Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Goodacre v. New York

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_

Suprene Cuurt, U.S

60-1359 FILED

= FEB 27 199)

Qia&

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1990

CHARLES GOODACRE and PETER GRIM,

Petitioners,

against

NEW YORK,

Respondent

On Perition FoR A Writ OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME

Court oF New York, APPELLATE Division, First

DEPARTMENT

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

RICHARD A. DIENST

Dienst & SERRINS

Counsel for Petitioners

225 Broadway

New York, NY 10007

(212) 406-1700

Of Counsel:

Harry GREENBERG

RAYMOND KERNO

February 25, 1991

Tee Reroeres Company, Inc. 30 Weary SR. New York. NY 10007.199)

wvC Dep )o2-o978 Westchester 914-68). 1922 Long istend $16-222-022!

($942—LC2-923)

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the state can satisfy its heavy

burden of proving legitimate independent

sources for its evidence where the

departmental investigators compelled

petitioners’ testimony pursuant to a grant

of immunity while they simultaneously

conducted the criminal investigation for

the state and there was both evidentiary

and nonevidentiary use of this immunized

testimony in violation of petitioners’

Fifth Amendment privilege against self-

incrimination.

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED .......... i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........4... ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......... iv

OPINIONS BELOW. .........4...1i1

JURISDICTION... 2... 21.2.2. ee ee 2

STATUTES INVOLVED ...........2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......... 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT... . . 24

I. BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THE STATE’*S

NONEVIDENTIARY USE OF IMMUNIZED

TESTIMONY, THE STATE COURTS

HOLDING IN

AND THE HOLDINGS OF SEVERAL COURTS

OF APPEALS .......2.+2+4e60. 24

II. AS THE STATE FAILED TO SEGREGATE THE

DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT... 24

ai

CONCLUS ION . *. . . * . * . . * . . .

APPENDIX:

A. OPINION OF THE NEW YORK SUPREME

COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST

DEPARTMENT. . © © + © © © © #

B. KASTIGAR HEARING. . « «+ «+ «+ «© «

C. SENTENCING MINUTES. ..-.++ «+ «

iii

42

“TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524

(llth Cir. 1985) . . . 26, 27, 28, 32, 36

United States v. Crowson, 828 F.2d 1427

(9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S.

wae CGeeeep we eee ewe tee 26, 27, 36

, 359 F.Supp.

684 (S.D.N.¥. 1973), ?

grounds, 491 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1974) . 26

, 775 F.2d 1479

(llth Cir. 1985)... . ... . . passim

406 U.S. 441 (1972)... .... passim

, $34 F.2d 511

(2d Cir. 1976) . . . . . . . . . > . . 40

United States v. McDaniel,

482 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973) . . . passin

, 851 F.2d 595

(2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,

490 U.S. 1011 (1989)... ... . 26, 28

United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843,

modified, reh’q denied, in part, en banc,

» 920 F.2d 940

(D.C. Cir. 1990) ......,..., passim

489 U.S. 248 (1963)... 2... 00

iv

United States v. Schwimmer,

662 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1989) ...... 38

United States v. Semkiw, 712 F.2d 891

(3d Cir. 1983) . ....+ + «+ «+ « « passin

» 870 F.2d 1

(ist Cir. 1969) . . «© « «© « «© 26, 27, 36

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1990

CHARLES GOODACRE and PETER GRIM,

Petitioners,

Vv.

NEW YORK,

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE

DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT

The petiticners Charles Goodacre and

Peter Grim respectfully pray that a writ

of certiorari issue to review the judgment

and opinion of the Supreme Court of New

York, Appellate Division, First

Department, entered in People of the State

of New York v. Peter Grim and People of

the State of New York v. Charles Goodacre

on October 16, 1990.

OPINIONS BELOW

The unreported opinions of the Supreme

Court of New York, Appellate Division,

First Department, affirming the decision

and order of the Supreme Court, New York

County, can be found in the Appendix.

JURISDICTION

The order of the Court of Appeals of

New York, denying leave to appeal, was

entered on November 29, 1990. The

jurisdiction of this Court to review the

judgment of the New York Supreme Court,

Appellate D:vision, First Department,

entered October 16, 1990, is invoked under

28 U.S.C. §1257(a).

STATUTES INVOLVED

U.S. Const. V Amendment

No person shall .. . be compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against

Himself... .

City of New York, Police Department,

Patrol Guide 1186-9:

If a member of the service (uniformed or

Civilian) is under arrest or is the

subject of a criminal investigation or

there is a likelihood that criminal

charges may result from the investigation,

the following warnings shall be given to

the member concerned prior to commencement

of the interogation:

"I wish to advise you that you are being

2

questioned as part of an official

investigation by the Police Department.

You will be asked questions specifically

directed and narrowly related to the

performance of your duties. You are

entitled to all the rights and privileges

guaranteed by the laws of the State of

New York, the Constitution of this state

and the Constitution of the United States,

including the right not to be compelled to

incriminate yourself and the right to have

legal counsel present at each and every

stage of this investigation.

I further wish to advise you that if you

refuse to testify or to answer questions

relating to the performance of yeur

official duties, you will be subject to

departmental charges which could result in

your dismissal from the Police Department.

If you do answer, neither your statements

nor any information or evidence which is

gained by reason of such statements can be

used against you in any subsequent

criminal proceedings. However, these

statement [sic) may be used against you in

relation to subsequent departmental

charges".

The questions and answers resulting from

the interogation conducted pursuant to

this procedure are confidential. They are

not to be revealed nor released to any

person or agency outside the department

without prior written approval of the

Deputy Commissioner-Legal Matters. If a

subpoena duces tecum is received for any

such questions and answers, the Legal

Bureau should be contacted immediately.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Course of proceedings in the case now

before this Court.

On June 28, 1989, the petitioners

were found guilty, after a jury trial

before the Supreme Court, New York County,

of assault in the second degree (New York

Penal Law §120.05(1)).

On October 16, 1990, the Appellate

Division of the Supreme Court of the State

of New York affirmed the petitioners’

conviction.

On November 29, 1990, petitioners’

timely application for leave to appeal to

the State of New York Court of Appeals was

denied.

B. How the Federal Question Was

Presented.

The federal question was first

presented in a pre-trial motion to dismiss

the indictments, dated July 12, 1988, on

the grounds that immunity had been

conferred upon the petitioners pursuant to

Police Department Patrol Guide Section

118-9. The motion to dismiss was denied,

however, a hearing on the issue was

directed pursuant to an order dated

October 18, 1988. A hearing was commenced

on April 24, 1989, pursuant to Kastigar v.

United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) to

determine whether any of the petitioners’

immunized testimony was used by the

prosecution in violation of their rights

under the Fifth Amendment to the United

States Constitution. (Trial Record at 1.)

Petitioners appealed the court’s

ruling on the federal question to the

Supreme Court of New York, Appellate

Division, First Department, which affirmed

the decision of the trial court. (Appendix

A)

Cc. Introduction

Around midnight of February 20, 1988,

Touissant Vogelsang was the victim of an

assault allegedly committed by several off

duty police officers.

On the date of the assault,

petitioners Sergeant CHARLES GOODACRE and

Officer PETER GRIM were New York City

police officers assigned to the Midtown

South Precinct. On the evening of

February 20, 1988, they attended a

basketball game at Madison Square Garden

in Manhattan with four other police

officers, Sergeant JAMES DEAN, Sergeant

ANTHONY DIRENZO, Officer GREG LEONE and

Officer STEVEN GOLDEN. After the game,

all of the officers went to a nearby bar.

The People claimed that after the officers

left the bar, they encountered complainant

Vogelsang, a racial slur was directed at

Vogelsang and that petitioner Grin punched

Vogelsang. Vogelsang apparently left the

6

area, but returned and was again attacked

by a group of men.

Following the incident, an

investigation was immediately commenced by

the Internal Affairs Division ("IAD").

Within the first three days of the

investigation, both of the petitioners

were compelled to testify pursuant to

General Order 15 ("G.0O. 15"). This

provision is now Patrol Guide 118-9 of the

Rules and Regulations of the New York City

Police Department, which have the force

and effect of law. Patrol Guide 118-9

requires an officer to testify under

threat of job forfeiture. Information

obtained pursuant to this provision can be

used administratively by the police

department, but cannot be used against the

officer in a subsequent criminal

proceeding. It was common practice for

the IAD to obtain approval from the

district attorney’s office before

commencing questioning pursuant to G.O. 15

(484).?

Following the IAD _ investigation,

after having been compelled to answer

questions, petitioners GOODACRE and GRIM

were indicted and charged with assault in

the second degree.

On April 24, 1989, a pre-trial

Kastigar hearing was commenced to

determine whether petitioners’ immunized

testimony had been used by the prosecution

in violation of their Fifth Amendment

priviledge against self incrimination.

D. The evidence at the Kastigar Hearing.

In the early morning of February 21,

1988, Lieutenant CHARLES MONAHAN, was

All page references are to the

actual page in the Trial Record

containing the Kastigar hearing

decision which is located at

Appendix 5.

summoned by his commanding officer,

Captain Stone, to the Midtown South

Precinct to investigate police involvement

in the assault of Vogelsang. Both Monahan

and Stone were members of the IAD. When

Monahan arrived at the precinct at 8:00

a.m., Stone (deceased at the time of

trial) informed him that an assault had

taken place on 7th Avenue and 34th Street.

Within one hour, the assistant

district attorney who prosecuted the

petitioners’ case, Susan Braver ("ADA

Braver"), arrived at the precinct (10).

Following a conversation between Captain

Stone and ADA Braver, Stone declared that

“(wie are going to G.0O. 15 the whole

place” (13-14). At this time, both the

departmental and the criminal

investigations began.

At the time the investigation began,

there was no written or “hard and fast"

policy mandating the IAD to use separate

units to conduct the criminal

investigation and the departmental

interrogations of targets. In this case,

both the departmental and criminal

investigations were conducted by the same

unit - Unit 2 (180) .? In fact, Lieutenant

JOHN KID testified that Unit 2 conducted

the investigation for the District

Attorney’s office and no outside

investigators were ever used (102-103).

Unit 2 consisted of Monahan, Kid,

Detective THOMAS ENG, Officer STEPHANIE

RICH, Detective ANDREA SORRENTINO,

Sergeants Robert Castellano and Villada,

and Detective Aubrey Weeks. It was

While there was testimony which

indicated that it was generally

IAD policy to separate

investigatory functions in

situations such as this one, no

explanation was given as to why

this was not done here (98,105).

10

before this unit that the petitioners

testified under a grant of immunity

pursuant to G.O. 15.

As of February 22, 1988, when

petitioner Grim testified pursuant to G.O.

15, there was no direct evidence

implicating the petitioners in the

assault.? Officer STEVEN GOLDEN and

Sergeant JAMES DEAN, who were interviewed

the day before, both stated that on

February 20, 1988 they had gone to a

basketball game with the petitioners and

several other officers and that following

the game the entire group went to McAnn’s,

a nearby bar. Golden stated that he and

Although the trial court refers

to a photo identification of

petitioners on February 21,

1988, this appears to be a

simple mistake, as it points

out later in its opinion that

the first photo compilation and

identification took place on

February 22, 1988 (485-486).

il

Leone left the bar at approximately 11:45

p.m.; walked a few blocks, and encountered

the assault upon Vogelsang; they attempted

to intervene; and during the course of the

events Leone was struck in the face by a

man wielding a "2 x 4." Neither Golden

nor Leone implicated the petitioners in

the assault. Further, neither officer

provided a description of the petitioners

or the time that the petitioners left the

bar.

Similarly, neither of the two

civilian witnesses implicated the

petitioners. While each recounted the

events regarding the assault, only one

witness, Rodney Grant, provided any type

of description of the assailants. Grant,

who was arrested for striking Leone,

stated that there were several white males

involved in the assault upon Vogelsang.

Monahan also testified that before he

12

obtained the petitioners’ G.0. 15s, he had

a description of one of the men who

assaulted Vogelsang. This description was

limited, however, to the fact that the

assailant was wearing a green army jacket.

When petitioner Grim testified

pursuant to G.0O.15 on February 22, 1988,

he was already a target of the

investigation. In fact, the trial court

found that Grim was a target as early as

the morning of February 21, 1988. IAD

asked Grim to describe his clothing. Grim

also told the IAD that he was at the

basketball game and that afterwards he

went to McAnn’s bar with the other

officers. At the bar, he met two friends,

CHRISTOPHER WALDRON and Christine Murphy.

Grim stated that he and petitioner

Goodacre left the bar after about one hour

and walked directly to Goodacre’s car

without encountering complainant

13

Vogelsang, and then drove home. (27-29,

353).

On the same day of Grim’s G.O. 15,

Officer Rich interviewed Waldron, whose

identity was discovered only because of

Grim’s G.O. 15 (471). Rich testified that

Waldron placed Grim at the bar from 11:30

p.m. to about 12:20 a.m. Waldron stated

that Grim invited him to a party at the

Hyatt Hotel, but that when he arrived at

the hotel, Grim was not there (434-435).

Prior to the matter being presented to the

Grand Jury, Waldron’s statement was

summarized and placed in the IAD folder

which was given to ADA Braver (383).

ADA Braver later summoned Waldron to

testify before the grand jury which

indicted the petitioners. Waldron’s grand

jury testimony revealed petitioner’s alibi

defense prior to trial. With this

knowledge, ADA Braver used Waldron’s grand

14

———Sw

jury testimony at least five times during

the petitioners’ trial for the purpose of

impeaching Waldron. Waldron testified at

trial as an alibi witness for the defense.

On the evening of February 22, 1988,

after Grim’s immunized statements had been

obtained, Detective Sorrentino conducted a

canvess of the area where the incident

occurred. Sorrentino brought a photo

array with her which included pictures of

the petitioners. She interviewed Greg

Nelson, who told her that he had witnessed

the incident and then picked petitioner

Grim out of a photo array. (204-209).

The following day, February 23,1988

petitioner Goodacre testified pursuant to

G.O. 15. Like Grim, he also stated that

he was at the basketball game and had gone

to McAnn’s bar. Goodacre stated that he

was at the bar for forty-five minutes to

one hour when he left with petitioner

Grim, who drove him home because he was

not feeling well. (47-48). Goodacre also

provided Monahan with a description of

what he was wearing the night of the

incident.

After Goodacre testified, Detective

Sorrentino compared his immunized

testimony with Grim’s. She testified that

she did this because every piece of

information had to be considered and

analyzed. Moreover, Sorrentino admitted

that the comparison was made for the

purposes of furthering the investigation

(246).

Monahan also made investigatory use

of Goodacre’s immunized testimony

attempting to verify the time _ that

Goodacre stated he had left the bar.

Monahan did this by questioning two

bartenders who were working on the night

of incident. The bartenders statements

16

—— SS!

were then summarized, placed in the IAD

file and delivered to ADA Braver prior to

presentment to the Grand Jury (384-385).

The same day Goodacre testified,

Officer Rich and ADA Braver, along with

Lieutenant Kid, interviewed complainant

Vogelsang (423-424). Rich reported that

Vogelsang identified the petitioners from

a photo array (418, 422). Rich aiso

testified that she reviewed each

petitioner’s G.O. 15 (423). Although it

is not clear whether Rich read _ the

petitioners’ immunized statements prior to

interviewing Vogelsang, Detective

Sorrentino testified that briefings were

held with unit members on a daily basis

(185). Detective Eng testified that a

G.O. 15 is considered something new and

that whenever “there was a new development

in the case, whoever was involved in the

case would know about it.” (124).

,

>

On February 25, 1988, Monahan

directed Sorrentino to interview Christine

Murphy, who Grim had named as an alibi

witness at his G.O. 15. According to

Sorrentino, Monahan told her that "Grim

had mentioned that he had been with

certain people that night and that it was

our responsibility to check that." (164).

A summary of Murphy’s statement was placed

in the IAD file and delivered to ADA

Braver prior to the presentment of the

matter to the Grand Jury (471).

Based on information provided by

Murphy, Monahan checked the Long Island

Railroad departure times (355-356). This

appears to have been a critical inquiry,

as Monahan stated that time was an

essential element of the investigation

(374).

Four days after the IAD obtained

Goodacre’s immunized testimony, Monahan

18

and Sorrentino interviewed Rodney Johnson.

Johnson selected Goodacre from a photo

array as one of the men involved in the

assault upon Vogelsang. Although Johnson

also thought he recognized petitioner

Grim, he did not positively identify him.

On April 5, 1988, Monahan delivered

most of the IAD file to ADA Braver. While

it was not clear whether all of the

contents of the file were delivered at

this time, the trial court found that the

file had been delivered in its entirety

during the month of April, 1988 prior to

the grand jury proceedings (480). The

only items removed from the file were the

summaries of the petitioners’ G.0O. 15’s

(385, 471). The summarized statements of

Christopher Waldron, Christine Murphy, and

the two bartenders, however, were not

removed.

In May 1988, grand jury proceedings

19

were commenced. Christopher Waldron was

compelled to appear as a witnesses before

the grand jury. Officer Rich, who had

read petitioners’ immunized statements and

had gathered evidence for the grand jury,

also testified. At the close of the

proceedings, the petitioners were each

indicted for the crime of assault in the

second degree.

E. The Trial Court’s Kastigar Ruling and

the Appellate Division’s Decision on

Appeal.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the

trial court rendered its decision.

(Appendix "B"). The trial court concluded

that the petitioners had met their initial

burden of demonstrating that they made

statements pursuant to a grant of immunity

and that those statements were related to

the prosecution (490). The court

determined, however, that the prosecution

20

had proven an independent source for all

the evidence introduced by a preponderance

of the evidence (495-496) .*

In reaching its decision, the court

stated that there were only two possible

sources of taint, the testimony of

Detective Rich and Christopner Waldron’s

compelled appearance before the grand

jury. The court, however, found that

Rich’s testimony was not a valid source of

taint (491). With respect to Waldron, who

testified that petitioner Grim had planned

to meet him at a party which Grim failed

to attend, the court concluded that Grim’s

failure to meet Waidron as planned did not

substantiate the charges in any

significant way (493). The court went on

to conclude that “harmless error is

The court cited Byrd, which

appears to be a reference to

, 765

F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1985).

21

applicable if, even without the immunized

testimony, the People would have acted

exactly as they dia."* (495).

On appeal, the Appellate Division of

the Supreme Court of the State of New

York, First Department, affirmed the

judgment of the trial court (App. A). In

its affirmance, the court directed only

one paragraph to the Kastigar issue and

stated that "(t)he operative facts

relative to the incident and the parties

involved in the altercation were known

prior to the time the Internal Affairs

Division interviewed defendants, at least

one of whom had previously been identified

from a photo array." (Id. ) The court

The court cited Gallo, which

may be a reference to either

United States v. Gallo, 859

F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1988) or

United States v. Gallo, 863

F.2d 185 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 489 U.S. 1083 (1988).

22

VTi

remand,

sentenced to a

between

ot

one and

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THE STATE’S

NONEVIDENTIARY USE OF IMMUNIZED

TESTIMONY, THE STATE COURTS PERMITTED

THE VIOLATION OF PETITIONERS’ FIFTH

AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-

INCRIMINATION IN CONTRADICTION TO

THIS COURT’S HOLDING IN KASTIGAR V.

UNITED STATES AND THE HOLDINGS OF

SEVERAL COURTS OF APPEALS.

In Kastigar v. United States, 406

U.S. 441 (1972), this Court upheld the

constitutionality of the federal

testimonial immunity statute because,

although it compelled testimony, the

statute conveyed immunity from the use and

derivative use of compelled testimony. ®

The immunity statute, 18 U.S.C.

§6002, provides in relevant

part that “no testimony or other

information compelled under the

order (or any information

directly or indirectly derived

from such testimony or other

information) may be used

against the witness in any

criminal case." Kastigar,

406 U.S. at 460.

24

This Court held that such immunity was

coextensive with the Fifth Amendment

privilege against self-incrimination and

that in any subsequent prosecution of the

witness, the government must meet a heavy

burden to show a legitimate independent

source for its evidence. Id. at 460-461.

Since Kastigar, the courts of appeals

have sharply divided on the issue of

whether nonevidentiary use of compelled

testimony violates the Fifth Amendment

privilege. United States v. North, 910

F.2d 843, 857, modified, reh’g denied, in

part, en banc, United States v. North, 920

F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In this case,

both the trial court and the appellate

court finding that the state satisfied its

heavy burden under Kastigar, without

having considered the state’s

nonevidentiary use of petitioners’

immunized statements, is contrary to

25

specific holdings of the Third, Eighth and

Eleventh Circuits. United States v.

Hampton, 775 F.2d 1479, 1490-91 (11th Cir.

1985); United States v. Semkiw, 712 F.2d

891, 895 (3rd Cir. 1983); United States v.

McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir.

1973); see also United States v. Dornau,

359 F.Supp. 684, 687 (S.D.N.¥. 1973),

rev'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 47 (2d

Cir. 1974). Compare United States v.

Serrano, 870 F.2d 1, 16 (list Cir. 1989);

United States v. Mariani, 851 F.2d 595,

600-01 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490

U.S. 1011 (1989); United States v.

Crowson, 828 F.2d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir.

1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1427 (1988);

United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524 (11th

Cir. 1985) (all holding nonevidentiary use

to be either permissible or permissible if

26

no evidentiary use).’ Recently, the D.C.

Circuit expressed uncertainty as _ to

whether Kastigar prohibits nonevidentiary

use and assumed without deciding that such

use is impermissible. North, 910 F.2d at

858-860. The uncertainty regarding the

constitutionality of nonevidentiary use,

evidenced by the division of the circuits,

has left the district and state courts

unclear as to whether nonevidentiary use

must be considered in determining whether

the government has met its burden under

Kastigar.®

Therefore, it 1s apparent that

whether Kastigar or the Fifth Amendment

The different holdings of Byrd

and Hampton also evidences a

split within the Eleventh

Circuit.

Even the courts of appeals

which have not prohibited

nonevidentiary use of compelled

testimony have stated that it

is a difficult question.

Serrano, 870 F.2d at 16;

Crowson, 828 F.2d at 1430.

2?

prohibits nonevidentiary use is a question

which warrants resolution by this Court.

Here, the state appellate court

incorrectly affirmed the trial court’s

Kastigar hearing decision because the

trial court found only two possible

sources of taint. The courts failed to

consider the significant nonevidentiary

use which resulted from the state’s

extensive exposure and access to the

immunized statements during all phases of

the criminal investigation.

Nonevidentiary use has been defined

to include use of the compelled testimony

in “focusing the investigation, deciding

to initiate prosecution, refusing to plea

bargain, interpreting evidence, planning

cross-examination and otherwise generally

planning trial strategy." McDaniel, 482

F.2d at 311; see also Mariani, 851 F.2d

at 600; Crowson, 828 F.2d at 1430; Byrd,

28

—

765 F.2d at 1530; Semkiw, 712 F.2d at 895.

Additionally, the Court of Appeals for the

D.C. Circuit has defined nonevidentiary

use to include instances where

{[p)rosecutorial knowledge of the

immunized testimony may help

explicate evidence theretofore

unintelligible, and it may expose as

significant facts once thought

irrelevant (or vice versa).

Compelled testimony could indicate

which witnesses to call, and in what

order. Compelled testimony may be

helpful in developing opening and

closing arguments.

North, 910 F.2d at 858-9.

The definitions of nonevidentiary use

provided by McDaniel and North encompass

the use that the state made of the

petitioners’ immunized testimony in this

case. Through their team of

investigators, the state heard the

petitioners’ immunized testimony, analyzed

them for consistency, attempted to verify

information contained therein, and

discovered the identities of petitioners’

29

alibi witnesses before trial.

Furthermore, the prosecutor was regularly

briefed on the progress of the

investigation and learned the substance of

petitioners’ alibi defense by calling one

of the alibi witnesses to testify before

the grand jury.’ In fact, one investigator

admitted that the petitioners’ imaunized

testimony was used for the purposes of

furthering the investigation.

Such nonevidentiary use is prohibited

under Kastigar, because this Court has

The uses delineated may also

constitute derivative

evidentiary use as the Court of

Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

has stated that "[o)ne

forbidden use of the immunized

testimony is the identification

of a witness, but other uses of

a citizen’s immunized testimony

“as by presenting the testimony

of grand jury or trial

witnesses that has been derived

from or irfluenced by the

immunized testimony-are equally

forbidden." North, 910 F.2d at

865.

30

|

held that any grant of immunity in

exchange for compelled testimony must be

coextensive with the Fifth Amendment

privilege against seilf-incrimination.

Pillsbury v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 254

(1983). In Kastigar, this Court explained

that the federal testimonial immunity

statute affords the same protection as the

Fifth Amendment privilege as it provides a

"sweeping prohibition of any use, direct

Or indirect, of the compelled testimony

and any information derived therefron,"

and "assur (es) that the compelled

testimony can in no way lead to the

infliction of criminal penalties on the

witness." Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460, 461

(emphasis added).

"

®

While declining to requ

transactional immunity to satisfy the

tne argument that the immunity statute

does not guard against “the subtle ways in

which the compelled testimony may

disadvantage a witness" by stating that

total prohibition on use provides a

comprehensive safeguard, barring the

use of compelled testimony as an

“investigatory lead," and also

barring the use of any evidence

obtained by focusing investigation on

a witness as a result of his

compelled disclosures.

Id. at 460.7° this Court further stated

that a person who is prosecuted after

giving testimony pursuant to a grant of

immunity “is not dependent for the

preservation of his rights upon. the

integrity and good faith of the

prosecuting authorities." Id. Thus, the

nonevidentiary use of compelled testimony,

either subtle or overt, constitutes use in

” The Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit appears to

ignore this language and has

held that it is premature to

bar nonevidentiary use because

there is not yet an evidentiary

use. Byrd, 765 F.2d at 1531-32.

32

violation of the petitioners’ Fifth

Amendment privilege against self-

incrimination. McDaniel, 482 F.2d at 311

(forbidding all prosecutorial use of

immunized testimony, not merely that which

results in the presentation of evidence

before the jury); Semkiw, 712 F.2d at 895.

Consequently, the failure of the

trial court to consider nonevidentiary use

in determining whether the state satisfied

its heavy burden under Kastigar,

over looked the state’s significant

nonevidentiary use of the petitioners’

immunized statements and allowed the state

to violate the peti. ioners’ Fifth

Amendment privilege against self-

incrimination. As such, the appellate

court erred in affirming the trial court’s

holding because it failed to address or

recognize the impermissible nature of

nonevidentiary use. The appellate court’s

33

silence on the issue, insofar as it may

suggest that the nonevidentiary use which

occurred was insignificant, also

constitutes error because the trial court

did not make a specific finding and

appellate courts may not construe facts in

the government’s favor where it has the

burden of proof. North, 910 F.2d at 855.

Therefore, the petition for a writ of

certiorari should be granted.

It.

AS THE STATE FAILED TO SEGREGATE THE

IMMUNIZED STATEMENTS, THE STATE

COURTS INCORRECTLY HELD THAT THE

STATE HAD MET ITS HEAVY BURDEN UNDER

KASTIGAR BECAUSE SEVERAL COURTS OF

APPEALS HAVE HELD THAT EXTENSIVE

EXPOSURE AND ACCESS CREATES AN

INSURMOUNTABLE BURDEN REQUIRING

DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT.

In interpreting Kastigar, several

courts of appeal have held that such

exposure and access creates an

insurmountable burden of proof for the

34

government. See e.g., Hampton, supra;

SemKkiw, supra; McDaniel, supra.

Therefore, in view of the state’s

significant exposure and access, the

decisions of trial court and the appellate

court are erroneous as the state could not

have satisfied its heavy burden under

Kastigar.

Where the state fails to segregate

the immunized statements, thereby leading

to extensive exposure and access, the

state’s burden of proof is greater because

"the possibility that the government

compromised the defendant’s immunity is

heightened." Semkiw, 712 F.2d at 895; see

also, Hampton, 775 F.2d at 1490; McDaniel,

482 F.2d at 311. The exposure resulting

from the failure to segregate the

immunized testimony causes "an

immeasurable subjective effect" such that

the government’s burden of proof becomes

35

insurmountable. McDaniel, 482 F.2d at

311-312; Hampton, 775 F.2d at 1490. In

the present case there was no such

segregation, nor was it ever attempted,

Since the departmental investigation and

the criminal investigation were

simultaneously conducted by the same unit.

Consequently, dismissal of the indictment

is warranted as a remand would be futile.

Hampton, 775 F.2d at 1491 n.54; McDaniel,

482 F.2d at 312.

Prohibiting nonevidentiary use where

the government compels testimony does not

create transactional immunity, as _ some

courts of appeals have suggested, 11 because

Kastigar specifically allows the

government to prosecute so long as it uses

evidence from legitimate independent

ss Serrano, 870 F.2d at 16;

Crowson, 828 F.2d at 1429;

Byrd, 765 F.2d at 1530.

36

sources. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461. This

Court has stated that where an individual

is compelled to testify, the immunity

conveyed must be coextensive with the

Fifth Amendment privilege leaving "the

witness and the prosecutorial authorities

in substantially the same position as if

the witness had claimed the Fifth

Amendment privilege." Id. at 462.

In the present case, neither

petitioners nor the prosecution was left

in substantially the same position, as the

state was able to use petitioners

immunized statements both for evidentiary

and nonevidentiary purposes, in violation

of the petitioners Fifth Amendment

privilege. The state had significant

exposure to petitioners’ immunized

testimony by virtue of the fact that the

individuals who conducted the criminal

investigation simultaneously acted as the

37

departmental investigators who compelled

petitioners’ testimony.

The Second and Third Circuits have

stated that the government can easily

protect the witness’ immunized statements

by taking measures to segregate the

statements from the prosecution. Semkiw,

712 F.2d at 895 (suggesting reassignment

of the case); United States v. Schwimmer,

882 F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating

that it may be necessary to construct a

"Chinese Wall" to adequately guard against

the use of immunized statements’. in

violation of the fifth amendment). These

measures may take the form of segregation

and in the present case, the government

need only have created a separate criminal

investigative unit. Requiring protective

procedures imposes no new burden on the

government, because where the government

decides to compel testimony pursuant to a

38

grant of immunity, it decides that it

values the testimony more than

prosecution. North, 910 F.2d 862. In so

deciding, the government "must understand

that the Fifth Amendment and Kastigar mean

that it is taking a great chance that the

witness cannot constitutionally be

indicted or prosecuted." Id. In the case

at bar, the state attempted to preserve

both its interest as an employer and as a

prosecutor. This it cannot do within the

constraints of Kastigar or the Fifth

Amendment. Therefore, because the state

utilized the petitioners’ immunized

statements, the decisions of the trial

court and the —_ court cannot

stand.

Furthermore, dismissal of the

indictment may be warranted because it may

be the only remedy as it is the use of

immunized testimony that is_ prohibited

39

under the Fifth Amendment and Kastigar.

See North, 910 F.2d at 869; see also

United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511, 516

(2d Cir. 1976) (Fifth Amendment is by its

terms an exclusionary rule). There is no

independent violation that can be remedied

by the exclusionary rule and "the

indictment becomes indistinguishable from

the constitutional and statutory

transgression." Id. at 869. Under these

circumstances, the state’s prosecution of

the petitioners violated Kastigar and the

petitioners’ Fifth Amendment privilege.

In the present case, the state courts

failed to recognized the significant of

the fact that the petitioners’ immunized

12 Mere denials that it did not

use the statements are

insufficient to satisfy the

burden that it had legitimate

independent sources. Hampton,

775 F.2d at 1489; McDaniel,

482 F.2d at 312.

40

testimony would not have been available to

the prosecution if the departmental

investigators who compelled the testimony

had not acted as the criminal

investigators. Thus, the state was faced

with an insurmountable burden of proof

such that, even if the trial court had

considered the state’s nonevidentiary use,

the state could not have satisfied its

heavy burden under Kastigar and the

indictment should have been dismissed.

Therefore, because the state prosecuted

the petitioners without proving an

independent legitimate source for its

evidence, in violation of petitioners’

Fifth Amendment privilege against self-

incrimination, the petition for a writ of

certiorari should be granted.

41

Conclusion

For the reasons’ stated, it is

respectfully requested that the Court

grant the petition for a writ of

certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Richard A. Dienst

Dienst & Serrins

225 Broadway

New York, N.Y. 10007

(212) 406-1700

Dated: New York, New York

February 25, 1991

APPENODI X

New York Supreme Court

Appellate Division, First Department

Entered October 16, 1990

Kupferman, J.P., Ellerin, Wallach, Smith,

Rubin, JJ.

40857 The People of the State of New

York,

Respondent,

-against-

Peter Grin,

Defendant-Appellant.

40858 The People of the State of New

York,

Respondent,

-against-

Charles Goodacre,

Defendant-Appellant.

Judgments of the Supreme Court, New

York County (Harold Rothwax, J.), both

rendered June 28, 1989, convicting

defendants, after jury trial, of assault

in the second degree, and sentencing each

of them to indeterminate terms of

imprisonment of from 1 to 3 years,

unanimously affirmed. The case is remitted

to the Supreme Court, New York County, for

A-1

further proceedings pursuant to CPL

460.50(5).

Defendants' claim that the prosecution

made derivative use of their immunized

statements is without merit. The evidence

adduced at the Kastigar hearing (Kastigar

v. United States, 406 US 441) established

that the prosecution's evidence was derived

from a legitimate independent’ § source

(Kastigar v. United States, supra; United

States v. North, _— F2d _, 1990 US App

Lexis 12106). The operative facts relative

to the incident and the parties involved in

the altercation were known prior to the

time the Internal Affairs Division

interviewed defendants, at least one of

whom had previously been identified from a

photo array.

The guilt of the defendants herein was

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. At

trial, Grim was identified by the victim

A-2

a

and two eyewitnesses, all of whom had

previously identified him at a lineup.

Nor did the trial court err when it

gave the jury instructions on accessorial

liability. While the single count

indictment did not contain the words

"acting in concert", both defendants were

charged with committing the same assault,

on the same victim, at the same time.

Defendants were convicted for the same

crime for which they were indicted (People

v. Iannone, 45 NY2d 589, 594), and the

court's instructions did not change the

theory of the case as it was presented and

tried.

We also find no merit to the claims

that the trial prosecutor should have been

recused and that the trial court unduly

interjected itself into the proceedings.

Although there was concern at the hearing

that the prosecutor might be a necessary

A-3

witness, defense counsel indicated that she

would not be called, and no showing has

been made that her testimony would have

been relevant to any issue at trial (People

Vv. Paperno, 54 NY2d 294, 302).

While the court indicated some

impatience with the lack of Clarity of

questions addressed to the witnesses and

with the slow pace of the proceedings, its

Criticism was directed at both the

prosecution and the defense, as

appropriate. The questions put to

witnesses by the court constituted largely

reformations of questions put by counsel,

restated to provide greater precision as

to the information sought to be elicited,

with particular attention to the sequence

of events. Without the court's assistance,

the jury could have easily become confused

about which of several similar occurrences

was being discussed. Moreover, no

A-4

—eSESE—t—<“=_=_OSSCS

specific, meaningful objection was raised

during trial (People v. Yut Wai Tom, 53

NY¥2d 44, 56).

Finally, the contention raised by

defendant Grim that the court should have

charged the jury on the defense of

justification is without merit. While the

inconsistency of the asserted alibi defense

does not preclude the right to a

justification charge (People v. Padgett,

60 NY2d 142; People v. Steele, 26 NY2d

526), in view of the severity of the

beating sustained by the complaining

witness, there is no reasonable view of the

evidence, construed most favorably to the

accused, upon which the jury could have

concluded that the defendants' conduct was

justified (Penal Law §35.30(1]); People v.

McManus, 67 NY2d 541, 549). Nor could the

jury have found that the defendants, off

duty police officers at the time of the

A-5

incident, employed force in the course of

making an arrest as no arrest was ever

effected. Indeed, when pressed by the

court, defense counsel could state no

theory which would warrant an instruction

to the jury on the defense of

justification.

We have considered defendants'

remaining claims and find them to be

without merit.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND

ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE

DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTER:

ENTERED OCT 16 1990

FRANCIS X. GALDI

Clerk

—

:

SUPREME COURT ; NEW YORK COUNTY

CRIMINAL TERM PART 56

The People of the State of New York

~against-

Peter Grim and Charles Goodacre

Defendants

Wade Hearing/Kastigar Hearing

Decided May 1, 1988

Trial Record:

The Court: All right, the Court will make

the following findings of fact and

conclusions of law:

The Court finds that on February 21,

1988, that Lieutenant Charles Monahan of

B-1

the Internal Affairs Division of the Police

Department, arrived at the Midtown South

Precinct at about eight o'clock in the

morning.

He had been advised or was advised

when he [469] arrived that there had been

an assault the previous night on February

20, 1988, at Seventh Avenue and 34th

Street, and that off-duty police officers

may have been involved in that assault.

At the precinct with him either at the

time he arrived or shortly after was

Captain Stone, now deceased, Sergeant

Castellano, Police Officer now Detective

Rich, and tective Weeks; Assistant

District Attorney Braver arrived at the

station house at about nine a.m. and

conferred with Captain Stone.

A complainant in the assault was at

the hospital. There was also a witness

from the assault, one Lafayette Bridget.

B-2

Thereafter, Lieutenant Monahan was

advised that they were going to G.O. 15 the

first platoon.

Let me state, for the purpose of this

hearing, that G.O. 15 and P.G. 118-9 have

been utilized interchangeably throughout

this hearing. For the present purpose I

conclude that they have the same legal

force and effect. Apparently G.O. 15 refers

to a General Order 15, subsequently

replaced by what is known presently as

Patrol Guide 118-9.

In that kind of ae situation a

defendant -- withdrawn. [469].

A police officer who is_ being

investigated is advised that if he answers

questions, neither his statement nor any

information or evidence gained by reason

of such statement can be used against him

in any subsequent criminal proceeding.

However, those statements can be used

B-3

against him in relation to subsequent

departmental charges and the Court accepts

for the present purpose of having been

given advisory warnings under 188-9, if the

officer refused to respond he would be

subjected to either suspension or dismissal

from the force.

As I indicated, these two defendants,

Grim and Goodacre quickly became targets,

and they were targets as of the morning of

February 21, 1988.

Lieutenant Monahan had been advised

that they were going to G.O. 15 the first

platoon. The first platoon had been a

platoon that went on duty about eleven-

twenty-five p.m. on February 20th and off

duty at about eight a.m. on February 21st.

Neither Goodacre nor Grim were members

of that first platoon. I accept that, that

whole platoon was G.O. 15'd.

Lieutenant Monahan subsequently spoke

B-4

to Police (471) Officer Grim at Health

Services in Queens on February 22, 1988,

between 12:15 p.m. and 12;45 p.m.

I have a recording of that interview

which is Defense Exhibit C in evidence.

Present at that interview were Captain

Stone and the officer's attorney, one Mr

Macuire. No Miranda warnings were given

to the witnesses at that time.

It is clear that as of the time that

officer Grim was interviewed the police did

not know of Christopher Waldren or Miss

Murphy, and that later on they were

interviewed by police officials, and those

interviews were turned over to the district

attorney at a subsequent time.

The summary of Officer Grim's

statement at that interview was found at

page 16 of the I.A.D. file. It should be

clear that prior to the time when Golden

-- prior to that time when Grim was

B-5

interviewed on February 22nd, that Police

Officer Golden and Sergeant Dean had

already ‘been interviewed and tape

recordings, now People's 7 and 8 in

evidence, were obtained.

They were also interviewed pursuant

to 188-9. Golden and Dean indicated prior

to the interview and thereafter with

Goodacre, that Grim and [(472] Goodacre had

taken lost time at about eight thirty in

the evening of February 20th; that all six

officers, that is, Golden, Dean, Direnzo,

Leone, Grim, and Goodacre, had gone to a

basketball game and after the basketball

game had gone to McAnn's Bar.

In any event, police records were also

-- have indicated that the officers signed

out at about eight thirty in the evening in

order to go to a basketball game, although

those records do not indicate where they

went thereafter.

I find that approximately twelve G.O.

15s were prepared prior to the time that

Officer Grim was interviewed; that nineteen

police officers were interviewed pursuant

to G.O. 15 after Police Officer Grim.

I find that the officers learned

nothing of any substantial use through the

investigation from Officer Grim that they

would not otherwise have learned except for

the possible involvement -- except for the

possible presence of witnesses Waldron and

Murphy at McAnn's Bar, to which I will

address myself later.

Officer Grim basically indicated what

the police officers already knew, that he

had been doing [473] a four-to twelve tour,

that he stopped at eight thirty and took

lost time to go to a basketball game; that

he sat with Golden, that all six thereafter

went to McAnn's Bar.

Thereafter, Officer Grim, on his own

B-7

said that he was at the bar for about an

hour, that he met a friend from Queens,

with his fiance, that he left McAnn's Bar

with Goodacre at about -- withdrawn ==

that he left with Goodacre after about an

hour to go to 36th Street and Ninth Avenue

to get Goodacre's car. That he observed

nothing at 34th Stree* and Seventh Avenue.

And that he denied any involvement in the

altercation that had taken place, which

I.A.D. was investigating.

Sergeant Goodacre was likewise

interviewed, his tape is in evidence as

Defendant's Exhibit A, pursuant to G.O. 15

on February 23, 1988, between three and

three twenty in the afternoon.

I find that both Grim and Goodacre

made their statements under the provisions

of P.G. 118-9, and that they made their

statements understanding that those

statements could not be used against them

in any criminal investigation and that

criminal proceedings -- and that they had

both use and derivative [474] use immunity.

When Serge.int Goodacre was interviewed

-- I believe Sergeant Goodacre's interview

was Defendant's Exhibit D. The Defendant's

Exhibit A is the G.O. 15 which is in

evidence, Defendant's Exhibit B is the tape

recording of Sergeant Goodacre, and he was

accompanied by his attorney, Mr. Fallek at

the time of the interview.

His remarks are found at Page 31 os

{sic} the I.A.D. file.

Like Officer Grim, he indicated that

he had been doing a four-to-twelve tour and

that he stopped at about eight thirty for

a basketball game. That he went with five

others thereafter to McAnn's Bar. That he

stayed at the bar for forty five minutes to

an hour, that he left with officer Grin,

and basically he indicated what Officer

B-9

Grim had said before him, that they went to

36th Street and Ninth Avenue, that Grim

drove Goodacre's car because Goodacre was

not feeling well, and he also denied

involvement in the altercation.

Lieutenant MOnahan [sic] indicated

that he was aware prior to the interview

of both Grim and Goodacre that pictures of

these officers had been identified [474]

by the people on the corner at the time of

the incident, and by people in the

emergency room at St. Vincent's Hospital,

who were there with regard to Officer

Leone.

The tape which had been interrupted

at about 322, resumed at that time, shortly

thereafter, and went on until 325 and

Sergeant Goodacre continued to deny any

involvement in the incident.

Lieutenant Monahan knew before the

interviews with these defendants that all

B-10

six of these officers had gone to the

busketball game and had taken off early.

They knew that a witness had said that

Golden may have been involved in the

assault on the complainant, and they had

information regarding what the assailants

were wearing at the time of the assault on

Mr. Vogelsang.

They knew the complainant had reported

that he had been involved with an

altercation with six to eight male whites,

that he threw a bottle and ran. The bottle

struck an individual, that he was then

[476] thrown down and beaten.

They knew chat -- they knew of Rodney

Grant. The complainant, Mr. Vogelsang, had

asked Mr. Grant to give him a hand, and

Rodney Grant had picked up a two-by-four

and hit one of the white men involved in

the assault upon Mr. Vogelsang.

Officer Golden and Sergeant Dean were

B-11

present in the precinct at eight a.m. on

February 2ist. I have listened to the

tapes of their conversation with the

Lieutenant. They are in evidence as

People's 7 and 8.

Additionally, Lieutenant Monahan had

checked the log book, checked roll call,

checked the record of the station house,

which showed that all six were granted lost

time, four hours of lost time, they got off

about eight thirty p.m. Dean and Golden,

as I have indicated, basically indicated

about the lost time and going to the

basketball game, and then to McAnn's Bar.

Sergeant Dean indicated that at the

bar he had met a friend named Ray Durand.

Dean indicated that there came a time

when he saw the complainant in a cab at the

location of the assault, saw Golden with

the arrested person, heard [476a]} Leone had

been injured, and he returned to the

B-12

<<

precinct with Golden.

Rodney Grant was at the precinct under

arrest for the assault on Leone, and

Lafayette Bridgett was also in the

precinct.([477].

Grant would have been arrested on --

for the assault on Leone, was interviewed

on February 21st shortly before noontime at

the precinct where he indicated that he had

seen the complainant being beaten by three

“to four, or four to five, persons, white

males, and believed that Golden, his

arresting officer, was one of then.

He recounted the events leading up to

ths assault upon the complainant and his

obtaining a two-by-four with which he hit

Police Officer Leone and his arrest by

Golden.

Assistant District Attorney Braver did

the questioning of Mr. Grant. Bridgett was

also interviewed on February 21st at 10:25

B-13

SS

a.m. in the precinct and he was interviewed

by Sgt. Chartier and Capt. Kincaid, and he

also recounted the events leading up to the

assault by Grant on Officer Leone.

There was also a George Hewitt at the

station house that morning. George Hewitt

was a cab driver who spoke to Sgt. Chartier

and Capt. Kincaid regarding observing the

beating and that one of the persons had

said he was a cop. [478]

He was a male white, in plain clothes,

with a green army jacket, and the cab

driver assisted Mr. Vogelsang.

Capt. Kincaid also spoke to Officer

Leone on February 21st at the Hospital and

reported that Leone's statement had been

basically the same as Golden's.

Lt. Monahan as a result of these

interviews decided to prepare photo arrays

on February 21 and prepared those photo

arrays from the police department files.

B-14

Photos of all of the six officers who

had taken lost time in regards to the

basketball game were included in order to

show those photos to the complainant, Mr.

Vogelsang, Mr. Hewitt and Mr. Bridget, and

also they were utilized for canvass

purposes on February 2lst.

As a result of the canvass on February

21st, persons were located at the

frankfurter store at the location of the

assault. A Mr. Nelson, a Mr. Morero, and

a witness, Patten, were also located at the

frankfurter store. I believe it is alsoa

Nathan's.

Officer Sheehan and Egan were also all

[479] interviewed on February 2lst.

Officer Leone had been removed to St.

Vincent's Hospital.

Lt. Monahan asserted, and I accept for

present purposes, that he never gave the

information he had obtained from Officers

B-15

Grim and Goodacre as a result of the

P.G.118-9 of these two defendants to the

district attorney, and that Capt. Stone had

directed that the G.0.15 of these two

defendants not be disclosed, and Monahan

obeyed that.

Lineups were conducted involving both

of these defendants on April 20th, 1988,

at Poplar Street in Brooklyn, the I.A.D.

headquarters, about 4:00 in the afternoon

for each of these defendants. Those

lineups were viewed by Mr. Johnson and by

the complainant.

I find the procedures utilized were

appropriate. The witnesses were told not

to discuss the matter with each other.

They were brought to the lineup separately.

There were six people in each lineup.

Attorneys were present for each of the

defendants who could have objected. Each

{480} defendant chose his number and his

B-16

position in the lineup.

People's Exhibit 3 is the photo of the

lineup of Sgt. Goodacre in which he is

number 3 in that lineup, and People's

number 4 is the photo of a lineup of

Officer Grim in which he is number 2 in

that lineup.

The witnesses were asked separately,

did they recognize anyone. Mr. Johnson

indicated separately, yes; he represented

he recognized in one lineup Sgt. Goodacre,

number 3, and Officer Grim, number 2.

The same process was repeated with Mr.

Vogelsang and he made the same

identification.

I do find that the I.A.D. file was

made available to Assistant District

Attorney Braver in April of 1988, prior to

the Grand Jury in May of 1988, but that not

included in that I.A.D. file were pages 16

and 31, which were the summaries of the

B-17

Grim and Goodacre worksheets, and also page

21, which is simply a duplicate of page 16.

I find that there did come a time that

the investigation by the police department,

in which [481] two bartenders from McAnn's

were spoken (cto, one Brody and one

Fitzgerald, and information derived from

those interviews was conveyed to the

Assistant District Attorney Braver.

Lt. Kid testified as well, February

23 he went to the hospital with Assistant

District Attorney Braver and Officer Rich

interviewed the complainant and showed a

photostat of the police department

identification photos which included Police

Officer Grim, and Lt. Kid's memory of this

was not as clear as that of now Detective

Rich, whose recollection was far more clear

about that. And I will go into that in a

moment.

He indicated that the I.A.D. unit is

B-18

aware that G.O. 15 information was not to

be disclosed to the district attorney, that

no one ever asked him for G.0O. 15s

regarding these defendants, that the I.A.D.

folder is kept in the file cabinet and he

was not present in the G.O. 15s of these

two defendants.

Det. Rich did testify that she was on

Midtown South on February 21st, 1988, with

Det. Weeks at about 10 a.m. She was

present at the interview with Rodney Grant

conducted by Assis- [482] tant District

Attorney Braver. She prepared a worksheet

and statement which the defendant signed,

and made a taped statement of the statement

that he made.

She also interviewed Toussaint

Vogelsang February 23, 1988, with Lt. Kid

and Assistant District Attorney Braver.

She indicated that a photo array consisting

of six separate folders, each with six

B-19

separate photographs, was prepared, one

folder containing a photo of Sgt. Goodacre;

that before showing the photo arrays to the

complainant, they first asked the

complainant fer descriptions. The

complainant gave descriptions of the two

persons and couldn't identify two others.

People's Exhibit 5 now in evidence is

one of the six folders which contains

photos of Police Office Grim in which he

is number 2 in that photo. That folder was

shown to Mr. Vogelsang and he was asked if

he recognized anybody and he said, yes,

number 2 was one of the assailants, and

additionally he initialed that photo or

that portion of the photo right near that

photo. [483]

People's 6 is also one of the six

folders in which a photo of Sgt. Goodacre

appears and is photo number 4, and the

complainant likewise identified that photo

B-20

and initialed it.

Det. Rich also indicated that she

never told Assistant District Attorney

Braver of the contents of the 188-9

interviews of these defendants.

She did indicate that she interviewed

Christopher Waldron and that the summary

of that appears on page 17 of the I.A.D.

folder; that she interviewed him. on

February 22nd; that Mr. Waldron indicated

that he knew Police Officer Grim, that he

was at the basketball game with Ms. Murphy,

his fiance, and that Grim invited he,

Waldron, to a party at the Hyatt Hotel, and

that therefore he dropped off his fiance at

the train station and went to the Hyatt

Hotel, but he didn't see Officer Grim at

the hotel.

He testified, that is, Waldron

testified before the Grand Jury, and I will

make further reference to his testimony

B-21

later.

Assistant Chief Frank Corsello

testified he [484] is now retired from the

police department, as one of July 1988, he

was assistant chief of I.A.D and indicated

there had been six C.I.U. teams under him

during the time that he served as

assistant chief; that in February of 1988

a 118-9 was in effect and applicable to

Goodacre and Grim; that there was no

written or hard and fast policy regarding

separation of C.I.U. teams or modules with

regard to those involved in a criminal

investigation; that there had been such a

practice in certain cases where there was

an indictment or an indictment was imminent

-- it is not relevant in this situation;

and that there was no requirement or policy

that would have required the separation to

which the defense attorneys have alluded in

this kind of case under the circumstances

B-22

at the time that the 188-9s were given to

Grim and Goodacre; that he did confer, or

it was common, that the I.A.D would confer

with the assistant district attorney

regarding the use of G.O. 15s, and if the

D.A. had no objection then they would use

G.O. 15.

The police department would not

necessarily [{485]) defer to the assistant

district attorney generally dependent on

the seriousness of the charges. Ultimately

it would be the Deputy Commissioner of

Legal Affairs to decide whether the G.0.15s

would be released. He does not have a

present recollection of whether or not he

had conferred with the legal affairs

commissioner in this particular matter.

Det. Eng of the I.A.D also testified

that on February 22nd, 1988, he became

involved in this investigation; that he

went to the Civil Complaint Review Board

B-23

regarding Officers Grim and Goodacre, and

that he compiled the photo display arrays

that were ultimately shown.

He also participated in an interview

with Ray Durand on February 26th, and he

went with Lt. Monahan for that purpose.

Sgt. Polacino of I.A.D. also testified

primarily that he escorted witnesses to the

lineup and back, that he knew of interviews

of the defendants, G.0.15s of these

defendants, but did not know of their

substance, and that he had not had any

contact with the assistant district

attorney. (486)

He served subpoenas on the witnesses

for the lineup, he did sit it on 118-9

interviews with other police officers, but

not these police officers [sic}.

He indicated that there was an

unwritten procedure with regard to 118-9s,

that 118-9 interviews would be separate

B-24

from other criminal investigations, to

preserve the integrity of the

investigation.

Det. Sorrentino of I.A.D. indicated

that Lt. Monahan was his superior, that on

February 22nd of 1988 he was deing a 4 to

12 tour, and that at that time he went to

the scene on 34th Street and Seventh Avenue

to do a canvass of the area with photo

arrays, including the arrays containing the

pictures of Grim and Goodacre; that he

interviewed certain witnesses from the

canvass, and he was not present at the G.O.

15 on [sic) either Officer Grim or Sgt.

Goodacre. He did review, however, the G.O.

15 of Officer Grim shortly after February

22nd.

Some time between February 22 and

February 29 he learned about Christine

Murphy from Lt. Monahan and knew that

Officer Grim had mentioned (487) Ms.

B-25

Murphy. And he interviewed Ms. Murphy on

February 25 along with Lt. Monahan.

He also knew of Chris Waldron from the

G.O. 15 of Officer Grim, but Mr. Waldron

had previously indicated Det. Rich

interviewed Mr. Waldron. He reviewed the

worksheet of the G.0.15 interviews of both

defendants but had not listened to the

tapes. He did not go to McAnn's Bar as a

result of the G.O. 15 of Sgt. Goodacre.

He received daily updates from Lt. Monahan

and he would have a number of conversations

with A.D.A. Braver.

He indicated that when the Grand Jury

was about to receiving [sic] evidence in

late April the assistant district attorney

had requested G.O. 15s of other police

officers, not these two defendants, and he

did not testify before the Grand Jury.

He did show photo arrays to various

civilians on F. sruary 22nd and showed photo

B-26

arrays to Greg Nelson, who was one of the

workers in the frankfurter store, and also

to Rodney Johnson on February 27. By the

photo arrays, it means the six folders,

each containing six [488] photographs, for

a total of 36 photos.

He asked when he showed those photos,

do you recognize anyone, and he indicated

that Nelson picked out Officer Grim. Also

showed photo array to Rodney Johnson.

He interviewed witnesses who made

identification after the lineup. He was

not present to [sic] the lineup when they

were conducted.

All right. Those are my findings of

fact. And let me deal initially with the

weight [sic][(Wade] aspect of the hearing.

I have looked at the photo arrays

which are in evidence, and I find them to

have been extremely fair.

The argument had been made by Mr.

B-27

Dienst with regard to the photo arrays that

his client is an Asian-American and that it

was therefore an unfair photo array because

Mr. Dienst alleges that Sgt. Goodacre was

the only male Asian-American in the photo

array.

I have previously said during the

hearing, and I will repeat now, that Sgt.

Goodacre may or may not be an Asian-

American, and indeed if Sgt. Goodacre had

been put in the photo array with six other

Asian-Americans, it seems to me it would

have been an unfair photo array precisely

because he does not look Asian-American.

That would have been an unfair photo array,

to have put him in a photo array with five

other people whom he did not look like.

As does appear in this photo array

that I have seen in this case, it was a

fair photo array.

Additionally, it seems clear to me

B-28

that Sgt. Goodacre appears to me to have

white skin. I don't hold myself out to be

an expert, but neither are the witnesses

who viewed these arrays lineup experts, and

it seems to me, as I have indicated, if he

were in a photo array with five other

Asian-Americans, he would stand out. He

did not stand out in this photo array.

And this photo array, as was the photo

array involving Police Officer Grim, was a

fair photo array, fair and non-suggestive.

Similarly, in the lineup photos which

were available to me, I find that the

persons in the lineup bore similar physical

characteristics with (490) regard to each

of these defendants, and that there was

nothing about the lineup makeup that was

either unfair or suggestive.

Similarly, I find that the procedures

followed by the police officer both during

the showing of the photo arrays and during

B-29

the administration of the lineups were fair

and non-suggestive, and the motion to

suppress the pre-trial identifications is

denied.

Now, the law is relatively clear with

regard to the Kastigar aspect of this

particular case.

First, I do find, as I indicated

during the hearing, that the defendants

have carried their burden of going forward,

that is, that they have demonstrated that

they made statements or testified under a

grant of immunity to matters concerning the

prosecution.

And having done that, the People have

the burden of showing that their evidence

is not tainted, by establishing that they

had an independent legitimate source for

the disputed evidence which is wholly

independent of the compelled testimony.

Perhaps before going further with this

B-30

|

[491] aspect of the case, I ought to

address myself to the Grand Jury minutes.

I have read -- I have reviewed the

Grand Jury minutes in their entirety as

submitted to me by Ms. Braver, and there

are two possible sources of taint that

arise.

The first relates to the testimony of

Det. Rich of the I.A.D. Rich's testimony

before the Grand Jury did not include any

statements by these defendants on any

information derived from G.O. 15s. She

primarily testified about statements made

to her by a Mr. Grant and the

identification of Grim and Goodacre by

Johnson and the complainant. That

testimony did not contribute otherwise to

identifying either police officers [sic]

as the assailants.

I don't find that to be a valid sourcé

of taint in regard to either the trial or

B-31

the grand Jury minutes.

The second possible source of taint

relates to Mr. Waldron, Chris Waldron, Mr.

Waldron in his testimony. And I find that

his identity was ascertained from Officer

Grim. He was unable to say what Grim wore

on February 20th when he left [492) the

bar, or who he left with.

He did place Grim in the bar from

11:30 to 12:20 a.m., as did other police

officers, and, parenthetically, I am

advised he probably will be an alibi

witness for Officer Grim and possibly

Officer Goodacre at the time of the trial.

He also testified that, although Grim

arranged to meet him at a party at the

Hyatt Hotel after leaving the bar, Grim was

not present when he arrived at 1 a.m.,

according to Grim's brother.

The Grand Jury was instructed by the

district attorney to disregard this

B-32

statement as hearsay.

Waldron stated that he waited for 20

minutes at the Hyatt and he Ileft.

Obviously this might incriminate Grim since

he did not appear as planned. However, it

adds nothing material to prove the crime.

_ There are myriad {[sic} innocent

explanat‘ons for Grim's failure to appear

at the hotel. The inference that he was

in fact there at the time is also left

open.

[493] I do not believe, given the district

attorney's instructions to disregard the

brother's statement to Mr. Waldron, that

this contributed in any manner to the

indictment.

Disregarding Waldron's testimony

altogether, the evidence before the Grand

Jury is sufficient, and Waldron's testimony

does not differ in any respect from that of

other witnesses.

His failure to meet Grim as planned

does not substantiate the charges in any

significant way, although it should be, it

seems to me, excluded at trial.

The other police officers and police

records establish that Goodacre, Grim and

the other four signed out at 8 p.m. to

attend the game at Madison Square Garden.

The police officers all concur that

they left the game between 11 and 11:30 and

went to McAnn's, where they remained at

least 20 minutes.

No police officers attended the Hyatt

party or testified about Grim and

Goodacre's movement after leaving the bar.

No one knew what Grim wore.

The civilian witnesses testified that

Grim, [494] Goodacre and two others beat

Toussaint Vogelsang for approximately 15

minutes at about midnight following an

argument and a chase.

B-34

In addition to two positive IDs,

Johnson and Vogelsang, the cab driver

Hewitt gave descriptions matching the

others of Grim and Goodacre.

Officers Golden and Leone testified

that they were present at the fight where

Vogelsang was beaten, but that they could

neither describe nor identify his

assailants.

Leone admitted being struck by

Johnson. Golden arrested Johnson.

A cashier at the Nathan's frankfurter

stand, one Patten, corroborates both

Vogelsang and Johnson. A second

corroborating witnesses was Nelson, a

restaurant manager. Neither of these

witnesses made an identification, however.

The case in no way relies on the

statements of the two defendants.

All right. To return then to the law,

there is not really much in dispute between

B-35

the parties as to what the law is in this

case. It seems to me that it is fairly

Clear, and the only issue is to apply the

law to the facts. [495)

Let me then restate it.

Once the defendants demonstrate, as

these defendants have, that they have

testified under a grant of immunity to

matters relating to the prosecution, the

People have tt.e burden of showing that

their evidence is not tainted, by

establishing that they had an independent

legitimate source for the disputed evidence

wholly independent of the compelled

testimony.

The People's burden has been referred

to as a “heavy burden," but the Byrd case

indicates clearly that heavy burden means

that they must show by a preponderance of

the evidence an independent source for all

of the evidence introduced.

B-36

In effect, the law states that the

witnesses must be left in substantially the

same position as if they claimed the Fifth

Amendment privilege and had never testified

at all.

The Gallo case, a Second Circuit 1988

decision has held that harmless error is

applicable if, even without the immunized

testimony, the People would have acted

exactly as they (496) did.

I am satisfied that the People have

met their burden. It is clear that there

were a large number of independent

legitimate sources wholly independent of

the compelled testimony.

There were the police officers with

whom these defendants went to the

basketball game and thereafter to McAnn's.

There were the complainant and Mr.

Johnson, who are identifying witnesses, and

there were other corroborating witnesses,

B-37

such as Mr. Nelson and Hewitt and Patten.

And, having reviewed the extensive and

lengthy Grand Jury minutes, I am satisfied

that they were in no way dependent upon

anything that these defendants in their

largely exculpatory statements had

indicated in their G.O. 15s.

The unexculpatory part of their

statement placing--placing themselves in

the vicinity and at the time are supplied

by the other four police officers who were

with them at the basketball game and at

McAnn's Bar.

I do however indicate to Ms. Braver,

as I did a moment ago, that it seems to me

that she (497) should not elicit from sr.

Waldron, certainly not on direct cause,

that when he went to the Hyatt Hotel, that

Officer Grim was not present.

The foregoing is the opinion and

decision and order of the Court.

B-38

eee

SENTENCING MINUTES

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

COUNTY OF NEW YORK,

Criminal Term : Part 56

oe

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF New York,

against

PeTer Gam, CHARLES GOODACRE,

Defendants

Index No. 4300-88

Charge: Aslit. 2

>

100 Centre Street

New York, New York 10013

June 28, 1989

Before

Hon. Harold Rothwax., Justice

Appearances

For the People: Susan Braver, Esq., Assistant District

Attorney

For Defendants: Francis Ganun, Esq. Richard A. Dienst,

bsg

(2) The Clerk: Number 39 on the calendar, Peter Grim

and Charles Goodacre.

Ganun, 118-21 Queens Boulevard, Forest Hills, New York.

Good morning, your Honor.

The Court Good morning.

Mr. Dienst: For defendant Goodacre, Richard A. Dienst,

225 Broadway, New York, New York.

May we approach the bench with the District Attorney”

The Court: If you wish.

(Counsel for both sides approach the Bench in a discus:

sion off the record.)

The Court We'll have a further call so that counsel can

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I've asked the defense attorncys whether or not they wished

an adjournment so that Miss Braver could respond in writ-

img and they've indicated to me that they're content that she

respond orally.

I have reviewed the motions on my own, so I'm familiar

with their contents. Before we hear her response, you may

wish to orally argue in support of that. The defendants can

be seated while we're doing this.

You want to add «© anfthing, Mr. Ganun?

(4) Mr. Ganun: Just to bring the Court's attention, your

Honor, the main thrust of the motion to set aside is that

based upon evidence or material that's in the record, that

there was what we characterize as a Castargar,

CASTARGAR, issue, the Castargar issue became

evident during the course of the trial especially in the sense

that it became admitted that the defendants, as police offi-

cers, were interviewed pursuant to the terms of 118-9 of

the Patrol Guide. They were given assurances that anything

they said and any product of what they had said would not

be used against them.

The District Attorney took the tactic that she did not

want to have specifically the statements of the particular

defendant. She took the complete IAD file save their state-

ments and went on with her preparation for trial.

I brought to the Court's attention the case of Castargar

and also the case of McDaniel, your Honor, which seems to

stand for the proposition that if the evidence as given to the

prosecution is tainted by the former use of immunized

testimony, that that taint, even if it’s indirect—we (5) main-

tain that the taint in this case was direct but certainly was

imelirect in the sense that Mr. Grim made a statement. In the

statement he said as to what his activities were on February

20th, 1988, where he went, who he met.

As a@ result of that statement, the District Attorney,

through its investigators, could go out and check out and

interview these individuals whom he claimed he met, which

C-3

they did. That statement led to the ability of the District

Attorney to form or shape her prosecution in this case.

As the case of McDaniels points out, if the taint is even

indirect and even if it forms the basis of the prosecution's

tactics in the prosecution of the case, then the remedy

should be a dismissal of the indictment and therefore, your

Honor, based upon my statement here and my notice of

motion which have been submitted to the Court, |

respectfully request that the indictment in this case be

dismissed and that the conviction be set aside.

The Court: All right. The record should reflect that

before the trial in this matter, the case had been referred to

me for Wade and Castargar (6) hearings and that a full

Castargar hearing was held in this matter and | was satis-

fied that Castargar and its progeny did not preclude this

prosecution from going forward. It seems to me, it’s not

necessary to repeat the record that was made at that time.

Nothing that subsequently occurred at the trial did anything

to, in my judgment, undermine the validity of the ruling

that I rendered at the end of that hearing.

Did you wish to respond at this point in time, Miss

Braver?

Ms. Braver: With respect to the Castargar hearing, your

Honor, People’s position remains what it was at the ime of

the hearing and we maintain that the use immunity which

was granted to the defendants was honored and that

nothing that occurred during the course of this trial abro-

gated his Fifth Amendment privileges as found in Cas-

targar or in rulings in cases of this jurisdiction.

With respect to the other statements made in Mr.

Ganun’s motion to set aside the verdict, | believe they

reiterate the facts which were heard at trial and heard by

the jury and I will not (7) respond to them at this point.

Clearly, suffice it to say, the jury found those facts that they

regarded as compelling and convicted the defendant

C-4

accordingly and we believe that the motion to set aside the

verdict should not be granted.

The Court: Mr. Dienst, do you wish to be heard?

Mr. Dienst: Yes, your Honor. Throughout this entire trial,

any application made on behalf of the defendant Grim or

any motion made on behalf of the defendant Grim was

deemed to be made on behalf of Goodacre. Mr. Ganun has

moved pursuant to Section 330.30 subdivision | and |

would adopt that motion and—

The Court: I have no problem with your doing so.

Mr. Dienst: —and Mr. Ganun has indicated to me that

for the 440 motion which | have made, he adopts the

positions that I take on behalf of Police Officer Grim in

connection therewith. | will not repeat the arguments that |

raised in connection with General Order 15 on the issucs

that were decided by the Court at the Castargar-type hear-

ing. They are fully set forth in my notice of (8) motion.

However, in addition to that, I believe that the verdict

should be set aside under the following grounds: First, the

defendant was charged in a single count with assault in the

second degree. Neither the grand jury nor the District

Attorney charged these defendants with acting in concert.

However, during the course of the trial, it was the People’s

theory and the Court, over objection, charged that the

defendants were acting in concert.

I respectfully submit, your Honor, that it was error for the

Court to charge acting in concert when the jury in fact—the

grand jury in fact had not found that they had been acting in

concert or acting in any form of conspiratorial manner. At

no time did the District Attorney move to amend the indict-

ment, nor, in my opinion, would such an application to

amend the indictment have been appropriate. Nowhere in

any of the discovery material was there any indication that

these defendants acted in concert. Basically, the case as

tried constituted a different theory and the case submitted

to the jury constituted a different charge than that which

C-5

was (9) set forth in the indictment by the grand jury. Most

respectfully, neither the Court nor the District Attorney can

substitute its jedgment for the judgment of the grand jury as

to what the charge may be in a particular case.

In addition to that, this verdict should be set aside upon

the grounds that the People failed to establish beyond a

reasonable doubt the intent of the defendant, Charles

Goodacre, to inflict serious physical injury on Toussaint

Vogelsang. nor was there any direct proof that Charles

Goodacre inflicted any serious physical injury upon Tous-

saint Vogelsang, nor was there any proof that it was Good-

(sic).

I don't wish to go through the testimony of the trial. Your

Honor’s recollection of it, I'm sure, is equal to if not better

than my recollection but just as to one or two salient items.

Let us disregard for a moment, if we may, the alibi

defense that was raised during the course of the trial which

obviously was rejected by the jury. Let us assume, therefore,

that Grim and Goodacre (10) were the persons who al-

legedly committed this assault. Testimony of the complain-

ant, Mr. Vogelsang, clearly indicated that a tall blondhaired

individual! was the one who struck him in the jaw at the first

encounter and at that pointed, fractured his jaw. He also

testified that others, somewhere between four to six or at

times six to cight others, tried to refrain or restrain that tall

blond individual from further engaging in an altercation

with Mr. Vogelsang.

The testimony thereafter, some twenty minutes later, Mr.

Vogelsang came back and I think his testimony was that he

was seeking vengeance, that he had obtained a broken

broom handle and that he went after the persons who he

had met in the previous encounter with the full intent of

striking them with a broom handle in order to get ven-

geance. Again, the testimony was vague.

C-6

There was no testimony beyond a reasonable doubt to

establish that it was the defendant Goodacre who had any

intent or who in fact did inflict any serious physical injury

upon the complainant Vogelsang. Assuming for the pur-

poses of this argument but clearly not admitting that (11)

Goodacre was present, the indications are that it was Good-

acre who attempted to intercede and prevent any fight,

intercede and prevent any altercation that occurred in the

street. The evidence shows that it was only after Vogelsang

attempted to attack whoever the group of individuals were

with a broom handle that a fight in the street ensued but

there has been no definitive evidence showing that this

defendant inflicted any serious physical injury.

Now, aside from the failure of proof of the People to

establish as a matter of law the guilt of this defendant

beyond a reasonable doubt for that charge, we have another

significant reason why this indictment should be dismissed

and why the motion to set aside the verdict should be

granted.

Prior to your Honor’s charge to the jury, I requested a

charge of justification. Although the defense of alibi was

raised, | submitted to your Honor that the jury could choose

to disbelieve the alibi defense and that the defense of

justification would be appropriate based upon the evidence

that was educed at the trial and most particularly, based

upon the testimony of Toussaint Vogelsang, (12) that in the

second incident he was the aggressor. -

Again, most respectfully, your Honor, I submit the Court

in its charge to the jury and its refusal to charge justifica-

tion, committed reversible error which mandates this Court

in the first instance to correct its error, set aside the verdict

and grant the defendants a new trial based upon that issue.

I will not at this particular point in time go into what is

raised in the motion papers as to what | consider, again

most respectfully in my position as a defense attorney, to be

C-7

prejudicial conduct on behalf of the Court. They are con-

tained in my motion papers and need not be repeated at this

i point in time.

The Court: Okay.

Mr. Dienst: Based upon the totality of the circumstances

and the other issues raised in the motion, | join Mr. Ganun

to set aside the verdict in this particular case.

The Court: You want to respond, Miss Braver?

Ms. Braver: Your Honor, | appreciate the opportunity

afforded to respond orally in the case and the courtesy.

With regard to the first point raised by (13) Mr. Dienst,

the grand jury clearly had al! the evidence before it that was

apparent at trial as well and there was clearly no change in

the theory of the prosecution from the time it was presented

to the grand jury until the time it was presented to the petit

jury in this case. When the grand jury voted on that evi-

dence, it clearly found and charged that both these defend-

ants were actually intending to cause serious physical

injury and that is exactly what the petit jury found as well

and the law clearly reflects the culpability attendant to the

acts of one who is found to act with the intent to cause

serious physical injury when in fact such injury results.

I believe the evidence at trial throughout and the evi-

dence replete throughout the entire IAD file which was

available for many many months prior to counsel and

which was in their possession reflect the theory of the

prosecution always was that these two defendants were

acting together throughout the incident up to and including

the point in time during which Mr. Vogelsang was beaten.

Therefore, I believe that the charge regarding acting in

concert was perfectly consonant with the evidence (14)

before the petit jury, as well as with the evidence before the

grand jury and therefore, there was no change in theory

which would require cither a dismissal of the indictment or

which would preclude the Court from reviewing the evi-

C-8

dence on a reasonable basis from assuming the grand jury

intended exactly that, as well as the fact that they both

acted as principals.

With regard to counsel's argument that the there was no

proof beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to Mr. Good-

acre’s involvement in striking of the complainant, the beat-

ing, it was indicated to the jury the beating took place for

approximately seven to ten minutes. It was also clear from

the testimony of Toussaint Vogelsang that he implicated

Mr. Grim was participating in that beating throughout.

It also was indicated by Rodnacy Johnson that he was

positive that the defendant Goodacre participated in that _

beating throughout his opportunity to view Mr. Goodacre.~

Officers Golden and Leone clearly said there were only two

people involved in the beating of Mr. Vogelsang.

The complainant did not appear to be injured (15) to

either Mr. Johnson or to Mr. Greg Nelson when he returned

to 34th Street where the second confrontation took place.

He certainly—Mr. Vogelsang himself is certainly not quali-

fied to determine at what moment in time an injury such as

a fracture to the jaw occurred. That was certainly not the

only injury that he suffered nevertheless. In fact, Mr.

Vogelsang said he was all right when he returned to 34th

Street to get his belongings.

Clearly, all his injuries were suffered during the course of

the beating by the two individuals whom the jury, on the

basis of substantial evidence, found to be these two defend-

ants. I believe that, therefore, there was ample evidence for

them to have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr.

Goodacre as well as Mr. Grim intended to cause serious

physical injury to Mr. Vogelsang and did so.

With regard to the third charge that Mr. Dienst raises as

to his motion to set aside the verdict, he believes and he

asserts that the charge of justification should have been

given upon his request to the jury. | believe that there is no

c-9

reasonable ground in the evidence, no reasonable (16) basis

in the evidence, to determine—for the Court to have found

that a charge of that kind was warranted. The evidence at

trial in fact established that Mr. Vogelsang was not the

initial aggressor, that he had returned to 34th Street to get

his belongings and even if he possessed a stick at that ume,

was going there with the intent to defend himself in the

event that another assault was made upon him by a group

of persons, he being alone at the time to his own belief and

the evidence demonstrated that these defendants rushed

Mr. Vogelsang at the time that he was holding that stick and

that he did not in fact swing with that stick, if in fact he did

so, unul such time as he was rushed by what he believed to

be an excess of two persons at that time and certainly, as he

described it, at the very least, the first two people under the

Therefore, | don't believe there's any basis in the evi-

dence to dem—to in—to warrant a charge of justification.

Mr. Vogelsang at no time was the initial aggressor, nor at

any time possesse | the degree of force which would have

required cither of these two gentlemen to act (17) cither in

self-defense or in defense of another. Therefore, | believe

that those grounds in support of the motion to set aside the

verdict are insufficient to warrant such an action by the

Court and as to the other grounds which are alleged in the

papers, the Court was present throughout and I do not

believe that any of those other grounds, including the alle-

gation that counsel was prejudiced by any actions by the

Court, have merit and does not require the drastic action of

setting aside a verdict which was properly found upon

sufficient evidence by a petit jury in this case.

Therefore, the People believe that the entire motion, the

motion in its entirety to set aside the verdict should be

denied.

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The Court: All right, this was a one-count indictment in

which the defendants were charged with assaulting the

complainant in this case. It's clear that the theory of the

tical count and it's clear to me (18) that the failure of the

defense attorney to understand and to realize that this was a

charge of acting in concert is attributable to him and not to

either the indictment or the District Attorney.

The issue of the defendant's intent is obviously a matter

for the jury to decide based on all of the evidence before it.

I'm satisfied that the jury was justified in concluding that

each of these defendants inter.ded to cause serous physical

injury to the person they were found by the jury to have

beaten. In my view, there was no basis for a justification

The defendants did argue alibi and did argue that they

weren't present at the time that the assault occurred. That

by itself would not mean that justification could not be

charged. Defendants under our system of law can charge

inconsistent —can request inconsistent defenses.

The fact was that in this particular case, there was no

reasonable view of the evidence under which the jury could

have found that the persons who assaulted the complainant

were acting in self-defense. Indeed, the testimony of wit-

nesses and of complainant himself was that he was on his

(19) back throughout the entire assault; that he kept on

being beaten. In the event, he was in the hospital for two

weeks. His ribs were broken. His lung was punctured. There

was testimony that the perpetrators pulled his shirt over his

head binding his arms so that he could not even swing his

arms.

There's simply nothing in the record that would indicate

that the people who were beating the complainant were

C-11

Now, I don't intend to go into any great detail with

regard to the other matters on the motwn to set asnde the

verdict cither. There's only one thing | feel that deserves

comment because it is not otherwise a part of this record

In his motion to set aside the verdict, Mr. Dienst, who |

trial and that they cannot have a fair trial if a judge indi-

(21) I may say parenthetically that Sergeant Goodacre’s

father, who was present throughout the trial, had sent a

C-12

letter to the Court saying that he thought | was especially

faw during the tnal and makes no menahon in hs letter that |

rolled my cyes skyward of any other way during the test-

mony of those witnesses.

These motions to set asade the verdict are denred in thew

enurety and defendants have cxicepions to that ruling

I showkd say that both sides have had the opportunity to

review the pre-sentence reports. | have received a large

number of letters with regard to doth defendants and Ive

made those available to the clerk and | will ask at the end of

these proceedings that those letters be attached to the pre-

sentence reports for cach of these defendants for any

reviewing authority that wishes to look at them

All right. Please arraign the defendants for sentence at

ths ume

The Clerk: Is your name Peter Grim”

The Defendant Grim: Yes.

The Clerk: Is Mr. Ganun, standing besxle you (22)

court, your attorney”

The Defendant Grim: Yes

The Clerk: Is your name Charles Goodacre”

The Defendant Goodacre. Yes

The Clerk: Is Mr. Dienst, standing beside you m court,

your attorney’

The Defendant Goodacre: Yes, he

The Clerk: You are cach now being arraigned for sen-

tence upon your conviction after jury trial to the crime of

assault in the second degree, the one and only count of

indictment 4300 of "88. Pror to the unposition of sentence,

first the Assistant District Attorney, then cach of your

attorneys and then cach of you, will have an opportunity to

address the Court on any matter relative to sentence

Miss Braver

Ms. Braver: Your Honor, these defendants were found

guilty by a jury after a full trial of the felony of asauk im

c-13

the second degree, a D felony. Statute lays out a scheme of

punishment with respect to that. These certainly afford the

Court ample latitude within which to impose a just

sentence.

(23) 1 would point out that, as the Court has indicated,

this was a very brutal act on the part of both of these men,

far in excess of a mere street fight which is what they

allege, at least Mr. Ganun alleges, in his pre-sentence mem-

orandum. This complainant was not only in the hospital for

two weeks but in fact left against the orders of his doctor

and was likely to have remained there longer still because

of the nature of the injuries that were done to him. He was

defenseless and it was a vicious act and fully qualified for

the verdict of an intent to cause serious physical injury and

did cause it.

I would point out that—

The Court: Excuse me. Why don’t you sit down while

she’s talking? There's no reason to stand. Go ahead.

Ms. Braver: I would point out in this particular instance,

these two gentlemen who otherwise appear to have no prior

criminal history, and I'm assuming that that is so, acted in a

criminal fashion; did not act while they were acting in their

capacity as police officers but rather acted as civilians and

as such, are subject (24) to the same laws and inhibitions as

are applied to all persons in this society.

The Court, I think and I urge, should consider the follow-

ing factors, though, in imposing sentence. These two gen-

tlemen were in fact police officers at the time, although off

duty officers. As such, they bore an additional responsibility

to the community. It became quite apparent to a large

crowd assembled in a very busy public thoroughfare on a

Saturday night that the people who were committing this

vicious assault on Mr. Vogelsang were in fact police offi-

cers because at least one person amongst those that were

beating Mr. Vogelsang, upon responding to a person in the

C-14

crowd who said, “Leave the boy alone. Haven't you done

enough,” held up his hand and said, “Stay out of it. Mind

your own business. I’m a police officer.” By so doing and by

drawing the attention of the crowd to the fact that these

were police officers, albeit that they were off duty at the

time, they created a very bad impression, to say the least, of

the quality of the police force in general of New York City

which I believe is very high.

(25) The police force in New York City is, by and large, a

very responsible, caring force and they do their best to

make sure that all persons are properly safeguarded under

the laws of this community. These two gentlemen acted

outside the laws of this community and in the manner in

which they acted and the knowledge became available to

the public, they caused great disillusionment on the part of

the persons who were present and the part of anybody they

might have spoken to with respect to the entire police force

and they, in effect as well, when they took the stand and

perjured themselves.

The Court: They both didn’t take the stand.

Ms. Braver: They both took the stand.

The Court: Again, only one took the stand. Go ahead.

Ms. Braver: I did not cross-examine one of them, your

Honor, but both of them did take the stand and they both

gave similar statements. I believe they both perjured them-

selves in the course of this trial.

Mr. Vogelsang initially told me when I first came into this

case that he was terribly distressed (26) that when he found

out subsequently in the course of the case that these two

gentlemen had been police officers, that in fact they were

police officers, that when he had been in that area before,

he had taken great pains to speak to people who were at—

appearing to be outside of this community and tell them

that they should cooperate with the police; the police were

just there to protect them and that they were frends of

C-15

theirs and he said he didn’t recall any moment in his life

when he had been more disillusioned than upon finding out

that the people who had beaten him were in fact themselves

police officers.

The fact that one of the persons who testified in this case

was, by his own words and also in defense counsel's pre-

sentence memorandum, characterized as a hustler by both

the statements of both these defendants does not mean that

he should not be accorded the same degree of respect and

protection under the laws. I believe their characterization

of that witness, Mr. Johnson, as a hustler and thereby not

worthy of anything, was characteristic of their contempt in

general for population—for a segment of this population

(27) which they believed to be—attacked themselves—to

be attacking on the night of this incident.

I urge that the Court consider the factors of their being

police officers in the sense that their duty to the public has

been betrayed; their duty to their fellow officers has been

betrayed, as well as the acts committed directly against Mr.

Vogelsang, in imposing sentence upon these gentlemen

within the structure that the statute requires and makes

available.

The Clerk: Mr. Ganun.

The Court: Do you have a specific recommendation?

Ms. Braver: I believe incarceration is warranted, your

Honor.

The Court: Beyond that, do you have any recom-

mendation?

Ms. Braver: The felony statute, the D felony, for which

they were incarcerated, mandates a state prison term whose

minimum, I believe, is one to three and whose maximum

term would be seven years.

The Court: No, it is not. There's no mandatory state

felony —

C-16

Ms. Braver: I believe there is on this (28) assault two, it

being a violent felony, your Honor.

The Court: Wrong. Mr. Ganun.

Ms. Braver: If I'm wrong on that, I still do believe that

incarceration is warranted in this case and would not rec-

ommend more than the one to three which I believe the

statute applies.

Mr. Ganun: Your Honor, on behalf of Peter Grim, I would

just like to indicate to the Court that I'm not going to

reargue the case. The Court has heard the testimony of all

of the witnesses.

The District Attorney has indicated that these individuals

should be treated like all other civilians. I venture to say

that so far, they were police officers. As the Court knows,

my client was a twenty-nine-year-old, or twenty-cight-

year-old at the time, probationary police officer.

Assuming arguendo that he was involved in this situa-

tion, we have the statements of Mr. Vogelsang that—and

taking the statements of the District Attorney that after the

initial confrontation, that Mr. Vogelsang came back armed

with a broomstick; that Mr. Vogelsang allegedly struck out

and hit my client on the head, or he identifies my client, on

the head with a bottle, struck my client in the (29) cheek

with a stick causing a purple mark; that according to him,

my client hit him with his fist causing his jaw to be broken.

The People—the defense put up a district surgeon from

New York City Police Department that testified that

defendant Grim had no marks on his head, no marks on his

cheek, no trauma to his knuckles.

Apparently, the jury didn’t understand or was not aware

of the position of the district surgeon. If the district surgeon,

I submit, had found such marks, Mr. Grim would have been

arrested on February 22nd, 1989.

Mr. Grim, your Honor, as indicated in a pre-sentence

memorandum, has never been in trouble before. He comes

C-17

from a tight, religious family. His father happens to be a

New York City firefighter. He's been that for over twenty-

nine years, your Honor. Mr. Grim has—his mother is a

homemaker. His two brothers have never been in trouble.

Mr. Grim has never been in trouble.

I respectfully submit, your Honor, that you treat Mr.

Grim as you would treat anybody faced with this type of

situation with no prior criminal record. I had suggested in

my pre-sentence (30) memorandum that perhaps the Court

could see fit to grant to Mr. Grim probation or probation

combined with community service and I had recommended

in my pre-sentence memorandum that perhaps, not tongue-

in-cheek or not in a sense of irony, that the community

service would entail perhaps working with street people

who apparently Mr. Vogelsang and Mr. Johnson were or

perhaps working with an organization such as Covenant

House.

Your Honor, the D. A. indicates that Mr. Vogelsang was

supposedly outraged. I'd like to point out that the Probation

Department has indicated that they could not even contact

Mr. Vogelsang to give an impact report on this particular

incident.

Based upon all of the foregoing, your Honor, I'd

respectfully request that this Court take into consideration

the numerous letters that have been submitted to the Court

setting forth the good background of Mr. Grim. He was at

the time a probationary police officer. As a result of this

incident, he was forced to retire. He lost his job. It was

because of probably his father, he wanted to follow his

father’s footsteps serving the People of the State of New

York. Unfortunately, that won't come to pass. He's been

tremendously penalized so far, not only himself, his wife,

his family, and we respectfully request that this Court take

into consideration all of the letters.

Your Honor, during the course of the trial your Honor

saw fit to advise counsel that it’s our responsibility to

C-18

suggest to the Court whenever we deem or see fit that he

may be going awry. The Court indicated that it would

accept suggestions to prevent it from making a court error.

I respectfully request that the Court take my recommen-

dation that the Court show mercy in affording Mr. Grim a

probation with community service that would be apropos to

this type of case. Society is not going to be threatened by

Mr. Grim doing anything in the future. If this happened, it

was an aberration. The business—the fact that he was a

New York City police officer, it sometimes sticks in my

craw that police officers, because of their duty or supposed

duty and oaths that they take, are held to extraordinarily

high level with regard to—

The Court: Shouldn't they be?

(32) Mr. Ganun: Excuse me?

The Court: Shouldn't police officers be held to that high

level of responsibility?

Mr. Ganun: They should, your Honor, but on the same

token, these men are human beings, you know. In the case

of Police Officer Grim, he was a probationary police offi-

cer, maybe hadn't, quote, gotten involved in the police

family. I had suggested in my memorandum to overturn the

verdict, your Honor, that it's my experience that there's

been in this society that police officers have become the

new minority. Everybody is biased against police officers.

I'm not just saying in this case but all cases, people jump to

conclusions; cops, they're accused of a crime, other cops

testify in their behalf, therefore, there's this blue wall of

silence or conspiracy.

Your Honor, I think Police Officer Grim should be given

the benefit of any privilege that any othér person in his

position would be able to ask of this Court. As I indicated to

you, I respectfully request that the Court consider probation

and probation involved with community service. I think

that the modern thinking with (33) regard to penology is to

C-19

try to have the punishment fit the crime, the situation, the

individual who s charged, and | think that in this case with

the factors that are here and that came through in the trial,

that probation and community service would be most

appropriate and society would be most satisfied.

The defendant, as | indicated, has been dismissed from

the Police Department. There's no threat to him going

back. I just respectfully request that the Court temper any

sentence with mercy. Thank you for your time, your Honor.

The Court: All right, Mr. Grim, is there anything you

wish to say?

The Defendant Grim: No, your Honor.

The Court: Mr. Dienst.

Mr. Dienst: Your Honor, on behalf of Mr. Goodacre, I'd

like first to address a remark that was made by the District

Attorney and that is the status of police officers. What is

conspicuously absent from the remarks of the District

Attorney is that a young police officer, Police Officer

Leone, who testified at the trial, was attempting to do his

duty and do his job that (34) particular night, sustained a

very serious injury inflicted by either the persons who

testified or Mr. Rodney Grant who was associated in some

way with the complainant, Mr. Vogelsang. That young man

has sustained serious permanent and protracted disabilities

which will mandate his retirement and his career being lost

from the New York City Police Department.

Your Honor, I'd like to respectfully suggest that police

officers are not entitled under law to any higher standard

than anybody else. They're not entitled to any greater privi-

leges or any greater immunities than anybody else but the

obverse of that is also correct. Police officers are not rele-

gated to a watered down version of the United States Con-

stitution and they should not be treated in a disparate

manner from any gther first offender that may appear

before your Honor fet a crime such as this. Had these

circumstances rose or arisen out of the performance of their

C-20

official duties, had they be acting as police officers at the

time of this incident, I think the remarks of the District

Attorney might have more merit than they do at this partic-

ular point.

(35) I would just like to say, during the course of the trial

and by the enormous amount of letters your Honor has

received on their behalf, it was pointed out to the Court that

Charles Goodacre is a quiet, peaceful young man. He is an

eight-year veteran o* the police force. He has made that

police force his career. In those eight years, including his

promotion to the rank of sergeant, he was never the subject

of any departmental charges or specifications of brutality.

He was decorated for his bravery. Even Police Department

witnesses who appeared on behalf of the prosecution testi-

fied as to his good character, as to his good reputation, as to

a peaceful, quiet guy in connection with his services with

the Police Department.

I don’t wish to characterize Mr. Vogelsang nor any of the

other witnesses that testified. Certainly, nobody should

receive a beating on behalf of anybody’s hands but to

suggest that in this off-duty situation that because they

serve the public and put their lives on the line every day for

years and years in the street that they should be penalized

for that service because of a single (36) isolated off-duty

incident which was counter to their whole sense of history

and sense of time and place, | think is inappropriate, an

inappropriate suggestion by the District Attorney. There is

no connection between the acts for which these defendants

stand convicted and their performances, their other duties

as a police officer and to seek to impose an additional

sanction and an additional penalty on them because they

chose law enforcement as a career, I think is inappropriate.

Your Honor has received a letter from Father Costello

who is active in the Queens courts. He knows Goodacre and

Goodacre’s family; has made a strong suggestion to your

C-21

Honor that incarceration, in his opinion, would not be

appropriate; that a period of prcoation and community

service would be appropriate. I suggest that the eight years

that Mr. Goodacre has served this community, he has per-

formed a significant amount of community service. Clearly,

if he did in fact commit this single isolated act of abhorrent

behavior, it is precisely that and | would ask the Court to

take into consideration his eight years of service on the

street and that all the good deeds be not (37) washed away

with this single isolated bad act and this felony conviction.

As your Honor knows, upon the verdict of guilty being —

coming in, Charles Goodacre forfeited eight years of con-

tributions to his pension fund, all future career paths and

opportunities with the New York City Police Department.

Should some court at some particular point in time vacate

the sentence or set aside this verdict, or vacate the judg-

ment, that will not reinstate Mr. Goodacre to the Police

Department. The Court of Appeals has definitively ruled

that a public official who is found guilty by a jury verdict of

a felony forfeits his office and there is—should he be exone-

rated from these charges at some point down the road by an

appellate court, if there is an appeal in this situation, would

not result in his restoration to his duty. Certainly, his dignity

and respect that he held in the community will never be

restored.

For all practical purposes, by this verdict, Sergeant

Goodacre is now homeless; homeless in the sense of not

having a career, homeless in the sense of not having a job;

homeless in the sense that his (38) entire pension and future

and salary and benefits and honors have all been stripped of

him.

In addition to that, there is pending in the Civil Court of

the Supreme Court, civil side, a multimillion-dollar action

for monetary damages. The finding of guilt in this particu-

lar case will be res judicata or at least collaterally estopped

Mr. Goodacre from asserting any defense to any claims for

C-22

monetary damages brought by Mr. Vogelsang. Your Honor

recalls at the trial you heard the telephone numbers that

were being demanded in connection with this case.

The man’s life is shattered. His career is shattered. His

conviction has brought disgrace to his father who served in

the Police Department for many many years. His family is

here. He’s been stigmatized and disgraced in the eyes of the

entire community. With the totality of the significant pun-

ishments that have already been imposed, I respectfully

suggest to your Honor that the imposition of a jail sentence

would be inappropriate under the circumstances.

Again, I don’t wish to attribute any greater or lesser

degree of responsibility as to what (39) transpired in that

street that night during those few minutes. Your Honor

heard the testimony. Your Honor heard of the passive

aspect of Mr. Goodacre’s participation as found by the jury.

I'd ask your Honor to consider the letters that were sent,

perhaps even consider my remarks that I've made to the

Court and in the interests of finding fairness, in the interests

of justice, impose a sentence of probation on behalf of Mr.

Goodacre. Thank you.

The Court: Mr. Goodacre, do you have anything to say?

The Defendant: No, your Honor.

The Court: The record should reflect that the Court is

satisfied that the jury's verdict was warranted by the evi-

dence. In other words, I'm satisfied that these defendants

arguably are guilty of the crimes of which they have been

convicted even though they continue to deny that fact.

Their continuing denial of that fact makes it difficult to

understand the exact circumstances in which this assault

took place. We have the testimony of the complainants but

the defendants have denied us their version of that fact. It is

clear that there was some kind of verbal (40) confrontation

initially between the complainant, Mr. Vogelsang, and

Police Officer Grim and that that escalated to a level of

C-23

extraordinary rage which resulted in Officer Grim and then

Sergeant Goodacre in viciously and repeatedly assaulting a

person who was at the time helpless to defend himself. He

was on the ground. His arms were restrained and he was

repeatedly beaten while police force was used, albeit off-

duty, to keep the crowd from assisting that person.

I do not believe that I have any bias against police

officers. I believe that they have a very difficult job. I do

believe, however, that public service is a public trust and

that when police officers take their oath and take their

arms, they undertake a level of responsibility and restraint

which they are not free to discard and which these officers

did discard and compounding what they did was what they

did after the assault.

In my view, they engaged in a process that would cover

up, confuse and mislead authorities and that that continued

throughout the entire process of this investigation. | believe

that these gentlemen have no prior record. They have good

(41) families. I don’t believe they pose any threat to this

community but I do believe that the criminal law exists to

punish wrongdoing and to assert moral condemnation of

acts which are serious and violent and unjustified and |

believe that we must be held responsible for what we do.

These were not mistakes. These were wrongs. These

were wrongs engaged in by police officers who, more than

others, should have been aware of their public obligation to

keep the peace. They violated that obligation and it seems

to me, they are to be held responsible for it. | am not

satisfied that a probationary sentence is sufficient response

by society. I'm aware that they have lost their police posi-

tions but it seems to me any public officer who commits a

crime loses is his public position. It seems to me there must

be a deterrent impact to the sentence that we impose

I'm mindful that the District Attorney is wrong when she

says | am obliged to impose a state prison sentence. | am

not obliged to do that. | could impose a probationary sen-

C-24

tence but given the excessiveness of this assault, the severe

injuries (42) that were inflicted upon a person who was

helpless to defend himself at the time that it occurred and

given the actions that they engaged in after that was done, it

seems to me appropriate that a state prison sentence be

imposed and it is the judgment of the Court that each

defendant be sentenced to an indeterminate sentence the

minimum of which shall be no less than one year and the

maximum of which shall be no more than three years

I am mindful that my view may not be shared by others,

even in the judiciary, and I therefore indicate to counsel

that I will stay the execution of that sentence to July 26th,

four weeks from today, to afford counsel ample opportunity

to seek a further stay from the Appellate Division

Please advise counse! the defendants of their rights to

appeal and advise me that you've done so. Have you

advised them of their right to appeal?

Mr. Dienst: Yes, your Honor, I have

The Court: The record should reflect that each defendant

has been provided with an information sheet that indicates

to him how he may perfect his appeal, if he wishes to do so

The defendant's parole will be continued until (43) July

26th. Absent a stay, they should be prepared to surrender at

that time. Obviously, if there is a stay, then we'll work out a

different adjourned date at that time

You may step out at this ume

Mr. Ganun: Thank you

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and

correct transcript of proceedings had upon the aforemen-

tioned matter

JOYCE HOUNSELI

Court Reporter

C-25

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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