Appendix — Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc.
Supreme Court brief1991
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IN THE APR 2 § 1991
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAGES of rue cues
October Term, 1990
KEHR PACKAGES, INC.
JAMES MCMURTRIE
CHARLES MCMURTRIE
EMILY MCMURTRIE,
Petitioners,
v.
FIDELCOR, INC.
FIDELITY BANK, N.A.
THOMAS DONNELLY
NEIL COHEN
JAMES NOON
MARIO GIANNINI,
Respondents.
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT
JOEL HARVEY SLOMSKY, ESQUIRE
1600 Market Street
Suite 1720
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103
(215) 568-3700
PACKARD PRESS / LEGAL DIVISION, 1617 JFK BOULEVARD, PHILA, PA. 18103 (215) 563-9000
————— EEO ee
TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDIX
Page
Opinion Of Court Of Appeals Dated March 6, 1991 With
Concurrence And Dissent ...............2.e0000- A-1
Order Of Court Of Appeals Denying Petition For Rehear-
ing Dated March 27, 199] ..................e0eee A-41
Order Of The United States District Court For The
Eastern District of Pennsylvania Dated May 14,
I or ee Pe ee CE Pe rT errr A-42
Memorandum Of The United States District Court For
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania Dated June 28,
RE Groen a ee Oa ale mae Sa Se ae ee ae A-43
Filed March 6, 199]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 90-1396
KEHR PACKAGES, INC.,
CHARLES and EMILY McMURTRIE,
and JAMES McMURTRIE,
Appellants
v.
FIDELCOR, INC.,
FIDELITY BANK, THOMAS DONNELLY,
NEIL COHEN, JAMES NOON. and
MARIO GIANNINI, ESQ.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 89-062 19)
Argued November 6, 1990
Before: SLOVITER, Chief Judge*
SCIRICA and ALITO, Circuit Judges
(Filed March 6, 1991)
“The Honorable Dolores K. Sloviter became
Chief Judge of the
Third Circuit on February 1, 1991.
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JOEL H. SLOMSKY, ESQ. (Argued)
DiGiacomo & Slomsky
1626 Pine Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103
Attorney for Appellants
WALTER WEIR, JR., ESQ. (Argued)
Patterson & Weir
Land Title Building, Suite 1200
Broad and Chestnut Streets
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19110
Attorney for Appellees
OPINION OF THE COURT
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
This case requires us once again to address the
question of what constitutes a ‘pattern of
racketeering activity” under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"),
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-68 (1984 & Supp. 1990). The
district court held that plaintiffs did not
sufficiently allege such a pattern. We will affirm.
Plaintiffs Kehr Packages, Inc. (“Kehr”), James
McMurtrie, Charles McMurtrie, and Emily
McMurtrie filed suit against Fidelcor, Inc., Fidelity
Bank, N.A. (“Fidelity”), Thomas Donnelly, Neil
Cohen, James Noon, and Mario Giannini. The
complaint contained both RICO and pendent state
law claims arising from an allegedly fraudulent
promise to lend money to Kehr. The substantive
grounds for the RICO claims were allegations of
mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. The
district court permitted defendants to conduct
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discovery to determine whether subject matter
jurisdiction existed.
Following discovery, defendants filed a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under Fed.. R. Civ P. 12(b)(1), and a motion for
summary judgment. Plaintiffs opposed the motions
and filed their own motion for leave to file an
amended complaint. The district court granted
defendants’ motion to dismiss and _ denied
plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend. The court
held that plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged mail
fraud, and assuming they had alleged such fraud,
the allegations in the complaint did not constitute
a “pattern” under RICO. The district court denied
plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend on the
grounds that the proposed amended complaint
would not cure the defects in the original.
Plaintiffs now appeal from these rulings.
I. STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW
Initially, we must decide what legal standard
should govern this appeal. Defendants filed a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). The district court
granted this motion because it found the RICO
claims in plaintiffs’ complaints to be legally
insufficient. Thus, although the court denominated
its order as one under Rule 12(b)(1), it appeared
to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.
The legal standards governing these two motions
are different. A district court can grant a Rule
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction based on the legal insufficiency
of a claim. But dismissal is proper only when the
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claim “clearly appears to be immaterial and made
solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or
. . . is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). See also Oneida
Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661,
666 (1974) (claim must be “so insubstantial,
implausible, foreclosed by pricr decisions of this
Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as
not to involve a federal controversy”). Ordinarily,
a court must assume jurisdiction over a case
before deciding legal issues on the merits. Bell,
327 U.S. at 682. A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for
failure to state a claim is not subject to the same
limitations. The claim need not be_ wholly
insubstantial to be dismissed. As this court has
noted, “[{t]he threshold to withstand a motion to
dismiss under [Rule] 12(b)(1) is thus lower than
that required to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”
Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir.
1989).
In this case, we believe the district court's order
should properly have been denominated a
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), and we will treat it
as such. See Black v. Payne, 591 F.2d 83, 86 n.1
(9th Cir.) (treating dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1)
as one under Rule 12(b)(6)), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
867 (1979); see also Kulick v. Pocono Downs
Racing Ass’n, Inc., 816 F.2d 895, 899 (3d Cir.
1987) (considering whether to treat Rule 12(b)(1)
dismissal as one under Rule 12(b)(6), but declining
to reach issue). Although the court did not discuss
the legal standards under which it decided
defendants’ motion, it considered only the
allegations in the complaints and found them
“lacking.” The court also denied plaintiffs’ mction
for leave to amend because “it fail[ed] to establish
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a valid claim under [RICO], and therefore fail[ed]
to correct the defects in the original complaint.”
A plaintiff may be prejudiced if what is, in
essence, a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge to the complaint
is treated as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. When subject
matter jurisdiction is challenged under Rule
12(b)(1), the plaintiff must bear the burden of
persuasion. See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. and
Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). On
the other hand, under Rule 12(b)(6) the defendant
has the burden of showing no claim has been
stated. In Johnsrud v. Carter, 620 F.2d 29, 33 (3d
Cir. 1980), we found that transforming a 12(b)(1)
motion into a 12(b)(6) motion would “deprive[] the
plaintiffs of the procedural safeguards to which
they were entitled.” Id. In this case, however, there
is no reason not to treat the motion as having
been made under Rule 12(b)(6). In opposing
defendants’ motion to dismiss, plaintiffs recognized
that the motion had been made under Rule
12(b)(1), but stated that “Plaintiffs are treating the
Motion of Defendants entitled a ‘Motion to Dismiss’
as one filed under Rule 12(b)(6).” Memorandum of
Law in Support of Plaintiffs Answer in Opposition
to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 15. In this
situation, there is no harm in treating the district
court's dismissal as having been made under Rule
12(b)(6). We stress, however, that challenges for
failure to state a claim ordinarily should be made
under Rule 12(b)(6). See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.
678, 682 (1946).
The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion for
leave to amend because the proposed amended
complaint would also fail to withstand a motion to
dismiss. Denials of leave to amend a complaint
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) are reviewed for abuse
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of discretion. Kiser v. General Elec. Corp., 831 F.2d
423, 426-27 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
906 (1988). However, reversal is proper when the
district court bases its denial on an erroneous rule
of law. Banks v. Wolk, 918 F.2d 418, 419 (3d Cir.
1990); Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422, 1431 (3d
Cir. 1989).
Since plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint
to rectify certain defects, the allegations in the
proposed amended complaint are the relevant ones
for purposes of this appeal. This fact is not of great
significance, since the amended complaint adds
little additional information to that contained in
the original. One difference is that the amended
complaint drops Fidelcor, Inc. and Mario Giannini
as defendants; thus, we do not consider any
allegations against them. Since we have treated
the district court's order as a Rule _ 12(b)(6)
dismissal, we must accept as true all factual
allegations in the amended complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
them. The amended complaint must be construed
in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and
can be dismissed only if the plaintiffs have alleged
no set of facts upon which relief could be granted.
Banks, 918 F.2d at 419.
II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
This case stems from the leveraged buyout of
Kehr by James McMurtrie and Charles McMurtrie.
The allegations of the amended complaint are as
follows. See Amended Complaint at 17 15-31. On
December 12, 1986, the McMurtries entered into
an agreement to purchase Kehr. Fidelity agreed to
provide $4,165,000 in financing, secured by the
assets and accounts of Kehr, and by real estate
owned by Charles McMurtrie and his wife Emily
McMurtrie. The terms of the loans ranged from five
to seven years. Neil Cohen and James Noon
handled this loan package for Fidelity. At that
time, Cohen was a commercial loan officer at the
bank, and Noon was a vice-president.
The original understanding of the parties was
that Fidelity would provide, as part of the total
$4,165,000 ioan, a credit line of $350,000 to be
used as working capital for Kehr. Id. at {7 17-18.
The eventual loan agreement included a $600,000
line of credit to be used as working capital, and
to finance closing costs and pay off Kehr's prior
debts. However, at the settlement on December 12,
James McMurtrie discovered that this line of credit
would be insufficient to fund the necessary
$350,000 in working capital. During the
settlement, Cohen and Noon, on behalf of Fidelity,
made an oral commitment to lend an additional
$185,000 for working capital. Cohen and Noon
knew that Kehr would operate at a deficit during
1987, and that the working capital would be
critically important. In_ reliance on __ this
commitment, the McMurtries closed the deal and
began operating Kehr. Id. at 7 31.
Between December, 1986 and August, 1987,
Cohen and Noon informed James McMurtrie by
telephone “numerous” times that the $185,000
would be available as promised. Id. at q 32.
However, Cohen and Noon had no intention of
providing the money, and “made such
commitments in order to induce Plaintiffs to
complete the settlement and to insure that
Defendant Fidelity Bank would be the recipient of
large monthly interest payments, profits and
collateral.” Id. at { 33. Between December, 1986
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and July, 1988, Fidelity mailed Kehr invoices for
the loan payments. Apparently, during this period
Kehr's financial situation became increasingly
precarious.
By August, 1987, Cohen and Noon had left
Fidelity. In September, responsibility for the Kehr
loan was transferred to Thomas Donnelly, a
vice-president of Fidelity. The McMurtries believed
Donnelly was a high level management consultant
who had lending authority. Id. at { 41. In reality,
he worked in Fidelity’s Asset Recovery Group, f
where he was responsible for protecting and
recovering the bank's assets. James McMurtrie
repeatedly demanded that Fidelity furnish the
additional loan as promised, and Donnelly said
that he would “review the credit file and terms and
conditions of the loans to determine whether
additional funds would be advanced by ([Fidelity].”
Id. at { 38. The amended complaint does not allege
that Donnelly ever represented that the funds
would be provided. In addition, Donnelly told
James McMurtrie that he would commission an
appraisal of Kehr's assets, and asked McMurtrie
to draft a “plan of attack” demonstrating how
Kehr’s financial situation could be improved.
According to the amended complaint, this request
was “part of the course of conduct of Mr. Donnelly
aimed at misleading Plaintiffs into believing that
he would attempt to secure additional working
capital.” Id. at { 42. However, Donnelly never
intended to do so, and in fact had no lending
authority. In December, 1987, Donnelly mailed two
loan invoices to Kehr. Id. at 1 45.
In the summer of 1988, the McMurtries found
a buyer for Kehr. Fidelity apparently had the
contractual right to approve the sale, and Donnelly
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met with the prospective buyer on July 20, 1988.
At this meeting, Donnelly announced that the Kehr
loans were in default, and also disclosed that he
worked in the Asset Recovery Group. On the same
day, Donnelly mailed Kehr a notice of default and
confessed judgment against the collateral. The
buyer continued with the transaction, but
Donnelly and Fidelity “unreasonably delayed”
approving the sale, despite knowing that the buyer
faced a specific deadline. Id. at { 54. As a result,
the buyer withdrew its offer. In September, 1988,
Donnelly ordered Kehr to cease operations and
liquidate its assets.
Il. STATUTORY LANGUAGE
The RICO statute authorizes civil suits by “[a]ny
person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of [18 U.S.C. § 1962].” 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988). Section 1962 contains
four separate subsections, each addressing a
different problem. Section 1962(a) prohibits “any
person who has received any income derived .. .
from a pattern of racketeering activity” from using
that money to acquire, establish or operate any
enterprise that affects interstate commerce.
Section 1962(b) prohibits any person from
acquiring or maintaining an interest in, or
controlling any such enterprise “through a pattern
of racketeering activity.” Section 1962(c}) prohibits
any person employed by or associated with an
enterprise affecting interstate commerce from
“conduct[ing] or participatling] . . . in the conduct
of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity.” Finally, section 1962(d)
prohibits any person from “conspirj{ing] to violate
any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c).”
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In this case, the amended complaint alleges
violations of §§ 1962(a), (b), (c) and (d). Case law
has established separate requirements for certain
subsections. Under § 1962(a), a plaintiff must
allege injury’ specifically from the use or
investment of income in the named enterprise.
Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 357-58 (3d Cir.
1989). But see Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc., 896
F.2d 833, 836-40 (4th Cir. 1990) (rejecting
“investment use” rule). Fidelity and its parent
companies are the named enterprises in this case.
Amended Complaint at ¥ 61. The injury stems
from the allegedly fraudulent activities of Noon,
Cohen, and Donnelly, but is not specifically linked
to the use or investment of income in any named
enterprise. Thus, § 1962(a) cannot be a basis for
liability in this case. Similarly, under § 1962(b), a
plaintiff must allege a specific nexus between
control of a named enterprise and the alleged
racketeering activity. Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group,
Inc., 885 F.2d 1162, 1168 n.2 (3d Cir. 1989). Since
the amended complaint does not allege such a
nexus, the § 1962(b) count also must be
dismissed.
The § 1962(c) claim is not subject to these
nexus limitations, and therefore is a possible basis
for liability here. However,’While an entity can be
both an enterprise and a defendant for purposes
of § 1962(a), such a dual role is impermissible in
actions based on § 1962(c). See Banks uv. Wolk,
918 F.2d 418, 421 (3d Cir. 1990). Fidelity is
named as both a defendant and an enterprise.
Since § 1962(c) is the only available basis for
liability, Fidelity must be dismissed as a RICO
defendant. Because Fidelity cannot be a RICO
defendant, it cannot be held liable under a
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respondeat superior theory for the RICO violations
of its employees.:'See Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western
Co. of North America, 824 F.2d 1349, 1359 (3d Cir.
1987). We will consider separately the allegations
against each individual defendant under
§ 1962(c).'
IV. THE “PATTERN” REQUIREMENT
A “pattern of racketeering activity” requires
commission of at least two predicate offenses on
a specified list. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961(1), (5) (1984
& Supp. 1990). The predicate acts alleged in this
case are instances of mail fraud in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1341. But a pattern requires more than
commission of the requisite number of predicate
acts. In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone
Co., 492 U.S. 229, 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989), the
Supreme Court stressed that a plaintiff must show
also “that the racketeering acts are related, and
that they amount to or pose a threat of continued
criminal activity.” Id. at 109 S. Ct. at 2900
(emphasis in original).
In H.J. Inc., customers of a telephone company
alleged that the company had been bribing state
regulatory officials to gain approval for excessive
telephone rates. This alleged bribery occurred over
a six-year period and consisted of cash and
in-kind payments, and negotiations for future
employment with the company. Id. at __, 109 S.
1. Because we hold that plaintiffs did not state a valid claim
under § 1962(c), see infra at 26-31, we need not consider
whether the dependent § 1962(d) claim has been properly
alleged. Cf. Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 365-67 (3d Cir. 1989)
(discussing pleading requirements for § 1962(d) claim).
a
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Ct. at 2897. The Court held that these allegations
stated a valid claim under RICO.
The Court emphasized that allegations cannot
constitute a RICO “pattern” unless they satisfy
both the “relatedness” and “continuity” tests. Both
tests depend heavily on the specific facts of each
case. The Court adopted a broad multi-factor test
for relatedness, which focuses on whether the
alleged predicate acts “are interrelated by
distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated
events.” Id. at __, 109 S. Ct. at 2901 (quoting
“Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing Act. 18
U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982), repealed by Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II,
§ 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1987). The Court found that
the allegations in H.J. Inc. satisfied this test,
because the alleged acts of bribery were related by
the common purpose of influencing state
regulators. Id. at 2906.
In discussing the continuity requirement, the
Court rejected the theory that a RICO pattern
requires proof that a defendant engaged in
multiple criminal “schemes.” Id. at __, 109 S. Ct.
at 2901. The Court noted that the concept of a
“scheme” appears nowhere in the statute or its
legislative history, and is difficult to define. Rather,
related predicate acts in furtherance of a single
scheme can constitute a pattern if the acts
constitute or present the threat of long-term
continuous criminal activity. Proof of multiple
schemes is “highly relevant” to the question of
continuity, but is not a prerequisite for a finding
of a RICO pattern. Id.
Of course, not every single scheme comprising
two or more predicate acts will constitute a
pattern. Continuity refers “either to a closed period
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of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its
nature projects into the future with a threat of
repetition.” Id. at __, 109 S.Ct. at 2902. A
short-term scheme threatening no future criminal
activity will mot suffice. Although Congress
intended a “natural and common-sense approach
to RICO’s pattern element” and_ continuity
“depends on the specific facts of each case,” id. at
__., _._, 109 S. Ct. at 2899, 2902, the Court
delineated some parameters of the analysis. The
Court stressed that continuity is “centrally a
temporal concept.” Id. at __, 109 S. Ct at 2902.
Thus, the length of time over which the criminal
activity occurs or threatens to occur is an
important factor. As the Court noted, “[pjredicate
acts extending over a few weeks or months and
threatening no future criminal conduct do not
satisfy this requirement: Congress was concerned
in RICO with long-term criminal conduct.” Id. One
method of demonstrating continuity is to show
that “the predicate acts or offenses are part of an
ongoing entity's regular way of doing business.” Id.
This showing can be made with respect to
otherwise legitimate entities, or when “the
predicate acts can be attributed to a defendant
operating as part of a long-term association that
exists for criminal purposes.” Id.
This court has also noted other factors that are
relevant to the “pattern” inquiry. In Barticheck v.
Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat’l State, 832 F.2d 36,
39 (3d Cir. 1987), we focused on “the number of
unlawful acts, the length of time over which the
acts were committed, the similarity of the acts, the
number of victims, the number of perpetrators,
and the character of the unlawful activity.” This
approach is entirely consistent with H.J. Inc. See
’
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Marshall-Silver Constr. Co. v. Mendel, 894 F.2d
593, 596 (3d Cir. 1990). After H.J. Inc., however,
“we must focus on these factors as they bear upon
the separate questions of continuity and
relatedness.” Banks, 918 F.2d at 423.
In H.wJ. Inc., the Court found the requisite
continuity. The Court first noted that “the
racketeering predicates occurred with some
frequency over at least a 6-year period, which may
be sufficient to satisfy the continuity requirement.”
492 U.S. at ___, 109 S. Ct. at 2906. Alternatively,
the allegations sufficiently indicated that “the
alleged bribes were a regular way of conducting
[the defendant's] ongoing business, or a regular
wey of conducting or participating in the conduct
of the alleged and ongoing RICO enterprise.” Id.
Following HJ. Inc., this court affirmed
dismissals in two cases for failure to allege a
sufficient RICO pattern. In Marshall-Silver
Construction Co. v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.
1990), the complaint contained allegations of
extortion and mail fraud in connection with the
filing of a false bankruptcy petition. We noted that
the predicate acts were concluded in less than
seven months, and that “the alleged illegal activity
posed no threat of additional repeated criminal
conduct over a significant period.” Id. at 597
(emphasis in original). In Banks v. Wolk, 918 F.2d
418 (3d Cir. 1990), the plaintiffs alleged, among
other things, that the defendants had used an
inside partner to drive down the price of certain
real estate. We found no RICO pattern with respect
to those defendants involved only in that scheme,
noting that the injury to the plaintiff occurred
during an eight month period, and that the
scheme “was an attempt to defraud a single
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investor of his interest in a single piece of real
estate over a relatively short period of time.” Id.
at 11. As in Marshall-Silver, we found no indication
of additional conduct that would constitute a
threat of long-term criminal activity.
In Swistock v. Jones, 884 F.2d 755 (3d Cir.
1989), we found the continuity requirement
satisfied with respect to an alleged real estate
fraud that lasted approximately one year. As we
stressed in Marshall-Silver and Banks, however,
the complaint in Swistock contained allegations of
further misrepresentations by the defendants in
regard to other potential transactions with the
plaintiffs. Id. at 759. See Marshall-Silver, 894 F.2d
at 597; Banks, 918 F.2d at 423. Thus, although
a single fraudulent scheme can give rise to RICO
liability, when that scheme is short-lived and
directed at a limited number of people, this court
has required some further indication that the
defendant's fraudulent activities are likely to
continue.
V. THE MAIL FRAUD ALLEGATIONS
AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE
PATTERN ANALYSIS
The district court found that the complaints
failed to state valid claims of mail fraud. In some
RICO cases, it will be clear that a defendant's
actions do not constitute a pattern without an
examination of the legal sufficiency of the
predicate acts. But since the pattern inquiry must
assess whether the defendant's actions “amount to
or pose a threat of continued criminal activity,”
H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2900, it is often helpful to
examine the actions which are alleged to form the
basis of criminal activity.
ee
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In cases involving allegations of mail fraud, this
inquiry is complicated by the nature of the statute.
The mail fraud statute prohibits any person from
knowingly causing the use of the mails “for the
purpose of executing” any “scheme or artifice to
defraud.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (Supp. 1990). The
actual violation is the mailing, although the
mailing must relate to the underlying fraudulent
scheme. Moreover, each mailing that is “incident
to an essential part of the scheme” constitutes a
new violation. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S.
1, 8 (1954). The mailing need not contain any
misrepresentations. Rather, “innocent’ mailings —
ones that contain no false information — may
supply the mailing element.” Schmuck v. United
States, 489 U.S. 705, 715 (1989).
The mailing element is not very helpful in
examining the sufficiency of a RICO pattern
allegation. The relatedness test will nearly always
be satisfied in cases alleging at least two acts of
mail fraud stemming from the same fraudulent
transaction — by definition the acts are related to
the same “scheme or artifice to defraud.” But the
continuity test requires us to look beyond the
mailings and examine the underlying scheme or
artifice. Although the mailing is the actual criminal
act, the instances of deceit constituting the
underlying fraudulent scheme are more relevant to
the continuity analysis.
For example, the “number of unlawful acts” is a
factor in determining continuity. Barticheck v.
Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat’l State, 832 F.2d 36,
39 (3d Cir. 1987). But the continuity question
should not be affected by the fact that a particular
fraudulent scheme involved numerous otherwise
“innocent” mailings, rather than only a few. As the
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Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently
has reaffirmed:
Mail fraud and wire fraud are perhaps unique
among the various sorts of “racketeering activity”
possible under RICO in that the existence of a
multiplicity of predicate acts (here, the mailings)
may be no indication of the requisite continuity
of the underlying fraudulent activity.
Hartz v. Friedman, 919 F.2d 469, 473 (7th Cir.
1990) (quoting Lipin Enters., Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d
322, 325 (7th Cir. 1986) (Cudahy, J., concurring)).
Accord United States Textiles, Inc. v.
Anheuser-Busch Cos., 911 F.2d 1261, 1268 (7th
Cir. 1990); Sutherland v. O’Malley, 882 F.2d 1196,
1205 n.8 (7th Cir. 1989); International Data Bank,
Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 155 (4th Cir. 1987)
(decided before H.J. Inc.). See also Ashland Oil, Inc.
v. Amett, 875 F.2d 1271, 1278 (7th Cir. 1989) (“the
number of [mail or wire fraud] offenses is only
tangentially related to the underlying fraud, and
can be a matter of happenstance.”).
In this case, the loan invoices sent to Kehr
constitute the main basis for the mail fraud
allegations. But the quantity of otherwise innocent
invoices cannot by itself transform defendants’
alleged fraud into a RICO pattern. It should not
be relevant, for example, that Fidelity sent invoices
on a monthly basis, rather than quarterly or
yearly. However, if a defendant committed
numerous acts of deceit as part of multiple
schemes or a single ongoing fraud, this fact would
be relevant to the continuity question, although
not necessarily dispositive. Moreover, it would be
relevant if particular mailings, unlike those in this
' |
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case, contained false or misleading statements or
otherwise constituted separate deceptive acts.
The importance of focusing in the continuity
analysis on deceptive activity rather than
otherwise innocent mailings is demonstrated by
the holding in HJ. Inc. that continuity can be
shown when “the predicate acts or offenses are
part of an ongoing entity’s regular way of doing
business.” 492 U.S. 229, 109 S. Ct. at 2902. In
that case, separate bribes to different government
officials sufficiently indicated that bribery was a
regular way of doing business for the defendant.
Id. at 2906. In this case, if we were to focus only
upon the mailings, we would necessarily conclude
that sending invoices was a regular way of
conducting Fidelity’s business. Such a holding
would extend RICO’s scope to all allegations of
mail fraud based upon two or more otherwise
routine business mailings, a result we believe
Congress did not intend. Rather, we must examine
whether defendants’ underlying deceptive activities
constitute a regular way of doing business. This
question was not faced in HJ. Inc., since each
bribe in that case independently constituted a
criminal act, without reference to any underlying
illegal scheme.
At this time, we need not decide precisely which
types or combinations of fraudulent actions will
present the requisite continuity. But we note that
the mailings in this case present a different
situation from that recently faced by the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit in Fleet Credit Corp.
v. Sion, 893 F.2d 441 (lst Cir. 1990). In that case,
the defendants obtained three separate business
loans over a five year period and allegedly
misappropriated the collateral for their personal
A-19
use. The plaintiffs RICO claim was predicated on
acts of mail fraud consisting of 95 checks allegedly
used by the defendants to dissipate the collateral
over a four and one-half year period. The court
found that these actions constituted “long-term
criminal conduct” under H.J. Inc. Id. at 446-47.
The court noted that “[{hJjad the number of acts
alleged by [the plaintiff] been few or the period of
time short, the predicate acts would not have
amounted to continued criminal activity.” Id. at
447.
The court noted, however, that each separate
mailing constituted a new breach of _ the
defendants’ promise not to remove, transfer, or
destroy the collateral. Id. at 443. Thus, the
defendants’ deceptive activities were ongoing
during the entire four and one-half year period,
and each mailing constituted a new fraudulent act.
Moreover, during this period, the defendants
applied for and received two new loans. In this
case, by contrast, the mailings did not constitute
separate fraudulent actions, but related entirely to
the initial allegedly deceptive actions of the
defendants. We do not believe that the Fleet court
focused on the number and duration of the
mailings without considering their integral
connection to the ongoing long-term deceptive
activities.”
2. In dicta, the court noted that “ja] threat of criminal activity
. . . ils not established merely by demonstrating that common
law fraud was a regular way of conducting [the defendants’]
ongoing business. Rather, [the plaintiff] must demonstrate that
the predicate acts — here the acts of mail fraud — were a
regular way of conducting the ongoing business.” Id. at 448
A-20
We now examine the allegations of deceptive
activity in this case. Under the mail fraud statute,
a scheme or artifice to defraud “need not be
fraudulent on its face, but must involve some sort
of fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions
reasonably calculated to deceive persons of
ordinary prudence and comprehension.” United
States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 535 (3d Cir.
1978). The scheme need not involve affirmative
misrepresentation, see United States v. Frankel,
721 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1983), but the statutory
term “defraud” usually signifies “the deprivation of
something of value by trick, deceit, chicane or
overreaching.” McNally v. United States, 483 U.S.
350, 358 (1987) (quoting Hammerschmidt v. United
States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924)). Accord
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987).
The amended complaint alleges that Cohen and
Noon misrepresented on numerous occasions that
the additional funds would be provided. Since
these appear to be actionable misrepresentations,
we will assume without deciding that the amended
complaint sufficiently alleges that Cohen and Noon
have engaged in a “scheme or artifice to defraud”
in violation of the mail fraud statute. We also will
assume without deciding that the invoices sent to
Kehr satisfy the “mailing” element. Thus, we will
(emphasis in original). It does not appear that the court was
emphasizing the mailings over the underlying fraud. Instead,
the court likely was referring to the fact that a plaintiff must
sufficiently allege a connection between a particular fraudulent
scheme and some mailing. See id. at 444-45 (apparently
finding that plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead connection
between certain allegations of common law fraud and use of
mails).
A-21
assume that Cohen and Noon have committed
predicate acts of mail fraud. We note, however,
that the district court held that defendants’ actions
could not constitute mail fraud because plaintiffs
“offer[ed] no evidence to suggest the statements the
bank mailed out were inaccurate, or fraudulent in
any way.” This analysis was incorrect. As the
Supreme Court recently held in Schmuck v. United
States, 489 U.S. 705, 715 (1989), completely
“innocent” mailings can satisfy the mailing
element.
The allegations against Donnelly are of a
different sort. The amended complaint asserts that
Donnelly engaged in three separate deceptive
actions after Cohen and Noon had left Fidelity.
First, Donnelly’s request for a “plan of attack” was
part of a scheme to “mislead{] Plaintiffs into
believing that he would attempt to secure
additional working capital.” Amended Complaint at
q 42. Although Donnelly said that he would
attempt to secure additional working capital,
unlike Cohen and Noon he never represented that
the capital would be provided. Second, Donnelly
did not disclose that he worked in the Asset
Recovery Group, and that he had no lending
authority. Third, he “unreasonably delayed”
approving the proposed sale of Kehr.
Even construing the complaint in the light most
favorable to appellants, none of these allegations
could form the basis for a separate mail fraud
violation on the part of Donnelly. We recognize
that the mail fraud statute has been “expansively
construed.” United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919,
925 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022
(1983). But none of Donnelly’s alleged acts or
omissions could be ‘reasonably calculated to
ia tainaenateeanitanineieel
A-22
deceive a person of ordinary prudence and
comprehension.” Pearlstein, 576 F.2d at 535.
Thus, the individual allegations against Donnelly
do not constitute additional criminal activity that
would help establish “continuity” under RICO.
The “plan of attack” request falls squarely within
the ambit of normal business communications.
especially considering the financial state of Kehr,
and contains no deceptive elements. Cf. Blount
FYnanctal Servs., Inc. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 819
F.2d 151, 153 (6th Cir. 1987) (plaintiffs reliance
on defendant's quotation of interest rate was
unreasonable in business setting, and precluded
mail fraud claim); McEvoy Travel Bureau, Inc. v.
Herttage Travel, Inc., 904 F.2d 786 (lst Cir.)
(allegations of kickbacks, rebates and illegal rent
payments could not be construed as scheme to
deceive and thus could not be basis for mail fraud
violation), cert. denied, ___ U.S. a oan oo ok
536 (1990). Likewise, the non-disclosure of
Donnelly’s job title cannot constitute mail fraud
absent further allegations. Since Donnelly never
represented that he had lending authority, or that
the funds would be provided, his non-disclosure
cannot reasonably be said to be deceptive. See,
e.g., United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999,
1006-07 (2d Cir. 1980) (non-disclosure not
actionable under mail fraud statute absent some
duty to disclose), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981);
see also Reynolds v. East Dyer Dev. Co., 882 F.2d
1249 (7th Cir. 1989) (absent elaborate efforts at
concealment, or larger pattern of misrepre-
A-23
sentations or half-truths, mere non-disclosure
cannot constitute mail fraud).°
Moreover, even if these actions were somehow
deceptive, they were calculated only to mislead
plaintiffs into believing that Donnelly would
“attempt” to secure additional funds. Since
Donnelly never indicated that the funds would be
provided, there was no deceit nor fraud within the
meaning of the mail fraud statute. By contrast, the
deceptions of Cohen and Noon are alleged to have
caused plaintiffs to close the deal and incur injury
when the funds were not provided. We note that
18 U.S.C. § 1346, which amended the mail fraud
statute to include schemes that “deprive another
of the intangible right of honest services,” does not
apply to this case, since all of the defendants’
alleged actions occurred prior to the effective date
of the statute. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (Supp.
3. Mail fraud can also be predicated on mailings made after
the completion of the scheme, but which are “designed to lull
the victims into a false sense of security, postpone their
ultimate complaint to the authorities, and therefore make the
apprehension of the defendants less likely than if no mailings
had taken place.” United States v. Lebovitz, 669 F.2d 894, 896
(3d Cir.), cert. dented, 456 U.S. 929 (1982) (quoting United
States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 403 (1974)). In this case,
however, we find as a matter of law that Donnelly’s alleged
actions could not have served this purpose. A person of
ordinary prudence and comprehension could not be misled by
Donnelly’s indications that he would look into whether Fidelity
would provide additional funding. Cf. Pyramid Securities, Ltd.
v. IB Resolution, Inc., 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 1350, *11 (D.C.
Cir. Feb. 1, 1991) (rejecting similar “lulling” claim in civil RICO
action).
A-24
1990) (effective Nov. 18, 1988) (overruling McNally
v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987)).*
Finally, the allegation that Donnelly
“unreasonably delayed” approving the sale of Kehr,
while possibly amounting to a breach of contract,
contains no deception that would bring it within
the purview of the mail fraud statute. Cf. United
States v. Kreitmer, 609 F.2d 126, 128 (5th Cir.
1980) (“the [mail fraud] statute does not reject all
business practices that do not fulfill expectations,
nor does it taint every breach of a business
contract. Its condemnation of a ‘scheme or artifice
to defraud’ implicates only plans catcuiated to
deceive."); see also Amended Complaint at { 83
(unreasonable delay not alleged as
misrepresentation in common law fraud count).
We emphasize that the _ responsibility for
determining the factual sufficiency of fraud
allegations remains with the fact-finder. In this
case, though, the allegations against Donnelly
simply contain no indication of the deception or
overreaching which the mail fraud _ statute
requires. We also recognize that appellants
4. We follow the other Courts of Appeals that have held that
§ 1346 has no retroactive effect. See United States v. Telink,
Inc., 910 F.2d 598, 601 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Granberry, 908 F.2d 278, 281 n.1 (8th Cir. 1990); McEvoy
Travel Bureau, Inc. v. Heritage Travel, Inc., 904 F.2d 786, 791
(1st Cir.) (civil RICO case), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 111 S.
Ct. 536 (1990); United States v. Bush, 888 F.2d 1145, 1145-46
(7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Stewart, 872 F.2d 957, 960
n.2 (10th Cir. 1989); Corcoran v. American Plan Corp., 886
F.2d 16, 19 n.4 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Davis, 873
F.2d 900, 902 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 110 S. Ct.
292 (1989).
ei
A-25
possibly could have demonstrated at trial that
Donnelly was engaged in a common mail fraud
scheme with Noon and Cohen. See, e.g., United
States v. Camiel, 689 F.2d 31, 36 (3d Cir. 1982)
(mail fraud violation can be proved by showing
common scheme rather than _ conspiratorial
agreement). In this event, Donnelly would have
been held liable for the misrepresentations of
Cohen and Noon. But for purposes of RICO
continuity, the separate allegations against
Donnelly do not add to the criminal activity alleged
against Cohen and Noon.
VI. THE “PATTERN” ALLEGATION IN THIS CASE
Plaintiffs in this case have not sufficiently
alleged that defendants engaged in a “pattern of
racketeering activity.” Since the complaint alleges
numerous acts of mail fraud related to the
common purpose of causing Kehr to default on its
loans, the relatedness requirement is satisfied. But
the amended complaint does not set forth acts that
“amount to or pose the threat of continuing
criminal activity.” Rather, as in Marshall-Silver and
Banks, the allegations here involve a short-term
attempt to force a single entity into bankruptcy,
and contain no additional threat of continued
criminal activity. Nor does this case involve a
“long-term association that exists for criminal
purposes.” See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at __, 109 S.
Ct. at 2902.
We have established that the critical acts for
purposes of the continuity analysis are the
misrepresentations of Cohen and Noon. The same
misrepresentations regarding the additional loan
were repeated “numerous” times over an eight
month period. H.J. Inc. holds that the actual or
A-26
threatened duration of a scheme is an important
factor in determining whether a_ defendant's
actions amount to long-term criminal activity.
When mail fraud is alleged, the question of
duration becomes more difficult. As we noted in
Marshall-Silver, “[vjirtually every garden-variety
fraud is accomplished through a series of wire or
mail fraud acts that are ‘related’ by purpose and
are spread over a period of at least several
months.” 894 F.2d at 597. In this case, the length
of the scheme as originally conceived was
indeterminate, since it would depend on how long
Kehr could survive without the promised $185,000
in additional working capital. The mailing of loan
invoices could possibly have continued for seven
years, the term of the longest loan.
However, we do not place much emphasis on the
fact that the mailings might have continued for
years. As we have noted, a defendant's deceptive
actions are more important to the continuity
analysis than otherwise innocent mailings. Thus,
the relevant criminal conduct occurred during the
initial eight month period, when the
misrepresentations were made. We noted in
Marshall-Silver that the duration of a scheme
should not be afforded overriding significance “in
the absence of a more significant societal threat.”
Id. Since we found the scheme in that case to be
sufficiently short-term, we did not rely on this
statement and need not embrace it at this time.
But see United States Textiles, Inc. _ v.
Anheuser-Busch Cos., 911 F.2d 1261, 1268-69 (7th
Cir. 1990) (adopting Marshall-Silver language). We
do hold, however, that in determining the duration
of a scheme involving mail fraud, the relevant
criminal conduct is the defendant's deceptive or
eal
A-27
fraudulent activity, rather than otherwise innocent
mailings that may continue for a long period of
time. Cf. United States Textiles, 911 F.2d at 1268
(noting that each mail and wire fraud count
“relates back” to initial extortions, and _ that
duration of transaction at issue was “pure
happenstance in light of the underlying concern
which is the ‘continuity’ of the criminal activity”).
We must apply a “natural and common-sense
approach to RICO’s pattern element.” H.J. Inc., 492
U.S. at __, 109 S. Ct. at 2899. Consequently, it
should not be important that otherwise innocent
mailings might continue long after the deceptive
practices cease. If the term of the Kehr loans had
been several decades rather than several years, it
would not make the initial actions of Cohen and
Noon any more deserving of RICC sanctions. Cf.
Dana Corp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 900 F.2d
882, 887 (6th Cir. 1990) (repeated fraudulent
misrepresentations during seventeen year life of
contract sufficient to state pattern). As in
Marshall-Silver and Banks, an eight-month period
of fraudulent activity directed at a single entity
does not constitute a pattern, absent a threat of
future criminal acts.
This case, therefore, is unlike H.J. Inc., which
involved six years of bribes directed at five
members of a regulatory agency. The alleged bribes
were numerous and varied, consisting of cash
payments, job negotiations, and payments for
meals and entertainment. See 492 U.S. at ___, 109
S. Ct. at 2897. Each separate bribe contributed to
an ongoing scheme aimed at influencing future
ratemaking decisions. This evidence led the Court
to find sufficient indication that bribery was a
regular way of doing business for the defendant.
A-28 ;
st de A Uitebe ne tit alt
Besides the significant disparity in longevity
between the schemes in HJ. Inc. and the present
case, there are other salient differences. First,
there is no apparent threat that’ the
misrepresentations of Cohen and Noon would have
continued past the time they left Fidelity. By
contrast, the regulatory decisions involved in HJ.
Inc. were a continuous part of the defendant's
business, and thus the bribes likely would have
continued into the future. Unlike Swistock, the
additional confirmatory misrepresentations of
Cohen and Noon did not concern future
transactions, and thus do not pose a threat of
additional criminal activity. There is no indication
that Cohen or Noon made other falSe statements
to Kehr, or treated other customers in a similar
manner. Consequently, the allegations in the
amended complaint do not indicate that fraud was
“a regular way of doing business” for any
defendant. Cf. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at __, 109 S.
Ct. at 2902. Nor, as we have noted, does this case
involve a “long-term association that exists for
criminal purposes.” See id.
Second, the bribes in H.J. Inc. were individually
directed at five different officials. As we noted in
Swistock, the Supreme Court did not rely on the
fact that the actual victims of the bribes — the
telephone company’s customers — were numerous.
See 884 F.2d at 758. However, it certainly should
be relevant that the criminal activity was
separately directed at several different people. Cf.
Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat’l State,
832 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1987) (“the scheme
involved the _ repetition oof similar mis-
representations to more than twenty investors”). In
this case, the direct target of the criminal activity
A-29
was a single entity. Kehr's individual shareholders
and guarantors, and the holders of pledged
collateral, were affected only indirectly.
Third, each bribe in HJ. Inc. separately
contributed to the injury inflicted on the plaintiffs.
Cf. Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970,
975 (7th Cir. 1986) (“occurrence of distinct
injuries” is factor in pattern analysis). In this case,
the damage to plaintiffs was largely accomplished
at the moment of settlement. Although the number
of misrepresentations can be an important factor,
the confirmatory misrepresentations made after
settlement do not transform the actions of Cohen
and Noon into a “pattern of racketeering activity.”
There is no allegation that Kehr was caused to
forgo additional financing because of the false
confirmations; on the contrary, a buyer was found
for Kehr after Cohen and Noon left Fidelity. Thus,
the repeated misrepresentations did not contribute
any injury additional to that already inflicted. Nor
is it relevant that each loan payment constituted
additional economic detriment to Kehr. Absent
continuous long-term fraudulent activity, it is of
little importance that a particular injury was
inflicted over an extended period of time, rather
than all at once. See United States Textiles, Inc. v.
Anheuser-Busch Cos., 911 F.2d 1261, 1269 (7th
Cir. 1990) (“[I]dentical economic injuries
stemming from a single contract were not the type
of injuries which Congress intended to compensate
via the civil provisions of RICO.”).
VII. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs may have valid claims of common law
fraud or breach of contract, but based on the
allegations of the complaint and the proposed
A-30
amended complaint, which we have assumed
throughout are true, they cannot maintain a RICO
suit. Thus, we will affirm the dismissal of the RICO
and pendent state law claims against ll
defendants, and the denial of plaintiffs’ motion for
leave to amend their complaint.
ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
I concur in the decision of the court insofar as
it affirms the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims
under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) and (b), but I would
reverse the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims under 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d). As the majority notes,
denial of plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend and
the dismissal of their claims may be sustained
only if the amended complaint proffered by the
plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. Majority typescript at 3-6. The
majority affirms the dismissal of the claims under
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d) on the ground that the
amended complaint did not sufficiently allege a
“pattern” of racketeering activity. I respectfully
disagree with the majority's analysis of the pattern
requirement and with its application in the present
case.
ial
A-3]
I.
The amended complaint alleged that the bank
and several officers carried out a scheme to
defraud the McMurtries, who obtained more than
four million dollars of secured loans to finance
their leveraged buyout of Kehr Packages, Inc. The
bank and its officers allegedly induced the
McMurtries to enter into loan agreements that
provided insufficient working capital for successful
operation of the company. This was accomplished,
the complaint asserts, by fraudulent oral promises
that additional financing would be _ provided.
According to the complaint, the purpose of this
scheme was to obtain large interest payments and,
ultimately, the pledged collateral, which exceeded
the value of the loans. The complaint alleged that
the defendants, in carrying out this scheme,
committed numerous acts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341, during a period of one year and seven
months, from December 1986 to July 1988.
The specific factual allegations in the complaint
are set out in the majority opinion (typescript at
6-9), but the following salient allegations merit
emphasis. At the settlement of the loans on
December 12, 1986, two bank officers, Neil Cohen,
a commercial loan officer, and James Noon, a vice
president, orally promised that an additional
$185,000 in working capital would be provided.
App. 24la-42a. For the next eight months, Cohen
and Noon repeated this promise during
“numerous” telephone conversations with James
McMurtrie. Id. at 242a. Cohen and Noon, however,
never intended to fulfill their promises but made
them to obtain interest payments and the pledged
collateral for their employer. Id. at 243a.
A-32
In September 1987, after Cohen and Noon had
left the bank, Thomas Donnelly, another vice
president, took over responsibility for the loan and
began a “course of conduct .. . aimed at
misleading plaintiffs into believing that he would
attempt to secure additional working capital” when
his real purpose was to prepare for foreclosure on
the assets of the company and the personal assets
of the McMurtries. Id. at 243a-46a. To carry out
this plan, Donnelly “act{ed] for months on the
pretense of being a management consultant” (id.
at 248a) although he actually worked in the bank's
Asset Recovery Group. Id. at 245a-46a, 248a.
Donnelly promised to look into the question of
increased working capital, when in fact he had no
intention of doing so. Id. at 244a-46a. He also
requested that plaintiffs draft a “plan of attack”
for profitably operating the company, although he
was actually preparing for foreclosure. Id. at
245a-46a. Finaily, Donnelly undermined an
agreement for sale of the company during the
summer of 1988 by unreasonably delaying approval
of the transaction, and in September 1989 he
ordered Kehr to cease operations and liquidate. Id.
at 248a-49a. I stress that these are merely the
unproven factual allegations in the complaint, but
at the present stage we are bound to accept them
as true. In my view, these allegations sufficiently
allege a “pattern of racketeering activity.”
Il.
The RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § I96I(1) defines
“racketeering activity” to mean any of a long list
of predicate offenses, including mail fraud (18
U.S.C. § 1341). The statute states that a “pattern
of racketeering activity’ requires at least two acts
of racketeering activity” (18 U.S.C. § 196i(5))
EE
A-33
(emphasis added). The complaint in this case
alleges more than two such acts.
In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,
____~-U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 2893 (1989), the Supreme
Court held that a “pattern of racketeering activity”
must satisfy two additional requirements not
mentioned in the statute itself: “relatedness” and
“continuity.” I agree with the majority that the
complaint in the present case _ satisfied the
requirement of “relatedness,” and therefore the
sole remaining hurdle is the requirement - of
“continuity.”
In H.J. Inc., ___. U.S. at ___, 109 S.Ct. at 2902,
the Supreme Court explained that “[cjontinuity’ is
both a _ closed-and open-ended concept.” For
present purposes, I think it is helpful to discuss
these two concepts in reverse order.
The open-ended concept of continuity refers to
a series of predicate acts that is cut short, either
by law enforcement efforts or other intervening
events, but that threatened long-term criminal
conduct. Id. In H.J. Inc., the Court gave several
examples of how such threatened criminal conduct
may be shown. In some cases, the Court noted
(id.), it may be proven that the perpetrators
expressly threatened repeated acts of racketeering.
In other cases, the Court observed (id.). it may be
shown that the predicate offenses were part of an
ongoing entity’s regular way of doing business,
thus giving rise to the inference that such offenses
would have continued if not interrupted.
In addition to thesc examples provided by the
Supreme Court, several factors’ previously
identified by this court are useful in determining
whether a threat of future racketeering acts has
been alleged or shown. Factors such as the
number of unlawful acts, the number of
A-34
perpetrators, the number of victims, and the
character of unlawful activity (Barticheck v. Fidelity
Union Bank/First National State, 832 F.2d 36, 39
(3d Cir. 1987)) may be indicative of threatened
criminal conduct in particular cases. Based upon
all of these factors and examples, | fully agree with
the majority that the complaint in the present case
does not allege facts showing a threat of
racketeering activity extending beyond the end of
the completed scheme alleged. I therefore turn to
the concept of “closed-ended” continuity.
Although the discussion of this concept in HJ.
Inc. is brief, the Court's opinion makes clear, in
my view, that the predominant, if not sole,
consideration in determining whether a
closed-ended pattern has been alleged or proven
is the duration of the racketeering activity. The
Court stated flatly (__. U.S. at __, 109 S.Ct. at
2902) that “[a] party alleging a RICO violation may
demonstrate continuity over a closed period by
proving a series of related predicates extending
over a substantial period of time.” Likewise, the
Court observed (id.) that “[p]redicate acts extending
over a few weeks or months and threatening no
future criminal conduct do not satisfy this
requirement.” These statements do not seem to
leave room for anything other than a measurement
of the duration of the racketeering activity. To be
sure, the Court noted (id.) (emphasis added) that
continuity is “centrally a temporal concept,” thus
perhaps implying that the concept has another
peripheral component. The Court, however,
provided no clue regarding the nature of any such
additional component.
Whether or not closed-ended continuity contains
any such additional component, it seems clear that
several factors have no place in determining
A-35
whether closed-ended continuity has been alleged
or shown. First, the absence of any threat of future
racketeering activity is irrelevant in determining
whether closed-ended continuity is present. The
threat of future criminal activity is the essence of
open-ended continuity but has no bearing on
closed-ended continuity, which refers by definition
to repeated conduct that has fully run its course.
Second, many of the factors disted by this court
in Barticheck and related cases, with the obvious
exception of “the length of time” of the criminal
conduct (Barticheck, 832 F.2d at 39), have no
logical connection to closed-ended continuity. Cf.
Banks v. Wolk, No. 90-1278, slip op. at 12 (3d Cir.
Nov. 9, 1990) (“After H.J. Inc., we must focus on
these factors as they bear upon the separate
questions of continuity and relatedness.") Factors
such as the number of unlawful acts, the number
of perpetrators, the number of victims, the
similarity of the acts, and the societal harm
associated with the unlawful activity have nothing
to do with the duration of the racketeering activity.
In addition, these factors, with the exception of
the number of unlawful acts, are-—not logically
related to the ordinary meaning of the term
“continuous,” which refers to an “uninterrupted
extension= in space, time, or sequence.
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW —§ INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 493-94 (197]).
Since closed-ended continuity, as described in
H.J. Inc., is primarily a question of duration, it is
critical to zero in on the line between “a
substantial period of time,” which may satisfy H.J.
Inc., and “a few weeks or months,” which do not.
U.S. at __, 109 S.Ct. at 2902. In cases
decided after H.J. Inc., this court has upheld the
dismissal of complaints alleging racketeering
A-36
activity over closed-ended periods of less than
seven months (Marshall-Silver Construction Co.,
Inc. v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1990)) and
eight months (Banks v. Wolk, supra). Since these
periods aré substantially shorter than that alleged
in the present case, these precedents do not
control our decision here.
By contrast, in Swistock v. Jones, 884 F.2d 755,
759 (3d Cir. 1989) (emphasis added), the court held
that a complaint alleging predicate acts of wire and
mail fraud “over a period of approximately fourteen
months” was sufficient to show ‘either the
existence of a closed-ended period of repeated
conduct of sufficient length or a threat of
continuity. . . .” Although the majority attempts to
distinguish Swistock based on the presence in that
case of open-ended continuity (typescript at 15), I
believe the holding in Swistock rested on two
independent grounds. I read Swistock to hold that,
even without allegations suggesting the threat of
future criminal conduct, the alleged acts of wire
and mail fraud extending over 14 months satisfied
the pattern requirement by showing closed-ended
continuity. Because the complaint in the present
case alleges numerous acts of mail fraud extending
over an even longer period (19 months), Swistock
weighs in favor of reversal here.
The relevant legislative history points to the
same result. In concluding that the “pattern”
element necessitates proof of “continuity,” the
Svoreme Court relied’ primarily upon the following
passage from the Senate Report on RICO (S. Rep.
No. 91-617, at 158 (1969) (emphasis added):
l. HJ. Inc., U.S. at __, 109 S.Ct. at 2900. See also
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex.Co., 473 U.S. 479. 496 n.14, 105
S.Ct. 3275, 3285 n.14 (1985).
A-37
The target of [RICO] is . . . not sporadic activity.
The infiltration of legitimate business normally
requires more than one “racketeering activity”
and the threat of continuing activity to be
effective. It is this factor of continuity plus
relationship which combines to produce a
pattern.
This seminal passage appears to measure
“continuity” by reference to the period of time
normally required for the infiltration of legitimate
business. As the Supreme Court has recognized,
preventing the infiltration of legitimate business by
organized crime was the major objective expressed
during congressional consideration of the RICO
statute.”
In light of this legislative history, closed-ended
continuity should not require racketeering activity
extending over a longer period of time than
Congress felt would normally be required for the
infiltration of a legitimate business by means of
the various RICO predicates, such as murder,
kidnapping, arson, bribery, or fraud. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 196l1(1) and 1962(b). It would be anomalous to
construe the concept of closed-ended continuity so
narrowly that efficient campaigns to infiltrate
legitimate businesses — the heart of congressional
concern when RICO was originally enacted — are
excluded from the coverage of that concept. And
there is no reason to suppose that Congress felt
2. In United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (198])
(footnote omitted), the Court wrote:
[T]he legislative history forcefully supports the view
that the major purpose of [RICO] is to address the
infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime.
The point is made time and again during the debates
and in the hearings before the House and Senate.
A-38
such campaigns ordinarily take longer than 19
months (the period at issue here) or 14 months
(the period in Swistock). Accordingly, in my view,
the 19 month period alleged in this case
constituted, in the terminology of HJ. Inc., ___
U.S. at ___, 109 S.Ct. at 2902, a “substantial”
period of time, rather than “a few weeks or
months,” and _ thus satisfied closed-ended
continuity. :
III.
Although the complaint in this case alleges acts
of mail fraud extending over a period of 19 months,
the majority whittles this period down to eight
months. The majority achieves this result in two
stages. First, the majority concludes that in RICO
cases grounded on mail fraud predicates, the
duration of the racketeering activity should be
measured, not by the duration of the mail fraud
violations, which may be based on “innocent”
mailings, but by the duration of the “instances of
deceit.” Majority typescript at 16-20. Second, the
majority concludes that the only relevant
“instances of deceit” in this case are the alleged
misrepresentations of Cohen and Noon, because
the allegations against Donnelly, when viewed in
isolation, do not establish criminal conduct.
Majority typescript at 20-26. I disagree with both
parts of this analysis.
The first part of this analysis is inconsistent
with the plain language of the RICO statute. The
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), equates “racketeering
activity” with the listed predicate offenses.®
3. The statute provides in pertinent part (18 U.S.C. § 1961(1))
that “racketeering activity’ means any of a long list of
predicates, including “(B) any act which is indictable under
any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code:
. . section 1341 (relating to mail fraud).”
ee
A-39
Therefore the duration of racketeering activity for
the purpose of judging closed-ended continuity
must equal the duration of the related predicates.
Moreover, even if it were proper in a case with
mail fraud predicates to look beyond the duration
of the mail fraud violations and measure the
duration of the deceitful conduct, the focus of
inquiry should be on the fraudulent scheme, not
the repetition of fraudulent statements. If a
fraudulent scheme is launched convincingly, there
may be no need for a repetition of the fraudulent
statements made at the outset. But as long as the
scheme continues — as long as the original false
statements are left uncorrected and victims
continue to be deceived — the deceitful conduct
must be regarded as continuing. Under the
majority's analysis, the deceitful conduct in such
a case would apparently be regarded as finished
once the original false statements were made —
although the deceitful conduct would apparently
be regarded as continuing if the original false
statements were not entirely convincing and
therefore had to be repeated over and over. This
approach does not seem to make sense.‘
The second part of the majority’s analysis is also
flawed. The majority labors to show that if the
allegations against Cohen and Noon are
disregarded, the remaining factual allegations
4. The term “innocent mailings” confuses analysis of the
question before us. This is a term of art that was used in
Schmuck v. United States, ___ U.S. ____, 109 S.Ct. 1443 (1989),
and related cases to refer to mailings that contain no false
information but form part of the execution of the criminal
scheme. See ____ U.S. at ___, 109 S.Ct. at 1449. Since such
mailings help to execute the criminal scheme, they are not
really innocent.
A-40
against Donnelly would not establish that he
committed mail fraud; the majority then reasons
that the allegations against Donnelly should not
be considered in calculating the duration of the
deceitful activity. Majority typescript at 22-26.
In my view, there is no justification for
examining the specific allegations against Donnelly
_in isolation. Fairly read, the complaint alleges that
Cohen and Noon launched the fraudulent scheme
with outright misrepresentations and _ that
Donnelly later joined the scheme and perpetuated
it by means of statements and conduct that were
misleading in light of what Cohen and Noon had
said and done before. Consequently, I think it is
entirely artificial to judge Donnelly’s alleged
behavior without considering its claimed role in
the entire scheme.
In the present case, the complaint alleged that
the fraudulent scheme and the mailings in
furtherance of the scheme continued for 19
months. That period, I—believe, is ample to show
closed-ended continuity.
A True Copy:
Teste:
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
Sor the Third Circuit
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 90-1396
KEHR PACKAGES, INC.,
CHARLES and EMILY McMURTRIE,
and JAMES McMURTRIE,
Appellants
v.
FIDELCOR, INC.,
FIDELITY BANK, THOMAS DONNELLY,
NEIL COHEN, JAMES NOON, and MARIO GIANNINI, Esq.
(D.C. Civ. No. 89-06219)
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING
Present: SLOVITER, Chief Judge, BECKER, STAPLETON,
MANSMANN, GREENBERG, HUTCHINSON, SCIRICA,
NYGAARD and ALITO, Circuit Judges
The petition for rehearing filed by appellants in the above-
entitled case having been submitted to the judges who partici-
pated in the decision of this Court and to all the other available
circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service, and no
judge who concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing,
and a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit in regular
service not having voted for rehearing, the petition for rehearing
by the panel and the Court in banc, is denied.
BY THE COURT,
a
Circuit Judge
Dated: MAR 27 1991
A-42
| IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KEHR PACKAGES, INC., et al : Civil Action
Plaintiffs :
No. 89-6219
Vv.
FIDELCOR, INC. et al :
Defendants : FILED MAY 14 1990
ORDER
And now, this 14th day of May, 1990, upon consideration of
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs’ Response, and
Plaintiffs’) Motion to File an Amended Complaint and the
Responses of both sides, it is ORDERED that:
1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction is GRANTED; and
2. Plaintiffs’ Motion to File an Amended Complaint is
DENIED, because it fails to establish a valid claim under
18 U.S.C.A. §1961, et seq., and therefore fails to correct
the defects in the original complaint.
: \ |
* fase vp oy ALL
ROBERT F. KELLY, |
United States District Judge
FILED 5/15/90
CLERK OF COURT
ohne
A-43
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KEHR PACKAGES, et al. : Civil Action
Plaintiffs, — : No. 89-6219
Te
FIDELCOR, INC., et al. :
: FILED JUN 28 1990.
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
R.F. KELLY, J. JUNE 28, 1990
Kehr Packages, a plaintiff in this case, was a Pennsylvania
corporation located in Horsham, Pennsylvania which made
flexible packaging material made of paper and plastic film. Most
of what Kehr Packages made was used by businesses which in
turn produced meat, snack foods, and confectioneries. Charles
and James McMurtrie, who are also plaintiffs, purchased Kehr
Packages in 1986.
The McMurtries purchased Kehr Packages after obtaining a
loan from the Fidelity Bank, a defendant in this case. The
McMutrtries allege that the Fidelity Bank agreed to lend them
$4,165,000 to complete the purchase, including a $350,000 line
of credit which was to be used as “as working capital with which
to operate the business as an ongoing entity.”! Settlement on the
sale occurred on December 12, 1986.
Plaintiffs’ case arises out of what happened at the Decernber
12 settlement. Plaintiffs say the settlement was temporarily
disrupted when James McMurtrie, who was presumably looking
over the loan agreement, noticed that while the Bank was
providing a loan in the agreed-upon amount, the Bank was not
providing a $350,000 line of credit. At that point, the plaintiffs
1. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint,
Exhibit A (proposed amended complaint), p. 5.
A-44
“recessed the Settlement, and a conference was held” between
the McMurtries and two Bank officials.? Plaintiffs contend the
Bank “made an oral commitment to make an additional loan to
plaintiffs in the amount of approximately $185,000” to bring the
working capital up to $350,000. With assurances that “only the
paperwork” needed to be completed to obtain the additional
$185,000, the plaintiffs went ahead with the settlement.®
Plaintiffs maintain they never got the extra $185,000 de-
spite what was said at settlement, and contrary to “numerous”
phone conversations which took place from the time of settle-
ment through August 1987. Around that time, a new bank officer
was given responsibility for their loan,‘ a man plaintiffs thought
was “a high level Management Consultant who had lending
authority,” but who in reality worked in the Asset Recovery
Division, where “his function was to protect and/or recover
assets of Defendant Fidelity Bank and not to assist Plaintiffs in
operating their business.”5
The Bank declared Kehr Packages’ loans in default on July
20, 1988, an announcement which was made at a meeting the
plaintiffs attended along with a prospective buyer of the com-
pany. Plaintiffs contend this announcement was made “solely for
the purpose” of wrecking the proposed sale and as a result, the
deal fell through. Subsequently, the Bank ordered layoffs, a
cessation of operations, and a liquidation budget. The Bank then
seized the plaintiffs’ bank accounts and assets, executed or
attempted to execute judgments on their real estate, sold the
real estate and machinery of Kehr Packages, garnished rents due
another company owned by Charles and his wife, Emily Mc-
Murtrie, and forced all three McMurtries into bankruptcy.®
The plaintiffs claim that the Fidelity Bank never intended
to lend them the money for the working capital, but only
promised to do so in order to “induce Plaintiffs to complete the
settlement and to insure that Fidelity Bank would be the
2. Neil Cohen, a Commercial Loan Officer, and James Noon, a Vice-
President of Fidelity Bank. Both are defendants.
3. Plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint, p. 10.
4. Defendant Thomas Dounelly, a Vice-President of the Fidelity Bank.
5. Plaintiffs’ proposed amended comfiaint, p. 13.
6. Plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint, pp. 17-18.
aaa tai i
A-45
recipient of large monthly interest payments, profits, and col-
lateral of Plaintiffs.”? They further allege that when the Bank
mailed monthly invoices to the plaintiffs which set forth the
amounts of principal and interest due on the loans, the Bank
used the United States mails in furtherance of their unlawful
objectives. The plaintiffs filed this case on August 24, 1989 and
charged the defendants with violations of the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §1961
et. seq., and several pendent state claims including fraud,
misrepresentation, and breach of contract.®
The defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Because federal jurisdiction over this case
stands or falls on the adequacy of plaintiffs’ RICO allegations, I
examined only those allegations when I considered the defen-
dants’ motion. However, while I did consider the allegations
contained in plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint, which
were somewhat more specific than the original complaint, I
agree with defendants’ contention that the amended complaint
does nothing to expand the nature of plaintiffs’ claim to some-
thing which constitutes a valid claim under the RICO statutes.
The theory of plaintiffs’ case is this: the Fidelity Bank
agreed to lend us an amount of money so we cou!d buy Kehr
Packages. The Fidelity Bank did in fact lend us an amount of
money, but the amount of money allocated towards working
capital was $185,000 less than they agreed to provide. The
Fidelity Bank intentionally short-changed us by $185,000 be-
cause while they wanted us to proceed with the purchase of
Kehr Packages so they could collect substantial monthly pay-
ments on the loans, they also wanted us to default on our loans
so they could close down our business, liquidate our assets, and
drive us into bankruptcy.
7. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss, p. 7.
8. The original complaint contained counts alleging “tortious interfer-
ence with perspective,” “contractual relations,” breaches good faith and fair
dealing, fiduciary duty, express warranty, and promissory estoppel. Later, the
plaintiffs offered an amended complaint which dropped two of the original
defendants, two of the state claims, and attempted to plead with more
specificity the remaining claims, particularly the RICO claims.
A-46
The RICO statute imposes criminal and civil liability upon
those engaging in “prohibited activities,” which must include
proof of either “a pattern of racketeering activity” or “collection
of an unlawful debt.” H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone
Co., ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 2897 (1989). “Racke-
teering activity” can be any act indictable under a federal
statute. A “pattern” requires at least two predicate acts within a
10-year period. Id.
Plaintiffs attempted to satisfy the requirement of a racke-
teering act by alleging that the defendants committed mail fraud
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1341. The mail fraud statute provides
criminal penalties for devising “any scheme or artifice to de-
fraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” The statute
has been expansively construed to prohibit all schemes to
defraud by any means of misrepresentation that in some way
involves the use of the postal system. United States v. Boffa, 688
F.2d 919, 925 (38d Cir. 1982). Plaintiffs contend the bank’s
mailings of a monthly statement on the loan, and the plaintiffs’
payments by check through the mail constitute the predicate
acts of mail fraud. It would be fair to say that many Courts have
found this theory unconvincing. See United States v. Kreimer,
609 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1980); Blount Financial Services, Inc. v.
Walter E. Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1987); See also,
Marshall-Silver Construction Company, Inc. v. Mendel, 894
F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1990). In the Blount decision, the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated that a RICO plaintiff relying
on the mail fraud statute must allege false statements “rea-
sonably calculated to deceive a business entity . . . of ordinary
prudence and comprehension.” Blount, supra, at 153.
Plaintiffs offer no evidence to suggest the statements the
bank mailed out were inaccurate, or fraudulent in any way, or
even that the bank was not acting within its rights when
plaintiffs’ loan was declared in default. Their claims are based on
oral promises the defendants allegedly made, not the written
communications which passed between the parties. Transform-
ing the rather mundane act of a bank in mailing out a monthly
statement into an act of mail fraud, and from there into a
a
A-47
racketeering act, is more an exercise in creative lawyering than
an effective allegation in a RICO case.
It is clear the plaintiffs’ allegations are also lacking when
they are studied in light of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
recent decision in the Marshall-Silver case, which examined the
“continuity” element in a RICO case. As Judge Stapleton wrote,
“virtually every garden-variety fraud is accomplished through a
series of wire or mail fraud acts that are related by purpose and
are spread out over a period of at least several months.”
Marshall-Silver, supra, at 597. Given the “natural and common
sense approach” to RICO’s pattern element that the Supreme
Court pointed to in its decision in H.J. Inc., and the Court of
Appeals’ observation in Marshall-Silver that “it is unlikely that
Congress intended RICO to apply in the absence of a more
significant societal threat.” Id. at 596, it is clear the plaintiffs’
allegations do not support a RICO claim.
Plaintiffs allege the Fidelity Bank’s scheme to defraud took
place from December 1986 and is continuing to the present.
Even accepting the plaintiffs’ version of the facts as true, and
assuming the Fidelity Bank intended from the beginning of its
dealings with the McMurtries to lure them into a bottomless pit
of debt so they could foreclose on Kehr Packages and liquidate
its assets, there is nothing in this case which would establish
“long-term criminal conduct” of the sort the Supreme Court
described in H.J. Inc. . There is nothing here which would
indicate the threat of a repetition of criminal conduct in the
future, or a showing that what the Fidelity Bank did to the
plaintiffs was the Bank’s regular way of conducting its business.
H.J. Inc., supra, at 2906; see also Swistock v. Jones, 884 F.2d
755 (3d Cir. 1989). For these reasons, I granted defendants’
Motion to Dismiss on May 14, 1990.
BY THE COURT:
AFtcam 2 FEC
ROBERT F. KELLY, J.
United States District Judge
A-48
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KEHR PACKAGES, INC.
and
CHARLES and EMILY MCMURTRIE
and : CIVIL ACTION
JAMES MCMURTRIE : NO. 89-6219
vs.
FIDELITY BANK, N.A. :
and : JURY TRIAL
THOMAS DONNELLY ; DEMANDED
and
NEIL COHEN
and
JAMES NOON
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs, by their attorneys, Pietro A. Barbieri, Esquire,
and Joel Harvey Slomsky, Esquire, respectfully state as follows:
PARTIES
1. Plaintiff, Kehr Packages, Inc., is a Pennsylvania corpo-
ration, which conducted its business from its corporate head-
quarters at 1196 Easton Road, Horsham, Pennsylvania 19044,
until about January, 1989. The company manufactured flexible
packaging material made of paper and plastic film, principally for
the meat, snack food and confectionery industries.
2. Plaintiff, Charles McMurtrie, resides at 1423 Schwenk.
mill Road, Perkasie, Pennsylvania 18944, and at all times
relevant was a principal and fifty per cent (50%) shareholder of
the corporation, Kehr Packages, Inc.
3. Plaintiff, James McMurtrie, resides at 2220 Hendrick
Station Road, Woxall, Pennsylvania 18979, and at all times
relevant was a principal and fifty per cent (50%) shareholder of
the corporation, Kehr Packages, Inc.
A-49
4. Plaintiff, Emily McMurtrie, is the wife of Plaintiff
Charles McMurtrie and resides at 1423 Schwenkmill Road,
Perkasie, Pennsylvania 18944.
5. Defendant, Fidelity Bank, N.A. (hereinafter “Fidelity
Bank), has its principal place of business at 1200 East Lancaster
Avenue, Rosemont, Pennsylvania, and is a national banking
association organized and existing under the laws of the United
States.
6. Fidelcor, Inc., was a bank holding company duly orga-
nized and existing under the laws of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania and had its principal place of business located at
1200 East Lancaster Avenue, Rosemont, Pennsylvania.
7. On February 29, 1988 Fidelcor Inc. merged with First
Fidelity Bancorporation, a bank holding company duly orga-
nized and existing under the laws of the State of New Jersey
which had its principal offices located in the State of New Jersey.
8. As a result of the merger on February 29, 1988, the
holding company First Fidelity Bancorporation was formed.
This holding company is duly organized and existing under the
laws of the State of New Jersey and has its principal offices
located at 550 Broad Street, Newark, New Jersey.
9. Defendant, Thomas Donnelly, is a Vice-President of
Defendant Fidelity Bank, and his place of business is located at
Broad and Walnut Streets, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. At all
times relevant hereto, Defendant Thomas Donnelly was an
agent, employee, servant, and/or officer of Fidelity Bank and
employed in the Asset Recovery Group of the Loan Adminis-
tration Division, and was acting within the scope of his employ-
ment and on behalf of Defendant Fidelity Bank.
10. Defendant, Neil Cohen, was a Commercial Loan Of-
ficer employed by Defendant Fidelity Bank and his place of
business was located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. At all times
relevant hereto, Defendant Neil Cohen was an agent, em-
ployee, servant and/or officer of Defendant, Fidelity Bank and
employed in the Commercial Loan Division, and was acting
within the scope of his employment and on behalf of Defendant
Fidelity Bank.
11. Defendant, James Noon, was a Vice-President of De-
fendant Fidelity Bank, and his place of business was located in
A-50
Philadciphia, Pennsylvania. At all times relevant hereto, Defen-
dant James Noon was an agent, employee, servant and/or officer
of Defendant Fidelity Bank, and was acting within the scope of
his employment and on behalf of Defendant Fidelity Bank.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
12. This Court has jurisdiction over the RICO causes of
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 and 18 U.S.C.
Section 1964(c).
13. This Court has jurisdiction over the remaining causes of
action under principles of Pendent Jurisdiction.
14. Venue of this suit is proper in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1965(a) and 28
U.S.C. Section 1391(b), in that the claims arose in this district
and all Defendants or their agents reside in, are found in or
transact business in this district.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
15. On or about December 12, 1986, Plaintiffs, James and
Charles McMurtrie, entered into an Agreement of Sale to
purchase the corporate entity Kehr Packages, Inc., along with
all of its real, personal or mixed property, assets and stock.
16. In order to finance the sale described in the preceding
paragraph, Plaintiffs, James and Charles McMurtrie, on or about
November 7, 1986 made application to Defendant, Fidelity
Bank, for financing necessary to complete the purchase and to
provide Plaintiffs with at least a ($350,000.00) Three Hundred
Fifty Thousand Dollar line of credit to be used as working capital
with which to operate the business as an ongoing entity.
17. Plaintiffs requested financing from Defendant Fidelity
Bank in the amount of ($4,165,000) Four Million One Hundred
Sixty-Five Thousand Dollars which was to be used as follows:
1) $3,750,000 to purchase the stock of Kehr Packages, Inc.
2) $350,000 to replace the existing line of credit as working
capital
3) $65,000 to finance estimated closing costs.
A-51
18. Defendant Fidelity Bank agreed to finance the acquisi-
tion of Kehr Packages, Inc. by Plaintiffs James and Charles
McMurtrie under the terms described in the preceding para-
graphs. The loan was approved by Defendants Neil Cohen,
James Noon and their superiors, all of whom had either nego-
tiated the financing to be provided by Defendant Fidelity Bank
or had been involved in reviewing the terms of the loan.
19. Defendants Neil Cohen and James Noon acted on
behalf of themselves and Defendant Fidelity Bank, in placing
the loan, in structuring the loan and in obtaining collateral from
Plaintiffs to secure the loan.
20. With full knowledge of Defendants, the proceeds of the
loan were used to purchase the shares and assets of Kehr
Packages, Inc. through a leveraged buyout (LBO). A leverage
buyout is defined here as a transaction where the bank customer
has acquired the majority of stock and assets of another company
by having the transaction financed one hundred per cent by the
bank, resulting in the customer having a debt equal to the
amount of the financing.
21. Defendants Cohen and Noon structured the terms of
the loan to conform to the procedures, policies and require-
ments of Defendant Fidelity Bank. The essential terms relevant
here were as follows:
a) A credit line in the amount of $600,000 was ap-
proved and secured by accounts receivable and
inventory.
b) A term loan in the amount of $2,175,000 was
approved with a (5) five year maturity and secured
by machinery and equipment.
c) A term loan in the amount of $750,000 was ap-
proved with a (5) five year maturity and secured by
real estate owned by Charles and Emily McMurtrie
as husband and wife.
d) A term loan in the amount of $640,000 was ap-
proved with a (7) seven year maturity and secured
by the land and building owned by Kehr Packages,
Inc. as well as another property known as “Aamco”
A-52
owned by Charles and Emily McMurtrie as hus-
band and wife.
e) All loans were also secured by personal guarantees
of Charles, James and Emily McMurtrie in the
amount of $4,000,000 each.
22. The value of the collateral pledged by Plaintiffs ex-
ceeded the value of the $4,165,000 loan by at least $250,000.
23. The $600,000 line of credit made available was to be
used specifically to finance all closing costs, to pay off all existing
bank debts of Kehr Packages, Inc. incurred by the prior owner,
and to provide a $350,000 line of credit as working capital to
Plaintiff Kehr Packages Inc. under the new owners, Plaintiffs
James and Charles McMurtrie.
24. The various amounts of money ultimately lent to
Plaintiffs was the result of Defendants’ estimate of those funds
necessary to consummate the purchase of Kehr Packages, Inc.
and to provide it with sufficient working capital in order to
operate the business.
25. Defendants, Fidelity Bank, Neil Cohen and James
Noon, knew that after settlement Kehr Packages, Inc. would be
required to generate sufficient sales and income in order to pay
to Defendant Fidelity Bank minimurn monthly payments to-
wards the loans of at least $50,000, for a yearly total payment of
at least $600,000.
26. The purchase of the company by James and Charles
McMurtrie and the financing of the purchase by Defendant
Fidelity Bank occurred on December 12, 1986. Present at
settlement were Plaintiffs, James, Charles and Emily McMur-
trie and Defendants, Neil Cohen and James Noon, acting on
behalf of themselves and Defendant Fidelity Bank.
27. At the settlement described in the preceding para-
graph, and prior to its completion, Plaintiff James McMurtrie
discovered that there were insufficient funds to complete the
transaction and fund the minimum amount of working capital as
described in Paragraph 17 in that $350,000 would not be
available as working capital to operate Kehr Packages, Inc.
Plaintiff James McMurtrie informed Defendants Cohen and
Noon that unless he had $350,000 in working capital by way of
A-53
the credit line, he could not operate Kehr Packages, Inc. at a
profit and would not agree to complete the settlement and
purchase of the company.
28. Defendants Cohen, Noon and Fidelity Bank knew at
that time, based upon financial information made available to
them by Plaintiffs and their own financial projections, that Kehr
Packages, Inc. would operate at a cash deficit for 1987. For this
reason the necessity of a minimum working capital of $350,000
was even more evident. In fact, the business was doomed to fail
without the full amount of working capital.
29. Plaintiffs, James and Charles McMurtrie, recessed the
Settlement, and a conference was held among Plaintiffs, James
and Charles McMurtrie, and Defendants Neil Cohen and James
Noon. At that time and during the conference, Defendants Neil
Cohen and James Noon on behalf of themselves and Defendant
Fidelity Bank made an oral commitment to make an additional
loan to Plaintiffs in the amount of approximately $185,000 in
order to provide Plaintiffs with a total of $350,000 in working
capital which was to be secured by existing collateral already
pledged.
30. The transaction to bring the credit line up to the amount
of $350,000 in working capital was to be accomplished by the
creation of a new term note in the approximate amount of
$185,000, the proceeds of which were to be placed in the line of
credit to bring the working capital up to $350,000.
31. Thereafter, and in reliance upon the commitment of
Defendants Neil Cohen and James Noon, Plaintiffs James and
Charles McMurtrie, now doing business through their corpora-
tion, Plaintiff Kehr Packages, Inc., began the operation of their
business. This undertaking was initiated in reliance by Plaintiffs
on the oral contract of Defendants Noon, Cohen and Fidelity
Bank that the additional $185,000 was available and only the
paperwork had to be completed to place the funds in the line of
credit.
32. From December 12, 1986, the day of settlement,
through August, 1987, Plaintiff James McMurtrie had numerous
telephone conversations with either Defendants Neil Cohen or
James Noon in which Mr. McMurtrie requested that the
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additional $185,000 be made available as committed by Defen-
dants. Mr. McMurtrie was informed each time by Defendants
Noon and Cohen that the money was available as relied upon.
33. In fact, at no time did Defendants Noon or Cohen
intend to fulfill their oral commitment to lend the additional
monies to Kehr Packages, Inc. as working capital, but, in fact,
made such commitments in order to induce Plaintiffs to com-
plete the settlement and to insure that Defendant Fidelity Bank
. would be the recipient of large monthly interest payments,
profits and collateral of Plaintiffs, all to the benefit of Defen-
dants, Noon, Cohen and Fidelity Bank, and the parent holding
company.
34. In furtherance of the scheme and artifice to defraud
Plaintiffs, and in furtherance of its objectives as described in the
preceding paragraph and those that follow, from December,
1986 to July, 1988, Defendants used the United States mails to
mail from Fidelity Bank to Kehr Packages, Inc. monthly invoices
setting forth the amounts of principal and interest due and owing
on each of the loans made to Kehr Packages, Inc. and caused to
be mailed from Kehr Packages, Inc. to Fidelity Bank checks
reflecting amounts in payment of principal and interest on the
loans.
35. By April and August, 1987, respectively, Defendants
Cohen and Noon left their employment at Fidelity Bank and
responsibility for the Kehr Packages, Inc. loan file was turned
over to a Commercial Loan Officer named James Hayes.
_ 86. Thereafter, and within a few weeks of his assuming
responsibility for the loan, in or about September, 1987, Mr.
Hayes turned responsibility of the Kehr Packages, Inc. loan over
to Thomas Donnelly, a Vice-President of Pefendant Fidelity
Bank.
37. At this point Plaintiff James McMurtrie repeatedly
demanded that Defendants Donnelly and Fidelity Bank comply
with the agreement to fund the line of credit to provide working
capital of $350,000.
38. In response to these demands of Plaintiff James
McMurtrie, Defendant Donnelly promised in person and dur-
ing numerous telephone conversations that he would review the
credit file and terms and conditions of the loans to determine
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whether additional funds would be advanced by Defendant
Fidelity Bank towards the line of credit as working capital.
39. In this regard, Mr. Donnelly told Plaintiff James
McMurtrie that he would have another appraisal done on the
machinery and equipment of Kehr Packages, Inc. Mr. Donnelly
also told Plaintiff James McMurtrie to draft a “plan of attack” for
1988 to show him how the company could be turned around
financially and make a profit if infused with additional working
capital in combination with cuts in salaries, personnel and other
expenses. P.
40. Plaintiffs in good faith complied with the requests of
Defendant Donnelly and had the reappraisal done and prepared
a “plan of attack” for 1988.
41. Neither Defendant Donnelly nor anyone else employed
by or acting on behalf of Defendant Fidelity Bank ever informed
Plaintiffs that Mr. Donnelly worked in the Asset Recovery
Group of the Loan Administration Division and his function was
to protect and/or recover assets of Defendants Fidelity Bank and
not to assist Plaintiffs in operating their business. Mr. Donnelly
had no lending authority and was not a Commercial Loan
Officer. Plaintiffs at all times believed that Mr. Donnelly was a
high level Management Consultant who had lending authority.
42. Unbeknownst to Plaintiffs, Mr. Donnelly had a
“knockdown” appraisal done on the equipment and machinery
in order to determine the liquidation value of these assets. The
“plan of attack” was another part of the course of conduct of Mr.
Donnelly aimed at misleading Plaintiffs into believing that he
would attempt to secure additional working capital. In fact, atno .
time, did Defendant Donnelly ever intend to assist Plaintiffs in
obtaining additional working capital.
43. Plaintiffs did not learn that Mr. Donnelly was working
for the Asset Recovery Unit until after the bank declared the
loans in default in July, 1988.
44. In fact, Defendant Donnelly’s strategy with respect to
this loan was to lull Plaintiffs into a: false sense of security in
believing that Defendant Fidelity Bank would fund additional
working capital when, in fact, his real purpose was to secure the
position of the bank against the existing collateral and personal
guarantees of Plaintiffs. Mr. Donnelly knew from his review of
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the file that without the additional working capital Kehr Pack-
ages, Inc. could not survive financially and would be forced to
terminate its operations.
45. Defendants’ scheme as described in the preceding
paragraphs continued through 1988 and to the present. On
December 2 and December 9, 1987, Defendant Donnelly on
behalf of himself and Defendant Fidelity Bank, in furtherance of
the scheme and artifice to defraud, used the United States Postal
Service to mail to Plaintiffs two letters in regard to payments of
interest and principal. On July 20, 1988, Defendant Donnelly,
on behaif of himself and Defendant Fidelity Bank, in further-
ance of the scheme and artifice to defraud, used the United
States Postal Service to mail to Plaintiffs a “Notice of Default,
and confessed judgments against the properties pledged as
collateral for the loans. Defendant Donnelly also used the
United States Postal Service to mail to Plaintiffs other letters and
mail matter in furtherance of the scheme and artifice to defraud.
46. As a direct and proximate result of the actions of
Defendants, Plaintiff Kehr Packages, Inc. was underfinanced
and could not meet its expenses, including the repayment of the
debt to Fidelity Bank, and payment for sufficient raw materials
to produce adequate amounts of inventory and finished goods for
sale in order to operate the company and make a profit.
47. Defendant Fidelity Bank’s parent holding companies,
Fidelcor Inc. and First Fidelity Bancorporation, conducted and
continues to conduct an internal loan audit review which
monitors and rates the loans of its subsidiaries. The loan review
group of the parent holding company is independent of the
lending units and management structure of subsidiary Fidelity
Bank.
48. As a direct result of the audit of the loan to Kehr
Packages, Inc. described herein conducted by the audit review
group of Fidelcor Inc. and First Fidelity Bancorporation, credit
reports were prepared which were relied upon by some and/or
all defendants in implementing the scheme to defraud Plaintiffs.
49. In view of the deteriorating financial position of Kebr
Packages, Inc., by the summer of 1988 a buyer or investor was
sought to purchase the company.
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50. Plaintiffs obtained a ready, willing and able buyer
and/or investor for Kehr Packages, Inc. and, upon demand of
Defendants Donnelly and Fidelity Bank, Plaintiffs were re-
quired to present the buyers or investors to Defendants Don-
nelly and Fidelity Bank. Plaintiffs complied with Defendants’
demand and on July 20, 1988 a meeting was held with the
prospective buyer and its principals.
51. At the meeting, Defendant Donnelly announced that
Defendant Fidelity Bank was calling the loans due, which had
been placed on a “demand” basis, and declaring Plaintiffs in
default in repaying the loans. Furthermore, it was announced
for the first time by Defendant Donnelly that he had been acting
for months on the pretense of being a management consultant,
when in fact, he was a Vice-President of Fidelity Bank's “Asset
Recovery Group.”
52. In spite of these announcements, which were made
solely for the purpose of prejudicing the proposed right to
transfer the corporate stock, the buyer of corporate stock and
investor continued in the transaction. The buyer offered terms
that would ‘save the corporation from financial ruin and at the
same time cure the default. The terms of the transfer of stock
were such as to provide the bank with additional security,
without prejudicing its creditor position.
53. Despite knowing that time was of the essence and that
the buyer had a specific deadline in purchasing the stock and
completing the transaction, Defendant Donnelly on his own
behalf and on behalf of Defendant Fidelity Bank requested time
to evaluate its position with regard to the transfer by doing an
expedited due diligence investigation of the buyer.
54. Thereafter, Defendant Donnelly and Fidelity Bank
unreasonably delayed their approval of the transaction, causing
the Agreement of Sale to lapse and the buyer to withdraw its
offer and causing further damage to Plaintiffs.
55. In September, 1988, Defendant Donnelly contacted
Plaintiffs and further exercised contro] over Plaintiff Kehr
Packages, Inc. by ordering the layoff of key personnel, the
cessation of all current operations, and the submission of a
liquidetion budget.
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56. Pursuant to the Defendants’ scheme to defraud, which
is continuing to the present, Defendants have seized personal
bank accounts and assets of Plaintiffs Charles, James and Emily
McMurtrie; have executed and attempted to execute judgments
on the real estate of Charles and Emily McMurtrie; have sold
the real estate and machinery and equipment of Kehr Packages,
Inc., garnished rents due a company which is two-thirds owned
by Charles and Emily McMurtrie, and forced Plaintiffs James,
Charles and Emily McMurtrie to declare bankruptcy.
COUNT I
RICO — 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1962(a)
57. Paragraphs 1 through 56 of this Complaint are incorpo-
rated by reference as though fully set forth herein.
58. As described above, Defendants, jointly and severally,
knowingly and wilfully devised or intended to devise a scheme
and artifice to defraud, or to obtain money or property of
Plaintiff by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, represen-
tations and promises, and in furtherance thereof used and
caused to be used the United States mails in violation of 18
U.S.C. Sections 1341 and 2. Defendants participated in the
scheme and artifice to defraud with knowledge of its fraudulent
nature and with specific intent to defraud Plaintiffs.
59. The acts of mail fraud as described in paragraphs 15 to
56 of this Complaint committed by each Defendant constitute
acts of racketeering activity within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.
Section 1961(1).
60. Defendants Fidelity Bank, Thomas Donnelly, Neil
Cohen and James Noon are “persons” as that term is defined in
18 U.S.C. Section 1961(3).
61. Fidelity Bank, and the parent bank holding companies,
Fidelcor, Inc. and First Fidelity Bancorporation, and the Com-
mercial Loan Department and Asset Recovery Group, together
were all associated in fact and formed an enterprise as defined in
18 U.S.C. Section 1961(4).
62. At all times relevant to this Complaint, each Defendant
was associated with the aforementioned enterprise, the activities
A-59
of which affected interstate commerce. The enterprise bene-
fitted from the pattern of racketeering activity described herein.
63. From in or about December, 1986 through the present,
Defendants Fidelity Bank, Thomas Donnelly, Neil Cohen and
James Noon received or caused to be received income derived
directly or indirectly from the pattern of racketeering activity in
which they participated as principals or as aiders and abettors
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. Section 2. These funds
consisted of the payments of interest and principal to Fidelity
Bank by Plaintiffs and other funds obtained by Defendants from
Plaintiffs pursuant to collection procedures after declaring the
loans in default.
64. Defendants, individually and/or in conspiracy with each
other, used and/or invested proceeds of the aforementioned
income, directly or indirectly, in the operation of the enterprise
described in paragraph 61 in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section
1962(a).
65. Plaintiffs have been injured in their business and
property by reason of Defendants’ violation of 18 U.S.C. Section
1962(a).
66. As a proximate cause of Defendants’ violation of 18
U.S.C. Section 1962(a), Plaintiffs, Kehr Packages, Inc., James
McMurtrie and Charles and Emily McMurtrie have suffered
and will continue to suffer damages for which Defendants are
liable.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, Kehr Packages, Inc., James
McMurtrie and Charles and Emily McMurtrie request that
judgment be entered in their favor and against all Defendants,
jointly and severally, in the amount of at least ($6,000,000) Six
Million Dollars, which constitutes actual damages to Plaintiffs,
treble damages which would amount to at least ($18,000,000)
Eighteen Million Dollars, reasonable attorney's fees, costs of
this suit and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the
highest lawful rate, all as allowed under 18 U.S.C. Section
1964(c).
A-60
COUNT II
RICO — 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1962(b)
67. Paragraphs 1 through 66 of the Complaint are incorpo-
rated by reference as though fully set forth herein.
68. From in or about December, 1986 through the present,
Defendants Fidelity Bank, Thomas Donnelly, Neil Cohen and
James Noon, individually and/or in conspiracy with each other,
acquired and/or maintained, directly and indirectly, an interest
in and control of the enterprise described in paragraph 61
through the aforementioned pattern of racketeering activity in
violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(b).
69. Plaintiffs have been injured in their business and
property by reason of Defendants’ violation of 18 U.S.C. Section
1962(b).
70. As a proximate cause of Defendants’ violation of 18
U.S.C. Section 1962(b), Plaintiffs, Kehr Packages, Inc., James
McMurtrie and Charles and Emily McMurtrie have suffered
and will continue to suffer damages for which Defendants are
liable.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, Kehr Packages, Inc., James
McMurtrie and Charles and Emily McMurtrie request that
judgment be entered in their favor and against all Defendants,
jointly and severally, in the amount of at least ($6,000,000) Six
Million Dollars, which constitutes actual damages to Plaintiffs,
treble damages which would amount to at least ($18,000,000)
Eighteen Million Dollars, reasonable attorney's fees, costs of
this suit and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the
highest lawful rate, all as allowed under 18 U.S.C. Section
1964(c).
COUNT III
RICO — 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1962(c)
71. Paragraphs 1 through 70 of the Complaint are incorpo-
rated by reference as though fully set forth herein.
72. From in or about December, 1986 through the present,
Defendants, Fidelity Bank, Thomas Donnelly, Neil Cohen and
James Noon, individually and/or in conspiracy with each other,
A-61
conducted and/or participated in the affairs of the enterprise
described in Paragraph 61 through the aforementioned pattern
of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(c).
73. Plaintiffs have been injured in their business and
property by reason of Defendants’ violation of 18 U.S.C. Section
1962(c).
74. As a proximate cause of Defendants’ violation of 18
U.S.C. Section 1962(c), Plaintiffs, Kehr Packages, Inc., James
McMurtrie and Charles and Emily McMurtrie have suffered
and will continue to suffer damages for which Defendants are
liable.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, Kehr Packages, Inc., James
McMurtrie and Charles and Emily McMurtrie request that
judgment be entered in their favor and against all Defendants,
jointly and severally, in the amount of at least ($6,000,000) Six
Million Dollars, which constitutes actual damages to the Plain-
tiffs, treble damages which would amount to at least
($18,000,000) Eighteen Million Dollars, reasonable attorney’s
fees, costs of this suit, and pre-judgment and post-judgment
interest at the highest lawful rate, all‘ as allowed under 18 U.S.C.
Section 1964(c).
COUNT IV
RICO — 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1962(d)
75. Paragraphs 1 through 74 of this Complaint are incorpo-
rated by reference as though fully set forth herein.
76. From in or about December 1986 through the present,
Defendants Fidelity Bank, Thomas Donnelly, Neil Cohen and
James Noon, and others combined, conspired, confederated and
agreed to commit violations of 18 U.S.C. Sections 1962(a), (b)
and (c) as set forth above.
77. It was the plan, purpose and object of the conspiracy to
injure Plaintiffs in their business and property as fully described
in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.
78. In furtherance of the conspiracy, Defendants commit-
ted overt acts as described in preceding paragraphs of this
Complaint through the roles each Defendant occupied in the
conspiracy as aforementioned.
A-62
79. Plaintiffs have been injured in their business and
property by reason of Defendants’ violation of 18 U.S.C. Section
1962(d).
80. As a proximate cause of Defendants’ violation of 18
U.S.C. Section 1962(d), Plaintiffs; Kehr Packages, Inc., James
McMurtrie and Charles and Emily McMurtrie have suffered
and will continue to suffer damages for which Defendants are
liable.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, Kehr Packages, Inc., James
McMurtrie and Charles and Emily McMurtrie request that
judgment be entered in their favor and against all Defendants,
jointly and severally, in the amount of at least ($6,000,000) Six
Million Dollars, which constitutes actual damages to the Plain-
tiffs, treble damages which would amount to at least
($18,000,000) Eighteen Million Dollars, reasonable attorney’s
fees, costs of this suit and pre-judgment and post-judgment
interest at the highest lawful rate, all as allowed under 18 U.S.C.
Section 1964(c).
COUNT V:
FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION
81. Paragraph 1 through 80 of this Complaint are incorpo-
rated herein by reference and realleged as though fully set forth
herein.
82. Defendants have intentionally and with reckless disre-
gard for the truth made material misrepresentations to Plaintiffs.
By virtue of the conduct described above, Defendants, Fidelity
Bank, Thomas Donnelly, Neil Cohen and James Noon, individ-
ually and in conspiracy with each other, have committed fraud
and misrepresentations against Plaintiffs, Kehr Packages, Inc.,
James McMurtrie, and Charles and Emily McMurtrie.
83. Defendants commission of fraud and misrepresentation
was intentional, willful and malicious. Defendants’ misrepresen-
tations, omissions and fraudulent conduct included, among
other things, the following:
a) Defendants Cohen and Noon repeatedly orally
committed to Plaintiff James McMurtrie to provide Plaintiff
¢
A-63
Kehr Packages, Inc. with an additional line of credit in
order to afford the company a working capital of $350,000,
when in fact, they never intended to do so.
b) Defendant Donnelly failed to disclose to Plaintiffs
that he was employed by the Asset Recovery Group and
- that his responsibility was to protect and recover collatera-
lized assets and not to advance additional loans to Plaintiffs
and assist them in the operation of Kehr Packages, Inc.
c) Defendant Donnelly failed to disclose that he had no
lending authority and in fact, led Plaintiffs to believe
otherwise.
d) Defendant Donnelly repeatedly told Plaintiff James
McMurtrie that Donnelly would determine whether addi-
tional working capital could be advanced to Kehr Packages,
Inc. after an appraisal was done on the machinery and
equipment when, in fact, he never intended to lend any
additional funds to the company.
e) Defendant Donnelly failed to disclose to Plaintiffs
that this appraisal was also a “knockdown” appraisal and
done for the sole purpose of determining the value of the
items at a liquidation sale.
f) Defendant Donnelly repeatedly told Plaintiff James
McMurtrie that if Mr. McMurtrie submitted a “plan of
attack” for 1988 appropriate to Defendant Fidelity Bank,
Donnelly would determire whether additional working
capital would be advanced to Kehr Packages, Inc. when, in
fact, he never intended to lend additional funds to the
company.
84. Plaintiffs relied to their detriment on Defendants’
material misrepresentations and omissions and was deceived by
Defendants’ fraudulent conduct. As a result of Defendants’
fraudulent actions, Plaintiffs were fraudulently induced and
coerced, among other things, to:
a) Rely upon Fidelity Bank and its agents and employ-
ees to fund the line of credit to provide $350,000 in working
capital.
A-64
b) Continue the operation of Kehr Packages, Inc. to
their financial detriment when Defendants had no intention
of providing the $350,000 working capital.
c) Expend considerable time and money to preserve
the business and defend against the fraudulent actions of
Defendants.
85. Had Plaintiffs known of the material falsity of Defen-
dants’ misrepresentations and the material omissions and had
Plaintiffs been aware of Defendants’ fraudulent and deceitful
conduct, Plaintiffs would:
a) Not have purchased the shares and assets of Kehr
Packages, Inc., and
b) Have taken steps to protect Plainti%s’ financial
investment in Kehr Packages, Inc. at an earlier stage.
86. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ misrep-
resentations, material omissions and fraudulent conduct, Plain-
tiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer damages for which
Defendants are liable.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the
Court enter judgment in their favor and against al! Defendants,
jointly and severally, awarding compensatory and punitive
damages, costs of the lawsuit, reasonable attorneys fees, interest
and other relief as the Court deems appropriate, all in accor-
dance with the request for judgment set forth in Count I.
COUNT VI
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
87. Paragraphs 1 through 86 of the Complaint are incorpo-
rated by reference and reallaged as though fully set forth herein.
88. Defendants, their agents, employees and/or servants,
negligently and recklessly made false representations concern-
ing material facts and failed to disclose the said material facts
where they had a duty to do so. The material facts Defendants
misrepresented are set forth in paragraph 83 above.
ll
A-65
89. Plaintiffs relied to their detriment on the material
misrepresentations and omissions made by Defendants as set
forth in paragraph 84 above.
90. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ negli-
gent and reckless misrepresentations and omissions, the Plain-
tiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer damages for which
Defendants are liable.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the
Court enter judgment in their favor and against all Defendants,
jointly and severally, awarding compensatory and punitive
damages, costs of the lawsuit, reasonable attorneys fees, interest
and other relief as the Court deems appropriate, all in accor-
dance with the request for judgment set forth in Count I.
COUNT VII
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
91. Paragraphs 1 through 90 of this Complaint are incorpo-
rated by reference and realleged as though fully forth herein.
92. By virtue of the aforementioned actions and by failing to
act within a reasonable time frame with respect to the prospec-
tive sale of Kehr Packages, Inc. to a ready, willing and able
buyer, Defendants Fidelity Bank and Thomas Donnelly know-
ingly, wilfully and maliciously invaded and interfered with the
contractual relationship of Plaintiff Kehr Packages, Inc. and the
prospective buyer.
93. Defendants Fidelity Bank a" Thomas Donnelly did
further interfere with the contractual relations between Plaintiff
Kehr Packages, Inc. and the prospective buyer by making the
aforementioned prejudicial remarks set forth above in paragraph
51 at the meeting among the Plaintiffs, Defendants and the
prospective buyer. These actions were made by the Defendants
willfully, wantonly, maliciously and with full knowledge of the
damage to be created by the actions and statements of the
Defendants.
94. Additionally, and because of the unreasonable delay by
Defendant Fidelity Bank and its agents and employees in
approving the sale of Kehr Packages, Inc., and the financial
A-66
arrangements proposed to Defendants by the buyer and Plain-
tiffs, the latter were unable to consummate a sale of the
corporation in 1988 and prevent the termination of the operation
of Kehr Packages, Inc. and its financial ruin.
95. As a direct and proximate cause of the actions, inaction
and the statements of Defendants, Fidelity Bank and their
agents, employees and/or servants, all of which were malicious
and intentional, Plaintiffs, Kehr Packages, Inc., James McMur-
trie, and Charles and Emily McMurtrie suffered loss of a
contractual relation between Kehr Packages, Inc. and a bona
fide purchaser resulting in damages for which the Defendants
are liable.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the
Court enter judgment in their favor and against all Defendants,
jointly and severally, awarding compensatory and punitive
damages, costs of the lawsuit, reasunable attorneys fees, interest
and other relief as the Court deems appropriate, all in accor-
dance with the request for judgment set forth in Count I.
COUNT VIII
BREACH OF DEFENDANTS’ DUTY OF
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
96. Paragraphs 1 through 95 of this Complaint are incorpo-
rated by reference and realleged as though fully set forth herein.
97. Defendants have breached its covenants of good faith
and fair dealing owed to Plaintiffs under its contractual and other
relationships with Plaintiff by:
a) Creating an inherently unequai bargaining position
to the detriment of Plaintiffs who were required to rely
upon Defendants for sufficient funds as working capital with
which to operate Kehr Packages, Inc.
b) Taking advantage of Plaintiffs’ vulnerable financial
position existing by reason of Defendants’ failure to provide
sufficient funds as working capital with which to operate
Kehr Packages, Inc.
A-67
c) Refusing to provide truthful and honest replies to
Defendants James McMurtrie’s request for additional fi-
nancing so that there was $350,000 in working capital with
which to operate the business.
d) Failing to protect Plaintiffs’ property and assets by
timely approving the sale of Kehr Packages, Inc. when
Defendants Fidelity Bank and Thomas Donnelly knew that
time was of the essence Or the sale would not be consum-
mated by the buyer. -
e) Failing to disclose that Defendant Thomas Donnelly
was an employee in the Asset Recovery Group with no
lending authority.
Defendants intentional failure to do the acts set forth in the
100. As a direct and proximate cause of the Plaintiffs’
reasonable reliance upon Defendants’ good faith obligations,
Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer damages for
which the Defendants are liable.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the
Court enter judgment in their favor and against all Defendants,
jointly and severally, awarding compensatory and punitive
damages, costs of the lawsuit, reasonable attorneys fees, interest
and other relief as the Court deems appropriate, all in accor-
dance with the request for judgment set forth in Count I.
COUNT IX
BREACH OF CONTRACT
101. Paragraphs 1 through 100 of this Complaint are
incorporated by reference and reallaged as though fully set forth
herein.
A-68
102. By and through the conduct described above, Defen-
dants jointly and severally breached, continue to breach and
caused to be breached the oral contracts between Defendants
and Plaintiffs to lend an additional $185,000 so that Plaintiffs
would have sufficient working capital with which to operate the
business.
103. Such breach of contract was purposeful and malicious
and done with intent to defraud Plaintiffs.
104. As a result Defendants’ breach of contract, Plaintiffs
Kehr Packages, Inc., James McMurtrie and Charles and Emily
McMurtrie have suffered and will continue to suffer damages for
which Defendants are liable.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the
Court enter judgment in their favor and against all Defendants,
jointly and severally, awarding compensatory damages, costs of
the lawsuit, reasonable attorneys fees, interest and other relief
as the Court deems appropriate, all in accordance with the
request for judgment set forth in Count I.
COUNT X
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
105. Paragraphs 1 through 104 of this complaint are incor-
porated by reference and reallaged as though fully set forth
herein.
106. Defendants Neil Cohen, James Noon and Fidelity
Bank orally agreed and/or promised to lend to Plaintiffs an
additional $185,000 in order to bring the working capital up to
$350,000 and to induce the Plaintiffs to complete settlement,
purchase the stock and assets of Kehr. Packages, Inc. and accept
the loan of Fidelity Bank.
107. Plaintiffs, in justifiable reliance upon the promises of
Defendants completed settlement. Thereafter Defendants failed
to provide to Plaintiffs the additional $185,000 working capital as
promised, causing Plaintiffs, Kehr Packages, Charles McMurtrie
and James and Emily McMurtrie to suffer and to continue
suffering damages for which the Defendants are liable.
A-69
108. Plaintiffs would not have completed settlement as set
forth above but for the oral agreement of Defendants to lend the
additional $185,000.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the
Court enter judgment in their favor and against all Defendants,
jointly and severally, awarding compensatory and punitive
damages, costs of the lawsuit, reasonable attorneys fees, interest
and other relief as the Court deems appropriate, all in accor-
dance with the request for judgment set forth in Count I.
COUNT XI
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
109. Paragraphs 1 through 108 of this complaint are incor-
porated by reference and reallaged as though fully set forth
herein.
110. The actions taken by Defendants as described in this
Complaint through fraud and misrepresentation, negligent mis-
representation, tortious interference with prospective contrac-
tual relations and breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing
and promissory estoppel were willful and malicious and were
carried out with reckless disregard for the rights and property of
Plaintiffs and with intent to inflict damages on Plaintiffs.
Loe]
severally, and awarding to Plaintiffs Punitive damages for the
ulful, wanton, deliberate and malicious conduct of Defen-
dants.
Respectfully submitted
JOEL HARVEY SLOMSKy » ESQUIRE
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
KEHR PACKAGES, INC.
JAMES McMURTRIE
C
S and EMILY McMURTRIE
A-71
VERIFICATION
I, JAMES McMURTRIE, by these presents swear, attest
and affirm that I am sufficiently familiar with the facts contained
herein to say that they are true and correct to the best of my
knowledge, information and belief.
I understand that false statements herein are made subject
to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. Sec. 4904 relating to unsworn
falsification to authorities.
JAMES McMURTRIE
Dated: March 7, 1990
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