Petition for Writ of Certiorari — In re Cournoyer

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~ ~e Supreme Court, U.S.

90-1874) OT ED

. JUN 4 9

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No. orn oF me cum |

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

IN RE: ARTHUR COURNOYER,

Petitioner,

PETITION FOR

AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

ROBERT D. POWELL

LAW OFFICES OF

ROBERT D. POWELL, P.C.

2033 M Street, N.W.

Suite 703

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 223-5140

Attorney for Petitioner.

June 4, 1991

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QUESTION PRESENTED

DID THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RHODE ISLAND VIO-

LATE PETITIONER’S RIGHTS UNDER THE 14 TH

AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED

STATES BY ORDERING THE DESTRUCTION OF NON-

OFFENDING FIXTURES AND PERSONAL PROPERTY

LAWFULLY PLACED ON HIS REALTY AS A METHOD

OF ENFORCING A CONTEMPT DECREE, WITHOUT

HOLDING A HEARING SPECIFICALLY FOCUSED ON

THE VALIDITY OF THOSE ITEMS BEING ON PETI-

TIONER’S PROPERTY?

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED. .........-00000000

TABLE OF CONTENTS, 0.00 cc cccccccsccccvsnes

JURISDICTION 2... ccc ccc crc ceneeeeennncvens

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED.......

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .... 0... ese eeeecees

REASONS FOR ALLOWING THIS REQUEST FOR

ISSUANCE OF EXTRAORDINARY WRIT.........

CONCLUSION 0.0 ccc ccc cer cc ees e sce nnesees

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Avery v. Midland County, Texas, 390 U.S. 474, 20

L.Ed.2d 45, 86 S.Ct. 1114 (1968) ............6.-

Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust and Savings v. Hill, 281 U.S.

673, 74 L.Ed. 1107, 50 S.Ct. 451 (1930)..........

Deauville Associates, Inc., v. Eristave Tchitcherine, 173

Fae Fae Gee Ge BOUND 622s 60k 6 ane eRe as 6S

De Beers Consol. Mines v. U.S., 325 U.S. 212, 89 L.Ed.

om Fe Re | ere ee ee

Ex Parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 91 L.Ed. 2041, 67 S.Ct.

tS pre cere ie CCN Tres

Far East Conf. v. U.S., 342 U.S. 570, 96 L.Ed. 576, 72

FoR gi Pre errr ee ee

Herbert v. State of Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 47 S.Ct. 103

House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 89 L.Ed. 739, 65 S.Ct. 517

| Pe er are ree sa on eer

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Cases, continued: Page

Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 407, 42 L.Ed. 215, 17 S.Ct.

DCCL Chh CASS SES ae na 6ceesecceoserecs 7

In re 620 Church St. Bldg., 299 U.S. 24, 81 L.Ed. 16,

DCR E CLS Sow eeéccessesececcsvess 6

Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy v. NRC, 479 U.S.

1312, 93 L.Ed.2d 692, 107 S.Ct. 682 (1986) ........... 5

Statutory Provisions, and the Constitution

of the United States:

1. Section 1, Amendment 14 to the Constitution of the

sees ck eben ee 6 bas sks esesece 2

EL SRcS Ga Rhee bce sc ceaecereserces 1

APPENDICES:

Appendix A — Order of the Honorable Justice Giannini,

PS) ) re Loti eakeweeues cee hae: ae

Appendix B — Order of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island,

March 28, 1991,...... yee e na ewe es bee ebeenees: 3a

Appendix C — Order of the Honorable Justice Giannini,

ae ee Pewee e686 eben e sees 4a

Appendix D - Supplemental Order, Honorable Justice

ae ) ee ee a 7a

Appendix E — Order of the Honorable Justice Giannini,

February 20, 1991............ cea es i eeeeeees . 9a

Appendix F — Order of the Supreme Court of Rhode

Island, November 16, 1990........ Leh ekGik bcs ss 808

Appendix G — Decree of the Honorable Justice Giannini,

February 22, 1990.......... Pek See es be be esos. 13a

Appendix H ~ Decree of the Honorable Justice Giannini,

l6a

February 21, 1990,........ : cece beeveaesteeer

w/attached transcript pages from honing of

POwrwaty ZI, 1GDG, 2. ccc cc cence sccvces .. 17a-19a

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

IN RE: ARTHUR COURNOYER,

Petitioner,

PETITION FOR

AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction of the Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

1651 (a). This Petition seeks the issuance of the extra-

ordinary writ of certiorari under said section, directed

to the orders of the Superior Court of Rhode Island,

dated February 20, 1991, and March 11, 1991, which

order, in part, the demolition of Petitioner’s garage, and

demolition or removal and sale of his house trailer, and

the removal and sale of his duly registered vehicles,

directing that review of said matters be brought directly

before this Court.

i aaa

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

Petitioner relies on a portion of Section 1 of the 14th

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, to

wit:

No state shall make or enforce any law which

shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-

zens of the United States; nor shall any state de-

prive any person of life, liberty or property with-

out due process of law; nor deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner’s history with the Town of Lincoln, Rhode

Island, extends back to 1958, and marches through a

massive amount of litigation. See Cournoyer v. ZBR of

Lincoln, 92 R.I. 42, 166 A.2d 128 (1960); Town of Lin-

coln v. Cournoyer, 95 R.I. 20, 186 A.2d 728 (1962);

Town of Lincoln v. Cournoyer, 102 R.I. 512, 232 A.2d

124 (1967); Cournoyer v. Sharkey, 107 R.I. 373, 267

A.2d 722 (1970); Town of Lincoln v. Cournoyer, R.I.

290 A.2d 600 (R.I. 1976); Town of Lincoln v. Courno-

yer, —R.L-, 375 A.2d 410 (R.I. 1977); Town of Lin-

coln v, Cournoyer, —R.I.— (Appeal #90-145A, sum-

marily dismissed November 16, 1990). All this litigation

stems from a Town Zoning Ordinance placing Petition-

er’s land in a residential zone, after it had been used for

many years in a commercial enterprise, a junk yard for

truck parts. Petitioner, in response to the Town’s initial

attempt to enforce its newly enacted ordinance, claimed

“grandfather” rights. Somehow, these rights were waived,

and a consent decree was passed in which Petitioner was

wel

3

alleged to have agreed to conform his use of his property

to the ordinance.

Throughout this litigation, Petitioner has claimed that

he had never authorized the original consent decree of

1958, which consented to his waiver of his “grandfather

rights” under the Town of Lincoln’s zoning ordinance

so assiduously enforced since 1958. He has never had a

hearing on that claim, and all parties involved at the time

in 1958, are deceased, save Petitioner.

Petitioner was incarcerated at least five times for con-

tempt of court for failing to clear junked trucks and parts

from his property. These parts have repeatedly been

cleared off the land, and sold, the proceeds going to pay

for administrative expenses. After the fifth imprisonment,

the property was entirely cleared of all property in con-

formance with the Town’s Zoning Ordinance. It is

cleared as of this day.

As part of the Superior Court’s order of February 22,

1990, for the stated purpose of depriving Petitioner of

ever again being able to defy a Court order regarding his

non-conforming use of his property (See Appendix H),

Petitioner was ordered to remove from his property his

house trailer, his garage, and several lawfully registered

vehicles. The garage was built on Petitioner’s property

pursuant to a lawful building permit. Petitioner attempt-

ed to introduce the permit into evidence, but no hearing

was conducted concerning its validity. Neither the Town

of Lincoln nor any of the Petitioner’s neighbors had com-

plained about the garage. Petitioner’s house trailer was

upon his property and served as his home prior to any

ordinance precluding it. He obtained and sought to

introduce affidavits to that effect, but no hearing was

ever held concerning this alleged pre-existing usage. No

one had ever complained about the house trailer.

[a

4

Finally, Petitioner maintains four registered vehicles

on his property, that may not be classified as “junk” or

“scrap,” and these have not been complained of by the

Town or his neighbors, yet the order requires their re-

moval and sale.

It should also be noted that Petitioner was sentenced

to serve six months at the Adult Correctional Institute

of Rhode Island for Contempt of Court on February 22,

1990, sentence suspended. The suspension was vacated

on March 11, 1991, and he began serving that sentence

on that date. He was released on his own recognizance

on May 9, 1991. An application for a writ of Habeas

Corpus, filed in the U.S. District Court for Rhode Island,

was denied on May 30, 1991, the stated grounds being

that petitioner had not yet exhausted all of his state

court remedies, as the appeal referenced below is pend-

ding. The District Court did not reach the merits of the

case.

Petitioner sought a stay of the Superior Court’s Order,

as it pertained to these items of property referred to

above, seeking a hearing on his rights under Section 1,

Amendment 14 to the U.S. Constitution. The Superior

Court refused to stay its order, but authorized that the

subject be briefed. Petitioner and counsel for the Town

of Lincoln submitted briefs. Petitioner sought only a

hearing to provide him with an opportunity to be heard

on the validity of the placement of his garage, house

trailer, and vehicles. The Court denied additional hear-

ings, ruling the matter res judicata, although no specific

hearing on the subject had ever been held. An applica-

tion for an interlocutory stay was made to the Supreme

Court of Rhode Island. Its ruling was that a stay would

not issue, as the matter was res judicata. ie

5

Petitioner has appealed the Superior Court’s Orders of

February 20, 1991, and March 11, 1991, to the Supreme

Court of Rhode Island. In addition to his Section 1, 14th

Amendment rights, Petitioner will assert in that court

rights under the 4th and 9th Amendments to the Consti-

tution, Given its ruling on Petitioner’s stay request, there

is no doubt that the Supreme Court of Rhode Island will

dismiss Petitioner’s appeal.

Petitioner presented an application for injunctive

relief to Justice Souter, on May 17, 1991, Case No.

A-869, which application was denied on May 18, 1991.

REASONS FOR ALLOWING THIS REQUEST FOR

ISSUANCE OF AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT

With Justice Scalia’s decision and caution in Ohio Citt-

zens for Responsible Energy, Inc., v. NRC, 479 U.S.

1312, 93 L.Ed.2d 692, 107 S.Ct. 682 (1986), squarely

in mind, as well as Rule 20 of this Court’s Rules, it is sub-

mitted that absent the issuance of a writ of certiorari

herein, Petitioner’s lawful residence will be destroyed or

sold; his garage, a lawful fixture on his property, will be

destroyed, and his lawfully registered vehicles, used by

him in his business, will be sold. The res that would be

the basis for review by this Court of the what would

no doubt be the ultimate and negative decision of the

Supreme Court of Rhode Island, would no longer exist.

Should this Court ultimately find the state actions below

unconstitutional, the decision would be of little solace to

the Petitioner. He would be left with an invitation

toward further litigation, and little more, and confront a

hardship in awaiting the finalization of the appeal pro-

cess. United States Alkali Export Association v. U.S.,

325 U.S. 196, 89 L.Ed. 1554, 65 S.Ct. 1120 (1945).

This Court clearly has authority to resort to the com-

mon law wnt of certiorari, in aid of its jurisdiction,

pei

ny

Cnited States halt Export cdyss'n. supra: Far East Con-

Jerence & ULS., 342 U.S. 370, Yo Lied. 576, 72 S.Ct.

#92 (1952); House ve, Mayu, 324 U.S. 42, 89 L.Ed. 739,

65 S.Ct. 317 (1945); dn re 620 Church St. Bldg, 299

U.S. 24, 81 L.Ed. 16, 57 S.Ct. 88 (1936), especially when

Petitioner will suffer great harm awaiting the appeal pro-

cess to be fulfilled. .tlkali Export .iss'n., supra, More-

over, at this juncture, given the ruling of the Supreme

Court of Rnode Island on Petitioner’s request for a stay,

it is safe to say that the sole appellate relief available to

Petitioner on the important constitutional issues raised

herein will be in this Court. Under these extraordinary

circumstances, where an appeal in a state court is mani-

fesdy inadequate, the extraordinary relief herein re-

quested is warranted Ex Parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258,

91 L.Ed. 2041, 67 S.Ct. 1558 (19+7).

Section | of the 14th Amendment clearly applies to

the issues at hand, including actions of the Rhode Island

judiciary. Brinkerhosf-Faris Trust and Savings v. Hill,

281 U.S. 673, 74 L.Ed. 1107, 50 S.Ct. 45: (1930); Steel

Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 93 L.Ed. 1544, 69 S.Ct.

1291 (1949); very v. Midland County, Texas, 390 U.S.

+74, 20 L.Ed.2d 45, 86 S.Ct 1114 (1968).

In the instant case, Petitioner submitted to the Rhode

Island courts that all offending property had been cleared

from his realty prior to the Superior Court's orders of

February 20 and March 11, 1991. An order had been

passed one year pnor, on February 22, 1990, dealing

with his house trailer, garage and vehicles, which he be-

lieved were not covered by orders of years passed, and

which dealt with property not offensive to anyone. The

stated purpose for including the garage, trailer, and vehi-

cles Was to insure that Petitioner did no turther business

“3

on his property (See Appendix H). But they were luw-

fully on his property, and have uses other than business

uses. He asked to be heard on this specific issue, as

recently as March 1991, Luc found the courthouse doors

closed to him. In effect, his property is being taken

from him, destroyed, or will be sold, as part of the con-

tempt process, without specific hearing or process, in

direct violation of this Court’s holding, limited to its

facts, of Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409, 42 L.Ed. 215,

17 S.Ct. 841 (1897). Also see Brinkerhoss-Fans Trust

and Savings v. Hill, wherein Justice Brandeis, speaking

for the Court, said

whether acting through its judiciary or through its

legislature, a state may not deprive a person of all

existing remedies for the enforcement of a right,

which the state has no power to destroy, unless

there is, or was, afforded to him some real oppor-

tunity to protect it. (281 U.S. 673, at 682).

A court should not prescribe, as a means to enforce its

orders, that its doors be closed to one in contempt in de-

fense of either his liberty or property. Deauville Assoct-

ates, Inc., v. Eristave Tchitcherine, 173 F.2d 745 (5th

Cir. 1949).

The enforcement of the Rhode Island Court’s Order

wouild fall squarely within this caveat, and the Hovey

pronibitions. In the instant case, without regard to Peti-

tioner’s constitutional rights, the Superior Court sought

to enforce its orders by means other than fines or im-

prisonment, without proper process. This was inappro-

priate and beyond the Court’s judicial power, Deauville

.issuciates, supra. When a court so acts bevond its judi-

clal power, its actions exemplify not mere error, but a

usurpation of power. I[t is this sort of a situation that

calis for the application of section 1651. De Beers

Consol. Mines v. U.S., 325 U.S. 212, 89 L.Ed. S06, 65

S.Ct. 1130 (1945).

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment does not take up the statutes of the several

states and make them the test of what it requires,

nor does it enable this court to reverse the decisions

of the State Courts on questions of state law. What

it does require is that state action, whether through

one agency or another, shall be consistent with the

fundamental principles of liberty and justice, which

lie at the base of all our civil and political institu-

tions. Herbert v. State of Louisiana, 272 U.S.

312 (1926), at p. 316.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner asks for the issuance of an extraordinary

writ of certiorari bringing the issue of the Superior Court

of Rhode Island’s actions with respect to his constitu-

tional rights directly before this Court. In effect, Peti-

tioner asks only for due process of law.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT D. PowELL

.lttomey sor Arthur Cournoyer

June +, 1991

eT rete a

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APPENDIX A

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

PROVIDENCE, SC.

EQUITY NO. 26210

SUPERIOR COURT

TOWN OF LINCOLN

VS

JOSEPH A. COURNOYER

ORDER

This matter came to be heard before the Court, the

Honorable Justice Giannini presiding, upon respondent's

hearing concerning constitutional issues. The issues were

submitted on memorandum by the respondent and peti-

tioner replied. The memoranda were supplemented by

oral argument on April 29, 1991. After hearing thereon

and consideration thereof, it is hereby

ORDERED as follows:

1. Respondents’ request to present memoranda of law

conceming constitutional issues having been granted and

heard shall further be treated as a motion to reconsider

and amend the Court’s order dated February 20, 1990.

2. As such, respondent’s motion to reconsider and

amend is denied.

3. In doing so, the Court finds that the Supreme Court

Order dated November 16, 1990 rendered final ull issues

relative to the arguments presently argued.

2a

+. Had said arguments been presented to the Superior

Court prior to the Court's order dated February 20, 1990

the Superior Court would have found Mr. Cournoyer’s

constitutional rights not to have been violated by the pro-

cess followed in this case.

BY ORDER

ENTER

Justice of the Superior Court

PRESENTED BY:

/s/ James P. Marusak

James P. Marusak

GIDLEY, LOVEGREEN & SARLI

70 Westminster Street

Providence, Rhode Island 02903

3a

APPENDIX B

SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND

No, 91-132-A.

Town of Lincoln

v.

Joseph Coumoyer.

ORDER

The defendant’s motion to stay the order of the Su-

perior Court entered in this matter on March 11, 1991 is

denied. The Special Master’s motion to remand the

Papers in this matter to the Superior Court for hearing

scheduled for April 2, 1991 is granted. Following said

hearing the papers shall be returned to this court forth-

with,

Mrs. Justice Murray did not participate.

Entered as an Order of this Court this 28th day of

March 1991.

By Order,

/s/ Beverly A. Clark per

Matthew J. Smith

Clerk

tu

APPENDIX C

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

PROVIDENCE, SC. SUPERIOR COURT

Equity + 26210

TOWN OF LINCOLN

VS.

JOSEPH A. COURNOYER, ET AL.

ORDER

This matter came to be heard before the Superior

Court, Mr. Justice Gianinni presiding, on March 11, 1991,

upon continuation of the Status Hearing of February 15,

1991.

After hearing thereon and consideration thereof it 1s

hereby

ORDERED, as follows:

1. The suspension of the six month sentence imposed

on February 15, 1991 is hereby vacated; the Respondent

having failed to remove the violating vehicles, structures

and materials as ordered.

2. The Respondent is ordered to serve six months in

the Adult Correctional Institution.

3. At the request of the Respondent's counsel the

hearing on the Special Masters request for payment of his

fees from funds on deposit in the Registry of the Court is

hereby continued to Apni 1, 1991 at 10 a.m.

CC OSSGDSS ST

5a

+. The Special Master is ordered to make arrangements

for the demolition of the garage; the sale of all materials

and vehicles in the garage; the sale of all vehicles and

plows now on the premises with the exception of the

Respondent’s passenger vehicle and the removal or demvu-

lition of the house trailer present on the premises.

5. The Respondent is assessed, and shal] remain re-

sponsible to pay for, all costs and fees incurred in the

prosecution of this Order and all other prior Orders of

the Court.

6. In order to obtain the services to be engaged and

the goods to be sold at appropriate values, the Special

Master is directed to seek said services and sales by com-

petitive bidding where feasible.

7. The Special Master is directed to advertise for a

contract or contracts for services for the demolition and/

or removal of the garage and trailer and to advertise for

the sale of the contents of the garage and all other vehi-

cles and items noted above. The Special Master shall en-

deavor to solicit at least three (3) competitive bids for the

items of service and sale which bids shall be opened and

awarded in open Court on a date certain to be selected

by the Special Master. The Master shall retain the right to

reject all bids and to go onto the open market with the

approval of the court for good cause shown.

8. To effectuate prompt payment for any and all ser-

vices and fees incurred pursuant hereto, the proceeds of

any sale of goods and the amounts now on deposit with

the Registry of the Court shall first be applied. If the

costs and fees exceed said amount recovered and on de-

posit, then the excess shall be paid by the Town of Lin-

coln. Any amounts so expended by the Town shall be

added to the amounts constituting a continuing lien upon

the Respondent’s property. All sums due to the Town of

————

a a < Nee

a — ———

6a

Lincoln may ultimately be recouped pursuant to fore:

closure and sale of the Respondent’s property alter fur-

ther hearing by the Court.

9. The Respondent's request to present Memorand’ of

Law concerning constitutional issues is granted. Respénd-

ent shall present any such memorandum on or before

March 22, 1991 and the Petitioner shall submit its reply

on or before April 10, 1991.

10. The Respondent's request for a stay of implemen-

tation of this Order is denied.

BY ORDER

/s/ Shirley A. Connelly, Asst. Clerk

ENTER

/s/ Giannini, P.J./Rel.)

Justice of the Superior Court

Dated: March 15, 1991

Presented by

/s/ James P. Marusak

James P. Marusak

GIDLEY, LOVEGREEN & SARLI

170 Westminster Street

Providence, RI 02903

ee 2

7a

APPENDIX D

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

PROVIDENCE, SC. SUPERIOR COURT

Equity # 26210

TOWN OF LINCOLN

VS.

JOSEPH A. COURNOYER, ET AL.

SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER

This matter came to be heard before the Superior

Court, Mr. Justice Gianinni presiding, on March 11, 1991,

upon Respondent’s Motion to clarify paragraph ++ of the

Order submitted by the Special Master and dated Febru-

ary 20, 1991.

After hearing thereon and consideration thereof it is

hereby

ORDERED, as follows:

That paragraph #4 of the Order submitted by the Spe-

cial Master on or about February 20, 1991 is hereby sup-

plemented to reflect the clear intent of the Bench deci-

sion issued on February 15, 1991 which intent was

plainly made known to all parties at that time.

As further detailed in said Bench Decision, by directing

the Respondent “to clean up his property’? the Court

required Mr. Cournoyer to remove all vehicles from his

8a

premises other than his personal passenger vehicle, as well

as all other structures and materials delineated in the

Order.

BY ORDER

/s/ Shirley A. Connelly, Asst. Clerk

ENTER

/s/ Giannini, P. J. (Ret.)

Justice of the Superior Court

Dated: March 15, 1991

Presented by:

/s/ James P. Marusak

James P. Marusak

GIDLEY, LOVEGREEN & SARLI

170 Westminster Street

Providence, RI 02903

| 9a

i APPENDIX E

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

PROVIDENCE, SC. SUPERIOR COURT

EQUITY NO. 26210

TOWN OF LINCOLN

VS.

JOSEPH A. COURNOYER, et al.

ORDER

This matter came on to be heard before Judge Gian-

nini, Presiding Justice of this Court, on February 15,

1991, upon status hearing and upon the Special Master's

request for payment of his fees from the funds on de-

posit in the Registry of the Court; and after hearing

1 thereon and consideration thereof, it is hereby

ee aga eta tie "ie

ORDERED

1. That Respondent is adjudged to be in civil con-

tempt of the Orders of the Superior Court.

2. Respondent is hereby sentenced to serve a term of

six months at the Adult Correctional Institution.

3. The purpose for the sentence is to get the Respond-

ent to clean up his property.

+. Respondent is directed to clean up his property,

to tear down the garage, and to remove the house trailer.

If these are done by March 8, 1991, Respondent will not

go to jail.

eee

10a

5. The sentence of six months for civil contempt is

hereby suspended to see what the Respondent does about

this matter by March 8, 1991.

6. This matter is continued to March 8, 1991, at

10:00 a.m. for a status hearing.

7. The request for payment of fees by the Special

Master shall be considered by the Court at the continua-

tion of this hearing on March 8, 1991, at 10:00 a.m.

By order,

/s/ Ilegible

Deputy Clerk 2-20-91

ENTER:

/s/ Giannini, P. J.

Presiding Justice of the

Superior Court

DATED: February 20, 1991

PRESENTED BY:

/s/ Joseph T. Little

JOSEPH T. LITTLE, ESQUIRE 7

Special Master 2

225 Waterman Avenue

P.O. Box 14198

East Providence, RI 02914

434-3800

lla

APPENDIX F

SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND

No. 90-145-Appeal.

Town of Lincoln

ve

Joseph A. Cournoyer, et al.

ORDER

~ 4s8 Case came before this court for oral argument on

",ovember 5, 1990. Both parties had been ordered to

show cause why the issues raised by this appeal should

not be summarily decided. Defendant is appealing his

contempt conviction. The conviction arises out of the

defendant’s failure to comply with a court decree order-

ing him to clean up his property. Defendant alleges that

the Superior Court judge exceeded his authority in order-

ing defendant to remove his trailer home and garage

from his property, and in enjoining defendant from keep-

ing more than one registered vehicle on the property.

After careful consideration of the arguments and

memoranda submitted by the parties, this court finds

that cause has not been shown. Accordingly, we sum-

marily decide that the trial judge did not exceed his

authority in entering the above order.

Therefore, defendants’ appeal is denied and dismissed.

The decision of the Superior Court is hereby affirmed.

es

12a

Entered as an Order of this Court this 16th day of

November 1990.

By Order,

/s/ Beverly A. Clark

Matthew J. Smith

Clerk

Mr. Chief Justice Fay did not participate.

ae hae ee ae ee ee ee ee ee eee ee ee ee ee oe ail aes

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APPENDIX G

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

PROVIDENCE, SC. SUPERIOR COURT

EQUITY NO. 26210

TOWN OF LINCOLN

VS

ARTHUR COURNOYER

DECREE

This matter came on for hearing on February 22, 1990,

before Presiding Justice Giannini for the imposition of

sanctions to be imposed upon the Defendant, Arthur

Cournoyer, based upon the Bench Decision of February

21, 1990; and after hearing arguments of counsel, it is

hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED:

1. Defendant is sentenced to the A.C.I. for a period of

six (6) months.

2. Said sentence is suspended upon the following con-

ditions:

A. Defendant is required to clear from that land all

vehicles, all parts of vehicles, all tires, all lumber, and all

debris. Defendant does not have to clear those trees

which might be uprooted and in a natural state.

B. Defendant is to remove anything that is inside

the garage.

l4a

C. The garage must be removed from the land

either by removal of the garage from the land or by the

demolition of same with the rubbish and rubble from

said demolition removed from the land.

D. Defendant is permitted to retain and drive on

the land one vehicle, a 1979 Ford automobile with the

present registration number WW 162. No other vehicles

are allowed on the land.

E. In the event that it is necessary for Defendant

to bring additional vehicles on the land to effectuate the

cleanup of the land, the Defendant is directed to call the

Special Master, Mr. Little, or his attorney, Charles Rogers,

to obtain permission from Presiding Justice Giannini to

bring any other vehicles onto the property.

F. The Defendant has until April 30, 1990 to clear

the land, demolish or remove the garage and clear every-

thing that is in the garage.

G. The house trailer on the premises must also be

removed from the premises by April 30, 1990.

3. This case is continued for further hearing on Thurs-

day, March 1, 1990, provided a Motion is filed by the

Defendant prior to that time.

4. The Lincoln Police Department is hereby advised

that the only vehicle allowed on the Cobble Hill Road

property is a 1979 Ford with registration of WW 162.

The Police Department is hereby advised that after March

1, 1990, there are to be periodic and random inspections

of that real estate on a daily basis, one of which inspec-

tions must be between midnight and 5:00 a.m. The pur-

pose of the inspections is to insure that no vehicles are

on the premises other than the 1979 Ford with the regis-

tration of WW 162.

15a

5. Mr. Little, Special Master, is directed to arrange to

video tape the entire premises including the interior of

the garage prior to February 28, 1990. In addition, the

entire 30 odd acres must be video taped.

6. The Special Master is directed to go on the land on

May lst and no later than May 5th to video tape the

garage, the contents of same and the entire 30 acres of

the premises.

7. The Special Master, is hereby directed to arrange

for both video tapes to be viewed by the Court on Mon-

day, May 7, 1990.

8. This matter is continued for further hearing on

Monday, May 7, 1990, at 10:00 a.m.

9. Nothing contained herein will prevent the Town

from moving that the suspension of the 6-months sen-

tence be removed if the Town is of the opinion that this

Order has been violated. The Town may present a Motion

to have the Defendant adjudged in contempt.

ENTERED as a Decree of this Court this day of

February, A.D. 1990.

By Order,

Clerk

ENTER:

JUDGE

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APPENDIX H

SUPERIOR COURT OF RHODE ISLAND

EQUITY NO. 26210

TOWN OF LINCOLN

VS

ARTHUR COURNOYER

DECREE

This matter came on for hearing on February 21. 1990,

before Presiding Justice Giannini on the Motion filed by

the Plaintiff, Town of Lincoln, who adjudged the Defend-

ant in Contempt. On the basis of the findings of fact con-

tained in the Bench Decision of February 21, 1990, it is

hereby

ORDERED, AD]UDGED and DECREED:

1. That the Defendant has violated the zoning ordi-

nance of the Town of Lincoln and is in contempt of the

Decree of this Court entered on February 18, 1958.

ENTERED as a Decree of this Court this day of

February, A.D. 1990.

By order,

ENTER: Clerk

JUDGE

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[Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings of

February 21, 1990]

[12] THE COURT: I’m going to discuss this proposal,

but before I do, I want to make some comments on state-

ments made by Mr. Ragers on behalf of this respondent.

The first statement is that what I heard this morning is in

large measure just a rehash of everything I heard in the

courtroom. The same arguments have been made. I heard

him say that Mr. Little isn’t doing anything. It’s not for

him to judge. That’s for me to judge. I have heard him

talk about his trailer and where he has to live. I have

made a ruling on that. I made a ruling with regard to the

garage. I see the garage as the means by which he is able

to conduct an illegal business in a residential zone. Now,

whether that ruling is correct or not in light of the pur-

ported building permit for that garage is another matter.

Supreme Court has that. There was evidence in the record

that there was no building permit issued, and there is no

contradictory evidence to that.

Now, there are a couple of things that were said by Mr.

Rogers that I think ought to be said, even though largely

it’s merely a rehash. This business about the tar-filled

trailer and it being the source of a large amount of the

$25,000 estimate given to Mr. Little by Metals Recycling,

as to that, it doesn’t seem to the Court to mean anything

that no one has ever moved it. It’s Mr. Cournoyer’s re-

sponsibility to move it. And whether the Town had

moved it, and probably spent a large amount of money

in doing so, and charged it to Mr. Cournoyer, or if Mr.

Couroyer is responsible to move it and pays a lot of

money to do it, or if Mr. Little gets Metals Recycling to

do it for a lot of money, it’s all going to come out of

Mr. Cournoyer’s pocket. The fact that it hasn’t been

moved before doesn’t change anything. It’s got to be

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moved. And whether it was moved in Judge Pettine’s

order and the costs charged to Mr. Cournoyer, or

whether Mr. Cournoyer is required to move it now, it

all comes out to the same thing, Mr. Cournoyer is

going to pay for it.

With respect to Mr. Cournoyer’s inability to clean

that place up now because he’s in prison, that man was

given better than two months to clear it up, and he

defied the Superior Court. And now he’s claiming that

he can’t comply because he’s incarcerated. That’s trying

to have it both ways. It’s up to him to figrue out a way.

The way Mr. Little was able to get hold of Metals Recy-

cling, Mr. Cournoyer can do the same thing. If he’s able

to use the telephone to talk to reporters, he’s able to call

Metals Recycling and probably some established junk

dealers to find out how to go about doing it. I don’t

accept the argument that his incarceration prevents him

from dealing with people on the outside. I would have

to have John Moran, Director of Corrections, tell me

that. I would have to have John Moran tell me that

people who are incarcerated cannot do business on the

outside, if that’s a legal business. Unfortunately, there

are people who are incarcerated who have no trouble

conducting illegal business on the outside.

With regard to this question that it’s unreasonable to

expect Mr. Cournoyer to clean this area without the use

of a couple of trucks, flies absolutely in the face of what

the Court said on the record in the courtroom. The Court

recognized in entering this order that in addition to the

use of that garage, the other means by which Mr. Cour-

noyer was able to conduct this illegal business was to be

able to use a pick-up and a tow truck.

* * *

19a

[22] Now, the cleanup must include everything that is in

that garage. That garage is the source of Mr. Cournoyer’s

violation of this zoning ordinance. If that garage is elimi-

nated, he’s not going to have any place to work. But if

the Supreme Court says that my ruling in that regard is

improper, then at least the material in that garage must

be removed, because there is no [23] question in my

mind that whatever is in that garage is used to further this

illegal conduct of the business.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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