nbs 40 ade tivedernteeiae 8

A. Federal imvolvement .....cccccscccvcscccces 8

oe i rrr ne 8

Se WOU VIO o.oo ks ce keene ceseiens 10

. SRR ROGNN oic. s oko ca bker esas 11

1. State’s Concern Was For “People Gener-

GN” cosicvivakecdesesiaetisniseesie 11

2. State Ignored Federal Approval .......... 12

3. Order WR 88-20 Reallocates The Federal

POOR TS 6 66-0060 2 dbeeen deen 13

iil

TABLE OF CONTENTS

pensons for Granting Writ .......cccccccccvvvess

A.

Congressional Policy, As Explicated By This

Court And Implemented By The Secretary Of

Interior, Would Be Substantially Eroded If

IID-II Were Allowed To Stand ..............

1. National Concern For Irrigation Projects. .

2. Implementation By 43 C.F.R. Part 417....

i

When State Action Interferes With Congres-

sional Policy And Directives — “State Law Has

tA vb wine aa dss ech veeneensees

2. California v. United States ...............

3. California v. FERC (herein “Rock Creek’’)

VI

EE SS ae

iV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931) ....... 24

Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) .......

Pe ee ery ee i, 3, 14, 16, 18, 19, 23, 24, 25, 28

Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964) ....... 17, 19

Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419 (1979) ....... 16,17

Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983) ....... 15, 16

Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980). ..10, 16, 19, 21, 26

California v. FERC, 495 U.S. ___, 109 L.Ed.2d 474

See <3 bu was aecses be nee 54s 6as eee hee sews 16, 27

California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978) .. 25

California Development Co. v. New Liverpool Salt

Co., 178, THB (ie Cie. WOOD)... wc ccccccccess 8

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. East Bay Mu-

nicipal Utility District, 439 U.S. 811 (1978) .... 8

Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Indians, 466

Wa ME do 4's Cos bhci«bae ce euec teens 16

FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960) 16

First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. FPC, 328

Pie CE FAG UES ORC eRL ee eiesedbetedde 16

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glen-

dale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318-

Par Rei i re ee 29

Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963) ........ 18

Imperial Irrigation District v. State Water Resources

Control Board, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1160 (1986)

fo | SR er Sipe Path lege 2

Imperial Irrigation District v. State Water Resources

Control Board, 225 Cal. App. 3d 548 (1990)

SE Ve vc 6c Cuvacededetedd aciaekudesees Passim

Imperial Land Co. v. Imperial Irrigation District,

173 Cal. 660, 161 P. 113 (1916) .............. 8

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page

International Longshoremen’s Assn. v. Davis, 476

et SE ol fee lds Phe ates ne keavenns 7

Ivanhoe v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958) ...... 18

Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. All Parties and Persons, 53

Cal.2d 692, 350 P. 2d 69, 3 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1960) 23, 24

Jones v. California Development Co., 173 Cal. 565,

ee ee ED: ig oa do 0s dk oo 6heneeen ewes 8

Nollan v. California Coastal Comm., 483 U.S. 825,

Te far 6a rad aces nee eee ene 29

Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reserva-

tion v. Wold Engineering, 476 U.S. 877 (1986) 7

United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S.

& fee ere ere 29

Statutes

California Water Code

Reta Doc eavulesddnenaeawane hes 24

SPT EE CECE EEE CEE POPPE CTE 8

Code of Federal Regulations, Title 43, Part 417

EE ical ek a hehe ie oe ked ete cer eeeeue 20

ES Cie de Oak ccekkes ee ecasvecetcsounl 20

OT a re rrr tn rr reer eey Terns 20, 21

| I ee ee 20

29 Fed. Reg. 13,605-13,606 (1964)............

34 Fed. Reg. 11,499-11,500 (1969) ............ 20

37 Fed. Reg. 18,076-18,078 (1972)............ 20

Pub. L. No. 90-515, 82 Stat. 868 (September 26,

|. | RS a ere a a Pe 15

Publ L. No. 90-537, 82 Stat. 885 ............... 23

Pub. Ll. Mo. G6-Goe, GS Blak. BOG... 2. occccccecs 23

ip ee ST PTT TTT Triree 23

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES

Page

Pub. L. No. 96-336, 94 Stat. 1063............... 23

Pub. L. No. 98-63, 97 Stat. 301, 315, 352 ........ 10, 23

United States Code, Title 28, See. 1257(3) ...... 2

United States Code, Title 43

re ee SLT Ls kas oben seh oe Skee we i, 19

NE I i's Winiele dpi h ie Cee Nok Rees 23

I 4's’ sacs wl onietnate asda Meta ias ke aso ee a 23

Textbooks

Abbott, California Colorado River Issues, 19 Pac.

Bie ey ae ii haa i ad chess 0 eae eee 6

Bulletin 4, DWR/SWRCB, January 1982........ 5

Bulletin No. 198, DWR, Water Conservation in

ES ee ee ree 5

Dunning, The Physical Solution in Western Water

Law, 57 U. Colo. L. Rev. 445 (1986) .......... 6

Nathanson, Updating The Hoover Dam Documents,

I oo. ss oN aK Rk CO eRe Ces 23

Water Policies For the Future, Final Report to the

President and to the Congress of the United

States by the National Water Commission, June,

NAS ics sc 6 + Opa ee eee hae ae ha 15

Wilbur & Ely, The Hoover Dam Documents, A589

Ee ie: Sid Libis 4'e guia ok hina aie anaes Wa 9,14

No. 91-

In the Supreme Court

OF THE

United States

OCTOBER TERM 1990

IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT,

Petitioner,

Vv.

STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD,

Respondent.

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC.,

Intervenor.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL,

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE

Petitioner, Imperial Irrigation District (“IID”), re-

spectfully requests that this Court issue a Writ to review

the opinion of the California Court of Appeal, Fourth

Appellate District, Division One, filed November 21, 1990.

I

OPINIONS BELOW

1. The subject opinion, Imperial Irrigation District v.

State Water Resources Control Board, 225 Cal. App. 3d

548, 275 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1990) (“JID-IT’), whereby the

Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s approval of

orders made by the California administrative agency

(herein the “Board” or “SWRCB”) which ordered IID to

use its financial resources to create conserved water from

9

~

Boulder Canyon Project water deliveries for the sole

benefit of lower priority users or other Californians, is in

the separate appendix filed herewith, at Appendix, 3. The

trial court judgment is at Appendix, 42; the trial court

statement of decision is at Appendix, 46; the Board’s

Order WR 88-20 is at Appendix, 53; Imperial Irrigation

District v. State Water Resources Control Board, 186 Cal.

App. 3d 1160, 231 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1986) (“IID-I’’) is at

Appendix, 101; the trial court judgment is at Appen-

dix, 121; the Board’s Order WR 84-12 is at Appendix, 127;

and the Board’s Decision 1600 is at Appendix, 151.

Il

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The opinion of the Court of Appeal, //D-II, was entered

on November 21, 1990. A petition for rehearing was

denied on December 12, 1990, and on March 15, 1991, the

Supreme Court of California denied, without opinion, a

Petition for Review. The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3).

Ill

FEDERAL QUESTION

The California Court of Appeal, by affirming ‘this

specific instance of far-reacning change...” (IID-II, 225

Cal. App. 3d at 573, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 267, Appendix, 40)

has caused a direct confrontation between the regulatory

powers of the Secretary of Interior over the use of

Colorado River water developed and released to users

under the Boulder Canyon Project Act and the adminis-

trative powers of the SWRCB.

3

At the commencement of hearings before the S‘VRCB,

IID, referencing Arizona I, stated that “[t]he docirine of

Federal pre-emption or supremacy could become impor-

tant if the SWRCB should disagree with IID’s present

‘ operational procedures... .’”’ Memorandum of Points and

Authorities on Behalf of Imperial Irrigation District, 6,

Appendix, 234. Next, at the first level of judicial review,

IID elaborated on Federal supremacy principles and

contended that Decision 1600 directly conflicted with

Congressional mandates. Memorandum of Points and

Authorities of Imperial Irrigation District In Support of

Complaint For Declaratory Relief, In the Alternative For

Writ of Mandamus, 33-39, Appendix, 250-255.

At the second level of review (the Court of Appeal),

IID’s Opening Brief explained:

The pattern of decisions made by members of IID’s

board and staff, as their best collective wisdom sug-

gested, focused on the ‘reclamation and cultivation of

arid land ... for agricultural purposes....’ [fn. 8]

IID lobbied for construction of a massive federal

project on the Colorado river [fn. 9], issued debt and

suffered bankruptcy [fn. 10], constructed an electric

system [fn. 11], established its water rights by U.S.

Supreme Court decree [fn. 12], and, also, its free-

dom from the 160-acre limitation of the 1902 Recla-

mation Act. [fn. 13]

'The footnote references noted in the quoted text are:

“8, Greeson v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (9th Cir. 1932) 59 F.2d

529, 532; n. 9, Crawford v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (1927) 200

Cal. 318, 328. See Boulder Canyon Project Act (1928) 43

U.S.C.A. §§ 617, et seq.; mn. 10, Wells Fargo Bank v. Imperial

Irrigation Dist. (9th Cir. 1943) 136 F.2d 539; In re Imperial

Irrigation Dist. (1935) 10 F.Supp. 832, 841; nm. 11, Imperial

Irrigation Dist. v. Nevada-California Corp. (9th Cir. 1940) 111

ean

4

IID also repeatedly asserted the Federal basis for its

rights.” The Court of Appeal, fully cognizant of the

Federal rights aspects, recognized both that IID had

“achieved water use efficiencies which are above average

for comparable [Federal] projects” (JID-II, 225 Cal. App.

3d at 571, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 266, Appendix, 38), and “that

IID’s water rights, based as they are on a unique blend of

statutory and contractual origins, could be characterized

as somehow more stable or securely vested than water

rights from traditional [i.e., purely California law]

sources.” Jd. at 561, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 260, Appendix, 23.

IID emphasized to the Court of Appeal that the Bureau

of Reclamation had approved IID’s operational prac-

tices.” IID also vigorously contended that its practices

were reasonable under state law.

F.2d 319; n. 12, Arizona v. California (1963) 373 U.S. 546; Id.

(1964) 376 U.S. 340; Id. (1979) 439 U.S. 419; Id. (1983) 460

U.S. 605; n. 13, Bryant, supra, 447 U.S. 352; bureaucratic vacilla-

tion spanned four presidential administrations. Id. at 363, n.

14.”

“SWRCB's Decision 1600 itself explained the federal basis for

I1D's rights to receive deliveries of Colorado River water from the

United States via the Boulder Canyon Project. Decision 1600, 9-19;

Appendix, 165-174.

‘IID introduced four lengthy exhibits (see Detailed Index, Admin-

istrative Record (AR) Part II, Item 5, Exhibits 21, 22, 24, and 25,

Appendix, 300) that showed its involvement with requirements of the

Secretary of Interior. The Bureau of Reclamation introduced two

Exhibits (AR, Part II, Item 12, Exhibits 1 and 2, Appendix, 304) that

explained the federal approach for dealing with potential opportuni-

ties to create conserved water within the irrigation project in Impe-

rial Valley, California.

Mr. MeCuilough, the Bureau’s Regional Planning Officer, testified

1iD’s “... reeords to be reliable” (AR, Part II, Item 1, Vol. VI, 98)

and presented a table which estimated IID’s losses of 33% and crop

consumptive use of 66%. AR, Part II, Item 5, Ex. 23. He testified that

)

In addition to the legal or jurisdiction-to-decide as-

pects, the facts pertinent to the conflict which these

overlapping regulatory powers caused were presented and

discussed at each stage of the proceedings below.* After

the Bureau, among other matters, annually reminded of “the continu-

ous need for conservation.” On September 20, 1974, the Bureau's

Regional Director wrote IID after “due consideration . .. it is deter-

mined that your request for additional water is adequately justified.”

On February 21, 1978, the Regional Director wrote IID, “I am

pleased with your 13-point program ....I urge you to continue to

provide programs for your water users with emphasis on water

conservation.” By letter dated December 12, 1980, the Bureau's

Director reminded, “[i]n accordance with 43 C.F.R. Part 417, [our]

representatives ... have met each year at your office to discuss water

conservation measures and operating practices . .. your 21-point pro-

gram...is a progressive one which certainly contributes to the

efficient and wise use of water.”

Also, Mr. McCullough testified “how well the district conveys and

utilizes the water supply.” AR, Part II, Item 1, Vol. VI, 95. By letter

of August 23, 1978,-the Bureau’s director advised that both the

“eanals and related structures are in excellent condition.”

‘For example, the Board introduced into evidence ten exhibits that

detailed Federal involvement with IID’s irrigation project (See, AR,

Part II, Item 2, Exhibits 7 through 16, Appendix, 292-293), and the

Department of Water Resources explained the essence of IID’s

rights and relationships with the Bureau. See, AR, Part II, Item 4,

Exhibit 1, Appendix, 297.

Study of the potential for conservation opportunities in IID’s

irrigation project had been made by California as well as the Bureau.

For example, Bulletin No. 198, DWR, Water Conservation in Califor-

nia, May 1976; Bulletin 4, DWR/SWRCB, January 1982.

However, all involved repeatedly found conserving more water

from agricultural projects should not be paid by those agriculturai

users for the benefit of urban users with junior Federal rights. See,

AR, Part I, Item 104, Appendix, 269, in December, 1982, DWR

Director says it is “not economic” for IID to salvage this water. The

Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (“MWD”) said,

6

Decision 1600 was filed, the Regional Director Lower,

Colorado Regional Office, Bureau of Reclamation, acting

for the Secretary, requested the Board to reconsider its

finding “of misuse of water at this time” contending that

“implementing additional conservation measures...

[has] been economically infeasible because no use existed

for the conserved water.” Letter, Juiy 18, 1984, Appendix,

338-339.

Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal brushed aside these

facts and instead interpreted California law as having

specifically given the Board exclusive “supervision over

water waste permitted by anyone in the state, including

IID....” IID-II, 225 Cal. App. 3d at 567, 275 Cal. Rptr.

at 264, Appendix, 31. The JID-II opinion conceded that its

effect was “governmental redefinition of water rights”

and affirmance of “this specific instance of far-reaching

change.” Id. at 573, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 267, Appendix, 40.

Under these circumstances the question-raised-and-de-

cided-below prerequisite has been clearly met. Even if the

Supremacy Clause (pre-emption issue) had not been

“[F]unds obviously not available to Imperial.” Buree said

“[E]conomically infeasible for IID.’ The Colorado River Board said

program “not currently economically justified for Imperial.” Jd. Item

25; AR, Part II, Item 7, Ex. 1, 16. EDF's study (AR, Part II, Item 8,

Ex. 3) envisioned no cost to IID, no decrease in agricultural produc-

tivity and recoupment of benefits “following 20 (or 10) years.” Jd. at

92; see also v.

In fact, “the idea” of an “arrangement” whereby junior urban users

would fund the cost of facilities to create conserved water from

irrigation projects “goes back at least to the 1950's.” Dunning, The

Physical Solution in Western Water Law, 57 U. Colo. L. Rev. 445, 480,

n.190 (1986). The former General Counsel for MWD explained that

the “stumbling block [for such an arrangement] has been the amount

of money ... [MWD would pay].”’ Abbott, California Colorado River

Issues, 19 Pac. L. J. 1391, 1415-1416 (1988).

presented, factually developed, or decided at all by Cali-

fornia, the question, whether a state (or its agencies) has

jurisdiction to regulate a Federal project can be raised

before this Court for the first time.’ In International

Longshoremen’s Assn. v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380 (1986), this

Court considered a pre-emption issue raised only in post-

trial proceedings, holding, “the point is ... whether juris-

diction provided by state law is itself pre-empted by

federal law vesting exclusive jurisdiction over that contro-

versy in another dody.” Jd. at 387-388 (emphasis in

original).

Under the same rationale, in Three Affiliated Tribes of

the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, 476

U.S. 877 (1986), this Court, on certiorari to a state

supreme court, considered a supremacy pre-emption is-

sue, neither explicitly raised below nor decided by the

state court. It too involved a “jurisdictional controversy.”

Id. at 878. As there, this Court’s consideration of the

Federal pre-emption issue “[would not] disservice...

{California Courts] or ... litigants, or impair[ ]...

[an] informed decision of the issue.” Jd. at 883.

*At the third level of review, Petition for Review to the California

Supreme Court, by a letter supporting review (February 19, 1991),

the Central Valley Project Water Association stated:

Such a nebulous and undefined standard to evaluate whether the

way local agencies are operating their publicly-owned water

system might well collide with federal supremacy issues. Califor-

nia may only impose conditions which are ‘not inconsistent with

congressional authorization.’ Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.

v. East Bay Mun. Utility Dist. (1980) 26 Cal.3d 183, 192. See,

California v. United States (1978) 438 U.S. 645, 674-675; Arizona

v. California (1963) 373 U.S. 546, 588. The CVP is a federal

project with many repayment obligations which could be jeopard-

ized by the endless scope of //D-II’s perception of the SWRCB’s

so-called expertise.

8

In view of the record presenting such a direct conflict

of power to decide between the Federal and state regula-

tory agencies, the merits of the supremacy and pre-

emption issues present a jurisdictional controversy that is

ripe for decision.®

IV

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Federal Involvement

1. The Contracts

Petitioner was formed in 1911 under the California

Irrigation District law.’ Its purpose was and continues to

be to provide a publicly-owned structure so that desert

land could be protected against floods and “with the aid

of irrigation ... become enormously productive.’”

IID first contracted with the United States on October

23, 1918 obtaining the right to use Laguna Dam and the

obligation to pay the United States $1.6 million. Wilbur &

Ely, The Hoover Dam Documents, A589 (1948). This

*If this Court concludes that before the merits are reached, the

California Court of Appeal should directly address the supremacy

issue, a remand for that purpose may be appropriate. Cf., Environ-

mental Defense Fund, Inc. v. East Bay Municipal Utility District, 439

U.S. 811 (1978).

"Imperial Land Co. v. Imperial Irrigation District 173 Cal. 660, 668,

161 P. 113, 116 (1916). The Irrigation District Law, California Water

Code § 20500, et seg. (West 1984 & Supp. 1991).

“The Salton Sea cases, California Development Co. v. New Liverpool

Salt Co., 172 F. 792, 794 (9th Cir. 1909). “Irrigated farms were laid

out and sold, towns sprung up, a railroad was constructed, and in

verity this desert was made to blossom like the rose.” Jones v.

California Development Co., 173 Cal. 565, 568, 160 P. 823, 824 (1916).

;

: 9

contract was incorporated within the All-American Canal

contract of December 1, 1932, made “particularly pursu-

ant to the Act of Congress approved December 21, 1928

(45 Stat. 1057), designated the Boulder Canyon Project

Act....” Id. at A595, Appendix, 354.

In the All-American Canal contract the United States

promised that:

As far as reasonable diligence will permit said water

shall be delivered as ordered by the District, and as

reasonably required for potable and irrigation pur-

poses within the boundaries of the District in the

Imperial and Coachella Valleys in California. This

contract is for permanent water service... .

Id. at A607-608, Appendix, 374-375.

The words “said water’ referenced IID’s “third prior-

ity ... for beneficial consumptive use, [of] 3,850,000 acre-

feet of water per annum less the beneficial consumptive

use under the priorities designated in Sections 1 and 2

above.” Jd. at A606, Appendix, 371-372. The first two

priorities were for Palo Verde Irrigation District and the

Yuma Project. After IID’s priority, the fourth and fifth

priorities were for the Coastal Plain urban users.

IID’s Section 5 contract specifically required it to make

repairs according to the Secretary’s instructions (Art. 9;

Appendix, 360); to make payments for the canal’s cost

(Art. 10; Appendix, 361); to measure the water according

to the Secretary’s instructions (Art. 18; Appendix, 376);

to make written reports as directed by the Secretary (Art.

19; Appendix, 376); to conform to rules and regulations

prescribed by the Secretary (Art. 24; Appendix, 380); and

to submit to inspections by the Secretary (Art. 25; Appen-

dix, 380). Title was to remain in the United States subject

10

to repayment and the Secretary's discretion (Art. 22;

Appendix, 379).

In Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 361, n.10 (1980), this

Court explained:

The All-American Canal system was not declared

completed until 1952. By that time, pursuant to the

1932 contract, the care, operation, and maintenance

of the system, with specified exceptions, had been

transferred to the District, although title to the

Imperial Dam and the canal remained in the United

States.

2. Federal Supervision

In 1964, the Secretary issued regulations providing

procedures “to the end that deliveries of Colorado River

water to each contractor will not exceed those reasonably

required for beneficial use under the _ respective

contract[s].””

IID and Burec officials had frequent interchanges, and

IID complied each year with the requirements of the

United States for conservation and reasonable use proce-

dures of its Colorado River water. Burec’s written testi-

mony (Appendix, 209) pointed out that it and IID had

made an agreement “in September 1981” (id. at 320) to

study “Water Conservation Opportunities in Imperial

Irrigation District, California.” Also, in 1983, Congress

authorized the Secretary “to engage in feasibility studies

of... (3) Water conservation and efficient use program,

All-American Canal relocation project, located in Impe-

rial County, California (Supplemental Appropriations

*Fed. Reg. 13,605-13,606 (1964) (codified at 43 C.F.R. Part 417),

(adding a new part to Title 43 of the Code of Federal Regulation).

See infra notes 19-21.

ee

11

Act, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-63, 97 Stat. 301, 315 (July 29,

1983)) approving $397,000 to Bureau of Reclamation for

‘General Investigations’.” 97 Stat. at 352. The studies

initiated by the 1980 Buree/IID Agreement” resulted in

a published “Special Report, July 1984, Water Conserva-

tion Opportunities in Imperial Irrigation District,

California.”

Obviously, these actions by Burec officials were taken

pursuant to regulations made by the Secretary under

authority as esteblished by Congress in the Boulder

Canyon Project Act.

B. State Involvement

1. State’s Concern Was For “People Generally”

California has reached exactly the opposite conclusion

concerning the very same operational practices and long

standing supply/demand regime of IID’s Colerado River

water. The Court of Appeal characterized the dispute

between IID and the Board as whether water lost to

consumptive use in IID’s irrigation project “was or was

not reasonable.” J/D-II, 225 Cal. App. 3d at 553, 275 Cal.

Rptr. at 255, Appendix, 11. The Court accepted the trial

court’s characterization that “[t]he Board did not find

that IID’s uses of water, in themselves, were unreasona-

ble.” Id. at 570, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 265, Appendix, 35. It

also accepted the overwhelming evidence that IID

“achieved water use efficiencies which are above average

for comparable projects.” Jd. at 571, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 266,

Appendix, 38.

See also supra, notes 3-5.

"It contemplated, “Future public involvement [which] will include

discussions on MWD participation and cost-sharing in both planning

and construction activities.” Jd. at 20.

iil

12

Nevertheless, it upheld the Board’s orders because a

use which may be “ ‘beneficial’ in some respect... does

not make such use ‘reasonable’ when compared with

demands, or even future demands, for more important

uses.” Id. at 571, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 266, Appendix, 36-37.

These ‘“‘more important uses’”’ were described by the Court

of Appeal “for the benefit of people, generally, in the

state—i.e., for the benefit of undetermined and unnamed

future potential users.” Jd. at 569, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 264,

Appendix, 33-34.

It held that “the Board was to serve as supervisor and

regulator of the activities of actual [Colorado River]

water deliverers [id. at 567, Appendix, 31]... [and] that

the Board is the expert... [with] no call to defer to the

decisions of IID in the field of water waste.” Jd. at 568,

275 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (emphasis in original), Appendix,

33.

2. State Ignored Federal Approval

The Court recognized that water “used by IID and its

customers... [was] authorized by the Boulder Canyon

Project Act... [and] contracts for the delivery and allo-

cation... to users in the southwestern United States...

[and] finally resolved by the United States Supreme

Court in 1963.” Id. at 561, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 259, Appen-

dix 22. The substantial interference that the SWRCB’s

orders caused IID and its irrigation project were also

noted. The Court wrote:

There can be no doubt that the Board’s intrusion into

IID’s previously untrammeled administration of the

use of water in its district was substantial. ... While

the Board’s decision in no way interfered with IID’s

water, it most certainly presaged an interference with

IID’s utilization of that water once it traversed the

All-American Canal.

a eae

13

Id. at 562, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 260, Appendix, 24.

The Court also stated that the Board did “substantially

erode IID’s otherwise virtually complete contro! over its

water use [id. at 562, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 260, Appendix, 24]

... [and] IID... has been deprived of a great deal of the

property rights which it thought were inherent in its

allocation of Colorado River waters, made many years ago

by federal and state statute and private contract...

[and] eroded IID’s bargaining position... [with] the

Metropolitan Water District.” Jd. at 571, 275, Cal. Rptr.

at 266, Appendix, 37.

Finally, even though the Court characterized IID as

‘having a “vested right in a geographical part of the

country that is ‘far western,’ embracing a philosophy that

is independent in every sense of the word”’ (id. (emphasis

in original), Appendix, 37), it held “California is engaged

in an evolving process of governmental redefinition of

water rights... [and we affirm] this specific instance of

far-reaching change....” Id. at 573, 275 Cal. Rptr. at

267, Appendix, 40.

3. Order WR 88-20 Reallocates The Federal Priority

Rights

The Board’s Order WR 88-20 on September 7, 1988 is

the latest action which finally, severely and substantially

impacted IID’s prior federal water rights and public fise.

The Board found “that conservation of 367,900 acre-feet

per annum...is a reasonable long-term goal which will

assist in meeting future water demands. The Board will

retain jurisdiction to review implementation of the initial

plan and future water conservation measures.” Id. at 44,

Appendix, 97.

The Board’s initial plan ordered implementation by

IID of “water conservation measures... sufficient to con-

14

serve at least 100,000 acre-feet per annum by January 1,

1994.” Id. at 44, Appendix, 98. However, to the consterna-

tion of IID, the Board ordered IID “to secure funding...

of the selected water conservation measures using District

resources....” Id. at 45, Appendix, 98. No cost estimates

were made by the Board, but the Bureau’s estimates

(Appendix, 316) suggest a $100,000,000 range just for the

initial plan.

This order amounts to an award of damages against the

farmers of IID in favor of the urbanites on California's

south coastal plain who depend upon MWD for water.

MWD’s own Section 5 contract with the Secretary (Wil-

bur and Ely, supra, A507) gave it the last 550,000 acre

feet (fourth priority) of the 4.4 million acre feet of water

allocated by Congress to California. Arizona I, 373 U.S. at

565. Thus, unless IID increased its agricultural uses by

100,000 acre feet, the 100,000 acre feet of conserved water

would pass, automatically, to MWD under its lower

fourth priority. This windfall to MWD must, according to

Order WR 88-20, be totally funded by IID. Ergo, in effect,

a damage award in the $100 million and more range.

California, if not restrained, would turn the Secretary’s

allocation of Colorado River water among California’s

water users upside down. Moreover, IID’s present per-

feeted rights, rooted in the 1922 Colorado River Compact,

preserved by the Boulder Canyon Project Act and de-

ereed by this Court in 1979, are ignored. In effect, the

Board says it is necessary for IID’s farmers to pay for

creating conserved water for lower priority users, while

the Secretary says such costs should be borne by those

who would benefit from the new water.

15

The Secretary’s position is consistent with reeommen-

dations by the National Water Commission.” The Com-

mission’s Final Report noted that opportunities existed

for some transfers of water from relatively low value

agricultural use to higher value municipal and industrial

uses. Id. at 125, 229, 260. It envisaged legal protection for

existing users (id. at 266, n.76; Recommendation 7035,

269), eschewed “uncompensated transfers” (id. at 326),

and urged economic protection for present users and

areas of origin. Jd. at 330; Recommendation 8-3(b), 333.

V

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

A. Congressional Policy, As Explicated By This Court

And Implemented By The Secretary Of Interior,

Would Be Substantially Eroded If IID-II Were

Allowed To Stand

1. National Concern For Irrigation Projects

A brief review of precedent provides the legal frame-

work for yet “another chapter in this original action

brought to determine rights to the waters of the Colorado

River.” Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 608 (1983).

The Court there reminded that “the Boulder Canyon

Project Act of 1928...[was] a vast federal effort to

"Water Policies For The Future, Final Report to the President and

to the Congress of the United States by the National Water Commis-

siont, June, 1973. The Commission was created by the National

Water Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 90-515, 82 Stat. 868 (Septem-

ber 26, 1968).

16

harness and put to use the waters of the lower Colorado

River.”’ Id. Also:

“The long and rich story...need not be repeated

here. We agreed with the Special Master that the

allocation of Colorado River water was to be gov-

erned by the standards set forth in the Project Act

rather than by the principles of equitable apportion-

ment...for] the local law of prior appro-

priation....”

Id. at 609."

This 1983 case explained that the law of the use and

disposition of the waters of the Colorado River “has been

and continues to be governed mainly by statutory consid-

erations.” Jd. at 616. The Court emphasized the important

role of “Certainty of rights...with respect to water

rights in the Western United States.” Jd. at 620.

In a supplemental decree, following Arizona I’s 1964

decree (376 U.S. 340), this Court established the present

perfected rights of IID “not to exceed (i) 2,600,000 acre-

feet...or (ii) the quantity... required for irrigation of

424,145 acres... whichever of (i) or (ii) is less, with a

priority date of 1901.” Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419,

429 (1979).

Justice White, who wrote for the majority, also authored Bryant

v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980), and has participated as a member of

this Court in each chapter of this saga, since Arizona J. This seminal

ease provides the guidepost and answer for analyzing the case at bar.

Compare this Court’s use of First lowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v.

FPC, 328 U.S. 152 (1946), in California v. FERC, 495 U.S. _-_, 109

L.Ed.2d 474, 485 (1990), and the case of FPC v. Tuscarora Indian

Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960), in Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla

Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 786 (1984). The former was a four decade

precedent, the latter only two. At bar, this binding precedent covers

nearly three decades.

i

et ee ee ee

ee

17

These rights were to “be exercised only for beneficial

uses.” Jd. at 421. The “reasonable”’ requirement, pursuant

to Federal policy and implemented by 43 C.F.R. Part 417,

was also contained in the Secretary’s 1932 contract with

IID.

In the 1964 decree, this Court made clear that:

Water Controlled by the United States refers to the

water in Lake Mead, Lake Mohave, Lake Havasu and

all other water in the mainstream below Lee Ferry

and within the United States.

Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964).

Moreover, the State of California was specifically en-

joined from doing what Order WR 88-20 would, if not set

aside, accomplish in fact. The decree enjoined California:

(A) From interfering with the management and

operation... of regulatory structures controlled by

the United States;

(B) From interfering ...with releases and deliv-

eries,... of water controlled by the United States;

(C) From...purporting to authorize the diver-

sion of water... which has not been authorized by the

United States for its particular use;

(D) From... purporting to authorize the consump-

tive use of water from the mainstream in excess of the

quantities permitted under Article II of this decree.”

Id. at 346-347."*

Article II of the decree (id. at 341-346) set forth, in injunctive

form, the manner by which officers of the United States were tb

operate the Boulder Canyon Project in conformity with the directives

of Congress as interpreted in Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. at 341.

18

In Arizona I, the Court made manifestly clear that

Congress did not intend for the states to “frustrate

efficient operation of the project and thwart full realiza-

tion of the benefits Congress intended this national pro-

ject to bestow.” Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 590. Also:

With the health and growth of the Lower Basin at

stake, Congress [passed] ... the Project Act... har-

ness[ed] ...the bountiful waters of the Colorado to

sustain growing cities, to support expanding indus-

tries, and to transform dry and barren deserts into

lands that are livable and productive.

Id. 588-589."°

A principal purpose of the Boulder Canyon Project Act

was to again foster irrigation, which had existed 2,000

years ago, by the United States undertaking “to build as a

national project the necessary works to control floods and

store river waters for irrigation....” Id. at 555.'°

Congress directed the Secretary “to allocate the water

among users within each State.” Jd. at 579. This

The promotion of agricultural irrigation was also an important

aspect of the Central Valley Project developed under the Reclama-

tion Act of 1902. In Ivanhoe v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958), this

Court explained: “In developing these projects the United States is

expending federal funds and acquiring federal property for a valid

public and national purpose, the promotion of agriculture.” Id. at 294.

Likewise, as there, here “it seems farfetched to foresee the Federal

Government ‘turning its back upon a people... and allowing their

lands to revert to desert.” Jd. at 299.

This congressional concern for promotion of irrigation projects

caused this Court to decide that the City of “Fresno has no preferen-

tial rights to contract for project water, but may receive it only if, in

the Seeretary’s judgment, irrigation will not be adversely affected.

Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627, 631 (1963).

ee

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Nat he

ha ERD OIE: Nis A me WOES

19

“supremacy given the Secretary’s contracts... [included

power] to decide which users within each State would get

water.” Id. at 580. Congress also specifically directed that

the Secretary was to make “no charge .. . for water or for

the use, storage, or delivery of water for irrigation or for

potable purposes in the Imperial or Coachella Valleys.”

BCPA, 43 USC $617. Yet, remarkably, if the SWRCB

orders are allowed to stand, the state will, contrary to

Congressional directive, levy huge charges against IID

for use of Colorado River water.

Federal policy provides that a primary focus of this

national project was to foster reclamation and irrigation

of public’’ and private desert lands for agricultural pur-

poses and pursuits. State policy, according to JID-II,

primarily foeuses on so-called “more important uses.”

IID-II, 225 Cal. App. 3d at 571, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 266,

Appendix, 37.

Article II of the Court’s 1964 decree made clear that

water was to be released for use in California, “only

pursuant to valid contracts therefor made with such users

by the Secretary of Interior, pursuant to Section 5 of the

Boulder Canyon Project Act....” Arizona v. California,

376 U.S. at 343. There was to be no water for “people,

generally, in the state” as approved by the subject opin-

ion — IID-II, 225 Cal. App. 3d at 569, 275 Cal. Rptr. at

264, Appendix, 33-34.

2. Implementation By 43 C.F.R. Part 417

In 1964, the Secretary formally implemented his pow-

ers to supervise the reasonable use and conservation of

water under the Boulder Canyon Project Act and the

In 1942... the District expanded its boundaries to include

271,588 acres of the unpatented public lands.” Bryant, supra, 447

U.S. 360, n. 9. See, IID’s Contract, Art. 23. Appendix, 379.

20

Section 5 contracts by adopting Part 417 of Title 43 of the

Code of Federal Regulations. See supra notes 9-10. On

July 3, 1969, these rules were revised in their entirety “to

establish new procedures for the adoption of recommen-

dations relating to water conservation pvactices in the

diversion, delivery, distribution, and use of Colorado

River water...to the end that deliveries of Colorado

River water to each contractor will not exceed that reason-

ably required for beneficial use.” 34 Fed. Reg.

11,499-11,500 (1969) (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 417).

Except for changes pertaining to Indian reservations

(43 C.F.R. § 417.5), Part 417 is substantially the same in

its eurrent form as adopted in 1964. 43 C.F.R. §417

(1990). IID has conformed to Federal requirements

thereunder. It requires the Regional Director to consult

with contractors (43 C.F.R. § 417.2, Appendix, 344),

make recommendations and determinations (43 C.F.R.

§ 417.3, Appendix, 345) and gives contractors a right to

appeal to the Secretary of the Interior. Jd.

It requires the recommendations and determinations of

the Regional Director to be based on many water manage-

ment factors such as:

the area to be irrigated, climatic conditions, location,

land classifications, the kinds of crops raised, crop-

ping practices, the type of irrigation system in use,

the condition of water carriage and distribution facil-

ities, record of water orders, and rejections of or-

dered water, general operating practices, the

operating efficiencies and methods of irrigation of

"In 1972, Part 417 was revised “to specifically include Indian

reservations and Federal establishments in the group of water users

required to follow conservation practices. ...” 37 Fed. Reg. 18,076-

18,078 (1972) (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 417).

: pe ee a Oe ee eee ee a ee alee eee

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21

the water users, amount and rate of return flows to

the river, municipal water requirements and the per-

tinent provisions of the Contractor’s Boulder Canyon

Project Act water delivery contract.

43 C.F.R. § 417.3, Appendix, 345.'°

Thus, Federal policy and directive vests in the Secre-

tary (1) the contract-making power, (2) the power to

make allocations among users in each state, (3) and the

power to supervise and control the distribution and use of

Colorado River water developed and stored by the Boul-

der Canyon Project. The promotion of successful irriga-

tion projects according to perceived financial capacity of

the agricultural economy was clearly intended.”

3. Summary

It is clear that under Federal policy the Secretary of

Interior has been designated as the decision-maker for

determination of what are reasonable practices for use

including conservation of Colorado River water. He has

implemented this function by adopting 43 C.F.R.

Part 417. This regulation has been applied to IID’s

practices annually since 1965. He considered IID’s prac-

tices to be reasonable and that requiring additional con-

"This specificity of Federal standards for establishing reasonable-

ness stands in stark contrast to the lack of any adopted rules by the

Board and of any enactments by the California Legislature establish-

ing standards for irrigation practices.

*° Although IID was, and still is, obligated to repay the full costs of

construction for the All-American Canal, the obligation was without

an interest cost. Bryant, 447 U.S. at 361, n.10. The ability to sustain a

viable agricultural economy would be seriously burdened by Califor-

nia’s ad hoc effort at “far-reaching change.” //]D-JI, 225 Cal. App. 3d

at 573, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 267, Appendix, 40.

22

servation measures at this time was “economically

infeasible.”” Appendix, 339.

On the other hand, in view of the far-reaching change in

California water law forged by the Court in JID-II, the

SWRCB is now the State’s expert given “supervision over

water waste permitted by anyone in the state, including

IID....” IID-II, 225 Cal. App. 3d at 567, 275 Cal. Rptr. at

264, Appendix, 31. This administrative agency has deter-

mined that IID’s practices are unreasonable.”

The Court of Appeal said that Decision 1600 “[i]n no

way interfered with IID’s contractual and statutory enti-

tlement to Colorado River water, [but] it most certainly

presaged an interference with IID’s utilization of that

water once it traversed the All-American Canal.” Jd. at

562, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 260, Appendix, 24.”

Instead of such intrusive and far-reaching orders,

which result in wholesale reallocations, Congress has

*'The basic rationale — to require IID to financially aid Californi-

ans generally — is clearly stated. See, Decision 1600, 19, 23, 29, 52,

56, 66, Appendix, 174, 179, 184-185, 206, 210, 219-220; WR 84-12, 16,

Appendix, 141; WR 88-20, 44, Appendix, 98. In fact, IID received

good grades from the Board, except for not funding conservation

measures for future strangers. See, WR 88-20, 4-16; Appendix, 59-71.

**At that point the Court discussed Decision 1600's benign require-

ment to prepare “a comprehensive water conservation plan.” Decision

1600, 67, Appendix, 220. As the trial court observed, “Decision 1600

simply requires the District to prepare plans... .” IJD-II, 225 Cal.

App. 3d at 562, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 260, Appendix, 23-24; Statement of

Decision, Appendix, 49. However, the presagement of Decision 1600

certainly became reality in WR 88-20 when the Board ordered IID to

fund the conservation of 100,000 acre feet and retained jurisdiction

to consider requiring IID to fund the cost of far greater conservation

measures.

a

_——

23

proceeded with orderly development of the Colorado seek-

ing to preserve and enhance prior rights.”

B. When State Action Interferes With Congressional

Policy And Directives — “State Law Has No Place”

1, Arizona I

In Arizona I, this Court succinctly stated the pre-

emption principle applicable to the utilization of Colorado

River water by California users with Section 5 contracts.”

It stated:

“(I]t is the Act and the Secretary’s contracts, not

the law of prior appropriation, that controls the

“For example, Congress consented to the Upper Colorado River

Basin compact, executed on October 11, 1948, “in a bill approved by

the President on April 6, 1949, 63 Stat. 31....” (Nathanson, Updat-

ing The Hoover Dam Documents, 97 (1978)); the “Colorado River

Storage Project Act became law on April 11, 1956, 70 Stat. 105” (id.

at 99); Congress was advised about the Secretary's actions and

general principles and operating criteria “were first published in the

Federal Register, 27 F.R. 6851, July 19, 1962” (id. at 107); the

Colorado River Basin Project Act, authorizing the Central Arizona

Project, became law on September 30, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-537, 82

Stat. 885; 43 U.S.C. §§ 1502, et seq. (id. 195-216); Congress contin-

ued its concern with the Mexican Salinity Problem (id. 217-222); the

Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act became law June 24, 1974,

Pub. L. No. 93-320, 88 Stat. 266, 43 U.S.C. 1571 (id. 223-230); on

April 7, 1977 Congress enacted legislation to deal with drought

conditions of 1976-1977, Pub. L. No. 95-18, 91 Stat. 36; appropria-

tions were made to study opportunities for water conservation in

Imperial Irrigation District in 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-336, 94 Stat.

1063, and in 1983 additional appropriations were made to study an

Ail-American Canal relocation project, Pub. L. No. 98-63, 97 Stat.

301, 315, 352.

*4In essence, as the California Supreme Court explained in Ivanhoe

Irrig. Dist. v. All Parties & Persons, 53 Cal.2d 692, 704, 350 P. 2d 69,

24

apportionment of water among the States. Moreover

...the Seeretary in choosing between users within

each State and in settling the terms of his contracts

is not bound by these sections to follow state law.”

Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 586.

‘Where the Government, as here, has exercised this

power and undertaken a comprehensive project for

the improvement of a great river and for the orderly

and beneficial distribution of water, there is no room

for inconsistent state laws.”’

Id. at 587.”

“Section 18 plainly allows the States to do things not

inconsistent with the Project Act or with federal

control of the river, for example, regulation of the use

of tributary water and protection of present per-

fected rights.... What other things the States are

free to do can be decided when the occasion arises.

But where the Secretary’s contracts, as here, carry

out a congressional plan for the complete distribu-

tion of waters to users, state law has no place.”

Id. at 588 (footnote omitted).”

75, 3 Cal. Rptr. 317, 323 (1960), “[t]he federal government with

federal funds has lawfully developed water — project water...

[which] [i]n a very real sense...is...the property of the United

States.”

In Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931), Arizona sought to

restrain Secretary Wilbur from proceeding with construction of

Boulder dam because he had not complied with state law. The Court

dismissed the petition stating, “[t]he United States may perform its

functions without conforming to the police regulations of a state.” Jd.

at 451.

*°An entirely different issue would be presented if IID, pursuant to

Cal. Water Code § 1011 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991), (Appendix, 351),

25

2. California v. United States

California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), does

not detract from previous Supreme Court pronounce-

ments about congressional actions and intentions perti-

nent to the Boulder Canyon Project. In Arizona I, the

Court explained how Congress was dealing with an inter-

national stream system which traverses 1,300 miles before

emptying in the Gulf of California in the Republic of

Mexico. Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 552.

By contrast, California involved the “Central Valley

Project” (California v. United States, 438 U.S. at 647),

and waters “of the Stanislaus River that will be im-

pounded behind the New Melones Dam [which] arise and

flow solely in California.” Jd. at 651. The United States

filed to appropriate unappropriated water and objected to

the Board’s “attached 25 conditions... .” Jd. at 652.

The Court noted that the Reclamation Act of 1902 was

reflective of “‘ ‘cooperative federalism,” (id. at 650) and

stated that the history of reclamation contained a “consis-

tent thread of purposeful and continued deference to

state water law by Congress.” Jd. at 653. However, in

contrast to the Boulder Canyon Project Act, the Reclama-

tion Act of 1902 contemplated that “once the waters were

released from the Dam, their distribution to individual

landowners would again be controlled by state law.” Jd. at

667.

The Court reiterated that “Congress did not intend to

relinquish total control of the actual distribution of the

reclamation water to the States... [and] that state water

law does not control in the distribution of reclamation

were to create conserved water and, with consent of the Secretary,

agree on terms to transfer the conserved water to users on Califor-

nia’s south coastal plain.

26

water if inconsistent with other congressional directives

to the Secretary.” Jd., at 668, n.21 (emphasis in original).

It distinguished the New Melones dam project from the

Boulder Canyon Project “because of the unique size and

multistate scope of the [Boulder Canyon] Project, Con-

gress did not intend the States to interfere with the Secre-

tary’s power to determine with whom and on what terms

water contracts would be made.” Jd. at 674. It held that

California could impose “conditions on the permit

granted to the United States which are not inconsistent

with congressional provisions authorizing the project in

question.” Id.

In sum, as this Court stated in Bryant, when writing

about present perfected rights:

‘While the source of present perfected rights is to be

found in state law, the question of whether rights

provided by state law amount to present perfected

rights within the meaning of § 6 is obviously one of

federal law.”

Bryant, 447 U.S. at 371, n.22.

A fortiori, the reasonableness of irrigation practices

and operational procedures under the Boulder Canyon

Project is also obviously one of federal law to be decided

by the Secretary and as provided in 43 C.F.R. Part 417.

At bar, there is no jurisdiction for the state to adjudi-

eate or regulate in a manner which the United States

considers to be economically infeasible. Doubtless the

intrusive orders will impact IID’s ability to complete

repayment, or perform other obligations to the United

States, and materially disturb the integrity and viability

of Imperial County’s agricultural economy. However, it is

enough that judgment by the Secretary about what consti-

tutes reasonable operating practices for this irrigation

project would be superseded and overridden by California

27

if IJD-II were allowed to stand. The Secretary, by Con-

gressional mandate, by annual reviews, detailed studies,

and three decades of experience, is the decision maker to

supervise conservation of Boulder Canyon Project water

and to reach balanced judgments “[i]n a large complex

situation such as IID....”’ Decision 1600, 26; Appendix,

182.

3. California v. FERC (herein “Rock Creek’’)

This recent unanimous opinion concerned “overlapping

federal and state regulation of a hydroelectric project

located near a California stream.” California v. FERC,

495 U.S. _, 109 L.Ed.2d 474, 483 (1990). It provides

persuasive logic in support of this petition.

FERC had required a “minimum flow rate for the

project at 20 efs. during the entire year... [but] the

WRCB issued an order directing the licensee to comply

with higher minimum flow requirements... .” Jd. at ___,

109 L.Ed.2d at 484.7"

The pre-emption issue turned on “the meaning of § 27

of the FPA....” Id. at , 109 L.Ed.2d at 485. In

analyzing that section, the Court explained:

[T]he meaning of § 27 and the pre-emptive effect of

the FPA are not matters of first;impression. Forty-

four years ago, this Court in First Iowa construed

the section and provided the understanding of the

FPA that has since guided the allocation of state and

federal regulatory authority over hydroelectric

projects.

Id. at __, 109 L.Ed.2d at 485.

“The Board's draft order required “permanent minimum flow rates

of 60 efs. from March through June and 30 cfs. during the remainder

of the year.” Id.

28

Similarly, for the dispute at bar, this Court should

again “decline at this late date to revisit and disturb the

understanding of...{BCPA] set forth in... [An-

zona I\” and adhere to its precedential holdings because

there “has been no sufficient intervening change in...

[federal] law, or indication that... [Arizona I] has

proved unworkable: ...” Jd.

The “broad and paramount federal regulatory role”’

(id. at 487), established by the FPA for the Federal

Power Commission was similar, in nature, to that estab-

lished by the Boulder Canyon Project Act for the Secre-

see

tary. The Boulder Canyon Project Act has, also, “ ‘seen

careful, intense, and sustained congressional attention’.

Id. at 487. See supra note 23.

To permit the subject opinion to stand would condone

‘* ‘a dual system of futile duplication’.”’ Jd. at 488. There is

“no room or need for conflicting state controls” of IID’s

irrigation project. Jd. In the BCPA “ ‘there is no sugges-

tion that the two agencies both shall have final author-

ity.” Id. Finally, “[a]llowing California to impose

significantly higher... requirements would disturb and

conflict with the balance... [determined by the Secre-

tary].” Id. at 491.

VI

CONCLUSION

Any fair comparison of benefit/cost relationships would

make ludicrous the results of WR 88-20 which ordered

IID to fund all economic costs.” IID’s farmers would

**For example, as between MWD and IID, comparative population

(14.5 million v. 100,000), assessed valuation ($597 billion v. $2.5

billion), and annual revenues ($495 million v. $24 million) suggest

that MWD’s water hardship should not be converted into an economic

disaster for IID. Clearly, MWD can more easily afford the cost of

hor ay 4

~ ee ne en

29

gain nothing in the form of increased crop yields or

higher crop prices by funding the conservation facilities.

However, if the coastal users provided the funding, they

would receive additional supplies at costs much less than

other potential new supplies. The Secretary was sensitive

to these very basic but important economic considera-

tions, but the Board was not. It knew that farmers were

“experiencing economic hardship” (WR 88-20, 19, Appen-

dix, 73), but cavalierly directed that “the possibility of

funding certain conservation measures with revenue from

electrical power sales should be investigated.” Jd. at 20,

Appendix, 74. Principles of basic fairness, utilized in a

balanced judgment by the Secretary and deeply embed-

ded in law, have been overlooked by the Board. See, ¢.g.,

Nollan v. California Coastal Comm., 483 U.S. 825, 841-842

(1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of

Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318-319

(1987); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S.

725, 752-753 (1950). “No reason appears why those who

get the waters should be spared from making whole those

from whom they are taken.”

creating conserved water for its benefit, than those who brave the

desert clime to produce food and fiber for the Nation's well-being.

30

Because California, contrary to the BCPA and binding

precedent, has intruded upon the Secretary’s powers and

obligations to supervise and control the distribution,

conservation, and use of Colorado River water, this Court

should issue a writ of certiorari to review the subject

opinion.

Respectfully submitted,

HORTON, KNOX, CARTER & FOOTE

AND

JENNINGS, ENGSTRAND &

HENRIKSON

A Professional Law Corporation

By:

Paul D. Engstrand

Attorneys for Petitioner

Imperial Irrigation District

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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