Amicus Curiae Brief — Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. United States

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Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

CP JUN 2 1 yegt

No. 90-1800 | QEFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

GRUMMAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

if

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To

The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Federal Circuit

SHIPBUILDERS COUNCIL OF AMERICA

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

PETITIONER, GRUMMAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION

JOHN G. DEGOOYER

Counsel of Record

RONALD A. UITz

HopKINS & SUTTER

888 Sixteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 835-8000

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Shipbuilders Council of America

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

THE AMICUS AND ITS INTERESTS ..................0000. 1

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ........... 4

I.

il.

IMPORTANT POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES OF

THE CONTRACT DISPUTES ACT ARE FRUS-

TRATED BY THE DECISION OF THE COURT

OT ia scoacatcneainathecadmicibbneiguie atiaetansamnttnecaneie 6

THIS COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS SUPER-

VISORY JURISDICTION TO CORRECT THE UN-

PRECEDENTED AND PATENTLY ERRONEOUS

READING GIVEN THE_CONTRACT DISPUTES

ACT AND THE FAR CERTIFICATION REGULA-

SEE ES EMRE CAFURE BAIA cocsecescssesteseresnveies 13

PETIT snnisevehseseneeshsdgetinntannesiniantennbediiteseapwaonin 18

il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page

Alaska Lumber and Pulp Co., Inc., AGBCA No. 82-

107-1, 1990 Westlaw 34704 (March 20,

SUED séninsdinicnctseisdemanneuaie madame ee 12

Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 182 (1982) woo... eee. 13

Chemical Manufacturers Ass’n v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985) .... 13

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) occ ceeeeee 13

Columbia Mfg. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 715 F.2d 1409

rN a nA 17

Crandon v. United States, 110 S.Ct. 997 (1990) ... 14

Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Sena-

torial Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. 27

SINE D cetbiecndecevdesbnnbasaeducsusdasiadmmeenese ae aene 13

Linn Timber, Inc., AGBCA No. 89-194-1, 90-1 BCA

YE CD vesscnccevecnexsseteccunnaieee 17

Little River Lumber v. United States, 21 Cl.Ct. 527

RUUD | Scccsnctenscesamanuaticerctisssanekdsata ee ae 12,17

Sullivan v. United States, 4 Cl.Ct. 70 (1983), aff'd,

742 F.2d 628 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) ... 17

United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864 (1977) ... 17

United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941) ... 17

STATUTES:

Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563,

92 Stat. 2383 (41 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq.) .... 4,passim

Sec. 2(4), 41 U.S.C. § 601(4) .0.............cccccceee. 15

Sec. 6(cX1), 41 U.S.C. § 605(cX(1) oo. 4,15

Sec. 8(aX1), 41 U.S.C. § 607(aY1) 0... 7

Sec. Od), 41 UBC. § GOT) ..cccicccccscscccessccces: 7

Sec. 8(h), 41 U.S.C. § GOT(h) ...c0....ccccscsccscesee. 14

ill

Table of Authorities Continued

Page

RS, OP MEED cscccsesesssesesessncecssseccces ll

Sec. 14(i), 92 Stat. 2391, amending 28 U.S.C.

ES 7

eee CP, © GOL GOCE) ............2..000005. 15

Act of November 26, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-129, 83

Nee scl ileseravassissnensosescsseccccserses 6

OFPP Act, Pub. L. No. 93-400, 88 Stat. 796

arr snissssavasscscssnsowanconsscosccosseeceees 17

Neen ees. tecbvsveonssascessccesssccscecoseoess 3,11

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:

S. Rep. No. 93-692, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974),

reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

NE IIE cescrsnssvescrnepsccee Ness siddsrbrsasssonnce 17

S. Rep. No. 95-1118, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1978),

reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

Neen To | eerncnsesccsnseccssocs 7,9,15

H.R. Rep. No. 95-1556, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Sep-

Nees rcasasnsnnsscvscrccsvssesece 9

124 Cong. Rec. S18636 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1978) .. 14

124 Cong. Rec. $18640 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1978) .. 15

See. GEG, BOEGO (1DTS) ..................0000.cceerreeee 15

REGULATIONS:

Federal Acquisition Regulation

0 A SD S|) eens 11

TE ES ee 12

PAR 35.201, 48 C.F.R. § 33.201 ..................... 11

FAR 33.207(c\2), 48 C.F.R. § 33.207(c\2) .... 4,15,16

Department of Defense FAR Supplement, 48 C.F.R.

TE tphateicanscenacccancssnsssvrcssenessesceesseeses 12

iv

Table of Authorities Continued

Department of Health and Human Services Acqui-

sition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. Chapter 3 ..........

Department of Agriculture Acquisition Regulation,

ee Re i I 8 a iiccad cs ieteassudenctudecennosate

General Services Administration Acquisition Regu-

lation, 48 C.F.R. Chapter 5 ........cccsocssscccoosseees

Department of State Acquisition Regulation, 48

Ra is aI RE ceca rcclebenigsaa cihestShoveionseds

Agency for International Development Acquisition

Regulation, 48 C.F.R. Chapter 7.0.0.0...

Department of Veterans Affairs Acquisition Regu-

mntion, 46 C.F BR. Chetet & oon cccnescccnsccssssesesss

Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation, 48

Rei ee MIMI WF <ncsiusscdssnesntnoatubucesdsrceaisancersce

Department of Treasury (Protests, disputes, and

appeals), 48 C.F.R. Chapter 10...

Department of Transportation Acquisition Regula-

OM, SF PE CGO UD oi csvenienscsiseccciccesvess

Department of Commerce Acquisition Regulation,

Oe a MOE BOF sacceinecersibihscasnertiocniees

Department of the Interior Acquisition Regulation,

Me Nicos, GMI BG vio coccssapasesscicndcseniccrxeraeas

Environmental Protection Agency Acquisition

Regulation, 48 C.F.R. Chapter 15.0.0...

Office of Personnel Management Federal Employ-

ees Health Benefits Acquisition Regulation, 48

ee | Peer ere en cneninne ee

Office of Personnel Management (Protests, dis-

putes, and appeals), 48 C.F.R. Chapter 17 ....

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

FAR Supplement, 48 C.F.R. Chapter 18 .......

United States Information Agency Acquisition

Regulation, 48 C.F.R. Chapter 19 ........00......

Page

1]

1]

11

1]

1]

11

11

11

1]

11

11

11

ll

Table of Authorities Continued

Small Business Administration (Contractor qualifi-

cations), 48 C.F.R. Chapter 22 ................00008

Department of Housing and Urban Development

Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. Chapter

Bcc scraac eaten evan esienaeneaNilacaaisnainanen

Department of Justice Acquisition Regulation, 48

Cer i ETD suiicicenscnvinsvesevtdrennguctetinmnaassenes

Department of Labor Acquisition Regulation, 48

ee ie MAN Te acndecceivcnasctenacnasasnarnnncennnsnnsss

Department of Education Acquisition Regulation,

ars NE TE ch acesenceccsynasvnintrsnecvastienne

Panama Canal Commission Acquisition Regulation,

Oe Fe SP etkthcsncneesavsinsnesasenennsvarnee

Federal Emergency Management Agency Acquisi-

tion Regulation, 48 C.F.R. Chapter 44 ..........

Department of the Army Acquisition Regulations,

rs IE, GEE coisticasicns cacencranncneasancenssnnves

Department of the Navy Acquisition Regulations,

ee A 8 ee ne enn

Department of the Air Force FAR Supplement, 48

Be ee IN TOI wercuenvenvensnascnestasnadsusearavosencres

African Development Foundation (Competition re-

quirements), 48 C.F.R. Chapter 57 ................

MISCELLANEOUS:

44 Fed. Reg. 5,219 (Jan. 25, 1979) .............ccccceeee

44 Fed. Reg. 12,519 (March 7, 1979) ............cc0000.

44 Fed. Reg. 12,524 (March 7, 1979) ................006

44 Fed. Reg. 34,228 (June 14, 1979) ............. eee

44 Fed. Reg. 34,229 (June 14, 1979) .............

45 Fed. Reg. 31,035 (May 9, 1980) .............ceeee

Report of the Commission on Government Procure-

meet, POCONOS TSTS, VOR. 1 ccevssccccsscssvcvesscss.

Page

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

No. 90-1800

GRUMMAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

vs

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To

The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Federal Circuit

SHIPBUILDERS COUNCIL OF AMERICA

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

PETITIONER, GRUMMAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION

The Shipbuilders Council of America, with the con-

sent of all parties, submits this brief amicus curiae

pursuant to Rule 37.2 of the Rules of this Court in

support of the petition for a writ of certiorari filed

by Grumman Aerospace Corporation.

THE AMICUS AND ITS INTERESTS

The Shipbuilders Council is a voluntary, nonprofit

national trade association composed of fifty-three

firms, corporations, partnerships and organizations lo-

bo

cated in the United States that are involved in the

shipbuilding industry. The Council was founded in

1920 for the purposes of (i) promoting a sound private

shipbuilding and ship repairing industry in the United

States, (ii) promoting an adequate mobilization poten-

tial of privately-owned shipbuilding, ship repairing and

allied industries for availability in time of national

emergency, and (iii) affording a means of cooperation

between Government and industry in matters of na-

tional concern.

A major portion of the business of the Shipbuilders

Council’s members involves contracts with the federal

Government, including contracts for the construction

and repair of vessels for the United States Navy and

Coast Guard, and for the development and production

of communication, propulsion, radar, electronic, com-

puter and other on-board systems for such vessels.

Members of the Shipbuilders Council are currently

performing contracts with the federal Government

valued at many billions of dollars. These members are

also involved in administrative or court proceedings

resulting from the Government’s denial of certified

claims submitted under their contracts with the Gov-

ernment, or they have claims awaiting decisions by

Government contracting officers. In either case, their

claims were certified and, therefore, involve the same

claim certification issue presented to this Court by

Grumman Aerospace’s petition. As a result, these

claims will be directly affected by this Court’s action

on the petition.

While the decision below will adversely affect all

non-individual Government contractors, its impact will

be particularly acute for contractors who build ships

for the Government because of an eighteen-month

statute of limitations applicable to contractor claims

under Government shipbuilding contracts. 10 U.S.C.

§ 2405. Such contracts entered into after December 7,

1983 are not eligible for price increases—whether

sought in a claim, request for equitable adjustment,

or demand for payment—if the claim forming the ba-

sis for such an increase arose ‘‘out of events occurring

more than 18 months before the submission of the

claim, request, or demand.”’ 10 U.S.C. § 2405(a). The

statute further provides:

A claim, request, or demand shall be considered

to have been submitted only when the contractor

has provided the certification required by section

6(c1) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978....

10 U.S.C. § 2405(b).

The Navy interprets 10 U.S.C. § 2405 as requiring

a “properly certified’’ claim in order to toll the run-

ning of this statute of limitations. As a result of the

decision of the court below, therefore, shipbuilding

claims now under administrative or judicial review are

in jeopardy of being rejected on jurisdictional grounds

even though the claims were ‘“‘properly certified’’ un-

der the law as it had been interpreted by the contract

appeals boards and the Claims Court as of the time

the certification was made. Because the government

typically does not challenge the claim certification un-

til well into appeal proceedings—often on the eve of

trial—the eighteen-month limitations period will likely

have already elapsed before the issue is even raised.

Under the decision below, then, many meritorious

shipbuilding claims could be forever barred.

The Shipbuilders Council and its members thus have

a direct -and substantial interest in the issues pre-

ERE

sented to this Court by Grumman Aerospace’s petition

and in urging this Court to review and reverse the

decision of the court below.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The decision of the court below presents important

questions arising under the Contract Disputes Act of

1978 (“CDA”), Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383

(1978), codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seqg., that have

not yet, but should be, decided by this Court. In par-

ticular, the Court is asked to resolve the meaning of

the statutory requirement imposed by Congress in the

CDA that contract claims against the government in

excess of $50,000 be certified by the ‘‘contractor.”’

CDA § 6(cX1), 41 U.S.C. § 605(c\1). A second, related

question concerns the force and effect of a regulation

originally promulgated in 1980 by the Office of Fed-

eral Procurement Policy (‘““OFPP’’), now found in the

Federal Acquisition Regulation (““FAR’’) 33.207(c)2),

48 C.F.R. §33.207(c\(2), which purports to define what

categories of employees of a non-individual ‘“‘contrac-

tor’ must certify claims in order to satisfy the CDA’s

statutory requirement.

The court below held, inter alia, (i) that the FAR

certification regulation was validly promulgated by

OFPP because it allegedly filled a gap left by Con-

gress in the CDA, (ii) that the regulation, therefore,

has the force and effect of law, and (iii) that, if a

certifier fails to match the regulation’s definition of

who must certify Government contract claims, the

agency contract appeals boards are stripped of their

statutory subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate such

claims. Petition, Appendix (“‘App.’’) 4a-9a. The court

below found that Grumman Acrospace’s certifier did

not match the regulatory definition, as interpreted by

the court, and vacated the favorable decision that

Grumman Aerospace had obtained on the merits be-

fore the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals

(““ASBCA’’). App. 9a-11la.

In holding that the FAR certification regulation de-

fines the subject matter jurisdiction of the tribunals

charged with adjudicating Government contract claims

under the CDA, the court below has condoned ma-

nipulation of the jurisdiction of contract appeals

boards by the procuring agencies litigating against

contractor claims before those boards. Such a result

directly contravenes the will of Congress as expressed

in the CDA and its legislative history, resurrects the

precise evil that Congress sought to purge from the

procurement process in enacting the CDA and per-

mits, if not encourages, the procuring agencies to

subvert the laudable, remedial purposes of the CDA.

The decision of the court below also allows these pro-

curing agencies to define, separately for their own

agency contracts, the subject matter jurisdiction not

only of the contract appeals boards, but also of the

United States Claims Court—a bizarre result never

intended by Congress.

The court below reached these erroneous results by

misreading and misapplying controlling precedent of

this Court, ignoring the express language and intent

of Congress in defining OFPP’s limited role in the

CDA statutory scheme, and thereby mistakenly con-

cluding that it was required to accord deference to

OFPP in its promulgation of the FAR certification

regulation at issue.

These failures of the court below constitute special

circumstances calling for review and reversal by this

Court.

I. IMPORTANT POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE

CONTRACT DISPUTES ACT ARE FRUSTRATED BY

THE DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW

Since the earliest days of our Nation, the Govern-

ment has purchased goods and services from the pri-

vate sector. From the beginning and continuing until

the present day, the procurement process has been

beset by problems including—to a greater or lesser

degree—profiteering, influence peddling, fraud, mis-

management, inefficiency, and inconsistency. On sev-

eral occasions over these two hundred years, the

procurement process and its attendant problems have

been studied by Congress and various commissions

(e.g., Dockery, Keep, First Hoover, and Second Hoo-

ver Commissions), often yielding proposals to reform

and improve the process.'

The latest and most comprehensive such study was

conducted at the direction of Congress by the Com-

mission on Government Procurement, created by Act

of November 26, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-129, 83 Stat.

269 (1969). This Commission was charged with the

responsibilities of (i) studying and investigating the

entire federal Government procurement process and

(ii) recommending to Congress methods ‘“‘to promote

the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the pro-

curement of goods, services and facilities by and for

the executive branch of the Federal Govern-

ment....’’ Jd., 83 Stat. at 269-270. ‘‘Until that time

' See Report of the Commission on Government Procurement,

December 1972 (‘‘Report’’), Vol. 1 at 163-184.

there had been no comprehensive examination de-

voted exclusively to the system by which claims by

and against the Government with regards to Govern-

ment contracts should be adjudicated.’”’ S. Rep. No.

95-1118, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1978) at 4, reprinted

im 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5235, 5238.

Over a two year period, the Commission collected

and analyzed massive amounts of material and infor-

mation derived from procurement reports, congres-

sional testimony, documents, comments, opinions,

questionnaires, interviews and public meetings. See

Report, Vol. 1 at vii-viii. In December 1972, the Com-

mission reported the results of its extensive study to

Congress, making 149 specific recommendations for

improving the procurement process. Report, Vol. 1 at

185-199. The Commission’s recommendations that

were directed toward contract disputes, Jd. at 197,

formed the framework for consideration and eventual

enactment of the CDA by Congress six years later.

See S. Rep. No. 95-1118 at 1-5. -

In the CDA, Congress authorized agencies to es-

tablish boards of contract appeals, CDA § 8(a)(1), 41

U.S.C. § 607(a\(1), and granted to those boards juris-

diction ‘“‘to decide any appeal from a decision of a

contracting officer.’’ CDA § 8d), 41 U.S.C. § 607(d).

Concurrent jurisdiction over such matters was also

given to the United States Court of Claims (now the

United States Claims Court). CDA § 14(i), 92 Stat.

2383, 2391, amending 28 U.S.C. § 1491. The legis-

lative history of the CDA leaves no doubt that Con-

gress was creating order and uniformity out of the

preexisting disarray and, in particular, was seeking

to eliminate procedural and substantive inconsisten-

cies in the adjudication of contract claims by pre-

venting the agencies from manipulating the

procurement disputes process to their own separate

and individual ends.

The Contract Disputes Act of 1978 provides a

fair, balanced, and comprehensive statutory sys-

tem of legal and administrative remedies in re-

solving Government contract claims.

~ * * * *

The present means for resolving disputes under

Government contracts is a mixture of contract

provisions, agency regulations, judicial decisions,

and statutory coverage. Basically the methods and

forums for handling such disputes exist by ex-

ecutive branch fiat—that is, by the insertion of

contract terms specifying how disputes in specific

areas will be resolved—and by agency regulations

governing the procedural and substantive adju-

dication of disputes.

x * « % ”

In large part, the present Government contract

remedies system has developed in an unplanned

manner. Many rules and requirements that gov-

ern the system are the result of unstructured

reactions to various events and decisions. The

predilections of different agencies .. . bring forth

new provisions and procedures that are -estric-

tive and uncoordinated.

* * * x *

While the existing dispute system may have

been satisfactory in earlier years, the complexity

of Government procurement demands the enact-

ment of a more efficient procedure. How pro-

curement functions has a far-reaching impact on

the economy of our society and on the success

of many major Government programs. Both can

be affected by the existence of competition and

quality contractors—or by the lack thereof. The

way potential contractors view the disputes-

resolving system influences how, whether, and at

what prices they compete for Government con-

tract business.

S. Rep. No. 95-1118 at 1-4 (emphasis added)?

Ignoring this clear expression of congressional in-

tent, the court below sanctioned the very agency con-

duct that Congress sought to eliminate in enacting

the CDA. For purposes of evaluating whether the

ASBCA had statutory subject matter jurisdiction, the

court below deferred to OFPP in its promulgation of

the claim certification regulation and to the procuring

agency's argument that the contractor’s certification

did not satisfy that regulation. App. 4a-7a. Yet, this

result not only runs directly afoul of the express in-

tent of Congress to divest the agencies of their pre-

vious power to define the jurisdiction of the boards

through disputes clause requirements and regulations,

* Interestingly, when the CDA was in draft form, the De-

partment of Defense sought to preserve its previous ability to

manipulate board jurisdiction: ‘‘We believe that leaving applic-

ability of the Disputes procedure to procuremcnt and other de-

partmental regulations should continue.” See Letter of General

Counsel of the Department of Defense dated June 23, 1978 to

Hon. Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judi-

ciary, House of Representatives, attached to H.R. Rep. No. 95-

1556, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 52 (Sept. 8, 1978). Congress ex-

pressly rejected DOD’s request: ‘‘[T]he bill provides a new sta-

tutory basis for Agency Boards of Contract Appeals.’ Jd. at 19.

10

but it also creates the potential for further subversion

by the agencies of the CDA’s uniform contract dispute

resolution process.

Numerous problems are engendered when an

agency, on the basis of its interpretation of its own

regulation, can challenge the subject matter jurisdic-

tion of the forum that is adjudicating a contractor’s

claim against the same agency. Congress determined

that creating a new, uniform statutory basis for the

jurisdiction of the contract appeals boards would elim-

inate those problems. Now, under the decision of the

court below, agencies litigating contractor claims,

whether in the Claims Court or any contract appeals

board, are free at any time in the course of the pro-

ceeding to challenge a claim certification on the

ground that the agencies’ interpretation of the claim

certification regulation suggests that an “improper”

person had certified the claim, and thereupon demand

dismissal of the appeal.

Such agency challenges come with ill grace, because

the agency’s contracting officer must have already

determined in the first instance that a proper person

had certified the claim in order to render a final

decision, which is a prerequisite to an appeal. Thus,

an agency is free to manipulate at will the jurisdiction

of a board, or the Claims Court, within a single case

to the prejudice of the contractor: first, the agency,

through its contracting officer, permits the appeal to

be filed by issuing a final decision, but then later,

through its litigation counsel, contests the validity of

the certification by a post hoc reapplication of the

regulation and demands dismissal. This is precisely

what happened to Grumman Aerospace in this case

and to other government contractors in other cases.

11

The agency’s motivation for such duplicity is that it

does not have to pay CDA statutory interest for the

period during which it delays contesting jurisdiction®

anc, in the case of shipbuilding claims subject to the

eighteen-month statute of limitations in 10 U.S.C.

§ 2405, the agency can avoid all liability for the con-

tractor’s claim if that statute has run.

Under the decision of the court below, the procur-

ing agencies are free to manipulate the procurement

process in yet another way that also clearly contra-

venes the will of Congress in enacting the CDA. The

claim certification regulation is incorporated in the

FAR and, under the regulatory scheme, each procur-

ing agency subject to the FAR may promulgate its

own supplement thereto. FAR 1.301, 48 C.F-.R.

§ 1.301.4 The decision of the court below now allows

+ In the CDA, Congress provided that ‘‘{iJnterest on amounts

found due contractors on claims shall be paid to the contractor

from the date the contracting officer receives the claim pursuant

to section 6(a) from the contractor until payment thereof.’’ CDA

§ 12, 41 U.S.C. §611. However, in defining ‘‘claim’’ for its

purposes, the FAR provides that a claim exceeding $50,000 ‘‘is

not a claim under the [CDA] until certified as required by the

Act and 33.207.” FAR 33.201, 48 C.F.R. § 33.201 (emphasis

added).

4 See 48 C.F.R. Ch. 3 (Health and Human Services); 48 C.F.R.

Ch. 4 (Agriculture); 48 C.F.R. Ch. 5 (General Services Admin-

istration); 48 C.F.R. Ch. 6 (State); 48 C.F.R. Ch. 7 (Agency for

International Development); 48 C.F.R. Ch. 8 (Veterans Affairs);

48 C.F.R. Ch. 9 (Energy); 48 C.F.R. Ch. 10 (Treasury); 48 C.F.R.

Ch. 12 (Transportation); 48 C.F.R. Ch. 13 (Commerce); 48 C.F.R.

Ch. 14 (Interior); 48 C.F.R. Ch. 15 (Environmental Protection

Agency); 48 C.F.R. Chs. 16 and 17 (Office of Personnel Man-

agement); 48 C.F.R. Ch. 18 (National Aeronautics and Space

Administration); 48 C.F.R. Ch. 19 (United States Information

12

each agency subject to the FAR to promulgate its own

supplemental claim certification regulation to further

define and refine who must certify claims under con-

tracts with that agency, so long as the supplemental

definition allegedly fills a gap in the CDA and is not

in conflict with or inconsistent with the FAR content.

FAR 1.304, 48 C.F.R. § 1.304. This, of course, marks

a return to the very lack of uniformity in the “pro-

cedural and substantive adjudication of disputes’’ that

Congress purged from the procurement process when

it enacted the CDA thirteen years ago.’

These consequences of the decision below, so plainly

contrary to the will of Congress, demand correction

by this Court.

Agency); 48 C.F.R. Ch. 22 (Small Business Administration); 48

C.F.R. Ch. 24 (Housing and Urban Development); 48 C.F.R. Ch.

25 (National Science Foundation); 48 C.F.R. Ch. 28 (Justice); 48

C.F.R. Ch. 29 (Labor); 48 C.F.R. Ch. 34 (Education); 48 C.F.R.

Ch. 35 (Panama Canal Commission); C.F.R. Ch. 44 (Federal

Emergency Management Agency); and 48 C.F.R. Ch. 57 (African

Development Foundation). In the case of the Department of

Defense, it has promulgated its own supplement to the FAR

(“DFARS”), 48 C.F.R. Ch. 2, and the Army, Navy and Air

Force have in turn promulgated their own supplements to the

DFARS. 48 C.F.R. Chs. 51, 52 and 53.

> The FAR certification requirement has already produced the

anomaly tnat CDA claims submitted under contracts subject to

the FAR are judged by the FAR’s restrictive standard of who

must certify claims on behalf of non-individual contractors, while

CDA claims submitted under contracts not subject to the FAR

are judged by the rational standard that a certifier authorized

to bind the ‘‘contractor’’ satisfies the will of Congress in the

CDA. See Little River Lumber v. United States, 21 Cl.Ct. 527,

533-34 (1990); Alaska Lumber and Pulp Co., Inc., AGBCA No.

82-107-1, 1990 Westlaw 34704 (March 20, 1990).

13

II. THIS COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS SUPERVISORY

JURISDICTION TO CORRECT THE UNPRECEDENTED

AND PATENTLY ERRONEOUS READING GIVEN THE

CONTRACT DISPUTES ACT AND THE FAR CERTI-

FICATION REGULATION BY THE COURT BELOW

In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-

fense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 887 (1984), this Court

articulated the principles governing judicial review of

interpretations by administrative agencies of the stat-

utes they are entrusted by Congress with the duty

to administer. Before applying this Court’s Chevron

principles of deference to agency action, however, a

reviewing court. must first determine whether Con-

gress has delegated to the agency a duty to admin-

ister the statute in question or, to put it differently,

whether Congress has empowered the agency to regu-

late in the first place.® In this case, the court below

® See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 844 (EPA accorded de-

ference since it was entrusted to administer statutory scheme

of Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91

Stat. 685); Chemical Manufacturers Ass’n v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 118 & n.2, 125 (1985) (EPA

accorded deference since it was entrusted to administer Clean

Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.); Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S.

132, 139-140 & n.8, 141-142 (1982) (Secretary of Health, Edu-

cation and Welfare accorded deference since he was charged

with administering federal funding for emergency assistance pro-

grams under Title IV-A of Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 603(a\5)); and Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Sen-

atorial Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. 27, 45 (1981) (Commis-

sion accorded deference because Congress vested it with primary

and substantial responsibility for enforcing Federal Election

Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. 44 431 et seg., and provided

the agency with extensive rulemaking and adjudicative powers).

By contrast, regulatory interpretations of a statute made by an

agency that has not been delegated specific responsibility to

14

made no such inquiry and made no such determina-

tion. Instead, the court improperly invoked Chevron

and thereby erroneously concluded that it was re-

quired to defer to the agency’s judgment and to its

regulation. App. 4a-7a. Had the court not ignored the

critical, indispensable first step of a proper Chevron

analysis, it would have quickly discerned that the FAR

certification regulation is entitled to no deference at

all and cannot, therefore, have the force and effect

of law.

The only authority that Congress granted to OFPP

in the CDA statutory scheme was the specific and

strictly limited authority to “issue guidelines with re-

spect to criteria for the establishment, functions, and

procedure of the agency boards.’”’ CDA § &(h), 41

U.S.C. § 607(h). Congress did not empower OFPP to

administer the CDA, or to promulgate any regulation

whatsoever, much less a binding legislative regulation

defining the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts

and contract appeals boards to adjudicate contract

disputes. The language of the CDA could not be

clearer, but even even if resort to the legislative his-

tory of the CDA were appropriate, it too affirms that

the authority granted to OFPP was strictly limited.’

administer that statute are not entitled to deference under the

Chevron principles. See Crandon v. United States, 110 S.Ct. 997,

1011 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).

‘ Originally, the bill reported out of committee in the Senate,

directed OFPP to “issue rules and regulations with respect to”’

the establishment, functions, and procedures of the agency

boards. 124 Cong. Rec. S18636 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1978) (em-

phasis added). Even at that, OFPP’s role was unmistakably lim-

ited, almost clerical in nature, 1.e., ‘developing ... workload

study formats; being the central clearing point for collection of

15

The specific claim certification provision of the CDA

at issue in this case, CDA §6(c\1), 41 U.S.C.

§ 605(c\(1), has no legislative history. The provision is

not discussed in the committee reports because it was

added by amendment on the Senate floor—without

explanation or discussion—on the day the Senate

passed the legislation and the day before the House

passed it. See 124 Cong. Rec. 36266, 37074-76 (1978).

The only guidance as to the meaning and intent of

this provision insofar as this case is concerned, there-

fore, is the statute’s plain language that claims in

excess of $50,000 shall be certified by the ‘‘contrac-

tor’’ and the statute’s definition of ‘“‘contractor’’ for

these purposes as “‘a party to a Government contract

other than the Government.’ CDA §§ 6(c)(1) & 2(4),

41 U.S.C. §§ 605(c)1) & 601(4).

It is against this legislative backdrop that OFPP

promulgated the claim certification regulation that lies

at the heart of this case and which is now found at

FAR 33.207(c)(2), 48 C.F.R. § 33.207(c)(2). Section 16

of the CDA provides that the ‘Act shall apply to

contracts entered into one hundred twenty days after

the date of enactment.’’ See 41 U.S.C. § 601 (note).

On at least three separate occasions, OF PP relied on

this provision as its authority to issue proposed rules,

stating that the proposed contract and regulatory cov-

erage was necessary because the CDA required cer-

...agency’s workload studies; and acting in concert with the

agency head in the establishment of each board.”’ S. Rep. No.

95-1118 at 27. Later, on the Senate floor the words ‘rules and

regulations with respect to” in the bill were eliminated and

replaced by the words ‘“‘guidelines with respect to the criteria

for.” 124 Cong. Rec. $18640 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1978) (emphasis

added).

16

tain changes to clauses and procurement regulations

of the procuring agencies by March 1, 1979 (one

hundred twenty days after the CDA was signed into

law on November 1, 1978). See Proposed Rules, 44

Fed. Reg. 5,219 (Jan. 25, 1979); Interim Final Rules,

44 Fed. Reg. 12,519 (March 7, 1979); Final Rules and

Proposed Contract Disputes Clause, 44 Fed. Reg.

34,228 (June 14, 1979).

The interim final rules set forth an interim disputes

clause, including a requirement that contractors cer-

tify claims. 44 Fed. Reg. at 12,524. When it published

the final rules, OFPP modified the interim disputes

clause and invited comments. 44 Fed. Reg. at 34,229.

Up to and including this point, however, both the

proposed rules and interim disputes clauses required

‘the contractor’’ to certify claims, in exactly the same

language as Congress had specified in the CDA.

Then, on May 9, 1980, OF PP issued what it termed

a “‘policy directive’ (OFPP Policy Letter 80-3), again

based on Section 16 of the CDA, which completely

rescinded the previous “‘final’’ regulations, and set

forth new final regulations and a final disputes clause.

Final Contract Disputes Regulatory Coverage and

Contract Disputes Clause, 45 Fed. Reg. 31,035 (May

9, 1980). For the first time, the regulation included

the restriction now found at FAR 33.207(c\2), which

purports to describe who must certify a claim on be-

half of a non-individual contractor. OFPP described

the restriction as a ‘‘technical’”’ change ‘‘made to bet-

ter reflect the intent of the Contract Disputes Act.”

Id. OF PP provided no opportunity for notice and com-

ment on this change.*

* This alone prevents the regulation from having the force and

17

«

It is clear from the foregoing that the assignment

given to OFPP by Congress was narrow and specific

and did not authorize OFPP’s unfettered excursion

into any other areas, and certainly not into subject

matter jurisdiction of the contract appeals boards or

the Claims Court. Moreover, it is equally clear from

effect of law, since OFPP is required to follow notice and com-

ment procedures. See OFPP Act, Pub. L. No. 93-400, 88 Stat.

796, 797 § 6(dX2) (1974) and S. Rep. No. 93-692, 93d Cong., 2d

Sess. at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

News 4589, 4601-02. But even if OFPP had been authorized to

promulgate the regulation and had done so properly, the reg-

ulation conflicts with the legislation it purports to implement,

and thus cannot have force or effect. See United States v. Lar-

tonoff, 431 U.S. 864, 873 (1977) (‘‘regulations, in order to be

valid, must be consistent with the statute under which they are

promulgated’); Sullivan v. United States, 4 Cl.Ct. 70, 73 (1983)

(‘‘a regulation which is clearly incompatible with the statute

under which it was ostensibly promulgated must give way’’),

affd, 742 F.2d 628 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (per curiam). There can be

no doubt that the regulation conflicts with the CDA when the

same certification can simultaneously be “‘ciearly’’ invalid under

the regulation yet clearly valid under the plain language of the

CDA. See Little River, 21 Cl.Ci. at 534 (not reaching the issue

of whether the certification regulation is valid or material to

the court’s jurisdiction because the contracts involved were not

subject to the FAR). Under the CDA, Congress intentionally

conferred statutory jurisdiction to the Boards so that no agency

regulation or dispute clause requirement could alter their juris-

diction. See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590

(1941) (a rule that purports to alter jurisdiction conferred by

Congress is invalid); Columtia Mfg. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 715 F.2d

1409, 1410 (9th Cir. 1983) (same). Cf Linn Timber, Inc., AGBCA

No. 89-194-1, 90-1 BCA 4 22,625 at-113,482 (1990) (refusing to

enforce contract disputes clause requirement for-certification of

claims for less than $50,000 since ‘‘such an act is obviously the

sole province of Congress’’). Yet according to the decision below,

whether or not a contract is subject to the FAR is a potentially

dispositive jurisdictional inquiry.

18

the regulation’s language and the context in which it

was promulgated that OFPP itself intended merely

to provide an interpretation of the CDA’s dispute

procedures for inclusion in agency contracts and

rules—not to define the subject matter jurisdiction of

the claims tribunals.

In these circumstances, the court below should not

have deferred to the assumed judgment and expertise

of the agency, but instead should have determined

whether the limiting language of the FAR certifica-

tion regulation could be squared with the statutory

grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the contract

appeals boards and the Court of Claims to adjudicate

claims certified by the “‘contractor.”” Had the court

done Sa, it never could have rendered the decision it

did. This Court should, therefore, review and reverse

that erroneous decision.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the petition for a writ of

certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN G. DEGOOYER

Counsel of Record

RONALD A. UITz

HopkKINs & SUTTER

888 Sixteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 835-8000

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

June 1991 Shipbuilders Council of America

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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