Amicus Curiae Brief — North Carolina v. Smith

@ | Bupreme Court, U.S, |

be

FILED

No. 90-1712 OCT 3

129}

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the Unite

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, PETITIONER

Vv.

CARLTON J. SMITH

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE

KENNETH W. STARR

Solicitor General

ROBERT S. MUELLER, III

Assistant Attorney General

WILLIAM C. BRYSON

Deputy Solicitor General

EDWIN S. KNEEDLER

Assistant to the Solicitor General

KATHLEEN A. FELTON

Attorney

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 514-2217

ZZ

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the State of North Carolina has jurisdiction

to prosecute respondent as an adult for crimes he alleg-

edly committed when he was a juvenile at Camp Lejeune,

a federal military installation over which the United

States has exclusive legislative jurisdiction.

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ns Re ee ee 1

EEE SRLS a A 7

EE RLS GE AS EOC 17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Ableman Vv. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859)... 14

Battle v. Johnson, 209 U.S. 36 (1908) ....0000000. %

Benson V. United States, 146 U.S. 325 (1892)... 5

Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956) .. 15

Board of Freeholders v. McCorkle, 98 N.J. Super.

451, 237 A.2d 640 (1968) _......... Mt See 11

Bowen V. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939) 000i BB

California vy. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307 (1987) ........... a 15

Cobb vy. Cobb, 406 Mass. 21, 545 N.E.2d 1161

Ne cniiasinoenbdbeneianine 11

D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462

(1983) ............ Ss nes OER TE 14-15

Evans vy. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970) 0.0... 11

Goodyear Atomic Corp. Vv. Miller, 486 U.S. 174

on ciuliaeondennanen 12

Howard vy. Commissioners, 344 ‘US. 624 (1953). 12

James B. Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94

ES Re Ee a 12

Martin Vv. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304

ss nitineninenees 14

People of Puerto Rico v. Koedel, 927 F.2d 662 (1st

rr casanamenennoens 8

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 15

Solem Vv. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984) 0.00000. 14

State in Interest of D.B.S., 137 N.J. Super. 371,

aS I 11

State v. DeBerry, 224 N.C. 834, 32 S.E.2d 617

EEE a a ee 5, 7,15

State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987). 5

Stedman, In re, 305 N.C. 92, 286 S.E.2d 527

i Ee eee 5

IV

Cases—Continued : Page

Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647 (1930)... 8

Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990) 2.00. 14, 15

Terry Y, In re, 101 Cal. App. 3d 178, 161 Cal.

Ss: a a easlllaahe 11

United States v. C.G., 736 F.2d 1474 (11th Cir.

IIIT sisecsi-cicteidaith cinching tecdtaduuaaaioantiogbintiatidatiotaiesnididcniaisiioid 13

United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978) ............ 8

United States v. Juvenile Male, 819 F.2d 468 (4th

I II cnisiinicsicicencdssib scien canscebaaapeeiniictiiiascaatienmiaaiitininneie 4

United States v. Juvenile Male, 939 F.2d 321 (6th

a ei a 10

United States v. Smith, 675 F. Supp. 307 (E.D.N.C.

1987), rev’d, 851 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1988)... 3,4

United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138 (1930)........ 5,8

United States v. Vancier, 515 F.2d 1378 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 (1975) 0.00... at cas 13

Washington v. Washington State Commercial Pas-

senger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658

i es 14

Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chiles, 214 U.S. 274

en Saale 8

Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711 (1946)... 8

Constitution, statutes and regulation:

U.S. Const. :

ne oe HF

Art. I, § 9, Cl. 3 (Ex Post Facto Clause) .......... 4,16

Amend XIV (Equal Protection Clause) ......... 11

Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Tit. II,

§ 1201 (b) (2), 98 Stat. 2150 200. penieanaed 4

Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.13 0.000000. 12

Be se ls I vncnccccexscnisccencectscsnsnnsosesens 12

Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. 5031 et seq.:

Ia eacnalle 4

Be I MII ctccsnninnerinsictebnnccense LAR TM 3, 4, 6, 10, 13

Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 1153 20000. : x

nT a cadcaudnionmdones 11

I I oocsaaisistis chicas ccttemenasaccnanbiaaiesacncmanenaniogiien 11

V

Statutes and regulation—Continued : Page

488 Fp er Dred bannicniaicausadusden aime “

Ua esnslnascica scnmceaianisneealiiaaabamsa 12

N.C. Gen. Stat. (1989) :

oa denneaenebbenion Cina 5

TTR ER CRs eRe 5

Be I iccoeninroecenene AE eco ote 5

aS eseinoensnacnliio 2,6,7

Army Reg. 608-18, The Army Family Advocacy

Program (Sept. 18, 1987) .........2.022-.-cccccceceeeeeseeee- 11

Miscellaneous:

Department of the Army, Administrative and

Civil Law Handbook (Pamphlet 27-21, Sept. 18,

SRILA IE SAINTS Ph Re cee eR tered ie eae 11

Interdepartmental Committee for the Study of

Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within the

States, Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within

ff kA seme Te)

In the Suprenwe Court of the Wuited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

No. 90-1712

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, PETITIONER

Vv.

CARLTON J. SMITH

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE

This brief is submitted in response to the Court’s in-

vitation to the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing

the views of the United States.

STATEMENT

1. On the morning of August 24, 1981, on the United

States Marine Corps Base at Camp Lejeune, North Caro-

lina, the bodies of respondent’s aunt, cousin, and sister

were found in the house where respondent lived. All

three had been murdered. Respondent, who was 15 years

old at the time, became a suspect. Pet. App. Al, A12,

A40, A41-A42.

The portion of Camp Lejeune where the murders were

committed, known as Area C, was acquired by the United

States in 1941. Pet. App. A35-A36, A39; Pet. 5. In

that year, Acting Secretary of the Navy Forrestal ac-

cepted jurisdiction over the area on behalf of the United

States “in the manner and form provided by an Act of

(1)

tae tere

2

1907, Ch. 25, N.C. Code 1927, Sec. 8059.” Pet. App. A1,

A38. The cited state statute, now codified at N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 104-7 (1985) (see Pet. 4-5), provides that the

consent of the State is given, in accordance with Article

I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the United States Constitution,’

to the acquisition by the United States of any land in the

State required for courthouses, post offices, arsenals, or

any other purposes of the government, and that “[e]xclu-

sive jurisdiction in and over any land so acquired by the

United States shall be and the same is hereby ceded to

the United States for all purposes,” except service of

civil or criminal process of the state courts.

On the day the murders occurred, the U.S. Attorney’s

office contacted the state district attorney’s office to deter-

mine its position on the question of federal or state

jurisdiction. In a letter of the same date, an assistant

district attorney informed the U.S. Attorney’s office that

it had always been his understanding that criminal of-

fenses occurring on Camp Lejeune “fall exclusively

within the federal jurisdiction,” but that “[e]ven assum-

ing concurrent jurisdiction exists,” the district attorney’s

office would defer to federal authorities in the case. Pet.

App. A40.

The Naval Investigative Service (NIS) was unable to

obtain sufficient evidence to bring charges against re-

spondent in 1981. Respondent and his family left Camp

Lejeune some time later, and they ultimately moved to

1 Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution provides that

the Congress shall have power:

To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over

such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by

Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress,

become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and

to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the

Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same

shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-

Yards, and other needful Buildings.

3

Oregon. In 1986 respondent attempted to enlist in the

Oregon National Guard. A background investigation dis-

closed that the murder investigation was still pending.

As a result, respondent was not allowed to join the

National Guard. Respondent’s mother then contacted offi-

cials at Camp Lejeune and requested that they close the

investigation. NIS agents thereafter conducted several

interviews with respondent and members of his family.

During one such interview, respondent made an incrimi-

nating statement. He was immediately arrested. See

United States v. Smith, 675 F. Supp. 307, 308-309 (E.D.

N.C. 1987), rev’d, 851 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1988).

2. On July 8, 1986, federal authorities filed a juvenile

information in the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of North Carolina charging respondent

with three counts of premeditated murder. Pet. App.

A41-A42. Pursvant to the Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18

U.S.C. 5032,? the United States filed with the informa-

tion a certification that “no juvenile court or other ap-

propriate court of any state, including the General Court

of Justice of the State of North Carolina, has jurisdic-

tion over said juvenile with respect to the acts of juvenile

delinquency alleged in this case, such acts having oc-

2 Section 5032 provides in relevant part:

A juvenile alleged to have committed an act of juvenile

delinquency, other than a violation of law committed within

the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United

States for which the maximum authorized term of imprison-

ment does not exceed six months, shall not be proceeded against

in any court of the United States unless the Attorney General,

after investigation, certifies to the appropriate district court

of the United States that (1) the juvenile court or other appro-

priate court of a State does not have jurisdiction or refuses to

assume jurisdiction over said juvenile with respect to such act

of juvenile delinquency, (2) the State does not have available

programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles, or

(3) the offense charged is a crime of violence that is a felony

[or one of certain enumerated offenses! and that there is a

substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense to warrant

the exercise of Federal jurisdiction.

4

curred on Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, North

Carolina, a military reservation acquired for the use of

the United States and under exclusive jurisdiction

thereof.” Pet. App. A43.

The district court subsequently granted the govern-

ment’s motion under 18 U.S.C. 5032 to have respondent

stand trial as an adult. Pet. App. A20. The court of ap-

peals, however, reversed. It held that the Ex Post Facto

Clause of the Constitution (Art. I, §9, Cl. 3) barred

application to respondent of the 1984 amendment to 18

U.S.C. 5032 that permits trial as an adult for a juvenile

charged with committing an offense after his fifteenth

birthday.* United States v. Juvenile Male, 819 F.2d 468,

470-472 (4th Cir. 1987).

Respondent turned 21 while his appeal was pending.

Accordingly, on July 6, 1987, after the Fourth Circuit

rendered its decision, the government sought and was

granted leave to dismiss the juvenile information. Pet.

App. A21. On July 8, 1987, a federal grand jury re-

turned an indictment charging respondent, as an adult,

with three counts of first-degree murder. Respondent

moved to dismiss the murder counts on the ground that

he could not be prosecuted as an adult after having been

proceeded against as a juvenile under the Juvenile De-

linquency Act. The district court denied the motion. /d.

at A22; United States v. Smith, 675 F. Supp. 307 (E.D.

N.C. 1987). The court of appeals reversed, holding that

under 18 U.S.C. 5032, the filing of juvenile proceedings

acted as a bar to the subsequent institution of criminal

charges against respondent, even after he turned 21.

United States v. Smith, 851 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1988).

3. On December 13, 1988, after the Fourth Circuit’s

decision ordering dismissal of the federal murder prose-

cution, a state grand jury in Onslow County, North

Carolina, returned an indictment charging respondent

* Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Tit. II, § 1201(b)(2),

98 Stat. 2150. Prior to the amendment, the minimum age for

transfer for trial as an adult was 16. 18 U.S.C. 5032 (1982).

5

with three counts of murder under state law based on

the events of August 24, 1981. The Superior Court de-

nied respondent’s motion to dismiss the indictment. It

held that the United States did not acquire exclusive

jurisdiction over juvenile delinquency matters at Camp

Lejeune and that the State retained jurisdiction over

such matters. Pet. App. A25-A31. The court further

ruled, on the basis of In re Stedman, 305 N.C. 92, 105,

286 S.E.2d 527, 534-535 (1982), that the state courts

no longer had juvenile jurisdiction over respondent, be-

cause such jurisdiction terminates when the individual

reaches his eighteenth birthday (see N.C. Gen. Stat.

§§ 7A-517(20), 7A-524 (1989)) and respondent was by

then more than 22 years of age, but that the Superior

Court did have jurisdiction to try respondent as an adult.

Pet. App. A30.*

4. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, hold-

ing that the United States has exclusive jurisdiction over

Camp Lejeune and that the state court therefore lacked

jurisdiction to prosecute respondent. Pet. App. A1l-A11.

The North Carolina Supreme Court pointed out that it,

as well as this Court, had previously concluded that when

the United States acquires exclusive jurisdiction over an

area pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the

Constitution, the State does not have jurisdiction to

prosecute a criminal offense occurring on the enclave.

Pet. App. A6-A7.°

4 Respondent would have been tried as an adult under state law

even if the state court had obtained jurisdiction over him prior to

his eighteenth birthday. Under North Carolina law, the juvenile

court may transfer jurisdiction over a juvenile 14 years of age or

older to the superior court if the juvenile was 14 or older when he

allegedly committed an offense that would be a felony if committed

by an adult, and the court must transfer jurisdiction if the alleged

felony is a capital offense. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-608 (1989); see

State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 12, 352 S.E.2d 653, 659 (1987).

5 The Court cited United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138 (1930):

Bowen Vv. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939); Benson v. United States,

146 U.S. 325 (1892); and State v. DeBerry, 224 N.C. 834, 32 S.E.2d

617 (1945).

6

The State conceded that it normally would not have

jurisdiction over criminal matters on Camp Lejeune.

Pet. App. A8. But the State contended that it has

jurisdiction in this case because a juvenile delinquency

proceeding is civil in nature and because state civil laws

in existence at the time of cession are deemed to con-

tinue in effect until abrogated by federal authority. Jd.

at A7. The State further contended that the federal

Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. 5032, embodies a

specific congressional determination that the States are

better able to deal with juvenile delinquency problems

than federal] authorities.

The North Carolina Supreme Court found the State’s

reliance on 18 U.S.C. 5032 misplaced, because Section

5032 does not require deference to state procedures where

the Attorney General certifies that state courts do not

have jurisdiction, and here the U.S. Attorney made such

a certification to the federal district court. Pet. App. A8-

A9. The court also rejected the State’s contention that

the federal government never accepted jurisdiction over

juvenile delinquency matters on Camp Lejeune. Jd. at

A7, A9-A10. It explained that Acting Secretary of the

Navy Forrestal expressly accepted jurisdiction in 1941 in

the manner provided by the 1907 North Carolina statute,

now codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 104-7 (1985), which

cedes “|e]xclusive jurisdiction” to the United States “for

all purposes” except service of process. Pet. App. A10.

The court was unpersuaded by the State’s suggestion that

Acting Secretary Forrestal could not have anticipated

“the many complexities of jurisdictional law that would

arise in the future.” bid. In its view, the Acting Secre-

tary had “accepted exclusive jurisdiction as completely as

he could,” and it noted that both the state and federal

governments had laws applicable to juvenile delinquency

at the time of the 1941 cession. [bid.

Finally, the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected

the State’s contention that federal and state courts have

concurrent jurisdiction over this case on the rationale that

7

a juvenile delinquency hearing is a civil matter in both the

federal and state court systems. The court concluded

that it was not necessary to decide whether state juvenile

delinquency proceedings are civil or criminal for these

purposes, because “|i]n this case the proceedings against

[respondent] in the Superior Court, Onslow County are

criminal! proceedings. His case was transferred to supe-

rior court on three charges of murder.” Pet. App. A111.

Since this case is an ordinary criminal prosecution, not a

juvenile delinquency proceeding, the court held that the

jurisdiction of the United States is exclusive. To hold

otherwise, the court concluded, would require it to over-

rule its prior decision in State v. DeBerry, 224 N.C. 834,

32 S.E.2d 617 (1945), which held that the State may not

prosecute an offense occurring on a federal enclave as

to which the State has ceded exclusive jurisdiction. Pet.

App. AT, A11.

DISCUSSION

The North Carolina Supreme Court was correct in

holding that the State does not have jurisdiction to prose-

cute respondent for the murders he allegedly committed

on Camp Lejeune. That decision does not conflict with

the decision of any other court and presents no question

of general importance warranting review by this Court.

Accordingly, although we are reluctant to conclude that

serious charges of this nature must be dismissed with-

out a trial on the merits in either federal or state court,

we believe that the petition for a writ of certiorari should

be denied.

1. a. The United States acquired jurisdiction over the

portion of the Camp at issue here in 1941, in accordance

with a North Carolina statute that ceded “/{e]xclusive

jurisdiction” to the United States “for all purposes,”

except service of process. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 104-7

(1985). The State does not dispute that, as a result,

Camp Lejeune is an exclusive federal enclave within the

meaning of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Consti-

8

tution and that established principles governing such

enclaves are applicable here. See Pet. 11.

It is firmly established that the United States alone

has jurisdiction to prosecute criminal offenses commit-

ted on an exclusive federal enclave. Whatever may be

the interrelationship between state and federal law on

such enclaves in other contexts, exclusive federal criminal

jurisdiction has long been at the very core of their unique

status. United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138 (1930) ;

Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 29-80 (1939); see also

Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 652-655

(1930) ; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chiles, 214 U.S. 274,

278 (1909); Battle v. Johnson, 209 U.S. 36, 37 (1908) ;

. People of Puerto Rico v. Koedel, 927 F.2d 662, 664-667

(1st Cir. 1991);* see generally Interdepartmental Com-

mittee for the Study of Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas

Within the States, Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas

Within the States Pt. 2, at 105-109 (1957). It follows

that the State of North Carolina does not have jurisdic-

tion to prosecute respondent for murders committed on

Camp Lejeune.

The State acknowledges (Pet. 11) that “an otherwise

plenary cession of jurisdiction to the federal government

does not implicitly reserve state criminal jurisdiction,”

because the purpose of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of

the Constitution is to enable Congress “to exercise di-

rect and plenary sovereignty” over federal enclaves and

because “the enforcement of the criminal law is one of

the highest attributes of sovereignty.” The State there-

fore “does not question the general rule upheld in cases

such as Bowen and Unzeuta” that the United States

alone has criminal jurisdiction over such enclaves. Pet.

*Cf. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 651 (19728) (federal

jurisdiction over prosecution of Indian under Major Crimes Act,

18 U.S.C. 1153, is exclusive of state jurisdiction); Williams v.

United States, 327 U.S. 711, 714 (1946) (federal courts have ex-

clusive jurisdiction under what is now 18 U.S.C. 1152 over crime

committed by non-Indian against Indian in Indian country).

~_

FS |e ltt

9

11-12; see also Pet. 15. The State does contend (Pet.

12-15), however, that it has jurisdiction to conduct juve-

nile delinquency proceedings with respect to acts com-

mitted on Camp Lejeune because such proceedings are

“civil” in nature and because, in its view, North Carolina

laws on the subject remained in effect after the cession

to the United States.

That issue is not presented here, because the State is

not proceeding against respondent as a juvenile. The

Superior Court held (Pet. App. A30), and the State does

not dispute, that the state courts do not have juvenile

jurisdiction over respondent even as a matter of state

law, because he is now more than 25 years old. Rather,

the State is proceeding against respondent as an adult,

invoking its ordinary criminal jurisdiction to prosecute

him for murder, which is a capital offense under state

law. See note 4, supra. Such a prosecution is not civil

in nature.

Nor can state jurisdiction be justified on the rationale

that the State’s jurisdiction over respondent “has its origin

in juvenile law” and that “[o]nce jurisdiction attaches, as

it did in 1981, it continues to exist notwithstanding the

fact that the respondent is no longer a juvenile.” Pet. 15.

We may assume, arguendo, that while respondent re-

mained a juvenile within the meaning of state law, the

State would have had jurisdiction to adjudicate him a

delinquent and to make a non-criminal disposition of his

case, on the State’s theory that such a “civil” proceeding

is not barred by the United States’ acquisition of exclu-

sive jurisdiction over Camp Lejeune. But the State would

not have had jurisdiction to bring an ordinary criminal

prosecution against respondent even while he was a juve-

nile, since the prosecution would not have been a “civil”

case over which the State had, by hypothesis, retained

jurisdiction.” It follows a fortiori that the State may not

7 We do not agree with the State’s apparent contention (Pet. 15)

that the federal Juvenile Delinquency Act’s policy of deferral to

- States carves out an implied exception to the rule of exclusive

10

bring a criminal prosecution against respondent now that

he is no longer subject to state juvenile jurisdiction.

b. The State does not cite any other case involving the

exercise of state criminal jurisdiction over an offense

committed by a juvenile on an exclusive federal enclave,

and we are aware of none. Moreover, the decision below

does not, in our view, introduce problems of law enforce-

ment on federal enclaves. When a person has allegedly

committed a serious crime of violence as a juvenile and

an ordinary criminal prosecution is warranted and per-

mitted by federal law, the matter falls within the normal

responsibilities of the U.S. Attorney and the jurisdiction

of the federal criminal justice system. In fact, the fed-

eral Juvenile Delinquency Act, as amended in 1984, does

not require deferral to state authority even outside an

exclusive enclave when the Attorney General certifies

that the offense is a crime of violence and that there is

a substantial federal interest in the case or offense war-

ranting the exercise of federal jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C.

5032. Thus, the decision below does not disrupt estab-

lished jurisdictional arrangements.

federal jurisdiction over ordinary criminal prosecutions arising on

a federal enclave. The policy of deferral to state courts focuses on

(and is triggered by) the existence and suitability of state juvenile

jurisdiction and programs. That is evident from the provision in

18 U.S.C, 5032 that a juvenile alleged to have committed an act of

juvenile delinquency may be proceeded against in federal court if

the Attorney General certifies that “the juvenile court or other

appropriate court of a State does not have jurisdiction or refuses to

assume jurisdiction over said juvenile with respect to such act of

juvenile delinquency,” or that “the State does not have available

programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles.”

Moreover, because the first portion of 18 U.S.C. 5032 quoted above

expressly contemplates that there will be situations in which a

State does not have juvenile jurisdiction, the Juvenile Delinquency

Act does not by its terms furnish a basis for recognizing the right

of a State to exercise even juvenile jurisdiction on an exclusive

enclave. See United States v. Juvenile Male, 939 F.2d 321, 323-324

(6th Cir. 1991). But the Act of course does not foreclose any other

available sources of state jurisdiction.

11

We have been informed in our consultations with de-

partments having jurisdiction over exclusive federal en-

claves that in many instances the responsible military

commanders and civilian officials would prefer to have

state courts and agencies exercise authority over routine

juvenile delinquency problems (and domestic relations

and similar matters) that arise on or concern residents

of the enclave. The State typically has established insti-

tutions and experienced personnel to address those issues

on a comprehensive basis, and there often is no compar-

able federal capability. For that reason, the federal gov-

ernment often would be prepared to retrocede jurisdiction

to the States if necessary to facilitate state cooperation

on these matters (see, ¢.g., 10 U.S.C. 2683; 16 U.S.C.

la-3) and has in the past supported the exercise of such

state authority in certain circumstances even in the ab-

sence of a formal retrocession.* But in this case the

North Carolina Supreme Court expressly declined to

* See, e.g., State in Interest of D.B.S., 137 N.J. Super. 371, 349

A.2d 105 (1975) (sustaining state juvenile jurisdiction over resident

of Fort Dix where base authorities filed petition in state court) ;

In re Terry Y, 101 Cal. App. 3d 178, 161 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1980)

(state court exercises jurisdiction, at request of base authorities,

over abused child residing at Fort Ord); Cobb v. Cobb, 406 Mass.

21, 545 N.E.2d 1161 (1989) (holding, supported by United States

as amicus curiae, that state court may issue spousal abuse preven-

tion order at request of enclave resident); Board of Freeholders v.

McCorkle, 98 N.J. Super. 451, 237 A.2d 640 (1968) (holding, sup-

ported by United States as amicus curiae, that state laws relating

to welfare services for children and commitment of mentally ill

persons apply to enclave residents). Moreover, residents of exclu-

sive federal enclaves frequently resort to state courts for divorce,

probate, or other purposes (see Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas

supra, Pt. 2, at 8, 215-238) and receive state welfare, education

and other benefits. See, ¢e.g., Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970)

(Equal Protection Clause prevents State from denying enclave resi-

dents right to vote); see generally Department of the Army, Ad-

ministrative and Civil Law Handbook 24-37 (Pamphlet 27-21, Sept.

18, 1990); Army Reg. 608-18, The Army Family Advocacy Program

(Sept. 18, 1987), Apps. B, C.

12

reach any broader questions concerning a State’s exercise

of traditional juvenile jurisdiction on an exclusive federal

enclave. Pet. App. All. There accordingly is no occasion

for this Court to consider those questions.’

2. The State asks this Court to consider whether the

state courts were bound by the U.S. Attorney’s certifica-

tion to the federal district court under the federal Juve-

nile Delinquency Act that the state courts did not have

juvenile jurisdiction over respondent’s conduct. See Pet.

16-17. That issue does not warrant review.

*We do note, however, that this Court’s cases to date do not

establish that a State may exercise juvenile jurisdiction on an

exclusive federal enclave. In Howard vy. Commissioners, 344 U.S.

624, 626-627 (1953), cited by the State (Pet. 12), the Court held

that a city was not barred from annexing an area located within an

enclave. That holding did not resolve any questions concerning what

jurisdiction the city could exercise over the area as a result, or

suggest that the only inquiry in any case involving state civil juris-

diction is whether it interferes with federal authority; such a test

would accord no significance to the exclusive nature of the enclave.

In fact, the Court in Howard sustained application of the challenged

city tax on the enclave only because it was authorized by the Buck

Act, 4 U.S.C. 105-110. 244 U.S. at 627-629.

The State also relies (Pet. 12) on the proposition that state civil

laws in effect at the time of cession remain in effect on the enclave

until displaced by federal legislation. But it appears that state

civil law is carried forward as federal law in the enclave. See

James B. Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 100 (1940)

(this principle “assimilate[s] the laws of the federal territory,

where the Congress has not legislated otherwise, to the laws of the

surrounding state”); Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas, supra, Pt. 2,

at 158 (“The rule serves to federalize not only the statutory but

the common law of a State.”); compare 18 U.S.C. 13 (Assimilative

Crimes Act). Moreover, state laws that are implemented through

a state administrative agency have generally been thought to be

inapplicable on the enclave (Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas, supra,

Pt. 2, at 161-162, 183-184; Stewart & Co., 309 U.S. at 102), in the

absence of a retrocession to the State, as in the case of state workers’

compensation laws permitted by 40 U.S.C. 290. See Jurisdiction Over

Federal Areas, supra, Pt. 2, at 207-210; Goodyear Atomic Corp. Vv.

Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 182-184 & n.4 (1988); id. at 193-194 (White,

J., dissenting).

Na

13

a. As the North Carolina Supreme Court pointed out,

the Second Circuit held in United States v. Vancier, 515

F.2d 1378, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 (1975), that at

least in the absence of bad faith, the federal courts are

bound by the U.S. Attorney’s certification that the state

court does not have or will not exercise jurisdiction. See

also United States v. C.G., 736 F.2d 1474, 1477-1478

(llth Cir. 1984); compare United States v. Juvenile

Male, 923 F.2d 614, 616-618 (8th Cir. 1991). We agree

with the State that the state courts are not similarly

bound by such a certification. But the North Carolina

Supreme Court did not hold otherwise. It discussed the

U.S. Attorney’s certification only in response to the

State’s argument that the States are better able to deal

with juvenile delinquency problems and that Section 5032

reflects a congressional intent to defer to state jurisdic-

tion. Pet. App. A9. To be sure, it is not entirely clear

what the state court meant when it wrote: “If we must

accept the United States Attorney’s certification as final

that the courts of this state do not have jurisdiction, then

18 U.S.C. § 5032 is not helpful to the State.” Ibid. But

the court did not say that it actually was required to

aecept the certification. Moreover, the court independ-

ently examined the governing jurisdictional principles

(id. at A6-A7, A9-A11) and held that the state courts

do not have jurisdiction here for the distinct reason that

the State is proceeding against respondent as an adult,

in an ordinary criminal prosecution. /d. at All. The

decision below therefore does not rest on any issue con-

cerning the U.S. Attorney’s certification.

The question of the effect of the certification on subse-

quent proceedings in state court is not in any event one

of general importance warranting review by this Court.

We are aware of no other cases raising the issue, and in

light of the fact that such a certification is ordinarily

filed only after consultation with state authorities, the

issue is unlikely to arise frequently.

14

b. In a related vein, the State objects (Pet. 18-19) to

one sentence in the last paragraph of the opinion below,

which states: “Bound as we are by the federal court’s

interpretation of this federal question, we must hold that

the Superior Court, Onslow County does not have juris-

diction to try the defendant.” Pet. App. All. The State

apparently reads this sentence as an indication that the

North Carolina Supreme Court believed that it was bound

by the Second Circuit’s holding in Vancier that the U.S.

Attorney’s certification is binding. See Pet. 18-19. But

the North Carolina Supreme Court did not identify

Vancier as the “interpretation” by a “federal court” to

which it was referring. In any event, we would not

readily infer that the North Carolina Supreme Court

believed that it was obligated to follow a single federal

court of appeals for a circuit that does not even embrace

North Carolina, and Vancier did not address the qustion

of whether a state court is bound by the U.S. Attorney’s

certification.

We of course agree with the State (Pet. 19 n.7) that a

state court is not ordinarily bound in any formal! sense

by the interpretation given to a federal law by an inferior

federal court. The Constitution and relevant statutes

contemplate that state courts may exercise independent

judgment in interpreting federal laws, subject to review

by this Court where Congress has provided, and that

conflicts among state and federal courts on questions of

federal law may and will arise. See Martin v. Hunter’s

Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 341-348 (1816) ; Ableman

v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 517-520 (1859) ; Tafflin

v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 464-467 (1990)." Because the

decisions of state courts may not be reviewed by inferior

federal courts, D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460

10 See, e.g., Washington Vv. Washington State Commercial Passen-

ger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 672 n.19 (1979); Solem v.

Bartlett, 465 U.S, 463, 466 (1984).

15

U.S. 462, 476 (1988); Rooker vy. Fidelity Trust Co., 263

U.S. 418, 415-416 (1923), it would make no sense for

state courts to be obligated to follow their decisions.

However, it is entirely proper for a state court to be

guided by and defer to the decisions of the lower federal

courts if it finds them persuasive. See 7T'afflin v. Levitt,

493 U.S. at 465. That may be all the North Carolina

Supreme Court meant to say.

Alternatively, the North Carolina Supreme Court may

have meant to refer to the decisions of this Court.

State courts properly regard themselves as bound by

this Court’s interpretations of federal law. In this re-

gard, the opinion below discusses a number of this Court’s

decisions holding that state courts have no criminal juris-

diction over offenses arising in an exclusive federal en-

clave. Pet. App. A6-A7. Because the sentence in the

opinion quoted above follows immediately after the court’s

holding that the North Carolina courts do not have juris-

diction to entertain an ordinary criminal prosecution

against respondent, id. at All, it may be that the North

Carolina Supreme Court meant to refer to an “interpre-

tation” of federal law announced by this Court.

Whatever the import of the ambiguous sentence in the

opinion’s closing paragraph, however, it presents no ques-

tion of general importance that warrants certiorari. This

Court reviews judgments, not statements in opinions.

Black yv. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292, 297 (1956);

see California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 311 (1987). It

is clear that the judgment below is correct, and the por-

tion of the opinion in question was not necessary to that

judgment; the North Carolina Supreme Court pointed

out that if it were to hold that the State could bring an

ordinary criminal] prosecution against respondent, it would

have to overrule its own prior decision in State v. De-

Berry, supra. Accordingly, dismissal of the state charges

was required by the North Carolina Supreme Court’s own

precedent, irrespective of whatever a lower federal court

16

might once have said about federal questions that might

have some relevance to this case.

3. Needless to say, we profoundly regret that the

charges of murder at issue here must be dismissed with-

out a trial on the merits in either federal or state court.

In the federal system, that result was the product of

prosecutorial and litigating decisions made at various

stages of the case; the judgment by Congress as of 1981

not to permit trial of a juvenile as an adult for crimes

he committed at age 15; and the interpretations of the

Ex Post Facto Clause and the federal Juvenile Delin-

quency Act in the two Fourth Circuit rulings that effec-

tively foreclosed a federal prosecution. In the state sys-

tem, the dismissal of the charges was required by the

allocation of jurisdiction that was made when the exclu-

sive federal enclave was established in the State, with its

consent, pursuant to the Constitution and statutes of the

United States and North Carolina. Unless that jurisdic-

tional regime is altered by Congress or by a retrocession

of jurisdiction to the State under existing statutory au-

thority, the creation of exclusive enclaves to further what

the Framers, Congress, and responsible Executive Branch

officials deemed to be important federal interests will, on

occasion, lead to a result such as the one the North

Carolina Supreme Court was required to reach here.

17

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

KENNETH W. STARR

: Solicitor General

ROBERT S. MUELLER, III

Assistant Attorney General

WILLIAM C. BRYSON

Deputy Solicitor General

EDWIN S. KNEEDLER

Assistant to the Solicitor General

KATHLEEN A. FELTON

Attorney

OCTOBER 1991

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WY ou. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING orrice; 1991 28206! 45096