Amicus Curiae Brief — Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. United States
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Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
CP JUN 2 1 yegt
No. 90-1800 | QEFICE OF THE CLERK
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Gnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1990
GRUMMAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
if
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To
The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Federal Circuit
SHIPBUILDERS COUNCIL OF AMERICA
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONER, GRUMMAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION
JOHN G. DEGOOYER
Counsel of Record
RONALD A. UITz
HopKINS & SUTTER
888 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 835-8000
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
Shipbuilders Council of America
PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE AMICUS AND ITS INTERESTS ..................0000. 1
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ........... 4
I.
il.
IMPORTANT POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES OF
THE CONTRACT DISPUTES ACT ARE FRUS-
TRATED BY THE DECISION OF THE COURT
OT ia scoacatcneainathecadmicibbneiguie atiaetansamnttnecaneie 6
THIS COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS SUPER-
VISORY JURISDICTION TO CORRECT THE UN-
PRECEDENTED AND PATENTLY ERRONEOUS
READING GIVEN THE_CONTRACT DISPUTES
ACT AND THE FAR CERTIFICATION REGULA-
SEE ES EMRE CAFURE BAIA cocsecescssesteseresnveies 13
PETIT snnisevehseseneeshsdgetinntannesiniantennbediiteseapwaonin 18
il
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: Page
Alaska Lumber and Pulp Co., Inc., AGBCA No. 82-
107-1, 1990 Westlaw 34704 (March 20,
SUED séninsdinicnctseisdemanneuaie madame ee 12
Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 182 (1982) woo... eee. 13
Chemical Manufacturers Ass’n v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985) .... 13
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) occ ceeeeee 13
Columbia Mfg. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 715 F.2d 1409
rN a nA 17
Crandon v. United States, 110 S.Ct. 997 (1990) ... 14
Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Sena-
torial Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. 27
SINE D cetbiecndecevdesbnnbasaeducsusdasiadmmeenese ae aene 13
Linn Timber, Inc., AGBCA No. 89-194-1, 90-1 BCA
YE CD vesscnccevecnexsseteccunnaieee 17
Little River Lumber v. United States, 21 Cl.Ct. 527
RUUD | Scccsnctenscesamanuaticerctisssanekdsata ee ae 12,17
Sullivan v. United States, 4 Cl.Ct. 70 (1983), aff'd,
742 F.2d 628 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) ... 17
United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864 (1977) ... 17
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941) ... 17
STATUTES:
Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563,
92 Stat. 2383 (41 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq.) .... 4,passim
Sec. 2(4), 41 U.S.C. § 601(4) .0.............cccccceee. 15
Sec. 6(cX1), 41 U.S.C. § 605(cX(1) oo. 4,15
Sec. 8(aX1), 41 U.S.C. § 607(aY1) 0... 7
Sec. Od), 41 UBC. § GOT) ..cccicccccscscccessccces: 7
Sec. 8(h), 41 U.S.C. § GOT(h) ...c0....ccccscsccscesee. 14
ill
Table of Authorities Continued
Page
RS, OP MEED cscccsesesssesesessncecssseccces ll
Sec. 14(i), 92 Stat. 2391, amending 28 U.S.C.
ES 7
eee CP, © GOL GOCE) ............2..000005. 15
Act of November 26, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-129, 83
Nee scl ileseravassissnensosescsseccccserses 6
OFPP Act, Pub. L. No. 93-400, 88 Stat. 796
arr snissssavasscscssnsowanconsscosccosseeceees 17
Neen ees. tecbvsveonssascessccesssccscecoseoess 3,11
LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:
S. Rep. No. 93-692, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
NE IIE cescrsnssvescrnepsccee Ness siddsrbrsasssonnce 17
S. Rep. No. 95-1118, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
Neen To | eerncnsesccsnseccssocs 7,9,15
H.R. Rep. No. 95-1556, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Sep-
Nees rcasasnsnnsscvscrccsvssesece 9
124 Cong. Rec. S18636 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1978) .. 14
124 Cong. Rec. $18640 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1978) .. 15
See. GEG, BOEGO (1DTS) ..................0000.cceerreeee 15
REGULATIONS:
Federal Acquisition Regulation
0 A SD S|) eens 11
TE ES ee 12
PAR 35.201, 48 C.F.R. § 33.201 ..................... 11
FAR 33.207(c\2), 48 C.F.R. § 33.207(c\2) .... 4,15,16
Department of Defense FAR Supplement, 48 C.F.R.
TE tphateicanscenacccancssnsssvrcssenessesceesseeses 12
iv
Table of Authorities Continued
Department of Health and Human Services Acqui-
sition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. Chapter 3 ..........
Department of Agriculture Acquisition Regulation,
ee Re i I 8 a iiccad cs ieteassudenctudecennosate
General Services Administration Acquisition Regu-
lation, 48 C.F.R. Chapter 5 ........cccsocssscccoosseees
Department of State Acquisition Regulation, 48
Ra is aI RE ceca rcclebenigsaa cihestShoveionseds
Agency for International Development Acquisition
Regulation, 48 C.F.R. Chapter 7.0.0.0...
Department of Veterans Affairs Acquisition Regu-
mntion, 46 C.F BR. Chetet & oon cccnescccnsccssssesesss
Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation, 48
Rei ee MIMI WF <ncsiusscdssnesntnoatubucesdsrceaisancersce
Department of Treasury (Protests, disputes, and
appeals), 48 C.F.R. Chapter 10...
Department of Transportation Acquisition Regula-
OM, SF PE CGO UD oi csvenienscsiseccciccesvess
Department of Commerce Acquisition Regulation,
Oe a MOE BOF sacceinecersibihscasnertiocniees
Department of the Interior Acquisition Regulation,
Me Nicos, GMI BG vio coccssapasesscicndcseniccrxeraeas
Environmental Protection Agency Acquisition
Regulation, 48 C.F.R. Chapter 15.0.0...
Office of Personnel Management Federal Employ-
ees Health Benefits Acquisition Regulation, 48
ee | Peer ere en cneninne ee
Office of Personnel Management (Protests, dis-
putes, and appeals), 48 C.F.R. Chapter 17 ....
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
FAR Supplement, 48 C.F.R. Chapter 18 .......
United States Information Agency Acquisition
Regulation, 48 C.F.R. Chapter 19 ........00......
Page
1]
1]
11
1]
1]
11
11
11
1]
11
11
11
ll
Table of Authorities Continued
Small Business Administration (Contractor qualifi-
cations), 48 C.F.R. Chapter 22 ................00008
Department of Housing and Urban Development
Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. Chapter
Bcc scraac eaten evan esienaeneaNilacaaisnainanen
Department of Justice Acquisition Regulation, 48
Cer i ETD suiicicenscnvinsvesevtdrennguctetinmnaassenes
Department of Labor Acquisition Regulation, 48
ee ie MAN Te acndecceivcnasctenacnasasnarnnncennnsnnsss
Department of Education Acquisition Regulation,
ars NE TE ch acesenceccsynasvnintrsnecvastienne
Panama Canal Commission Acquisition Regulation,
Oe Fe SP etkthcsncneesavsinsnesasenennsvarnee
Federal Emergency Management Agency Acquisi-
tion Regulation, 48 C.F.R. Chapter 44 ..........
Department of the Army Acquisition Regulations,
rs IE, GEE coisticasicns cacencranncneasancenssnnves
Department of the Navy Acquisition Regulations,
ee A 8 ee ne enn
Department of the Air Force FAR Supplement, 48
Be ee IN TOI wercuenvenvensnascnestasnadsusearavosencres
African Development Foundation (Competition re-
quirements), 48 C.F.R. Chapter 57 ................
MISCELLANEOUS:
44 Fed. Reg. 5,219 (Jan. 25, 1979) .............ccccceeee
44 Fed. Reg. 12,519 (March 7, 1979) ............cc0000.
44 Fed. Reg. 12,524 (March 7, 1979) ................006
44 Fed. Reg. 34,228 (June 14, 1979) ............. eee
44 Fed. Reg. 34,229 (June 14, 1979) .............
45 Fed. Reg. 31,035 (May 9, 1980) .............ceeee
Report of the Commission on Government Procure-
meet, POCONOS TSTS, VOR. 1 ccevssccccsscssvcvesscss.
Page
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Gnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1990
No. 90-1800
GRUMMAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
vs
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To
The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Federal Circuit
SHIPBUILDERS COUNCIL OF AMERICA
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONER, GRUMMAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION
The Shipbuilders Council of America, with the con-
sent of all parties, submits this brief amicus curiae
pursuant to Rule 37.2 of the Rules of this Court in
support of the petition for a writ of certiorari filed
by Grumman Aerospace Corporation.
THE AMICUS AND ITS INTERESTS
The Shipbuilders Council is a voluntary, nonprofit
national trade association composed of fifty-three
firms, corporations, partnerships and organizations lo-
bo
cated in the United States that are involved in the
shipbuilding industry. The Council was founded in
1920 for the purposes of (i) promoting a sound private
shipbuilding and ship repairing industry in the United
States, (ii) promoting an adequate mobilization poten-
tial of privately-owned shipbuilding, ship repairing and
allied industries for availability in time of national
emergency, and (iii) affording a means of cooperation
between Government and industry in matters of na-
tional concern.
A major portion of the business of the Shipbuilders
Council’s members involves contracts with the federal
Government, including contracts for the construction
and repair of vessels for the United States Navy and
Coast Guard, and for the development and production
of communication, propulsion, radar, electronic, com-
puter and other on-board systems for such vessels.
Members of the Shipbuilders Council are currently
performing contracts with the federal Government
valued at many billions of dollars. These members are
also involved in administrative or court proceedings
resulting from the Government’s denial of certified
claims submitted under their contracts with the Gov-
ernment, or they have claims awaiting decisions by
Government contracting officers. In either case, their
claims were certified and, therefore, involve the same
claim certification issue presented to this Court by
Grumman Aerospace’s petition. As a result, these
claims will be directly affected by this Court’s action
on the petition.
While the decision below will adversely affect all
non-individual Government contractors, its impact will
be particularly acute for contractors who build ships
for the Government because of an eighteen-month
statute of limitations applicable to contractor claims
under Government shipbuilding contracts. 10 U.S.C.
§ 2405. Such contracts entered into after December 7,
1983 are not eligible for price increases—whether
sought in a claim, request for equitable adjustment,
or demand for payment—if the claim forming the ba-
sis for such an increase arose ‘‘out of events occurring
more than 18 months before the submission of the
claim, request, or demand.”’ 10 U.S.C. § 2405(a). The
statute further provides:
A claim, request, or demand shall be considered
to have been submitted only when the contractor
has provided the certification required by section
6(c1) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978....
10 U.S.C. § 2405(b).
The Navy interprets 10 U.S.C. § 2405 as requiring
a “properly certified’’ claim in order to toll the run-
ning of this statute of limitations. As a result of the
decision of the court below, therefore, shipbuilding
claims now under administrative or judicial review are
in jeopardy of being rejected on jurisdictional grounds
even though the claims were ‘“‘properly certified’’ un-
der the law as it had been interpreted by the contract
appeals boards and the Claims Court as of the time
the certification was made. Because the government
typically does not challenge the claim certification un-
til well into appeal proceedings—often on the eve of
trial—the eighteen-month limitations period will likely
have already elapsed before the issue is even raised.
Under the decision below, then, many meritorious
shipbuilding claims could be forever barred.
The Shipbuilders Council and its members thus have
a direct -and substantial interest in the issues pre-
ERE
sented to this Court by Grumman Aerospace’s petition
and in urging this Court to review and reverse the
decision of the court below.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The decision of the court below presents important
questions arising under the Contract Disputes Act of
1978 (“CDA”), Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383
(1978), codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seqg., that have
not yet, but should be, decided by this Court. In par-
ticular, the Court is asked to resolve the meaning of
the statutory requirement imposed by Congress in the
CDA that contract claims against the government in
excess of $50,000 be certified by the ‘‘contractor.”’
CDA § 6(cX1), 41 U.S.C. § 605(c\1). A second, related
question concerns the force and effect of a regulation
originally promulgated in 1980 by the Office of Fed-
eral Procurement Policy (‘““OFPP’’), now found in the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (““FAR’’) 33.207(c)2),
48 C.F.R. §33.207(c\(2), which purports to define what
categories of employees of a non-individual ‘“‘contrac-
tor’ must certify claims in order to satisfy the CDA’s
statutory requirement.
The court below held, inter alia, (i) that the FAR
certification regulation was validly promulgated by
OFPP because it allegedly filled a gap left by Con-
gress in the CDA, (ii) that the regulation, therefore,
has the force and effect of law, and (iii) that, if a
certifier fails to match the regulation’s definition of
who must certify Government contract claims, the
agency contract appeals boards are stripped of their
statutory subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate such
claims. Petition, Appendix (“‘App.’’) 4a-9a. The court
below found that Grumman Acrospace’s certifier did
not match the regulatory definition, as interpreted by
the court, and vacated the favorable decision that
Grumman Aerospace had obtained on the merits be-
fore the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
(““ASBCA’’). App. 9a-11la.
In holding that the FAR certification regulation de-
fines the subject matter jurisdiction of the tribunals
charged with adjudicating Government contract claims
under the CDA, the court below has condoned ma-
nipulation of the jurisdiction of contract appeals
boards by the procuring agencies litigating against
contractor claims before those boards. Such a result
directly contravenes the will of Congress as expressed
in the CDA and its legislative history, resurrects the
precise evil that Congress sought to purge from the
procurement process in enacting the CDA and per-
mits, if not encourages, the procuring agencies to
subvert the laudable, remedial purposes of the CDA.
The decision of the court below also allows these pro-
curing agencies to define, separately for their own
agency contracts, the subject matter jurisdiction not
only of the contract appeals boards, but also of the
United States Claims Court—a bizarre result never
intended by Congress.
The court below reached these erroneous results by
misreading and misapplying controlling precedent of
this Court, ignoring the express language and intent
of Congress in defining OFPP’s limited role in the
CDA statutory scheme, and thereby mistakenly con-
cluding that it was required to accord deference to
OFPP in its promulgation of the FAR certification
regulation at issue.
These failures of the court below constitute special
circumstances calling for review and reversal by this
Court.
I. IMPORTANT POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE
CONTRACT DISPUTES ACT ARE FRUSTRATED BY
THE DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW
Since the earliest days of our Nation, the Govern-
ment has purchased goods and services from the pri-
vate sector. From the beginning and continuing until
the present day, the procurement process has been
beset by problems including—to a greater or lesser
degree—profiteering, influence peddling, fraud, mis-
management, inefficiency, and inconsistency. On sev-
eral occasions over these two hundred years, the
procurement process and its attendant problems have
been studied by Congress and various commissions
(e.g., Dockery, Keep, First Hoover, and Second Hoo-
ver Commissions), often yielding proposals to reform
and improve the process.'
The latest and most comprehensive such study was
conducted at the direction of Congress by the Com-
mission on Government Procurement, created by Act
of November 26, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-129, 83 Stat.
269 (1969). This Commission was charged with the
responsibilities of (i) studying and investigating the
entire federal Government procurement process and
(ii) recommending to Congress methods ‘“‘to promote
the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the pro-
curement of goods, services and facilities by and for
the executive branch of the Federal Govern-
ment....’’ Jd., 83 Stat. at 269-270. ‘‘Until that time
' See Report of the Commission on Government Procurement,
December 1972 (‘‘Report’’), Vol. 1 at 163-184.
there had been no comprehensive examination de-
voted exclusively to the system by which claims by
and against the Government with regards to Govern-
ment contracts should be adjudicated.’”’ S. Rep. No.
95-1118, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1978) at 4, reprinted
im 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5235, 5238.
Over a two year period, the Commission collected
and analyzed massive amounts of material and infor-
mation derived from procurement reports, congres-
sional testimony, documents, comments, opinions,
questionnaires, interviews and public meetings. See
Report, Vol. 1 at vii-viii. In December 1972, the Com-
mission reported the results of its extensive study to
Congress, making 149 specific recommendations for
improving the procurement process. Report, Vol. 1 at
185-199. The Commission’s recommendations that
were directed toward contract disputes, Jd. at 197,
formed the framework for consideration and eventual
enactment of the CDA by Congress six years later.
See S. Rep. No. 95-1118 at 1-5. -
In the CDA, Congress authorized agencies to es-
tablish boards of contract appeals, CDA § 8(a)(1), 41
U.S.C. § 607(a\(1), and granted to those boards juris-
diction ‘“‘to decide any appeal from a decision of a
contracting officer.’’ CDA § 8d), 41 U.S.C. § 607(d).
Concurrent jurisdiction over such matters was also
given to the United States Court of Claims (now the
United States Claims Court). CDA § 14(i), 92 Stat.
2383, 2391, amending 28 U.S.C. § 1491. The legis-
lative history of the CDA leaves no doubt that Con-
gress was creating order and uniformity out of the
preexisting disarray and, in particular, was seeking
to eliminate procedural and substantive inconsisten-
cies in the adjudication of contract claims by pre-
venting the agencies from manipulating the
procurement disputes process to their own separate
and individual ends.
The Contract Disputes Act of 1978 provides a
fair, balanced, and comprehensive statutory sys-
tem of legal and administrative remedies in re-
solving Government contract claims.
~ * * * *
The present means for resolving disputes under
Government contracts is a mixture of contract
provisions, agency regulations, judicial decisions,
and statutory coverage. Basically the methods and
forums for handling such disputes exist by ex-
ecutive branch fiat—that is, by the insertion of
contract terms specifying how disputes in specific
areas will be resolved—and by agency regulations
governing the procedural and substantive adju-
dication of disputes.
x * « % ”
In large part, the present Government contract
remedies system has developed in an unplanned
manner. Many rules and requirements that gov-
ern the system are the result of unstructured
reactions to various events and decisions. The
predilections of different agencies .. . bring forth
new provisions and procedures that are -estric-
tive and uncoordinated.
* * * x *
While the existing dispute system may have
been satisfactory in earlier years, the complexity
of Government procurement demands the enact-
ment of a more efficient procedure. How pro-
curement functions has a far-reaching impact on
the economy of our society and on the success
of many major Government programs. Both can
be affected by the existence of competition and
quality contractors—or by the lack thereof. The
way potential contractors view the disputes-
resolving system influences how, whether, and at
what prices they compete for Government con-
tract business.
S. Rep. No. 95-1118 at 1-4 (emphasis added)?
Ignoring this clear expression of congressional in-
tent, the court below sanctioned the very agency con-
duct that Congress sought to eliminate in enacting
the CDA. For purposes of evaluating whether the
ASBCA had statutory subject matter jurisdiction, the
court below deferred to OFPP in its promulgation of
the claim certification regulation and to the procuring
agency's argument that the contractor’s certification
did not satisfy that regulation. App. 4a-7a. Yet, this
result not only runs directly afoul of the express in-
tent of Congress to divest the agencies of their pre-
vious power to define the jurisdiction of the boards
through disputes clause requirements and regulations,
* Interestingly, when the CDA was in draft form, the De-
partment of Defense sought to preserve its previous ability to
manipulate board jurisdiction: ‘‘We believe that leaving applic-
ability of the Disputes procedure to procuremcnt and other de-
partmental regulations should continue.” See Letter of General
Counsel of the Department of Defense dated June 23, 1978 to
Hon. Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judi-
ciary, House of Representatives, attached to H.R. Rep. No. 95-
1556, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 52 (Sept. 8, 1978). Congress ex-
pressly rejected DOD’s request: ‘‘[T]he bill provides a new sta-
tutory basis for Agency Boards of Contract Appeals.’ Jd. at 19.
10
but it also creates the potential for further subversion
by the agencies of the CDA’s uniform contract dispute
resolution process.
Numerous problems are engendered when an
agency, on the basis of its interpretation of its own
regulation, can challenge the subject matter jurisdic-
tion of the forum that is adjudicating a contractor’s
claim against the same agency. Congress determined
that creating a new, uniform statutory basis for the
jurisdiction of the contract appeals boards would elim-
inate those problems. Now, under the decision of the
court below, agencies litigating contractor claims,
whether in the Claims Court or any contract appeals
board, are free at any time in the course of the pro-
ceeding to challenge a claim certification on the
ground that the agencies’ interpretation of the claim
certification regulation suggests that an “improper”
person had certified the claim, and thereupon demand
dismissal of the appeal.
Such agency challenges come with ill grace, because
the agency’s contracting officer must have already
determined in the first instance that a proper person
had certified the claim in order to render a final
decision, which is a prerequisite to an appeal. Thus,
an agency is free to manipulate at will the jurisdiction
of a board, or the Claims Court, within a single case
to the prejudice of the contractor: first, the agency,
through its contracting officer, permits the appeal to
be filed by issuing a final decision, but then later,
through its litigation counsel, contests the validity of
the certification by a post hoc reapplication of the
regulation and demands dismissal. This is precisely
what happened to Grumman Aerospace in this case
and to other government contractors in other cases.
11
The agency’s motivation for such duplicity is that it
does not have to pay CDA statutory interest for the
period during which it delays contesting jurisdiction®
anc, in the case of shipbuilding claims subject to the
eighteen-month statute of limitations in 10 U.S.C.
§ 2405, the agency can avoid all liability for the con-
tractor’s claim if that statute has run.
Under the decision of the court below, the procur-
ing agencies are free to manipulate the procurement
process in yet another way that also clearly contra-
venes the will of Congress in enacting the CDA. The
claim certification regulation is incorporated in the
FAR and, under the regulatory scheme, each procur-
ing agency subject to the FAR may promulgate its
own supplement thereto. FAR 1.301, 48 C.F-.R.
§ 1.301.4 The decision of the court below now allows
+ In the CDA, Congress provided that ‘‘{iJnterest on amounts
found due contractors on claims shall be paid to the contractor
from the date the contracting officer receives the claim pursuant
to section 6(a) from the contractor until payment thereof.’’ CDA
§ 12, 41 U.S.C. §611. However, in defining ‘‘claim’’ for its
purposes, the FAR provides that a claim exceeding $50,000 ‘‘is
not a claim under the [CDA] until certified as required by the
Act and 33.207.” FAR 33.201, 48 C.F.R. § 33.201 (emphasis
added).
4 See 48 C.F.R. Ch. 3 (Health and Human Services); 48 C.F.R.
Ch. 4 (Agriculture); 48 C.F.R. Ch. 5 (General Services Admin-
istration); 48 C.F.R. Ch. 6 (State); 48 C.F.R. Ch. 7 (Agency for
International Development); 48 C.F.R. Ch. 8 (Veterans Affairs);
48 C.F.R. Ch. 9 (Energy); 48 C.F.R. Ch. 10 (Treasury); 48 C.F.R.
Ch. 12 (Transportation); 48 C.F.R. Ch. 13 (Commerce); 48 C.F.R.
Ch. 14 (Interior); 48 C.F.R. Ch. 15 (Environmental Protection
Agency); 48 C.F.R. Chs. 16 and 17 (Office of Personnel Man-
agement); 48 C.F.R. Ch. 18 (National Aeronautics and Space
Administration); 48 C.F.R. Ch. 19 (United States Information
12
each agency subject to the FAR to promulgate its own
supplemental claim certification regulation to further
define and refine who must certify claims under con-
tracts with that agency, so long as the supplemental
definition allegedly fills a gap in the CDA and is not
in conflict with or inconsistent with the FAR content.
FAR 1.304, 48 C.F.R. § 1.304. This, of course, marks
a return to the very lack of uniformity in the “pro-
cedural and substantive adjudication of disputes’’ that
Congress purged from the procurement process when
it enacted the CDA thirteen years ago.’
These consequences of the decision below, so plainly
contrary to the will of Congress, demand correction
by this Court.
Agency); 48 C.F.R. Ch. 22 (Small Business Administration); 48
C.F.R. Ch. 24 (Housing and Urban Development); 48 C.F.R. Ch.
25 (National Science Foundation); 48 C.F.R. Ch. 28 (Justice); 48
C.F.R. Ch. 29 (Labor); 48 C.F.R. Ch. 34 (Education); 48 C.F.R.
Ch. 35 (Panama Canal Commission); C.F.R. Ch. 44 (Federal
Emergency Management Agency); and 48 C.F.R. Ch. 57 (African
Development Foundation). In the case of the Department of
Defense, it has promulgated its own supplement to the FAR
(“DFARS”), 48 C.F.R. Ch. 2, and the Army, Navy and Air
Force have in turn promulgated their own supplements to the
DFARS. 48 C.F.R. Chs. 51, 52 and 53.
> The FAR certification requirement has already produced the
anomaly tnat CDA claims submitted under contracts subject to
the FAR are judged by the FAR’s restrictive standard of who
must certify claims on behalf of non-individual contractors, while
CDA claims submitted under contracts not subject to the FAR
are judged by the rational standard that a certifier authorized
to bind the ‘‘contractor’’ satisfies the will of Congress in the
CDA. See Little River Lumber v. United States, 21 Cl.Ct. 527,
533-34 (1990); Alaska Lumber and Pulp Co., Inc., AGBCA No.
82-107-1, 1990 Westlaw 34704 (March 20, 1990).
13
II. THIS COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS SUPERVISORY
JURISDICTION TO CORRECT THE UNPRECEDENTED
AND PATENTLY ERRONEOUS READING GIVEN THE
CONTRACT DISPUTES ACT AND THE FAR CERTI-
FICATION REGULATION BY THE COURT BELOW
In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 887 (1984), this Court
articulated the principles governing judicial review of
interpretations by administrative agencies of the stat-
utes they are entrusted by Congress with the duty
to administer. Before applying this Court’s Chevron
principles of deference to agency action, however, a
reviewing court. must first determine whether Con-
gress has delegated to the agency a duty to admin-
ister the statute in question or, to put it differently,
whether Congress has empowered the agency to regu-
late in the first place.® In this case, the court below
® See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 844 (EPA accorded de-
ference since it was entrusted to administer statutory scheme
of Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91
Stat. 685); Chemical Manufacturers Ass’n v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 118 & n.2, 125 (1985) (EPA
accorded deference since it was entrusted to administer Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.); Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S.
132, 139-140 & n.8, 141-142 (1982) (Secretary of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare accorded deference since he was charged
with administering federal funding for emergency assistance pro-
grams under Title IV-A of Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 603(a\5)); and Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Sen-
atorial Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. 27, 45 (1981) (Commis-
sion accorded deference because Congress vested it with primary
and substantial responsibility for enforcing Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. 44 431 et seg., and provided
the agency with extensive rulemaking and adjudicative powers).
By contrast, regulatory interpretations of a statute made by an
agency that has not been delegated specific responsibility to
14
made no such inquiry and made no such determina-
tion. Instead, the court improperly invoked Chevron
and thereby erroneously concluded that it was re-
quired to defer to the agency’s judgment and to its
regulation. App. 4a-7a. Had the court not ignored the
critical, indispensable first step of a proper Chevron
analysis, it would have quickly discerned that the FAR
certification regulation is entitled to no deference at
all and cannot, therefore, have the force and effect
of law.
The only authority that Congress granted to OFPP
in the CDA statutory scheme was the specific and
strictly limited authority to “issue guidelines with re-
spect to criteria for the establishment, functions, and
procedure of the agency boards.’”’ CDA § &(h), 41
U.S.C. § 607(h). Congress did not empower OFPP to
administer the CDA, or to promulgate any regulation
whatsoever, much less a binding legislative regulation
defining the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts
and contract appeals boards to adjudicate contract
disputes. The language of the CDA could not be
clearer, but even even if resort to the legislative his-
tory of the CDA were appropriate, it too affirms that
the authority granted to OFPP was strictly limited.’
administer that statute are not entitled to deference under the
Chevron principles. See Crandon v. United States, 110 S.Ct. 997,
1011 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
‘ Originally, the bill reported out of committee in the Senate,
directed OFPP to “issue rules and regulations with respect to”’
the establishment, functions, and procedures of the agency
boards. 124 Cong. Rec. S18636 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1978) (em-
phasis added). Even at that, OFPP’s role was unmistakably lim-
ited, almost clerical in nature, 1.e., ‘developing ... workload
study formats; being the central clearing point for collection of
15
The specific claim certification provision of the CDA
at issue in this case, CDA §6(c\1), 41 U.S.C.
§ 605(c\(1), has no legislative history. The provision is
not discussed in the committee reports because it was
added by amendment on the Senate floor—without
explanation or discussion—on the day the Senate
passed the legislation and the day before the House
passed it. See 124 Cong. Rec. 36266, 37074-76 (1978).
The only guidance as to the meaning and intent of
this provision insofar as this case is concerned, there-
fore, is the statute’s plain language that claims in
excess of $50,000 shall be certified by the ‘‘contrac-
tor’’ and the statute’s definition of ‘“‘contractor’’ for
these purposes as “‘a party to a Government contract
other than the Government.’ CDA §§ 6(c)(1) & 2(4),
41 U.S.C. §§ 605(c)1) & 601(4).
It is against this legislative backdrop that OFPP
promulgated the claim certification regulation that lies
at the heart of this case and which is now found at
FAR 33.207(c)(2), 48 C.F.R. § 33.207(c)(2). Section 16
of the CDA provides that the ‘Act shall apply to
contracts entered into one hundred twenty days after
the date of enactment.’’ See 41 U.S.C. § 601 (note).
On at least three separate occasions, OF PP relied on
this provision as its authority to issue proposed rules,
stating that the proposed contract and regulatory cov-
erage was necessary because the CDA required cer-
...agency’s workload studies; and acting in concert with the
agency head in the establishment of each board.”’ S. Rep. No.
95-1118 at 27. Later, on the Senate floor the words ‘rules and
regulations with respect to” in the bill were eliminated and
replaced by the words ‘“‘guidelines with respect to the criteria
for.” 124 Cong. Rec. $18640 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1978) (emphasis
added).
16
tain changes to clauses and procurement regulations
of the procuring agencies by March 1, 1979 (one
hundred twenty days after the CDA was signed into
law on November 1, 1978). See Proposed Rules, 44
Fed. Reg. 5,219 (Jan. 25, 1979); Interim Final Rules,
44 Fed. Reg. 12,519 (March 7, 1979); Final Rules and
Proposed Contract Disputes Clause, 44 Fed. Reg.
34,228 (June 14, 1979).
The interim final rules set forth an interim disputes
clause, including a requirement that contractors cer-
tify claims. 44 Fed. Reg. at 12,524. When it published
the final rules, OFPP modified the interim disputes
clause and invited comments. 44 Fed. Reg. at 34,229.
Up to and including this point, however, both the
proposed rules and interim disputes clauses required
‘the contractor’’ to certify claims, in exactly the same
language as Congress had specified in the CDA.
Then, on May 9, 1980, OF PP issued what it termed
a “‘policy directive’ (OFPP Policy Letter 80-3), again
based on Section 16 of the CDA, which completely
rescinded the previous “‘final’’ regulations, and set
forth new final regulations and a final disputes clause.
Final Contract Disputes Regulatory Coverage and
Contract Disputes Clause, 45 Fed. Reg. 31,035 (May
9, 1980). For the first time, the regulation included
the restriction now found at FAR 33.207(c\2), which
purports to describe who must certify a claim on be-
half of a non-individual contractor. OFPP described
the restriction as a ‘‘technical’”’ change ‘‘made to bet-
ter reflect the intent of the Contract Disputes Act.”
Id. OF PP provided no opportunity for notice and com-
ment on this change.*
* This alone prevents the regulation from having the force and
17
«
It is clear from the foregoing that the assignment
given to OFPP by Congress was narrow and specific
and did not authorize OFPP’s unfettered excursion
into any other areas, and certainly not into subject
matter jurisdiction of the contract appeals boards or
the Claims Court. Moreover, it is equally clear from
effect of law, since OFPP is required to follow notice and com-
ment procedures. See OFPP Act, Pub. L. No. 93-400, 88 Stat.
796, 797 § 6(dX2) (1974) and S. Rep. No. 93-692, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 4589, 4601-02. But even if OFPP had been authorized to
promulgate the regulation and had done so properly, the reg-
ulation conflicts with the legislation it purports to implement,
and thus cannot have force or effect. See United States v. Lar-
tonoff, 431 U.S. 864, 873 (1977) (‘‘regulations, in order to be
valid, must be consistent with the statute under which they are
promulgated’); Sullivan v. United States, 4 Cl.Ct. 70, 73 (1983)
(‘‘a regulation which is clearly incompatible with the statute
under which it was ostensibly promulgated must give way’’),
affd, 742 F.2d 628 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (per curiam). There can be
no doubt that the regulation conflicts with the CDA when the
same certification can simultaneously be “‘ciearly’’ invalid under
the regulation yet clearly valid under the plain language of the
CDA. See Little River, 21 Cl.Ci. at 534 (not reaching the issue
of whether the certification regulation is valid or material to
the court’s jurisdiction because the contracts involved were not
subject to the FAR). Under the CDA, Congress intentionally
conferred statutory jurisdiction to the Boards so that no agency
regulation or dispute clause requirement could alter their juris-
diction. See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590
(1941) (a rule that purports to alter jurisdiction conferred by
Congress is invalid); Columtia Mfg. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 715 F.2d
1409, 1410 (9th Cir. 1983) (same). Cf Linn Timber, Inc., AGBCA
No. 89-194-1, 90-1 BCA 4 22,625 at-113,482 (1990) (refusing to
enforce contract disputes clause requirement for-certification of
claims for less than $50,000 since ‘‘such an act is obviously the
sole province of Congress’’). Yet according to the decision below,
whether or not a contract is subject to the FAR is a potentially
dispositive jurisdictional inquiry.
18
the regulation’s language and the context in which it
was promulgated that OFPP itself intended merely
to provide an interpretation of the CDA’s dispute
procedures for inclusion in agency contracts and
rules—not to define the subject matter jurisdiction of
the claims tribunals.
In these circumstances, the court below should not
have deferred to the assumed judgment and expertise
of the agency, but instead should have determined
whether the limiting language of the FAR certifica-
tion regulation could be squared with the statutory
grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the contract
appeals boards and the Court of Claims to adjudicate
claims certified by the “‘contractor.”” Had the court
done Sa, it never could have rendered the decision it
did. This Court should, therefore, review and reverse
that erroneous decision.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the petition for a writ of
certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN G. DEGOOYER
Counsel of Record
RONALD A. UITz
HopkKINs & SUTTER
888 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 835-8000
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
June 1991 Shipbuilders Council of America
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.