Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Snow v. Akins
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Susreme “ourt, U.S.
4 | eee
90-1730 }
| MAY 9 1991
In The | CFFICE OF THE CLERK
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1991
— 7%
-
WAYNE SNOW, JR., Chairman,
, Georgia State Board of
Pardons and Paroles,
Petitioner,
C. T. AKINS and JAY M. FATE,
Respondents
$$$ $$$
Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To the
United States Court Of Appeals
For The Eleventh Circuit
y
Ww
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
—______—__—_-
Daryt A. ROBINSON
Senior Assistant
Attorney General
Attorney for Petitioner
C. LATAIN KEL
Assistant Attorney General
MIcHAEL J. Bowers
Attorney General
Please serve:
Dary_L A. ROBINSON
132 State Judicial Building
40 Capitol Square, S.W
Atlanta, Georgia 30334
(404) 656-9622
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
QUESTION PRESENTED
Does the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision
that the discretionary intervals between parole recon-
siderations are a part of parole “eligibility” and subject to
the prohibitions of the ex post facto clause conflict with
the holding in Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. __, 110 S.Ct.
2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)?
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page(s)
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION .........cccscceees 2
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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ........... 3
A. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION IS CONTRARY TO THE
RECENT DECISION IN COLLINS V. YOUNG-
BLOOD, 497 U.S. __, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111
be Oe ENO vkhdncesossceuueeeerewenes 3
B. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IS
BASED UPON ERRONEOUS FACTS......... 9
C. RODRIGUEZ V. UNITED STATES PAROLE
COMMISSION IS DISTINGUISHABLE FROM
THE INSTANT ACTION........... pa eaeaaecne 11
RPA AIMEE o's bvevcccdaee ch esabs eeu tare 13
ili
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES:
Akins v. Snow, 922 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1991) ..1, 2, 3, 9
Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925)................... 5
Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 391 L.Ed. 648 (1798).. 4, 5, 6
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. __, 110 S.Ct. 2715,
ee” a = 67, 4,9
Damiano v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission,
som pa wae (item Cie. 1966).................... 8, 11
Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377 (1894)............... 5
Gunter v. State, 298 S.Ct. 113, 378 S.E.2d 443 (1989) .... 12
In re: Jackson, 39 Cal.3d 464, 703 Pac.2d 100, 216
a 12
Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883) .............. 5, 6
Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180 (1915).......... 5
Murphy v. Kentucky, 465 U.S. 1072 (1984)............. 4
Rodriguez v. United States Parole Commission, 594
ED) 11,.12
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898).............. 6, 7
Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653 (1974) .............. 11
STATUTES:
SE 10
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OTHER:
State Board of Pardons and Parole Rule Ch.
a tee DE SA 10
,%
_
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1991
A.
_
WAYNE SNOW, JR., Chairman,
Georgia State Board of
Pardons and Paroles,
Petitioner,
V.
C. T. AKINS and JAY M. FATE,
Respondents.
y%
of
Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To the
United States Court Of Appeals
For The Eleventh Circuit
v
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
,™
-
Petitioner, Wayne Snow, Jr., Chairman of the Georgia
Board of Pardons and Paroles, respectfully prays the writ
of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals entered on February 7, 1991.
,%
-
OPINIONS BELOW
The original panel decision of the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals was reported in Akins v. Snow, 922 F.2d
1558 (11th Cir. 1991), decided February 7, 1991, and a
copy of that opinion is included in the Appendix to the
instant Petition as Appendix B. The opinion of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia;
Atlanta Division, was issued June 28, 1989, and is
included as Appendix A.
7%
bal
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit was entered on February 7, 1991.
See Akins v. Snow, 922 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1991). This
Petition for Writ of Certiorari has been filed within the
allowable ninety days from that date. This court’s juris-
diction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
a»
a
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. X, Cl. I.
“No state shall... pass any .. . ex post facto law... .”
,%
4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
C. T. Akins, Jay M. Fate and Michael Schroeder filed
the instant action pro se in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Divi-
sion. They sought declaratory judgment, injunctive relief
and/or damages against the Chairman of the State Board
———
of Pardons and Paroles alleging unconstitutional applica-
tion of certain rules of the Board.
Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed by
the parties. Upon consideration of the motions, Judge
Richard C. Freeman granted summary judgment in favor
of Petitioner Snow and denied Respondents’ motion for
summary judgment. Akins and Fate appealed this deci-
sion; Schroeder did not. Counsel was appointed to repre-
sent Akins and Fate on the appeal.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit panei reversed the
decision of the district court and remanded the case for
consideration of the issue of relief and entry of judgment
in favor of Respondents/Appellees. Rehearing en banc
was requested of the Court of Appeals but was denied.
,%
v
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
A. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION IS CON-
TRARY TO THE RECENT DECISION IN COLLINS
V. YOUNGBLOOD, 497 U.S. __, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111
L.Ed.2d 30 (1990).
As the opinion of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals notes, this Court has never held that parole
eligibility is a part of a-prisoner’s sentence subject to the
prohibitions of the ex post facto clause. Akins v. Snow,
Case No. 89-8622 (11th Cir., Feb. 7, 1991). A recent deci-
sion by this court, Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. ___, 110
S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990), narrowly defines the
parameters of the ex post facto clause so as to exclude
parole “eligibility” from its scope.
In Collins, this Court in a unanimous decision entered
June 21, 1990, examined the historical definition of the ex
post facto clause and specifically overruled two long-
standing Supreme Court cases which “unjustifiably”
expanded the definition of the ex post fact clause. See
Collins, 110 S.Ct. at 2722. In so doing, the Court cited,
with approval, the following definition of the ex post
facto clause:
1st. Every law that makes an action done before
the passing of the law, and which was innocent
when done, criminal; and punishes such action.
2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes
it greater than it was, when committed. 3d.
Every law that changes the punishment, and
inflicts a greater punishment, than the law
annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th.
Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence,
and receives less, or different, testimony, than
the law required at the time of the commission
of the offense, in order to convict the offender.
Id. at 2719, quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 391 L.Ed.
648 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) (emphasis in original).
Collins notes that previous cases attempting to
expand upon the above definition have caused “confu-
sion among lower courts concerning the application of
the ex post facto clause to changes in rules of evidence
and procedure.” Id. at 42, quoting Murphy v. Kentucky, 465
U.S. 1072, 1073 (1984) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). As the Court notes, lower courts have seized
upon language in previous Supreme Court cases which
indicated that “procedural” changes in law could violate
the ex post facto prohibitions by affecting “matters of
substance” or depriving a defendant of “substantial pro-
tections with which the existing law surrounds the per-
son accused of a crime,” or arbitrarily infringing upon
“substantial personal rights.” Id. at 2720, citing Duncan v.
Missouri, 152 U.S. 377 (1894); Malloy v. South Carolina, 237
U.S. 180 (1915); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 (1925). In
seeking to explain the true meaning of such phrases,
however, this Court stated:
The references in Duncan and Malloy to “sub-
stantial protections” and “personal rights”
should not be read to adopt without explanation
an undefined enlargement of the ex post facto
clause.
Id. at 2721.
Collins defines and clarifies those types of procedural
matters which would violate ex post facto prohibitions by
unconstitutionally infringing upon “substantial protec-
tions” and “personal rights.” The Court also overrules
two previous decisions which broadened the scope of the
ex post facto clause.
The first case overruled by the court, Kring v. Mis-
souri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883), defined an ex post facto law as
one which “in relation to the offense or its consequences,
alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage.” Id.,
citing Kring, 107 U.S. at 228-29. The Court rejected such a
broad definition of the ex post facto clause. In overruling
the Kring decision, the Court stated:
The holding in Kring can only be justified if the
Ex Post Facto Clause is thought to include not
merely the Calder categories, but any change
which “alters the situation of a party to his
disadvantage.” We think such a reading of the
Clause departs from the meaning of the Clause
as it was understood at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution, and it is not supported by
later cases.
Collins, 110 S.Ct. at 2723.
The second case, Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343
(1898), stated that the ex post facto clause was violated
when a procedural change in the law affected “a substan-
tial right involved in (the accused’s) liberty.” Collins, 110
S.Ct. at 2724, citing Thompson, 170 U.S. 352. In overruling
the Thompson decision, this Court indicated that only
those rights which affect the definitions of crimes,
defenses or punishments are the concern of the ex post
facio clause. Collins, 110 S.Ct. at 2724. This Court noted
that the right to jury trial which was at issue in Thompson
was a “substantial” right, but since it had nothing to do
with the definition of crimes, defenses or punishments,
did not fall within the scope of the ex post facto clause.
Id.
Collins states that the Court’s departure, in Kring and
Thompson, from the definition of the ex post facto clause
provided in Calder v. Bull was “unjustified.” Id. at 2722. In
fact, the Court indicates that a definition cf ex post facto
laws as any laws which “alter the situation of a party to
his disadvantage” is unwarranted and inconsistent with
Supreme Court precedent. Id.
In the instant action, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals has determined that by changing the maximum
time interval between parole reconsiderations (the defini-
tion of which is discussed in Section B, below), the Board
of Pardons and Paroles has somehow increased the pun-
ishments annexed to Plaintiffs’ crimes. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit rejects the notion that such a change is procedural.
Given the Collins decision’s clarification of the scope of ex
post facto and the meaning of “procedural” changes, the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision is incorrect.
As Justic Stevens points out in his concurring opin-
ion in Collins (in which Justices Brennan and Marshall
join):
Just what alterations of procedure will be held
to be of sufficient moment to transgress the
constitutional prohibition cannot be embraced
within a formula or stated in a general proposi-
tion. The distinction is one of degree. But the
constitutional provision was intended to secure
substantial personal rights against arbitrary and
oppressive legislation, and not to limit the legis-
lative control of remedies and modes of procedure
which do not affect matters of substance.
Id. at 2727 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In mak-
ing a determination of “matters of substance,” the con-
currence suggests that the “analysis should focus on the
impact of the change upon the ‘right belonging to [the
defendant] when the offense was committed.’ ” Id., quot-
ing Thompson, 170 US. at 351. Justice Stevens hastens to
point out that “a procedural protection is likely to be
substantial, when viewed from the time of the commis-
sion of the offense, only if it affects the modes of procedure by
which a valid conviction or sentence may be imposed.” Id.
(Emphasis added).
In determining “matters of substance,” the concur-
rence indicates that it is appropriate to consider whether
the plaintiff claims:
(1) he was denied any procedural protections
relevant to the determination of his guilt or
innocence;
(2) the sentence imposed was unauthorized by
law or that it was the consequence of
improper procedures; and
(3) he has been deprived of any avenue of
review for correcting errors that may have
vitiated the validity of his conviction or
sentence.
Id. at 2728. None of these factors is present in the instant
case. As Justice Stevens states, “a procedural protection
does not become substantial merely because it meets the
low threshold [stated above]. It does, however, become
insubstantial by failing to do so.” Id. Analyzed under this
test, the instant action is not one which the concurring
Justices define as the deprivation of a “substantial” right
in violation of the ex post facto clause.
At the time Akins and Fate committed their crimes,
the awarding of parole to an incarcerated life sentenced
inmate was a discretionary act of the Board of Pardons
and Paroles. This circumstance has not changed. See Dam-
lano, 785 F.2d at 929.
In addition to the above, at the time Akins and Fate
committed their crimes, the rules of the Board of Pardons
and Paroles setting the maximum intervals between
parole reconsiderations were clearly subject to change.
O.C.G.A. § 42-9-45. Thus, any reliance upon such time
intervals would have been speculative and unwarranted.
As the Collins concurrence points out:
The mere possibility of a capricious and unlikely
windfall is not the sort of procedural protection
that could reasonably be judged substantial
from the perspective of the defendant at the
time the offense was committed.
Collins, 110 S.Ct. at 2728. Reliance upon the suppositions
that life-sentenced inmates initially denied parole would
thereafter be reconsidered annually and perhaps granted
parole is reliance upon just‘such caprice or unlikely wind-
fall.
B. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IS BASED
UPON ERRONEOUS FACTS.
At the outset of its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit
defines a “parole reconsideration hearing,” stating:
We use the terms parole consideration hearing
and parole reconsideration hearing to include
the Board’s interview of the inmate, the Board’s
investigation of the inmate, the Board’s discus-
sion of the inmate and the Board’s subsequent
decision whether the inmate should be paroled.
Akins v. Snow, 922 F.2d at 1561, n.8. These terms are
repeated frequently throughout the Eleventh Circuit's
opinion. In reality, however, no “hearing” is required as
defined by the Eleventh Circuit.
In conducting a parole consideration or reconsidera-
tion, the members of the Board of Pardons and Paroles
are provided with updated inmate files containing the
most current information received by the Board with
regard to each inmate. In conducting a parole consider-
ation, the Board members review the files and suggest
potential time periods that, based upon the file, the mem-
bers believe the particular inmate should serve. The
Board then votes whether to grant or deny parole
10
No “hearing” is required by the statutes, nor is one
normally held with relation to parole considerations.
O.C.G.A. § 42-9-43. The Board does not always interview
the inmate nor always conduct a special investigation of
the inmate for the purpose of parole reconsideration.
Neither of these activities is required by statute. See
O.C.G.A. § 42-9-43(b) and (c). Of course, circumstances
may warrant that one or both of these techniques be
employed.
The Eleventh Circuit correctly assumes that at the
initial parole consideration a number of factors may be
considered to determine the inmate’s eligibility for
parole. If parole is denied at that initial consideration,
however, contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s assumption,
the inmate does not then enter into a period of parole
“ineligibility.” On the contrary, an inmate is “eligible” for
parole at any time if he can show, to the Board’s satisfac-
tion, that parole would be in the best interests of both the
individual and society as a whole. A significant change in
circumstances can trigger a reconsideration at any time.
The Board’s system for scheduling parole recon-
siderations existed prior to any change in Board Rule Ch.
475-3-.05(2) and still exists at present. The only change in
the Board’s rules has been to lengthen the maximum
period of time between parole reconsiderations. No mini-
mum has ever been set. See Rule 475-3-.05(2) of the Rules
of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles.
Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s assumption, parole
reconsiderations are not on a rigid eight-year schedule.
Rather, the appropriate time for a parole reconsideration
is determined by the individual inmate’s actions or by
11
circumstances judged on a case-by-case basis. Parole
being a purely discretionary exercise of executive power,
such a case-by-case determination is only appropriate. See
Damiano v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 785
F.2d 929 (11th Cir. 1986).
As the court noted in Damiano, postponement of
parole is “merely a disappointment rather than a punish-
ment....” Id. at 939. Such a disappointment does not rise
to the level of a constitutional violation, nor does it
increase the punishment for the crime. No state legisla-
tion exists which would indicate that changing the maxi-
mum intervals between parole reconsiderations
constitutes an increase in punishment. This is especially
true since, as described above, the inmate does not enter
into a period of “ineligibility” for parole in the interim.
C. RODRIGUEZ V. UNITED STATES PAROLE COM-
MISSION IS DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE
INSTANT ACTION.
The case relied upon by the Eleventh Circuit,
Rodriguez v. United States Parole Commission, 594 F.2d 170
(7th Cir. 1979), concerned an amendment to a statute
effectively eliminating a previously existing possibility of
parole. In a decision concerning parole eligibility, the
Supreme Court stated “a repealer of parole eligibility
previously available to imprisoned offenders would
clearly present the serious question under the ex post
facto clause . . . of whether it imposed a greater or more
severe punishment than was prescribed by law at the time
of the... offense... .” Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653,
662-63 (1974). Marrero and Rodriguez concerned repealer
12
of all possibility for parole available at the time of the
commission of the crime. Nothing in either case, how-
ever, indicates that a change in the timetable for consider-
ing inmates for parole would have the same implication
with respect to the ex post facto clause.
As noted by the Eleventh Circuit, two other courts
have determined that a mere change in the frequency of
parole hearings did not implicate a violation of the ex
post facto clause. In re: Jackson, 39 Cal. 3rd 464, 703 Pac.2d
100, 216 Cal. Rptr. 760 (1985) and Gunter v. State, 298 S.C.
113, 378 S.E.2d 443 (1989). Both courts concluded that
since there had been no elimination of the parole avail-
able at the time of the plaintiffs’ crimes, there was no
constitutional violation.
Given the above, the Eleventh Circuit’s characteriza-
tion of the difference between the circumstances in Rodri-
quez and the instant case as “incidental” is incorrect.
There is a substantial difference, from a constitutional]
perspective, between the complete elimination of oppor-
tunity for parole and an alteration in the rules concerning
when parole consideration will take place.
7%
—
13
CONCLUSION
For all the above and foregoing reasons, Petitioner
prays that this Court grant a writ of certiorari to review
the decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals as
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ignored the prece-
dent of this Court and ruled erroneously.
Please Serve:
Respectfully submitted,
Miciiars. J. Bowers 071650
Attorney General
Daryi A. Ropinson 610012
Senior Assistant Attorney General
C. Latain Ketst. 411590
Assistant Attorney General
Daryt A. Rowinson
132 State Judicial Building
40 Capitol Square, S. W
Atlanta, Georgia 30334
(404) 656-9622
App. 1
APPENDIX A
UNITED S¥FATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
C. T. ATKINS, et al JUDGMENT IN A
V CIVIL CASE
CASE NUMBER
WAYNE SNOW, JR. 1:88-cv-2421-RCF
Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a
trial by jury. The issues have been tried and the jury
has rendered its verdict.
X Decision by Court. This action came for consider-
ation before the Court. The issues have been consid-
ered and a decision has been rendered.
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that plaintiffs C. T.
AKINS, MICHAEL SCHROEDER and JAY FATE take
nothing, that the action be dismissed, and that the defen-
dant WAYNE SNOW, JR. recover of the plaintiffs his costs
of action.
FILED IN CLERK’S OFFICE
JUNE 29, 1989
ENTERED ON DOCKET
JULY 5, 1989
LUTHER D. THOMAS, CLERK
BY: /s/ Evelyn Y. Brown
Deputy Clerk
July 5, 1989 Luther D. Thomas
Date Clerk
/s/ Evelyn Y. Brown
(By) Deputy Clerk
App. 2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
C. T. AKINS, et al. 1:88-cv-2421-RCF
VS. FILED JUN 29 1989
WAYNE SNOW, JR.
ORDER
This action is before the court on cross motions for
summary judgment and plaintiffs’ motion to strike.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs in this action are C.T. Akins, Michael Schro-
eder, and Jay Fate, inmates at the Georgia State Prison in
Reidsville, Georgia. Defendant is the chairman of the
State Board of Pardons and Paroles [the board].
Plaintiffs filed this action seeking declaratory judg-
ment and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs contend postpone-
ment of reconsideration of their denials of parole by
defendant violates the due process clause and the ex post
facto clause because defendant is applying the revised
Rule 475-3-.05, para. 2, [“revised rule”] of the Rules of
State Board of Pardons and Paroles. The revised rule
provides that “[rjeconsideration of those inmates serving
life sentences who have been denied parole shall take
place at least every eight years.” Revised rule, attached to
plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, exhibit A, p. 8.
Prior to the enactment of the revised rule, after a denial
of parole, the board would reconsider the inmate’s eligi-
bility every year. The revised rule became effective Febru-
ary 1, 1985. Plaintiffs were all incarcerated for crimes
occurring prior to 1985 and contend the board should
App. 3
consider their eligibility for parole under the rules in
effect at the time their crimes were committed (i.e. recon-
sideration of parole denial each year after the initial
denial). Plaintiffs contend the revised rule increases their
punishment and deprives them of their right to be
reviewed for parole every year. In response, defendant
contends plaintiff has failed to state cognizable a claim
for relief.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 the court should grant a
motion for summary judgment where “there is no genu-
ine issue as to any material fact and... . the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The Supreme
Court has clarified the standard for granting summary
judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106
S.Ct. 2548 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 US.
242, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986). The movant carries his burden
by showing the court that there is “an absence of evi-
dence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex,
477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554. The nonmovant, how-
ever, bears the burden of making a sufficient showing
establishing the existence of each element essential to his
case, and on which he will bear the burden of proof at
trial. Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. “The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence” supporting the nonmovant’s case is
insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. The court,
resolving all reasonable doubts in favor of the nonmo-
vant, must determine “whether a fair-minded jury could
return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence pre-
sented.” Id.
The material facts are not in dispute. Each of the
plaintiffs served the seven-year, statutory time for parole
App. 4
review, came up for review and was denied parole. Under
the revised rule in issue, the board may refuse to recon-
sider plaintiffs for parole for eight years following their
initial denials.
The court will grant defendant’s motion for summary
judgment. Plaintiffs have neither a liberty interest nor a
protectable expectation of release under the applicable
rules. See Fuller v. Georgia State Board of Pardons and
Paroles, 851 F.2d 1307, 1309 (11th Cir. 1988) (“no entitle-
ment or liberty interest in parole was created by Georgia
statute.”). Neither the revised rule nor its predecessor
creates any expectation of release. At most the rule cre-
ates an expectation of review; the court declines to deem
that expectation to be a liberty interest under the four-
teenth amendment. Thus, plaintiffs have failed to assert
any claim that defendant violated their due process
rights.
Likewise, plaintiffs have not stated a claim for viola-
tion of the ex post facto clause. The ex post facto clause,
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3, prohibits laws that are
criminal, retrospective, and “disadvantageous to the
offender because [they] may impose greater punish-
ment.” Dufresne v. Baer, 744 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 817, 106 S.Ct. 61 (1985). The
Eleventh Circuit has expressly ruled that the denial or
postponement of parole is “merely a disappointment
rather than a punishment... .” Damiano v. Florida Parole
and Probation Commission, 785 F.2d 929, 933 (11th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1015 (1988). As a matter of
law, the postponement of reconsideration for parole is not
a punishment subject to the ex post facto clause.
App. 5
Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment is GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter final
judgment in defendant’s favor. Plaintiffs’motion to strike
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 28 day of June, 1989.
/s/ Richard C. Freeman
RICHARD C. FREEMAN
UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE
App. 6
APPENDIX B
C.T. AKINS, Jay M. Fate,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Michael Schroeder, Plaintiff,
v.
Wayne SNOW, Jr., Chairman State Board of
Pardons & Paroles,
Defendant-Appellee,
No. 89-8622.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
Feb. 7, 1991.
Inmates brought § 1983 action alleging that application
by Board of Pardons and Paroles of amended rules and
regulations to their cases violated their substantive due pro-
cess rights. The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia, No. 1:88-cv-2421-RCF, Richard C. Free-
man, J., denied relief, and inmates appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Cox, Circuit Judge, held that denial of annual
parole reconsideration hearing, pursuant to amendment of
board rule to provide for reconsideration hearing at least
every eight years after denial of parole, violated ex post facto
clause with respect to inmates who, when their crimes were
committed, were entitled to annual reconsideration hearings.
Reversed and remanded.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern [District} of Georgia.
Before EDMONDSON and COX, Circuit Judges, and
WISDOM", Senior Circuit Judge.
* Honorable John Minor Wisdom, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for
the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.
App. 7
COX, Circuit Judge:
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In October 1988, C.T. Akins and Jay Fate! filed this
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief or in the alternative compensatory and
punitive damages, against Wayne Snow, chairman of the
Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles (the Board).?
As the basis fur their section 1983 action Akins and Fate
allege that the Board’s application of the 1986 parole rules
and regulations to their cases violates their substantive
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and
the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution,
art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
Both appellants in this case are inmates serving life
terms at the Georgia State Prison in Reidsville, Georgia.
The crime for which Akins was convicted was committed
in 1972; the crime for which Fate was convicted was
committed in 1977. When these crimes were committed,
the Board’s rules required the Board to initially consider
an inmate serving a life term for parole after serving
seven years of his life sentence.* If the Board denied an
1 Michael Schroeder was also a party to the suit, but he
did not appeal.
2 Because Akins and Fate challenge the parole decision
process, specifically their eligibility for parole, and not the
denial of parole, they may properly bring a claim under § 1983
without first bringing a habeas corpus claim and exhausting
their state remedies. See Gwin v. Snow, 870 F.2d 616 (11th
Cir.1989). Snow makes no argument to the contrary.
3 Georgia State Board of Pardon and Paroles rules and
regulations (Board rules), ch. 475-3.-06(3) (1972).
App. 8
inmate parole at this initial hearing, the rules required the
Board thereafter to hold an annual hearing to reconsider
its parole decision.4
In September 1980, the Board held Akins’s initial
parole hearing and denied him parole. The Board recon-
sidered Akins for parole annually through 1986. In Sep-
tember 1986, the Board, pursuant to new rules, scheduled
Akins for another parole reconsideration hearing in
1994.5 These new rules only require the Board to recon-
sider an inmate for parole once every eight years after the
denial of parole.®
Fate received his first parole consideration hearing in
July 1984. The Board refused to grant him parole at that
time and deferred reconsideration of this decision until
the following year. At the subsequent reconsideration
hearing the Board again denied Fate parole but this time,
pursuant to the new rules, did not schedule another
reconsideration hearing until 1993.
After the Board failed to hold a number of annual
reconsideration hearings for Akins and Fate, they filed
this action alleging a due process and ex post facto clause
violation. The district court, in ruling on cross-motions
for summary judgment, denied Akins’s and Fate’s motion
but granted Snow’s summary judgment motion. On the
due process claim, the court held that Akins and Fate did
not have, under the original or revised rules, a “liberty
interest nor a protectable expectation of release.”
4 Board rules, ch. 475-3-.05(2) (1969).
> Board rules, ch. 475-3-.05(2) (1986).
6 Id.
App. 9
R.1-13-3. On the ex post facto claim, the court held that
“as a matter of law, the postponement of reconsideration
for parole is not a punishment subject to the ex post facto
clause.” Id. The district court based its ex post facto
ruling upon Damiano v. Florida Parole and Probation Com-
mission, 785 F.2d 929 (11th Cir.1986), in which this court
held that parole postponement is “merely a disappoint-
ment rather than a punishment... . ” Id. at 933.7 Akins
and Fate only appeal the district court’s ruling relating to
their ex post facto claim.
II. DISCUSSION
An appellate court reviews summary judgment deci-
sions de novo. Tackitt v. Prudential Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 1572,
1574 (11th Cir.1985). Summary judgment is proper if there
are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c).
The Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall
... pass any... ex post facto Law....” U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 10, cl. 1. At the time the Constitution was drafted, the
phrase “ex post facto law” was a term of art with a well-
established meaning. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 386,
1 L.Ed. 648 (1798). Justice Chase’s opinion in Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798), identified
several legislative acts that clearly implicated the core
7 We find the court’s reliance on Damiano misplaced. Dam-
iano involved a change in the factors used to determine if a
prisoner would be released on parole. Id. at 931. Damiano did
not involve an alleged change in parole eligibility.
App. 10
concerns of the various ex post facto clauses that existed
at the time of the Constitution’s framing. One such legis-
lative act he noted was: “Every law that changes the pun-
ishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law
annexed to the crime when committed.” Id. at 390, 1 L.Ed.
at 650 (opinion of Chase, J.) (emphasis in original). The
Supreme Court’s ex post facto rulings have been faithful
to the original principle that “every law that changes the
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the
law annexed to the crime when committed,” violates the
ex post facto provision. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423,
429, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 2450, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987); Weaver v.
Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28, 101 S.Ct. 960, 964, 67 L.Ed.2d 17
(1981); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292, 97 S.Ct. 2290,
2298, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977); Lindsey v. Washington, 301
U.S. 397, 401, 57 S.Ct. 797, 799, 81 L.Ed. 1182 (1937);
Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319, 324-325, 25 S.Ct. 264,
265-266, 49 L.Ed. 494 (1905); In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160,
171, 10 S.Ct. 384, 387, 33 L.Ed. 835 (1890); Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 325-326, 18 L.Ed. 356, 363-364
(1867); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648,
650 (1798).
Before addressing the substantive issue of whether
the Board’s action violates the ex post facto clause, three
preliminary issues must be discussed. First, are the
Board’s rules laws within the meaning of the ex post facto
clause? Second, are parole reconsideration hearings a part
of parole eligibility? Third, are the ex post facto clause’s
restrictions applicable to a change in parole eligibility?
Regarding the first preliminary issue, the Georgia
legislature has delegated to the Board the authority to
enact “rules and regulations” concerning parole. Ga.Code
App. 11
Ann. § 77-525 (Harrison 1969); Ga.Code Ann. § 42-9-45
(1989). This delegation mandates that the Board’s rules
and regulations “contain an eligibility requirement for
parole which shall set forth the time when the automatic
initial consideration for parole of inmates under the juris-
diction of the Department of Corrections shall take place
and also the times at which periodic reconsideration
thereafter shall take place.” Id.
If the Georgia legislature had passed the parole
reconsideration rule at issue, the rule clearly would be a
law and the ex post facto clause would obviously apply.
The inquiry is whether the Board’s rule is the equivalent
of a law for ex post facto purposes.
The effect of the legislature’s delegation is to grant
the Board quasi-legislative power. The Board’s rules and
regulations have the force and effect of law. Since the
legislature delegated to the Board the power to enact
rules and regulations concerning parole reconsideration,
the rules or regulations enacted by the Board are subject
to the ex post facto clause’s prohibitions. Decisions in
other circuits, involving similar circumstances, support
this conclusion. See Rodriguez v. United States Parole
Comm'n, 594 F.2d 170, 174 (7th Cir.1979) (“This rule must
be viewed as tantamount to a statute for the purpose of
determining whether its application to Rodriguez runs
afoul of the ex post facto clause.”); Love v. Fitzharris, 460
F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir.1972), vacated, 409 U.S. 1100, 93 S.Ct.
896, 34 L.Ed.2d 682 (1973) (a state parole authority’s
change in the interpretation of a parole eligibility provi-
sion is subject to ex post facto constraints because the
agency’s interpretation had the effect of law).
App. 12
The second preliminary issue concerns whether a
parole reconsideration hearing is a part of a prisoner’s
parole eligibility. Under the Georgia parole system, an
inmate serving a life sentence becomes eligible for parole
consideration after serving seven years of his sentence.
This means that the inmate is given a parole consider-
ation hearing,® and the Board then determines if he is
suitable for release based on a number of factors. If the
inmate is denied parole at this initial hearing the Board
schedules a parole reconsideration hearing at a later
date.? If the inmate is denied parole at the reconsidera-
tion hearing, the Board schedules the inmate for another
reconsideration hearing at a later date. Since the Board is
required to hold some type of parole reconsideration
hearing before granting parole,'° an inmate is effectively
ineligible for parole between two parole reconsideration
hearings. Because an inmate is not paroled without a
parole reconsideration hearing, the hearing must be con-
sidered an essential part of parole eligibility.
® We use the terms parole consideration hearing and
parole reconsideration hearing to include the Board’s interview
of the inmate, the Board’s investigation of the inmate, the
Board’s discussion of the inmate and the Board’s subsequent
decision whether the inmate should be paroled. See, ¢.g.,
Ga.Code Ann. § 42-9-43 (1989).
° The only distinction between a parole consideration
hearing and a parole reconsideration hearing is that a parole
consideration hearing is the term used to describe an inmate’s
initial parole hearing and a parole reconsideration hearing is
the term used to describe any subsequent parole hearing.
10 See Ga.Code Ann. §§ 42-9-41, 42-9-42, and 42-9-43.
App. 13
The conclusion that a parole reconsideration hearing
is an essential part of parole eligibility under Georgia’s
parole system is supported by the language of the statute
delegating to the Board the power to enact rules and
regulations concerning parole. The statute provides that
“{[s]uch rules and regulations shall contain an eligibility
requirement for parole which shall set forth the time when
the automatic initial consideration of inmates . . . shall
take place and also the times at which periodic reconsidera-
tion thereafter shall take place... .” Ga.Code Ann. § 77-525
(Harrison 1969) (emphasis added); see also Ga.Code Ann.
§ 42-9-45 (1989). This language indicates that the legisla-
ture considers a parole reconsideration hearing an essen-
tial and important part of parole eligibility.
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez v. United
States Parole Commission, 594 F.2d 170 (7th Cir.1979), also
supports our conclusion. Rodriguez was convicted in
1977 for crimes he committed in 1974 and 1975. He was
sentenced to the statutory maximum of two years, which
made him technically eligible for immediate parole. In
1974 and 1975, when Rodriguez committed his crimes,
the applicable parole regulations required that prisoners
receive an immediate initial hearing, at which almost no
one was ever granted parole, and a subsequent hearing
after serving one-third of their sentence. After Rodriguez
committed his crimes, the applicable parole rules were
amended. The amended parole rules eliminated the addi-
tional hearing at the one-third point and replaced it with
additional review hearings that were to occur not less
frequently than eighteen months after the initial hearing.
The amended rules effectively prevented Rodriguez from
App. 14
being paroled since almost no one was paroled at the
initial hearing.
The Rodriguez court held that such a change in parole
hearings violated the ex post facto clause. The court
noted that “[aJt the time of the offense for which
Rodriguez was convicted, any ‘punishment’ prescribed
included such an opportunity for parole release. The
retroactive elimination of this opportunity is plainly to
his ‘substantial disadvantage.’” Id. at 175 (footnotes
omitted). The court concluded that “deprivation of all
opportunity to be released on parole . . . comes within the
scope of [the] clause.” Id. In reaching this conclusion, the
court reasoned that “[e]ligibility in the abstract is useless;
only an unusual prisoner could be expected to think that
he is not suffering a penalty when even though he is
eligible for parole and might be released if granted a
hearing, he is denied that hearing.” Id. at 176. This lan-
guage demonstrates the Rodriguez court’s belief that a
parole hearing is an essential element of parole eligibility.
Therefore, Rodriguez implies that without the opportunity
for a parole hearing an inmate is not, in any realistic
meaning of the term, eligible for parole.
We realize that Rodriguez involved a change that
effectively eliminated all opportunity for parole release,
but we think the specific disadvantage is incidental. The
key to the court’s conclusion was that Rodriguez was
deprived of an opportunity for parole that existed prior
to the alteration of the parole rules. See Watson v. Estelle,
859 F.2d 105, 109 (9th Cir.1988), vacated, 886 F.2d 1093 (9th
Cir.1989).
App. 15
The third preliminary issue concerns whether the ex
post facto clause applies to a change in parole eligibility.
The Supreme Court never has held that parole eligibility
is part of a prisoner’s sentence subject to the prohibitions
of the ex post facto clause. The Court has commented in
dicta that “a repealer of parole eligibility previously avail-
able to imprisoned offenders would clearly present a
serious question under the ex post factor clause. . :
Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 663, 94 S.Ct. 2532, 2538,
41 L.Ed.2d 383 (1974) (citations omitted). This court's
predecessor implied that parole eligibility is a part of a
prisoner’s sentence by stating any “official po[s]t-sen-
tence action that delays eligibility for supervised release
release runs afoul of the ex post facto proscription.”
United States ex rel. Graham v. United States Parole Comm'n,
629 F.2d 1040, 1043 (5th Cir.1980) (quoting Shepard v.
Taylor, 556 F.2d 648, 654 (2nd Cir.1977).!! Other courts
also have held that parole eligibility is part of the sen-
tence imposed as punishment for a crime and therefore
subject to the prohibitions of the ex post factor clause. See
Fender v. Thompson, 883 F.2d 303, 306 (4th Cir.1989) (retro-
spective application of a statute changing parole eligi-
bility would substantially alter the consequences attached
to a crime already completed and therefore change the
punishment for prisoners who committed crimes before
the statute’s enactment); Schwartz v. Muncy, 834 F.2d 396,
398 n. 8 (4th Cir.1987) (“parole eligibility is part of the
law annexed to the crime at the time of a person’s
11 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th
Cir.1981) (en banc), this court adopted as binding precedent all
decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to
October 1, 1981.
App. 16
offense”); Beebe v. Phelps, 650 F.2d 774, 777 (5th Cir. Unit A
1981) (“parole eligibility is considered an integral part of
any sentence”); Rodriguez v. United States Parole Comm’n,
594 F.2d 170, 176 (7th Cir.1979) (“the possibility of parole
[is] an element of punishment”); Breest v. Helgemoe, 579
F.2d 95, 102 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 933, 99 S.Ct.
327, 58 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978) (“parole eligibility constitutes
part of punishment”). We agree with these holdings; for
ex post facto purposes, parole eligibility must be consid-
ered part of any sentence.
Having concluded that the Board’s rules are “laws”
within the meaning of the ex post facto clause; that parole
reconsideration hearings are an essential part of parole
eligibility; and that parole eligibility is part of a sentence
for ex post facto purposes, we now consider whether the
Board’s action in amending its rules regarding parole
reconsideration hearings violates the ex post facto clause.
Snow argues that the amended rules do not violate the
clause because Akins and Fate do not have any entitle-
ment or vested right to parole. Appellee’s Brief at 4. Snow
misconstrues the scope of the ex post facto clause. The
Supreme Court in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct.
960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981), rejected the contention that the
ex post factor clause is violated only when the law in
question affects a vested interest. The Weaver Court stated
that “a law need not impair a ‘vested right’ to violate the
ex post facto prohibition . . . The presence or absence of
an affirmative, enforceable right is not relevent . . . to the
ex post facto prohibition, which forbids the imposition of
punishment more severe than the punishment assigned
by law when the act to be punished occurred.” Id. at
29-30, 101 S.Ct. at 964-65 (footnote omitted).
App. 17
The Supreme Court has developed a two-pronged
analysis in evaluating a law under the ex post facto
clause. The first prong requires that the law be “retro-
spective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before
its enactment... .” Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29, 101 S.Ct. at 964
(1981) (footnote omitted). The second prong requires that
the law “disadvantage the offender affected by it.” Id.
(footnote omitted).
In determining whether a law is retrospective, a court
must look to the date when the crime was committed.
Weaver, 450 U.S. at 31, 101 S.Ct. at 965. If the law alters the
legal consequences of an act after the act is completed,
the law is retrospective. Id. Snow does not dispute that
the Board’s rules are being retrospectively applied to
Akins and Fate. Akins committed his crime in 1972 and
Fate committed his crime in 1977. In both years the
Board’s rules required an arinual reconsideration hearing.
In 1986, the Board amended its rules to provide for a
reconsideration hearing at least every eight years after a
denial of parole. By applying the new rules to Akins and
Fate, the Board effectively altered the consequences of
their crimes after they were completed.
The second prong of the Supreme Court’s test
requires us to determine whether the Board’s amended
rules disadvantage Akins and Fate. The Board’s rule
“need not technicaily increase the punishment” attached
to Akins’s and Fate’s crime but only “substantially disad-
vantage” Akins’s and Fate’s parole eligibility. Lindsey v.
Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401-02, 57 S.Ct. 797, 799, 81
L.Ed. 1182 (1937).
App. 18
The Board’s 1986 rules alter the period between
parole reconsideration hearings that existed when Akins
and Fate committed their crimes. At the time of Akins’s
and Fate’s crimes, the Board’s rules provided the oppor-
tunity for a parole reconsideration hearing every year
after a denial of parole. Now the Board’s rules provide
the opportunity for a parole reconsideration hearing only
once every eight years after a denial of parole. Because
we have already concluded that a parole reconsideration
hearing is an essential part of parole eligibility under
Georgia’s parole system, the Board’s alteration of the
period between parole reconsideration hearings also
alters a prisoner’s parole eligibility. The Board, in altering
the period between a parole reconsideration hearing and
a subsequent parole reconsideration hearing, has
increased the time an inmate must spend in prison before
he can again become eligible for parole. This change in
parole eligibility substantially disadvantages a prisoner. '?
12 The courts that have dealt with the issue of a change in
frequency of parole hearings are divided as to whether such a
change can violate the ex post facto clause. Compare Watson v.
Estelle, 859 F.2d 105 (9th Cir.1988), vacated, 886 F.2d 1093 (9th
Cir.1989) (change in parole hearing date violates ex post facto
clause); Rodriguez v. United States Parole Comm'n, 594 F.2d 170 (7th
Cir.1979) (change in frequency of parole hearings violates ex post
facto clause); Upshaw v. Klincar, No. 89-3133, 1990 WL 114476
(N.D.IIl. July 30, 1990) (WESTLAW, Allfeds library, Dist file)
(change in parole hearings can violate ex post facto clause); Lett v.
Klincar, 151 Ill.App.3d 783, 104 IIl.Dec. 422, 502 N.E.2d 1082 (1986)
(elimination of annual parole hearing violates ex post fact clause);
with In re Jackson, 39 Cal.3d 464, 703 P.2d 100, 216 Cal.Rptr. 760
(1985) (change in frequency of parole hearings does not violate ex
post facto clause); Gunter v. State, 298 S.C. 113, 378 S.E.2d 443
(1989) (change from annual to biannual parole hearing does not
violate ex post facto clause).
———
App. 19
If the Board had extended the date of an inmate’s
initial parole hearing the change would violate the ex
post facto clause. See Schwartz v. Muncy, 834 F.2d 396 (4th
Cir. 1987). By making such a change the Board would
require an inmate to spend more time in prison before he
became eligible for parole. There is no principled distinc
tion between changing the date of the initial hearing and
changing the period between parole reconsideration hear-
ings. Both substantially disadvantage a prisoner’s parole
eligibility and therefore his opportunity for parole.
The Board argues that even if the new rule disadvan-
tages Akins and Fate by changing their parole eligibility,
the change is a procedural one not prohibited by the ex
post facto clause. The Supreme Court has held that even a
retrospective law that is disadvantageous will not violate
the clause if the change concerns “legislative control of
remedies and modes of procedures which do not affect
matters of substance.” Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293,
97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977). However, the
Court has noted that the distinction between procedural
and substantive changes is often quite elusive. Miller v.
Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 433-35, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 2453, 96
L.Ed.2d 351 (1987). A law that is seemingly procedural
will still violate the clause if the law alters a substantive
right. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. at 964 n. 12
(1981).
In Rodriguez v. United States Parole Commission, 594
F.2d 170 (7th Cir.1979), the Seventh Circuit rejected the
argument that the change in the date of a parole recon-
sideration hearing was only a procedural change not
subject to the ex post facto clause. The court stated that
App. 20
“neither the right to a meaningful hearing nor the abroga-
tion of the right is ‘procedural’ as that term is used in ex
post facto law.” Id. at 175 n. 7. The change “did not simply
alter ‘the methods employed’ . . . in determining whether
an eligible prisoner would be released on parole.” Id.
(citing Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293-94, 97 S.Ct.
2290, 2298, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977)).
We agree with the Rodriguez court’s reasoning and
conclude that the Board’s new rule, regarding the date of
reconsideration hearings, is not merely a procedural
change. The elimination of a parole reconsideration hear-
ing does not simply alter the methods employed to deter-
mine whether an otherwise eligible inmate is granted
parole. A parole consideration hearing is both in law and
in practice an important component of a prisoner’s parole
eligibility. The change is a substantive one that effectively
disadvantages an inmate.
We therefore hold that the elimination of an annual
parole reconsideration hearing can as a matter of law
violate the ex post facto clause.
The district court found that there was no genuine
issue of material fact and therefore that Snow was enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law. The record estab-
lishes that at the time Akins and Fate committed their
crimes, the Board’s rules required that Akins and Fate be
given an annual reconsideration hearing after a denial of
parole. The record also establishes that since 1986 Akins
and Fate have not had an annual reconsideration hearing.
Based on these facts and our discussion of the law, we
find that the Board’s actions violated the ex post facto
| cae
App. 21
clause. Therefore, Akins and Fate were entitled to sum-
mary judgment as a matter of law and the district court
erred by not granting their summary judgment motion.
Il. CONCLUSION
We REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for Snow and REMAND the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
13 Akins and Fate are entitled to appropriate relief. The
district court has not yet addressed what relief is appropriate
in this case, and therefore we do not address tiat issue
App. 22
APPENDIX C
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 89-8622
C.T. AKINS,
JAY M. FATE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
MICHAEL SCHROEDER,
Plaintiff,
versus
WAYNE SNOW, JR., Chairman
State Board of Pardons & Paroles,
Defendant-Appellee.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
FILED APR 09 1991
ON PETITION(S) FOR REHEARING AND
SUGGESTION(S) OF REHEARING EN BANC
(Opinion February 7, 1991, 11th Cir, 19__, __ F.2d___).
Before: EDMONDSON and COX, Circuit Judges, and
WISDOM”, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
(X) The Petition(s) for Rehearing are DENIED and no
member of this panel nor other Judge in regular active
* Honorable John Minor Wisdom, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge
for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.
ee
App. 23
service on the Court having requested that the Court be
polled on rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure; Eleventh Circuit Rule 35-5), the
Suggestion(s) of Rehearing En Banc are DENIED.
() The Petition(s) for Rehearing are DENIED and the
Court having been polled at the request of one of the
members of the Court and a majority of the Circuit
Judges who are in regular active service not having voted
in favor of it (Rule 35, Federal! Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure; Eleventh Circuit Rule 35-5), the Suggestion(s) of
Rehearing En Banc are also DENIED.
() A member of the Court in active service having
requested a poll on the reconsideration of this cause en
banc, and a majority of the judges in active service not
having voted in favor of it, Rehearing En Banc is
DENIED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT:
/s/ Emmett R. Cox
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE
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