Appendix — Georgiou v. Gauthier

80- 1648 } FILED |

MAR % 1981

7 @F THE CLERK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

D. Georgiou,

Petitioner,

V.

George A. Gauthier,

Respondent.

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS,

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Dimitrios C. Georgiou, M.D.

2642 Prairie Avenue

Evanston, IL 60201

(708) 869-8189

Pro se Petitioner

1A

APPERDISA

THIRD DIVISION May 27, 1990

(Seal:) NOTICE The text of this order

may be changed or corrected prior to the

time for filing of a Petition for Rehear-

ing or the disposition of the same.

No. 1-89-3013

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

GEORGE A. GAUTHIER Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Plaintiff-Appellee, Cook County.

Vv. No. 88 M2 1681

DR. D. GEORGIOU, Honorable

Joseph H. Romano,

Defendant-Appellant.Judge Presiding.

ORDER

Plaintiff, George Gauthier, initi-

ated this forcible entry and detainer

action in the circuit court against

defendant, Dr. Dimitrios C. Georgiou,

for the possession of residential pre-

mises. The parties subsequently entered

2A

an agreed order which the defendant

moved to vacate. Following a hearing,

the trial court denied the motion.

Defendant now appeals, contending that:

1) the denial of the motion was improper

because the trial court failed to "read"

or appropriately consider the motion and

a related memorandum; and 2) plaintiff

failed to protect the leased premises

from wrongful entry during defendant's

absence.

On September 5, 1989, piaintiff, as

landlord of premises located at 2642

Prairie Avenue in Evanston, Illinois,

filed a forcible entry and detainer

action against drfendant, a tenant who

resided in Apartment 2-F. The action

sought only possession of the premises.

On the scheduled trial date of Octo-

ber 23, 1989, defendant appeared without

counsel and was allowed a continuance

é

3A

until October 30, 1989, to obtain counsel.

The order stated that the October 30,

1989, hearing would be "final."

On the morning of October 30, 1989,

just prior to the trial, defendant met

with his attorney for the first time.

This attorney was the second attorney

hired by defendant. It was defendant's

impression that his second attorney de-

fonstrated a “strong bias" ayainst

psychiatrists and psychiatry, defendant's

chosen profession. For the next three

hours, defendant, his attorney, and

plaintiff's attorney wrangled over the

terms and defendant's understanding of

a proposed agreed order. Defendant

claims to have been ina "State of

confusion with regard to the particulars

of the agreed order". Defendant asked

his attorney how defendant could dismiss

him and enlist the services of a third

4h

attorney. According to defendant, the

attorney did not reply. Defendant fur-

ther claims that at that time he was

under the impression that he was cbhii-

gated to be represented and proceed to

trial that same day. He also says that

he did not know that a Chicago Bar As-

sociation attorney was assigned to the

particular court where the parties were

to appear.

Apparentiy, at some point during

the lengthy discussion, defendant had

’

a brief conversation with the trial

judge regarding defendant's concern

that "all of his rights were preserved"

The trial judge advised defendant to

Ww

continue discussing the matter with hi

attorney which defendant did. During

the subsequent discussion, defendant's

= hie wi pherm ¢ ,

attorney told him that his rights wer

iv

protected by the agreed order. Accordins

5A

to the defendant, he then agreed to ini-

tial the order with the caveat that he

could not "read" the order and therefore

could not give "informed consent", but

that he would rely upon his attorney's

advice.

The agreed order provided that: 1)

an order of possession was entered, but

stayed until November 30, 1989: 2) defen-

dant would provide access to the apart-

ment on November 1, 1989, for plaintiff

to decorate and renovate from 9 a.m. to

5 p.m.; 3) if access was not provided,

plaintiff might move to vacate the stay

of possession and seek immediate posses-

Sion; and 4) defendant would pay use and

occupancy at a rate of $345 per month

from September 1, 1989, until posses-

sion was finally relinguished.

During the afternoon of October 30,

1983, defendant claims to have contacted

.

6A

additional attorneys who advised him

that he had been improperly counseled by

his secona attorney. Defendant immediate-

ly dismissed his second counsel by certi-

fied letter dated October 30, 1989,

claiming that the attorney had impro-

perly explained the specifics of the

agreed order, so that defendant remain-

ed confused.

On the next day, October 31, 1989,

defendant and plaintiff both signed a

"memorandum" which referred to the

agreed order of October 30, 1989, and

which provided additional specifics

regarding the provision of access to the

apartment, including that the date of

access would be changed from November

1 to November 4, 1989.

On November 3, 1983, defendant filed

a notice of motion and a motion to va-

cate the agreed order entered on Octo-

-

7A

ber 30, 1989. The notice of motion made

reference only to the filing of the mo-

tion to vacate the agreed order. The mo-

tion was lengthy and recited that defend-

ant had been confused about the terms

of the agreed order as he was improperly

counseled hy his attorney. The motion

essentially presented the same arguments

defendant raises on this appeal concern-

ing the circumstances surrounding the

execution of the agreed order.

On November 6, 1989, plaintiff filed

a "Motion for Immediate Hearing of Mo-

tion and Immediate Possession." This mo-

tion aiso requested that defendant be

ordered to pay use and occupancy as due

in accordance with the agreed order.

On November 8, i989, the trial court

heard both defendant's motion to vacate

the agreed order and plaintiff's moti-

on for immediate possession. Although

8A

Although defendant has not provided a

transcript of proceedings or any bystand-

er's report of this hearing, defendant

maintains that the trial court "read"

plaintiff's motion and additional materi-

als in their “entirety," but did not

consider or "read" defendant's motion

or a related “memorandum" dated November

4, 1989. Defendant claims that the only

material read by the trial court was

defendant's letter dismissing his second

attorney because that letter was located

"on the top" of all the documents.

At the conclusion of the hearing,

the trial court granted plaintiff im-

mediate possession as of that date, No-

vember 8, 1989; and the court denied

defendant's motion to vacate the agreed

order. The trial court did not rule on

plaintiff's request for use and occupan-

cy payments. Subsequent to the filing

9A

of the notice of appeal, the order of

possession was stayed pending an outcome.

As a threshold matter, we decline to

dismiss this appeal as requested by

plaintiff on the basis that defendant

has violated Supreme Court Rules in the

filing of his appeilate brief. (i107 ill.

2d R. 341 et. seg. ) Piaintiff raised

this issue by motion before this court

on March 13, 1990, and we denied it on

March 28, 1990. We fail to find that

this pro se defendant has since violated

Supreme Court Rules so flagrantiy as to

require dismissal. See Menicocci v.

Archer Nat'l Bank of Chicago, (1978),

67 Ill. App. 3d 388, 390, 385 N.E.2d 63;

In re J.M. v. William McCarron (1988),

170 Ill. App. 3d 552, 556, 524 N.E.2d

Similarly, we also decline to dismiss

the appeal on the basis that it is now

LOA

moot. That defendant concedes that his

leasehold rights terminated as of April

1990, as asserted by plaintiff, is

nowhere reflected by the record before

us. Furthermore, even if the record re-

flected such a concession, it still

does not provide us with sufficient

information to discern the legal basis

for any such concession. Accordingly,

we now consider defendant's first

contention.

Defendant argues that the denial

of his motion to vacate the agreed

order of October 10, 1989, was improper

because the trial court did not consider

or “read" that motion and a reiated

"memorandum" dated November 4, 1989.

The record, however, fails to reflect

the inclusion of this memorandun. A

reviewing court will not consider any-

thing which is not contained in the

LILA

record. (International Amphitheater v.

Vanguard Underwriters Insurance Company

(1988), 177 Till. App. 3d 555, 564, %32

N.E. 2d 493.) Indeed, defendant attempt-

ed to have this memorandum included in

the record by way of an appendix to his

appellate brief. However, we denied de-

fendant leave to file such an appendix

on April 4, 1990, so that the memo-

randum is not now before us.

Since defendant has not supplied a

transcript or a bystander's report sf

the November 8, 1989, hearing in ac-

i.’

‘

cordance with Supreme Court Pule 32

(107 Ill. 2d R. 323(¢c)), we have n6

choice but to indulge in every rea-

sonable presumption favorable to the

judgment order or ruling from which an

appeai is taken. See Alta

4

neat elena,

a

ca

—y a a —

12A

1032; and Dell’ Armi Builders, Inc. v.

Johnston (1988), 172 Ill . App. 3d 144,

149, 526 N.E. 2d 409.

Even assuming that the trial court

"read plaintiff's brief in its entirety”

either silently or out loud, or that

defendant could discern what in fact the

trial court was reading at any given

point, this does not demonstrate that

the trial court did not consider or

read defendant's motion filed some five

days previously. Indeed the trial court's

order reflects a consideration of de-

fendant's motion because it specifical-

ly stated that it concerned a hearing

on that motion, that the court was

“advised in the premises,” specifically

recognizing that defendant was appearing

"personally", and yet it denied the mo-

tion. Particularly where no report of

proceedings is supplied and the judgment

——

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13A

order utilizes the operative language

that it is "fully advised in the pre-

mises," a reviewing court will indulge

in every reasonable presumption favor-

able to the order and must presume that

the matters heard by the trial court

were sufficient to support the judgment

absent any contrary indication in the

record. Altaf v. Hanover Square Condomi-

nium Assoc., No. 1, 188 Ill. App. 3d at

539; Dell' Armi Builders, Inc. v. Johns-

ton, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 149; In re

Marriage of Macaluso (1982), 110 Ill.

App. 3d 838, 846, 443 N.E.2d l.

Accordingly, we believe any argu-

ment that the trial court did not

consider or "read" defendant's motion

to vacate the agreed order is totally

insupportable. See Foutch v. O'Bryant

(1984), 99 Ill. 2d 389, 459 N.E.2d 958.

However, even though not explicitly

14A

Stated, defendant seems to argue that

denial was improper because there were

legal and factual bases to support va-

catur of the agreed order.

"Such an order can be set aside

only by agreement of the parties

upon a showing that it resulted

from fraudulent misrepresentation,

coercion, incompetence of one of the

parties, gross disparity in the

parties' bargaining positions, or

newly discovered evidence." (Empha-

Sis added.) (Kandalepas v. Economou

(1989), 191 Ill. App. 3d 51, 54, 547

N.E.2d 496; Berymon v. Henderson (1935),

135 Ill. App. 3d 852, 865, 482 N.E. 2d

391.) None of these bases exist in tli

oy

case.

Certainly defendant was not incom-

petent at the time he initialed the

agreed order, nor was he "coerced" into

15A

entering the agreement. Being advised

that one must sign or proceed to triai

that same day, going with the legal re-

presentation at hand, is not coercion.

(See First Sec. Bank of Glendale Heights

v. Bawoll (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 787,

456 N.E.2d 193.) Neither can defendant

claim that a gross disparity in the

parties' bargaining positions existed

given defendant's professional status,

articuiateness, and the tenacity which

he has demonstrated throughout this

matter. Furthermore, the strongest argu-

ment defendant makes that the terms of

the agreement were fraudulentiy mis-

represented is that he later learned

that a reference to a third party with

whom he might have to negotiate was not

incorporated into the final agreed order,

although the attorneys inciuded such a

reference when repetitiously "“reading"

16A

the proposed order to him. Indeed the

best that can be said is that defendant

did not understand the agreement, his

counsel's explanations did not clarify

it to him, and, nevertheless, he signed

in reliance upon counsel. Such a scenario,

unfortunately, does not rise to the

level of fraud, coercion or unfair ad-

vantage. A party to a written contract

is under a duty to learn or know the

contents of that contract before he

Signs it and is under a duty to determi-

ne the obligations which he undertakes

by the creation of a written agreement.

(Leon v. Max L£. Miller & Son, Inc. (1974),

23 Ill. App. 3d 694, 699-70, 320 N.E.2d

256). Mature adults have a duty to be

fully advised as to the nature of the

contents of a binding agreement. See

Great American Federal Savings and Loan

Association v. Grivas (1985), 137 Ill.

17A

App. 3d 267, 484 N.E.2d 429.

Defendant does contend that during

the afternoon of the day he initialed

the agreement he "realized" after con-

tacting "other attorneys" that he had

been “improperly counseled" by his

second attorney. What information was

provided to defendant by these attorneys

that caused him to "realize" anything

is not even suggested. Hence, we do not

find that newly Sieouaret evidence

has been presented warranting vacatur

of the agreed order.

Of significance also is that defend-

ant entered into and signed a supplement-

ary agreement ( memorandum dated Octo-

ber 31, 1989,), which further parti-

cularized the terms of the agreed order

the day after he signed the agreed order

and allegedly "realized" that he had been

“improperly counseled". Sureiy, defend-

18A

dant cannot honestly claim that he was

coerced, or unfairly disadvantaged when

he signed the agreed order since he sub-

sequently freely entered into the sup-

plementary agreement. Accordingly, we

find no error by the denial of defend-

ant's motion to vacate the agreed order.

Defendant's secona contention is that

Since 1985, plaintiff has failed to

protect the leased premises during de-

fendant's absences. He contends that

in 1985, plaintiff left the apartment

door unlocked, so that the apartment

was burglarized. Since that time,

defendant has noticed that valuable

personal items are being removed and

foreign objects, including "insects"

are appearing in the apartment.

This issue,however, is not properly

before us at this time. The point was

nowhere raised below at the trial court,

ee

19A

so that we cannot take cognizance of it

now. It is axiomatic that questions not

raised in the trial court are deemed

waived and may not be raised for the

first time upon appeal. Western Casualty

& Surety Company v. Brochu (1985), 105

Ill. 2d 486, 500-1, 475 N.E.2d 872.

Finally plaintiff requests that we

grant him costs, attorney fees, and any

use and occupancy payments allegedly

due him. The trial court,however, never

ruled on plaintiff's request for use

and occupancy payments, although plain-

tiff requested that relief in his motion

for immediate possession. Accordingly,

we would remand to the trial court for

a consideration of any amounts owed

because of use and occupancy in ac-

cordance with the agreed order.

The judgment of the circuit court

denying defendant's motion to

————————

2 Gikaw :

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20A

vacate the agreed order is affirmed.

We remand the cause to the trial court

for a consideration of any use and cc-

cupancy payments in accordance with

the terms of the agreed order.

Affirmed and remanded.

WHITE, J., with CERDA, P.J. and

FREEMAN, J., concurring.

20A-Add

IN THE APPELLATE COURT, STATE OF ILL.

FIRST DISTRICT

GEORGE A. GAUTHIER, Plaintiff- Appellee,

v. Dr. D. GEORGICU, Defendant- Appellant

NO. 1-89-3013

ORDER

THIS CAUSE COMING ON TO BE HEARD

upon the Motion of Defendant-Appellant

For Leave To File A Response To The

Objections Of Plaintiff-Appellee To De-

fendant-Appellant's Motion To File Reply

Brief In Excess Of Page Limitation

Instanter, due Notice having been given

and the Court being advised in the pre-

mises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Mo-

tion To File A Response is granted.

(Seal:) ORDER ENTERED May 29 90

(signature:) David Cerda Justice

Dr.D.GEORGICU,Appellant,2642 Prairie Ave.

Evanston, IL 60201, Tel:708/869-8189

GILBERT S. MARCHMAN,CLERK APP.CT.FIRST DIS.

21A

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY,ILL.

George A. Gauthier

Vv. NO. 89 M2-16€81

Dr. D. Georgiou (Petitioner's

Note: Text

Agreed ORDER handwritten

by plaintiff's

attorney,

not legible)

This matter coming on for hearing in date

set, plaintiff appear(ing?) (...?) with

his attorney; Defendant appearing and

with his attorn(ey) (...?) parties having

agreed in a settlement and the Court

being adv(...?) (..?) the premises; it

is hereby ordered. 1. An order of pos-

session for Apt 2F 2642 Prairie, Evanston

(..?) (..)ntered and stayed to November

30, 1989. 2. Defendant shall give Plain-

tiff access to the apartment for (decor)-

ation and renovation. Plaintiff shali

work around Derend(ant's) (posse?)ssions

to the extent possible and practicable.

If not, Plaintiff (...)11 move posses-

sions (Petitioner's Note: Different

CO

(Agreed ORDER, continued) 22A

handwriting here, not legible) to a safe

place (Petitioner's Note:Different hand-

writing here, legible in part, reading

approximately:)/only in the presence of

and following approval by defendant

(initials)/,and return them after (decor)

ation and renovation is finished. Access

shall be provided on 11/1/89 at 9 am.De-

fendant shall give plaintiff access to

the (ap)artment,work shall take place

from 9 am to 5 pm. 3. If Defendant

does not cooperate in the access, Plain-

“tiff (...?) have right to move for va-

cating stay of possession (...?) obtain

immediate possession. 4. Defendant shall

pay use and occupancy at rate of $345 per

month from 9/1/89 to date possession is

delivered or obtained.

(Plaintiff's signature, Defendant's ini-

(Seal:) ENTERED 10/30/1989 Jtiais.)

AURELIA PUCINSKI, CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT

(continued)

itll

(Agreed CRDER, continued) 23A

COURT. (Notes, not legible)

Atty No. 50373 Name Charles R. Goerth

Attorney for plaintiff,Address 1200

Central ,City Wilmette IL 60091

Telephone 256-7102

(Record on Appeal number, seal:)

C000012

AURELIA PUCINSKI, CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT

COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

24A

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. George A. Gauthier

From: Dr. D GEORGIOU (initialed)

Subj}: Your demand to have access to

my apartment

Date: November 4, 89 (Saturday)

I do not understand why you came

this morning to my apartment, despite

the fact that I have personally served

you on November 3, 89 (yesterday) a

copy of my Motion to vacate “agreed order’

You have been knecking thunderously

and you were shouting and demanding for

me to give you access, mentioning that

you were in possession of an "agreed

order"

I told you(behind my docr, being

inside my apartment} that I am not

waiving my above Motion to vacate

“agreed order", by opening the door

and giving you access.

a

25A

You insisted demanding for me to open

the door and to give you access. Then

I told you to wait for a few minutes in

order for me to get dressed. Then I

opened the door, I saw you in the stairs,

I said: "I opened the door because you

are or were demanding it" and I also

told you that I was sick because of

your alarming behavior.

Then you came to the door, you stop-

pea after vou entered in part. I said

nothing, I did nothing. I was not phy-

Sically preventing you. Then you said:

"This is not access, I will go to court

to evict you". I said:"I did what you

were asking me to do."Ycou repeated:

"This is not access", you turned your

back to me and you left without greeting

me, stating: “" I will take you to court

to evict you because you did not

give me access". I said:

OO

26A

"Without waiving my Motion to vacate

"agreed order", I gave you access;

to my surprise you are turning your

back to me and you are leaving ".

END OF MEMORANDUM.

(Signature:) D.C.Georgiou

27A

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY,ILL.

Gauthier

Vv. NO. 89 M2 1681

Georgiou

ORDER

This matter coming on to be heard on

motion of plaintiff to hear defendant's

motion to vacate an agreec order; and

plaintiff's motion for immediate pos-

session, plaintiff appearing and with

his attorney; Defendant appearing

personally; and the court being advised

in the premises, it is ordered:

1. Defendant's motion to vacate agreed

order is denied. 2. Plaintiff's motion

for immediate possession is granted.

3. Plaintiff shall have possession this

date, Nov 8,1989.

(Seal:) ENTERED 11/8/1989

Atty No.50373 Name Cnaries Goerth, Atty

for plaintiff,120C Central Av.,Wilmette IL

tel:256-7102. Record on AppealNo:C0C0026

S|

APPENODUIA

ORDER

IN THE APPELLATE COURT, STATE OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

GEORGE A. GAUTHIER,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

¥. NO. 1-89-3013

DR. D. GEORGIOU,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of petition for

rehearing filed by Defendant-Appellant

on June 20, 1990,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said

petition for rehearing is DENIED.

(Seal:) ORDER ENTERED JUL 12 90

/s/ David Cerda Justice

/s/ William S. White Justice

/s/ Charles E Freeman Justice

GILBERT S. MARCHMAN, CLERK OF THE

APPELLATE COURT, FIRST DISTRICT

OO

29A

70670 ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT

JULEANN HORNYAK, CLERK

SUPREME COURT BUILDING

SPRINGFIELD, ILL 62706

(217) 782-2035

October 3, 1990

Dr. So eageetou

2642 Prairie Ave.

Evanston, IL 60201

No. 70670 - George A. Gauthier, respond-

ent, v. Dr. D. Georgiou, petitioner.

Leave to appeal, Appellate Court,

First District.

The Supreme Court today DENIED the

petition for leave to appeal in the

above entitled cause.

The mandate of this Court will issue

' to the Appellate Court on October 25,

1990.

30A

SEAL OF THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF ILLINOIS, SUPREME COURT CLERK

SUPREME COURT BUILDING,SPRINGFIELD 62706

JULEANN HORNYAK CLERK OF THE COURT

(217) 782-2035

FIRST DISTRICT OFFICE , ROOM 30-129

RICHARD J. DALEY CENTER, CHICAGO €0602

(322) 793-1332

October 16,1990

Dr. D.C.Georgiou,

2642 Prairie Avenue, Evanston, IL 60201

THE COURT HAS TODAY ENTERED THE FOLLOWING

ORDER IN THE CASE OF:

No. 7067C - George A. Gauthier, respond-

ent, v. Dr. D. Georgiou, petitioner.

The motion by petitioner to stay the

Mandate pending the filing and dispositi-

on of writ of certiorari in the United

States Supreme Court is allowed.

A copy of the order is enclosed.

/Goerth

JH:kp Encl. cc:George A.Gauthier,Charles

CC

31A

(Seal:) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, U.S.A.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

ARMED FORCES EXAMINING AND ENTRANCE

STATION, 65 EAST 9TH STREET

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60605

MEFPCC-CHI 12 April 1979

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

Dimitrios C. Georgiou, MD

Chief Medical Officer

Consultant in Psychiatry and Neurology

AFEES - Chicago

65 E. 9th Street, Chicago, IL 60605

Dear Dr. Georgiou:

It is with great pieasure that I wish to

express my appreciation with regard to

the extremely competent service you have

offered to the Department of Defense as

Chief Medical Officer and Consultant in

Psychiatry and Neurology at AFEES~Chicago,

Since January 31, 1977 when you were

appointed. (continued)

»

asi + t As (_o— 5 om

Se Se. Sete

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eee a oateed

32A

(DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Letter of

Appreciation of 12 April 1979, continued).

Your proper handling of the complex medi-

cal, psychiatric and administrative is-

sues, arising frequently, has demonstrated

an extensive theoretical background as

well as abilities and skills which are

more than ordinary.

The MEPCOM Surgeon, Dr. Joseph W. McNaney,

MD Colonel, MC was also glad tc share with

me his positive comments on several oc-

casions.

A copy of this correspondence will be

placed in your official personnel file.

(Signature) GEORGE CRONIN

LTC, FA

Commanding

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33A

(Seal:) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, U.S.A.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

WASHINGTON DC 20310 1813 (Seal)

24 AUG 1988

SFMR-RBE

Ms. Dolores L. Rozzi, Director

Office of Review and Appeals

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

5203 Leesburg Pike, Suite 900

Falis Chusch, Virginia 22041

RE: Complaint of Dimitrios C. Georgiou

and John O. Marsh, Jr., Secretary

of the Army. Docket No: 01.88.3042

Agency No: 81-06-519

Dear Ms. Rozzi:

Thank you for your letter of July 12,

1988, that requested the case file on Mr.

Dimitrios C. Georgiou. The final Army

decision issued to Mr. Georgiou was not

in compliance with governing EEO policies

_ 34A

DEPT. OF THE ARMY, OFFICE OF THE AS-

SISTANT SECRETARY, Letter 24 AUG 88,Cont'd

and procedures. The complaint is being

remanded for procedural compliance and

the final decision shall be rescinded.

Therefore, the complaint is inappro-

priate for review and appeal.

Sincerely,

(Signature)

Stanley L. Kelley, Jr.

Deputy Director,

Egual Employment Opportunity

Compliance and Complaints Review

Agency.

35A

(Seal:)}) EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMN.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Review and Appeals

5203 Leesburg Pike, Suite 900

Falls Church, Virginia 22041

OCT 6 1988

Dr. Dimitrios C. Georgiou

2642 Prairie Avenue, Evansyon, Illinois

ORA Docket No. 01.88.3042

Dear Dr. Georgiou:

Our records indicate that we have alrea-

dy forwarded a copy of the enclosed let-

ter from the Department of the Army to

you. However, in response to your re-

quest a second copy herewith is

forwarded.

Sincerely,

(Signature) C. Lloyd Buddoo

Supervisory General Attorney

Research and Analysis Unit

Enclosure

36A

CERTIFIED P-468-158-955 RETURN REC.REQD.

MEMCRANODUM

To: Ms. Dolores L. Rozzi, Director, Of-

fice of Review and Appeals, EEO COMMISN.

5203 Leesburg Pike, Suite 900, Falls

Church, Virginia 22041

From: Dimitrios C. Georgiou, M.D.,2642

Prairie Ave., Evanston, IL 60201

Date: December 28, 1990

This is to remind you, once more, that

the enclosed two documents (one from

EEOC, dated Oct.6, 1988, and signed

C. Lloyd Buddoo and the other, at-

tached together, from the Department of

the Army, Office of the Assistant

Secretary, dated 24 August 1988, signed

Stanley Kelley, Jr., Deputy Director,

EEO Compliance and Compiaints Review A-

gency) are the ones I have received last

from your Agency. Meanwhile,as I have in-

office DG

formed youyperiodically,discrimination

/continues. (Signed)

37A

IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT No.

GEORGE A. GAUTHIER, Plaintiff-Respondent

v. DR. D. GEORGIOU, Defendant-Petitioner

NOTICE OF FILING AND PROOF OF SERVICE

To: Mr. Charles R. Goerth, Attorney At

Law, 1200 Central Av., Wilmette, IL 60091

You are hereby notified that pursuant to

the provisions of the Rules-of Court, we

have on this date filed with the Clerk of

the Court the Petition for Writ of Certio-

-ari, and Appendix, including, but not li-

mited to, extension of the period within

which the mandate is stayed, until dis-

position of the Petition by the U.S.

Supreme Court, with the proper number of

copies. Date: March 1,1991. /s/D.C.Georgiou

| I, Dr. D. GEORGIOU, Defendant-Peti-

tioner, on oath state that on March 1,91,

I served the proper number of copies of

the above document on the party mentioned

' above, by mailing to his office address

ee

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38A

(NOTICE OF FILING AND PROOF OF SERVICE,

continuation page)

mentioned above the above mentioned

copies, by enclosing them in a postmarked,

prepaid, sealed envelope, postage pre-

paid and depositing same at the post-

office on Dearborn St. and Adams in

Chicago. (Signature): D C Georgiou

Subscribed and sworn to before me

this lst day of March 1991

(Signature)

(Seal:) OFFICIAL SEAL FREEDA I. KOSIEK

Notary Public, State of Illinois

My Commission Expires 8-31-92