Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Snow v. Akins

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Susreme “ourt, U.S.

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90-1730 }

| MAY 9 1991

In The | CFFICE OF THE CLERK

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1991

— 7%

-

WAYNE SNOW, JR., Chairman,

, Georgia State Board of

Pardons and Paroles,

Petitioner,

C. T. AKINS and JAY M. FATE,

Respondents

$$$ $$$

Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To the

United States Court Of Appeals

For The Eleventh Circuit

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Ww

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

—______—__—_-

Daryt A. ROBINSON

Senior Assistant

Attorney General

Attorney for Petitioner

C. LATAIN KEL

Assistant Attorney General

MIcHAEL J. Bowers

Attorney General

Please serve:

Dary_L A. ROBINSON

132 State Judicial Building

40 Capitol Square, S.W

Atlanta, Georgia 30334

(404) 656-9622

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTION PRESENTED

Does the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision

that the discretionary intervals between parole recon-

siderations are a part of parole “eligibility” and subject to

the prohibitions of the ex post facto clause conflict with

the holding in Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. __, 110 S.Ct.

2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page(s)

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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ........... 3

A. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF

APPEALS DECISION IS CONTRARY TO THE

RECENT DECISION IN COLLINS V. YOUNG-

BLOOD, 497 U.S. __, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111

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B. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IS

BASED UPON ERRONEOUS FACTS......... 9

C. RODRIGUEZ V. UNITED STATES PAROLE

COMMISSION IS DISTINGUISHABLE FROM

THE INSTANT ACTION........... pa eaeaaecne 11

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES:

Akins v. Snow, 922 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1991) ..1, 2, 3, 9

Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925)................... 5

Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 391 L.Ed. 648 (1798).. 4, 5, 6

Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. __, 110 S.Ct. 2715,

ee” a = 67, 4,9

Damiano v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission,

som pa wae (item Cie. 1966).................... 8, 11

Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377 (1894)............... 5

Gunter v. State, 298 S.Ct. 113, 378 S.E.2d 443 (1989) .... 12

In re: Jackson, 39 Cal.3d 464, 703 Pac.2d 100, 216

a 12

Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883) .............. 5, 6

Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180 (1915).......... 5

Murphy v. Kentucky, 465 U.S. 1072 (1984)............. 4

Rodriguez v. United States Parole Commission, 594

ED) 11,.12

Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898).............. 6, 7

Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653 (1974) .............. 11

STATUTES:

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OTHER:

State Board of Pardons and Parole Rule Ch.

a tee DE SA 10

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_

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1991

A.

_

WAYNE SNOW, JR., Chairman,

Georgia State Board of

Pardons and Paroles,

Petitioner,

V.

C. T. AKINS and JAY M. FATE,

Respondents.

y%

of

Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To the

United States Court Of Appeals

For The Eleventh Circuit

v

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

,™

-

Petitioner, Wayne Snow, Jr., Chairman of the Georgia

Board of Pardons and Paroles, respectfully prays the writ

of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the Eleventh

Circuit Court of Appeals entered on February 7, 1991.

,%

-

OPINIONS BELOW

The original panel decision of the Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals was reported in Akins v. Snow, 922 F.2d

1558 (11th Cir. 1991), decided February 7, 1991, and a

copy of that opinion is included in the Appendix to the

instant Petition as Appendix B. The opinion of the United

States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia;

Atlanta Division, was issued June 28, 1989, and is

included as Appendix A.

7%

bal

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Eleventh Circuit was entered on February 7, 1991.

See Akins v. Snow, 922 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1991). This

Petition for Writ of Certiorari has been filed within the

allowable ninety days from that date. This court’s juris-

diction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

a»

a

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. X, Cl. I.

“No state shall... pass any .. . ex post facto law... .”

,%

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

C. T. Akins, Jay M. Fate and Michael Schroeder filed

the instant action pro se in the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Divi-

sion. They sought declaratory judgment, injunctive relief

and/or damages against the Chairman of the State Board

———

of Pardons and Paroles alleging unconstitutional applica-

tion of certain rules of the Board.

Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed by

the parties. Upon consideration of the motions, Judge

Richard C. Freeman granted summary judgment in favor

of Petitioner Snow and denied Respondents’ motion for

summary judgment. Akins and Fate appealed this deci-

sion; Schroeder did not. Counsel was appointed to repre-

sent Akins and Fate on the appeal.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit panei reversed the

decision of the district court and remanded the case for

consideration of the issue of relief and entry of judgment

in favor of Respondents/Appellees. Rehearing en banc

was requested of the Court of Appeals but was denied.

,%

v

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

A. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION IS CON-

TRARY TO THE RECENT DECISION IN COLLINS

V. YOUNGBLOOD, 497 U.S. __, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111

L.Ed.2d 30 (1990).

As the opinion of the Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals notes, this Court has never held that parole

eligibility is a part of a-prisoner’s sentence subject to the

prohibitions of the ex post facto clause. Akins v. Snow,

Case No. 89-8622 (11th Cir., Feb. 7, 1991). A recent deci-

sion by this court, Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. ___, 110

S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990), narrowly defines the

parameters of the ex post facto clause so as to exclude

parole “eligibility” from its scope.

In Collins, this Court in a unanimous decision entered

June 21, 1990, examined the historical definition of the ex

post facto clause and specifically overruled two long-

standing Supreme Court cases which “unjustifiably”

expanded the definition of the ex post fact clause. See

Collins, 110 S.Ct. at 2722. In so doing, the Court cited,

with approval, the following definition of the ex post

facto clause:

1st. Every law that makes an action done before

the passing of the law, and which was innocent

when done, criminal; and punishes such action.

2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes

it greater than it was, when committed. 3d.

Every law that changes the punishment, and

inflicts a greater punishment, than the law

annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th.

Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence,

and receives less, or different, testimony, than

the law required at the time of the commission

of the offense, in order to convict the offender.

Id. at 2719, quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 391 L.Ed.

648 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) (emphasis in original).

Collins notes that previous cases attempting to

expand upon the above definition have caused “confu-

sion among lower courts concerning the application of

the ex post facto clause to changes in rules of evidence

and procedure.” Id. at 42, quoting Murphy v. Kentucky, 465

U.S. 1072, 1073 (1984) (White, J., dissenting from denial of

certiorari). As the Court notes, lower courts have seized

upon language in previous Supreme Court cases which

indicated that “procedural” changes in law could violate

the ex post facto prohibitions by affecting “matters of

substance” or depriving a defendant of “substantial pro-

tections with which the existing law surrounds the per-

son accused of a crime,” or arbitrarily infringing upon

“substantial personal rights.” Id. at 2720, citing Duncan v.

Missouri, 152 U.S. 377 (1894); Malloy v. South Carolina, 237

U.S. 180 (1915); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 (1925). In

seeking to explain the true meaning of such phrases,

however, this Court stated:

The references in Duncan and Malloy to “sub-

stantial protections” and “personal rights”

should not be read to adopt without explanation

an undefined enlargement of the ex post facto

clause.

Id. at 2721.

Collins defines and clarifies those types of procedural

matters which would violate ex post facto prohibitions by

unconstitutionally infringing upon “substantial protec-

tions” and “personal rights.” The Court also overrules

two previous decisions which broadened the scope of the

ex post facto clause.

The first case overruled by the court, Kring v. Mis-

souri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883), defined an ex post facto law as

one which “in relation to the offense or its consequences,

alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage.” Id.,

citing Kring, 107 U.S. at 228-29. The Court rejected such a

broad definition of the ex post facto clause. In overruling

the Kring decision, the Court stated:

The holding in Kring can only be justified if the

Ex Post Facto Clause is thought to include not

merely the Calder categories, but any change

which “alters the situation of a party to his

disadvantage.” We think such a reading of the

Clause departs from the meaning of the Clause

as it was understood at the time of the adoption

of the Constitution, and it is not supported by

later cases.

Collins, 110 S.Ct. at 2723.

The second case, Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343

(1898), stated that the ex post facto clause was violated

when a procedural change in the law affected “a substan-

tial right involved in (the accused’s) liberty.” Collins, 110

S.Ct. at 2724, citing Thompson, 170 U.S. 352. In overruling

the Thompson decision, this Court indicated that only

those rights which affect the definitions of crimes,

defenses or punishments are the concern of the ex post

facio clause. Collins, 110 S.Ct. at 2724. This Court noted

that the right to jury trial which was at issue in Thompson

was a “substantial” right, but since it had nothing to do

with the definition of crimes, defenses or punishments,

did not fall within the scope of the ex post facto clause.

Id.

Collins states that the Court’s departure, in Kring and

Thompson, from the definition of the ex post facto clause

provided in Calder v. Bull was “unjustified.” Id. at 2722. In

fact, the Court indicates that a definition cf ex post facto

laws as any laws which “alter the situation of a party to

his disadvantage” is unwarranted and inconsistent with

Supreme Court precedent. Id.

In the instant action, the Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals has determined that by changing the maximum

time interval between parole reconsiderations (the defini-

tion of which is discussed in Section B, below), the Board

of Pardons and Paroles has somehow increased the pun-

ishments annexed to Plaintiffs’ crimes. The Eleventh Cir-

cuit rejects the notion that such a change is procedural.

Given the Collins decision’s clarification of the scope of ex

post facto and the meaning of “procedural” changes, the

Eleventh Circuit’s decision is incorrect.

As Justic Stevens points out in his concurring opin-

ion in Collins (in which Justices Brennan and Marshall

join):

Just what alterations of procedure will be held

to be of sufficient moment to transgress the

constitutional prohibition cannot be embraced

within a formula or stated in a general proposi-

tion. The distinction is one of degree. But the

constitutional provision was intended to secure

substantial personal rights against arbitrary and

oppressive legislation, and not to limit the legis-

lative control of remedies and modes of procedure

which do not affect matters of substance.

Id. at 2727 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In mak-

ing a determination of “matters of substance,” the con-

currence suggests that the “analysis should focus on the

impact of the change upon the ‘right belonging to [the

defendant] when the offense was committed.’ ” Id., quot-

ing Thompson, 170 US. at 351. Justice Stevens hastens to

point out that “a procedural protection is likely to be

substantial, when viewed from the time of the commis-

sion of the offense, only if it affects the modes of procedure by

which a valid conviction or sentence may be imposed.” Id.

(Emphasis added).

In determining “matters of substance,” the concur-

rence indicates that it is appropriate to consider whether

the plaintiff claims:

(1) he was denied any procedural protections

relevant to the determination of his guilt or

innocence;

(2) the sentence imposed was unauthorized by

law or that it was the consequence of

improper procedures; and

(3) he has been deprived of any avenue of

review for correcting errors that may have

vitiated the validity of his conviction or

sentence.

Id. at 2728. None of these factors is present in the instant

case. As Justice Stevens states, “a procedural protection

does not become substantial merely because it meets the

low threshold [stated above]. It does, however, become

insubstantial by failing to do so.” Id. Analyzed under this

test, the instant action is not one which the concurring

Justices define as the deprivation of a “substantial” right

in violation of the ex post facto clause.

At the time Akins and Fate committed their crimes,

the awarding of parole to an incarcerated life sentenced

inmate was a discretionary act of the Board of Pardons

and Paroles. This circumstance has not changed. See Dam-

lano, 785 F.2d at 929.

In addition to the above, at the time Akins and Fate

committed their crimes, the rules of the Board of Pardons

and Paroles setting the maximum intervals between

parole reconsiderations were clearly subject to change.

O.C.G.A. § 42-9-45. Thus, any reliance upon such time

intervals would have been speculative and unwarranted.

As the Collins concurrence points out:

The mere possibility of a capricious and unlikely

windfall is not the sort of procedural protection

that could reasonably be judged substantial

from the perspective of the defendant at the

time the offense was committed.

Collins, 110 S.Ct. at 2728. Reliance upon the suppositions

that life-sentenced inmates initially denied parole would

thereafter be reconsidered annually and perhaps granted

parole is reliance upon just‘such caprice or unlikely wind-

fall.

B. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IS BASED

UPON ERRONEOUS FACTS.

At the outset of its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit

defines a “parole reconsideration hearing,” stating:

We use the terms parole consideration hearing

and parole reconsideration hearing to include

the Board’s interview of the inmate, the Board’s

investigation of the inmate, the Board’s discus-

sion of the inmate and the Board’s subsequent

decision whether the inmate should be paroled.

Akins v. Snow, 922 F.2d at 1561, n.8. These terms are

repeated frequently throughout the Eleventh Circuit's

opinion. In reality, however, no “hearing” is required as

defined by the Eleventh Circuit.

In conducting a parole consideration or reconsidera-

tion, the members of the Board of Pardons and Paroles

are provided with updated inmate files containing the

most current information received by the Board with

regard to each inmate. In conducting a parole consider-

ation, the Board members review the files and suggest

potential time periods that, based upon the file, the mem-

bers believe the particular inmate should serve. The

Board then votes whether to grant or deny parole

10

No “hearing” is required by the statutes, nor is one

normally held with relation to parole considerations.

O.C.G.A. § 42-9-43. The Board does not always interview

the inmate nor always conduct a special investigation of

the inmate for the purpose of parole reconsideration.

Neither of these activities is required by statute. See

O.C.G.A. § 42-9-43(b) and (c). Of course, circumstances

may warrant that one or both of these techniques be

employed.

The Eleventh Circuit correctly assumes that at the

initial parole consideration a number of factors may be

considered to determine the inmate’s eligibility for

parole. If parole is denied at that initial consideration,

however, contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s assumption,

the inmate does not then enter into a period of parole

“ineligibility.” On the contrary, an inmate is “eligible” for

parole at any time if he can show, to the Board’s satisfac-

tion, that parole would be in the best interests of both the

individual and society as a whole. A significant change in

circumstances can trigger a reconsideration at any time.

The Board’s system for scheduling parole recon-

siderations existed prior to any change in Board Rule Ch.

475-3-.05(2) and still exists at present. The only change in

the Board’s rules has been to lengthen the maximum

period of time between parole reconsiderations. No mini-

mum has ever been set. See Rule 475-3-.05(2) of the Rules

of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles.

Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s assumption, parole

reconsiderations are not on a rigid eight-year schedule.

Rather, the appropriate time for a parole reconsideration

is determined by the individual inmate’s actions or by

11

circumstances judged on a case-by-case basis. Parole

being a purely discretionary exercise of executive power,

such a case-by-case determination is only appropriate. See

Damiano v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 785

F.2d 929 (11th Cir. 1986).

As the court noted in Damiano, postponement of

parole is “merely a disappointment rather than a punish-

ment....” Id. at 939. Such a disappointment does not rise

to the level of a constitutional violation, nor does it

increase the punishment for the crime. No state legisla-

tion exists which would indicate that changing the maxi-

mum intervals between parole reconsiderations

constitutes an increase in punishment. This is especially

true since, as described above, the inmate does not enter

into a period of “ineligibility” for parole in the interim.

C. RODRIGUEZ V. UNITED STATES PAROLE COM-

MISSION IS DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE

INSTANT ACTION.

The case relied upon by the Eleventh Circuit,

Rodriguez v. United States Parole Commission, 594 F.2d 170

(7th Cir. 1979), concerned an amendment to a statute

effectively eliminating a previously existing possibility of

parole. In a decision concerning parole eligibility, the

Supreme Court stated “a repealer of parole eligibility

previously available to imprisoned offenders would

clearly present the serious question under the ex post

facto clause . . . of whether it imposed a greater or more

severe punishment than was prescribed by law at the time

of the... offense... .” Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653,

662-63 (1974). Marrero and Rodriguez concerned repealer

12

of all possibility for parole available at the time of the

commission of the crime. Nothing in either case, how-

ever, indicates that a change in the timetable for consider-

ing inmates for parole would have the same implication

with respect to the ex post facto clause.

As noted by the Eleventh Circuit, two other courts

have determined that a mere change in the frequency of

parole hearings did not implicate a violation of the ex

post facto clause. In re: Jackson, 39 Cal. 3rd 464, 703 Pac.2d

100, 216 Cal. Rptr. 760 (1985) and Gunter v. State, 298 S.C.

113, 378 S.E.2d 443 (1989). Both courts concluded that

since there had been no elimination of the parole avail-

able at the time of the plaintiffs’ crimes, there was no

constitutional violation.

Given the above, the Eleventh Circuit’s characteriza-

tion of the difference between the circumstances in Rodri-

quez and the instant case as “incidental” is incorrect.

There is a substantial difference, from a constitutional]

perspective, between the complete elimination of oppor-

tunity for parole and an alteration in the rules concerning

when parole consideration will take place.

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—

13

CONCLUSION

For all the above and foregoing reasons, Petitioner

prays that this Court grant a writ of certiorari to review

the decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals as

the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ignored the prece-

dent of this Court and ruled erroneously.

Please Serve:

Respectfully submitted,

Miciiars. J. Bowers 071650

Attorney General

Daryi A. Ropinson 610012

Senior Assistant Attorney General

C. Latain Ketst. 411590

Assistant Attorney General

Daryt A. Rowinson

132 State Judicial Building

40 Capitol Square, S. W

Atlanta, Georgia 30334

(404) 656-9622

App. 1

APPENDIX A

UNITED S¥FATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

C. T. ATKINS, et al JUDGMENT IN A

V CIVIL CASE

CASE NUMBER

WAYNE SNOW, JR. 1:88-cv-2421-RCF

Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a

trial by jury. The issues have been tried and the jury

has rendered its verdict.

X Decision by Court. This action came for consider-

ation before the Court. The issues have been consid-

ered and a decision has been rendered.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that plaintiffs C. T.

AKINS, MICHAEL SCHROEDER and JAY FATE take

nothing, that the action be dismissed, and that the defen-

dant WAYNE SNOW, JR. recover of the plaintiffs his costs

of action.

FILED IN CLERK’S OFFICE

JUNE 29, 1989

ENTERED ON DOCKET

JULY 5, 1989

LUTHER D. THOMAS, CLERK

BY: /s/ Evelyn Y. Brown

Deputy Clerk

July 5, 1989 Luther D. Thomas

Date Clerk

/s/ Evelyn Y. Brown

(By) Deputy Clerk

App. 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ATLANTA DIVISION

C. T. AKINS, et al. 1:88-cv-2421-RCF

VS. FILED JUN 29 1989

WAYNE SNOW, JR.

ORDER

This action is before the court on cross motions for

summary judgment and plaintiffs’ motion to strike.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs in this action are C.T. Akins, Michael Schro-

eder, and Jay Fate, inmates at the Georgia State Prison in

Reidsville, Georgia. Defendant is the chairman of the

State Board of Pardons and Paroles [the board].

Plaintiffs filed this action seeking declaratory judg-

ment and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs contend postpone-

ment of reconsideration of their denials of parole by

defendant violates the due process clause and the ex post

facto clause because defendant is applying the revised

Rule 475-3-.05, para. 2, [“revised rule”] of the Rules of

State Board of Pardons and Paroles. The revised rule

provides that “[rjeconsideration of those inmates serving

life sentences who have been denied parole shall take

place at least every eight years.” Revised rule, attached to

plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, exhibit A, p. 8.

Prior to the enactment of the revised rule, after a denial

of parole, the board would reconsider the inmate’s eligi-

bility every year. The revised rule became effective Febru-

ary 1, 1985. Plaintiffs were all incarcerated for crimes

occurring prior to 1985 and contend the board should

App. 3

consider their eligibility for parole under the rules in

effect at the time their crimes were committed (i.e. recon-

sideration of parole denial each year after the initial

denial). Plaintiffs contend the revised rule increases their

punishment and deprives them of their right to be

reviewed for parole every year. In response, defendant

contends plaintiff has failed to state cognizable a claim

for relief.

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 the court should grant a

motion for summary judgment where “there is no genu-

ine issue as to any material fact and... . the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The Supreme

Court has clarified the standard for granting summary

judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106

S.Ct. 2548 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 US.

242, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986). The movant carries his burden

by showing the court that there is “an absence of evi-

dence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex,

477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554. The nonmovant, how-

ever, bears the burden of making a sufficient showing

establishing the existence of each element essential to his

case, and on which he will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. “The mere existence of a

scintilla of evidence” supporting the nonmovant’s case is

insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. The court,

resolving all reasonable doubts in favor of the nonmo-

vant, must determine “whether a fair-minded jury could

return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence pre-

sented.” Id.

The material facts are not in dispute. Each of the

plaintiffs served the seven-year, statutory time for parole

App. 4

review, came up for review and was denied parole. Under

the revised rule in issue, the board may refuse to recon-

sider plaintiffs for parole for eight years following their

initial denials.

The court will grant defendant’s motion for summary

judgment. Plaintiffs have neither a liberty interest nor a

protectable expectation of release under the applicable

rules. See Fuller v. Georgia State Board of Pardons and

Paroles, 851 F.2d 1307, 1309 (11th Cir. 1988) (“no entitle-

ment or liberty interest in parole was created by Georgia

statute.”). Neither the revised rule nor its predecessor

creates any expectation of release. At most the rule cre-

ates an expectation of review; the court declines to deem

that expectation to be a liberty interest under the four-

teenth amendment. Thus, plaintiffs have failed to assert

any claim that defendant violated their due process

rights.

Likewise, plaintiffs have not stated a claim for viola-

tion of the ex post facto clause. The ex post facto clause,

U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3, prohibits laws that are

criminal, retrospective, and “disadvantageous to the

offender because [they] may impose greater punish-

ment.” Dufresne v. Baer, 744 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir.

1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 817, 106 S.Ct. 61 (1985). The

Eleventh Circuit has expressly ruled that the denial or

postponement of parole is “merely a disappointment

rather than a punishment... .” Damiano v. Florida Parole

and Probation Commission, 785 F.2d 929, 933 (11th Cir.

1986), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1015 (1988). As a matter of

law, the postponement of reconsideration for parole is not

a punishment subject to the ex post facto clause.

App. 5

Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judg-

ment is GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter final

judgment in defendant’s favor. Plaintiffs’motion to strike

is DENIED.

SO ORDERED, this 28 day of June, 1989.

/s/ Richard C. Freeman

RICHARD C. FREEMAN

UNITED STATES

DISTRICT JUDGE

App. 6

APPENDIX B

C.T. AKINS, Jay M. Fate,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Michael Schroeder, Plaintiff,

v.

Wayne SNOW, Jr., Chairman State Board of

Pardons & Paroles,

Defendant-Appellee,

No. 89-8622.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

Feb. 7, 1991.

Inmates brought § 1983 action alleging that application

by Board of Pardons and Paroles of amended rules and

regulations to their cases violated their substantive due pro-

cess rights. The United States District Court for the Northern

District of Georgia, No. 1:88-cv-2421-RCF, Richard C. Free-

man, J., denied relief, and inmates appealed. The Court of

Appeals, Cox, Circuit Judge, held that denial of annual

parole reconsideration hearing, pursuant to amendment of

board rule to provide for reconsideration hearing at least

every eight years after denial of parole, violated ex post facto

clause with respect to inmates who, when their crimes were

committed, were entitled to annual reconsideration hearings.

Reversed and remanded.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern [District} of Georgia.

Before EDMONDSON and COX, Circuit Judges, and

WISDOM", Senior Circuit Judge.

* Honorable John Minor Wisdom, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for

the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.

App. 7

COX, Circuit Judge:

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In October 1988, C.T. Akins and Jay Fate! filed this

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and

injunctive relief or in the alternative compensatory and

punitive damages, against Wayne Snow, chairman of the

Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles (the Board).?

As the basis fur their section 1983 action Akins and Fate

allege that the Board’s application of the 1986 parole rules

and regulations to their cases violates their substantive

due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and

the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution,

art. I, § 10, cl. 1.

Both appellants in this case are inmates serving life

terms at the Georgia State Prison in Reidsville, Georgia.

The crime for which Akins was convicted was committed

in 1972; the crime for which Fate was convicted was

committed in 1977. When these crimes were committed,

the Board’s rules required the Board to initially consider

an inmate serving a life term for parole after serving

seven years of his life sentence.* If the Board denied an

1 Michael Schroeder was also a party to the suit, but he

did not appeal.

2 Because Akins and Fate challenge the parole decision

process, specifically their eligibility for parole, and not the

denial of parole, they may properly bring a claim under § 1983

without first bringing a habeas corpus claim and exhausting

their state remedies. See Gwin v. Snow, 870 F.2d 616 (11th

Cir.1989). Snow makes no argument to the contrary.

3 Georgia State Board of Pardon and Paroles rules and

regulations (Board rules), ch. 475-3.-06(3) (1972).

App. 8

inmate parole at this initial hearing, the rules required the

Board thereafter to hold an annual hearing to reconsider

its parole decision.4

In September 1980, the Board held Akins’s initial

parole hearing and denied him parole. The Board recon-

sidered Akins for parole annually through 1986. In Sep-

tember 1986, the Board, pursuant to new rules, scheduled

Akins for another parole reconsideration hearing in

1994.5 These new rules only require the Board to recon-

sider an inmate for parole once every eight years after the

denial of parole.®

Fate received his first parole consideration hearing in

July 1984. The Board refused to grant him parole at that

time and deferred reconsideration of this decision until

the following year. At the subsequent reconsideration

hearing the Board again denied Fate parole but this time,

pursuant to the new rules, did not schedule another

reconsideration hearing until 1993.

After the Board failed to hold a number of annual

reconsideration hearings for Akins and Fate, they filed

this action alleging a due process and ex post facto clause

violation. The district court, in ruling on cross-motions

for summary judgment, denied Akins’s and Fate’s motion

but granted Snow’s summary judgment motion. On the

due process claim, the court held that Akins and Fate did

not have, under the original or revised rules, a “liberty

interest nor a protectable expectation of release.”

4 Board rules, ch. 475-3-.05(2) (1969).

> Board rules, ch. 475-3-.05(2) (1986).

6 Id.

App. 9

R.1-13-3. On the ex post facto claim, the court held that

“as a matter of law, the postponement of reconsideration

for parole is not a punishment subject to the ex post facto

clause.” Id. The district court based its ex post facto

ruling upon Damiano v. Florida Parole and Probation Com-

mission, 785 F.2d 929 (11th Cir.1986), in which this court

held that parole postponement is “merely a disappoint-

ment rather than a punishment... . ” Id. at 933.7 Akins

and Fate only appeal the district court’s ruling relating to

their ex post facto claim.

II. DISCUSSION

An appellate court reviews summary judgment deci-

sions de novo. Tackitt v. Prudential Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 1572,

1574 (11th Cir.1985). Summary judgment is proper if there

are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P.

56(c).

The Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall

... pass any... ex post facto Law....” U.S. Const. art. I,

§ 10, cl. 1. At the time the Constitution was drafted, the

phrase “ex post facto law” was a term of art with a well-

established meaning. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 386,

1 L.Ed. 648 (1798). Justice Chase’s opinion in Calder v.

Bull, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798), identified

several legislative acts that clearly implicated the core

7 We find the court’s reliance on Damiano misplaced. Dam-

iano involved a change in the factors used to determine if a

prisoner would be released on parole. Id. at 931. Damiano did

not involve an alleged change in parole eligibility.

App. 10

concerns of the various ex post facto clauses that existed

at the time of the Constitution’s framing. One such legis-

lative act he noted was: “Every law that changes the pun-

ishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law

annexed to the crime when committed.” Id. at 390, 1 L.Ed.

at 650 (opinion of Chase, J.) (emphasis in original). The

Supreme Court’s ex post facto rulings have been faithful

to the original principle that “every law that changes the

punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the

law annexed to the crime when committed,” violates the

ex post facto provision. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423,

429, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 2450, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987); Weaver v.

Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28, 101 S.Ct. 960, 964, 67 L.Ed.2d 17

(1981); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292, 97 S.Ct. 2290,

2298, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977); Lindsey v. Washington, 301

U.S. 397, 401, 57 S.Ct. 797, 799, 81 L.Ed. 1182 (1937);

Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319, 324-325, 25 S.Ct. 264,

265-266, 49 L.Ed. 494 (1905); In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160,

171, 10 S.Ct. 384, 387, 33 L.Ed. 835 (1890); Cummings v.

Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 325-326, 18 L.Ed. 356, 363-364

(1867); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648,

650 (1798).

Before addressing the substantive issue of whether

the Board’s action violates the ex post facto clause, three

preliminary issues must be discussed. First, are the

Board’s rules laws within the meaning of the ex post facto

clause? Second, are parole reconsideration hearings a part

of parole eligibility? Third, are the ex post facto clause’s

restrictions applicable to a change in parole eligibility?

Regarding the first preliminary issue, the Georgia

legislature has delegated to the Board the authority to

enact “rules and regulations” concerning parole. Ga.Code

App. 11

Ann. § 77-525 (Harrison 1969); Ga.Code Ann. § 42-9-45

(1989). This delegation mandates that the Board’s rules

and regulations “contain an eligibility requirement for

parole which shall set forth the time when the automatic

initial consideration for parole of inmates under the juris-

diction of the Department of Corrections shall take place

and also the times at which periodic reconsideration

thereafter shall take place.” Id.

If the Georgia legislature had passed the parole

reconsideration rule at issue, the rule clearly would be a

law and the ex post facto clause would obviously apply.

The inquiry is whether the Board’s rule is the equivalent

of a law for ex post facto purposes.

The effect of the legislature’s delegation is to grant

the Board quasi-legislative power. The Board’s rules and

regulations have the force and effect of law. Since the

legislature delegated to the Board the power to enact

rules and regulations concerning parole reconsideration,

the rules or regulations enacted by the Board are subject

to the ex post facto clause’s prohibitions. Decisions in

other circuits, involving similar circumstances, support

this conclusion. See Rodriguez v. United States Parole

Comm'n, 594 F.2d 170, 174 (7th Cir.1979) (“This rule must

be viewed as tantamount to a statute for the purpose of

determining whether its application to Rodriguez runs

afoul of the ex post facto clause.”); Love v. Fitzharris, 460

F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir.1972), vacated, 409 U.S. 1100, 93 S.Ct.

896, 34 L.Ed.2d 682 (1973) (a state parole authority’s

change in the interpretation of a parole eligibility provi-

sion is subject to ex post facto constraints because the

agency’s interpretation had the effect of law).

App. 12

The second preliminary issue concerns whether a

parole reconsideration hearing is a part of a prisoner’s

parole eligibility. Under the Georgia parole system, an

inmate serving a life sentence becomes eligible for parole

consideration after serving seven years of his sentence.

This means that the inmate is given a parole consider-

ation hearing,® and the Board then determines if he is

suitable for release based on a number of factors. If the

inmate is denied parole at this initial hearing the Board

schedules a parole reconsideration hearing at a later

date.? If the inmate is denied parole at the reconsidera-

tion hearing, the Board schedules the inmate for another

reconsideration hearing at a later date. Since the Board is

required to hold some type of parole reconsideration

hearing before granting parole,'° an inmate is effectively

ineligible for parole between two parole reconsideration

hearings. Because an inmate is not paroled without a

parole reconsideration hearing, the hearing must be con-

sidered an essential part of parole eligibility.

® We use the terms parole consideration hearing and

parole reconsideration hearing to include the Board’s interview

of the inmate, the Board’s investigation of the inmate, the

Board’s discussion of the inmate and the Board’s subsequent

decision whether the inmate should be paroled. See, ¢.g.,

Ga.Code Ann. § 42-9-43 (1989).

° The only distinction between a parole consideration

hearing and a parole reconsideration hearing is that a parole

consideration hearing is the term used to describe an inmate’s

initial parole hearing and a parole reconsideration hearing is

the term used to describe any subsequent parole hearing.

10 See Ga.Code Ann. §§ 42-9-41, 42-9-42, and 42-9-43.

App. 13

The conclusion that a parole reconsideration hearing

is an essential part of parole eligibility under Georgia’s

parole system is supported by the language of the statute

delegating to the Board the power to enact rules and

regulations concerning parole. The statute provides that

“{[s]uch rules and regulations shall contain an eligibility

requirement for parole which shall set forth the time when

the automatic initial consideration of inmates . . . shall

take place and also the times at which periodic reconsidera-

tion thereafter shall take place... .” Ga.Code Ann. § 77-525

(Harrison 1969) (emphasis added); see also Ga.Code Ann.

§ 42-9-45 (1989). This language indicates that the legisla-

ture considers a parole reconsideration hearing an essen-

tial and important part of parole eligibility.

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez v. United

States Parole Commission, 594 F.2d 170 (7th Cir.1979), also

supports our conclusion. Rodriguez was convicted in

1977 for crimes he committed in 1974 and 1975. He was

sentenced to the statutory maximum of two years, which

made him technically eligible for immediate parole. In

1974 and 1975, when Rodriguez committed his crimes,

the applicable parole regulations required that prisoners

receive an immediate initial hearing, at which almost no

one was ever granted parole, and a subsequent hearing

after serving one-third of their sentence. After Rodriguez

committed his crimes, the applicable parole rules were

amended. The amended parole rules eliminated the addi-

tional hearing at the one-third point and replaced it with

additional review hearings that were to occur not less

frequently than eighteen months after the initial hearing.

The amended rules effectively prevented Rodriguez from

App. 14

being paroled since almost no one was paroled at the

initial hearing.

The Rodriguez court held that such a change in parole

hearings violated the ex post facto clause. The court

noted that “[aJt the time of the offense for which

Rodriguez was convicted, any ‘punishment’ prescribed

included such an opportunity for parole release. The

retroactive elimination of this opportunity is plainly to

his ‘substantial disadvantage.’” Id. at 175 (footnotes

omitted). The court concluded that “deprivation of all

opportunity to be released on parole . . . comes within the

scope of [the] clause.” Id. In reaching this conclusion, the

court reasoned that “[e]ligibility in the abstract is useless;

only an unusual prisoner could be expected to think that

he is not suffering a penalty when even though he is

eligible for parole and might be released if granted a

hearing, he is denied that hearing.” Id. at 176. This lan-

guage demonstrates the Rodriguez court’s belief that a

parole hearing is an essential element of parole eligibility.

Therefore, Rodriguez implies that without the opportunity

for a parole hearing an inmate is not, in any realistic

meaning of the term, eligible for parole.

We realize that Rodriguez involved a change that

effectively eliminated all opportunity for parole release,

but we think the specific disadvantage is incidental. The

key to the court’s conclusion was that Rodriguez was

deprived of an opportunity for parole that existed prior

to the alteration of the parole rules. See Watson v. Estelle,

859 F.2d 105, 109 (9th Cir.1988), vacated, 886 F.2d 1093 (9th

Cir.1989).

App. 15

The third preliminary issue concerns whether the ex

post facto clause applies to a change in parole eligibility.

The Supreme Court never has held that parole eligibility

is part of a prisoner’s sentence subject to the prohibitions

of the ex post facto clause. The Court has commented in

dicta that “a repealer of parole eligibility previously avail-

able to imprisoned offenders would clearly present a

serious question under the ex post factor clause. . :

Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 663, 94 S.Ct. 2532, 2538,

41 L.Ed.2d 383 (1974) (citations omitted). This court's

predecessor implied that parole eligibility is a part of a

prisoner’s sentence by stating any “official po[s]t-sen-

tence action that delays eligibility for supervised release

release runs afoul of the ex post facto proscription.”

United States ex rel. Graham v. United States Parole Comm'n,

629 F.2d 1040, 1043 (5th Cir.1980) (quoting Shepard v.

Taylor, 556 F.2d 648, 654 (2nd Cir.1977).!! Other courts

also have held that parole eligibility is part of the sen-

tence imposed as punishment for a crime and therefore

subject to the prohibitions of the ex post factor clause. See

Fender v. Thompson, 883 F.2d 303, 306 (4th Cir.1989) (retro-

spective application of a statute changing parole eligi-

bility would substantially alter the consequences attached

to a crime already completed and therefore change the

punishment for prisoners who committed crimes before

the statute’s enactment); Schwartz v. Muncy, 834 F.2d 396,

398 n. 8 (4th Cir.1987) (“parole eligibility is part of the

law annexed to the crime at the time of a person’s

11 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th

Cir.1981) (en banc), this court adopted as binding precedent all

decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to

October 1, 1981.

App. 16

offense”); Beebe v. Phelps, 650 F.2d 774, 777 (5th Cir. Unit A

1981) (“parole eligibility is considered an integral part of

any sentence”); Rodriguez v. United States Parole Comm’n,

594 F.2d 170, 176 (7th Cir.1979) (“the possibility of parole

[is] an element of punishment”); Breest v. Helgemoe, 579

F.2d 95, 102 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 933, 99 S.Ct.

327, 58 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978) (“parole eligibility constitutes

part of punishment”). We agree with these holdings; for

ex post facto purposes, parole eligibility must be consid-

ered part of any sentence.

Having concluded that the Board’s rules are “laws”

within the meaning of the ex post facto clause; that parole

reconsideration hearings are an essential part of parole

eligibility; and that parole eligibility is part of a sentence

for ex post facto purposes, we now consider whether the

Board’s action in amending its rules regarding parole

reconsideration hearings violates the ex post facto clause.

Snow argues that the amended rules do not violate the

clause because Akins and Fate do not have any entitle-

ment or vested right to parole. Appellee’s Brief at 4. Snow

misconstrues the scope of the ex post facto clause. The

Supreme Court in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct.

960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981), rejected the contention that the

ex post factor clause is violated only when the law in

question affects a vested interest. The Weaver Court stated

that “a law need not impair a ‘vested right’ to violate the

ex post facto prohibition . . . The presence or absence of

an affirmative, enforceable right is not relevent . . . to the

ex post facto prohibition, which forbids the imposition of

punishment more severe than the punishment assigned

by law when the act to be punished occurred.” Id. at

29-30, 101 S.Ct. at 964-65 (footnote omitted).

App. 17

The Supreme Court has developed a two-pronged

analysis in evaluating a law under the ex post facto

clause. The first prong requires that the law be “retro-

spective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before

its enactment... .” Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29, 101 S.Ct. at 964

(1981) (footnote omitted). The second prong requires that

the law “disadvantage the offender affected by it.” Id.

(footnote omitted).

In determining whether a law is retrospective, a court

must look to the date when the crime was committed.

Weaver, 450 U.S. at 31, 101 S.Ct. at 965. If the law alters the

legal consequences of an act after the act is completed,

the law is retrospective. Id. Snow does not dispute that

the Board’s rules are being retrospectively applied to

Akins and Fate. Akins committed his crime in 1972 and

Fate committed his crime in 1977. In both years the

Board’s rules required an arinual reconsideration hearing.

In 1986, the Board amended its rules to provide for a

reconsideration hearing at least every eight years after a

denial of parole. By applying the new rules to Akins and

Fate, the Board effectively altered the consequences of

their crimes after they were completed.

The second prong of the Supreme Court’s test

requires us to determine whether the Board’s amended

rules disadvantage Akins and Fate. The Board’s rule

“need not technicaily increase the punishment” attached

to Akins’s and Fate’s crime but only “substantially disad-

vantage” Akins’s and Fate’s parole eligibility. Lindsey v.

Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401-02, 57 S.Ct. 797, 799, 81

L.Ed. 1182 (1937).

App. 18

The Board’s 1986 rules alter the period between

parole reconsideration hearings that existed when Akins

and Fate committed their crimes. At the time of Akins’s

and Fate’s crimes, the Board’s rules provided the oppor-

tunity for a parole reconsideration hearing every year

after a denial of parole. Now the Board’s rules provide

the opportunity for a parole reconsideration hearing only

once every eight years after a denial of parole. Because

we have already concluded that a parole reconsideration

hearing is an essential part of parole eligibility under

Georgia’s parole system, the Board’s alteration of the

period between parole reconsideration hearings also

alters a prisoner’s parole eligibility. The Board, in altering

the period between a parole reconsideration hearing and

a subsequent parole reconsideration hearing, has

increased the time an inmate must spend in prison before

he can again become eligible for parole. This change in

parole eligibility substantially disadvantages a prisoner. '?

12 The courts that have dealt with the issue of a change in

frequency of parole hearings are divided as to whether such a

change can violate the ex post facto clause. Compare Watson v.

Estelle, 859 F.2d 105 (9th Cir.1988), vacated, 886 F.2d 1093 (9th

Cir.1989) (change in parole hearing date violates ex post facto

clause); Rodriguez v. United States Parole Comm'n, 594 F.2d 170 (7th

Cir.1979) (change in frequency of parole hearings violates ex post

facto clause); Upshaw v. Klincar, No. 89-3133, 1990 WL 114476

(N.D.IIl. July 30, 1990) (WESTLAW, Allfeds library, Dist file)

(change in parole hearings can violate ex post facto clause); Lett v.

Klincar, 151 Ill.App.3d 783, 104 IIl.Dec. 422, 502 N.E.2d 1082 (1986)

(elimination of annual parole hearing violates ex post fact clause);

with In re Jackson, 39 Cal.3d 464, 703 P.2d 100, 216 Cal.Rptr. 760

(1985) (change in frequency of parole hearings does not violate ex

post facto clause); Gunter v. State, 298 S.C. 113, 378 S.E.2d 443

(1989) (change from annual to biannual parole hearing does not

violate ex post facto clause).

———

App. 19

If the Board had extended the date of an inmate’s

initial parole hearing the change would violate the ex

post facto clause. See Schwartz v. Muncy, 834 F.2d 396 (4th

Cir. 1987). By making such a change the Board would

require an inmate to spend more time in prison before he

became eligible for parole. There is no principled distinc

tion between changing the date of the initial hearing and

changing the period between parole reconsideration hear-

ings. Both substantially disadvantage a prisoner’s parole

eligibility and therefore his opportunity for parole.

The Board argues that even if the new rule disadvan-

tages Akins and Fate by changing their parole eligibility,

the change is a procedural one not prohibited by the ex

post facto clause. The Supreme Court has held that even a

retrospective law that is disadvantageous will not violate

the clause if the change concerns “legislative control of

remedies and modes of procedures which do not affect

matters of substance.” Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293,

97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977). However, the

Court has noted that the distinction between procedural

and substantive changes is often quite elusive. Miller v.

Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 433-35, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 2453, 96

L.Ed.2d 351 (1987). A law that is seemingly procedural

will still violate the clause if the law alters a substantive

right. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. at 964 n. 12

(1981).

In Rodriguez v. United States Parole Commission, 594

F.2d 170 (7th Cir.1979), the Seventh Circuit rejected the

argument that the change in the date of a parole recon-

sideration hearing was only a procedural change not

subject to the ex post facto clause. The court stated that

App. 20

“neither the right to a meaningful hearing nor the abroga-

tion of the right is ‘procedural’ as that term is used in ex

post facto law.” Id. at 175 n. 7. The change “did not simply

alter ‘the methods employed’ . . . in determining whether

an eligible prisoner would be released on parole.” Id.

(citing Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293-94, 97 S.Ct.

2290, 2298, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977)).

We agree with the Rodriguez court’s reasoning and

conclude that the Board’s new rule, regarding the date of

reconsideration hearings, is not merely a procedural

change. The elimination of a parole reconsideration hear-

ing does not simply alter the methods employed to deter-

mine whether an otherwise eligible inmate is granted

parole. A parole consideration hearing is both in law and

in practice an important component of a prisoner’s parole

eligibility. The change is a substantive one that effectively

disadvantages an inmate.

We therefore hold that the elimination of an annual

parole reconsideration hearing can as a matter of law

violate the ex post facto clause.

The district court found that there was no genuine

issue of material fact and therefore that Snow was enti-

tled to judgment as a matter of law. The record estab-

lishes that at the time Akins and Fate committed their

crimes, the Board’s rules required that Akins and Fate be

given an annual reconsideration hearing after a denial of

parole. The record also establishes that since 1986 Akins

and Fate have not had an annual reconsideration hearing.

Based on these facts and our discussion of the law, we

find that the Board’s actions violated the ex post facto

| cae

App. 21

clause. Therefore, Akins and Fate were entitled to sum-

mary judgment as a matter of law and the district court

erred by not granting their summary judgment motion.

Il. CONCLUSION

We REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary

judgment for Snow and REMAND the case for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

13 Akins and Fate are entitled to appropriate relief. The

district court has not yet addressed what relief is appropriate

in this case, and therefore we do not address tiat issue

App. 22

APPENDIX C

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 89-8622

C.T. AKINS,

JAY M. FATE,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

MICHAEL SCHROEDER,

Plaintiff,

versus

WAYNE SNOW, JR., Chairman

State Board of Pardons & Paroles,

Defendant-Appellee.

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

FILED APR 09 1991

ON PETITION(S) FOR REHEARING AND

SUGGESTION(S) OF REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion February 7, 1991, 11th Cir, 19__, __ F.2d___).

Before: EDMONDSON and COX, Circuit Judges, and

WISDOM”, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM:

(X) The Petition(s) for Rehearing are DENIED and no

member of this panel nor other Judge in regular active

* Honorable John Minor Wisdom, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge

for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.

ee

App. 23

service on the Court having requested that the Court be

polled on rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure; Eleventh Circuit Rule 35-5), the

Suggestion(s) of Rehearing En Banc are DENIED.

() The Petition(s) for Rehearing are DENIED and the

Court having been polled at the request of one of the

members of the Court and a majority of the Circuit

Judges who are in regular active service not having voted

in favor of it (Rule 35, Federal! Rules of Appellate Pro-

cedure; Eleventh Circuit Rule 35-5), the Suggestion(s) of

Rehearing En Banc are also DENIED.

() A member of the Court in active service having

requested a poll on the reconsideration of this cause en

banc, and a majority of the judges in active service not

having voted in favor of it, Rehearing En Banc is

DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Emmett R. Cox

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

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