Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Savic v. United States

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90-1790)

IN THE

Supreme Court, U.S.

MAY 15 1991

SUPREME COURT OF THRE UNITED S’

October Term, 1990

TOMISLAV SAVIC,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

Owins OF THE CLERK

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Bogdan Martinovich

Of Counsel

RAY & GLICK, LTD.

611 South Milwaukee Avenue

Libertyville, Illinois 60048

(708)680-9600

Attorneys for Petitioners

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I.

Is Seventh Circuit’s reversal of the judgment of

the District Court in direct conflict with the decisions

of the Illinois Supreme Court in its interpretation of

the Illinois Structural Work Act, Illinois Revised

Statutes Chapter 48, paragraphs 60-68.

Il.

Did the Seventh Circuit engage in impermissible

fact finding when it redetermined credibility and

weight of testimony in ruling that the District

Court’s fact finding was clearly erroneous.

il

LIST OF PARTIES

The parties to the proceedings below were

petitioners, the respondents and a third party defend-

ant not the subject matter of this petition:

The petitioner is Tomislav Savic.

The respondent is the United States of America.

The third party defendant is Kovilic Construction

Company, Inc., an Illinois corporation.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PF jee 8! 9) | ere il

RIT MIIOW oo... c ce nccnccacscccccccce l

NI secu a seuccccccccsccecccss 9

STATUTES INVOLVED ...........00eeeeeee: 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE...........0000+ 2

THE REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.7

I.

Il.

CONCLUSION

REVIEW IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT

THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT FROM

IGNORING ILLINOIS LAW AS IT RELATES

TO THE ILLINOIS STRUCTURAL WORK ACT

AND PREVENT THE APPLICATION OF THE

ACT IN FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS CASES

WHICH ARE IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH

THE DECISIONS OF THE ILLINOIS

oo 9 7

THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPREHEND-

ED AND MISAPPLIED THE CLEARLY ERRON-

EOUS STANDARD OF FEDERAL RULES OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE 52(a), 28 USCA...... 1]

APPENDIX

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,

105 S.Ct. 1504 (1985)

Cannon v. United States, 328 Fed.2d

768,(7th Cir. 1964) cccccccccccccsccccese ll

Chance v. City of Collinsville,

112 Ill.App.3d 6, 11, 445 N.E.2d

SD, 42 (USGS)... crcccccccnccccccecccces 10

Emberton v. State Farm Mutual Auto

Insurance Company, 71 [ll.2d 111,

117, 373 N.E.2d 1384, 1350 (1978)....... 9, 10

Hollis v. R. Latora Construction,

Inc., (1985) 108 IIl.2d 401, 410,

92 Ill.Dec. 494, 485 N.E.2d 4............ 18

Johnson vs. Commonwealth Edison

Company, 88 IIl.Dec. 449,

453 N.E.2d 1057 (1st Dist.1985).......... 10

Kochan v. Commonwealth Edison

Company, 123 Ill.App.3d 844, 848,

79 Ill.Dec. 367, 463 N.E.2d 921.......... 16

Larson v. Commonwealth Edison

Company (1965), 33 Ill.2d 316,

Dee, BEE Peel BET, GOks ve cccccssecs 7, 8

Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill.2d 273,

966 N.E.2d 630, 39 (1967)......eeceeees 10, 11

Vv.

Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537

Fn SPO se cna vag sadensuascenensens 16

People v. Gould, 345 Ill. 288, 323,

ROW PUR. TOD, BOD ccccccscevccccscceses 8

Phillips v. United States,

792 F.2d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 1986)........ 7

Savic v. United States of America,

702 F.Supp. 695 (N.D.III.1988) .......... 2

Savic v. United States of America,

918 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1990)

TETTTTTITITITT TTT 1, 9,

10, 11,

14, 15,

19

Simmons v. Union Electric Company,

104 Ill.2d 444, 85 Ill.Dec. 347,

473 N.E.2d 946, 949 (1984)............. 9, 18

Smith v. Georgia Pacific, 86 Ill.App.3d

PER GOP PME BOE No ccdcccsescseceees 18

United States v. Aluminum Company of America,

148 F.2d 416, 433

CCAS BGR) ides ccncwcssesivccscesceses 16

Zenith Radio Corporation v. Hazeitine

Research, Inc. 395 U.S. 100, 123

89 S.Ct. 1562, 1576 L.Ed.2d 129

CODD) ccc rccscccevccvesessesssesevceuss 14

Vi.

STATUTES

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 52(a), 28 U.S.CA........6-- 12

Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.

Sections 2671-2680 .....--eeeeees 9 6

Illinois Revised Statute, Chapter 48

paragraphs 60-68 .........eeeee+: 2, 6

BS UBC. Sec. 1BSE1). .cccececces 2

Me Uses OE. LOOOUD. ccccccccees 6

29 C.F.R. Sec. 1926 450 (7)(1981)

ee ee ee ee thee eens 5

29 C.F.R. Sec. 1926 450 (9)(1981)

ERSTE POT TTT TTT TET TTT Te UL 5

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1990

TOMISLAV SAVIC,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner prays for a writ of certiorari to issue to

review a judgment and opinion of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit entered on

November 19, 1990.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit is reported at 918 F.2d 696 and is

reprinted in the Appendix, p. lc, infra.

The trial of this cause was bifurcated with the

District Court for the Northern District of Illinois

(Duff, D.J.) ruling from the bench after the trial on

liability. That portion of the official record is re-

printed in Appendix, p. la, infra.

The memorandum decision of the District Court

at the close of the case is reported at 702 F.Supp

695 (Northern District, Illinois 1988) and is reprinted

in Appendix, p. 1b, infra.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit was entered on November 19, 1990.

On December 5, 1990 Plaintiff timely petitioned the

Seventh Circuit for Rehearing or for Rehearing En

Banc. On January 14, 1991 the Seventh Circuit

denied the petition for rehearing. Appendix, p. ld,

infra. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

under 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(1).

STATUTES INVOLVED

This case involves the Illinois Structural Work

Act, Illinois Revised Statute, Chapter 48 paragraphs

60-68 and the Federal Tort Claims Act 28 U.S.C.

Sections 2671-2680. The Illinois Act is reprinted in

the Appendix, p. le, infra.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Tomislav Savic had been employed as a roofing

laborer for Kovilic Construction Company, Inc.

(Kovilic) when he fell from a roof attempting to

descend on a ladder and sustained severe injuries to

2

his arm, ribs, kidney and hip. Kovilic had contracted

with the United States to strip and re-roof canopies

covering loading docks on three warehouses at the

Great Lakes Navel Training Station in Great Lakes,

Illinois.

The United States Government construction

contract that was used provided that the work would

be performed under the general direction of the

contracting officer, who would designate a represent-

ative of the government and under the direction of

the contracting officer have complete charge of the

work and exercise full supervision and _ general

direction of the work so far as it affords the interest

of the government. The contract further provided

among other things that the government may at any

time make any change in their work including but

not limited to changes in the specifications, the

method or manner of the performance of the work,

equipment, services, or direct acceleration in the

performance of the work. The contract further

provided that the government may order the con-

tractor to suspend or delay all or any part of the

work for such time as he may determine to be

appropriate for the convenience of the government’.

The Department of the Navy maintained on the

premises an officer whose title was "Resident Officer

in Charge of Construction" who actually administered

all of the construction contracts at Great Lakes,

Illinois.

'See Appendix If

The government employed two construction

inspectors, Skonie and Syska, whose responsibilities

included general over sight responsibilities of

Kovilic’s performance; to act as safety inspectors to

assure compliance with Army Corp of Engineers and

OSHA Safety Standards; to instruct the individual

worker, for Kovilic to cease doing anything that may

endanger his safety and the welfare of those around

him; to stop a project if they saw anything unsafe

and generally conduct inspection for quality of work

and for unsafe work practices. They had the author-

ity to stop the work until corrective action was taken

in either the quality of the work or safety practices.

They had the ultimate authority to promote safety.’

They each visited the worksite three to four times a

day.* Their supervisor was Mr. Barnett, the project

manager.

On the portion of the roof work where Savic was

injured, Kovilic’s workers climbed the roof with the

use of an aluminum extension ladder. There was

substantial evidence that the top of the ladder had

been attempted to be secured by the use of nails

along the side of the ladder, however, one of the

government inspectors recalled the ladder being tied

with a wire. Marko Letica, a co-worker of Savic,

testified that nothing was used to secure the ladder

*See excerpts of testimony of Barnett, Skonie and

Syska, Appendix 1h, li and II

*See excerpts of Kovilic’s testimony, Appendix 1k

from time to time prior to the time of Savic’s injury

and that the government inspectors were present

when this occurred. There was uncontroverted

evidence that the ladder was not secured at its base

as required by OSHA’, that the ladder exceeded a

maximum 4 to 1 pitch required by OSHA%, and

there was uncontroverted evidence that the ladder

was too short in that it did not protrude three feet

above the working surface as required by OSHA’.

Piainuff's expert, Charles Schultz, former govern-

ment safetv inspector, testified that all four of the

aforementioned defects violated OSHA and safety

practices of the construction industry and were the

cause of Savic’s fall. The ladder was climbed in this

condition by the government inspectors during their

daily inspections.

On the morning of August 10, 1981 Savic des-

cended the ladder in a crouched position in order to

grab the top of the ladder which extended only

below his knees. Upon stepping on the ladder, it

moved causing Savic to fall off the roof onto the

ground some 18 feet below.

‘See excerpts of Letica testimony, Appendix lg

°29 CFR Section 1926 450 (10) 1981

629 CFR Section 1926 450 (7) 1981

729 CFR Section 1926 450 (9) 1981

This case arose under the Federal Tort Claims

Act 28 U.S.C. Section 2671-2680 (FTCA). The law

which is to be applied is the law of the State of

Illinois, "the law of the place where act or omission

occurred", 28 U.S.C. Section 1346(b). The trial court

in applying Illinois law found that the United States

was liable pursuant to the Illinois Structural Work

Act, Illinois Revised Statutes Chapter 48, paragraphs

60-69.°

The government appealed the District Court’s

judgment to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

In preparing the Record on Appeal the government

did not include the exhibits that were introduced at

trial. Accordingly the Appellate Court did not have

before it any of the numerous photographs of

physical evidence including the site and ladder in

question, as well as others of varying lengths showing

their relationship to the site of the work performed.

The Appellate Court, after reviewing only a

partial record, found that based on its view of what

weight should have been afforded to what it felt was

credible testimony as opposed to what the District

Court believed, that the District Court’s judgment

was clearly erroneous and was therefore reversed.

*For entire text see Appendix le

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

REVIEW IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT

THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT FROM

IGNORING ILLINOIS LAW AS IT RELATES

TO THE ILLINOIS STRUCTURAL WORK

ACT AND PREVENT THE APPLICATION

OF THE ACT IN FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS

CASES WHICH ARE IN DIRECT CON-

FLICT WITH THE DECISIONS OF THE

ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT.

The Appellate Court’s decision that the District

Court was clearly erroneous in finding that the

Government did not "have charge of" the work as

required under the Illinois Structural Work Act

("Act") is in direct conflict with the decisions of the

Illinois Supreme Court.

Whether one has charge of work under the Act

is a question of fact, a finding which can be over-

turned on review only if it is clearly erroneous

ma 792 F2d 639, 645 (7th Cir.

1986).

The Illinois Supreme Court in Larson vs.

w (1965), 33 Ill.2d

316, 321-22, 211 N.E.2d 247, 451, stated:

"While it may be conceded that some of the

decisions in this jurisdiction involving the

Scaffold Act appear to have equated ‘having

charge’ with; supervision and control; in

varying degrees, it is our opinion the language

of the statute, and the legislative intent it re-

flects, do not permit the conclusion that the

terms are the inflexible and unbending legal

equivalent of the other. The term ‘having

charge of is a generic term of broad import,

and although it may include supervision and

control, it is not confined to it. As was said of

the word ’charge’ in People vs. Gould, 345

111.288, 323, 178 N.E. 133, 148; "The word

does not necessarily include custody, control or

restraint, and its meaning must be determined

by the associations and circumstances sur-

rounding its use. "To have charge of" does

not necessarily imply more than to care for or

to have the care of.’* * *. [Consistent with its

beneficent purpose of preventing injury to

person employed in the extra-hazardous

occupation of structural work, the thrust of the

statute is not confined to those who perform,

or supervise, or control, or who retain the

right to supervise and control, the actual work

from which the injury arises, but, to insure

maximum protection, is made to extend to

owners and others who have charge of the

erection of alteration of any building or

structure.]' (Emphasis added.)

The Court went on to hold that the mere right

to stop the work done in a dangerous manner makes

those persons "having charge" within the meaning of

the Act whether the right is exercised or not Larson

at 252.

The Illinois Supreme Court in Miller vs. DeWitt,

37 Ill.2d 273, 266 N.E.2d 630, 639 (1967) reaffirmed

its ruling in Larson supra.

The Illinois Supreme Court in Emberton vs. State

a a 71

Ill.2d 111, 373 N.E.2d 1348 (1978) held that both

the owner of the property as well as the architect

"had charge" of the work being done by a contractor.

The owner was held liable even though it did not

exercise control over the manner in which the work

was done or concerned itself with the assembly and

construction of scaffolds. Liability was merely pred-

icated on frequent job inspections and issuances of

change orders. The architect was held liable because

he had the authority to stop work whenever such

stoppage may be necessary to insure the proper

execution of the contract. Emberton at 669.

The Illinois Supreme Court in Simmons_vs.

J 104 Ill.2d 444, 85 Ill.Dec.

347, 473 N.E.2d 946, upheld a finding of an owner

to "have charge" where the work performed by the

contractor was "subject to inspection and final accept-

ance" and the contractors only entered the premises

upon the request of the owner.

The Appellate Court in reversing the District

Court’s factual finding of "having charge of" ignored

and refused to follow the dictates of the Illinois

Supreme Court. Instead it has held that 10 factors

must be considered in determining whether a de-

fendant "has charge of' work. 918 F.2d 69. The

Appellate Court then goes on to recite those ely

which are cited in Vv

112 Ill.App.3d 6, 445 N.E.2d 39, 42 (1983). Those

factors constitute a summary of factors taken into

account from time to time in various appellate

decisions as probative on "having charge of" they are

not exclusive.

88 Ill.Dec. 449, 453 N.E.2d 1057 (1st Dist.

1985). The Appellate Court treated the 10 factors as

if they constituted prima facie requirement for

"having charge of" then simply arithmetically con-

cluded that the factors "weigh" in favor of the Gov-

ernment 7 to 3 and therefore the District Court's

finding was erroneous.

The Appellate Court went on to hold that be-

cause in its view the evidence did not demonstrate

control of the day to day work, or continued and

constant supervision that the District Court was

clearly erroneous in finding the Government "having

charge of". 918 F.2d 703.

This ruling is not a finding of clearly erroneous

fact rather it is a statement of law, one that is in

direct conflict with the decisions of the. Illinois

Supreme Court as set forth in Larson, Miller, and

Emberton supra. The mere right, whether exercised

or not, to stop the work if it is done in a dangerous

manner or inconsistent with the contract can make

a person "have charge of".

No where is it more evident that the Appellate

Court is attempting to make new law in direct

10

conflict with the decisions of the Illinois Supreme

Court then when it stated;

"We decline to hold that the mere Govern-

ment inspection of work being performed by

an independent contractor to assure that the

independent contractor is following the neces-

sary safety precautions, is by itself, enough to

shift the responsibility for taking safety pre-

cautions to the Government." 918 F.2d at

703.

Not only is this policy making on the part of the

Appellate Court, but also demonstrates a fa'lure to

recognize that Illinois courts have determined that

more than one entity can "have charge of" a project,

even though the Court acknowledges this fact in its

opinion. 918 F.2d at 700. Accordingly, there is no

necessity for a "shifting of responsibility" in order for

the Government to be "in charge of".

It should be noted that the Appellate Court relies

on an earlier Seventh District opinion to buttress its

conclusion. Cannon vs. United States, 328 Fed.2d

763 (7th Cir. 1964). However, that decision was

rendered one year before the standards announced

by the Illinois Supreme Court in Larson supra.

Il.

THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPRE-

HENDED AND MISAPPLIED THE CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS STANDARD OF FEDERAL

1]

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 52(a), 28

“ISCA.

The issues on which the Appellate Court reversed

the District Court’s judgment were specifically;

l. That the Government did not "have charge

of" the job.

2. That three of the four defects of the ladder

in question upon which evidence was

presented were not proximate causes of the

injury to Savic.

3. That the Government did not willfully

violate the Illinois Structural Work Act.

All three of the findings by the District Court that

were reversed were findings of fact. The standard

governing Appellate review of the District Court’s

finding of fact is that set forth in Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure 52(a):

"Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless

clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be

given to the opportunity of the Trial Court to

judge the credibility of the witnesses."

A careful reading of the decision by the Appellate

Court in this case demonstrates that it reversed the

finding of the trier of facts simply because it was

convinced that it would have decided the case dif-

ferently. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals

misapprehended and misapplied the erroneous

12

standard and must be reversed. Anderson vs. City of

Bessemer City, N.C., 105 S.Ct.1504 470 U.S. 562, 84

L.Ed.2d 518.

If the District Court’s account of the evidence is

plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety,

the Court of Appeals may not reverse it even though

convinced that had it been sitting as a trier of fact it

would have weighed the evidence differently. This

is true even when the District Court’s findings do

not rest on credibility determinations, but are based

on the physical or documentary evidence or infer-

ences from other facts. Anderson supra 105 S.Ct. at

1507. In the instant case, the Appellate Court did

not even have the entire record in front of it from

the standpoint of photographic and physical evidence

to determine what inferences the District Court drew

from same. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals

failed to give due regard to the District Court’s

ability to interpret and discern the credibility of oral

tesiumony. Indeed the Appellate Court chastised the

District Court for determining the credibility, analyz-

ing facts and drawing inferences from the facts based

on the Trial Court’s own experiences in life rather

then having viewed the evidence as the Appellate

Court would have. This criticism is curious in light

of the fact that under Illinois law jurors are instruct-

ed that in considering the evidence in a case they

are not required to set aside their own observations

and experiences in the affairs of life but they have a

right to consider all the evidence in the light of their

13

own observations and experiences in the affairs of

life. Clearly the District Court cannot be required

to do otherwise.

The Appellate Court failed to follow the principal

that their function is not to decide factual issues de

novo. orati Vv

Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 89 S.Ct. 1562,

1576 23L.Ed.2d 129 (1969). The Appellate Court’s

decision is replete with examples of de novo fact

finding. Not only does the Appellate Court criticize

the District Court’s reliance on his experience in life

in deciding the credibility, weight and application of

the facts in arriving at his judgment; but it berates

the Court for giving credence to Plaintiffs expert

testimony because his opinion was based on a dis-

puted ladder, 918 F.2d at 705 Foot Note 11. The

District Court is attacked for its credibility finding as

to whether the ladder that Kovilic testified that he

gave to his insurance company a few months after

the accident was in fact the ladder involved in the

fall. Kovilic firmly believed it was the ladder at the

time he gave the ladder to his insurance company,

and did not believe the ladder might not be the lad-

der in question until after the Plaintiffs expert in-

*Ill.Rev.Stats. 1987 ch. 110a, sec. 239 (a); Ill.Patern

Jury Instr. - Civil (IPI) 3d Ed. ch. 1-60 (1990)

14

spected and measured same while Kovilic was still a

third party Defendant.'® The Court as a trier of fact

was in a position to determine the credibility of

Kovilic, his bias and interest, and had the opportun-

ity to view photographs of the ladder and its rela-

tionship to the work site and to draw inferences

therefrom in conjunction with other testimony

presented at trial. The Appellate Court did not have

such opportunity.

The Appellate Court also made a de novo finding

of fact relative to Letica’s testimony that the ladder

had not always been previously attached when

persons were climbing on it, and independently

found that Letica’s testimony was questionable for

what the Appellate Court deemed was impeachment

or bias; and therefore the District Court had no

business relying on this testimony to determine that

the Government knew of the dangerous condition

and simply decided to do nothing about it. Such a

conclusion by the Appellate Court fails to give due

deference to the Trial Court. The Appellate Court

went on to say in its view the "overwhelming weight

of credible evidence" shows that the Government had

no knowledge that the nail had previously been

detached when the ladder was in use, 918 F.2d 706.

This statement by the Appellate Court clearly dem-

onstrates that it is engaging in de novo fact finding.

See excerpts of Kovilic’s testimony, Appendix 1k

15

The Appellate Court disagreed with the District

Court as to the finding that three defects existed and

held that in any event, in its view, those defects were

irrelevant and the District Court was clearly erron-

eous in finding that three of the four defects were

the proximate cause of Savic’s injuries. The question

of proximate cause under the Act is a question of

law only when facts are not disputed and where

there can be no difference in the judgment of

reasonable men. Kochan vs. Commonwealth Edison

7 123 Ill.App.3d 844, 848, 79 IIll.Dec. 367,

463 N.E.2d 921. However the Appellate Court went

on to substitute its own judgment of what evidence

should be believed. It held that in its judgment

Plaintiffs expert Schultz’ opinion as to causation was

discounted on cross-examination because in its view

Schultz said that if the nails had been in place the

ladder would not have fallen. Such testimony by

Schultz was not internally inconsistent in that Savic’s

fall and not the fall of the ladder was in issue.,

Furthermore the District Court was in a position to

determine the adequate basis, foundation and weight

to be given to any cross-examination on the basis of

all of the evidence before it as well as the photo-

graphs of the physical evidence. Thus Schultz’

tesumony that all four defects were the cause of

Savic’s fall rather then the ladder’s falling was not

contradicted by extrinsic evidence and not internally

inconsistent. Raney ten there can be no clear

error.

America, 148 F.2d 416, 433 (CA 2 1945), Orvis vs.

Higgins, 180 F.2d 537 (CA 2 1950).

16

There was more than sufficient evidence for the

District Court to conclude that the pitch of the

ladder in excess of a 4 to | ratio caused the plaintiff

to step out far over the edge of the canopy thereby

contributing to his loss of balance when the ladder

shifted. Furthermore, there was sufficient evidence

to support the finding that the inadequate length of

the ladder caused the Plaintiff to crouch in order to

attempt to grab the ladder which was extending only

12 to 15 inches over the roof, thereby causing him

to have his weight and center of gravity in a pre-

carious position, contributing to his fall when the

ladder shifted. Taking into account these factors

coupled with the general instability of the ladder

because of lack of proper fastening, the Appellate

Court could hardly conclude that the District Court’s

finding that all four factors were contributing causes

to Savic’s fall was clearly erroneous.

The Appellate Court’s conclusion that there was

only one proximate cause, that of the lack of nails

near the top of the ladder, and that the Government

could not have been responsible therefore because

such a condition never existed before it happened on

the day of Savic’s fall, is not only improper de novo

fact finding for the reasons set forth above, but

would necessitate a credibility finding that Letica was

lying when he said the condition existed from time

to time before the fall with the Government in-

spectors present. This credibility finding was not

made by the District Court and cannot now be made

by the Appellate Court.

17

The Appellate Court was also critical of the

District Court’s finding that there was no reliable

evidence that Savic descended the ladder improperly.

The Appellate Court was critical of the District Court

because in its view there was no evidence to support

such a finding since the only direct testimony on the

subject was Savic’s who said he did not descend the

ladder improperly.'' However, the fact that the

Appellate Court even raises this issue is puzzling

since comparative negligence is not applied to

actions under the Act. The only inquiry is in assess-

ment of the Defendant’s culpability and not the

Fibagge conduct. Hollis vs. R. Latora Construction,

Inc., (1985) 108 Ill.2d 401, 410, 92 Ill.Dec. 494, 485

N.E.2d 4; Simmons_vs. Union Electric Company,

(1984) 104 IIl.2d 444, 459-60, 85 Ill.Dec. 347, 473

N.E.2d 946. Furthermore even if Savic’s negligence

was the primary cause of his fall, a concurrent

violation of OSHA that contributed to the fall re-

mains a question of fact for the fact finder. See

v ific, 86 Iil.App.3d 570, 408

N.E.2d 117. However the District Court in this case

found that there was no negligence, primary or

otherwise, with respect to Mr. Savic’s conduct. For

the Appellate Court to suggest otherwise it would not

only have to engage in de novo fact finding, but in

fact engage in sheer speculation.

To fully comprehend the extent to which the

Appellate Court engaged in de novo fact finding, the

entire record would have to be reviewed. Not only

did it redetermine weight and credibility, but it

"See Appendix lj

18

Pi

ignored or misapprehended evidence; e.g. the Appel-

late Court in its opinion relative to the "having

charge of" issue stated that the Government only

inspected the job twice a day, 918 F.2d 701, when

the record shows as many as six to eight inspections

per day."

The Appellate Court in its decision has cited in

part this Court’s standard of review as set forth in

Anderson supra, however, it has wholly failed to

follow its dictates and sorely misapplied and mis-

apprehended its meaning.

CONCLUSION

This is the only Court to which the decision of

the Seventh Circuit can be appealled. Accordingly,

for all the foregoing reasons it is submitted that the

Petitioner for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted.

See Appendix lk

Respectfully Submitted,

RAY & GLICK, LTD.

Bogdan Martinovich

Bogdan Martinovich

RAY & GLICK, LTD.

P.O. Box 400

Libertyville, Illinois 60048-0400

(708) 680-9600

19

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1990

TOMISLAV SAVIC,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

APPENDIX

Bogdan Martinovich

Of Counsel

RAY & GLICK, LTD.

611 South Milwaukee Avenue

Libertyville, Illinois 60048

(708)680-9600

Attorneys for Petitioners

A-i

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Appendix A: District Court’s Ruling

from Bench at close of

liability portion of

WR i bab aeaneadeesncssscccens la

Appendix B: | Memorandum Opinion and

Order of the District Court

December 29, 1988.........00- lb

Appendix C: Opinion of the Court of

Appeals November 19,

1990 ..ccccccccccccccccccccces lc

Appendix D: Order of Court of Appeals,

denying Petition for

Rehearing en banc

January 14, 1991............-.. ld

Appendix E: Relevant Statutory

PLOVISIONS ...ccccccccccccccees le

I. Illinois Revised

Statutes, Chapter 48

paragraphs 60-68........ le

II. 29 CFR Sec. 1926

450 (7) (1981)........06- De

29 CFR Sec. 1926

Soe Ce CAO i cee ccxccccs Qe

Appendix F:

Appendix G:

Appendix H:

Appendix I:

Appendix J:

Appendix K:

Appendix L:

A-il

29 CFR Sec. 1926

450 (10) (1981)......

Construction Contract......

Excerpts of Letica’s

BOMBERORY soc ccccccvccccces

Excerpts of Syska’s

Pi aaas neces icenes

Excerpts of Sconie’s

re eo eTTeTTT ee

Excerpts of Savic’s

Testimony

Excerpts of Kovilic’s

TORI. wn cccccesecccecs

Excerpts of Barnett’s

SR oo cas cadcsewesces

—

APPENDIX A

District Court’s Ruling from Bench at

Close of Liability Portion of Trial

————e

DISTRICT COURTS RULING FROM

BENCH AT CLOSE OF LIABILITY

PORTION OF TRIAL

Pages 432 through 443

THE COURT: Okay. Well, first of all, let me

tell you that -- and I’m quite sincere -- that some-

times my job gets very difficult and sometimes it’s

irksome, nettlesome, or boring, and with you three

lawyers -- four lawyers it has not been any of the

above. In fact, I am quite sincere, it’s been a

pleasure to have you in my courtroom. You worked

hard, you have maintained your sense of humor, you

have worked intelligently and responsibly, and I am

more than happy to have had you with us this week.

I say that first because the loser doesn’t even

know afterwards what I’m saying, so I have to say it

first. But it’s not hard for me to rule on this case.

Having listened to all the evidence, having

observed the witnesses and determined my sense of

their credibility, applying my own knowledge of the

law, my experiences in life, as I would instruct any

jury, my sense of the facts, my consideration of the

totality of the evidence, it is my opinion that on

Count | the Government loses and on Count 2 the

plaintiff loses, that is to say, on the Structural Work

Act the plaintiff wins and on the negligence the

Government wins. There is two counts, right? Yes.

Now, more specifically, for citations, some of the

ones that you have actually given to me you can

refer to. You have already mentioned Phillips. You

could add Emberton v. State Farm, which has been

referred to earlier, Gannon v_ Chicago Milwaukee

has been referred to earlier. That would relate to

the Structural Work Act essentially.

Now, I would say that the Untied States for the

purposes of the Act had charge of the project, not

alone, but in the context of the Act had charge,

because it had some direct connection with the work

above mere ownership or employment of an inde-

pendent contractor, which is what Phillips would

refer to along with the Illinois cases it cited.

The United States inspected the work, they

oversaw the work, in the opinion of the Court, they

had a right to control the work. Whether or not

that right was exercised constantly or in the fullest

sense of the word, I believe they did.

In particular, there were two Government in-

spectors, each with slightly different roles, who

investigated as much as seven times a day on loca-

tion, they could have stopped the work for compli-

ance with the safety regulations. The contract

reflects their responsibility in that respect.

It is more than just their property, but it was

their property. They were in total control of the

circumstances of the base. They had a safety officer

in control of the whole base and the construction

came within the purview of the people who owned

and ran the base, as did every project under it and

specifically and directly this one.

I think that the social relationship may have had

something to do with the situation. I think the

Government was lazy or slack in their application of

their control over the safety aspects of the Act.

Now, the Structural Work Act, as you will know,

is a strict liability and it’s to be applied for the

purposes for which it was intended to the extent that

it can be. I don’t think that the Government relin-

quished any immunities in this respect. If at some

future point in time the Government would like to

give me some kind of a brief on some specific aspect

I haven’t dealt with adequately in their opinion in

terms of sovereignty, I’ll listen to that, but I don’t

see any here right now which would fit this set of

facts.

I also believe that the dangerous condition was

one which the United States knew of the existence of

which. It was a -- or by the exercise of reasonable

care could have discovered the existence of that

condition, and I would refer you to Kohutko v. Four

Columsn, Ltd., 148 Ill.App.3d, 181 at 187, a 1986

case, and Mathiew v. Venture Stores, Inc., 144

Ill.App.3d 783 at 795, also a 1986 case, and I think

the government in particular -- to be more parti-

cular, but not to in any way denigrate from what I

have already said, I would find as facts that the

project was ongoing with the ladders being moved

not only daily, but many times within each day for

the purposes of allowing the workers to move along

the platform of the ceiling or of the roof in terms of

applying the asphalt.

They had to move the ladder, they had to move

the buckets, they had to move the workers, and

many workers were going up and down the ladder

all day, and as far as I can see, the only consistent

attempt -- well, it wasn’t consistent, the general

attempt to secure the ladder in my opinion was to

use sixteenpenny nails.

There is no indication anywhere in the record

that there were ever more than two used per side on

either end of the ladder. There is some indication

that there was one used, there is some indication

that they were used fairly often, there is no indica-

tion that they were used constantly.

The inspectors actually went up the ladders and

down. They knew the circumstances of the ladder.

The ladder was, according to at least one witness,

and I believe it, propped up against the outside

track. Some say it was sometimes in the middle. I

think that’s possible.

There is no indication that these 2 x 4s or 4 x 6s

were used constantly or regularly, since it’s also

apparent that sometimes one was used and some-

times the other and it’s not certain that they were

ever all used, and if they were, they were nailed to

the ties so that the lower end of the ladder could

rest against them.

There is no indication that they were always used

or always moved when the ladder was moved. I

don’t believe they were from the general tenor of

what I have heard from all the witnesses in terms of

the circumstances of the working place.

I believe that the ladder was lower than it should

have been in its projection above the roof and |

believe that the plainuff put his left foot over onto

the ladder, and before he had an opportunity to take

a hold of the ladder with his right hand, the ladder

moved and he fell.

Now, that suggests to me and I will find, that he

did not try to go down the ladder forward. He is a

laborer, a man of, it would appear to me, some

intelligence some experience. He is a physically

competent human being from what I observed of

him physically and his expressions of himself and the

experience to which he has referred, and I do not

believe that he would try to go down a ladder

backwards, but more than that, I think the testimony

doesn’t prove it in any way, shape, or form except

some self-serving comments made by an insurance

claims investigator who spoke to unnamed persons at

the scene of the accident who didn’t speak his

language, were excited and upset, and if seeing him

fall forward, which indeed he easily could have been,

and I would tell you frankly that were I in his

circumstances I would have made an effort to fall in

the same fashion and I would have been successful.

I do not think that any human being with any

reasonable agility would find it difficult to, if starting

to fall backwards from a ladder 18 feet in the air or

a roof 18 feet in the air, would have any difficulty

turning enough to fall forward on his hands. In

fact, I think it would be even a rational attempt.

There is really no direct evidence anywhere that he

came down the ladder the wrong way.

I also find that the word "secured" is not met,

and my ruling, finding of fact is that the ladder was

not adequately secured by one or two sixteenpenny

nails driven into a board one and a half or two

inches deep with a projection of only an inch and a

half above on a ladder which is clearly three times

that length in its own elevation, also heavy, heavy

enough to go 22 to 24 feet in the air -- excuse me,

20 to 24 feet in the air depending upon utilization,

heavy enough to bear the weight of a 230 pound

man. With that weight plus that ladder those nails

could hardly be considered to be sufficient to secure

the ladder from any extraordinary stress, leverage or

pressure, and if the ladder weren’t high enough and

if the angle were too wide, then the extra _ stress,

leverage or pressure might easily fall against those

nails, which would be inadequate to serve the

purpose.

I don’t think that those nails were put in regular-

ly and, I think the inspectors had an obligation to

know they were not put in regularly and did know

or should have known because of the frequency of

their visits over the number of days. The custom

and usage didn’t stop during those days or change in

any fashion.

The question of "in charge of," I think that the

Government had a sufficient degree of supervision

and control. They had retained the right to super-

6

—

vise and control. They could have stopped the work

at any time. They weren’t constantly on location,

but they were on location several times a day every

day for a number of days.

The contract suggested they had a right, they did

have in my opinion a meeting that could be con-

sidered to be adequate to include the concept of

safety, there was safety discussed, according to the

Government and its own witnesses. They had

responsibility for monitoring the compliance with the

contract. The contract included safety requirements.

They could have changed the work circumstance. As

the man said, you know, he could have told them to,

and when I asked him, "Could you stop them from

using that asphalt bucket? Certainly could."

Well, if you can stop them from using an asphalt

bucket, you can certainly stop them from inadequate-

ly supporting a ladder.

Now, the authority to issue change orders isn’t

important in this situation. The right to stop work,

they did, they said they did, I would find they did

under any circumstances.

The ownership of equipment is not relevant to

this instance. They were surely and clearly familiar

with construction customs and practices of this job

and of every other job since they spoke of the large

number of times that they were involved in letting

construction contracts on the base, and I think the

difference between the word "assure" and "insure" is

important.

They didn’t have to insure workers’ safety be-

cause they weren’t an insurance company, but they

did indeed have the ability to assure workers’ safety

by simply speaking to the issue to the contractor in

many, many ways, not only under the contract itself,

but under the fact that they gave out the contract

and could give out more contracts and had given out

contracts in the past, as well as to assure simply by

pointing out the lack of compliance and the necessity

of complying.

But in addition to that, the other rights and

powers that they had, which were more than merely

property owners, gave them the ability to assure

workers’ safety and very conveniently, by the wey,

without any great stress.

I think they were lax and lazy, and I think that

under the circumstances it all constitutes a willful --

under the statute -- as we know, "willful" under the

Statute doesn’t require the same kind of willfulness

that an intentional tort under the common law

would require.

I think the plainufPs expert witness lacked some-

thing, to be sure. Too bad you can’t pay him

afterwards instead of before. But by the same token,

he did include in his testimony some of the things

that he was called upon to do, references to the

statutes and references to the rules, and I did pay

attention to his testimony, I didn’t give it any greater

credibility than it deserved, but I will tell you as you

inquired in fact, yes, I have had a great deal of

experience on ladders, as a matter of fact.

I have been a laborer in my life on more than

one occasion, and as I say, even a homeowner gets

a certain amount of experience with ladders. But I

used ladders in the navy, I used ladders when I was

a worker on the highways in the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts many years ago, I washed trucks and

moved things around for Rouan Motor Transport

out in Iowa years ago, and I painted fences with

creosote and buildings with creosote on ladders

when I was a healthy young lad.

I know without any difficulty at all the actions

that his laborer was going through when he was

attempting to get off that roof and on to that ladder.

I am sure, and I find, that the ladder was not

high enough above the leverage of the building, and

it was insecure, that it was -- now, as far as the

negligence is concerned, I don’t think that under the

common law rules of negligence I can find the

Government negligent. I think there is a clear

distinction, and so I rule against the plaintiff on

negligence. That means the issue of contributory

negligence is not an element that I need to deal

with.

Now, I think I have covered everything. It took

me more than five minutes.

Now, we need to deal with the issue, since this is

a bifurcated trial, of damages. I would suggest that

9

what I would first ask you to do is talk to each other

about that. If you need to have it resolved by me

on a trial, we can set a date and time for that. You

can do it by stipulation if you wish.

You can have the plaintiff come back and talk

about his pain and suffering if you want. You can

have me take the testimony that I have already

heard if you want. You can settle it if you want.

You can tell how long you think it will take me to

try it.

And if you want, I think -- I’m not sure of this,

but I maybe we could refer it to a magistrate if you

wanted too, but I’m not sure. The liability having

been found, I think the damages could be done that

way.

So I’m happy to do whatever you four discuss

with each other and decide.

MR. MARTINOVICH: Can we have a short

status date? That will give us an opportunity to get

together.

THE COURT: Yes. Let’s have Mrs. Brotherson

call and pick a date. It will be early next week.

MR. MARTINOVICH: You will be on vacation,

though.

THE COURT: My staff is not going to be

around. I’m not going on vacation as soon as they

are, but that means I won’t be on the bench, and

10

that won’t -- but I won’t lose all of my support

systems until the 18th. So we can do it early next

week.

MR. MARTINOVICH: Thank you, Judge.

MR. FLESSNER: Thank you.

MS. GINSBERG: Thank you.

1]

APPENDIX B

Memorandum Opinion and Order of the

District Court

December 19, 1988

(Filed December 29, 1988)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

702 F.Supp. 695 (N.D.III. 1988)

Tomislav Savic and Kristina

Savic, Plaintiffs,

VS.

Civ. No. 83 C 5388

The United States of America

and S.W. Barnett, Defendants.

The United States of America,

Third Party Plaintiff,

Vs.

Kovilic Construction Co., Inc.,

Third Party Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BRIAN BARNETT DUFF, District Judge

Plaintiff Tomislav Savic has sued the United States

of America under the Federal Claims Act ("the

FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2671 et seq. for violations of

the Illinois Structural Work Act, IIl.Rev.Stat. ch. 48,

sec. 69, resulting in his fall from the roof of a

building at the Great Lakes Naval Base while work-

]

ing for Kovilic Construction Co., Inc. The case came

before the court as a bifurcated trial beginning in

August, 1988. On August 7, this court ruled, for the

reasons stated in open court, that the United States

was liable to the plaintiff his injuries because it was

in charge of the construction project for the purposes

of the Structural Work Act, 689 F.Supp. 854. This

court now makes the following findings of fact and

conclusions law with regard to the damages phase of

the trial.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Plaintiff was born on March 27, 1954 in

Yugoslavia, and attained an eighth grade education

in that country.

2. Plaintiff worked primarily as a farmer in

Yugoslavia but also did work as a roofer on an

informal basis there.

3. Plaintiff came to the United States in 1980

and, through mid-1981, worked as a greenskeeper at

the Owentsia Country Club in Lake Forest, Illinois.

4. Plaintiff is married and presently has two

children, aged 2 and 11.

5. Plainuffs wife works as a janitor at Lake

Forest College in Illinois.

6. In late July, 1981, plaintiff was employed as a

laborer by Kovilic Construction Co. ("Kovilic").

7. Plaintiff worked as a roofer for Kovilic at a

roofing job at the Great Lakes Naval Base in Great

Lakes, Illinois for the two weeks prior to August 10,

1981.

8. At the time, plaintiff was earning $11.87 per

hour; experienced roofers were earning $16.50.

9. On August 10, plaintiff fell off the roof of a

building on which he was doing work for Kovilic,

injuring his left elbow, his left kidney, and his left

leg.

10. The United States was in charge of the

project.

11. The injury to his elbow required three

separate hospitalizations for surgery.

12. Plaintiffs medical expenses incurred as a

result of the injuries caused by the fall came to

$18,523.35.

13. Plainuff will eventually need surgery on his

elbow to relieve the pain caused by further deteriora-

tion, costing approximately $10,000.

14. Plaintiff speaks English at a third grade level

and, despite his efforts to learn the language, cannot

and will never master it sufficiently to gain employ-

ment requiring fluency in the language.

15. Plaintiffs mathematical skills are at a sixth

grade level and, due to his below-average intelli-

3

gence, will not improve much beyond this level

irrespective his efforts.

16. The injury to his elbow has prevented and

will continue to prevent plaintiff regularly lifting

more than 20 pounds (although under some cir-

cumstances he may occasionally do so) and, together

with his inability to speak English, has prevented and

will prevent him from doing anything but menial

labor at a wage of approximately $5.50 per hour at

present wage levels.

17. Plaintiff is a responsible individual devoted to

supporting his family, has done whatever he reason-

ably could to mitigate his damages from the fall,

including taking on available work that he was

capable of doing in the years following his injury

(with the exception of one period during which he

remained home with his newborn child when babysit-

ters’ fees approximated his wages but not his

wife’s.).

18. As a result of his injuries, plaintiff lost the

following amount of wages from the date of his

injuries through the date of trial (based on a wage

of $11.87 per hour at 40 hours per week for 50

weeks a year and subtracting out the amounts he

either earned or would have earned had he taken an

available job he could handle):

a. 1981 -$ 9,400

b. 1982 - $ 19,200

c. 1983 - $ 23,700

d. 1984 - $ 20,700

e. 1985 - $ 20,700

f. 1986 - $ 20,700

. 1987 - $ 13,700

h. 1988 - $ 13,700

Total $141,800

19. Had plaintiff not sustained the injuries he

did in 1981, he would today be working as a roofer

at a rate of approximately $16.50 per hour.

20. Because of his injures, plaintiff will only be

able to earn $5.50 per hour in the future.

21. From now through the time he reaches 65

years of age, at which point he would have stopped

working as a roofer, plaintiff will lose $11.00 per

hour for 40 hours a week for 50 weeks a year, or

$22,000 a year, for 31 years, as a result of his

injuries.

22. Based on the seasonal and risky nature of

work as a roofer, there is a 60% probability that

plainuff would have remained employed as a roofer

full-time through the age of 65 had he not been

injured.

23. The fall caused plaintiff to experience pain

and suffering from his left arm, kidney and leg, but

plainuff failed to establish that the fall caused the

lower back pain he now suffers.

24. Plainuffs past pain and suffering quantifiable

in an amount of $45,000.

25. Plaintiff will experience pain and suffering in

the amount of $5,000 in the future provided that he

has the $10,000 operation to relieve the pain caused

by further deterioration of his left elbow.

26. In the absence of such an operation, plaintiff

would experience an additional $10,000 in future

pain and suffering. .

27. Plaintiff recovered $100,000 in a settlement

with Kovilic for injuries resulting from the fall.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. This court has jurisdiction pursuant the

FTCA, 28 U.S.C. sec. 1346(b). Venue is net con-

tested.

2. Illinois substantive law governs this case.

3. Plaintiffs injuries to his left arm, kidney and

left leg, were proximately caused by the August 10,

1981 fall.

[1] 4. The United States is liable under the

Structural Work Act, IIl.Rev.Stat. ch. 48, sec. 69, for

these injuries and resultant damages.

[2-5] 5. Plaintiff is entitled to recover for (a) his

past medical expenses, (b)future medical expenses, (c)

his lost past wages, (d) his lost future wages, (e) his

past pain and suffering, and (f) his future pain and

suffering.

(a) Plaintiff has sustained $18,500 in past medical

expenses.

(b) Plaintiff will sustain an additional $10,000

(present dollars) in future medical expenses.

(c) Plaintiff lost a total of $141,800 in past wages.

(d)(1) Plaintiffs damages for loss of future

earnings must be calculated at their present-day cash

value. Fenolio v. Smith, 802 F.2d 256, 258 (7th

Cir.1986). At $22,000 a year for the next 31 years,

plaintiffs lost earnings have a present-day cash value

(at a discount rate of 2%, see O’Shea vs. Riverway

677 F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir.1982) of

$504,630.

(d)(2) This amount must be reduced by 40%, to

$302,778 to account for the seasonal and risky

nature of plaintiffs work. See O’Shea v. Riverway

Towing Co., 677 F.2d at 1200.

(d)(3) The United States argues that this amount

must be further reduced to account for the income

taxes plaintiff would have had to pay had he received

the money as income over the next 31 years, since

the damages award will not be taxed. Although

Harden v. United States, 688 F.2d 1025 (5th

Cir.1982), involved a wrongful death claim, the

United States cites it for the proposition that Norfolk

& Western R. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 100 S.Ct.

755, 62 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980), mandates a deduction

for income taxes under the FTCA even where, as

here, state law does not allow for a deduction of

income taxes from personal injury awards, see

Vv -W.

115 Ill.App.3d 702, 705-08, 71 Ill.Dec. 432, 450

N.E.2d 1311 (1983); see also Klawonn v. Mitchell,

105 Ill.2d 450, 454-58, 86 Ill.Dec. 478, 475 N.E.2d

857 (1985) (rejecting Liepelt for state law causes of

rinieg Compare Vv

453 U.S. 473, 486-87, 101 S.Ct. 2870, 2879-

30, 69 L.Ed.2d 784 (1981) (Liepelt established a

federal common law rule for all federal causes of

action).

Although the rule set forth in Harden might

require the deduction of federal income taxes here,

but see In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, IIl.,

701 F.2d 1189, 1195-96 (7th Cir. 1985) (distinguishing

wrongful death from personal injury claims), this

court disagrees with the Fifth Circuit that Liepelt

mandates the deduction of income taxes in all actions

under the FTCA. "Damages under the Federal Tort

Claims Act are assessed according to state law."

Jastremski v. United States, 737 F.2d 666, 672 (7th

Cir.1984). Harden held that an income tax deduc-

tion was required by the FTCA’s prohibition against

punitive damages, 688 F.2d 1029; see 28 U.S.C. sec.

2674; Felder v. United States 543 F.2d 657, 665-66

(9th Cir.1976), but that holding is inconsistent with

the Illinois nondeductibility rule.

Under Illinois law, as in many states, federal tax

liability is excluded from consideration of compensa-

tory damage awards not to punish the government

but instead to ensure full compensation for the

victim. ann _v. Lisle-W ldge rotec

District, 115 Ill.App.3d at 706-07, 71 Ill.Dec. 432, 450

N.E.2d 1311. As the Eighth Circuit held in Manko

vs. United States, 830 F.2d 831 (8th Cir.1987):

Whether to deduct income taxes is simply

one of many issues courts face in deciding what

is fair compensation for the injury. Other such

issues are whether to apply the collateral-source

rule, whether or award pre-judgment interest,

how certain a forecast of future earnings must be,

how to value pain and suffering, and so forth.

Different jurisdictions resolve these issues in

different ways, but they have nothing to do with

"punitive damages" as that term is traditionally

used in the law. They do not depend on a

finding of wanton or malicious conduct, they are

not imposed to punish a defendant, and they have

nothing to do with a defendant's net worth-all

questions that customarily arise when punitive

damages are awarded. We conclude that Con-

gress did not mean to outlaw all variations from

some ideal norm of compensation when it forbade

"punitive damages." It was referring only to the

concept in its traditional sense.

Id. at 836. Accordingly, this court rules that the

United States is not entitled to a deduction in

plainuffs ward for income taxes. )foreover, even

were this court to rule otherwise, the United States

has presented no evidence as to the amount plain-

tiffs award would have to be reduced and, in the

absence of such evidence, this court would not at-

tempt a purely speculative calculation as to the

proper amount to deduct.

9

ieee

(e) Plaintiff is entitled to recover $45,000 for past

pain and suffering.

(f) Plaintiff is entitled to $5,000 for future pain

and suffering. (Had this court agreed with the

government that plaintiff did not prove that he will

need $10,000 in future medical expenses to relieve

the pain from the deterioration of his left elbow, the

court would have awarded him an additional $10,000

for future pain and suffering).

6. Plaintiffs total damages come to $523,078.

7. The United States is entitled to a credit of

$100,000 by reason of plaintiffs settlement with

Kovilic, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 70, sec. 302(c); O’Connor v.

Pinto Trucking Service, Inc., 149 Ill.App.3d 911, 103

Ill.Dec. 242, 501 N.E.2d 263 (1986), bringing the

liability of the United States to $423,078.

[6] 8. The United States argues that this amount

should be further reduced to reflect only its relative

culpability in the incident. Although it recognizes

that under Illinois law, indeed under well-settled

principles of common law throughout this country,

apportionment among joint tortfeasors of their lia-

bility to the injured does not exist, the United States

grounds its argument on the FTCA. According to

the United States, because the FTCA only permits

recovery against the government for its negligent or

wrongful acts, Loque v. United States, 412 U.S. 521,

93 S.Ct. 2215, 37 L.Ed.2d 121 (1973), it is entitled to

10

a credit for Kovilic’s share of culpability in the

incident as a matter of federal law.

This argument is essentially one for a federal

-common law rule of apportionment among tort-

feasors. Recognizing that such a rule is unsupported

by any FTCA caselaw, the United States attempts to

distinguish this case from the ordinary joint tort-

feasor situation based on the Structural Work Act’s

imposition of liability on persons "having charge of"

work, a theory of liability distinct from ordinary

common law negligence. Yet, for purposes of the

FTCA, this is a distinction without a difference.

The Seventh Circuit has held that under statutes

imposing liability against an owner “in charge of"

work, the United States can be held liable under the

FTCA, since such statutes are predicated on the

owner's wrongful conduct. Fentress v. United States,

431 F.2d 824 (7th Cir.1970); also see Phillips v

United States, 792 F.2d 639 (7th Cir.1986). And

under the Structural Work Act, liability is joint and

several. Dinschel v. United States Gypsum Co., 83

Ill.App.2d 466, 476-77, 228 N.E.2d 106 (1976).

Thus, a Structural Work Act case against the govern-

ment is no different than any joint tortfeasor situa-

tion, and in the absence of a contrary federal statute,

the United States is entitled to apportionment only

to the extent that applicable state law allows it. See

of W. Wa v. United States, 669

F.Supp. 234, 236 (N.D.III.1987). Illinois law does

not. See Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 70, sec. 302(c)

1}

CONCLUSION

Judgment is entered for the plaintiff and against

the United States in the amount of $423,078.

12

APPENDIX C

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

November 19, 1990

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 89-1399

TOMISLAV SAVIC,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant and Third Party

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

KOVILIC CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

INCORPORATED,

Third Party Defendant-Appellee.

,

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 83 C 5388—Brian Barnett Duff, Judge.

ARGUED FEBRUARY 18, 1990—DECIDED NOVEMBER 19, 1990

Before Woop, JR., CoFFEY, Circuit Judges, and

ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge.

CoFFEY, Circuit Judge. The United States appeals the

district court’s finding of liability and the award of dam-

ages following a bench trial pursuant to the Illinois Struc-

tural Work Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, Pars. 60-68, and

the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 in

favor of Tomislav Savic. We reverse.

Cited as Savic vs. United States of America,

918 F. 2d 696 (7th Cir. 1990)

2 No. 89-1399

I.

FACTS

Tomislav Savic had been employed as a roofing laborer

for Kovilic Construction Co., Inc. (“Kovilic’’) for approx-

imately two weeks prior to his fall from a ladder, in which

he sustained injuries to his arm, ribs, kidney and hip.

Kovilic had contracted with the United States to strip and

re-roof the canopies covering loading docks on three ware-

houses at the Great Lakes Naval Training Station in Great

Lakes, Illinois.

The standard United States Government construction

contract was used on this project and placed the respon-

sibility for proper safety and health precautions on the

contractor. Kovilic, the contractor, was required to sub-

mit a safety plan for the project, and the parties stipu-

lated that a pre-construction conference was held at which

the government, among other things, discussed Kovilic’s

responsibility for the safety of his employees and the ad-

ministration of the contract, as well as the applicable labor

standards.

The government retained the authority under the con-

tract for general oversight of the project, such as the abil-

ity to stop work for any safety violations observed and

the authority to change the construction ifications dur-

ing the performance of the work. In the Accident Preven-

tion section of the contract, the “Contractor” (Kovilic) was

required to take actions necessary to ensure a safe work-

place, but the Government only had the responsibility to

“notify the Contractor of any noncompliance with the fore-

going provisions and the action to be taken. The Contrac-

tor shall, after receipt of such notice, immediately take

corrective action.” At a later point in that section, the

contract provided: “If the Contractor fails or refuses to

comply promptly, the Contracting Officer may issue an

order stopping all or part of the work until satisfactory

corrective action has been taken.” ;

The government employed two experienced construction

inspectors whose responsibilities included general oversee-

No. 89-1399 3

ing responsibilities of Kovilic’s performance and ensuring

quality control during the term of the contract. One of

the inspectors, Mr. James Skonie, was a government em-

ployee, and the other, Mr. Joseph Szyszka, was an em-

ployee of an independent contractor.

On the particular portion of the roofing job where Savic

was injured, Kovilic’s workers climbed to the roof via an

aluminum extension ladder. Even though there was a con-

flict in testimony between the government’s construction

representative and other witnesses dealing with the method

of how the ladder was secured, the judge failed to state

why he chose to believe that the ladder was attached by

nails, rather than wire in spite of the fact that James

Skonie, one of the government’s construction representa-

tives, testified that he recalled the ladder being tied and

secured at the top with wire. There was also conflicting

testimony at trial on the question of whether attaching

the top of the ladder with nails was the safest method,

but the two construction representatives and the plain-

tiffs ladder expert did agree that this method would have

prevented the ladder from moving sideways and thus would

have prevented the accident. At trial Savic testified that

at the beginning of the work day on the morning of Au-

gust 10, 1981 he climbed the ladder, and that the ladder

was attached to the roof, as it had been in the past, and

further, that he and one of his co-workers moved a tar

pipe! immediately prior to his accident. Moving the tar

pipe necessitated the detachment of the ladder from the

roof momentarily in order that the pipe might be passed

behind it. Although it is unclear from the evidence whether

Savic or his co-worker detached the ladder, it is clear that

it was not reattached to the roof after the pipe had been

moved. Immediately after moving the pipe, Savic was

summoned by his supervisor (Nic Kovilic) to help him

move some insulation on the ground. As Savic stepped

1 The tar pipe is a pipe which is used in pumping hot tar from

ground level to the roof.

4 No. 89-1399

on the ladder to descend, the ladder moved sideways,

catapulting Savic to the ground, some eighteen feet.?

As a result of the fall, Savic injured his left elbow, frac-

tured four ribs, damaged his left kidney as well as his

left hip. After being awarded worker’s compensation for

his claim against Kovilic, Savic filed suit against the

United States claiming violations of the Illinois Structural

Work Act and common law negligence. The United States

filed a third- complaint against Kovilic Construction,

on the grounds of common law indemnity, and later amended

the third party complaint to include a claim under the

Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, Ill. Rev. Stat.

ch. 70, pars. 301-305. Over four years after the filing of

the original third-party complaint, the trial judge refused

to allow a further amendment by the United States, a

claim against Kovilic for contractual indemnity, because

of the lapse in time. Kovilic was dismissed from the ac-

tion prior to trial after settling directly with Savic. Savic

v. United States, 689 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ill. 1988).

The court trial was bifurcated as to the issues of liability

and damages. In the liability phase of the trial, the tria!

judge found the United States to be liable under the IlIli-

nois Structural Work Act but did not find common law

negligence on the part of the United States. In its oral

decision, the court found that the United States “had

charge of” the project on which Kovilic was working, ac-

2 There was testimony at trial that Savic may have attempted to

descend the ladder improperly, facing away from the building in

descending it similar to a staircase. This evidence was based upon

information which Nic Kovilic testified to hearing from Savic’s co-

workers after the accident, as well as the testimony of Emilio

a who witnessed the final eight to ten feet of Savic’s

fall, and testified that he was falling face-forward. The judge found

that there was no reliable evidence that Savic descended in this

manner and found this evidence not to be credible. In his opinion,

the trial judge stated that Savic would naturally have turned his

body in mid-air in order to be facing downward as he fell, but

there was no evidence of this in the record.

No. 89-1399 5

cording to the Illinois Structural Work Act, because the

government participated in the work beyond merely own-

ing the property or employing an independent contractor,

citing Phillips v. United States, 792 F.2d 689 (7th Cir.

1986). The court further found that the method of attach-

ing the ladder with nails to the building was an improper

method of securing the ladder, was inadequate, and this

was the proximate cause of Savic’s injuries. The court also

reasoned that the United States had willfully violated the

Act, as the term “willful” is used under the Illinois Struc-

tural Work Act, in allowing this method of ladder attach-

ment. Although the government inspectors’ testimony con-

flicted on the question of whether the ladder was secured

with nails or wire, both inspectors nonetheless agreed that

attaching the ladder with nails would have complied with

safety requirements. Despite extensive testimony in the

record regarding the adequacy of the method of attach-

ment using nails, the judge discounted the testimony of

the government’s expert witnesses, who testified concern-

ing the attachment of the ladder and instead cited his

“great deal of experience on ladders” as the basis for his

findings.*®

After having found liability on the part of the United

States, the judge received evidence regarding Savic’s dam-

ages, finding that Savic had sustained damages in the

3 Specifically, the trial judge stated in his oral findings:

“T have been a laborer in my life on more than one occa-

sion, and as I say, even a 4" (~ a certain amount

of experience with ladders. But I ladders in the navy,

I used ladders when I was a worker on the highways in the

Commonwealth of Massachusetts many years , I washed

trucks and moved things around for Rouan [sic] Motor Trans-

port out in Iowa years ago, and I painted fences with creosote

and buildings with creosote on ladders when I was a healthy

young lad.

I know without any difficulty at ali the actions that this

laborer was going through when he was attempting to get off

that roof and on to that ladder.”

6 No. 89-1399

amount of $523,087.00.* After subtracting the $100,000.00

which Savic received as a result of the settlement with

Kovilic, judgment was entered = the United States

in the amount $423,087.00. The United States appealed.

II.

DISCUSSION

This case arises under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28

U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (“FTCA”). The law which is to be

— is the law of the State of Illinois, “the law of the

place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1346(b).

The trial judge found that the United States was li-

able pursuant to the Illinois Structural Work Act, Ill. Rev.

Stat. ch. 48, pars. 60-69.5 In order to find liability under

4 The judge’s damage award calculation contains many assump-

tions unsupported in the record. Savic had been a “laborer” prior

to his accident, and was omg laborer’s wages at $11.87 per hour,

but the judge found that his future —— would be $16.50 per hour,

stating that is what “experienced roofers” were ing. The rec-

ord fails to set forth his basis for finding where the $16.50 per

hour came from (the evidence showed experienced roofers made

$16.82 per hour) nor how Savic could be classified as an ‘“‘experi-

enced roofer.” In calculating Savic’s earning abilit~ xfter the in-

jury, the judge projected his future i at $0... per hour,

an in we are unaware of the source of this figure. On the

other Kovilic testified that he paid Savic $10 to $12 per hour

for approximately fifteen weeks in 1982, the year following the

accident. Kovilic stated that Savic worked as a laborer and that

Savie did not have any problems doing the tasks assigned to him.

At the end of fifteen weeks, Savic was laid off because the winter

season prevented outdoor construction work. Savic did not return

to work the following spring.

5 Section 1 of the Structural Work Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48,

par. 60, provides, -in pertinent part:

“All scaffolds, hoists, cranes, stays, ladders, supports, or other

mechanical contrivances, erected or constructed by any per-

son, firm or corporation in this state for the use in the erec-

(Footnote continued on following page)

No. 89-1399 7

the Structural Work Act, the plaintiff must prove all of

the following:

“(1) The plaintiff was engaged in or was passing un-

der or by a structural activity; (2) the activity was

being performed with reference to a structure; (3) a

scaffold or other mechanical device was being used;

(4) a defect existed in the construction or use of the

device; (5) the defect proximately caused the plain-

tiffs injuries; (6) the defendant had charge of the

5 continued

tion, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any house,

building, mie viaduct, or other structure, shall be erected

or constructed, in a safe, suitable and proper manner, and shall

be so erected and constructed, placed and operated as to give

proper and adequate protection to the life and limb of any per-

son or ns employed or engaged thereon, or passing under

or by the same, and in such manner as to prevent the falling

of any material that may be used or deposited thereon.”

A private cause of action arises under Section 9 of the Struc-

tural Work Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, par. 69, which provides in

part:

“Any owner, contractor, sub-contractor, foreman or other

person having charge of the erection, construction, repairing,

alteration, removal or painting of any building, bridge, viaduct

or other structure within the provisions of this act, shall com-

ply with all the terms thereof, and any such owner, contrac-

tor, sub-contractor, foreman or other person violating any of

the provisions of this act shall be guilty of a Class A

misdemeanor.

*_ * *

For any injury to person or pro , occasioned by an

wilful violations of this Act, or rvilfal failure to comply wi

any of its provisions, a right of action shall accrue to party

injured, for any direct damages sustained thereby; and in case

Ce ee ee ee ee ee

ure as aforesaid a right of action shall accrue to the survivi

of the person so killed, the lineal heirs or adopted chil-

n of such person, or to any other person or persons who

were, before such loss of life, a for support on the

person or persons so killed, for a like recovery o s for

the injuries sustained by reason of such loss of life or lives.”

8 No. 89-1399

work being performed; and (7) the defendant willfully

violated the Act’s safety standard.”

Fisher v. Crippen, 144 Ill. App. 3d 239, 493 N.E.2d 1204,

1206 (1986) (citations omitted). On appeai, the United States

disputes the district court’s findings regarding whether

it was “in charge of” the construction activities under the

act, the defect in use which proximately caused the acci-

dent, and the government’s willfulness in allowing the

defective use to exist.

Findings of fact pursuant to FTCA and the Illinois Struc-

tural Work Act must be affirmed unless they are clearly

erroneous. Phillips v. United States, 792 F.2d 639, 644

(7th Cir. 1986). A finding is clearly erroneous when, al-

though there may be some evidence to support it, “‘the

reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been com-

mitted.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,

573 (1985) ree United States v. United States Gyp-

sum Co., U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). “We may have such a

conviction if the trial judge’s interpretation of the facts is

implausible, illogical, internally inconsistent or contradicted

by documentary or other extrinsic evidence.” E.E.0.C.

v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 309 (7th Cir. 1988)

(citations omitted).

The lack of written findings by the district court makes

review difficult. See Jones v. Jones Brothers Construc-

tion Corp., 879 F.2d 295 (7th Cir. 1989). In Jones, this

court remanded because it felt that “the district court’s

opinion makes review difficult because the limited number

of specific findings do not sufficiently identify the evidence

or credibility determinations upon which they were based

and reflect certain inconsistencies.” Jones, 879 F.2d at 297.

In the present case, however, the transcript of the court’s

oral opinion does reflect a sufficient amount of informa-

tion for us to glean the basis for the court’s relevant find-

ings in order that this court might make a valid deter-

mination of the propriety of those findings.

No. 89-1399 9

A

Whether the United States

“had charge of’ the Project

Whether the United States “had charge of” Kovilic’s

roofing operation, which is the sixth element under Fisher,

is a question of fact, to be reviewed under the totality

of circumstances standard. Gentile v. Kehe, 165 Ill. App.

3d 802, 520 N.E.2d 827, 829 (1987). Illinois courts have

determined that more than one entity can “have charge

of’ a project, Fruzyna v. Walter C. Carlson Associates,

Inc., 78 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 398 N.E.2d 60, 63 (1977), but

a number of factors (10) must be considered in determin-

ing whether or not a particular defendant “has charge of”’

(responsibility for) the project under the parameters of

the Structural Work Act.

“These factors are: (1) supervision and control of the

work; (2) retention of the right to supervise and con-

trol the work; (3) constant participation in ongoing

activities at the construction site; (4) supervision and

coordination of subcontractors; (5) responsibility for

taking safety precautions at the job site; (6) author-

ity to issue change orders; . . . (7) the right to stop

the work; . . . (8) ownership of the equipment used

on the job site; (9) defendant’s familiarity with con-

struction customs and practices; and (10) whether

defendant was in a position to assure worker safety

or alleviate equipment deficiencies or improper work

habits.”

Chance v. City of Collinsville, 112 Ill. App. 3d 6, 445

N.E.2d 39, 42 (1983) (citations omitted); Gentile, 520

N.E.2d at 829. The government would be found to be

“in charge of’ Kovilic’s project if the totality of these

factors weighs in favor of such a finding. As with the de-

fendant landowner in Gentile, the government should not

be held liable for “merely requiring compliance with the

contract and insuring the quality of the work.” Jd. at 530.

In Fruzyna, an architect was not found to be “in charge

of’ the contractor’s work even though he was familiar

iii

10 No. 89-1399

with the type of work being performed and had the right

to Po work for inferior quality. Fruzyna, 398 N.E.2d

at °

Supervision and control of Kovilic’s work would require

day-to-day control of the workers and the details of the

work, as in Emberton v. State Farm Insurance, 71 Ill.

2d 111, 373 N.E.2d 1348 (1978), where the numerous daily

change orders by the architect amounted to day-to-day

control. Retention of this right is also significant, even

if it is not exercised. Constant participation would require

an ongoing presence and involvement in the day-to-day

work. The very language of the contract as well as Kovi-

lic’s understanding of the situation establishes that respon-

ng: for safety precautions rest clearly upon Kovilic and

not the United States.

The government did meet the sixth and seventh ele-

ments, retaining authority to change specifications and

stop work if necessary. Ownership of equipment, however,

was clearly not a factor in favor of a finding that the

government was in charge, because Kovilic owned and his

employees operated the equipment used at the site. The

government representatives were familiar with construc-

tion practices, the ninth element. However, based upon

the record, it is at best highly questionable and nigh unto

impossible for the government to be in a position to as-

sure worker safety or alleviate equipment deficiencies or

improper work habits (the tenth element), given that the

government inspectors visited the construction site only

once or twice during an ordinary work day.

The district court did make reference to some of the

appropriate factors for determining whether the United

States had charge of the geen referring to Mathieu v.

Venture Stores, Inc., 144 Ill. APP. 3d 783, 494 N.E.2d 806

(1986) and Kohutko v. Four Columns, Ltd., 148 Ill. App.

3d 181, 498 N.E.2d 522 (1986). Specifically, the district

court said “that the government a sufficient degree

of supervision and control,” because “the United States

inspected the work, they oversaw the work, and in the

No. 89-1399 11

opinion of the court, they had a right to control the work.

Whether or not that right was exercised constantly in the

fullest sense of the word, I believe they did.” However,

the judge did not provide an analysis nor examples of

what he relied upon in yr of this statement. Addi-

tionally, the district court found that the government “re-

tains the right to supervise and control,” and that the

government was not “constantly on location, but they

were on location several times a day every day for a

number of days.” Even though he found that the govern-

ment was not on location constantly, the judge found that

the United States was “in total control of the circum-

stances of the base,” citing the United States’ ownership

and general supervision of the property.* The testimony

demonstrated that the government inspectors climbed the

ladders but one or two times per day, when they wished

to inspect the installation of roofing material as well as

the quality of the same pursuant to the terms of the con-

tract; and at these times they testified they took notice

that the ladders were attached to the roof.

Regarding safety, the district judge cited the pre-con-

struction conference at which safety, along with numerous

other administrative details, was discussed by represen-

tatives of the government and the contractor. The govern-

ment was responsible for monitoring compliance with the

contract which included the ability to stop work for qual-

ity control problems; however, section 45 of the contract

between the government and Kovilic placed responsibility’

® Using such reasoning, one could easily envision a situation where

the government would be found to be “in charge of” work being

performed by an employee of a private security system firm who

was injured during the installation of the security system in a

government building simply because of the United States’ owner-

ship and supervision of the property.

7 The relevant portion of section 45 states:

“(a) In order to provide safety controls for protection to the

life and health of employees and other persons . . . the Con-

tractor [Kovilic] shall comply with all pertinent provisions of

Corps of Engineers Manual . . . and will also take or cause to

be taken such additional measures as the Contracting Officer

may determine to be reasonably necessary for the purpose.”

oltre

12 No. 89-1399

for accident prevention upon Kovilic. In demonstrating

that the government had a right to control the work, the

judge cited testimony by Sherman Barnett, the Navy’s

project manager for this and all other construction proj-

ects at Great Lakes Naval Training Station, that he could

make Kovilic change the asphalt bucket, although no evi-

dence established that ing the asphalt bucket would

be a safety precaution, rather than an aspect of quality

control.* From this unexplained evidence, the judge came

to the conclusion that “if you can stop them from using

an asphalt bucket, you can certainly stop them from in-

adequately supporting a ladder.” The district court found

that the government could have stopped the work at any

time, that the government was “surely and clearly famil-

iar with construction customs and practices” related to

this job because the inspectors were highly experienced

in the construction industry, and that the government “did

indeed have the ability to assure workers’ safety” because

of the inspectors’ ability to “point out the lack of com-

pliance and the necessity of complying,” as provided in

the contract.

The factors regarding whether a party “has charge of’

a project under the Illinois Structural Work Act are aimed

at determining whether a particular defendant has a depth

of involvement in the project beyond mere ownership of

the property or employment of the contractor, which was

the case in Phillips. Being “in charge of” a project consists

of a “continuing and substantial involvement with the

work, or authority over, or responsibility for, and knowl-

edge of the conditions which caused the injury.” Phillips,

792 F.2d at 645. “Mere ownership, without more, is in-

sufficient to establish liability under the Structural Work

Act.” Norton v. Wilbur Waggoner Equipment Rental, 76

Ill. 2d 481, 394 N.E.2d 408, 406 (1979). The owners in Em-

8 Indeed, the record reveals that Barnett testified that the ~

ernment inspectors could order the asphalt bucket changed to

make a “correction on it.”

No. 89-1399 13

berton were found to have charge of the work where they

were at the work site every day, sometimes all day, at-

tended the contractor’s weekly progress meetings with

subcontractors, and issued over a hundred change orders

on all aspects of the project, acting over and above mere

ownership or the employment of a contractor.? Ember-

ton, 373 N.E.2d at 1852-53. In Phillips, the United States

was not “in charge of’ work on its own property when

it had no idea of the progress of the work when the ac-

cident occurred or the particular methods being used in

that work. Phillips, 792 F.2d at 645.

The United States argues, and we agree, that only three

of the ten factors from Chance would support a finding

that it was “in charge of’ the work being performed by

Kovilic: the authority to issue change orders, the right

to stop work (only when it does not comply with contract

specifications), and familiarity with construction customs

and practices; the other seven factors applied to Kovilic.

Thus, under the totality of the factors from Chance, we

firmly believe that the United States was not “‘in charge

fl ged roofing project, for purposes of the Structural

ork Act.

As to the first two factors, the judge found that the

United States had “a sufficient degree of supervision and

control” for him to find that the United States “‘had charge

of’ the work, although he failed to delineate or explain his

reasoning, much less the difference between “sufficient”

and “insufficient.” However, Mr. Barnett, the Navy’s proj-

ect manager, and Nic Kovilic both testified to the fact

that the government did not have a right to control the

work of the contractor, except when the quality of the

work did not comply with the contract’s specifications. The

main duty of the inspectors was to ensure not only the

quality of the material used but also compliance with the

contract specifications as to installation. Although the con-

® In contrast, there was no testimony in this case of the govern-

ment inspectors’ ever submitting even a single change order.

ell

14 No. 89-1399

tract mentioned safety, it clearly assigned the duty for

maintaining a safe operation to the contractor Kovilic: “In

order to provide safety controls . . . the Contractor shall

comply with all pertinent provisions of [the] Corps of En-

gineers Manual .. . entitled ‘General Safety Require-

ments.’ ” The United States’ i rs testified that they

would only become involved with the work of the individ-

ual laborers when and if they observed immediate danger

to “life and limb, where someone could get hurt,” but that

this situation never became necessary during Kovilic’s

roofing project. Otherwise, section 45 of the contract re-

quired any comments or requests for changes in the con-

tract provisions to be channeled through the contractor’s

supervisor on the site. The contract required Kovilic “to

have on the work ({site] a competent superintendent”’ at

all times, with authority to act for the contractor. The

evidence regarding the United States’ authority to enforce

safety regulations and control the work, except as to qual-

ity control, established that the government did not have

or retain the right to supervise and control the day-to-

day work of Kovilic, and neither Savic nor the court have

cited any evidence to contradict that conclusion, thus fail-

ing to support the trial court’s finding as to supervision

and control, as well as retention of that right, the first

two factors under Chance.

Regarding the third factor, “constant participation in

ongoing activities at the construction site,” the trial judge

stated “they weren’t constantly on location, but they were

on location several times a day every day for a number

of days.” The judge made no finding, however, and the -

evidence fails to demonstrate that the government’s lim-

ited presence at the site amounted to “participation” in

the work. The government’s periodic inspections fail to

fall within the parameters of continual supervision. Kovilic

testified that the inspectors usually just “came up and

talked to you... and asked you questions” about the

activity, and that after the start of the project “they kind

of slack off.” In finding that the government was constant-

ly participating in the ongoing activities at the site, the

No. 89-1399 15

judge reached out beyond the contractually stated respon-

sibilities and the evidence presented. This factor cannot

weigh in favor of the government being in charge of the

ap for the government did not participate ‘“constant-

y.” Moreover, this court has previously held that govern-

ment inspection of work being performed by an indepen-

dent contractor is not enough to place the government

“in charge of’ the work. Cannon v. United States, 328

F.2d 763, 765 (7th Cir. 1964). The fact that the govern-

ment had retained two inspectors who, from time to time,

inspected the work being performed by Kovilic’s employ-

ees did not place the government “in charge of” the work.

This is especially so, given that the government inspec-

tors were also responsible for making inspections of as

many as twenty other work sites each day.

The terms of the contract established that the respon-

sibility for ensuring safety precautions at the job site was

upon Kovilic, the fifth of the Chance factors. That respon-

sibility for safety was affirmed at the pre-construction con-

ference. Nic Kovilic, at trial, was asked “you assumed

responsibility for the safety of your employees, did you

not?” Kovilic answered ‘‘yes.”” When asked whether the

“government [had] responsibility for taking safety precau-

tions at the job site,’ Mr. Barnett, the Navy’s project

manager, replied ‘‘no.” When asked whether the inspec-

tors had the authority to stop the project, Mr. Barnett

replied that “The only way they could stop a phase of the

project would be if they saw some thing unsafe [such as]

in the case of endangerment of life or limb or property.”’

Both government inspectors made similar statements. The

government was not in the position to assure workers’

safety because, under the terms of the contract it had

delegated this responsibility to the contractor. Further-

more, we decline to hold that mere government inspection

of work being performed by an independent contractor

to assure that the independent contractor is following

necessary safety precautions is, by itself, enough to shift

the responsibility for taking safety precautions to the gov-

ernment. To do so would create a disincentive for the

so lhtthiteeienenll

16 No. 89-1399

government to ever become involved in ensuring that

work by an independent contractor is performed in a safe

manner.

Regarding Chance’s eighth factor, Kovilic owned, main-

tained and operated the equipment used at the job site,

including the portable ladder upon which Savic was stand-

ing when he suffered his injuries.

Because seven of the ten Chance factors mandate our

holding that Kovilic had complete safety responsibility on

the roofing project, we reverse the district court’s finding

that the government “‘had charge of’’ the project. While the

government maintained some responsibility regarding the

authority to issue change orders concerning installation

and quality of the material and was familiar with the con-

struction activities as an owner, in our opinion the con-

tract entered into between the government and Kovilic,

as well as the practice on the job site, clearly placed the

responsibility of safety on the contractor, Kovilic Construc-

tion Co. When asked whether he agreed with the state-

ment “the Government would turn over the plans and

specifications to you and then you were responsible for

performing the work,” Nic Kovilic responded “‘yes.”’ Al-

though the district court judge found some of the factors

to weigh in favor of the government being “in charge of’

the project (like familiarity with construction practices

and the ability to issue change orders), our review of the

record considered in its totality reveals that the judge

erroneously found liability on the government, based upon

what he referred to as his “experience on ladders.” Be-

cause the evidence fails to support the trial judge’s find-

ing that the government above and beyond the role

of a mere property owner or the hiring of a contractor,

we hold that the trial judge’s finding that the government

“had charge of” the project for purposes of establishing

liability under the Illinois Structural Work Act was erro-

neous.

| No. 89-1399 17

B.

Defect in Use of the Ladder

Our hoiding that the United States was not “in charge

of” the roofing project when Mr. Savic was injured would

itself preclude a finding of liability against the United

States under the Structural Work Act, but we feel that

we are obligated to discuss the other grounds which com-

pel this reviewing court to reverse the district court’s

finding of liability against the United States under the

Act. The trial court found that the manner of securing

the ladder to the roof was the defective use of the lad-

der which proximately caused Savic’s injuries, and that

the United States willfully allowed the existence of that

defect. The trial court failed to recognize the defect in

the use of the ladder which clearly caused Savic’s injuries:

The ladder was not attached to the roof when Savic stepped

upon it and feil because either Savic or his co-worker had

detached it immediately prior to Savic stepping upon it

and falling. Based upon the record before us we fail to

understand how the United States could be found to have

willfully allowed that defect to exist.

The district court referred to three different defects in

the use of the particular ladder which it felt caused the

accident. First, the court felt that the method by which

Kovilic secured the ladder at the top was inadequate to

support the weight of the ladder and the people climb-

ing it. Second, the court found that the ladder was not

consistently secured at the bottom. Third, the court found

that the ladder was too short, not extending high enough

over the rm of the roof. As will be shown later, all three

of these defects are immaterial (even if we agreed with

the findings, which we do not) because the proximate

cause of the accident was that the ladder was not attached

to the roof when Savic fell. The court also found that since

the United States “had charge of’ the project and

“willfully” allowed these conditions to exist, as that term

is defined in cases under the Illinois Structural Work Act,

all the necessary elements for liability under the Act were

satisfied.

1 eeeerl

18 No. 89-1399

There is evidence regarding the three defects which the

court found (the improper attachment at the top, improper

attachment at the bottom, and insufficient projection above

the roof), but the findings as to whether these defects

existed is irrelevant because the record clearly illustrates

that none of these factors caused Savic’s accident. The

evidence in the record establishes that Savic’s accident

occurred because the ladder had been detached from its

moorings immediately prior to the accident and not re-

attached to the roof before Savic attempted to descend.

This detachment of the ladder was the defect in use which

was the proximate cause of Savic’s accident. Savic had

been working on the roof for over two weeks, having

climbed the ladder “hundreds of times” during that pe-

riod, and his own testimony reveals that the ladder had

never previously been detached from the roof without be-

ing immediately re-attached. Savic or his co-worker pulled

the ladder from the nails which secured it to the roof in

order to move the tar pipe, and failed to re-attach it. The

detachment of the ladder was a defect in use, but under

no circumstances can the United States be found to have

willfully allowed this defect to exist because it had no

knowledge of the momentary detachment and lack of re-

attachment of the ladder. How the government can be

faulted for an accident of this nature we are at a loss to

understand.

The district court “‘believe{d] that the ladder was lower

than it should have been in its projection above the roof,”

and found that this was a contributing cause of the acci-

dent. The parties stipulated that the roof was 18 feet, 8%

inches above the ground, and that the ladder in the pos-

session of Kovilic’s insurance company was 20 feet, 1 inch

in its usable length (the maximum usable length is based

upon a full extension of the ladder with a safe overlap

of the two sections). The plaintiff's expert based his

testimony on these stipulated facts, including the measure-

ment of the ladder, to conclude that the ladder was too

- No. 89-1399 19

short to safely reach the height of the roof,!° which ac-

tually may not have been the ladder used at the time of

the accident.!1 Upon cross-examination, however, the ex-

pert stated that the purpose of the three-foot projection

requirement was to provide a hand hold at the top of the

ladder for persons getting on or off the ladder. He fur-

ther testified that a violation of the regulation would not

have caused the ladder to fall as Savic described it as

falling because grasping a falling ladder upon which he

was standing would not have prevented the fall. The trial

judge relied upon the testimony of the plaintiff's expert

as to the safety of the ladder as to its height in relation

to the height of the roof (which had been discounted on

cross-examination by a showing that the three-foot pro-

jection would not have prevented the accident), and again

relying upon his own personal experience as a laborer in

deciding that the violation of the three-foot projection re-

quirement, combined with the nail method of securing the

ladder, were the proximate causes of Savic’s accident.

The competent testimony regarding the proximate cause

of Savic’s accident set forth that Savic fell because the

ladder was not secured to the roof at the time when Savic

stepped upon it to descend. The plaintiff Savic was the

only eye-witness to the beginning of the fall, and in his

testimony at trial he stated that the ladder was not at-

tached to the roof when he started down. He further tes-

tified that he had climbed the ladder perhaps twenty to

thirty times per day for two weeks and had never seen

10 OSHA standards require the side rails of a ladder to “extend not

less than 36 inches above the landing.” 29 C.F.R. § 1926.450(aX9).

11 Kovilic testified that he was not certain that the ladder which

he had provided to the insurance company a few months after the

accident was in fact the ladder that was used by Savic at the time

: of the accident. Because the plaintiff's expert witness based his

testimony on his i ion of a ladder that may not have been

the ladder used at the time of the accident, we find it hard to

understand how the trial judge gave credence to the plaintiff's ex-

pert’s testimony.

steel

20 No. 89-1399

it detached from the roof before. The plaintiff's expert,

Charles Schulz, cited as one of three reasons for the cause

of the fall, along with the projection of the ladder above

the roof and the improper pitch of the ladder (both of which

according to the transcript were discounted as causes on

cross-examination) was the fact that the ladder was not

attached at the time when the plaintiff stepped upon it

to descend. Nic Kovilic, who was Savic’s supervisor on

the job and had asked Savic to descend to help him, tes-

tified that he saw the ladder detached by Savic or one of

his co-workers when they moved the tar pipe, but that he

paid no attention to whether the ladder was re-attached.

He assumed that the person who detached the ladder

would re-attach it.

The fact that the ladder was detached when Savic stepped

upon it to descend it was the proximate cause of the ac-

cident. The trial court’s finding that the method of at-

tachment (whether adequate or not), or the height of the

ladder’s projection above the roof caused the accident is

unsupported in the record and thus clearly erroneous.

C.

Willfulness of the United States

Since there was a defective use of the ladder, and that

defective use was the proximate cause of the accident,

our analysis requires a discussion of whether the viola-

tion of the Act’s safety standard was a willful violation

by the United States.12 Under the Illinois Structural

Work Act, “a willful violation occurs when one having

charge of the work knows that a dangerous condition ex-

12 As we mentioned pe our holding that the United States

charge j

finding of liability against the United States under the

Work Act. However, we feel it necessary to discuss the other

grounds which compel a reversal of the district court’s finding of

liability against the United States.

| No. 89-1399 21

ists on the [ladder] or, by the exercise of reasonable care,

could have discovered the existence of the dangerous con-

dition.” Simmons v. Union Electric Co., 104 Ill. 2d 444, 473

N.E.2d 946, 950 (1984); Dickman v. Midwest Interstate

Electric Construction Co., 143 Ill. App. 3d 494, 493 N.E.2d

33, 36 (1986); Moore v. Clearing Industrial District, Inc.,

64 Ill. App. 3d 391, 380 NE 2d 1063 (1978). The trial

judge based his finding of willfulness on the fact that the

government had knowledge of the method of attachment

and the height of the ladder, defects which we hold not

causal of the accident.

The government inspectors, Skonie and Szyska, as well

as Savic, Kovilic, and Emilio Spasojevic all testified that

previously the ladder had always been attached when per-

sons were climbing upon it. The only testimony at trial

that the ladder may not have been attached at any time

previously was the deposition testimony of Marko Letica.

However, the credibility of Letica’s testimony was ques-

tionable because he contradicted himself regarding whether

he quit or was fired from his employment with Kovilic

and the length of time he had been planning the trip

which prevented him from being present at the trial. Ob-

viously, the trial judge did not rely upon his testimony,

for he made no mention of Letica’s deposition testimony

in his findings, but rather again relied upon his own per-

sonal experience. The judge stated, “I think they [the

government inspectors] were lax and lazy, and I think that

under the Se ak oe it bee rma arte . ion ng age

tion, apparently implying that the Uni tates knew 0

dangerous conditions, was responsible for changing them

and simply decided to do nothing about them. A willful

violation of the Illinois Structural Work Act requires that

the party “in charge of” the tre know of the defec-

tive condition: iy owner is liable where the dangerous

condition is known to him or when, in the exercise of rea-

sonable care, the existence of the dangerous condition

could have been known to him.” Phillips v. United States,

792 F.2d 639, 646 (7th Cir. 1986). We disagree with the

tll

22 No. 89-1399

trial judge’s finding that the government willfully violated

the Act because, on the overwhelming weight of

the credible evidence, it is clear that the United States,

through its agents, had no knowledge that the ladder had

previously been detached from the nails when in use.

The United States did not know, nor could its agents

reasonably have anticipated, that the ladder would be

unattached and thus used improperly. Furthermore, Kovilic

Construction was “in charge of” the project, and their

actions did not depend upon the government’s presence

at the site: (1) Kovilic furnished the ladders, (2) Kovilic

a secured the ladders, (3) Kovilic employees de-

tached the ladder, and (4) Kovilic employees failed to re-

attach the ladder. The periodic inspections of the United

States’ agents for quality and contract compliance cannot

be expected to detect every momentary change in condi-

tions at the work site, including each of the 20 to 30 daily

ascents and descents of the ladders by Kovilic’s 10 to 20

employees.

The United States did not know, and there was no rea-

son that the United States should have known, of the mo-

mentarily defective condition in the detachment of the lad-

der. When there is no notice of unsafe activities, there

can be no finding of liability under the Illinois Structural

Work Act. See Phillips, supra. The district court’s find-

ing that the United States willfully allowed the defective

condition which caused the accident to occur is clearly er-

roneous because it does not ply to the defect in use

which caused Savic’s accident. From our review of the

record, we are unable to ascertain any willfulness on the

part of the United States in allowing the existence of the

defective condition which caused Savic’s injury. No act

or omission of the United States was a proximate cause

of Tomislav Savic’s injuries, but clearly, the proximate

cause of the accident was the detachment of the ladder

by Savic himself, or his co-worker, with the government’s

inspectors nowhere near the scene.

& No. 89-1399 23

III.

CONCLUSION

“This is [another] one of those relatively rare cases in

which we are left with a ‘definite and firm conviction’. . .

that the district judge erred in a yn 3 of fact.” Louis

Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 589 (7th Cir. 1989) (cita-

tions omitted). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although

there may be some evidence to support it, “the review-

ing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite

and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573

(1985) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum

Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). The district court judge,

rather than relying upon the evidence in the trial record,

relied on his own personal experience regarding the course

of events which ied to Tomislav Savic’s fall and his subse-

quent injuries. We are of the opinion that the trial judge’s

interpretation of the evidence at trial fails to support the

judge’s findings dealing with the cause of the accident,

while the true proximate cause of the accident was abun-

dantly clear from the trial record. We hold that the United

States is not liable under the Illinois Structural Work Act

for the injuries Tomislav Savic received as a result of the

fall from the ladder at Great Lakes Naval Base. The judg-

ment against the United States is

REVERSED.

A true Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

USCA 79004—Midwest Law Printing Co., Inc., Chicago—11-19-90—500

0

en es re

APPENDIX D

Order of Court of Appeals, denying

Petition for Rehearing en Banc

January 14, 1991

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

January 14, 1991

_Before

Hon. Harlington Wood, Jr., Circuit Judge

Hon. John L. Coffey, Circuit Judge

Hon. Jesse E. Eschbach,

Senior Circuit Judge

Tomislav Savic, ] Appeal from the

Plaintiff-Appellee, ] United States

] District Court

No. 89-1399 v. ] for the

] Northern

United States of America _] District of

Defendant and Third ] Illinois,

Party, ] Eastern

Plaintiff-Appellant, ] Division.

]

v. ] No. 83 C 5388

] Brian B. Duff,

Kovilic Construction ] Judge

Company, Incorporated, ]

Third Party ]

Defendant-Appellee ]

ORDER

On consideration of the petition for rehearing

with suggestion for rehearing en banc filed herein by

the plaintiff-appellee, no judge in active service has

requested a vote thereon, and all of the judges on

the original panel have voted to deny a rehearing.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the aforesaid petition for

rehearing be, and the same is hereby, DENIED.

APPENDIX E

Relevant Statutory Provisions

| eee owe

ILLINOIS STRUCTURAL WORK ACT

Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 48

paragraphs 60-68

60. Scaffoids, cranes, ladders, etc. - Erection and

construction

Sec. 1. All scaffolds, hoists, cranes, stays, ladders,

supports, or other mechanical contrivances, erected

or constructed by any person, firm or corporation in

this State of the use in the erection, repairing,

alteration, removal of painting of any house, build-

ing, bridge, viaduct, or other structure, shall be

erected and constructed, in a safe, suitable and

proper manner, and shall be so erected and con-

structed, placed and operated as to give proper and

adequate protection to the life and limb of any

person or persons employed or engaged thereon, or

passing under or by the same, and in such manner

as to prevent the falling of any material that may be

used or deposited thereon.

Section 9 of the Structural Work Act, IIl.Rev.Stat. ch.

48, par. 69, provides in pertinent part:

"Any owner, contractor, sub-contractor,

foreman or other person having charge of the

erection, construction, repairing, alteration,

removal or painting of any building, bridge,

viaduct or other structure within the provisions of

this act, shall comply with all the terms thereof,

and any such owner, contractor, sub-contractor,

foreman or other person violating any of the

]

SEL

provisions of this act shall be guilty of a Class A

misdemeanor.

* & * * /” *

For any injury to person or property,

occasioned by and wilful violations of this Act, or

wilful failure to comply with any of its provisions,

2 right of action shall accrue to the party injured,

for any direct damages sustained thereby; and in

case of loss of life by reason of such wilful viola-

tion or wilful failure as aforesaid a right of action

shall accrue to the surviving spouse of the person

so killed, the lineal heirs or adopted children of

such person, or to any other person or persons

who were, before such loss of life, dependent for

support on the person or persons so killed, for a

like recovery of damages for the injuries sustained

by reason of such loss of life or lives."

29 CFR Sec. 1926 (7) (1981):

Portable ladders shall be used at such a pitch that

the horizontal distance from the top support of

the foot of the ladder is about one-quarter of the

working length of the ladder (the length along

the ladder between the foot and the top support).

Ladders shall not be used in a horizontal position

as platforms, runways, or scaffolds.

29 CFR Sec. 1926 (9) (1981):

The side rails shall extend not less than 36 inches

above the landing. When this is not practical,

2

grab rails which provide a secure grip for an

) employee moving to or from the point of access,

shall be installed.

29 CFR Sec. 1926 (10) (1981):

Portable ladders in use shall be tied, blocked, or

otherwise secured to prevent their being dis-

placed. .

Wrasse 3 Ores, oe ow

APPENDIX F

Construction Contract

CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT

General Provisions

1. DEFINITIONS

(a) The term "head of the agency" or "Secretary"

as used herein means the Secretary, Under Sec-

retary, any Assistant Secretary, or any other head or

assistant head of the executive or _ military

department or other Federal agency; and the term

"has duly authorized representative "means any

person or persons or board (other than the Contract-

ing Officer) authorized to act for the head of the

agency or the Secretary.

(b) The term "Contracting Officer" as used

herein means the person executing this contract on

behalf of the Government and includes a duly

appointed successor or authorized representative.

(DAR 7-602.1).

3. CHANGES

(a) The Contracting Officer may, at any time,

without notice to the sureties, by written order —

designated or indicated to be a change order, make

any change in the work within the general scope of

the contract, including but not limited to changes:

(1) In the specifications (including drawings and

designs);

(ii) In the method or manner of performance of

the work;

(iit) In the Government-furnished facilities,

equipment, materials, services, or site, or

(iv) Directing acceleration in the performance of

the work.

9. MATERIAL AND WORKMANSHIP

(a) Unless otherwise specifically provided in this

contract, all equipment, material, and articles incor-

porated in the work covered by this contract are to

be new and of the most suitable grade for the

purpose intended. Unless otherwise specifically

provided in this contract, reference to any equip-

ment, material, article, or patented process, by trade

name, make or catalog number, shall be regarded as

establishing a standard of quality and shall not be

construed as limiting competition, and the Contractor

may at his option, use any equipment, material,

article or process which, in the judgment of the

Contracting Officer, is equal to the named. The

Contractor shall furnish to the Contracting Officer

for his approval the name of the manufacturer, the

model number, and other identifying data and

information respecting the performance, capacity,

nature and rating of the machinery and mechanical

and other equipment which the Contractor con-

templates incorporating in the work. When required

by this contract or when called for by the Contract-

ing Officer, the Contractor shall furnish the Con-

tracting officer for approval full information concern-

ing the material or article which he contemplates

incorporating in the work...

(b) All work under the contract shall be per-

formed in a skillful and workmanlike manner. The

Contracting Officer may, in writing, require the

Contractor to remove from the work any employee

the Contracting Officer deems incompetent, careless,

or otherwise objectionable. (DAR 7-602.9)

10. INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE (1976 OCT)

(a) All work (which term includes but is not

restricted to materials, workmanship and manufacture

and fabrication of components) shall be subject to

inspection and test by the Government at all reason-

able times and at all places prior to acceptance. Any

such inspection and test is for the sole benefit of the

Government and shall not relieve the Contractor of

the responsibility of providing quality control meas-

ures to assure ... No inspection or test by the

Government be construed as constituting or implying

acceptance. Inspection or test shall not relieve the

Contractor of responsibility for damage to or loss of

the material prior to acceptance nor in any way

affect the continuing rights of the Government after

acceptance of the completed work under the terms

of paragraph (f) of this clause, except as hereinabove

provided.

(b) The Contractor shall without charge, replace

any material or correct any workmanship found by

the Government not to conform to the contract

requirements, unless in the public interest the

Government consents to accept such material or

workmanship with an appropriate adjustment in

contract price. The Contractor shall promptly

segregate and remove rejected material from the

premises.

(c) If the Contractor does not promptly replace

rejected material or correct rejected workmanship

the Government (1) may, by contract or otherwise

replace such material or correct such workmanship

and charge the cost thereof to the Contractor, or (2)

may terminate the Contractor’s right to proceed in

accordance with the clause of this contract entitled

"Termination for Default - Damages For Delay -

Time Extensions."

17. SUSPENSION OF WORK (1968 FEB)

(a) The Contracting Officer may order the

Contractor in writing to suspend, delay, or interrupt

all or any part of the work for such period of time

as he may determine to be appropriate for the

convenience of the Government.

18. TERMINATION FOR CONVENIENCE OF

THE GOVERNMENT (1974 APR)

(a) The performance of work under this contract

may be terminated by the Government in accordance

with this clause in whole, or from time to time in

part, whenever the Contracting Officer shall deter-

mine that such termination is in the best interest of

the Government. Any such termination shall be

effected by delivery to the Contractor of a Notice of

Termination specifying the extent to which perform-

ance of work under the contract is terminated, and

the date upon which such termination becomes

effective.

44. ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS (1965 JAN)

(a) Wherever in the specifications or upon the

drawings the words "directed", "required", "ordered",

"designated", "prescribed", or words of like import are

used, it shall be understood that the "direction",

"requirement", "order", "designation", or "prescription"

of the Contracting Officer is intended and similarly

words "approved", "acceptable", "satisfactory", or words

of like import shall mean "approved by" or "accept-

able to" or "satisfactory to" the Contracting Officer,

unless otherwise expressly stated.

(b) Where "as shown", "as indicated", "as detail-

ed", or words of similar import are used, it shall be

understood that the reference is made to the draw-

ings accompanying this contract unless stated

otherwise. The word "provided" as used herein shall

be understood to mean "provided complete in place,"

that is "furnished and installed." (DAR 7-602.41)

45. ACCIDENT PREVENTION (1977 JAN)

(a) In order to provide safety controls for protec-

tion to the life and health of employees and other

persons; for prevention of damage to property,

materials, supplies and equipment, and for avoidance

of work interruptions in the performance of this

contract, the Contractor shall comply with all perti-

nent provisions of Corps of Engineers Manual, EM

3M5 1-1, dated 1 June 1977 entitled "General Safety

5

Requirements", as amended, and will also take or

cause to be taken such additional measures as the

Contracting Officer may determine to be reasonably

necessary for the purpose.

(b) The Contractor will maintain as accurate

record of, and shall report to the Contracting Officer

in the manner and on the forms prescribed by the

Contracting Officer, exposure data and all accidents

resulting in death, traumatic injuries, occupational

disease, and damage to property, materials, supplies

and equipment incident to work performed under

this contract.

(c) The Contracting Officer shall notify the

Contractor of any noncompliance with the foregoing

provisions and the action to be taken. The Con-

tractor shall, after receipt of such notice, immediately

take corrective action. Such notice, when delivered

to the Contractor or his representative at the site of

the work, shall be deemed sufficient for the purpose.

If the Contractor fails or refuses to comply promptly,

the Contracting Officer may issue an order stopping

all or part of work until satisfactory corrective action

has been taken. No part of the time lost due to any

such stop orders shall be made the subject of claim

for extension of time or for excess costs or damages

by the Contractor.

(d) Compliance with the provision of this article

by subcontractors will be the responsibility of the

Contractor.

If the contract involves more than 6 months work

or is described as hazardous character in the invita-

tion for Bids, Schedule, or Specifications, the

following paragraph (e) will apply.

(e) Prior to commencement of the work the

Contractor will

(1) submit in writing his proposals for effectuat-

ing this provision for accident prevention.

(2) meet in conference with representatives of

the Contracting Officer to discuss and develop

mutual understandings relative to administration of

the overall safety program. (DAR 7-602.42)

46. GOVERNMENT INSPECTORS (1965 JAN)

The work will be conducted under the general

direction of the Contracting Officer and is subject to

inspection by his appointed inspectors to insure strict

compliance with the terms of the contract. No

inspector is authorized to change any provision of

the specifications without written authorization of the

Contracting Officer, nor shall the presence or ab-

sence of an inspector relieve the Contractor from

any requirements of the contract. (DAR 7-602.43)

69. GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES (6-72)

(a) The work will be under the general direction

of the Contracting Officer, the Commander, Naval

Facilities Engineering Commander, who shall des-

ignate an officer of the Civil Engineer Corps, United

7

States Navy, or other officer or representative of

the Government, as Officer in Charge of Construc-

tion, hereinafter referred to as the "OICC", who

except in connection with the "Disputes" clause shall

be the authorized representative of the Contracting

Officer and under the direction of the Contracting

Officer have complete charge of the work, and shall

exercise full supervision and general direction of the

work, so far as it affects the interest of the Govern-

ment. For the purposes of the "Dispute" clause the

Contracting Officer shall mean the Commander,

Naval Facilities Engineering Commander; the Acting

Commander, their successors, or their representatives

specially designated for this purpose.

(b) The provisions in this clause or elsewhere in

this contract regarding supervision, approval or

direction by the Contracting Officer or the OICC or

action taken pursuant thereto are not intended to

and shall not relieve the Contractor of responsibility

for the accomplishment of the work either as regards

sufficiency or the time of performance, except as

expressly otherwise provided herein.

94. WORK OUTSIDE REGULAR HOURS (6-72)

If the Contractor desires to carry on work outside

regular hours or on Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays,

he shall submit application to the Officer in Charge

of Construction, but shall allow ample time to enable

satisfactory arrangements to be made by the Govern-

ment for inspecting the work in progress. At night,

he shall light the different parts of the work in an

approved manner. All utility cutovers shall be made

after normal working hours or on_ weekends.

Anticipated costs shall be included in the bid.

APPENDIX G

Excerpts of Letica’s Testimony

Excerpts of Letica’s Testimony

Q. Okay. Now the ladder that’s depicted in

Exhibits 1 and 2 for the week prior, for the week

before Mr. Savic fell, does that photograph truly and

accurately depict how high above the canopy the top

of the ladder extended?

MR. FLESSNER: Objection, foundation.

WITNESS: A. How high the stepladder ex-

tended?

MR. MARTINOVICH: Yes.

A. It extended approximately, well it was below

my knee level and I had to bend down to - In order

to grab the stepladder before I can get, before I can

step onto the roof or the steps if I was going up or

down. It looks approximately this high.

MR. MARTINOVICH: Q. This high?

A. Probably maybe a few inches different.

Q. Prior to Mr. Savic’s injury and fall, did you

have occasion to see the ladder or a ladder that

appears like the ladder in Exhibit 2 fastened at all?

A. Yes, on occasions, not all the time. I don’t

remember if it was attached on all the time.

I do remember personally that when I was going

up on the roof, and once in a while it would be

windy, and if you - I used to carry felt paper and

different equipment onto the roof and tools --

A. And the stepladder was shaking at times and

you had to be very careful before you could step

onto the roof without slipping and falling.

Q. Previously you testified that the ladder before

Mr. Savic’s fall was secured occasionally. Can you

please tell us what you mean by occasionally.

A. Occasionally, well sometimes when we're

working, they’re working fast and they move from

one position to another and in a hurry to get started

we don’t usually anchor them right away. I remem-

ber occasions when they were not.

Q. Do you know who Jim Skonie is?

A. Yes, inspector who came by, checked out the

work. Yes, I seen him almost every day.

Q. Was he ever present when the ladders were

unfastened? ;

A. I believe he was.

MR. GRANEY: Objection to that question and

that response, in that the time period is not set.

Whether it has any relevance to this accident, the

fact it doesn’t relate, but it was on the day of the

accident or week before or month before or year

before.

MR. MARTINOVICH: Thank you for clarifying.

Q. At any time before Mr. Savic fell, was Mr.

Skonie present when the ladder was not fastened?

WITNESS: A. Yes.

APPENDIX H

Excerpts of Syska’s Testimony

Excerpts of Syska’s Testimony

And from when to when did you do the

consulting for the Navy?

A. We started in 1981, and I was there -- In

fact, we’re still there, and I was there through 19,

July of 1983.

Q. And were you there at the inception of 1981?

A. Yes.

Q. And the name of your company again?

A. Project Control, Incorporated. Actually it was

1980. Excuse me. It was 1980.

And were you the only person that actually

did work on behalf of the United States Government

or the Department of Navy through Project Control?

A. ‘Yes, at that time, yes.

And what exactly were your duties in 19,

from 1980 to the time you quit?

A. I was the inspector of the roofing operations,

the quality control. I was in charge of quality

control and had some duties as, some dealings with

the safety of the projects just as a standard citizen

would.

Q. In your duties as inspector of roofing, what

did that involve?

A. “heck the quality; make sure all the products

that were specified by the United States Navy were

being installed; that they were being installed proper-

ly; that they were getting the amounts specified as

far as liquid bitumens and the number of sheets

called for and the type of insulation that was called

for; that all the material, old materials were being

removed from the site, and wood blocking put back

in its place. It’s everything to do with the roof.

Q. And that also would be true of the quality

control? That would encompass what you just

described?

A. Right.

Q. Relative to the safety, were you ever given

instrucuons by the Government relative to any

safety?

A. To watch out that the people were following

OSHA and the Corp of Engineer Safety Regulations.

Q. And were you provided with those regula-

tions, or were those regulations that you were well

familiar with?

A. I was well familiar with them.

Q. Was there a safety inspector that was assigned

to the job site that you were familiar with?

We were all safety inspectors as such.

All of you had equal duties?

Pretty much so, yes.

o> © P

Same authority in terms of stopping the job?

A. I didn’t have the authority, but the Navy

personnel did. I could make the recommendation to

the Navy.

Q. And who is the Navy -- Who were the people

in the Navy who had the authority to stop the job

while you were there in August of 1981?

A. Sconi, Barnett. If they gave us permission,

we could go out there and stop the job, and Mr.

Stall.

| APPENDIX I

Excerpts of Sconie’s Testimony

Excerpts of Sconie’s Testimony

Q. Now, one of your duties in August 1981 was

also a Safety Inspector, was it not?

A. Correct.

Q. And in fact, you participated in the pre-

construction conference involving safety with Mr.

Kovilic, Mr. Barnette and Mr. Cisca, did you not?

A. If I remember correct, I participated with

them.

Q. Okay, do you recall participating in the

preconstruction conference regarding safety with Mr.

Kovilic?

A. No.

Q. As a safety inspector, what was your under-

standing as to what your duties were?

A. To see that the contractor complied to the

Corps of Engineer Safety Manual.

Q. As well as OSHA standards?

A. As well as OSHA standards.

Q. Because OSHA is one of the things that’s

required in the preconstruction conference, isn’t that

correct?

A. I believe so.

Q. And what was your powers, as you found that

they didn’t comply with OSHA or the Corps of

Engineer standards?

A. If it was life and limb where someone could

get hurt, you could thoroughly stop the job.

Q. Have you ever had occasion to do that in

your career with the Navy?

A. Oh yes.

Q. What else was your understanding as to what

your power was?

A. You are to get that corrected immediately.

Q. You had the authority to, if you saw a

worker doing something unsafe, to tell that worker

to stop and tell them to correct it?

A. Yeah, if it was a matter of that guy getting

hurt immediately, you go and tell him. If it’s a

matter of mistake or something, you go see the

superintendent or the foreman or whoever and tell

him, you know. But if that guy was going to get

hurt doing something, you would definitely --

Q. You would stop them.

A. --stop them, try to.

ER AERNO NT. 18a? Toy tama

Rae.

Q. What else, if any, what other powers did you

have?

A. Power, I don’t understand, what do you

mean?

Q. You know, what other rights did you under-

stand to have when you saw a safety violation, other

than stop the job and stop the individual, if there are

any other rights you thought you had?

A. To get the correct, to get the problem solved

immediately.

APPENDIX J

Excerpts of Savic’s Testimony

Excerpts of Savic’s Testimony

Q. As you stepped on the ladder, what did you

notice about the ladder, if anything?

A. I had a feeling that the ladder was sinking.

Q. Can you describe to us, please, how you got

on the ladder?

A. The roof was level, the ladder was leaning

against the roof. I was coming from the right side.

I stepped with my left foot on the rung of the

ladder. As I was stepping with my left foot I was

trying to grip the ladder with my right hand, but I

| didn’t manage to get hold of the ladder and fell

) down.

Q. What position was your body in when you

went to grab the ladder?

A. I was turned towards the roof.

Q. Where was the height of the ladder relative

to any part of your body?

A. It was low.

Q. Can you tell us in relation to your body, for

instance, was it below or above your knee, if you

recall?

A. Below the knee.

THE COURT: How high was it above the roof?

THE INTERPRETER: I am still trying to repeat

the questions.

He didn’t answer the question, he repeated what

he said before, it was below the knee.

THE COURT: No. Ask him my question.

Did the ladder come above the roof?

THE WITNESS: Yes, it was.

THE COURT: How high.

THE WITNESS: About this much (indicating).

THE COURT: 12 to 15 inches by demonstration.

—_—_— ‘

— Ahearn ie AT cae Lr lat aa

APPENDIX K

Excerpts of Kovilic’s Testimony

Excerpts of Kovilic’s Testimony

Q. Now, before Mr. Savic fell you had daily

contact with the inspectors from Great Lakes, is that

correct?

A. Yes. I mean, you know, they come by all the

time, you know, to check up on you and stuff.

Q. In fact, Mr. Scony would appear about three

or four times a day, right?

A. Right.

Q. And Mr. Siska about an additional three or

four times a day?

A. Right.

Q. I take it you had occasion to see the Govern-

ment inspectors Scony and Siska there while you

were there?

A. Yes. I mean, you know, they came up and

talked to you and, you know -- I mean, they see

what you’re doing and ask you questions.

Q. And before Savic was there you were there

every day, isn’t that correct?

A. Right.

Q. And you were there all day long when the

workmen were there, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And on those seven or eight occasions that

the Government inspectors showed up every day you

saw them, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, sometime prior to the end of the year

1981, did you -- did anybody ask you for the ladder

that was involved in the fall with Mr. Savic?

A. What’s the dates?

Q. Somewhere before the end of 1981 did

someone ask you for the ladder that was involved in

Mr. Savic’s fall?

A. Well, the insurance company asked for it. I

don’t know when that was, though.

Q. And Mr. William Wallrab was a representa-

tive for the insurance company, isn’t that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And he came to your shop and he asked you

for the ladder that was involved in the fall, isn’t that

correct?

A. Yes.

And you went and -- tell us what you did

when he asked you that.

A. Well, he had a couple of young guys with

him with a van and, you know, they wanted to get

this ladder and we went to the shop. You know,

there was a bunch of stuff there and I picked out a

ladder and I gave it to them.

Q. And did you give them the ladder you

believed was involved in the fall?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, it wasn’t until four years after you gave

the insurance company the ladder that it first came

to your mind that you might have given the insur-

ance company the wrong ladder, isn’t that right?

A. Well, in those, whatever, three years between

nobody ever raised the question and I never thought

about it.

Okay. You didn’t really think about it until

late 1985, is that correct?

A. Right, when I was asked.

Q. That’s after tests were run and it was deter-

mined that the ladder might not have met OSHA

standards, isn’t that right?

A. No. I mean, I don’t know that tests were

run or anything.

Q. But it came to mind after your attorneys

talked to you, isn’t that right, or talked to your

father?

A. No.

Q. When did it first come to mind, Mr. Kovilic?

A. As far as i remember, there was talk -- I

don’t know who said it or what -- that the ladder

that I had given was too short to reach the roof.

Q. There was talk. What do you mean by

"talk"?

A. Well, you know, somebody might have said

something -- I mean, an attorney might have said

something or my father might have said something

or, you know.

Q. And after this talk you just couldn’t find the

matching ladder so you concluded that somehow or

other the ladder you gave was not right, right?

A. Yes.

Q. And that’s the only reason you think that, is

that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Isn't it possible that over those four years you

could have lost the matching ladder?

4

A. Yes, I mean, sure, you could use a lot of

ladders.

Q. It could have been misplaced, right?

A. Yes, and they get stolen on jobs.

on ars Jie: yes aS 24

~

APPENDIX L

Excerpts of Barnett’s Testimony

Excerpts of Barnett’s Testimony

Q. You say the Government could order a

contractor, Mr. Kovilic in particular, to remove a

piece of broken equipment such as a broken ladder?

A. Oh, definitely.

Q. And they had the authority to require Mr.

Kovilic to remove any piece of equipment that they

felt was defective?

A. No, their reference here is to ladders only.

That’s in the Corps of Engineers Safety Manual.

THE COURT: What about the asphalt tank,

could they make them remove that if they thought

it was defective?

THE WITNESS: We could stop them from using

it for making any kind of correction on it.

Q. Did the Government also go by every day

and make sure the job was left in a clean manner?

A. That would be one of their collateral duties.

Q. And if it wasn’t, they would cite the contract-

or, right?

A. They would notify the contractor. They

wouldn't necessarily cite him, they would notify him.

Then if he didn’t clean it up, then they would give

him a noncompliance notice.

Q. And ultimately, if noncompliance notices are

not met the job gets stopped, is that right?

A. If it is repeated and repeated, it could prob-

ably be stopped.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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