Appendix — Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc.

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IN THE APR 2 § 1991

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAGES of rue cues

October Term, 1990

KEHR PACKAGES, INC.

JAMES MCMURTRIE

CHARLES MCMURTRIE

EMILY MCMURTRIE,

Petitioners,

v.

FIDELCOR, INC.

FIDELITY BANK, N.A.

THOMAS DONNELLY

NEIL COHEN

JAMES NOON

MARIO GIANNINI,

Respondents.

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

JOEL HARVEY SLOMSKY, ESQUIRE

1600 Market Street

Suite 1720

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103

(215) 568-3700

PACKARD PRESS / LEGAL DIVISION, 1617 JFK BOULEVARD, PHILA, PA. 18103 (215) 563-9000

————— EEO ee

TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDIX

Page

Opinion Of Court Of Appeals Dated March 6, 1991 With

Concurrence And Dissent ...............2.e0000- A-1

Order Of Court Of Appeals Denying Petition For Rehear-

ing Dated March 27, 199] ..................e0eee A-41

Order Of The United States District Court For The

Eastern District of Pennsylvania Dated May 14,

I or ee Pe ee CE Pe rT errr A-42

Memorandum Of The United States District Court For

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania Dated June 28,

RE Groen a ee Oa ale mae Sa Se ae ee ae A-43

Filed March 6, 199]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 90-1396

KEHR PACKAGES, INC.,

CHARLES and EMILY McMURTRIE,

and JAMES McMURTRIE,

Appellants

v.

FIDELCOR, INC.,

FIDELITY BANK, THOMAS DONNELLY,

NEIL COHEN, JAMES NOON. and

MARIO GIANNINI, ESQ.

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 89-062 19)

Argued November 6, 1990

Before: SLOVITER, Chief Judge*

SCIRICA and ALITO, Circuit Judges

(Filed March 6, 1991)

“The Honorable Dolores K. Sloviter became

Chief Judge of the

Third Circuit on February 1, 1991.

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JOEL H. SLOMSKY, ESQ. (Argued)

DiGiacomo & Slomsky

1626 Pine Street

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103

Attorney for Appellants

WALTER WEIR, JR., ESQ. (Argued)

Patterson & Weir

Land Title Building, Suite 1200

Broad and Chestnut Streets

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19110

Attorney for Appellees

OPINION OF THE COURT

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.

This case requires us once again to address the

question of what constitutes a ‘pattern of

racketeering activity” under the Racketeer

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"),

18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-68 (1984 & Supp. 1990). The

district court held that plaintiffs did not

sufficiently allege such a pattern. We will affirm.

Plaintiffs Kehr Packages, Inc. (“Kehr”), James

McMurtrie, Charles McMurtrie, and Emily

McMurtrie filed suit against Fidelcor, Inc., Fidelity

Bank, N.A. (“Fidelity”), Thomas Donnelly, Neil

Cohen, James Noon, and Mario Giannini. The

complaint contained both RICO and pendent state

law claims arising from an allegedly fraudulent

promise to lend money to Kehr. The substantive

grounds for the RICO claims were allegations of

mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. The

district court permitted defendants to conduct

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discovery to determine whether subject matter

jurisdiction existed.

Following discovery, defendants filed a motion to

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

under Fed.. R. Civ P. 12(b)(1), and a motion for

summary judgment. Plaintiffs opposed the motions

and filed their own motion for leave to file an

amended complaint. The district court granted

defendants’ motion to dismiss and _ denied

plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend. The court

held that plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged mail

fraud, and assuming they had alleged such fraud,

the allegations in the complaint did not constitute

a “pattern” under RICO. The district court denied

plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend on the

grounds that the proposed amended complaint

would not cure the defects in the original.

Plaintiffs now appeal from these rulings.

I. STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW

Initially, we must decide what legal standard

should govern this appeal. Defendants filed a

motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). The district court

granted this motion because it found the RICO

claims in plaintiffs’ complaints to be legally

insufficient. Thus, although the court denominated

its order as one under Rule 12(b)(1), it appeared

to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for

failure to state a claim upon which relief could be

granted.

The legal standards governing these two motions

are different. A district court can grant a Rule

12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction based on the legal insufficiency

of a claim. But dismissal is proper only when the

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claim “clearly appears to be immaterial and made

solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or

. . . is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” Bell v.

Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). See also Oneida

Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661,

666 (1974) (claim must be “so insubstantial,

implausible, foreclosed by pricr decisions of this

Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as

not to involve a federal controversy”). Ordinarily,

a court must assume jurisdiction over a case

before deciding legal issues on the merits. Bell,

327 U.S. at 682. A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for

failure to state a claim is not subject to the same

limitations. The claim need not be_ wholly

insubstantial to be dismissed. As this court has

noted, “[{t]he threshold to withstand a motion to

dismiss under [Rule] 12(b)(1) is thus lower than

that required to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”

Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir.

1989).

In this case, we believe the district court's order

should properly have been denominated a

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), and we will treat it

as such. See Black v. Payne, 591 F.2d 83, 86 n.1

(9th Cir.) (treating dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1)

as one under Rule 12(b)(6)), cert. denied, 444 U.S.

867 (1979); see also Kulick v. Pocono Downs

Racing Ass’n, Inc., 816 F.2d 895, 899 (3d Cir.

1987) (considering whether to treat Rule 12(b)(1)

dismissal as one under Rule 12(b)(6), but declining

to reach issue). Although the court did not discuss

the legal standards under which it decided

defendants’ motion, it considered only the

allegations in the complaints and found them

“lacking.” The court also denied plaintiffs’ mction

for leave to amend because “it fail[ed] to establish

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a valid claim under [RICO], and therefore fail[ed]

to correct the defects in the original complaint.”

A plaintiff may be prejudiced if what is, in

essence, a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge to the complaint

is treated as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. When subject

matter jurisdiction is challenged under Rule

12(b)(1), the plaintiff must bear the burden of

persuasion. See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. and

Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). On

the other hand, under Rule 12(b)(6) the defendant

has the burden of showing no claim has been

stated. In Johnsrud v. Carter, 620 F.2d 29, 33 (3d

Cir. 1980), we found that transforming a 12(b)(1)

motion into a 12(b)(6) motion would “deprive[] the

plaintiffs of the procedural safeguards to which

they were entitled.” Id. In this case, however, there

is no reason not to treat the motion as having

been made under Rule 12(b)(6). In opposing

defendants’ motion to dismiss, plaintiffs recognized

that the motion had been made under Rule

12(b)(1), but stated that “Plaintiffs are treating the

Motion of Defendants entitled a ‘Motion to Dismiss’

as one filed under Rule 12(b)(6).” Memorandum of

Law in Support of Plaintiffs Answer in Opposition

to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 15. In this

situation, there is no harm in treating the district

court's dismissal as having been made under Rule

12(b)(6). We stress, however, that challenges for

failure to state a claim ordinarily should be made

under Rule 12(b)(6). See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.

678, 682 (1946).

The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion for

leave to amend because the proposed amended

complaint would also fail to withstand a motion to

dismiss. Denials of leave to amend a complaint

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) are reviewed for abuse

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of discretion. Kiser v. General Elec. Corp., 831 F.2d

423, 426-27 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.

906 (1988). However, reversal is proper when the

district court bases its denial on an erroneous rule

of law. Banks v. Wolk, 918 F.2d 418, 419 (3d Cir.

1990); Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422, 1431 (3d

Cir. 1989).

Since plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint

to rectify certain defects, the allegations in the

proposed amended complaint are the relevant ones

for purposes of this appeal. This fact is not of great

significance, since the amended complaint adds

little additional information to that contained in

the original. One difference is that the amended

complaint drops Fidelcor, Inc. and Mario Giannini

as defendants; thus, we do not consider any

allegations against them. Since we have treated

the district court's order as a Rule _ 12(b)(6)

dismissal, we must accept as true all factual

allegations in the amended complaint and all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn from

them. The amended complaint must be construed

in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and

can be dismissed only if the plaintiffs have alleged

no set of facts upon which relief could be granted.

Banks, 918 F.2d at 419.

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

This case stems from the leveraged buyout of

Kehr by James McMurtrie and Charles McMurtrie.

The allegations of the amended complaint are as

follows. See Amended Complaint at 17 15-31. On

December 12, 1986, the McMurtries entered into

an agreement to purchase Kehr. Fidelity agreed to

provide $4,165,000 in financing, secured by the

assets and accounts of Kehr, and by real estate

owned by Charles McMurtrie and his wife Emily

McMurtrie. The terms of the loans ranged from five

to seven years. Neil Cohen and James Noon

handled this loan package for Fidelity. At that

time, Cohen was a commercial loan officer at the

bank, and Noon was a vice-president.

The original understanding of the parties was

that Fidelity would provide, as part of the total

$4,165,000 ioan, a credit line of $350,000 to be

used as working capital for Kehr. Id. at {7 17-18.

The eventual loan agreement included a $600,000

line of credit to be used as working capital, and

to finance closing costs and pay off Kehr's prior

debts. However, at the settlement on December 12,

James McMurtrie discovered that this line of credit

would be insufficient to fund the necessary

$350,000 in working capital. During the

settlement, Cohen and Noon, on behalf of Fidelity,

made an oral commitment to lend an additional

$185,000 for working capital. Cohen and Noon

knew that Kehr would operate at a deficit during

1987, and that the working capital would be

critically important. In_ reliance on __ this

commitment, the McMurtries closed the deal and

began operating Kehr. Id. at 7 31.

Between December, 1986 and August, 1987,

Cohen and Noon informed James McMurtrie by

telephone “numerous” times that the $185,000

would be available as promised. Id. at q 32.

However, Cohen and Noon had no intention of

providing the money, and “made such

commitments in order to induce Plaintiffs to

complete the settlement and to insure that

Defendant Fidelity Bank would be the recipient of

large monthly interest payments, profits and

collateral.” Id. at { 33. Between December, 1986

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and July, 1988, Fidelity mailed Kehr invoices for

the loan payments. Apparently, during this period

Kehr's financial situation became increasingly

precarious.

By August, 1987, Cohen and Noon had left

Fidelity. In September, responsibility for the Kehr

loan was transferred to Thomas Donnelly, a

vice-president of Fidelity. The McMurtries believed

Donnelly was a high level management consultant

who had lending authority. Id. at { 41. In reality,

he worked in Fidelity’s Asset Recovery Group, f

where he was responsible for protecting and

recovering the bank's assets. James McMurtrie

repeatedly demanded that Fidelity furnish the

additional loan as promised, and Donnelly said

that he would “review the credit file and terms and

conditions of the loans to determine whether

additional funds would be advanced by ([Fidelity].”

Id. at { 38. The amended complaint does not allege

that Donnelly ever represented that the funds

would be provided. In addition, Donnelly told

James McMurtrie that he would commission an

appraisal of Kehr's assets, and asked McMurtrie

to draft a “plan of attack” demonstrating how

Kehr’s financial situation could be improved.

According to the amended complaint, this request

was “part of the course of conduct of Mr. Donnelly

aimed at misleading Plaintiffs into believing that

he would attempt to secure additional working

capital.” Id. at { 42. However, Donnelly never

intended to do so, and in fact had no lending

authority. In December, 1987, Donnelly mailed two

loan invoices to Kehr. Id. at 1 45.

In the summer of 1988, the McMurtries found

a buyer for Kehr. Fidelity apparently had the

contractual right to approve the sale, and Donnelly

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met with the prospective buyer on July 20, 1988.

At this meeting, Donnelly announced that the Kehr

loans were in default, and also disclosed that he

worked in the Asset Recovery Group. On the same

day, Donnelly mailed Kehr a notice of default and

confessed judgment against the collateral. The

buyer continued with the transaction, but

Donnelly and Fidelity “unreasonably delayed”

approving the sale, despite knowing that the buyer

faced a specific deadline. Id. at { 54. As a result,

the buyer withdrew its offer. In September, 1988,

Donnelly ordered Kehr to cease operations and

liquidate its assets.

Il. STATUTORY LANGUAGE

The RICO statute authorizes civil suits by “[a]ny

person injured in his business or property by

reason of a violation of [18 U.S.C. § 1962].” 18

U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988). Section 1962 contains

four separate subsections, each addressing a

different problem. Section 1962(a) prohibits “any

person who has received any income derived .. .

from a pattern of racketeering activity” from using

that money to acquire, establish or operate any

enterprise that affects interstate commerce.

Section 1962(b) prohibits any person from

acquiring or maintaining an interest in, or

controlling any such enterprise “through a pattern

of racketeering activity.” Section 1962(c}) prohibits

any person employed by or associated with an

enterprise affecting interstate commerce from

“conduct[ing] or participatling] . . . in the conduct

of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of

racketeering activity.” Finally, section 1962(d)

prohibits any person from “conspirj{ing] to violate

any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c).”

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In this case, the amended complaint alleges

violations of §§ 1962(a), (b), (c) and (d). Case law

has established separate requirements for certain

subsections. Under § 1962(a), a plaintiff must

allege injury’ specifically from the use or

investment of income in the named enterprise.

Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 357-58 (3d Cir.

1989). But see Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc., 896

F.2d 833, 836-40 (4th Cir. 1990) (rejecting

“investment use” rule). Fidelity and its parent

companies are the named enterprises in this case.

Amended Complaint at ¥ 61. The injury stems

from the allegedly fraudulent activities of Noon,

Cohen, and Donnelly, but is not specifically linked

to the use or investment of income in any named

enterprise. Thus, § 1962(a) cannot be a basis for

liability in this case. Similarly, under § 1962(b), a

plaintiff must allege a specific nexus between

control of a named enterprise and the alleged

racketeering activity. Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group,

Inc., 885 F.2d 1162, 1168 n.2 (3d Cir. 1989). Since

the amended complaint does not allege such a

nexus, the § 1962(b) count also must be

dismissed.

The § 1962(c) claim is not subject to these

nexus limitations, and therefore is a possible basis

for liability here. However,’While an entity can be

both an enterprise and a defendant for purposes

of § 1962(a), such a dual role is impermissible in

actions based on § 1962(c). See Banks uv. Wolk,

918 F.2d 418, 421 (3d Cir. 1990). Fidelity is

named as both a defendant and an enterprise.

Since § 1962(c) is the only available basis for

liability, Fidelity must be dismissed as a RICO

defendant. Because Fidelity cannot be a RICO

defendant, it cannot be held liable under a

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respondeat superior theory for the RICO violations

of its employees.:'See Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western

Co. of North America, 824 F.2d 1349, 1359 (3d Cir.

1987). We will consider separately the allegations

against each individual defendant under

§ 1962(c).'

IV. THE “PATTERN” REQUIREMENT

A “pattern of racketeering activity” requires

commission of at least two predicate offenses on

a specified list. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961(1), (5) (1984

& Supp. 1990). The predicate acts alleged in this

case are instances of mail fraud in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1341. But a pattern requires more than

commission of the requisite number of predicate

acts. In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone

Co., 492 U.S. 229, 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989), the

Supreme Court stressed that a plaintiff must show

also “that the racketeering acts are related, and

that they amount to or pose a threat of continued

criminal activity.” Id. at 109 S. Ct. at 2900

(emphasis in original).

In H.J. Inc., customers of a telephone company

alleged that the company had been bribing state

regulatory officials to gain approval for excessive

telephone rates. This alleged bribery occurred over

a six-year period and consisted of cash and

in-kind payments, and negotiations for future

employment with the company. Id. at __, 109 S.

1. Because we hold that plaintiffs did not state a valid claim

under § 1962(c), see infra at 26-31, we need not consider

whether the dependent § 1962(d) claim has been properly

alleged. Cf. Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 365-67 (3d Cir. 1989)

(discussing pleading requirements for § 1962(d) claim).

a

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Ct. at 2897. The Court held that these allegations

stated a valid claim under RICO.

The Court emphasized that allegations cannot

constitute a RICO “pattern” unless they satisfy

both the “relatedness” and “continuity” tests. Both

tests depend heavily on the specific facts of each

case. The Court adopted a broad multi-factor test

for relatedness, which focuses on whether the

alleged predicate acts “are interrelated by

distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated

events.” Id. at __, 109 S. Ct. at 2901 (quoting

“Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing Act. 18

U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982), repealed by Sentencing

Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II,

§ 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1987). The Court found that

the allegations in H.J. Inc. satisfied this test,

because the alleged acts of bribery were related by

the common purpose of influencing state

regulators. Id. at 2906.

In discussing the continuity requirement, the

Court rejected the theory that a RICO pattern

requires proof that a defendant engaged in

multiple criminal “schemes.” Id. at __, 109 S. Ct.

at 2901. The Court noted that the concept of a

“scheme” appears nowhere in the statute or its

legislative history, and is difficult to define. Rather,

related predicate acts in furtherance of a single

scheme can constitute a pattern if the acts

constitute or present the threat of long-term

continuous criminal activity. Proof of multiple

schemes is “highly relevant” to the question of

continuity, but is not a prerequisite for a finding

of a RICO pattern. Id.

Of course, not every single scheme comprising

two or more predicate acts will constitute a

pattern. Continuity refers “either to a closed period

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of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its

nature projects into the future with a threat of

repetition.” Id. at __, 109 S.Ct. at 2902. A

short-term scheme threatening no future criminal

activity will mot suffice. Although Congress

intended a “natural and common-sense approach

to RICO’s pattern element” and_ continuity

“depends on the specific facts of each case,” id. at

__., _._, 109 S. Ct. at 2899, 2902, the Court

delineated some parameters of the analysis. The

Court stressed that continuity is “centrally a

temporal concept.” Id. at __, 109 S. Ct at 2902.

Thus, the length of time over which the criminal

activity occurs or threatens to occur is an

important factor. As the Court noted, “[pjredicate

acts extending over a few weeks or months and

threatening no future criminal conduct do not

satisfy this requirement: Congress was concerned

in RICO with long-term criminal conduct.” Id. One

method of demonstrating continuity is to show

that “the predicate acts or offenses are part of an

ongoing entity's regular way of doing business.” Id.

This showing can be made with respect to

otherwise legitimate entities, or when “the

predicate acts can be attributed to a defendant

operating as part of a long-term association that

exists for criminal purposes.” Id.

This court has also noted other factors that are

relevant to the “pattern” inquiry. In Barticheck v.

Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat’l State, 832 F.2d 36,

39 (3d Cir. 1987), we focused on “the number of

unlawful acts, the length of time over which the

acts were committed, the similarity of the acts, the

number of victims, the number of perpetrators,

and the character of the unlawful activity.” This

approach is entirely consistent with H.J. Inc. See

’

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Marshall-Silver Constr. Co. v. Mendel, 894 F.2d

593, 596 (3d Cir. 1990). After H.J. Inc., however,

“we must focus on these factors as they bear upon

the separate questions of continuity and

relatedness.” Banks, 918 F.2d at 423.

In H.wJ. Inc., the Court found the requisite

continuity. The Court first noted that “the

racketeering predicates occurred with some

frequency over at least a 6-year period, which may

be sufficient to satisfy the continuity requirement.”

492 U.S. at ___, 109 S. Ct. at 2906. Alternatively,

the allegations sufficiently indicated that “the

alleged bribes were a regular way of conducting

[the defendant's] ongoing business, or a regular

wey of conducting or participating in the conduct

of the alleged and ongoing RICO enterprise.” Id.

Following HJ. Inc., this court affirmed

dismissals in two cases for failure to allege a

sufficient RICO pattern. In Marshall-Silver

Construction Co. v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.

1990), the complaint contained allegations of

extortion and mail fraud in connection with the

filing of a false bankruptcy petition. We noted that

the predicate acts were concluded in less than

seven months, and that “the alleged illegal activity

posed no threat of additional repeated criminal

conduct over a significant period.” Id. at 597

(emphasis in original). In Banks v. Wolk, 918 F.2d

418 (3d Cir. 1990), the plaintiffs alleged, among

other things, that the defendants had used an

inside partner to drive down the price of certain

real estate. We found no RICO pattern with respect

to those defendants involved only in that scheme,

noting that the injury to the plaintiff occurred

during an eight month period, and that the

scheme “was an attempt to defraud a single

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investor of his interest in a single piece of real

estate over a relatively short period of time.” Id.

at 11. As in Marshall-Silver, we found no indication

of additional conduct that would constitute a

threat of long-term criminal activity.

In Swistock v. Jones, 884 F.2d 755 (3d Cir.

1989), we found the continuity requirement

satisfied with respect to an alleged real estate

fraud that lasted approximately one year. As we

stressed in Marshall-Silver and Banks, however,

the complaint in Swistock contained allegations of

further misrepresentations by the defendants in

regard to other potential transactions with the

plaintiffs. Id. at 759. See Marshall-Silver, 894 F.2d

at 597; Banks, 918 F.2d at 423. Thus, although

a single fraudulent scheme can give rise to RICO

liability, when that scheme is short-lived and

directed at a limited number of people, this court

has required some further indication that the

defendant's fraudulent activities are likely to

continue.

V. THE MAIL FRAUD ALLEGATIONS

AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE

PATTERN ANALYSIS

The district court found that the complaints

failed to state valid claims of mail fraud. In some

RICO cases, it will be clear that a defendant's

actions do not constitute a pattern without an

examination of the legal sufficiency of the

predicate acts. But since the pattern inquiry must

assess whether the defendant's actions “amount to

or pose a threat of continued criminal activity,”

H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2900, it is often helpful to

examine the actions which are alleged to form the

basis of criminal activity.

ee

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In cases involving allegations of mail fraud, this

inquiry is complicated by the nature of the statute.

The mail fraud statute prohibits any person from

knowingly causing the use of the mails “for the

purpose of executing” any “scheme or artifice to

defraud.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (Supp. 1990). The

actual violation is the mailing, although the

mailing must relate to the underlying fraudulent

scheme. Moreover, each mailing that is “incident

to an essential part of the scheme” constitutes a

new violation. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S.

1, 8 (1954). The mailing need not contain any

misrepresentations. Rather, “innocent’ mailings —

ones that contain no false information — may

supply the mailing element.” Schmuck v. United

States, 489 U.S. 705, 715 (1989).

The mailing element is not very helpful in

examining the sufficiency of a RICO pattern

allegation. The relatedness test will nearly always

be satisfied in cases alleging at least two acts of

mail fraud stemming from the same fraudulent

transaction — by definition the acts are related to

the same “scheme or artifice to defraud.” But the

continuity test requires us to look beyond the

mailings and examine the underlying scheme or

artifice. Although the mailing is the actual criminal

act, the instances of deceit constituting the

underlying fraudulent scheme are more relevant to

the continuity analysis.

For example, the “number of unlawful acts” is a

factor in determining continuity. Barticheck v.

Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat’l State, 832 F.2d 36,

39 (3d Cir. 1987). But the continuity question

should not be affected by the fact that a particular

fraudulent scheme involved numerous otherwise

“innocent” mailings, rather than only a few. As the

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Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently

has reaffirmed:

Mail fraud and wire fraud are perhaps unique

among the various sorts of “racketeering activity”

possible under RICO in that the existence of a

multiplicity of predicate acts (here, the mailings)

may be no indication of the requisite continuity

of the underlying fraudulent activity.

Hartz v. Friedman, 919 F.2d 469, 473 (7th Cir.

1990) (quoting Lipin Enters., Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d

322, 325 (7th Cir. 1986) (Cudahy, J., concurring)).

Accord United States Textiles, Inc. v.

Anheuser-Busch Cos., 911 F.2d 1261, 1268 (7th

Cir. 1990); Sutherland v. O’Malley, 882 F.2d 1196,

1205 n.8 (7th Cir. 1989); International Data Bank,

Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 155 (4th Cir. 1987)

(decided before H.J. Inc.). See also Ashland Oil, Inc.

v. Amett, 875 F.2d 1271, 1278 (7th Cir. 1989) (“the

number of [mail or wire fraud] offenses is only

tangentially related to the underlying fraud, and

can be a matter of happenstance.”).

In this case, the loan invoices sent to Kehr

constitute the main basis for the mail fraud

allegations. But the quantity of otherwise innocent

invoices cannot by itself transform defendants’

alleged fraud into a RICO pattern. It should not

be relevant, for example, that Fidelity sent invoices

on a monthly basis, rather than quarterly or

yearly. However, if a defendant committed

numerous acts of deceit as part of multiple

schemes or a single ongoing fraud, this fact would

be relevant to the continuity question, although

not necessarily dispositive. Moreover, it would be

relevant if particular mailings, unlike those in this

' |

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case, contained false or misleading statements or

otherwise constituted separate deceptive acts.

The importance of focusing in the continuity

analysis on deceptive activity rather than

otherwise innocent mailings is demonstrated by

the holding in HJ. Inc. that continuity can be

shown when “the predicate acts or offenses are

part of an ongoing entity’s regular way of doing

business.” 492 U.S. 229, 109 S. Ct. at 2902. In

that case, separate bribes to different government

officials sufficiently indicated that bribery was a

regular way of doing business for the defendant.

Id. at 2906. In this case, if we were to focus only

upon the mailings, we would necessarily conclude

that sending invoices was a regular way of

conducting Fidelity’s business. Such a holding

would extend RICO’s scope to all allegations of

mail fraud based upon two or more otherwise

routine business mailings, a result we believe

Congress did not intend. Rather, we must examine

whether defendants’ underlying deceptive activities

constitute a regular way of doing business. This

question was not faced in HJ. Inc., since each

bribe in that case independently constituted a

criminal act, without reference to any underlying

illegal scheme.

At this time, we need not decide precisely which

types or combinations of fraudulent actions will

present the requisite continuity. But we note that

the mailings in this case present a different

situation from that recently faced by the Court of

Appeals for the First Circuit in Fleet Credit Corp.

v. Sion, 893 F.2d 441 (lst Cir. 1990). In that case,

the defendants obtained three separate business

loans over a five year period and allegedly

misappropriated the collateral for their personal

A-19

use. The plaintiffs RICO claim was predicated on

acts of mail fraud consisting of 95 checks allegedly

used by the defendants to dissipate the collateral

over a four and one-half year period. The court

found that these actions constituted “long-term

criminal conduct” under H.J. Inc. Id. at 446-47.

The court noted that “[{hJjad the number of acts

alleged by [the plaintiff] been few or the period of

time short, the predicate acts would not have

amounted to continued criminal activity.” Id. at

447.

The court noted, however, that each separate

mailing constituted a new breach of _ the

defendants’ promise not to remove, transfer, or

destroy the collateral. Id. at 443. Thus, the

defendants’ deceptive activities were ongoing

during the entire four and one-half year period,

and each mailing constituted a new fraudulent act.

Moreover, during this period, the defendants

applied for and received two new loans. In this

case, by contrast, the mailings did not constitute

separate fraudulent actions, but related entirely to

the initial allegedly deceptive actions of the

defendants. We do not believe that the Fleet court

focused on the number and duration of the

mailings without considering their integral

connection to the ongoing long-term deceptive

activities.”

2. In dicta, the court noted that “ja] threat of criminal activity

. . . ils not established merely by demonstrating that common

law fraud was a regular way of conducting [the defendants’]

ongoing business. Rather, [the plaintiff] must demonstrate that

the predicate acts — here the acts of mail fraud — were a

regular way of conducting the ongoing business.” Id. at 448

A-20

We now examine the allegations of deceptive

activity in this case. Under the mail fraud statute,

a scheme or artifice to defraud “need not be

fraudulent on its face, but must involve some sort

of fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions

reasonably calculated to deceive persons of

ordinary prudence and comprehension.” United

States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 535 (3d Cir.

1978). The scheme need not involve affirmative

misrepresentation, see United States v. Frankel,

721 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1983), but the statutory

term “defraud” usually signifies “the deprivation of

something of value by trick, deceit, chicane or

overreaching.” McNally v. United States, 483 U.S.

350, 358 (1987) (quoting Hammerschmidt v. United

States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924)). Accord

Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987).

The amended complaint alleges that Cohen and

Noon misrepresented on numerous occasions that

the additional funds would be provided. Since

these appear to be actionable misrepresentations,

we will assume without deciding that the amended

complaint sufficiently alleges that Cohen and Noon

have engaged in a “scheme or artifice to defraud”

in violation of the mail fraud statute. We also will

assume without deciding that the invoices sent to

Kehr satisfy the “mailing” element. Thus, we will

(emphasis in original). It does not appear that the court was

emphasizing the mailings over the underlying fraud. Instead,

the court likely was referring to the fact that a plaintiff must

sufficiently allege a connection between a particular fraudulent

scheme and some mailing. See id. at 444-45 (apparently

finding that plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead connection

between certain allegations of common law fraud and use of

mails).

A-21

assume that Cohen and Noon have committed

predicate acts of mail fraud. We note, however,

that the district court held that defendants’ actions

could not constitute mail fraud because plaintiffs

“offer[ed] no evidence to suggest the statements the

bank mailed out were inaccurate, or fraudulent in

any way.” This analysis was incorrect. As the

Supreme Court recently held in Schmuck v. United

States, 489 U.S. 705, 715 (1989), completely

“innocent” mailings can satisfy the mailing

element.

The allegations against Donnelly are of a

different sort. The amended complaint asserts that

Donnelly engaged in three separate deceptive

actions after Cohen and Noon had left Fidelity.

First, Donnelly’s request for a “plan of attack” was

part of a scheme to “mislead{] Plaintiffs into

believing that he would attempt to secure

additional working capital.” Amended Complaint at

q 42. Although Donnelly said that he would

attempt to secure additional working capital,

unlike Cohen and Noon he never represented that

the capital would be provided. Second, Donnelly

did not disclose that he worked in the Asset

Recovery Group, and that he had no lending

authority. Third, he “unreasonably delayed”

approving the proposed sale of Kehr.

Even construing the complaint in the light most

favorable to appellants, none of these allegations

could form the basis for a separate mail fraud

violation on the part of Donnelly. We recognize

that the mail fraud statute has been “expansively

construed.” United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919,

925 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022

(1983). But none of Donnelly’s alleged acts or

omissions could be ‘reasonably calculated to

ia tainaenateeanitanineieel

A-22

deceive a person of ordinary prudence and

comprehension.” Pearlstein, 576 F.2d at 535.

Thus, the individual allegations against Donnelly

do not constitute additional criminal activity that

would help establish “continuity” under RICO.

The “plan of attack” request falls squarely within

the ambit of normal business communications.

especially considering the financial state of Kehr,

and contains no deceptive elements. Cf. Blount

FYnanctal Servs., Inc. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 819

F.2d 151, 153 (6th Cir. 1987) (plaintiffs reliance

on defendant's quotation of interest rate was

unreasonable in business setting, and precluded

mail fraud claim); McEvoy Travel Bureau, Inc. v.

Herttage Travel, Inc., 904 F.2d 786 (lst Cir.)

(allegations of kickbacks, rebates and illegal rent

payments could not be construed as scheme to

deceive and thus could not be basis for mail fraud

violation), cert. denied, ___ U.S. a oan oo ok

536 (1990). Likewise, the non-disclosure of

Donnelly’s job title cannot constitute mail fraud

absent further allegations. Since Donnelly never

represented that he had lending authority, or that

the funds would be provided, his non-disclosure

cannot reasonably be said to be deceptive. See,

e.g., United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999,

1006-07 (2d Cir. 1980) (non-disclosure not

actionable under mail fraud statute absent some

duty to disclose), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981);

see also Reynolds v. East Dyer Dev. Co., 882 F.2d

1249 (7th Cir. 1989) (absent elaborate efforts at

concealment, or larger pattern of misrepre-

A-23

sentations or half-truths, mere non-disclosure

cannot constitute mail fraud).°

Moreover, even if these actions were somehow

deceptive, they were calculated only to mislead

plaintiffs into believing that Donnelly would

“attempt” to secure additional funds. Since

Donnelly never indicated that the funds would be

provided, there was no deceit nor fraud within the

meaning of the mail fraud statute. By contrast, the

deceptions of Cohen and Noon are alleged to have

caused plaintiffs to close the deal and incur injury

when the funds were not provided. We note that

18 U.S.C. § 1346, which amended the mail fraud

statute to include schemes that “deprive another

of the intangible right of honest services,” does not

apply to this case, since all of the defendants’

alleged actions occurred prior to the effective date

of the statute. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (Supp.

3. Mail fraud can also be predicated on mailings made after

the completion of the scheme, but which are “designed to lull

the victims into a false sense of security, postpone their

ultimate complaint to the authorities, and therefore make the

apprehension of the defendants less likely than if no mailings

had taken place.” United States v. Lebovitz, 669 F.2d 894, 896

(3d Cir.), cert. dented, 456 U.S. 929 (1982) (quoting United

States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 403 (1974)). In this case,

however, we find as a matter of law that Donnelly’s alleged

actions could not have served this purpose. A person of

ordinary prudence and comprehension could not be misled by

Donnelly’s indications that he would look into whether Fidelity

would provide additional funding. Cf. Pyramid Securities, Ltd.

v. IB Resolution, Inc., 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 1350, *11 (D.C.

Cir. Feb. 1, 1991) (rejecting similar “lulling” claim in civil RICO

action).

A-24

1990) (effective Nov. 18, 1988) (overruling McNally

v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987)).*

Finally, the allegation that Donnelly

“unreasonably delayed” approving the sale of Kehr,

while possibly amounting to a breach of contract,

contains no deception that would bring it within

the purview of the mail fraud statute. Cf. United

States v. Kreitmer, 609 F.2d 126, 128 (5th Cir.

1980) (“the [mail fraud] statute does not reject all

business practices that do not fulfill expectations,

nor does it taint every breach of a business

contract. Its condemnation of a ‘scheme or artifice

to defraud’ implicates only plans catcuiated to

deceive."); see also Amended Complaint at { 83

(unreasonable delay not alleged as

misrepresentation in common law fraud count).

We emphasize that the _ responsibility for

determining the factual sufficiency of fraud

allegations remains with the fact-finder. In this

case, though, the allegations against Donnelly

simply contain no indication of the deception or

overreaching which the mail fraud _ statute

requires. We also recognize that appellants

4. We follow the other Courts of Appeals that have held that

§ 1346 has no retroactive effect. See United States v. Telink,

Inc., 910 F.2d 598, 601 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.

Granberry, 908 F.2d 278, 281 n.1 (8th Cir. 1990); McEvoy

Travel Bureau, Inc. v. Heritage Travel, Inc., 904 F.2d 786, 791

(1st Cir.) (civil RICO case), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 111 S.

Ct. 536 (1990); United States v. Bush, 888 F.2d 1145, 1145-46

(7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Stewart, 872 F.2d 957, 960

n.2 (10th Cir. 1989); Corcoran v. American Plan Corp., 886

F.2d 16, 19 n.4 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Davis, 873

F.2d 900, 902 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 110 S. Ct.

292 (1989).

ei

A-25

possibly could have demonstrated at trial that

Donnelly was engaged in a common mail fraud

scheme with Noon and Cohen. See, e.g., United

States v. Camiel, 689 F.2d 31, 36 (3d Cir. 1982)

(mail fraud violation can be proved by showing

common scheme rather than _ conspiratorial

agreement). In this event, Donnelly would have

been held liable for the misrepresentations of

Cohen and Noon. But for purposes of RICO

continuity, the separate allegations against

Donnelly do not add to the criminal activity alleged

against Cohen and Noon.

VI. THE “PATTERN” ALLEGATION IN THIS CASE

Plaintiffs in this case have not sufficiently

alleged that defendants engaged in a “pattern of

racketeering activity.” Since the complaint alleges

numerous acts of mail fraud related to the

common purpose of causing Kehr to default on its

loans, the relatedness requirement is satisfied. But

the amended complaint does not set forth acts that

“amount to or pose the threat of continuing

criminal activity.” Rather, as in Marshall-Silver and

Banks, the allegations here involve a short-term

attempt to force a single entity into bankruptcy,

and contain no additional threat of continued

criminal activity. Nor does this case involve a

“long-term association that exists for criminal

purposes.” See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at __, 109 S.

Ct. at 2902.

We have established that the critical acts for

purposes of the continuity analysis are the

misrepresentations of Cohen and Noon. The same

misrepresentations regarding the additional loan

were repeated “numerous” times over an eight

month period. H.J. Inc. holds that the actual or

A-26

threatened duration of a scheme is an important

factor in determining whether a_ defendant's

actions amount to long-term criminal activity.

When mail fraud is alleged, the question of

duration becomes more difficult. As we noted in

Marshall-Silver, “[vjirtually every garden-variety

fraud is accomplished through a series of wire or

mail fraud acts that are ‘related’ by purpose and

are spread over a period of at least several

months.” 894 F.2d at 597. In this case, the length

of the scheme as originally conceived was

indeterminate, since it would depend on how long

Kehr could survive without the promised $185,000

in additional working capital. The mailing of loan

invoices could possibly have continued for seven

years, the term of the longest loan.

However, we do not place much emphasis on the

fact that the mailings might have continued for

years. As we have noted, a defendant's deceptive

actions are more important to the continuity

analysis than otherwise innocent mailings. Thus,

the relevant criminal conduct occurred during the

initial eight month period, when the

misrepresentations were made. We noted in

Marshall-Silver that the duration of a scheme

should not be afforded overriding significance “in

the absence of a more significant societal threat.”

Id. Since we found the scheme in that case to be

sufficiently short-term, we did not rely on this

statement and need not embrace it at this time.

But see United States Textiles, Inc. _ v.

Anheuser-Busch Cos., 911 F.2d 1261, 1268-69 (7th

Cir. 1990) (adopting Marshall-Silver language). We

do hold, however, that in determining the duration

of a scheme involving mail fraud, the relevant

criminal conduct is the defendant's deceptive or

eal

A-27

fraudulent activity, rather than otherwise innocent

mailings that may continue for a long period of

time. Cf. United States Textiles, 911 F.2d at 1268

(noting that each mail and wire fraud count

“relates back” to initial extortions, and _ that

duration of transaction at issue was “pure

happenstance in light of the underlying concern

which is the ‘continuity’ of the criminal activity”).

We must apply a “natural and common-sense

approach to RICO’s pattern element.” H.J. Inc., 492

U.S. at __, 109 S. Ct. at 2899. Consequently, it

should not be important that otherwise innocent

mailings might continue long after the deceptive

practices cease. If the term of the Kehr loans had

been several decades rather than several years, it

would not make the initial actions of Cohen and

Noon any more deserving of RICC sanctions. Cf.

Dana Corp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 900 F.2d

882, 887 (6th Cir. 1990) (repeated fraudulent

misrepresentations during seventeen year life of

contract sufficient to state pattern). As in

Marshall-Silver and Banks, an eight-month period

of fraudulent activity directed at a single entity

does not constitute a pattern, absent a threat of

future criminal acts.

This case, therefore, is unlike H.J. Inc., which

involved six years of bribes directed at five

members of a regulatory agency. The alleged bribes

were numerous and varied, consisting of cash

payments, job negotiations, and payments for

meals and entertainment. See 492 U.S. at ___, 109

S. Ct. at 2897. Each separate bribe contributed to

an ongoing scheme aimed at influencing future

ratemaking decisions. This evidence led the Court

to find sufficient indication that bribery was a

regular way of doing business for the defendant.

A-28 ;

st de A Uitebe ne tit alt

Besides the significant disparity in longevity

between the schemes in HJ. Inc. and the present

case, there are other salient differences. First,

there is no apparent threat that’ the

misrepresentations of Cohen and Noon would have

continued past the time they left Fidelity. By

contrast, the regulatory decisions involved in HJ.

Inc. were a continuous part of the defendant's

business, and thus the bribes likely would have

continued into the future. Unlike Swistock, the

additional confirmatory misrepresentations of

Cohen and Noon did not concern future

transactions, and thus do not pose a threat of

additional criminal activity. There is no indication

that Cohen or Noon made other falSe statements

to Kehr, or treated other customers in a similar

manner. Consequently, the allegations in the

amended complaint do not indicate that fraud was

“a regular way of doing business” for any

defendant. Cf. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at __, 109 S.

Ct. at 2902. Nor, as we have noted, does this case

involve a “long-term association that exists for

criminal purposes.” See id.

Second, the bribes in H.J. Inc. were individually

directed at five different officials. As we noted in

Swistock, the Supreme Court did not rely on the

fact that the actual victims of the bribes — the

telephone company’s customers — were numerous.

See 884 F.2d at 758. However, it certainly should

be relevant that the criminal activity was

separately directed at several different people. Cf.

Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat’l State,

832 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1987) (“the scheme

involved the _ repetition oof similar mis-

representations to more than twenty investors”). In

this case, the direct target of the criminal activity

A-29

was a single entity. Kehr's individual shareholders

and guarantors, and the holders of pledged

collateral, were affected only indirectly.

Third, each bribe in HJ. Inc. separately

contributed to the injury inflicted on the plaintiffs.

Cf. Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970,

975 (7th Cir. 1986) (“occurrence of distinct

injuries” is factor in pattern analysis). In this case,

the damage to plaintiffs was largely accomplished

at the moment of settlement. Although the number

of misrepresentations can be an important factor,

the confirmatory misrepresentations made after

settlement do not transform the actions of Cohen

and Noon into a “pattern of racketeering activity.”

There is no allegation that Kehr was caused to

forgo additional financing because of the false

confirmations; on the contrary, a buyer was found

for Kehr after Cohen and Noon left Fidelity. Thus,

the repeated misrepresentations did not contribute

any injury additional to that already inflicted. Nor

is it relevant that each loan payment constituted

additional economic detriment to Kehr. Absent

continuous long-term fraudulent activity, it is of

little importance that a particular injury was

inflicted over an extended period of time, rather

than all at once. See United States Textiles, Inc. v.

Anheuser-Busch Cos., 911 F.2d 1261, 1269 (7th

Cir. 1990) (“[I]dentical economic injuries

stemming from a single contract were not the type

of injuries which Congress intended to compensate

via the civil provisions of RICO.”).

VII. CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs may have valid claims of common law

fraud or breach of contract, but based on the

allegations of the complaint and the proposed

A-30

amended complaint, which we have assumed

throughout are true, they cannot maintain a RICO

suit. Thus, we will affirm the dismissal of the RICO

and pendent state law claims against ll

defendants, and the denial of plaintiffs’ motion for

leave to amend their complaint.

ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and

dissenting in part.

I concur in the decision of the court insofar as

it affirms the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims

under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) and (b), but I would

reverse the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims under 18

U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d). As the majority notes,

denial of plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend and

the dismissal of their claims may be sustained

only if the amended complaint proffered by the

plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief

could be granted. Majority typescript at 3-6. The

majority affirms the dismissal of the claims under

18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d) on the ground that the

amended complaint did not sufficiently allege a

“pattern” of racketeering activity. I respectfully

disagree with the majority's analysis of the pattern

requirement and with its application in the present

case.

ial

A-3]

I.

The amended complaint alleged that the bank

and several officers carried out a scheme to

defraud the McMurtries, who obtained more than

four million dollars of secured loans to finance

their leveraged buyout of Kehr Packages, Inc. The

bank and its officers allegedly induced the

McMurtries to enter into loan agreements that

provided insufficient working capital for successful

operation of the company. This was accomplished,

the complaint asserts, by fraudulent oral promises

that additional financing would be _ provided.

According to the complaint, the purpose of this

scheme was to obtain large interest payments and,

ultimately, the pledged collateral, which exceeded

the value of the loans. The complaint alleged that

the defendants, in carrying out this scheme,

committed numerous acts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1341, during a period of one year and seven

months, from December 1986 to July 1988.

The specific factual allegations in the complaint

are set out in the majority opinion (typescript at

6-9), but the following salient allegations merit

emphasis. At the settlement of the loans on

December 12, 1986, two bank officers, Neil Cohen,

a commercial loan officer, and James Noon, a vice

president, orally promised that an additional

$185,000 in working capital would be provided.

App. 24la-42a. For the next eight months, Cohen

and Noon repeated this promise during

“numerous” telephone conversations with James

McMurtrie. Id. at 242a. Cohen and Noon, however,

never intended to fulfill their promises but made

them to obtain interest payments and the pledged

collateral for their employer. Id. at 243a.

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In September 1987, after Cohen and Noon had

left the bank, Thomas Donnelly, another vice

president, took over responsibility for the loan and

began a “course of conduct .. . aimed at

misleading plaintiffs into believing that he would

attempt to secure additional working capital” when

his real purpose was to prepare for foreclosure on

the assets of the company and the personal assets

of the McMurtries. Id. at 243a-46a. To carry out

this plan, Donnelly “act{ed] for months on the

pretense of being a management consultant” (id.

at 248a) although he actually worked in the bank's

Asset Recovery Group. Id. at 245a-46a, 248a.

Donnelly promised to look into the question of

increased working capital, when in fact he had no

intention of doing so. Id. at 244a-46a. He also

requested that plaintiffs draft a “plan of attack”

for profitably operating the company, although he

was actually preparing for foreclosure. Id. at

245a-46a. Finaily, Donnelly undermined an

agreement for sale of the company during the

summer of 1988 by unreasonably delaying approval

of the transaction, and in September 1989 he

ordered Kehr to cease operations and liquidate. Id.

at 248a-49a. I stress that these are merely the

unproven factual allegations in the complaint, but

at the present stage we are bound to accept them

as true. In my view, these allegations sufficiently

allege a “pattern of racketeering activity.”

Il.

The RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § I96I(1) defines

“racketeering activity” to mean any of a long list

of predicate offenses, including mail fraud (18

U.S.C. § 1341). The statute states that a “pattern

of racketeering activity’ requires at least two acts

of racketeering activity” (18 U.S.C. § 196i(5))

EE

A-33

(emphasis added). The complaint in this case

alleges more than two such acts.

In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,

____~-U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 2893 (1989), the Supreme

Court held that a “pattern of racketeering activity”

must satisfy two additional requirements not

mentioned in the statute itself: “relatedness” and

“continuity.” I agree with the majority that the

complaint in the present case _ satisfied the

requirement of “relatedness,” and therefore the

sole remaining hurdle is the requirement - of

“continuity.”

In H.J. Inc., ___. U.S. at ___, 109 S.Ct. at 2902,

the Supreme Court explained that “[cjontinuity’ is

both a _ closed-and open-ended concept.” For

present purposes, I think it is helpful to discuss

these two concepts in reverse order.

The open-ended concept of continuity refers to

a series of predicate acts that is cut short, either

by law enforcement efforts or other intervening

events, but that threatened long-term criminal

conduct. Id. In H.J. Inc., the Court gave several

examples of how such threatened criminal conduct

may be shown. In some cases, the Court noted

(id.), it may be proven that the perpetrators

expressly threatened repeated acts of racketeering.

In other cases, the Court observed (id.). it may be

shown that the predicate offenses were part of an

ongoing entity’s regular way of doing business,

thus giving rise to the inference that such offenses

would have continued if not interrupted.

In addition to thesc examples provided by the

Supreme Court, several factors’ previously

identified by this court are useful in determining

whether a threat of future racketeering acts has

been alleged or shown. Factors such as the

number of unlawful acts, the number of

A-34

perpetrators, the number of victims, and the

character of unlawful activity (Barticheck v. Fidelity

Union Bank/First National State, 832 F.2d 36, 39

(3d Cir. 1987)) may be indicative of threatened

criminal conduct in particular cases. Based upon

all of these factors and examples, | fully agree with

the majority that the complaint in the present case

does not allege facts showing a threat of

racketeering activity extending beyond the end of

the completed scheme alleged. I therefore turn to

the concept of “closed-ended” continuity.

Although the discussion of this concept in HJ.

Inc. is brief, the Court's opinion makes clear, in

my view, that the predominant, if not sole,

consideration in determining whether a

closed-ended pattern has been alleged or proven

is the duration of the racketeering activity. The

Court stated flatly (__. U.S. at __, 109 S.Ct. at

2902) that “[a] party alleging a RICO violation may

demonstrate continuity over a closed period by

proving a series of related predicates extending

over a substantial period of time.” Likewise, the

Court observed (id.) that “[p]redicate acts extending

over a few weeks or months and threatening no

future criminal conduct do not satisfy this

requirement.” These statements do not seem to

leave room for anything other than a measurement

of the duration of the racketeering activity. To be

sure, the Court noted (id.) (emphasis added) that

continuity is “centrally a temporal concept,” thus

perhaps implying that the concept has another

peripheral component. The Court, however,

provided no clue regarding the nature of any such

additional component.

Whether or not closed-ended continuity contains

any such additional component, it seems clear that

several factors have no place in determining

A-35

whether closed-ended continuity has been alleged

or shown. First, the absence of any threat of future

racketeering activity is irrelevant in determining

whether closed-ended continuity is present. The

threat of future criminal activity is the essence of

open-ended continuity but has no bearing on

closed-ended continuity, which refers by definition

to repeated conduct that has fully run its course.

Second, many of the factors disted by this court

in Barticheck and related cases, with the obvious

exception of “the length of time” of the criminal

conduct (Barticheck, 832 F.2d at 39), have no

logical connection to closed-ended continuity. Cf.

Banks v. Wolk, No. 90-1278, slip op. at 12 (3d Cir.

Nov. 9, 1990) (“After H.J. Inc., we must focus on

these factors as they bear upon the separate

questions of continuity and relatedness.") Factors

such as the number of unlawful acts, the number

of perpetrators, the number of victims, the

similarity of the acts, and the societal harm

associated with the unlawful activity have nothing

to do with the duration of the racketeering activity.

In addition, these factors, with the exception of

the number of unlawful acts, are-—not logically

related to the ordinary meaning of the term

“continuous,” which refers to an “uninterrupted

extension= in space, time, or sequence.

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW —§ INTERNATIONAL

DICTIONARY 493-94 (197]).

Since closed-ended continuity, as described in

H.J. Inc., is primarily a question of duration, it is

critical to zero in on the line between “a

substantial period of time,” which may satisfy H.J.

Inc., and “a few weeks or months,” which do not.

U.S. at __, 109 S.Ct. at 2902. In cases

decided after H.J. Inc., this court has upheld the

dismissal of complaints alleging racketeering

A-36

activity over closed-ended periods of less than

seven months (Marshall-Silver Construction Co.,

Inc. v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1990)) and

eight months (Banks v. Wolk, supra). Since these

periods aré substantially shorter than that alleged

in the present case, these precedents do not

control our decision here.

By contrast, in Swistock v. Jones, 884 F.2d 755,

759 (3d Cir. 1989) (emphasis added), the court held

that a complaint alleging predicate acts of wire and

mail fraud “over a period of approximately fourteen

months” was sufficient to show ‘either the

existence of a closed-ended period of repeated

conduct of sufficient length or a threat of

continuity. . . .” Although the majority attempts to

distinguish Swistock based on the presence in that

case of open-ended continuity (typescript at 15), I

believe the holding in Swistock rested on two

independent grounds. I read Swistock to hold that,

even without allegations suggesting the threat of

future criminal conduct, the alleged acts of wire

and mail fraud extending over 14 months satisfied

the pattern requirement by showing closed-ended

continuity. Because the complaint in the present

case alleges numerous acts of mail fraud extending

over an even longer period (19 months), Swistock

weighs in favor of reversal here.

The relevant legislative history points to the

same result. In concluding that the “pattern”

element necessitates proof of “continuity,” the

Svoreme Court relied’ primarily upon the following

passage from the Senate Report on RICO (S. Rep.

No. 91-617, at 158 (1969) (emphasis added):

l. HJ. Inc., U.S. at __, 109 S.Ct. at 2900. See also

Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex.Co., 473 U.S. 479. 496 n.14, 105

S.Ct. 3275, 3285 n.14 (1985).

A-37

The target of [RICO] is . . . not sporadic activity.

The infiltration of legitimate business normally

requires more than one “racketeering activity”

and the threat of continuing activity to be

effective. It is this factor of continuity plus

relationship which combines to produce a

pattern.

This seminal passage appears to measure

“continuity” by reference to the period of time

normally required for the infiltration of legitimate

business. As the Supreme Court has recognized,

preventing the infiltration of legitimate business by

organized crime was the major objective expressed

during congressional consideration of the RICO

statute.”

In light of this legislative history, closed-ended

continuity should not require racketeering activity

extending over a longer period of time than

Congress felt would normally be required for the

infiltration of a legitimate business by means of

the various RICO predicates, such as murder,

kidnapping, arson, bribery, or fraud. 18 U.S.C.

§§ 196l1(1) and 1962(b). It would be anomalous to

construe the concept of closed-ended continuity so

narrowly that efficient campaigns to infiltrate

legitimate businesses — the heart of congressional

concern when RICO was originally enacted — are

excluded from the coverage of that concept. And

there is no reason to suppose that Congress felt

2. In United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (198])

(footnote omitted), the Court wrote:

[T]he legislative history forcefully supports the view

that the major purpose of [RICO] is to address the

infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime.

The point is made time and again during the debates

and in the hearings before the House and Senate.

A-38

such campaigns ordinarily take longer than 19

months (the period at issue here) or 14 months

(the period in Swistock). Accordingly, in my view,

the 19 month period alleged in this case

constituted, in the terminology of HJ. Inc., ___

U.S. at ___, 109 S.Ct. at 2902, a “substantial”

period of time, rather than “a few weeks or

months,” and _ thus satisfied closed-ended

continuity. :

III.

Although the complaint in this case alleges acts

of mail fraud extending over a period of 19 months,

the majority whittles this period down to eight

months. The majority achieves this result in two

stages. First, the majority concludes that in RICO

cases grounded on mail fraud predicates, the

duration of the racketeering activity should be

measured, not by the duration of the mail fraud

violations, which may be based on “innocent”

mailings, but by the duration of the “instances of

deceit.” Majority typescript at 16-20. Second, the

majority concludes that the only relevant

“instances of deceit” in this case are the alleged

misrepresentations of Cohen and Noon, because

the allegations against Donnelly, when viewed in

isolation, do not establish criminal conduct.

Majority typescript at 20-26. I disagree with both

parts of this analysis.

The first part of this analysis is inconsistent

with the plain language of the RICO statute. The

statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), equates “racketeering

activity” with the listed predicate offenses.®

3. The statute provides in pertinent part (18 U.S.C. § 1961(1))

that “racketeering activity’ means any of a long list of

predicates, including “(B) any act which is indictable under

any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code:

. . section 1341 (relating to mail fraud).”

ee

A-39

Therefore the duration of racketeering activity for

the purpose of judging closed-ended continuity

must equal the duration of the related predicates.

Moreover, even if it were proper in a case with

mail fraud predicates to look beyond the duration

of the mail fraud violations and measure the

duration of the deceitful conduct, the focus of

inquiry should be on the fraudulent scheme, not

the repetition of fraudulent statements. If a

fraudulent scheme is launched convincingly, there

may be no need for a repetition of the fraudulent

statements made at the outset. But as long as the

scheme continues — as long as the original false

statements are left uncorrected and victims

continue to be deceived — the deceitful conduct

must be regarded as continuing. Under the

majority's analysis, the deceitful conduct in such

a case would apparently be regarded as finished

once the original false statements were made —

although the deceitful conduct would apparently

be regarded as continuing if the original false

statements were not entirely convincing and

therefore had to be repeated over and over. This

approach does not seem to make sense.‘

The second part of the majority’s analysis is also

flawed. The majority labors to show that if the

allegations against Cohen and Noon are

disregarded, the remaining factual allegations

4. The term “innocent mailings” confuses analysis of the

question before us. This is a term of art that was used in

Schmuck v. United States, ___ U.S. ____, 109 S.Ct. 1443 (1989),

and related cases to refer to mailings that contain no false

information but form part of the execution of the criminal

scheme. See ____ U.S. at ___, 109 S.Ct. at 1449. Since such

mailings help to execute the criminal scheme, they are not

really innocent.

A-40

against Donnelly would not establish that he

committed mail fraud; the majority then reasons

that the allegations against Donnelly should not

be considered in calculating the duration of the

deceitful activity. Majority typescript at 22-26.

In my view, there is no justification for

examining the specific allegations against Donnelly

_in isolation. Fairly read, the complaint alleges that

Cohen and Noon launched the fraudulent scheme

with outright misrepresentations and _ that

Donnelly later joined the scheme and perpetuated

it by means of statements and conduct that were

misleading in light of what Cohen and Noon had

said and done before. Consequently, I think it is

entirely artificial to judge Donnelly’s alleged

behavior without considering its claimed role in

the entire scheme.

In the present case, the complaint alleged that

the fraudulent scheme and the mailings in

furtherance of the scheme continued for 19

months. That period, I—believe, is ample to show

closed-ended continuity.

A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

Sor the Third Circuit

A-41

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 90-1396

KEHR PACKAGES, INC.,

CHARLES and EMILY McMURTRIE,

and JAMES McMURTRIE,

Appellants

v.

FIDELCOR, INC.,

FIDELITY BANK, THOMAS DONNELLY,

NEIL COHEN, JAMES NOON, and MARIO GIANNINI, Esq.

(D.C. Civ. No. 89-06219)

SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING

Present: SLOVITER, Chief Judge, BECKER, STAPLETON,

MANSMANN, GREENBERG, HUTCHINSON, SCIRICA,

NYGAARD and ALITO, Circuit Judges

The petition for rehearing filed by appellants in the above-

entitled case having been submitted to the judges who partici-

pated in the decision of this Court and to all the other available

circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service, and no

judge who concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing,

and a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit in regular

service not having voted for rehearing, the petition for rehearing

by the panel and the Court in banc, is denied.

BY THE COURT,

a

Circuit Judge

Dated: MAR 27 1991

A-42

| IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KEHR PACKAGES, INC., et al : Civil Action

Plaintiffs :

No. 89-6219

Vv.

FIDELCOR, INC. et al :

Defendants : FILED MAY 14 1990

ORDER

And now, this 14th day of May, 1990, upon consideration of

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs’ Response, and

Plaintiffs’) Motion to File an Amended Complaint and the

Responses of both sides, it is ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction is GRANTED; and

2. Plaintiffs’ Motion to File an Amended Complaint is

DENIED, because it fails to establish a valid claim under

18 U.S.C.A. §1961, et seq., and therefore fails to correct

the defects in the original complaint.

: \ |

* fase vp oy ALL

ROBERT F. KELLY, |

United States District Judge

FILED 5/15/90

CLERK OF COURT

ohne

A-43

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KEHR PACKAGES, et al. : Civil Action

Plaintiffs, — : No. 89-6219

Te

FIDELCOR, INC., et al. :

: FILED JUN 28 1990.

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

R.F. KELLY, J. JUNE 28, 1990

Kehr Packages, a plaintiff in this case, was a Pennsylvania

corporation located in Horsham, Pennsylvania which made

flexible packaging material made of paper and plastic film. Most

of what Kehr Packages made was used by businesses which in

turn produced meat, snack foods, and confectioneries. Charles

and James McMurtrie, who are also plaintiffs, purchased Kehr

Packages in 1986.

The McMurtries purchased Kehr Packages after obtaining a

loan from the Fidelity Bank, a defendant in this case. The

McMutrtries allege that the Fidelity Bank agreed to lend them

$4,165,000 to complete the purchase, including a $350,000 line

of credit which was to be used as “as working capital with which

to operate the business as an ongoing entity.”! Settlement on the

sale occurred on December 12, 1986.

Plaintiffs’ case arises out of what happened at the Decernber

12 settlement. Plaintiffs say the settlement was temporarily

disrupted when James McMurtrie, who was presumably looking

over the loan agreement, noticed that while the Bank was

providing a loan in the agreed-upon amount, the Bank was not

providing a $350,000 line of credit. At that point, the plaintiffs

1. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint,

Exhibit A (proposed amended complaint), p. 5.

A-44

“recessed the Settlement, and a conference was held” between

the McMurtries and two Bank officials.? Plaintiffs contend the

Bank “made an oral commitment to make an additional loan to

plaintiffs in the amount of approximately $185,000” to bring the

working capital up to $350,000. With assurances that “only the

paperwork” needed to be completed to obtain the additional

$185,000, the plaintiffs went ahead with the settlement.®

Plaintiffs maintain they never got the extra $185,000 de-

spite what was said at settlement, and contrary to “numerous”

phone conversations which took place from the time of settle-

ment through August 1987. Around that time, a new bank officer

was given responsibility for their loan,‘ a man plaintiffs thought

was “a high level Management Consultant who had lending

authority,” but who in reality worked in the Asset Recovery

Division, where “his function was to protect and/or recover

assets of Defendant Fidelity Bank and not to assist Plaintiffs in

operating their business.”5

The Bank declared Kehr Packages’ loans in default on July

20, 1988, an announcement which was made at a meeting the

plaintiffs attended along with a prospective buyer of the com-

pany. Plaintiffs contend this announcement was made “solely for

the purpose” of wrecking the proposed sale and as a result, the

deal fell through. Subsequently, the Bank ordered layoffs, a

cessation of operations, and a liquidation budget. The Bank then

seized the plaintiffs’ bank accounts and assets, executed or

attempted to execute judgments on their real estate, sold the

real estate and machinery of Kehr Packages, garnished rents due

another company owned by Charles and his wife, Emily Mc-

Murtrie, and forced all three McMurtries into bankruptcy.®

The plaintiffs claim that the Fidelity Bank never intended

to lend them the money for the working capital, but only

promised to do so in order to “induce Plaintiffs to complete the

settlement and to insure that Fidelity Bank would be the

2. Neil Cohen, a Commercial Loan Officer, and James Noon, a Vice-

President of Fidelity Bank. Both are defendants.

3. Plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint, p. 10.

4. Defendant Thomas Dounelly, a Vice-President of the Fidelity Bank.

5. Plaintiffs’ proposed amended comfiaint, p. 13.

6. Plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint, pp. 17-18.

aaa tai i

A-45

recipient of large monthly interest payments, profits, and col-

lateral of Plaintiffs.”? They further allege that when the Bank

mailed monthly invoices to the plaintiffs which set forth the

amounts of principal and interest due on the loans, the Bank

used the United States mails in furtherance of their unlawful

objectives. The plaintiffs filed this case on August 24, 1989 and

charged the defendants with violations of the Racketeer Influ-

enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §1961

et. seq., and several pendent state claims including fraud,

misrepresentation, and breach of contract.®

The defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. Because federal jurisdiction over this case

stands or falls on the adequacy of plaintiffs’ RICO allegations, I

examined only those allegations when I considered the defen-

dants’ motion. However, while I did consider the allegations

contained in plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint, which

were somewhat more specific than the original complaint, I

agree with defendants’ contention that the amended complaint

does nothing to expand the nature of plaintiffs’ claim to some-

thing which constitutes a valid claim under the RICO statutes.

The theory of plaintiffs’ case is this: the Fidelity Bank

agreed to lend us an amount of money so we cou!d buy Kehr

Packages. The Fidelity Bank did in fact lend us an amount of

money, but the amount of money allocated towards working

capital was $185,000 less than they agreed to provide. The

Fidelity Bank intentionally short-changed us by $185,000 be-

cause while they wanted us to proceed with the purchase of

Kehr Packages so they could collect substantial monthly pay-

ments on the loans, they also wanted us to default on our loans

so they could close down our business, liquidate our assets, and

drive us into bankruptcy.

7. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss, p. 7.

8. The original complaint contained counts alleging “tortious interfer-

ence with perspective,” “contractual relations,” breaches good faith and fair

dealing, fiduciary duty, express warranty, and promissory estoppel. Later, the

plaintiffs offered an amended complaint which dropped two of the original

defendants, two of the state claims, and attempted to plead with more

specificity the remaining claims, particularly the RICO claims.

A-46

The RICO statute imposes criminal and civil liability upon

those engaging in “prohibited activities,” which must include

proof of either “a pattern of racketeering activity” or “collection

of an unlawful debt.” H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone

Co., ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 2897 (1989). “Racke-

teering activity” can be any act indictable under a federal

statute. A “pattern” requires at least two predicate acts within a

10-year period. Id.

Plaintiffs attempted to satisfy the requirement of a racke-

teering act by alleging that the defendants committed mail fraud

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1341. The mail fraud statute provides

criminal penalties for devising “any scheme or artifice to de-

fraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or

fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” The statute

has been expansively construed to prohibit all schemes to

defraud by any means of misrepresentation that in some way

involves the use of the postal system. United States v. Boffa, 688

F.2d 919, 925 (38d Cir. 1982). Plaintiffs contend the bank’s

mailings of a monthly statement on the loan, and the plaintiffs’

payments by check through the mail constitute the predicate

acts of mail fraud. It would be fair to say that many Courts have

found this theory unconvincing. See United States v. Kreimer,

609 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1980); Blount Financial Services, Inc. v.

Walter E. Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1987); See also,

Marshall-Silver Construction Company, Inc. v. Mendel, 894

F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1990). In the Blount decision, the Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated that a RICO plaintiff relying

on the mail fraud statute must allege false statements “rea-

sonably calculated to deceive a business entity . . . of ordinary

prudence and comprehension.” Blount, supra, at 153.

Plaintiffs offer no evidence to suggest the statements the

bank mailed out were inaccurate, or fraudulent in any way, or

even that the bank was not acting within its rights when

plaintiffs’ loan was declared in default. Their claims are based on

oral promises the defendants allegedly made, not the written

communications which passed between the parties. Transform-

ing the rather mundane act of a bank in mailing out a monthly

statement into an act of mail fraud, and from there into a

a

A-47

racketeering act, is more an exercise in creative lawyering than

an effective allegation in a RICO case.

It is clear the plaintiffs’ allegations are also lacking when

they are studied in light of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals

recent decision in the Marshall-Silver case, which examined the

“continuity” element in a RICO case. As Judge Stapleton wrote,

“virtually every garden-variety fraud is accomplished through a

series of wire or mail fraud acts that are related by purpose and

are spread out over a period of at least several months.”

Marshall-Silver, supra, at 597. Given the “natural and common

sense approach” to RICO’s pattern element that the Supreme

Court pointed to in its decision in H.J. Inc., and the Court of

Appeals’ observation in Marshall-Silver that “it is unlikely that

Congress intended RICO to apply in the absence of a more

significant societal threat.” Id. at 596, it is clear the plaintiffs’

allegations do not support a RICO claim.

Plaintiffs allege the Fidelity Bank’s scheme to defraud took

place from December 1986 and is continuing to the present.

Even accepting the plaintiffs’ version of the facts as true, and

assuming the Fidelity Bank intended from the beginning of its

dealings with the McMurtries to lure them into a bottomless pit

of debt so they could foreclose on Kehr Packages and liquidate

its assets, there is nothing in this case which would establish

“long-term criminal conduct” of the sort the Supreme Court

described in H.J. Inc. . There is nothing here which would

indicate the threat of a repetition of criminal conduct in the

future, or a showing that what the Fidelity Bank did to the

plaintiffs was the Bank’s regular way of conducting its business.

H.J. Inc., supra, at 2906; see also Swistock v. Jones, 884 F.2d

755 (3d Cir. 1989). For these reasons, I granted defendants’

Motion to Dismiss on May 14, 1990.

BY THE COURT:

AFtcam 2 FEC

ROBERT F. KELLY, J.

United States District Judge

A-48

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KEHR PACKAGES, INC.

and

CHARLES and EMILY MCMURTRIE

and : CIVIL ACTION

JAMES MCMURTRIE : NO. 89-6219

vs.

FIDELITY BANK, N.A. :

and : JURY TRIAL

THOMAS DONNELLY ; DEMANDED

and

NEIL COHEN

and

JAMES NOON

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs, by their attorneys, Pietro A. Barbieri, Esquire,

and Joel Harvey Slomsky, Esquire, respectfully state as follows:

PARTIES

1. Plaintiff, Kehr Packages, Inc., is a Pennsylvania corpo-

ration, which conducted its business from its corporate head-

quarters at 1196 Easton Road, Horsham, Pennsylvania 19044,

until about January, 1989. The company manufactured flexible

packaging material made of paper and plastic film, principally for

the meat, snack food and confectionery industries.

2. Plaintiff, Charles McMurtrie, resides at 1423 Schwenk.

mill Road, Perkasie, Pennsylvania 18944, and at all times

relevant was a principal and fifty per cent (50%) shareholder of

the corporation, Kehr Packages, Inc.

3. Plaintiff, James McMurtrie, resides at 2220 Hendrick

Station Road, Woxall, Pennsylvania 18979, and at all times

relevant was a principal and fifty per cent (50%) shareholder of

the corporation, Kehr Packages, Inc.

A-49

4. Plaintiff, Emily McMurtrie, is the wife of Plaintiff

Charles McMurtrie and resides at 1423 Schwenkmill Road,

Perkasie, Pennsylvania 18944.

5. Defendant, Fidelity Bank, N.A. (hereinafter “Fidelity

Bank), has its principal place of business at 1200 East Lancaster

Avenue, Rosemont, Pennsylvania, and is a national banking

association organized and existing under the laws of the United

States.

6. Fidelcor, Inc., was a bank holding company duly orga-

nized and existing under the laws of the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania and had its principal place of business located at

1200 East Lancaster Avenue, Rosemont, Pennsylvania.

7. On February 29, 1988 Fidelcor Inc. merged with First

Fidelity Bancorporation, a bank holding company duly orga-

nized and existing under the laws of the State of New Jersey

which had its principal offices located in the State of New Jersey.

8. As a result of the merger on February 29, 1988, the

holding company First Fidelity Bancorporation was formed.

This holding company is duly organized and existing under the

laws of the State of New Jersey and has its principal offices

located at 550 Broad Street, Newark, New Jersey.

9. Defendant, Thomas Donnelly, is a Vice-President of

Defendant Fidelity Bank, and his place of business is located at

Broad and Walnut Streets, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. At all

times relevant hereto, Defendant Thomas Donnelly was an

agent, employee, servant, and/or officer of Fidelity Bank and

employed in the Asset Recovery Group of the Loan Adminis-

tration Division, and was acting within the scope of his employ-

ment and on behalf of Defendant Fidelity Bank.

10. Defendant, Neil Cohen, was a Commercial Loan Of-

ficer employed by Defendant Fidelity Bank and his place of

business was located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. At all times

relevant hereto, Defendant Neil Cohen was an agent, em-

ployee, servant and/or officer of Defendant, Fidelity Bank and

employed in the Commercial Loan Division, and was acting

within the scope of his employment and on behalf of Defendant

Fidelity Bank.

11. Defendant, James Noon, was a Vice-President of De-

fendant Fidelity Bank, and his place of business was located in

A-50

Philadciphia, Pennsylvania. At all times relevant hereto, Defen-

dant James Noon was an agent, employee, servant and/or officer

of Defendant Fidelity Bank, and was acting within the scope of

his employment and on behalf of Defendant Fidelity Bank.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

12. This Court has jurisdiction over the RICO causes of

action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 and 18 U.S.C.

Section 1964(c).

13. This Court has jurisdiction over the remaining causes of

action under principles of Pendent Jurisdiction.

14. Venue of this suit is proper in the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1965(a) and 28

U.S.C. Section 1391(b), in that the claims arose in this district

and all Defendants or their agents reside in, are found in or

transact business in this district.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

15. On or about December 12, 1986, Plaintiffs, James and

Charles McMurtrie, entered into an Agreement of Sale to

purchase the corporate entity Kehr Packages, Inc., along with

all of its real, personal or mixed property, assets and stock.

16. In order to finance the sale described in the preceding

paragraph, Plaintiffs, James and Charles McMurtrie, on or about

November 7, 1986 made application to Defendant, Fidelity

Bank, for financing necessary to complete the purchase and to

provide Plaintiffs with at least a ($350,000.00) Three Hundred

Fifty Thousand Dollar line of credit to be used as working capital

with which to operate the business as an ongoing entity.

17. Plaintiffs requested financing from Defendant Fidelity

Bank in the amount of ($4,165,000) Four Million One Hundred

Sixty-Five Thousand Dollars which was to be used as follows:

1) $3,750,000 to purchase the stock of Kehr Packages, Inc.

2) $350,000 to replace the existing line of credit as working

capital

3) $65,000 to finance estimated closing costs.

A-51

18. Defendant Fidelity Bank agreed to finance the acquisi-

tion of Kehr Packages, Inc. by Plaintiffs James and Charles

McMurtrie under the terms described in the preceding para-

graphs. The loan was approved by Defendants Neil Cohen,

James Noon and their superiors, all of whom had either nego-

tiated the financing to be provided by Defendant Fidelity Bank

or had been involved in reviewing the terms of the loan.

19. Defendants Neil Cohen and James Noon acted on

behalf of themselves and Defendant Fidelity Bank, in placing

the loan, in structuring the loan and in obtaining collateral from

Plaintiffs to secure the loan.

20. With full knowledge of Defendants, the proceeds of the

loan were used to purchase the shares and assets of Kehr

Packages, Inc. through a leveraged buyout (LBO). A leverage

buyout is defined here as a transaction where the bank customer

has acquired the majority of stock and assets of another company

by having the transaction financed one hundred per cent by the

bank, resulting in the customer having a debt equal to the

amount of the financing.

21. Defendants Cohen and Noon structured the terms of

the loan to conform to the procedures, policies and require-

ments of Defendant Fidelity Bank. The essential terms relevant

here were as follows:

a) A credit line in the amount of $600,000 was ap-

proved and secured by accounts receivable and

inventory.

b) A term loan in the amount of $2,175,000 was

approved with a (5) five year maturity and secured

by machinery and equipment.

c) A term loan in the amount of $750,000 was ap-

proved with a (5) five year maturity and secured by

real estate owned by Charles and Emily McMurtrie

as husband and wife.

d) A term loan in the amount of $640,000 was ap-

proved with a (7) seven year maturity and secured

by the land and building owned by Kehr Packages,

Inc. as well as another property known as “Aamco”

A-52

owned by Charles and Emily McMurtrie as hus-

band and wife.

e) All loans were also secured by personal guarantees

of Charles, James and Emily McMurtrie in the

amount of $4,000,000 each.

22. The value of the collateral pledged by Plaintiffs ex-

ceeded the value of the $4,165,000 loan by at least $250,000.

23. The $600,000 line of credit made available was to be

used specifically to finance all closing costs, to pay off all existing

bank debts of Kehr Packages, Inc. incurred by the prior owner,

and to provide a $350,000 line of credit as working capital to

Plaintiff Kehr Packages Inc. under the new owners, Plaintiffs

James and Charles McMurtrie.

24. The various amounts of money ultimately lent to

Plaintiffs was the result of Defendants’ estimate of those funds

necessary to consummate the purchase of Kehr Packages, Inc.

and to provide it with sufficient working capital in order to

operate the business.

25. Defendants, Fidelity Bank, Neil Cohen and James

Noon, knew that after settlement Kehr Packages, Inc. would be

required to generate sufficient sales and income in order to pay

to Defendant Fidelity Bank minimurn monthly payments to-

wards the loans of at least $50,000, for a yearly total payment of

at least $600,000.

26. The purchase of the company by James and Charles

McMurtrie and the financing of the purchase by Defendant

Fidelity Bank occurred on December 12, 1986. Present at

settlement were Plaintiffs, James, Charles and Emily McMur-

trie and Defendants, Neil Cohen and James Noon, acting on

behalf of themselves and Defendant Fidelity Bank.

27. At the settlement described in the preceding para-

graph, and prior to its completion, Plaintiff James McMurtrie

discovered that there were insufficient funds to complete the

transaction and fund the minimum amount of working capital as

described in Paragraph 17 in that $350,000 would not be

available as working capital to operate Kehr Packages, Inc.

Plaintiff James McMurtrie informed Defendants Cohen and

Noon that unless he had $350,000 in working capital by way of

A-53

the credit line, he could not operate Kehr Packages, Inc. at a

profit and would not agree to complete the settlement and

purchase of the company.

28. Defendants Cohen, Noon and Fidelity Bank knew at

that time, based upon financial information made available to

them by Plaintiffs and their own financial projections, that Kehr

Packages, Inc. would operate at a cash deficit for 1987. For this

reason the necessity of a minimum working capital of $350,000

was even more evident. In fact, the business was doomed to fail

without the full amount of working capital.

29. Plaintiffs, James and Charles McMurtrie, recessed the

Settlement, and a conference was held among Plaintiffs, James

and Charles McMurtrie, and Defendants Neil Cohen and James

Noon. At that time and during the conference, Defendants Neil

Cohen and James Noon on behalf of themselves and Defendant

Fidelity Bank made an oral commitment to make an additional

loan to Plaintiffs in the amount of approximately $185,000 in

order to provide Plaintiffs with a total of $350,000 in working

capital which was to be secured by existing collateral already

pledged.

30. The transaction to bring the credit line up to the amount

of $350,000 in working capital was to be accomplished by the

creation of a new term note in the approximate amount of

$185,000, the proceeds of which were to be placed in the line of

credit to bring the working capital up to $350,000.

31. Thereafter, and in reliance upon the commitment of

Defendants Neil Cohen and James Noon, Plaintiffs James and

Charles McMurtrie, now doing business through their corpora-

tion, Plaintiff Kehr Packages, Inc., began the operation of their

business. This undertaking was initiated in reliance by Plaintiffs

on the oral contract of Defendants Noon, Cohen and Fidelity

Bank that the additional $185,000 was available and only the

paperwork had to be completed to place the funds in the line of

credit.

32. From December 12, 1986, the day of settlement,

through August, 1987, Plaintiff James McMurtrie had numerous

telephone conversations with either Defendants Neil Cohen or

James Noon in which Mr. McMurtrie requested that the

A-54

additional $185,000 be made available as committed by Defen-

dants. Mr. McMurtrie was informed each time by Defendants

Noon and Cohen that the money was available as relied upon.

33. In fact, at no time did Defendants Noon or Cohen

intend to fulfill their oral commitment to lend the additional

monies to Kehr Packages, Inc. as working capital, but, in fact,

made such commitments in order to induce Plaintiffs to com-

plete the settlement and to insure that Defendant Fidelity Bank

. would be the recipient of large monthly interest payments,

profits and collateral of Plaintiffs, all to the benefit of Defen-

dants, Noon, Cohen and Fidelity Bank, and the parent holding

company.

34. In furtherance of the scheme and artifice to defraud

Plaintiffs, and in furtherance of its objectives as described in the

preceding paragraph and those that follow, from December,

1986 to July, 1988, Defendants used the United States mails to

mail from Fidelity Bank to Kehr Packages, Inc. monthly invoices

setting forth the amounts of principal and interest due and owing

on each of the loans made to Kehr Packages, Inc. and caused to

be mailed from Kehr Packages, Inc. to Fidelity Bank checks

reflecting amounts in payment of principal and interest on the

loans.

35. By April and August, 1987, respectively, Defendants

Cohen and Noon left their employment at Fidelity Bank and

responsibility for the Kehr Packages, Inc. loan file was turned

over to a Commercial Loan Officer named James Hayes.

_ 86. Thereafter, and within a few weeks of his assuming

responsibility for the loan, in or about September, 1987, Mr.

Hayes turned responsibility of the Kehr Packages, Inc. loan over

to Thomas Donnelly, a Vice-President of Pefendant Fidelity

Bank.

37. At this point Plaintiff James McMurtrie repeatedly

demanded that Defendants Donnelly and Fidelity Bank comply

with the agreement to fund the line of credit to provide working

capital of $350,000.

38. In response to these demands of Plaintiff James

McMurtrie, Defendant Donnelly promised in person and dur-

ing numerous telephone conversations that he would review the

credit file and terms and conditions of the loans to determine

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whether additional funds would be advanced by Defendant

Fidelity Bank towards the line of credit as working capital.

39. In this regard, Mr. Donnelly told Plaintiff James

McMurtrie that he would have another appraisal done on the

machinery and equipment of Kehr Packages, Inc. Mr. Donnelly

also told Plaintiff James McMurtrie to draft a “plan of attack” for

1988 to show him how the company could be turned around

financially and make a profit if infused with additional working

capital in combination with cuts in salaries, personnel and other

expenses. P.

40. Plaintiffs in good faith complied with the requests of

Defendant Donnelly and had the reappraisal done and prepared

a “plan of attack” for 1988.

41. Neither Defendant Donnelly nor anyone else employed

by or acting on behalf of Defendant Fidelity Bank ever informed

Plaintiffs that Mr. Donnelly worked in the Asset Recovery

Group of the Loan Administration Division and his function was

to protect and/or recover assets of Defendants Fidelity Bank and

not to assist Plaintiffs in operating their business. Mr. Donnelly

had no lending authority and was not a Commercial Loan

Officer. Plaintiffs at all times believed that Mr. Donnelly was a

high level Management Consultant who had lending authority.

42. Unbeknownst to Plaintiffs, Mr. Donnelly had a

“knockdown” appraisal done on the equipment and machinery

in order to determine the liquidation value of these assets. The

“plan of attack” was another part of the course of conduct of Mr.

Donnelly aimed at misleading Plaintiffs into believing that he

would attempt to secure additional working capital. In fact, atno .

time, did Defendant Donnelly ever intend to assist Plaintiffs in

obtaining additional working capital.

43. Plaintiffs did not learn that Mr. Donnelly was working

for the Asset Recovery Unit until after the bank declared the

loans in default in July, 1988.

44. In fact, Defendant Donnelly’s strategy with respect to

this loan was to lull Plaintiffs into a: false sense of security in

believing that Defendant Fidelity Bank would fund additional

working capital when, in fact, his real purpose was to secure the

position of the bank against the existing collateral and personal

guarantees of Plaintiffs. Mr. Donnelly knew from his review of

A-56

the file that without the additional working capital Kehr Pack-

ages, Inc. could not survive financially and would be forced to

terminate its operations.

45. Defendants’ scheme as described in the preceding

paragraphs continued through 1988 and to the present. On

December 2 and December 9, 1987, Defendant Donnelly on

behalf of himself and Defendant Fidelity Bank, in furtherance of

the scheme and artifice to defraud, used the United States Postal

Service to mail to Plaintiffs two letters in regard to payments of

interest and principal. On July 20, 1988, Defendant Donnelly,

on behaif of himself and Defendant Fidelity Bank, in further-

ance of the scheme and artifice to defraud, used the United

States Postal Service to mail to Plaintiffs a “Notice of Default,

and confessed judgments against the properties pledged as

collateral for the loans. Defendant Donnelly also used the

United States Postal Service to mail to Plaintiffs other letters and

mail matter in furtherance of the scheme and artifice to defraud.

46. As a direct and proximate result of the actions of

Defendants, Plaintiff Kehr Packages, Inc. was underfinanced

and could not meet its expenses, including the repayment of the

debt to Fidelity Bank, and payment for sufficient raw materials

to produce adequate amounts of inventory and finished goods for

sale in order to operate the company and make a profit.

47. Defendant Fidelity Bank’s parent holding companies,

Fidelcor Inc. and First Fidelity Bancorporation, conducted and

continues to conduct an internal loan audit review which

monitors and rates the loans of its subsidiaries. The loan review

group of the parent holding company is independent of the

lending units and management structure of subsidiary Fidelity

Bank.

48. As a direct result of the audit of the loan to Kehr

Packages, Inc. described herein conducted by the audit review

group of Fidelcor Inc. and First Fidelity Bancorporation, credit

reports were prepared which were relied upon by some and/or

all defendants in implementing the scheme to defraud Plaintiffs.

49. In view of the deteriorating financial position of Kebr

Packages, Inc., by the summer of 1988 a buyer or investor was

sought to purchase the company.

A-57

50. Plaintiffs obtained a ready, willing and able buyer

and/or investor for Kehr Packages, Inc. and, upon demand of

Defendants Donnelly and Fidelity Bank, Plaintiffs were re-

quired to present the buyers or investors to Defendants Don-

nelly and Fidelity Bank. Plaintiffs complied with Defendants’

demand and on July 20, 1988 a meeting was held with the

prospective buyer and its principals.

51. At the meeting, Defendant Donnelly announced that

Defendant Fidelity Bank was calling the loans due, which had

been placed on a “demand” basis, and declaring Plaintiffs in

default in repaying the loans. Furthermore, it was announced

for the first time by Defendant Donnelly that he had been acting

for months on the pretense of being a management consultant,

when in fact, he was a Vice-President of Fidelity Bank's “Asset

Recovery Group.”

52. In spite of these announcements, which were made

solely for the purpose of prejudicing the proposed right to

transfer the corporate stock, the buyer of corporate stock and

investor continued in the transaction. The buyer offered terms

that would ‘save the corporation from financial ruin and at the

same time cure the default. The terms of the transfer of stock

were such as to provide the bank with additional security,

without prejudicing its creditor position.

53. Despite knowing that time was of the essence and that

the buyer had a specific deadline in purchasing the stock and

completing the transaction, Defendant Donnelly on his own

behalf and on behalf of Defendant Fidelity Bank requested time

to evaluate its position with regard to the transfer by doing an

expedited due diligence investigation of the buyer.

54. Thereafter, Defendant Donnelly and Fidelity Bank

unreasonably delayed their approval of the transaction, causing

the Agreement of Sale to lapse and the buyer to withdraw its

offer and causing further damage to Plaintiffs.

55. In September, 1988, Defendant Donnelly contacted

Plaintiffs and further exercised contro] over Plaintiff Kehr

Packages, Inc. by ordering the layoff of key personnel, the

cessation of all current operations, and the submission of a

liquidetion budget.

A-58

56. Pursuant to the Defendants’ scheme to defraud, which

is continuing to the present, Defendants have seized personal

bank accounts and assets of Plaintiffs Charles, James and Emily

McMurtrie; have executed and attempted to execute judgments

on the real estate of Charles and Emily McMurtrie; have sold

the real estate and machinery and equipment of Kehr Packages,

Inc., garnished rents due a company which is two-thirds owned

by Charles and Emily McMurtrie, and forced Plaintiffs James,

Charles and Emily McMurtrie to declare bankruptcy.

COUNT I

RICO — 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1962(a)

57. Paragraphs 1 through 56 of this Complaint are incorpo-

rated by reference as though fully set forth herein.

58. As described above, Defendants, jointly and severally,

knowingly and wilfully devised or intended to devise a scheme

and artifice to defraud, or to obtain money or property of

Plaintiff by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, represen-

tations and promises, and in furtherance thereof used and

caused to be used the United States mails in violation of 18

U.S.C. Sections 1341 and 2. Defendants participated in the

scheme and artifice to defraud with knowledge of its fraudulent

nature and with specific intent to defraud Plaintiffs.

59. The acts of mail fraud as described in paragraphs 15 to

56 of this Complaint committed by each Defendant constitute

acts of racketeering activity within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.

Section 1961(1).

60. Defendants Fidelity Bank, Thomas Donnelly, Neil

Cohen and James Noon are “persons” as that term is defined in

18 U.S.C. Section 1961(3).

61. Fidelity Bank, and the parent bank holding companies,

Fidelcor, Inc. and First Fidelity Bancorporation, and the Com-

mercial Loan Department and Asset Recovery Group, together

were all associated in fact and formed an enterprise as defined in

18 U.S.C. Section 1961(4).

62. At all times relevant to this Complaint, each Defendant

was associated with the aforementioned enterprise, the activities

A-59

of which affected interstate commerce. The enterprise bene-

fitted from the pattern of racketeering activity described herein.

63. From in or about December, 1986 through the present,

Defendants Fidelity Bank, Thomas Donnelly, Neil Cohen and

James Noon received or caused to be received income derived

directly or indirectly from the pattern of racketeering activity in

which they participated as principals or as aiders and abettors

within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. Section 2. These funds

consisted of the payments of interest and principal to Fidelity

Bank by Plaintiffs and other funds obtained by Defendants from

Plaintiffs pursuant to collection procedures after declaring the

loans in default.

64. Defendants, individually and/or in conspiracy with each

other, used and/or invested proceeds of the aforementioned

income, directly or indirectly, in the operation of the enterprise

described in paragraph 61 in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section

1962(a).

65. Plaintiffs have been injured in their business and

property by reason of Defendants’ violation of 18 U.S.C. Section

1962(a).

66. As a proximate cause of Defendants’ violation of 18

U.S.C. Section 1962(a), Plaintiffs, Kehr Packages, Inc., James

McMurtrie and Charles and Emily McMurtrie have suffered

and will continue to suffer damages for which Defendants are

liable.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, Kehr Packages, Inc., James

McMurtrie and Charles and Emily McMurtrie request that

judgment be entered in their favor and against all Defendants,

jointly and severally, in the amount of at least ($6,000,000) Six

Million Dollars, which constitutes actual damages to Plaintiffs,

treble damages which would amount to at least ($18,000,000)

Eighteen Million Dollars, reasonable attorney's fees, costs of

this suit and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the

highest lawful rate, all as allowed under 18 U.S.C. Section

1964(c).

A-60

COUNT II

RICO — 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1962(b)

67. Paragraphs 1 through 66 of the Complaint are incorpo-

rated by reference as though fully set forth herein.

68. From in or about December, 1986 through the present,

Defendants Fidelity Bank, Thomas Donnelly, Neil Cohen and

James Noon, individually and/or in conspiracy with each other,

acquired and/or maintained, directly and indirectly, an interest

in and control of the enterprise described in paragraph 61

through the aforementioned pattern of racketeering activity in

violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(b).

69. Plaintiffs have been injured in their business and

property by reason of Defendants’ violation of 18 U.S.C. Section

1962(b).

70. As a proximate cause of Defendants’ violation of 18

U.S.C. Section 1962(b), Plaintiffs, Kehr Packages, Inc., James

McMurtrie and Charles and Emily McMurtrie have suffered

and will continue to suffer damages for which Defendants are

liable.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, Kehr Packages, Inc., James

McMurtrie and Charles and Emily McMurtrie request that

judgment be entered in their favor and against all Defendants,

jointly and severally, in the amount of at least ($6,000,000) Six

Million Dollars, which constitutes actual damages to Plaintiffs,

treble damages which would amount to at least ($18,000,000)

Eighteen Million Dollars, reasonable attorney's fees, costs of

this suit and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the

highest lawful rate, all as allowed under 18 U.S.C. Section

1964(c).

COUNT III

RICO — 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1962(c)

71. Paragraphs 1 through 70 of the Complaint are incorpo-

rated by reference as though fully set forth herein.

72. From in or about December, 1986 through the present,

Defendants, Fidelity Bank, Thomas Donnelly, Neil Cohen and

James Noon, individually and/or in conspiracy with each other,

A-61

conducted and/or participated in the affairs of the enterprise

described in Paragraph 61 through the aforementioned pattern

of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(c).

73. Plaintiffs have been injured in their business and

property by reason of Defendants’ violation of 18 U.S.C. Section

1962(c).

74. As a proximate cause of Defendants’ violation of 18

U.S.C. Section 1962(c), Plaintiffs, Kehr Packages, Inc., James

McMurtrie and Charles and Emily McMurtrie have suffered

and will continue to suffer damages for which Defendants are

liable.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, Kehr Packages, Inc., James

McMurtrie and Charles and Emily McMurtrie request that

judgment be entered in their favor and against all Defendants,

jointly and severally, in the amount of at least ($6,000,000) Six

Million Dollars, which constitutes actual damages to the Plain-

tiffs, treble damages which would amount to at least

($18,000,000) Eighteen Million Dollars, reasonable attorney’s

fees, costs of this suit, and pre-judgment and post-judgment

interest at the highest lawful rate, all‘ as allowed under 18 U.S.C.

Section 1964(c).

COUNT IV

RICO — 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1962(d)

75. Paragraphs 1 through 74 of this Complaint are incorpo-

rated by reference as though fully set forth herein.

76. From in or about December 1986 through the present,

Defendants Fidelity Bank, Thomas Donnelly, Neil Cohen and

James Noon, and others combined, conspired, confederated and

agreed to commit violations of 18 U.S.C. Sections 1962(a), (b)

and (c) as set forth above.

77. It was the plan, purpose and object of the conspiracy to

injure Plaintiffs in their business and property as fully described

in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

78. In furtherance of the conspiracy, Defendants commit-

ted overt acts as described in preceding paragraphs of this

Complaint through the roles each Defendant occupied in the

conspiracy as aforementioned.

A-62

79. Plaintiffs have been injured in their business and

property by reason of Defendants’ violation of 18 U.S.C. Section

1962(d).

80. As a proximate cause of Defendants’ violation of 18

U.S.C. Section 1962(d), Plaintiffs; Kehr Packages, Inc., James

McMurtrie and Charles and Emily McMurtrie have suffered

and will continue to suffer damages for which Defendants are

liable.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, Kehr Packages, Inc., James

McMurtrie and Charles and Emily McMurtrie request that

judgment be entered in their favor and against all Defendants,

jointly and severally, in the amount of at least ($6,000,000) Six

Million Dollars, which constitutes actual damages to the Plain-

tiffs, treble damages which would amount to at least

($18,000,000) Eighteen Million Dollars, reasonable attorney’s

fees, costs of this suit and pre-judgment and post-judgment

interest at the highest lawful rate, all as allowed under 18 U.S.C.

Section 1964(c).

COUNT V:

FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION

81. Paragraph 1 through 80 of this Complaint are incorpo-

rated herein by reference and realleged as though fully set forth

herein.

82. Defendants have intentionally and with reckless disre-

gard for the truth made material misrepresentations to Plaintiffs.

By virtue of the conduct described above, Defendants, Fidelity

Bank, Thomas Donnelly, Neil Cohen and James Noon, individ-

ually and in conspiracy with each other, have committed fraud

and misrepresentations against Plaintiffs, Kehr Packages, Inc.,

James McMurtrie, and Charles and Emily McMurtrie.

83. Defendants commission of fraud and misrepresentation

was intentional, willful and malicious. Defendants’ misrepresen-

tations, omissions and fraudulent conduct included, among

other things, the following:

a) Defendants Cohen and Noon repeatedly orally

committed to Plaintiff James McMurtrie to provide Plaintiff

¢

A-63

Kehr Packages, Inc. with an additional line of credit in

order to afford the company a working capital of $350,000,

when in fact, they never intended to do so.

b) Defendant Donnelly failed to disclose to Plaintiffs

that he was employed by the Asset Recovery Group and

- that his responsibility was to protect and recover collatera-

lized assets and not to advance additional loans to Plaintiffs

and assist them in the operation of Kehr Packages, Inc.

c) Defendant Donnelly failed to disclose that he had no

lending authority and in fact, led Plaintiffs to believe

otherwise.

d) Defendant Donnelly repeatedly told Plaintiff James

McMurtrie that Donnelly would determine whether addi-

tional working capital could be advanced to Kehr Packages,

Inc. after an appraisal was done on the machinery and

equipment when, in fact, he never intended to lend any

additional funds to the company.

e) Defendant Donnelly failed to disclose to Plaintiffs

that this appraisal was also a “knockdown” appraisal and

done for the sole purpose of determining the value of the

items at a liquidation sale.

f) Defendant Donnelly repeatedly told Plaintiff James

McMurtrie that if Mr. McMurtrie submitted a “plan of

attack” for 1988 appropriate to Defendant Fidelity Bank,

Donnelly would determire whether additional working

capital would be advanced to Kehr Packages, Inc. when, in

fact, he never intended to lend additional funds to the

company.

84. Plaintiffs relied to their detriment on Defendants’

material misrepresentations and omissions and was deceived by

Defendants’ fraudulent conduct. As a result of Defendants’

fraudulent actions, Plaintiffs were fraudulently induced and

coerced, among other things, to:

a) Rely upon Fidelity Bank and its agents and employ-

ees to fund the line of credit to provide $350,000 in working

capital.

A-64

b) Continue the operation of Kehr Packages, Inc. to

their financial detriment when Defendants had no intention

of providing the $350,000 working capital.

c) Expend considerable time and money to preserve

the business and defend against the fraudulent actions of

Defendants.

85. Had Plaintiffs known of the material falsity of Defen-

dants’ misrepresentations and the material omissions and had

Plaintiffs been aware of Defendants’ fraudulent and deceitful

conduct, Plaintiffs would:

a) Not have purchased the shares and assets of Kehr

Packages, Inc., and

b) Have taken steps to protect Plainti%s’ financial

investment in Kehr Packages, Inc. at an earlier stage.

86. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ misrep-

resentations, material omissions and fraudulent conduct, Plain-

tiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer damages for which

Defendants are liable.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the

Court enter judgment in their favor and against al! Defendants,

jointly and severally, awarding compensatory and punitive

damages, costs of the lawsuit, reasonable attorneys fees, interest

and other relief as the Court deems appropriate, all in accor-

dance with the request for judgment set forth in Count I.

COUNT VI

NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION

87. Paragraphs 1 through 86 of the Complaint are incorpo-

rated by reference and reallaged as though fully set forth herein.

88. Defendants, their agents, employees and/or servants,

negligently and recklessly made false representations concern-

ing material facts and failed to disclose the said material facts

where they had a duty to do so. The material facts Defendants

misrepresented are set forth in paragraph 83 above.

ll

A-65

89. Plaintiffs relied to their detriment on the material

misrepresentations and omissions made by Defendants as set

forth in paragraph 84 above.

90. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ negli-

gent and reckless misrepresentations and omissions, the Plain-

tiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer damages for which

Defendants are liable.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the

Court enter judgment in their favor and against all Defendants,

jointly and severally, awarding compensatory and punitive

damages, costs of the lawsuit, reasonable attorneys fees, interest

and other relief as the Court deems appropriate, all in accor-

dance with the request for judgment set forth in Count I.

COUNT VII

TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE

CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS

91. Paragraphs 1 through 90 of this Complaint are incorpo-

rated by reference and realleged as though fully forth herein.

92. By virtue of the aforementioned actions and by failing to

act within a reasonable time frame with respect to the prospec-

tive sale of Kehr Packages, Inc. to a ready, willing and able

buyer, Defendants Fidelity Bank and Thomas Donnelly know-

ingly, wilfully and maliciously invaded and interfered with the

contractual relationship of Plaintiff Kehr Packages, Inc. and the

prospective buyer.

93. Defendants Fidelity Bank a" Thomas Donnelly did

further interfere with the contractual relations between Plaintiff

Kehr Packages, Inc. and the prospective buyer by making the

aforementioned prejudicial remarks set forth above in paragraph

51 at the meeting among the Plaintiffs, Defendants and the

prospective buyer. These actions were made by the Defendants

willfully, wantonly, maliciously and with full knowledge of the

damage to be created by the actions and statements of the

Defendants.

94. Additionally, and because of the unreasonable delay by

Defendant Fidelity Bank and its agents and employees in

approving the sale of Kehr Packages, Inc., and the financial

A-66

arrangements proposed to Defendants by the buyer and Plain-

tiffs, the latter were unable to consummate a sale of the

corporation in 1988 and prevent the termination of the operation

of Kehr Packages, Inc. and its financial ruin.

95. As a direct and proximate cause of the actions, inaction

and the statements of Defendants, Fidelity Bank and their

agents, employees and/or servants, all of which were malicious

and intentional, Plaintiffs, Kehr Packages, Inc., James McMur-

trie, and Charles and Emily McMurtrie suffered loss of a

contractual relation between Kehr Packages, Inc. and a bona

fide purchaser resulting in damages for which the Defendants

are liable.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the

Court enter judgment in their favor and against all Defendants,

jointly and severally, awarding compensatory and punitive

damages, costs of the lawsuit, reasunable attorneys fees, interest

and other relief as the Court deems appropriate, all in accor-

dance with the request for judgment set forth in Count I.

COUNT VIII

BREACH OF DEFENDANTS’ DUTY OF

GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING

96. Paragraphs 1 through 95 of this Complaint are incorpo-

rated by reference and realleged as though fully set forth herein.

97. Defendants have breached its covenants of good faith

and fair dealing owed to Plaintiffs under its contractual and other

relationships with Plaintiff by:

a) Creating an inherently unequai bargaining position

to the detriment of Plaintiffs who were required to rely

upon Defendants for sufficient funds as working capital with

which to operate Kehr Packages, Inc.

b) Taking advantage of Plaintiffs’ vulnerable financial

position existing by reason of Defendants’ failure to provide

sufficient funds as working capital with which to operate

Kehr Packages, Inc.

A-67

c) Refusing to provide truthful and honest replies to

Defendants James McMurtrie’s request for additional fi-

nancing so that there was $350,000 in working capital with

which to operate the business.

d) Failing to protect Plaintiffs’ property and assets by

timely approving the sale of Kehr Packages, Inc. when

Defendants Fidelity Bank and Thomas Donnelly knew that

time was of the essence Or the sale would not be consum-

mated by the buyer. -

e) Failing to disclose that Defendant Thomas Donnelly

was an employee in the Asset Recovery Group with no

lending authority.

Defendants intentional failure to do the acts set forth in the

100. As a direct and proximate cause of the Plaintiffs’

reasonable reliance upon Defendants’ good faith obligations,

Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer damages for

which the Defendants are liable.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the

Court enter judgment in their favor and against all Defendants,

jointly and severally, awarding compensatory and punitive

damages, costs of the lawsuit, reasonable attorneys fees, interest

and other relief as the Court deems appropriate, all in accor-

dance with the request for judgment set forth in Count I.

COUNT IX

BREACH OF CONTRACT

101. Paragraphs 1 through 100 of this Complaint are

incorporated by reference and reallaged as though fully set forth

herein.

A-68

102. By and through the conduct described above, Defen-

dants jointly and severally breached, continue to breach and

caused to be breached the oral contracts between Defendants

and Plaintiffs to lend an additional $185,000 so that Plaintiffs

would have sufficient working capital with which to operate the

business.

103. Such breach of contract was purposeful and malicious

and done with intent to defraud Plaintiffs.

104. As a result Defendants’ breach of contract, Plaintiffs

Kehr Packages, Inc., James McMurtrie and Charles and Emily

McMurtrie have suffered and will continue to suffer damages for

which Defendants are liable.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the

Court enter judgment in their favor and against all Defendants,

jointly and severally, awarding compensatory damages, costs of

the lawsuit, reasonable attorneys fees, interest and other relief

as the Court deems appropriate, all in accordance with the

request for judgment set forth in Count I.

COUNT X

PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

105. Paragraphs 1 through 104 of this complaint are incor-

porated by reference and reallaged as though fully set forth

herein.

106. Defendants Neil Cohen, James Noon and Fidelity

Bank orally agreed and/or promised to lend to Plaintiffs an

additional $185,000 in order to bring the working capital up to

$350,000 and to induce the Plaintiffs to complete settlement,

purchase the stock and assets of Kehr. Packages, Inc. and accept

the loan of Fidelity Bank.

107. Plaintiffs, in justifiable reliance upon the promises of

Defendants completed settlement. Thereafter Defendants failed

to provide to Plaintiffs the additional $185,000 working capital as

promised, causing Plaintiffs, Kehr Packages, Charles McMurtrie

and James and Emily McMurtrie to suffer and to continue

suffering damages for which the Defendants are liable.

A-69

108. Plaintiffs would not have completed settlement as set

forth above but for the oral agreement of Defendants to lend the

additional $185,000.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the

Court enter judgment in their favor and against all Defendants,

jointly and severally, awarding compensatory and punitive

damages, costs of the lawsuit, reasonable attorneys fees, interest

and other relief as the Court deems appropriate, all in accor-

dance with the request for judgment set forth in Count I.

COUNT XI

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

109. Paragraphs 1 through 108 of this complaint are incor-

porated by reference and reallaged as though fully set forth

herein.

110. The actions taken by Defendants as described in this

Complaint through fraud and misrepresentation, negligent mis-

representation, tortious interference with prospective contrac-

tual relations and breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing

and promissory estoppel were willful and malicious and were

carried out with reckless disregard for the rights and property of

Plaintiffs and with intent to inflict damages on Plaintiffs.

Loe]

severally, and awarding to Plaintiffs Punitive damages for the

ulful, wanton, deliberate and malicious conduct of Defen-

dants.

Respectfully submitted

JOEL HARVEY SLOMSKy » ESQUIRE

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

KEHR PACKAGES, INC.

JAMES McMURTRIE

C

S and EMILY McMURTRIE

A-71

VERIFICATION

I, JAMES McMURTRIE, by these presents swear, attest

and affirm that I am sufficiently familiar with the facts contained

herein to say that they are true and correct to the best of my

knowledge, information and belief.

I understand that false statements herein are made subject

to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. Sec. 4904 relating to unsworn

falsification to authorities.

JAMES McMURTRIE

Dated: March 7, 1990

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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