Opposition Brief — Work v. Tyson Foods, Inc.

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Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

LEWIS STEPHEN WORK, ET AL., PETITIONERS

OP

TYSON Foops, INC., ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

KENNETH W. STARR

Solicitor General

BARRY M. HARTMAN

Acting Assistant Attorney General

JOHN A. BRYSON

WILLIAM B. LAZARUS

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the resolution of an enforcement action

brought by the government under Section 309(b)

and (d) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1319(b)

and (d), precludes citizens from prosecuting the

same violations against the same polluter in a sepa-

rate citizen suit that had been initiated under Sec-

tion 505(a)(1) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 1365(a) (1),

prior to commencement of the government’s action.

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman

Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1991) ............. 9

Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. American Re-

covery Co., 769 F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1985) —.......... 8

Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay

Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) 22.0000... 6, 7-8

Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304

EE 7

Statutes, regulation and rule:

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.:

SS ee

§ 301, 88 U.S.C. 18111 .................... t= hires oO

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§ 309 (d), 33 U.S.C. 1819(d) ...................-..-..---...

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§ 505 (a) (1), 33 U.S.C. 1365 (a) (1) ae es i

§ 505 (a) (2), 33 U.S.C. 1865 (a) (2) _................

§ 506 (b) , 88 U.S.C. 1865 (b) .........................-....

§ 505(b) (1) (A), 33 U.S.C. 1365(b) (1) (A) ...

§ 505(b) (1) (B), 33 U.S.C. 1365 (b) (1) (B) _...

§ 505 (b) (2), 33 U.S.C. 1865 (b) (2) 0...

§ 506(c), 88 U.S.C. 1865(c) ................................

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In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

No. 90-1768

LEWIS STEPHEN WORK, ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

TYSON Foops, INC., ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App.

1-40) is reported at 921 F.2d 1394. The memoran-

dum opinion of the district court (Pet. App. 44-60)

is reported at 720 F. Supp. 132.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (Pet. App.

41) was entered on December 18, 1990. The order

of the court of appeals denying rehearing was en-

tered on February 14, 1991. Pet. App. 81. The peti-

tion for a writ of certiorari was filed on May 15,

1991. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under

28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

2

STATEMENT

1. The Clean Water Act creates a comprehensive

program “to restore and maintain the chemical,

physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s

waters.” 33 U.S.C. 1251(a). As part of that pro-

gram, Section 301(a) of the Act prohibits all dis-

charges of pollutants into navigable waters except

those made in compliance with other sections of the

Act, including Section 402, 33 U.S.C. 1342, which

establishes the National Pollutant Discharge Elimi-

nation System (NPDES). See 33 U.S.C. 1311(a).

Section 402(a) provides that the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) shall issue NPDES per-

mits authorizing effluent discharges in strict compli-

ance with conditions specified in the permit. 33

U.S.C. 1342(a). Section 309 of the Act authorizes

the United States to enforce the terms of a permit

through a variety of administrative, civil, and crimi-

nal mechanisms. See 33 U.S.C. 1319. In addition,

Section 505(a)(1) of the Act permits private citi-

zens to commence a civil action in certain situations

against anyone “who is alleged to be in violation of

* * * an effluent standard or limitation under this

chapter,” 33 U.S.C. 1365(a) (1), including the terms

of a permit, 33 U.S.C. 1365(f). Section 505 author-

izes the district courts to enforce the permit require-

ments and impose civil penalties, which are payable

solely to the United States treasury. A citizen suit

may also be brought against the Administrator alleg-

ing failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty under

the Act. 33 U.S.C. 1365(a) (2).

The commencement of a citizen suit under Section

505 is, however, subject to certain limitations. Citi-

zen suits against alleged violators may not be com-

menced either (1) prior to 60 days after giving

3

notice of an alleged violation to the Administrator of

EPA, the State, and any alleged violator, 33 U.S.C.

1365(b)(1)(A)'; or (2) “if the Administrator or

State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a

civil or criminal action * * * to require compliance

** *” 33 U.S.C. 1865(b)(1)(B). When a citizen

suit is barred because the United States has com-

menced and is diligently prosecuting an enforcement

action, Section 505(b)(1)(B) further provides that

“any citizen may intervene as a matter of right” in

any such action in a federal court. 33 U.S.C.

1365(b) (1) (B).

2. In March 1987, after giving the requisite no-

tice, petitioners Lewis Stephen Work and others filed

a complaint pursuant to the Clean Water Act’s citi-

zen suit provision against Tyson Food, Inc. (Tyson),

the City of Green Forest, Arkansas, and the Admin-

istrator of EPA, among others, concerning pollution

allegedly caused by discharges from the City of Green

Forest’s wastewater treatment plant. The United

States subsequently brought a Clean Water Act en-

forcement action in September 1987 under Sections

309(b) and (d). The government’s suit, like the

citizen suit, sought civil penalties and injunctive re-

lief against the City of Green Forest for its discharge

of pollutants in violation of (1) Section 301 of the

Act, 33 U.S.C. 1311, (2) certain terms and condi-

tions of an NPDES permit issued to the City pursu-

ant to Section 402 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 1342, and

(3) various Administrative Orders issued to the City

under Section 309 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 1319. The

government’s complaint alleged that the City had dis-

1 Similarly, no citizen suit may be commenced against the

Administrator prior to 60 days after giving notice of such

action to the Administrator. 33 U.S.C. 1365(b) (2).

4

charged pollutants from the City’s wastewater treat-

ment works in excess of the limits established by the

NPDES permit, and sought an order requiring the

City to comply with the Act, the NPDES permit, and

the Administrative Orders by adhering to the per-

mit’s effluent limitations and submitting required

reports.

Nearly two months after the government filed its

enforcement action, the citizens filed two motions in

the government’s action, one seeking intervention in

the government’s action and the other seeking con-

solidation of the two cases. The district court re-

jected the motion to intervene as untimely, and re-

jected the motion to consolidate on account of the

complications that consolidation would cause.? The

citizens did not file a notice of appeal from the court’s

denial of the intervention motion within the 60-day

period allowed by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).

The United States and the City subsequently en-

gaged in extensive settlement negotiations in the gov-

ernment’s enforcement action, resulting in a proposed

consent decree and an opportunity for public com-

ment. In March 1989, the citizens filed a second mo-

tion to intervene, based on the lodging of the proposed

consent decree. The district court denied the citizens’

second intervention motion, explaining that interven-

tion was not appropriate and that the prospective in-

tervenors had an opportunity to, and did, file their

objections to the proposed consent decree during the

available public comment period. See 28 C.F.R. 50.7.

The consent decree was entered by the district court

shortly after it denied the citizens’ second motion to

2 The district court also denied another motion, filed by the

citizens in their citizen suit, to consolidate the citizen suit with

the government’s enforcement action.

5

intervene. Pet. App. 78. The decree (1) required the

City to pay a penalty of $15,000 for past violations

and to maintain compliance with the NPDES permit

and the Act, effective immediately, and (2) provided

for stipulated penalties in the event of future

violations.

Following the entry of the consent decree in the

government’s enforcement action, the district court

dismissed the citizens’ Clean Water Act claims against

the City. The court explained that “[b]ecause issues

raised against the City under the Clean Water Act

have been resolved, plaintiffs are barred from raising

the same issues here.” Pet. App. 79. The citizens

subsequently appealed from the district court’s de-

nials of their two intervention motions. That appeal

was held in abeyance pending completion of the citizen

suit at the citizens’ request.

After a trial, a jury found in favor of the citizens

as against Tyson Foods, and awarded $244,412 in

damages on state law claims. The jury found in favor

of the City on the citizens’ claims against it that had

not been dismissed. The district court entered judg-

ment on the verdict and assessed Tyscn $43,000 in

civil penalties for the company’s Clean Water Act

violations. Tyson and the citizens both appealed, and

their appeals were consolidated with the citizens’ ap-

peals from the denial of their intervention motion at

the citizens’ request.

3. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s

dismissal of the citizens’ Clean Water Act claims

against the City. Pet. App. 16-21.° The court noted

3 The court also determined that it lacked jurisdiction to

consider the citizens’ appeal from the denial of their first

motion to intervene in the government’s enforcement action

because that appeal was untimely. Pet. App. 11-12. The court

6

that the citizens “concede[] that the CWA claims

made in the citizens’ suit were the same as those made

by the EPA.” /d. at 17. It stated that “there may be

some cas¢s in which it would be appropriate to let a

citizens’ action go forward in the wake of a subse-

quently-filed government enforcement action,” id. at

19-20, but found that “this is not such a case” due

to the entry of the consent decree, id. at 20:

In view of the preeminent role that must be

afforded the EPA in enforcing CWA act viola-

tions—a role contemplated by the legislative his-

tory and recognized by the Supreme Court in

Gwaltney [of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay

Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987) ]—we

hold that it was proper for the district court to

dismiss [petitioners’] CWA claims against Green

Forest after the latter had entered into a con-

sent decree with the EPA. The EPA is charged

with enforcing the CWA on behalf of all citizens.

Since citizens suing under the CWA are cast in

the role of private attorneys general, as a prac-

tical matter there was little left to be done after

the EPA. stepped in and negotiated a consent

decree.

Ibid.

4. Following the denial by the court of appeals of

requests for reconsideration, Pet. App. 81, the parties

filed cross petitions for writs of certiorari. Because

the issues identified in the two petitions all arose in

the citizen suit, the United States waived its right to

respond to those petitions. The Court subsequently

determined that the district court had erred by denying the

citizens’ second motion to intervene, id. at 13, but determined

that this error was “largely harmless,” id. at 14; it remanded

for the purpose of allowing the citizens an opportunity to

recover attorneys’ fees, id. at 15.

7

requested that the United States respond to question

1 in the citizens’ petition, which concerns the pro-

priety of the court of appeals’ affirmance of the dis-

trict court’s dismissal of the citizens’ Clean Water

Act claims against the City.‘

ARGUMENT

The decision of the court of appeals is correct and

is not in conflict with any decision of this Court or

any other court of appeals. Accordingly, further re-

view is not warranted.

1. Petitioners contend that the court of appeals

“erroneously concluded that the entry of a consent

decree in an enforcement action commenced subse-

quent to the filing of a citizens’ suit pursuant to Sec-

tion 505(a) of the CWA * * * precluded the prose-

cution of a previously filed citizen suit.” Pet. 12.

But there is no good reason why petitioners should

have been permitted to pursue the very same claims

resolved by the consent decree simply because the

government’s enforcement action was commenced sub-

sequent to the filing of their suit. Indeed, as peti-

tioners admit, “Congress intended for the EPA to

have the primary role in enforcing the Act.” Pet. 13,

citing Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay

Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987); see also Hall-

strom vy. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304, 310 (1989)

(EPA’s enforcement efforts may obviate the need for

citizen suits). In Gwaltney, the Court held that “the

* Petitioners also complain that “the appellate court erred

in holding the district court’s failure to allow intervention

harmless.” Pet. 17 n.4. However, they add that “this error is

overshadowed by the greater error herein addressed,” ibid.,

and they did not include any challenge to the court of appeals’

rulings on intervention in their list of questions presented to

the Court.

8

citizen suit is meant to supplement rather than to

supplant governmental action.” 484 U.S. at 60. Ac-

cordingly, where EPA has entered into a consent de-

cree, citizens should not be permitted to pursue an

action based on the claims resolved by the consent

decree.

Contrary to petitioners’ suggestions, Pet. 12-15,

nothing in the Act supports their position. Neither

the requirements of Section 505(b), which governs

commencement of a citizen suit, nor the provisions of

Section 505(c), which authorizes EPA to intervene

in citizen suits and to review and comment on pro-

posed consent decrees in citizens suits, show that

Congress intended EPA’s role as enforcer to diminish

based simply upon the timing of commencement of

an enforcement action by the government. Indeed,

far from showing a congressional intent that EPA

yields its role as primary enforcer of the Act if it

waits to commence an enforcement action until after

the filing of a citizen suit, the provisions petitioners

cite reveal Congress’s intent that EPA play a central

role in enforcement actions even where the agency

chooses not to file its own enforcement action.

Contrary to petitioners’ assertion (Pet. 12), no

other court of appeals has ruled differently than the

court of appeals below. Petitioners wrongly cite the

decision of the Fourth Circuit in Chesapeake Bay

Foundation, Inc. v. American Recovery Co., 769 F.2d

207 (4th Cir. 1985), to support their theory that

they should have been permitted to pursue their claims

against the City despite the fact that those very

claims had been settled in the government’s enforce-

ment action. In fact, that court made no such ruling

in that case, having found that the appeal was moot

due to the negotiation of a consent decree. Jd. at 209.

In addition, petitioners incorrectly state that “there

is no authority under any case that has dealt with this

9

issue for the holding below.” Pet. 17. To the con-

trary, only one other court of appeals has faced

similar circumstances, and that court’s decision is

fully consistent with the decision of the court of

appeals in this case. In Atlantic States Legal Founda-

tion, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124 (1991),

the Second Circuit upheld the propriety of dismissing

a citizen suit based on the entry of a consent decree

in a subsequently commenced government enforce-

ment action. In Atlantic States, the State of New

York commenced an enforcement action under the

Clean Water Act after the Atlantic States Legal

Foundation had initiated a citizen suit, and the dis-

trict court dismissed the citizen suit based on entry of

a consent decree between the State and the polluter

in the State’s enforcement action. On appeal, the Sec-

ond Circuit held that “[i]f the state enforcement pro-

ceeding has caused the violations alleged in the citi-

zen suit to cease without any likelihood of recurrence

—has eliminated the basis for the citizen suit—we

believe that the citizen action must be dismissed.”

933 F.2d at 127. The court explained:

The purpose of the citizen suit is to stop viola-

tions of the Clean Water Act that are not chal-

lenged by appropriate state and federal author-

ities. However, we do not belie e the Clean

Water Act can or should be read to discourage

a governmental enforcement action once a citizen

suit has been commenced nor to prevent state or

local authorities from achieving a settlement as

to conduct that is the subject of a citizen com-

plaint. To hold otherwise would likely lead to

underenforcement of the Clean Water Act.

Ibid. That same reasoning applies here.

Significantly, this is not a case where claims made

by the citizens in their suit have been left unresolved

10

by the combined entry of a consent decree in the gov-

ernment’s enforcement action and the dismissal of

their Clean Water Act claims in their citizen suit.

The district court determined that the consent decree

had “resolved” the “issues raised against the City

under the Clean Water Act,” Pet. App. 79, and peti-

tioners conceded in the court of appeals that their

Clean Water Act claims against the City “were the

same as those made by the EPA,” id. at 17. In those

circumstances, the court of appeals correctly affirmed

the district court’s dismissal of the citizens’ Clean

Water Act claims against the City. Furthermore, pe-

titioners commented on the proposed decree, and the

district court took their comments into account in

reaching its decision. Pet. App. 14. Allowing the

citizens now to pursue the same claims resolved by the

consent decree, where the relief available to the citi-

zens—injunctive relief and penalties—is identical to

that available to the government, would undermine

the district court’s judgment that the consent decree

provides an adequate remedy for the violations.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

denied.

Respectfully submitted.

KENNETH W. STARR

Solicitor General

BARRY M. HARTMAN

Acting Assistant Attorney General

JOHN A. BRYSON

WILLIAM B. LAZARUS

Attorneys

OCTOBER 1991

% ©. 6. Covennucer reimtine orrice; 1991 312324 45115

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