Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co.

Supreme Court brief1991

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Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1990

STATE OF COLORADO,

Petitioner,

IDARADO MINING CO. et al.,

Respondents.

,

4

Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United States

Court Of Appeals For The Tenth Circuit

La

vv

PETITION FOR WRIT OF-CERTIORARI

a.

vv

Gate A. Norton

Attorney General

TimotHy M. TyMKOvICH

Solicitor General

(Counsel of Record)

JACQUELINE HERNANDEZ BERARDINI

Deputy Attorney General

James D. ELLMAN

First Assistant Attorney General

CERCLA Litigation Section

Attorneys for Petitioner

110 Sixteenth Street, 10th Floor

Denver, Colorado 80202

Telephone: (303) 620-4500

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

‘

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Section 121(e)(2) of the Comprehensive Environmen-

tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 as

amended (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(e)(2) (1988),

grants states the power to enforce federal or state require-

ments to which a remedial action is required to conform

under CERCLA in United States District Court. Does

§ 121(e)(2) authorize a district court to grant injunctive

relief to a state with respect to a state-selected remedial

action that has been approved by that court?

ii

LIST OF PARTIES

Petitioner is the State of Colorado.

Respondents are [darado Mining Company; New-

mont Services, Ltd.; and Newmont Mining Corporation.

ae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ............... i

EES ii

I IEE vc vn acccsscccccsscccaseccce iii

po iv

ie kb 66h 65 65% Kk 600 senccncsace 1

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT...................... 1

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS

RR UC ELAR hese ceeesisscsnnsececss 1

emueeeeeree GPP CUM CAGE... ccc ccc cece ee 2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ......... 7

I. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER CERCLA § 121(e)(2)

AUTHORIZES INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO

ENFORCE STATE-SELECTED REMEDIAL

ACTIONS IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO

COLORADO AND OTHER STATES AND

SHOULD BE SETTLED BY THIS COURT......... 7

Il. THE TENTH CIRCUIT’S UNDULY RESTRIC-

TIVE INTERPRETATION OF CERCLA § 121(e)(2)

IGNORES THAT SECTION’S EXPLICIT LAN-

GUAGE AND MISCONSTRUES CERCLA’S

occ nanscncctcscencsescs 11

A. Section 121(e)(2) is not limited to remedial

actions selected by the federal government or its

IIE ES TE 12

B. There are requirements to which state-selected

remedial actions must conform under CERCLA.. 15

eee eee Chess uc cechsssccseaceess 17

iv

e

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 707 F. Supp. 1227

ew Se Mrrrrrrerrerrresrr ere Tere rire 1, 5, 6

Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 916 F2d 1486

Re PT Peer ore ver Tere Teer ee passim

Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy,

Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986) ........ 11, 15

FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 349 (1958) .... 12

Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237

STE akin nce Adeeb vent nwun a sndwebbaaseescenncckee: 7

Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S.

DU BU UD hn 860 cc cae eadcnndsedccweweesnscccess 7

Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U'S.

eee eC eh eho ncee Reken as Pes +< 7

New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032,

pe Bo ee | PPPTTTPITerTTTTrer Tre Tit eeiee 15

Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300,

BSEG GOED. COS TOGRP. wn wc ccc sc neces ees ecenes il

Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 762

UPI chan anc sncdnsdawsdacancnctdesbersseneensyas. 14

United States ex rel. Texas Portland Cement Co. v.

Mick eed, 253 US. 157, BGR CIPD «noses sccccceses, 16

United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals

Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th Cir. 1989)...... 11, 15

United States v. Akzo Coatings of America, Inc.,

719 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Mich. 1989)............. 12, 13

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318

Er ere eer eee Per eT Serr ry 11

62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593, 596

GOMER kb 4 060 entcuecwhUaedveueseuesads eee Se eOreey 13

STATUTES

ee Ae Ree SES ceive soba eceasacctcesnecunas 1

ee Gas I SIs A p'0 005 sku eb uneanasaevecusens 3

ee es Ee IE oa nawrheses va exc chencdccuenaee 3

42 USC. § SGI AES) (IDOE) « . 2.5 ccc ccc nc enss 3

TE UL. Bh Pee MISO ws ca ccseseseccuns 2, 13, 14

Te UK., Bree GI heck cc cceeceancececs 2, 14, 15

ee oe kk errrrer reer rer ret passim

GE Wes IE a 6c dss scrccnesicustaes 2, 3, 8

ee ET er 3

42 USA. § SOISe) CIPGS) .. . . 22. 2, 3, 14

Ge Sees Se Pe IE ba 5 hd he kaa nek csisnchagieeees 2

CE EA. Fe Gn 5 oko sec sccccnaccss 3, 11, 13

42 U.S.C. § 9621(b) (1988)........ . eevee 3 4, 13, 13

42 U.S.C. § 9621(c) (1988).............. Smee eae 13

CE ULAR, FH Pe MMe scan cs vncccnccuncencecen 4, 13

GD RIDA. & SORT eee CEO oo ccs cde sin ness seen passim

Se Ui Se Pe IU 5 no so nc ceesccuseseneneweuts 13

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Superfu: { Amendments and Reauthorization Act

of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) ..... 3

REGULATIONS

40 C.RR. pt. 300... 0... cece cece e cece e eee ence ee eees 2

40 C.ER. § 300.6 (1989) .......... cece cece eee eee ee eee 4

40 C.F.R. § 300.66(c)(2) (1989)... .. 6.6... 6. eee eee eee 10

40 C.FR. § 300.68(d) (1989) .......... 6. eee eee eee eee 4

40 C.FR. § 300.68(e)-(i) (1989)... 2... eee ee ee eee 16

40 C.FR. § 300.68(i)(1) (1989) .............0-5-- 2, 4, 16

40 C.FR. § 300.71(a) (1989) ..........62 2-2 eee 2, 4, 16

55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8815 (definition of feasibility

study), 8817 (definition of remedial investiga-

tion), 8846-50 (1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.

§§ 300.5, 300.430(a)(2), (d), (e) (1990)).......-.-.+-- 4

55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8845 (1990) (to be codified at 40

C.F.R. § 300.425(b)(1) (1990)).. 2... eee eee eee eee 10

55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8850-51 (1990) (to be codified at

4% C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(1)(1990)) .... 6... eee 2, 4, 17

OTHER AUTHORITIES

H.R. Rep. No. 96-1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18,

reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

News 6119, 6120 ..........cccccceeeeeeesccneeess 8, 9

Markell & Tuohy, Some Thoughts on Running a

Superfund Enforcement Program: A State Per-

spective, Nat'l Envtl. Entorcement J., hv. 1990,

Ne ecin'e §i. 45464 Cahn s URCEEERES CAD ERORRG KES A 0 89.50 10

Preamble to CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat.

re es 6.x 606666300 06 hE RSESERESAAR SKB OS 11

Petitioner State of Colorado (“Colorado”) respect-

fully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the Octo-

ber 11, 1990, judgment and opinion of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in this case.

a

-

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth

Circuit is reported at 916 F.2d 1486 and is attached hereto

as Appendix A. The opinion of the United States District

Court for the District of Colorado is reported at 707 F.

Supp. 1227 and is attached hereto as Appendix B.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The judgment and opinion of the Tenth Circuit was

entered on October 11, 1990. The Tenth Circuit entered an

order denying Colorado’s timely filed petition for rehear-

ing on November 21, 1990 (attached hereto as Appendix

C). The jurisdiction of this Court to review the judgment

and opinion of the Tenth Circuit is invoked pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1988).

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The statutory provision at issue in this case is the

first sentence of CERCLA § 121(e)(2), 42 U.S.C.

§ 9621(e)(2) (1988), which Provides that “[a] State may

1

enforce any federal or state standard, requirement, crite-

ria, or limitation to which the remedial action is required

to conform under this chapter [CERCLA] in the United

States district court for the district in which the facility is

located.”

In construing this provision, Colorado’s petition dis-

cusses and relies upon other provisions of CERCLA and

provisions in CERCLA’s implementing regulations con-

tained in the National Oil and Hazardous Substances

Pollution Contingency Plan (“NCP”), 40 C.F.R. pt. 300.

These provisions, attached hereto as Appendix D, are: 42

U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1988); 42 U.S.C § 9606(a) (1988); 42

U.S.C. § 9607(a) and (f)(1) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)

(1988); 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(i)(1)

(1989); 40 C.FR. § 300.71(a) (1989); 55 Fed. Reg. 8666,

8850-51 (1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(1)

(1990)).

a.

—_

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

CERCLA is a comprehensive environmental cleanup

statute which authorizes the federal government and

states to take certain actions with respect to releases of

hazardous substances into the environment. CERCLA

§ 107(a) and (f), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) and (f) (1988), delin-

eates two basic types of federal and state governmental

authority: actions to recover all cleanup costs (“costs of

removal or remedial action”) not inconsistent with the

NCP, and actions to recover damages for injury to natural

resources.

Colorado filed the present lawsuit in 1983 against

respondents (hereinafter collectively referred to as

“Idarado”) pursuant to CERCLA § 107(a) and (f) to

recover damages for injury to natural resources with

respect to releases from the 16.5 square mile Idarado

mine facility located in southwestern Colorado. Colorado

later amended its complaint to seek a declaratory judg-

ment holding Icarado liable pursuant to CERCLA

§ 107(a) for all of Colorado’s costs of removal or remedial

action not inconsistent with the NCP.! The jurisdiction of

the district court was invoked pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 9613(b) (1988), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988), and 28 U.S.C.

§ 2201 (1988).

CERCLA provides for two kinds of cleanup actions.

Removal actions generally are temporary actions taken to

expeditiously respond to releases of hazardous sub-

stances, and remedial actions are comprehensive

cleanups undertaken after detailed investigations and

analyses. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(23)-(25), 9621(a)-(b) (1988).

The present case involves a remedial action se.ected by

Colorado.

1 Colorado relied upon the Federal Declaratory Judgment

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988), as the basis for its declaratory

judgment claim. Congress subsequently enacted CERCLA

§ 113(g)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2) (1988), as part of the October

17, 1986, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

(“SARA”) amendments to CERCLA. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100

Stat. 1613 (1986). Section 113(g)(2) codified the judicially recog-

nized availability of declaratory relief in a § 107(a) action. Prior

to trial, Colorado supplemented its pleadings and added

§ 113(g)(2) as a further basis for seeking the declaratory judg-

ment.

Prior to the selection of a remedial action, a detailed

investigation of the nature and extent of contamination

(the “remedial investigation”) and a detailed analysis of

various cleanup alternatives (the “feasibility study”) are

performed pursuant to the NCP. See 40 C.FR. §§ 300.6

(definitions of feasibility study and remedial investiga-

tion), 300.68(d) (1989); 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8815 (definition

of feasibility study), 8817 (definition of remedial investi-

gation), 8846-50 (1990) (to be codified at 40 C.FR.

§§ 300.5, 300.430(a)(2), (d), (e) (1990)). Both CERCLA and

the NCP prescribe certain fundamental requirements for

remedial actions, including that they be protective of

human health and the environment, be cost effective, and

that they attain or exceed applicable or relevant and

appropriate requirements (“ARARs”) contained in federal

and state environmental laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b), (d)

(1988); 40 C.FR. §§ 300.68(i)(1), 300.71 (a)(2)(ii)(B) and

(a)(4) (1989); 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8850 (1990) (to be codified

at 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(1)(i)(A) and (ii)(A), (B) and (D)

(1990)). .

Colorado performed a remedial investigation and a

feasibility study for the Idarado site and issued the

reports in April and June of 1986, respectively. After

taking into account public comments and rebuttal reports

from Idarado, Colorado issued the Record of Decision

(“ROD”) in March 1987 which contained the selected

remedial action for the site.

The district court presided over a 26-day nonjury

trial in 1987 to determine the appropriate remedial

action.? Prior to trial, Colorado supplemented its

2 The district court bifurcated Colorado’s natural resource

damages claim prior to trial; this issue still has not been tried.

pleadings to seek an injunction requiring Idarado to per-

form the selected remedial action pursuant to CERCLA

§ 121(e)(2), which was enacted as part of the October 1986

SARA amendments to CERCLA.

On February 22, 1989, the district court issued its

decision. Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 707 F. Supp. 1227

(D. Colo. 1989). The court upheld Colorado’s selected

remedial action in most respects. The court recognized

that the continuing releases of hazardous substances from

the Idarado site are causing endangerment and injury to

aquatic life, including fish, insects, algae, and plants; the

releases contaminate surface and ground water; the

releases pose a threat to and have harmed public welfare

and the environment; and remedial action is required.

Appendix B at App. 48 to App. 53, App. 79 to App. 85,

App. 88 to App. 92, App. 101. The court ruled that the

appropriate ARARs had been identified and applied to

the site as set forth in the ROD; that overall, Colorado’s

response efforts, which include the ROD and remedial

action plan set forth therein, were not inconsistent with

the NCP; that, except as modified by the court’s order,

Colorado had selected the appropriate extent of remedy

that was cost-effective and effectively protective of public

health and the environment; that, except as modified by

the court’s order, Colorado’s remedial action plan accords

with the law and is not arbitrary and capricious; and that

Idarado is strictly, and jointly and severally, liable to

Colorado for all post-March 31, 1987, remedial action

costs incurred and to be incurred in responding to

releases at the site as set forth in the ROD as modified by

the court’s order. Id. at App. 116 to App. 117. The court

also “ordered and mandatorily enjoined [Idarado] to con-

duct the remedial activities as described in the State’s

Record of Decision, to the extent they are in accordance

with this Order. ...” Id. at App. 119 to App. 120. The

court relied on CERCLA § 121(e)(2) as the authority for

its injunction. Id. at App. 34, App. 41.

On November 3, 1989, Idarado appealed the district

court’s injunction to the Tenth Circuit, which issued its

decision on October 11, 1990. Colorado v. Idarado Mining

Co., 916 F2d 1486 (10th Cir. 1990).3 The Tenth Circuit

reversed and remanded with respect to the injunctive

authority issue and vacated the district court’s injunction.

Appendix A at App. 10, App. 32. The Tenth Circuit held

that CERCLA § 121(e)(2) does not authorize injunctive

relief to Colorado in the circumstances presented. Id. at

App. 17. The court reasoned that the § 121(e)(2) grant of

state authority only covers remedial actions selected by

the federal government or its delegates, id. at App. 19 to

App. 23, and that there are no requirements to which the

remedial action selected by Colorado had to conform

under CERCLA. Id. at App. 23 to App. 26.

+

vr

3 Idarado appealed six issues, see Appendix A at App. 9 to

App. 10, but the Tenth Circuit only ruled on the two issues

“most directly related to the injunctive relief.” Id. at App. 14;

see also id. at App. 10. This petition for writ of certiorari only

addresses one of the two issues decided by the Tenth Circuit:

whether the district court had authority under CERCLA

§ 121(e)(2) to grant Colorado injunctive relief requiring

Idarado to implement the remedial action selected by Colo-

rado, as modified by the court.

ee

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I.

THE ISSUE OF WHETHER CERCLA § 121(e)(2)

AUTHORIZES INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO ENFORCE

STATE-SELECTED REMEDIAL ACTIONS IS OF

GREAT IMPORTANCE TO COLORADO AND OTHER

STATES AND SHOULD BE SETTLED BY THIS COURT.

The ability to require environmental cleanups is an

issue of major importance to Colorado and other states.

Numerous statutes in virtually every state recognize the

broad police power authority of states to act for their

citizens by protecting public health and the environment

from pollution. The common law quasi-sovereign and

public trust doctrines recognize states’ broad powers and

obligations with respect to the natural resources within

their boundaries. These doctrines acknowledge states’

interests in preserving all the natural resources within

their boundaries regardless of ownership. “[T]he state

has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its

citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It

has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be

stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breath

pure air.” Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237

(1907). Accordingly, a state may bring suit “to protect the

atmosphere, the water and the forests within its territory,

irrespective of the assent or dissent of the private owners

of the land most immediately concerned.” Hudson County

Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908). See also

Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452-53

(1892) (state powers pursuant to the public trust doc-

trine).

CERCLA recognizes the states’ powers, duties, and

interests in these areas. It authorizes and encourages state

action to accomplish the cleanup of hazardous substances

in order to protect human health and the environment.

Congress put the states on the same footing as the federal

government in being able to recover all costs of removal

and remedial action not inconsistent with the NCP and in

being able to recover damages for injury to natural

resources. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A), (a)(4)(C), and (f)(1).

Compare CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B) and (f)(1) (nongovern-

mental parties are not authorized to recover damages for

injury to natural resources, and are limited in their recov-

ery of removal and remedial action costs to any other

necessary costs of response consistent with the NCP). In

unduly limiting states’ CERCLA cleanup authority, the

Tenth Circuit construed CERCLA § 121(e)(2) in a manner

contrary to its express language and Congress’ intent in

passing the statute.

As recognized by CERCLA’s legislative history,

CERCLA’s enactment was necessitated by the massive

problem of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites and

the inability of then-existing law to address the problem.

Over the past two decades, the Congress has

enacted strong environmental legislation in rec-

ognition of the danger to human health and the

environment posed by a host of environmental

pollutants. This field of environmental legisla-

tion has expanded to address newly discovered

sources of such danger as the frontiers of medi-

cal and scientific knowledge have been broad-

ened.

After having previously focused on air and

water pollutants, the Congress, in the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, pro-

vided a prospective cradle-to-grave regulatory

regime governing the movement of hazardous

waste in our society. Since enactment of that

law, a major new source of environmental con-

cern has surfaced: the tragic consequences of

improperly, negligently, and recklessly [sic] haz-

ardous waste disposal practices known as the

“inactive hazardous waste site problem.” The

unfortunate human health and environmental

consequence of these practices has received

national attention amidst growing public and

Congressional concern over the magnitude of

the problem and the appropriate course of

response that should be pursued. Existing law is

clearly inadequate to deal with this massive

problem.

H.R. Rep. No. 96-1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18,

reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6119,

6120.

Most state governments do not have the necessary

resources or experience to actually perform cleanups of

hazardous substances. In order to effectuate Congress’

intent that states, as well as the federal government,

implement cleanups of hazardous substances under the

authority of CERCLA, states need the ability to obtain

injunctions ordering polluters to perform the cleanups.

The Tenth Circuit’s ruling will have detrimental

effects nationwide on the state cleanup role envisioned by

CERCLA. Colorado now has a court-approved $42 mil-

lion cleanup remedy for the Idarado site but no order

requiring implementation. In addition, Colorado had

intended to rely on § 121(e)(2) with respect to remedial

actions at other sites. Other states also are interested in

using, or are actually attempting to rely on, § 121(e)(2) to

10

enforce state-selected remedial actions. The Tenth Circuit

decision is the only court decision to rule on states’

ability to use § 121(e)(2) to enforce state-selected remedial

actions, and thus it will almost certainly be accorded

deference by other courts to the detriment of states and

the health and environment of their citizens. In fact, the

decision already is hindering the attempts of other states

to implement state-selected remedial actions. Representa-

tives of two other states in the process of negotiating

CERCLA remedial actions with polluters have had the

decision thrown in their faces in attempts to limit the

extent of cleanup and to question state authority to even

negotiate a remedial action agreement.

There are thousands of sites across the country pol-

luted by hazardous substances that, like the Idarado site,

are not listed on the CERCLA National Priorities List

(“NPL”). See Markell & Tuohy, Some Thoughts on Running

a Superfund Enforcement Program: A State Perspective, Nat'l

Envtl. Enforcement J., Nov. 1990, at 3 (of the approx-

imately 28,000 hazardous waste sites in the United States,

only 1,200 are listed or proposed to be listed on the NPL).

The NCP precludes the federal government from funding

remedial actions at non-NPL sites. See 40 C.F.R.

§ 300.66(c)(2) (1989); 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8845 (1990) (to be

codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b)(1) (1990)). Allowing the

Tenth Circuit decision to stand will unjustifiably and

severely restrict a major state enforcement tool provided

by Congress and will result in many of the non-NPL sites

not being cleaned up. A ruling of this scope which is

clearly contrary to congressional intent cries out for

Supreme Court review.

11

Il.

THE TENTH CIRCUIT’S UNDULY RESTRICTIVE

INTERPRETATION OF CERCLA § 121(e)(2) IGNORES

THAT SECTION’S EXPLICIT LANGUAGE AND MIS-

CONSTRUES CERCLA’S STATUTORY SCHEME.

Federal courts of appeals construing CERCLA have

consistently applied the well-established canon of statu-

tory construction that remedial statutes and statutes

enacted for the public welfare are to be broadly and

liberally construed. See, e.g., United States v. Aceto Agri-

cultural Chemicals Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th Cir.

1989); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc.,

805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986). Courts “are therefore

obligated to construe its [CERCLA’s] provisions liberally

to avoid frustration of the beneficial legislative pur-

poses.” Dedham Water Co., 805 F.2d at 1081. Among these

beneficial purposes are that hazardous substances be

cleaned up so as to protect human health and the envi-

ronment, that the responsible parties pay for the

cleanups, and that states be encouraged to respond to

releases of hazardous substances. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.

§ 9621(a) and (b) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988); Pre-

amble to CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767

(1980); Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th

Cir. 1985); Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp.

1300, 1316 (N.D. Ohio 1983).

The Tenth Circuit also acknowledged that CERCLA

should be broadly and liberally construed, Appendix A at

App. 14, but utterly failed to implement this canon of

statutory construction. In fact, the court was forced to

add limiting language to § 121(e)(2) to supply the basis

for its decision. Such judicial lawmaking is improper,

12

especially when exercised in a manner that frustrates

congressional intent behind a remedial statute, and

should not be allowed. See FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390

U.S. 341, 349 (1968) (“we cannot, in the absence of an

unmistakable directive, construe the Act in a manner

which runs counter to the broad goals which Congress

intended it to effectuate”).

A. Section 121(e)(2) is not limited to remedial actions

selected by the federal government or its delegates.

The Tenth Circuit’s ruling that § 121(e)(2) is limited

to remedial actions selected by the federal government or

its delegates, Appendix A at App. 19 to App. 23, is based

on the court adding language that Congress did not pro-

vide. The explicit language of § 121(e)(2) authorizes states

to enforce all requirements to which the remedial action is

required to conform under CERCLA, with no reference to

federally-selected remedial actions.4 Other pertinent

4 The Tenth Circuit’s reliance on United States v. Akzo

Coatings of America, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Mich. 1989), is

misplaced. See Appendix A at App. 22. Akzo is the only other

case that has construed states’ injunctive authority under

§ 121(e)(2). However, it did so in a totally different context

than the present case.

In Akzo, the court held that the State of Michigan could not use

§ 121(e)(2) to compel the inclusion of non-selected ARARs into

a remedy already chosen by EPA. 719 F. Supp. at 577-78. The

holding and reasoning of Akzo have no relevance to the present

case where the United States is not using its CERCLA authority

to clean up the site and there is no EPA remedy. In fact, the

Akzo decision contains language that strongly supports Colo-

rado’s position:

(Continued on following page)

13

previsions of CERCLA also contradict the court’s judi-

cially imposed “federally-selected” limitation. See, e.g., 42

U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1988) (definition of remedial action); 42

U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988) (a state is authorized to

recover for all costs of remedia! action incurred by the

state that are not inconsistent with the NCP).

In drafting CERCLA § 121, Congress clearly knew

how to limit portions of that section to federally-selected

remedial actions when it intended to, and explicitly did

so in many instances. See, e.g., § 121(a) (“The President

shall select appropriate remedial actions ... ”);

§ 121(b)(1) (“The President shali select a remedial

action... ”); § 121(b)(2) (“The President may select an

alternative remedial action .. . ”); § 121(c) (“If the Presi-

dent selects a remedial action. . . ”); § 121(d)(1) (“Reme-

dial actions selected under this section or otherwise

required or agreed to by the President... ”);

§ 121(d)(2)(C)(iv) (“Where the remedial action selected by

the President . . . ”); § 121(f)(2)(A) (“if the President

proposes to select a remedial action... ”).

There is no such limiting language in § 121(e)(2), and

it is not the courts’ role to supply nonexistent statutory

language. See 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593,

596 (1951) (“our problem is to construe what Congress

(Continued from previous page)

[T]his section [§ 121(e)(2)] only provides the State

with authority to ensure that the relevant parties

comply with the remedial action selected for the site.

It does not empower the State to require the parties

to comply with standards that were not embodied in

the remedial action plan.

719 F. Supp. at 578.

14

has written. After all, Congress expresses its purpose by

words. It is for us to ascertain - neither to add nor

subtract, neither to delete nor to distort”); see also Road-

way Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 762 (1980) (reading

portions of a statute into a related statute “would consti-

tute standardless judicial lawmaking”).

The court partially relied on CERCLA § 106(a), 42

U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988), for its ruling, concluding that

granting states injunctive authority to enforce state-

selected remedial actions under § 121(e)(2) is unaccept-

able because it would give states greater injunctive

authority than that enjoyed by the federal government

pursuant to § 106(a). Appendix A at App. 18, App. 22.

The court reasoned that CERCLA § 106(a) requires the

federal government to make a showing of imminent and

substantial endangerment io public health or welfare or

the environment while § 121(e)(2) imposes no such

requirement on states.

However, the court overlooked the definition of

remedial action in CERCLA § 101(24), 42 U.S.C.

§ 9601(24) (1988). Remedial actions are limited to those

actions taken “to prevent or minimize the release of haz-

ardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause

substantial danger to present or future public health or

welfare or the environment.” Thus, as a threshold matter,

a remedial action can only be undertaken if necessary +o

mitigate or prevent substantial danger to public health,

public welfare, or the environment. And, after meeting

this threshold requirement, under CERCLA §§ 121(e)(2),

107(a)(4)(A), and 113(g)(2) a state is entitled to an injunc-

tion to enforce a state-selected remedial action only if it

selects the remedial action in a manner not inconsistent

15

with the NCP and the appropriate federal district court

approves the remedial plan (with or without modifica-

tions) in a declaratory judgment action. The federal gov-

ernment, on the other hand, does not even have to go

through the rigorous steps of selecting a remedial action

in order to get an injunction under CERCLA § 106(a): it

merely has to show that an actual or threatened release of

hazardous substances may present an imminent and sub-

stantial endangerment. Thus, the Tenth Circuit was incor-

rect in concluding that states would enjoy greater

injunctive authority under § 121(e)(2) than the federal

government under § 106(a).

B. There are requirements to which state-selected

remedial actions must conform under CERCLA.

The Tenth Circuit also based its holding on its conclu-

sion that CERCLA does not require state-selected reme-

dial actions to comply with any requirements. Appendix

A at App. 23 to App. 26. The court’s analysis is incorrect

and fails to follow the standard adopted by the First,

Second, and Eighth Circuits: “We will not interpret sec-

tion 9607(a) in any way that apparently frustrates the

statute’s goals, in the absence of a specific congressional

intention otherwise.” New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759

F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985); Dedham Water Co., 805 F.2d

at 1081; Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp., 872 F.2d at

1380.

CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A) expressly authorizes states to

recover all costs of remedial action but requires such costs

to be not inconsistent with the NCP as the prerequisite to

such recovery. See, e.g., Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1041

16

(“states, like EPA, can sue responsible parties for reme-

dial and removal costs if such efforts are ‘not inconsistent

with’ the NCP”) (emphasis added). Obviously, when a

statute creates a cause of action that is conditional upon

compliance with certain requirements, a party must com-

ply with those requirements in order to successfully pro-

ceed pursuant to that cause of action. See United States ex

rel. Texas Portland Cement Co. v. McCord, 233 U.S. 157, 162

(1914) (“The statute thus creates a new liability and gives

a special remedy for it, and upon well settled principles

the limitations upon such liability become a part of the

right conferred and compliance with them is made essen-

tial to the assertion and benefit of the liability itself’).

In the present case, Colorado was proceeding under

the authority of CERCLA § 107(a) in seeking to recover its

remedial action costs. Thus, in order to prevail in the

current action, Colorado’s costs were required to be not

inconsistent with the NCP. Colorado was required by the

NCP to select a remedial action that was protective of

human health and the environment; that attains or

exceeds ARARs; and that was cost effective. See 40 C.F.R.

§§ 300.71(a)(4), 300.71(a)(2)(ii)(B), 300.68(i)(1) (1989);5 55

> The Tenth Circuit concluded that Colorado cannot rely

on 40 C.FR. § 300.68(i)(1) (1989) because that section only

applies to lead agencies. Appendix A at App. 25 to App. 26.

However, 40 C.F.R. § 300.71(a)(2) (1989) lists the NCP require-

ments with which a state must comply in order to be not

inconsistent with the NCP whether or not the state is acting as

a lead agency. 40 C.F.R. § 300.71(a)(2)(ii)(B) requires Colorado

to comply with 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(e)-(i). Thus, the court was

incorrect in ruling that § 300.68(i)(1) does not apply to the

present case.

17

Fed. Reg. 8666, 8850 (1990) (to be codified at 40 C.FR.

§ 300.430(f)(1)(i)(A) and (ii)(A), (B) and (D) (1990)). These

requirements are requirements to which state-selected

remedial! actions are required to conform under CERCLA,

and thus the Tenth Circuit was incorrect in ruling that

§ 121(e)(2) does not authorize injunctive relief with

respect to state-selected remedial actions.

a

_

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ

of certiorari should be granted.

Gace A. Norton

Attorney General

Timotuy M. TyMKOvVICH

Solicitor General

(Counsel of Record)

JACQUELINE HERNANDEZ BERARDINI

Deputy Attorney General

James D. ELLMAN

First Assistant Attorney General

CERCLA Litigation Section

Attorneys for Petitioner

110 Sixteenth Street, 10th Floor

Denver, Colorado 80202

Telephone: (303) 620-4500

App. 1

APPENDIX A

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

STATE OF COLORADO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

IDARADO MINING COMPANY,

Nos. 89-1077

valle 89-1326

Defendants-Appellants and 89-1344

Third-Party Piaintiffs, 90-1129

VS.

BAUMGARTNER OIL COMPANY,

et al.,

ee eee eee

Third-Party Defendants.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FROM THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

(D.C. No. 83-C-2385)

(707 F. Supp. 1227)

James D. Ellman, Assistant Attorney General, CERCLA

Litigation Section (Duane Woodard, Attorney General,

Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Rich-

ard H. Forman, Solicitor General, & Michael R. Hope,

Deputy Attorney General, CERCLA Litigation Section,

with him on the brief), State of Colorado, Denver, Colo-

rado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

f

e

BD

App. 2

Nancy C. Shea, Shea & Gardner, Washington, D.C. (James

R. Bieke, Michael S. Giannotto & Paula A. Sweeney, Shea

& Gardner, Washington, D.C. and Christopher Lane &

Cassandra G. Sasso, Sherman & Howard, Denver, Colo-

rado, with her on the brief), for Defendants-Appellants.

Richard B. Stewart, Assistant Attorney General, David C.

Shilton & Dirk D. Snel, Attorneys, Land and Natural

Resources Division Appellate Section, Department of Jus-

tice, and Charles Openchowski, Office of the General

Counsel & Nancy Mangone, Office of Enforcement and

Compliance Monitoring, United States Environmental

Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., for the United

States, Amicus Curiae.

Before McKAY, ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit

Judges.

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.

Defendants-appellants Idarado Mining Company,

Newmont Mining Corporation, and Newmont Services

Limited appeal from a mandatory injunction issued by

the district court on February 22, 1989. Plaintiff-appellee

State of Colorado (State) is the beneficiary of the injunc-

tion, issued on the authority of the Comprehensive Envi-

ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9626, as amended by the

1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

App. 3

(SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). Subse-

quent to the issuance of the injunction, the district court

entered judgment in favor of the State for past response

costs plus prejudgment interest. State of Colorado v. Idarado

Mining Co., 735 F. Supp. 368 (D. Colo. 1990). That inter-

locutory order is not the subject of this appeal. See Appel-

lants’ Motion for Consolidation at 3 (filed May 10, 1990).

The injunction issued on the authority of § 121(e)(2)

of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9621(e)(2), directs appellants to

carry out an extensive environmental cleanup plan pro-

posed by the State and adopted, with various modifica-

tions, by the district court. See Colorado v. Idarado Mining

Co., 707 F. Supp. 1227, 1232, 1261-63 (D. Colo. 1989),

amended in part, 735 F. Supp. 368 (1990). In December

1989, a three-judge panel of this court stayed the injunc-

tion pending appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 8(a); 10th Cir. R.

8.1. The district court’s jurisdiction arose under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2201 and § 113(b) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9613(b); our

jurisdiction to consider the appeal from the district

court’s grant of an injunction arises under 28 U.S.C.

1292(a)(1).

I.

As enacted in 1980 and amended in 1986, CERCLA

was designed to facilitate cleanup of environmental con-

tamination caused by releases of hazardous substances.

The act sets forth several inechanisms for responding to

such releases and delineates the respective powers of the

federal government, the states, Indian Tribes and private

parties. Section 111 of CERCLA provides for the creation

of a Hazardous Substance Superfund to finance cleanup

App. 4

actions at sites affected by releases or threatened releases

of hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9611. Section 104(a)

authorizes the federal government to take necessary

cleanup actions financed by the Superfund to respond to

such releases or threatened releases. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a).

Alternatively, under § 104(d), the federal government

may enter into cooperative agreements with states, politi-

cal subdivisions or Indian Tribes to conduct cleanup

actions using the Superfund. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d).

To shift the financial burden of a cleanup to the

parties responsible for the releases, a governmental entity

may sue these parties for the costs incurred in responding

to a release. CERCLA § 107(a); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). In such

a cost recovery action, responsible parties include, among

others, the “owner or operator” of the facility from which

the release occurred. Id. Even when no cooperative agree-

ment exists permitting use of Superfund money for

cleanup, CERCLA § 114(a) preserves the right of a state

or other party to proceed under applicable state law to

conduct a cleanup of a site affected by hazardous subs-

tances. 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a). States or other parties which

incur response costs not financed by the Superfund may

bring a cost recovery action against the responsible par-

ties. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).

When a cost recovery action is brought by the federal

government, a state, an Indian Tribe or a private party,

§ 107(a)(4) imposes liability on responsible parties for

response costs “not inconsistent with the national contin-

gency plan [NCP].” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). The NCP con-

sists of procedurai and substantive guidelines issued by

the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) governing

CERCLA cleanup actions. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1989).

App. 5

Liability among responsible parties is joint and several,

O'Neill v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178-79 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,

110 S. Ct. 1115 (1989), and one responsible party may seek

contribution from other responsible parties, 42 U.S.C.

9613(f).

In addition to the authority to finance cleanups from

the Superfund and to recover costs from responsible par-

ties, CERCLA provides the federal government with

additional power to deal with releases of hazardous subs-

tances by bringing an abatement action in federal district

court. See generally Koppers Indus., Inc. v. United States

EPA, 902 F.2d 756, 757 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing

federal options); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Mor-

rison Grain Co., 734 F. Supp. 437, 441 (D. Kan. 1990)

(same). If the President determines that a release or

threatened release may pose “an imminent and substan-

tial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the

environment,” § 106(a) provides that the federal govern-

ment may seek “such relief as the public interest and the

equities of the case may require.” 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).

Such relief may include a mandatory injunction compel-

ling responsible parties to perform a cleanup. See, e.g.,

United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162,

192 (W.D. Mo. 1985). However, § 106(a) does not allow a

state, with or without a cooperative agreement, to seek

injunctive relief against responsible parties. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 9606(a). Whether that authorization is found elsewhere

in CERCLA is the subject of this appeal.

Il.

This action relates to a cleanup of a highly miner-

alized area that has been prospected and mined

App. 6

extensively throughout the century. Idarado, 707 F. Supp.

at 1234. According to the State, Idarado and iis codefen-

dants are responsible for various metallic releases in cer-

tain rivers and creeks located between the towns of

Teluride [sic] and Ouray in southwestern Colorado. The

sources of these releases are tailings piles, mine portals

and waste rock piles. Tailings essentially are finely

ground ore from which most of the valuable metal has

been removed by the milling process. Because some metal

remains, however, tailings piles release metal when water

flows over or seeps through them. Portals are mine open-

ings originally used for access to underground mines.

Water entering a mine by seepage from the surface or by

groundwater movement can pick up metals while flowing

through mineralized materials underground and then

exiting through the mine portals. Waste rock is material

removed from a mine lacking sufficient metal content to

warrant further processing. Like tailings, waste rock can

release metals upon contact with water flows.

Idarado’s properties are located in three areas. Two

are in the Telluride and Red Mountain valleys, separated

by the mountains in which Idarado’s mine is located. The

Telluride Valley property contains six tailings piles and

two mine portals. Id. at 1233. The San Miguel River flows

through Idarado’s property, down the valley, and past the

town of Telluride. The Red Mountain Valley property

contains five tailings piles and several portals and waste

rock piles. Id. Red Mountain Creek flows through the

valley past Idarado’s property and empties into the

Uncompahgre River above the town of Ouray. The third

property is known as the High Country, consisting of the

App. 7

mountain basins between the Telluride and Red Moun-

tain Valleys. The parties have agreed in large part upon

remediation for the High Country.

The State of Colorado initiated this action against

Idarado, its parent company, Newmont Mining Corpora-

tion, and a subsidiary of the parent which had provided

| services to Idarado, Newmont Services Limited. The

State’s complaint, as amended, sought to hold the defen-

dants liable for cleanup costs associated with the Idarado

mining properties.! Following the enactment of SARA in

1986, the state further supplemented its pleadings to seek

an injunction directing Idarado to cleanup the sites.

In March 1987, the State issued a Record of Decision

(ROD) which contained its proposed plan for remedial

activities to be undertaken at the sites. Thereafter, the

district court ruled that Newmont Mining was an “owner

and operator” of the Idarado facilities and that Newmont

Services was an “operator” of those facilities because

1 The State’s amended complaint also included pendent

state law claims, but these were dismissed by the district court.

The State also sought monetary recovery for damage to natural

resources pursuant to CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(C). See 42 U.S.C.

§ 9607(a)(4)(C). Idarado filed third-party claims for contribu-

tion under CERCLA § 113(f), against certain other owners of

mining facilities in the Red Mountain Valley. See 42 U.S.C.

9613(f). With the consent of the parties, the district court bifur-

cated the trial into two consecutive phases: a remedy/response

cost phase and a natural resource damage phase. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 42(b); State of Colorado v. Idarado, No. 83-C-2385, Order

Bifurcating Trial at 1-2 (D. Colo. filed Apr. 20, 1987). The

district court also severed Idarado’s third-party claims for

contribution. The natural resource damage phase and the con-

tribution phase have yet to take place.

ill

App. 8

both entities “were involved directly in day-to-day opera-

tions of Idarado Mining Company and the sites here in

dispute.” See Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 18 Env’tl. L.

Rep. (Envt'l. L. Inst.) 20578, 20579 (D. Colo. 1987); see also

United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 22

(D.R.I.), aff'd, 910 F2d 24,___ (Ist Cir. 1990). Accordingly,

Newmont Mining and Newmont Services, as well as

Idarado Mining, were held liable under CERCLA

§ 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1).

During twenty-six trial days, the district court con-

sidered the testimony of over thirty witnesses and

received over 1,000 documents into evidence. The record

on appeal consists of sixty volumes and we obtained the

pleadings below. Much of the evidence concerns the

extent, if any, of environmental harm and whether the

proposed remediation alternatives presented by the State

and Idarado were technically feasible, cost-effective and

consistent with the NCP. The district court determined

that surface and ground water had been contaminated by

releases from tailings, as evidenced by damage to the

aquatic environment. Idarado, 707 F. Supp. at 1236-37,

1249, 1252, 1255. With various modifications, the district

court determined the State’s plan “effectively protects

and minimizes threats to public health, welfare and the

environment.” Id. at 1261. Having declared the defen-

dants liable for future cleanup activity under CERCLA

§ 107(a)(4)(A), the court entered a mandatory injunction

requiring the defendants to execute the State’s plan as

modified. Idarado, 707 F. Supp. at 1262. The district court

indicated that it would retain jurisdiction over the parties

App. 9

to insure full compliance with its order conc »rning reme-

dial activities. Id. The district court also retains jurisdic-

tion also to resolve the plaintiffs’ pending claims for

natural resource damage and defendants’ third-party

claims for contribution.?

Il.

On appeal, defendants contend that the district court

(1) lacked authority under CERCLA to grant the State

injunctive relief, (2) made inadequate and unsupported

findings of fact in deciding that the State’s cleanup plan

was “not inconsistent with” the NCP, (3) lacked authority

to hold the defendants liable for the permanent relocation

2 In interlocutory appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), the district court retains jurisdiction to act

on matters not involved in the appeal. 9 J. Moore, B. Ward & B.

Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice J 203.11 (2d ed. 1990); Garcia v.

Burlington N. R.R. Co., 818 F.2d 713, 721 (10th Cir. 1987).

However, the district court is generally without jurisdiction to

proceed when an interlocutory appeal is from the rejection of a

double jeopardy defense or the denial of absolute or qualified

immunity. Stewart v. Donges, Nos. 88-2454 & 88-3020, slip op. at

9-10 (10th Cir. Sep. 17, 1990) [1990 WL 132564].

Here, the interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)

is from the district court’s grant of a mandatory injunction,

thus, “the district court retains power to act on the case pend-

ing appeal.” 16 C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper & E. Gressman,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 3921 at 26 (1977). And the

district “court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore,

or grant an injunction during the pendency of the appeal.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c). Accord 9 Moore’s Federal Practice J 203.11

(appeal from the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction

does not “divest the district court of jurisdiction to proceed

with the action on the merits.”).

App. 10

of the residents of a trailer park, (4) improperly held

defendants liable for cleaning up Red Mountain Creek,

(5) improperly held defendant's [sic] liable for remedia-

tion of releases from certain mine portals, and (6) improp-

erly held that the defendants Newmont Mining Corp. and

Newmont Services Ltd. were owners or operators of

defendant Idarado’s facilities. We vacate the district

court’s injunction and remand on the basis of the first and

third points. We decline to decide the remaining issues at

this time because the district court will modify its relief

based upon this opinion and various portions of the case,

which could affect the phase just completed, have yet to

be resolved. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-

cians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 757 (1986) (discussing

principles of pendent appellate jurisdiction in the injunc-

tion context); Tri-State Generation & Transmission v. Sho-

shone River Power, Inc., 874 F.2d 1346, 1351-53 (10th Cir.

1989) (same); see also Hill v. Department of the Air Force, 884

F.2d 1318, 1320 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206

(1990) (on appeal from denial of qualified immunity,

court considered merits of non-immunity issue); Dube v.

State Univ., 900 F.2d 587, 598-600 (2d Cir. 1990) (same).

A.

Defendants argue that even if we decide that the

district court lacked authority to issue the mandatory

injunction, we should exercise pendent appellate jurisdic-

tion over whether the State’s plan is “not inconsistent

with” the NCP because this issue is critical to the imple-

mentation of an appropriate remedy, regardless of who

actually implements the remedy. Appellaris’ Brief at 41

n.28. Without question, we have jurisdiction to consider

App. 11

those matters which are closely related to the grant or

denial of the injunction. Asset Allocation & Management v.

Western Employers Ins. Co., 892 F.2d 566, 568-69 (7th Cir.

1989); Tri-State, 874 F.2d at 1351-52. We also have discre-

tionary jurisdiction to consider “rulings that are related

but not essential to the validity of the injunction.” Asset

Allocation, 892 F.2d at 569; Tri-State, 874 F.2d at 1352-53.

Important factors which inform our discretion whether to

exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction include (1)

whether the otherwise nonappealable issue is sufficiently

developed, both factually and legally, for our review, Tri-

State, 874 F.2d at 1352, (2) whether review of the appeal-

able issue involves consideration of factors closely related

or relevant to the otherwise nonappealable issue,

McCowan v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 908 F.2d 1099, 1104 (2d

Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No. 90-274 (Aug. 13, 1990);

Dube, 900 F.2d at 598; Tri-State, 874 F.2d at 1352, and (3)

whether judicial economy will be better served by resolv-

ing the otherwise nonappealable issue, notwithstanding

the federal policy against piecemeal appeals, see

McCowan, 908 F.2d at 1099 (although pendent appellate

jurisdiction should be used sparingly, pendent review of

otherwise nonappealable issue was “a wise and time

saving exercise of . . . discretion”); Tri-State, 874 F.2d at

1352 (not exercising pendent appellate jurisdiction over

otherwise nonappealable issue that did not need further

development of record would be a “waste of judicial

resources”).

B.

This is a case in which the district court bifurcated

the trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b), see supra n.1;

App. 12

“{t]here is no final judgment until all of the issues have

been resolved and judgment entered on the whole case.”

9C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2392

(1971 & 1990 Supp.). This interlocutory appeal concerns

the district court’s authority to grant injunctive relief; our

resolution turns on the construction of CERCLA §§ 121(e)

and 101(24), rather than on the remaining issues raised by

defendants under other provisions of CERCLA. Although

the defendants are confident that the district court will

not reconsider its findings and conclusions on these

remaining issues, see Appellants’ Brief at 41 n.28., we

simply do not have before us a judgment which finally

resolves the remedial issue consistent with liability per-

mitted under the Act. Nor do we have before us the

district court’s interlocutory order awarding the State

past response costs, which, in the interest of judicial

economy, should be considered at the same time the

State’s plan (as modified) is evaluated for cost recovery.

Any appellate determination about whether the

State’s plan is “not inconsistent with” the NCP, is primar-

ily factual, and in view of our resolution of the injunction

issue, not closely related to the merits we must address.

In Tri-State, we stated that “this court as a matter of law

may justifiably, though cautiously, decide other generally

nonappealable legal issues.” 874 F.2d at 1352 (emphasis

added). There, the district court determined as a matter

of law that the buyer in a requirements contract did not

have an implied obligation to remain in business and

declined to grant a permanent injunction. On appeal, this

court found an absence of irreparable harm which would

App. 13

support a permanent injunction, but nonetheless consid-

ered the merits of the contract issue, a legal issue involv-

ing contract interpretation. Id. at 1352-53. This court

reversed the district court on its application of contract

law, but declined to exercise pendent appellate jurisdic-

tion over matters which involve the application of well-

established legal standards of review (e.g. abuse of dis-

cretion, sufficiency of the evidence) to the trial evidence.

Id. at 1353. Thus, although some issues were sufficiently

well developed factually to review, see Thornburgh, 476

U.S. at 757, the court nonetheless declined to exercise

pendent appellate jurisdiction over issues concerning

remititur, new trial and judgment notwithstanding the

verdict. Tri-State, 874 F.2d at 1353.

In points two (adequacy of district court findings

whether State’s plan is “not inconsistent with” the NCP)

and four (whether defendants are liable for remediation

of Red Mountain Creek), the defendants are challenging

in large part whether the district court’s factual findings

are supported by the record. These claims primarily con-

cern application of the clearly erroneous standard of

review to the voluminous record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).

We decline to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over

these claims in the interest of judicial efficiency and con-

sistency. These issues should be resolved when past

response costs and any natural resource damages are

considered. At that time, any subsequent factual findings

will be before us. Resolving numerous fact-bound issues

in a single appeal from a final judgment is in keeping

with this court’s concern with judicial efficiency.

Defendants’ point five (whether releases from the

Mill and Meldrum Tunnel mine portals constitute

App. 14

federally permitted releases which are exempt from

CERCLA liability) and point six (whether Newmont Min-

ing may be held liable as an “owner and operator” and

Newmont Services as an “operator”) do contain legal

issues, however, our preliminary review of the district

court’s factual findings and legal conclusions and the

record on appeal convince us that the factual issues pre-

dominate and are best resolved on appeal from a final

judgment. In the exercise of our discretion, we decline to

review all points but those most directly related to the

injunctive relief. Hence, we decide defendants’ points one

and three at this time.

IV.

The State’s position concerning the authority of the

district court to grant injunctive relief must be examined

with reference to those courts which have considered this

issue, legislative history and, most importantly, the lan-

guage of the statute and its reasonable interpretation in

light of CERCLA. CERCLA is a remedial statute and its

provisions should be construed liberally, but with due

regard for executive and legislative intent as reflected in

the enactment process and the statute itself. See Kayser-

Roth, 910 F.2d at __; State of New York v. Shore Realty, 759

F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985).

A.

Prior to the amendment of CERCLA, several courts

had rejected the position that injunctive relief was avail-

able to states and other non-federal plaintiffs. In Shore

Realty, the Second Circuit rejected New York’s claim that

App. 15

a district court has inherent or implied power to grant

injunctive relief under § 107 of CERCLA in view of the

express injunctive authority and accompanying standard

for injunctive relief contained in § 106. 759 F.2d at 1049-50

(construing 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606, 9607). Section 106 specifi-

cally identifies the federal government as entitled to

injunctive relief; allowing an injunction under § 107

(which is silent concerning injunctive relief) would ren-

der § 106’s express language surplusage. Shore Realty, 759

F.2d at 1049. Moreover, the standard for obtaining relief

in an abatement action under § 106 is narrower than that

in a cost recovery action under § 107. Allowing injunctive

relief to any § 107 plaintiff would conflict with § 106’s

narrower scope. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1049. Accord

Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. at 231-32; Cadillac

Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 21 Env’t Rep.

Cas. (BNA) 1108, 1115-17 (C.D. Cal. 1984), aff’d in perti-

nent part, 840 F.2d 691, 696-97 (9th Cir. 1988); Velsicol

Chem. Corp. v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 21 Env’t Rep. Cas.

(BNA) 2118, 2121 (E.D. Tenn. 1984). On appeal and below,

the State concedes that, prior to the effective date of the

SARA amendments in 1986, a state could not obtain

injunctive relief under CERCLA requiring private defen-

dants to implement a state cleanup plan.3

Courts have adhered to the view that injunctions are

not available to states and other non-federal plaintiffs

3 See State’s Answer Brief at 5; Plaintiff’s Memorandum in

Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims

for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief to Enforce or Approve Its

Remedial Action Plan at 9 (D. Colo. filed May 14, 1987), incor-

porating Plaintiff’s Trial Memorandum § XIII at 150-51 (D. Colo.

filed Apr. 20, 1987).

App. 16

under CERCLA, even after the 1986 SARA amendments.

See Cadillac Fairview, 840 F.2d at 696-97; United States v.

Cannons Eng’g Corp., 720 F. Supp. 1027, 1052 (D. Mass.

1989), aff’d, 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v.

Akzo Coatings, 719 F. Supp. 571, 577-78 (E.D. Mich. 1988);

McGregor v. Industrial Excess Landfill, Inc., 709 F. Supp.

1401, 1408-09 (N.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd, 856 F.2d 39 (6th Cir.

1988); State of Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822, 835

(D. Vt. 1988); Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1180

(M.D. Tenn. 1988); Utah State Dep't of Health v. Ng, 649 F.

Supp. 1102, 1105-06 (D. Utah 1986).

B.

The State argues that injunctive relief for states is

now authorized by CERCLA § 121(e)(2), 42 U.S.C.

9621t{e)€2) which provides in part:

A State may enforce any Federal or State stan-

dard, requirement, criteria, or limitation to

which the remedial action is required to con-

form under this Act in United States district

court for the district in which the facility is

located.

Section 121 of CERCLA, added by SARA, deals with

cleanup standards applicable to federal cleanup actions,

and with the rights of the states to participate in such

federal remedial activities. Section 121(e)(2)4 allows a

4 The section provides:

A State may enforce any Federal or State standard,

requirement, criteria, or limitation to which the

remedial action is required to conform under this Act

(Continued on following page)

App. 17

state to insure that a remedy of federal character will

comply with substantive federal and state cleanup stan-

dards required of federal remedies under CERCLA.

The district court referenced § 121(e)(2) and con-

cluded that “injunctive relief also is available to the State

under CERCLA.” Idarado, 707 F. Supp. at 1232. For the

reasons that follow, we hold that the structure of

CERCLA does not permit the injunctive relief granted in

these circumstances, notwithstanding § 121(e)(2).

In a presentation that does not cultivate simplicity,

the State reminds us that § 121(e)(2) allows a state injunc-

tive relief “to enforce any requirement to which the reme-

dial action is required to conform.” Appellee’s Brief at 6.

According to the State, the standards, requirements, crite-

ria, or limitations referred to in § 121(e)(2) include the

requirements of CERCLA and the NCP, as well as appli-

cable requirements of federal and state environmental

(Continued from previous page)

in United States district court for the district in

which the facility is located. Any consent decree

shall require the parties to attempt expeditiously to

resolve disagreements concerning implementation of

the remedial action informally with the appropriate

Federal and State agencies. Where the parties agree,

the consent decree may provide for administrative

enforcement. Each consent decree shall also contain

stipulated penalties for violations of the decree in an

amount not to exceed $25,000 per day, which may be

enforced by either the President or the State. Such

stipulated penalties shall not be construed to impair

or affect the authority of the court to order compli-

ance with the specific terms of any such decree.

42 U.S.C. § 9621(e)(2).

App. 18

law (ARARs).5 Appellee’s Brief at 6 (citing CERCLA

121(d); 40 C.FR. 300.68(i)(1) & 300.71(a)(4) (1989)). The

State then argues that it was required to integrate all

ARARs described in the NCP regulations into its plan

pursuant to 40 C.FR. § 300.71(a)(4), and, therefore,

should be granted an injuction [sic] to enforce such

requirements. Appellee’s Brief at 9. The State further

argues, relying upon 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(e)(1), that because

its cost recovery action under CERCLA § 107 was

required to be “not inconsistent with” the NCP, the

State’s remedial action plan has incorporated NCP stan-

dards as well, and the State must be allowed injunctive

relief to uphold NCP standards. Appellee’s Brief at 9-11.

Next, the State argues that when the district court

approved the State’s remedial action plan with minor

modification, the State’s plan became an additional

requirement to which the remedial action was required to

conform and, consequently, injunctive relief was avail-

able. Id. at 12-13. Finally, the State argues that the district

court had inherent equitable authority to grant injunctive

relief. Id. at 25-28.

“a

The State’s position is untenable because it ignores

the scope of § 121 and fails to view the provision in the

context of CERCLA, which still contains an express and

limited grant of injunctive authority in § 106. Section

§ [sic] 121(e)(2) allows states to enforce requirements of

5 These other federal and state requirements are com-

monly designated as “applicable or relevant and appropriate

requirements,” and abbreviated as ARARs.

sisal namin

App. 19

remedial actions embodied in consent decrees under

CERCLA and describes requirements of such consent

decrees. We may consult legislative history as a second-

ary source of a statute’s meaning, Miller v. Commissioner,

836 F.2d 1274, 1282-83 (10th Cir. 1988), and our under-

standing of § 121(e)(2) is in accord with the Conference

Report addressing the 1986 amendments enacted by

SARA. About § 121(e)(2), the Report indicates:

States are given the authority to enforce require-

ments of consent decrees to which the remedial

action must conform, in Federal district court.

Consent decrees are to contain dispute resolu-

tion and enforcement provisions, and may

include administrative enforcement. Consent

decrees must contain stipulated penalties for

violations of the decree of $25,000 per day,®

enforceable by the President or the State.

H.R. Rep. No. 99-962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 249 (1986). Our

job in construing statutes is to effectuate the intent

reflected in the language of the enactment and the legisla-

tive process, however, neither the text of § 121(e)(2) nor

the relevant legislative history supports the State’s expan-

Sive interpretation.

By its express terms, § 121(e)(2) limits a state’s

enforcement authority to “any Federal or State standard,

requirement, criteria, or limitation to which the remedial

action is required to conform under this Act [CERCLA].”

We agree with amicus United States and the defendants

that the term “the remedial action” for purposes of

§ 121(e)(2) pertains to the remedial action encompassed

® Section 121(e)(2) as enacted allows for penalties “in an

amount not to exceed $25,000 ner day.”

App. 20

by § 121. Section 121 unquestionably envisions a remedial]

action selected by the federal government or its dele-

gates.

Section 121 provides a general description of the

criteria, methods, and procedures which EPA must follow

in the selection_of a remedial action. Section 121 begins:

(a) Selection of remedial action. The President

shall select appropriate remedial actions deter-

mined to be necessary to be carried out under

section 104 or secured under section 106 which

are in accordance with this section and, to the

extent practicable, the national contingency

plan, and which provide for cost effective

response... .

Section 121 pertains to remedial actions selected by the

President through EPA. Not only in § 121(a), but also in

§§ 121(c) and (d)(2)(A), § 121 refers to remedial actions

under §§ 104 and 106, which are remedies selected by the

federal government or its delegates. Section 121(d) like-

wise refers to “[r]emedial actions selected under this

section or otherwise required or agreed to by the Presi-

dent under this Act. ...” Thus, the term “remedial

action” in § 121(e)(2) means a remedial action which is

selected by the federal government or its delegates. The

remedial action plan developed by the State of Colorado

was not undertaken by the EPA pursuant to CERCLA

§§ 104 or 106.7

7 The State’s Record of Decision (ROD) puts the matter

this way:

The remedial action in this case is not undertaken

pursuant to section 104 or 106 of . . . CERCLA, as

(Continued on following page)

ee ee

App. 21

To adopt the State’s interpretation would defeat the

intended scope of state involvement as contained in

§ 121(f). Section 121(f) provides a mechanism for state

involvement in the selection and adoption of remedial

actions which are federal in character. 42 U.S.C.

§ 9621(f)(1)-(3). For example, states must be given a “rea-

sonable opportunity for... review and comment” on

investigations, feasibility studies, and planned remedial

actions. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(f)(1)(E). Prior to entry of a

federal consent decree in which the EPA waives a federal

or state standard (ARAR), under § 121(d)(4), a state is

given an opportunity to concur in the remedial action

and, if it does not, the state may intervene as of right. 42

U.S.C. § 9621(f)(2)(A) & (B). If the court upholds EPA’a

[sic] waiver of a standard, the state may seek to have the

standard incorporated into the remedial plan, provided

the state pays the additional costs. 42 U.S.C.

§ 121(f)(2)(B). When the EPA has determined that a par-

ticular standard or requirement is an ARAR for a particu-

lar remedial action, § 121(e)(2) merely allows a state to

enforce that standard or requirement as an ARAR con-

tained in a federal remedial action and implemented by a

consent decree.

(Continued from previous page)

amended by . .. SARA, 42 U.S.C. sec. 9604 and 9606

(1986), respectively. Therefore, the remedial action

selection process set out in section 121 of SARA, 42

U.S.C. sec. 9621 (1986), is not strictly applicable.

ROD, pl. ex. 168A at 73, reproduced in Appellants’ Addendum

of Exhibits at A-l. The State indicates that notwithstanding it

has determined cleanup levels in general conformity with § 121

and the NCP.

App. 22

To allow a state to select a plan independently and

then to commence an abatement action under § 121(e)(2)

would render these provisions irrelevant. Akzo Coatings,

719 F. Supp. at 578. Moreover, in cases in which the EPA

has waived a standard and a state does not agree, the

state could have two bites out of the apple when it comes

to challenging the waiver of an ARAR. Id. First, the state

could follow the procedure of § 121(f) and seek judicial

review prior to the entry of a consent order. Id. If the

district court upheld the EPA and the state was unwilling

to pay the extra cost of incorporating the waived ARAR

into the remedial action, the state could seek to enforce

the ARAR under § 121(e)(2), all without paying the extra

cost required under § 121(f)(2)(B). Id.

it is of no moment that such circumstances will not

occur in this case because the federal government is not

involved in the remedial plan. Peculiar consequences

would result from allowing a state to use § 121(e)(2) to

compel performance of its remedial plan when that plan

was developed without federal involvement. Most signif-

icantly, the states would enjoy greater injunctive author-

ity than the federal government, because the federal

government must make a showing of “imminent and

substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare”

when it seeks injunctive relief under § 106; no such

showing is necessary under § 121(e)(2). Finally, constru-

ing § 121(e)(2) to authorize injunctive relief in these cir-

cumstances, but relegating states challenging federal

consent decrees to the procedures in § 121(f)(2)(A) & (B)

would amount to pure judicial legislation.

App. 23

D.

Apart from these problems, we also must reject the

State’s arguments that conforming its plan to the NCP

and federal and state standards (ARARs) automatically

meant that its independently selected and financed reme-

dial plan was required to conform to those criteria within

the meaning of § 121(e)(2). Even if the State could over-

come the hurdle that § 121(e)(2) identifies a remedial

action selected by the federal government or its dele-

gates, the State would have to identify standards with

which CERCLA requires a state to comply as a prerequi-

site to selecting a plan. To be sure, several advantages

accrue to the State from compliance with CERCLA § 121

and the NCP, see NCP Proposed Rule, 53 Fed. Reg. 51,394,

51,4588 (Dec. 21, 1988). But § 121(d)(2), with exceptions

8 53 Fed. Reg. at 51,458 provides in part:

Subpart F does not require that States select

remedies for non-Fund-financed State-lead enforce-

ment sites in conformance with CERCLA section 121

and the remedy selection process specified in the

NCP. However, where a State-selected remedy does

not so conform, States and or PRPs may be at risk in

several ways, includig [sic] but not limited to the

following: (1) EPA will not concur with the recom-

mended remedy; (2) EPA may refuse to designate the

State as lead agency for any subsequent response

activities; (3) States and PRPs may be deprived of the

assurance that EPA will find it necessary later to

seek to compel further response actions; (4) EPA may

be unable to delete a site from the NPL and/or (5)

State cost recovery efforts may be hindered.

Failing to comply with CERCLA § 121 and the NCP selection

process would appear to carry far more significant conse-

quences than amicus United States and the defendants are

willing to admit.

App. 24

contained in § 121(d)(4), (f)(2) & (3), requires remedial

plans selected by the federal government or its delegates

to conform to federal and state standards, requirements,

criterion, or limitations, regardless of whether response

costs are sought. The same cannot be said with respect to

remedial plans selected independently by the State,

which developed this plan to be “not inconsistent with”

the NCP and with attention to § 121, in order to accrue

certain advantages, including cost recovery. See supra n.8.

The State has not identified “any Federal or State

standard, requirement, criteria, or limitation to which

[its] remedial action is required to conform under

[CERCLA]” see CERCLA § 121(e)(2) (emphasis added),

within the meaning of § 121(e)(2). The State’s reliance

upon 40 C.F.R. § 300.71(a)(4)9 (1989) is misplaced. The

State must comply with “all otherwise legally applicable

or relevant and appropriate Federal, State, and local

9 40 C.F.R. § 300.71(a)(4) (1989) provides:

Persons performing response actions that are

neither Fund-financed nor pursuant to action under

section 106 of CERCLA shall comply with all other-

wise legally applicable or relevant and appropriate

Federal, State, and local requirements, including per-

mit requirements.

This regulation was superseded by a new NCP effective April

9, 1990. EPA, National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution

Control Contingency Plan, 55 Fed. Reg. 8,666-8,865 (March 8,

1990). The new NCP provides that “[alny person may under-

take a response action to reduce or eliminate a release of

hazardous substance, pollutant or contaminant,” and also sets

forth prerequisites for § 107(a) cost recovery, including consis-

tency with the NCP and compliance with ARARs. Id.

§ 300.700(a)-(c), 40 [sic] Fed. Reg. 8,858-59.

App. 25

requirements, including permit requirements” id., not as

a condition to selecting its plan, but to recover its costs

under § 107. This interpretation is supported by the pre-

amble accompanying the 1985 NCP: “§ 300.71 does set

out the requirements that a private party or State must

meet for a response to be ‘consistent [or not consistent]

with the NCP’ to recover its costs from a responsible

party pursuant to CERCLA section 107.” NCP Final Rule,

50 Fed. Reg. 47,912, 47,934 (Nov. 20, 1985). The EPA

explained that “[tlo be consistent with the NCP for the

purposes of cost recovery under CERCLA, non-Fund-

financed responses must... . comply with all otherwise

applicable or relevant and appropriate Federal, State and

local requirements.” Id. at 47935.

Nor can the State take comfort from its citation of 40

C.F.R. § 300.68(i)(1)° (1989), requiring selection of a

remedial plan that complies with federal ARARs. Section

300.68(i)(1) by its terms applies to a “lead agency” which

10 40 C.FR. § 300.68(i) (1989) provides:

Selection of remedy. (1) The appropriate extent of

the remedy shall be determined by the lead agency’s

selection of a cost-effective remedial alternative that

effectively mitigates and minimizes threats to and

provides adequate protection of public health and

welfare and the environment. Except as provided in

§ 300.68(i)(5), this will require selection of a remedy

that attains or exceeds applicable or relevant and

appropriate Federal public health and environmental

requirements that have been identified for the spe-

cific site.

App. 26

is defined in § 40 C.F.R. 300.61! (1989) to include only

federal agencies and their delegates. The State is not a

lead agency under the regulation.

E.

The State also contends that its remedial actions were

required to comply with the NCP and other standards by

virtue of § 107(a). But merely because § 107(a) allows cost

recovery for response costs “not inconsistent with the

NCP does not mean that the State’s actions were required

by § 107(a) and now may [sic] enforced by injunctive

relief under § 121(e)(2). An action for state cost recovery

is permissive, not mandatory. To adopt the State’s

approach would mean that entitlement to injunctive relief

under § 121(e)(2) would turn on whether a state seeks

response costs. Building on this argument, however, the

State offers the following tautology: once the district

court found that the State’s plan was “not inconsistent

with” the NCP, the elements of the plan became require-

ments “to which the remedial action is required to con-

form under CERCLA.” That the plan must conform to

itself is circular, but putting that problem aside, the dis-

trict court’s finding that the plan is “not inconsistent

with” the NCP merely allows the State response costs on

remand (should it choose to implement the plan), not

11 40 C.FR. § 300.6 (1989) provides in pertinent pari:

Lead agency means the Federal agency (or State agency

operating pursuant to a contract or cooperative agree-

ment executed pursuant to section 104(d)(1) of

CERCLA) that has primary responsibility for coordinat-

ing response action under this Plan.

App. 27 :

injunctive relief. Neither the State nor anyone else is

required under CERCLA to implement this specific plan.

F.

The State’s last argument is that the district court had

inherent equitable authority to issue the injunction. How-

ever, application of a district court’s equitable power is

not appropriate when the statute carefully limits injunc-

tive relief as a remedy. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors,

Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-20 (1979); Shore Realty, 759

F.2d at 1049; Ng, 649 F. Supp. at 1106; Cadillac Fairview, 21

Env’t Rep. Cas. at 1116. Although the State reminds us of

our obligation to construe CERCLA to effectuate its broad

remedial purpose, this does not endow federal courts,

carte blanche, to upset the balance between federal and

state authority envisioned by CERCLA. The states have

been given certain express authority in the statute. See,

e.g., CERCLA §§ 121(f)(1) (permitting review and com-

ment on proposed remedies); 121(f)(2) (permitting states

to seek compliance with state ARARs waived pursuant to

121(d)(4)); 107(a)(4)(A) (allowing cost recovery); 104(d)

(providing for cooperative agreements with states);

121(e)(2) (enabling states to enforce ARARs set forth in a

federal consent decree, regardless of whether the state is

a signatory to that decree). For us to imply injunctive

authority in these circumstances would exceed what was

contemplated by the executive and legislative branches in

enacting CERCLA and arrogate to ourselves powers

rightfully retained by those two branches of government.

See The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton); see also 42 U.S.C.

§ 9613(h) (limiting federal court jurisdiction concerning

challenges to remedial action); Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d

App. 28

1091, 1095-98 (7th Cir.) Gudicial challenge to remedial

action under CERCLA §§ 104 or 106 permitted only after

remedial action is completed), petition for cert. filed, No.

90-354 (Aug. 28, 1990); State of Alabama v. United States

EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1557-60 (11th Cir.) (same), cert. denied,

110 S. Ct. 538 (1989).

V.

As part of the remedial action plan, the district court

thought itself empowered to order the defendants to relo-

cate permanently the month-to-month tenants of the Pan-

dora Trailer Park, so that the State could implement its

remediation plan. Idarado, 707 F. Supp. at 1258-59. The

trailer owners rent the land from defendant Idarado. Id.

at 1259. From the preceding, it is clear that the district

court did not derive such power from § 121(e)(2).

Defendants argue that the district court’s action con-

flicts with CERCLA § 101(24), which in defining “reme-

dial action” provides in pertinent part:

The term includes the cost of permanent reloca-

tion of residents and businesses and community

facilities where the President determines that,

alone or in combination with other measures,

such relocation is more cost-effective than and

environmentally preferable to the transporta-

tion, storage, treatment, destruction, or secure

disposition offsite of hazardous substances, or

may otherwise be necessary to protect the pub-

lic health or welfare;....

42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (emphasis added). As an initial mat-

ter, we note that the statute refers to the “cost of perma-

nent relocation,” so § 101(24) does not empower the

App. 29

district court to grant injunctive relief to implement the

State’s permanent relocation plan. Continuing, however,

the district court looked to the purpose of the relocation

in deciding that a Presidential order was not a prerequi-

site for such permanent relocation costs. It determined

that because the State was “not attempting to relocate the

persons to a new area to isolate them from exposure to

toxic waste,” but rather to implement its remediation

plan for the Idarado facility as a whole, the requirement

of a Presidential order contained in § 101(24) did not

apply. Idarado, 707 F. Supp. at 1258. Another district court

has concluded that permanent relocation costs “must be

approved by the President to be categorized as reimburs-

able response costs.” T & E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 680

F. Supp. 696, 707 (D.N.J. 1988).

The legislative history on this point indicates that on-

site remediation normally is preferred because it is signif-

icantly less expensive. S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d

Sess. 55-56. Even among off-site remedial alternatives,

permanent relocation is one “of the most costly possible

actions.” Id. “To assist the President in determining the

appropriate remedial action, specific criteria are included

in the definitior of remedy for” permanent relocation. See

id. at 55. The Senate Report on the bill from which this

provision originated continues:

The term “remedy” includes the cost of per-

manently locating residences, businesses, or

community facilities when relocation would be

more cost-effective than, an [sic] environmen-

tally preferable to, other off-site remedial

actions. In addition to these considerations, a

decision to provide permanent relocation may

App. 30

be based, at least in part, on findings from epi-

demiological or other health effect studies

which, in the opinion of the President, demon-

strate that a) there is a substantial probability

that exposure to hazardous substances from the

site has caused or is likely to cause or contribute

to adverse health effect; b) even after remedial

actions are taken, persons remaining in the

vicinity of the site would be exposed to hazard-

ous substances; and c) such exposure has a sig-

nificant likelihood of causing or contributing to

adverse health effects or exacerbating existing

conditions.

Id. This legislative history confirms that permanent

relocation ordinarily would be permissible only upon a

Presidential finding that on-site and other off-site cleanup

alternatives would not be as cost-effective or environ-

mentally sound as permanent relocation. See 40 C.FR.

300.6 (1989) (definition of “remedy or remedial action”).

Thus, the Presidential determination requirement

applies when permanent relocation is to protect residents

from exposure to hazardous substances. Given the over-

riding concern for efficient use of remediation resources,

the requirement also should apply when the land on

which they reside is to be used for constructing remedial

facilities. The statute is broad enough to encompass the

latter situation; the President could make a finding that

such action “was otherwise necessary to protect public

health and welfare,” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24); 40 C.F.R. 300.6

(1989). Merely because the legislative history addresses

the most common (and potentially serious) situation does

not mean that § 101(24) does not apply to other perma-

nent relocation proposals. The purpose of requiring a

App. 31

Presidential determination for the alternative of perma-

nent relocation is to inform and control discretion con-

cerning the very costly alternative of permanent

relocation; our holding serves these purposes. We note

that “temporary evacuation and housing of threatened

individuals” is within the definition of a removal action

under CERCLA § 101(23). 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) [sic]; Lutz

v. Chroamtex, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 413, 419-20 (M.D. Pa.

1989); T & E Indus., 680 F. Supp. at 707. However, the

State’s plan calls for permanent relocation under

CERCLA § 101(24). See Appellee’s Brief at 45.

Moreover, the district court’s decision requiring

defendants to bear the costs of permanently relocating

the tenants would diminish defendant Idarado’s rights

under Colorado law, in the likely event that Idarado

chooses to cease renting its property so that the property

may be used in the cleanup effort. Under Colorado law, a

month-to-month tenancy may be terminated on thirty

days notice. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-12-202(d) (1989 Supp.);

Hurricane v. Kanover, Ltd., 651 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Colo. 1982).

The contended-for judicial rule, that recovery of “perma-

nent relocation” costs is permissible without reference to

extant property interests, is a call for abrogation of State-

created property interests which the statute or legislative

history of § 101(24) does not support. Under ° ¢e district

court’s approach, Idarado gets only the burdens of the

tenancies, without the obvious benefit that month-to-

month tenancies provide should the State perform the

plan. The district court’s approach would lead to the odd

result that, having permanently relocated all the tenants

and incurring massive capital expenditures, Idarado

would bear the risk that any or all of the tenants could

App. 32

terminate on thirty days notice. CERCLA does not require

such fleecing.

REVERSED and REMANDED. Upon remand, the dis-

trict shall VACATE its mandatory injunction requiring the

defendants to perform the State’s cleanup plan (as mod-

ified) and VACATE its prohibitory injunction concerning

the relationship between Idarado and its tenants in the

Pandora Trailer Park.

App. 33

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

CASE NO. 83-C-2385

STATE OF COLORADO,

Plaintiff,

V.

IDARADO MINING COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CARRIGAN, J.

Plaintiff State of Colorado instituted this declaratory

judgment action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 asserting

claims under the Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 9601 et seq., as amended by the Superfund Amendments

and Reauthorization Act of 1986 [“SARA”], Pub. L. No.

99-499, 100 Stat. 1615 (1986) (collectively “CERCLA”) and

under the Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601

et seq., (“the TSCA”). Plaintiff seeks to impose liability

against the defendants for the cleanup of hazardous

wastes and for natura: resources damage at and near the

defendants’ mine and milling facilities located between

Ouray and Telluride, Colorado. Defendants are Idarado

Mining Company, Newmont Mining Corporation (“New-

mont Mining”) and Newmont Services Limited (“New-

mont Services”), all owners and operators of the Idarado

Mine. (For convenience only, these defendants may be

App. 34

referred to collectively as “Idarado” in this opinion. Maps

of the area at issue are appended as Exhibits A, B and C.)

Pursuant to CERCLA § 107(a)(1)-(4)(A) and (D), [42

U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4)(A) and (D)], the State has sued to

recover its response costs incurred and to be incurred in

the cleanup of past and ongoing releases of hazardous

wastes at the mining site. Plaintiff state also seeks an

injunction under CERCLA § 121(e)(2), [42 U.S.C.

§ 9621(e)(2)] to implement certain remedial actions it

proposes to effectuate the cleanup process. In addition,

pursuant to CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(C), [42 U.S.C.

§ 9607(a)(4)(C)], the State has sued for damages for

destruction of natural resources. Finally, the State seeks

an injunction under the TSCA compelling the defendants

to remedy the adverse environmental consequences

caused by their allegedly illegal mishandling of poly-

chlorinated biphenyls (“PCB’s”) at the site.

1 earlier granted the State’s motion to bifurcate trial

on the claim for natural resources damage. The State’s

claims under the TSCA and the CERCLA response costs

were tried to the court over twenty-six trial days. This

opinion constitutes my findings of fact, conclusions of

law and order as to the matters tried, pursuant to Rule 52,

Fed. R. Civ. P.

I. Scope of Liability Under CERCLA § 107(a), [42 U.S.C.

§ 9607(a)].

To establish liability under CERCLA, the State must

prove that (1) the defendants are owners or operators (2)

of a facility (3) from which there has been a release or a

threatened release, of a hazardous substance that causes

App. 35

response costs to be incurred. State of Colorado v.

ASARCO, Inc., Civil Action No. 83-C-2383, Slip Op. at 2

(D. Colo. Nov. 27, 1985). Defendant Idarado Mining Com-

pany has admitted that it is an owner and operator of the

Idarado Mine. In a previous order, | ruled that, for pur-

poses of CERCLA liability, Newmont Mining was both an

owner and an operator, and that Newmont Services was

an operator, of the Idarado property and sites at issue.

Moreover, I have previously determined that the

defendant Idarado Mining Company is liable to the State

under CERCLA § 107(a), [42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)] for the

release, or threatened release of a hazardous substance

from a facility that has caused the State to incur response

costs. That holding applies equally to the liability of

Newmont Services and Newmont Mining.

Generally, CERCLA authorizes the United States

Environmental Protection Agency (“USEPA”) to under-

take pollution abatement and cleanup efforts and then

seek reimbursement for cleanup costs from responsible

parties. The National Contingency Plan (“the NCP”), 40

C.F.R. Part 300 (1986), prepared by the USEPA, outlines

the administrative process that governs these cleanup

efforts by establishing procedures and standards applica-

ble to the response actions.

Like the USEPA, states can sue responsible parties to

recover remedial and removal costs. To prevail, a State’s

response efforts must be “not inconsistent with the NCP.”

United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co.,

810 F.2d 726, 747 (8th Cir. 1986); State of New York v. Shore

Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1041 (2d Cir. 1985); State ex rel.

Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F.Supp. 1300, 1315 (N.D. Ohio

App. 36

1983). CERCLA § 121(d)(1), [42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(1)], pro-

vides that:

“Remedial actions selected under this sec-

tion . . . shall attain a degree of cleanup of

hazardous substances, pollutants, and contami-

nants released into the environment and of con-

trol of further release at a minimum which

assures protection of human health and the

environment. Such remedial actions shall be rel-

evant and appropriate under the circumstances

presented by the release or threatened release of

such substance, pollutant, or contaminant.”

Pursuant to the NCP, a detailed environmental inves-

tigation of the area is performed and the feasibility of

various remedial alternatives is analyzed. The Remedial

Investigation (“RI”), or first component, determines the

nature and extent of the harm caused or threatened by

the release of hazardous substances into the environment

at a site. The Feasibility Study (“FS”), or second compo-

nent, is the evaluation of proposed remedies. These two

components are interdependent and may be conducted

concurrently.

CERCLA § 121(d)(2)(A), [42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)(A)]

requires that applicable or relevant and appropriate fed-

eral and state environmental and public health require-

ments be identified and applied to the response action

undertaken at the site. Under the NCP, ‘applicable

requirements’ mean “those Federal requirements that

would be legally applicable, whether directly, or as incor-

porated by a Federally authorized State program, if the

response actions were not undertaken pursuant to

CERCLA section 104 or 106.” 40 C.F.R. § 300.6. Also,

pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 300.6,

scinaiaditnaiiaitta ——

App. 37

“{rlelevant and appropriate requirements are

those Federal requirements that, while not

‘applicable,’ are designed to apply to problems

sufficiently similar to those encountered at

CERCLA sites that their application is appropri-

ate. Requirements may be relevant and appro-

priate if they would be ‘applicable’ but for

jurisdictional restrictions associated with the

requirement.”

After notice and an opportunity for public comment,

a comprehensive remedial action plan appropriate for the

site as a whole is selected utilizing the data gathered from

the RI/FS activities. The final remedy selected for the site

is issued as the Record of Decision (“ROD”). CERCLA

§ 121(d)(2)(A)(ii), [42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)(A)(ii)]; 40 CER.

§§ 300.68(i)(1), 300.71(a)(2)(ii)(B) and 300.71(a)(4).

CERCLA § 121(a), [42 U.S.C. § 9621(a)], requires that

the governmental response be “cost-effective,” taking

into consideration total long and short term costs, includ-

ing costs of operation and maintenance. Pursuant to 40

C.F.R. § 300.68(i), the NCP provides that:

“(1) The appropriate extent of the remedy shall

be determined by the . . . selection of a cost-

effective remedial alternative that effectively

mitigates and minimizes threats to and provides

adequate protection of public health and welfare

and the environment. . . . [T]his will require

selection of a remedy that attains or exceeds

applicable or relevant and appropriate Federal

public health and environmental requirements

that have been identified for the specific site.”

“(2) In selecting the appropriate extent of the

remedy from among the alternatives that will

achieve adequate protection of public health

and welfare and the environment in accordance

with § 300.68(i)(1), the lead agency will consider

App. 38

cost, technology, reliability, administrative and

other concerns, and their relevant effects on

public health and welfare and the environ-

ment.”

“(3) If there are no applicable or relevant and

appropriate Federal public health or environ-

mental requirements, the lead agency will select

that cost-effective alternative that effectively

mitigates and minimizes the threats to and pro-

vides adequate protection of public health and

welfare and the environment, considering cost,

technology, and the reliability of the remedy.”

“(4) Pertinent other Federal criteria, adviso-

ries, and guidance and State standards will be

considered and may be used in developing

alternatives, with adjustments for site-specific

circumstances.”

+ + *

Determining the appropriate removal and remedial

action involves specialized knowledge and expertise.

Where the federal government has sued polluters, the

courts have recognized that the choice of a particular

cleanup method is within the USEPA’s discretion, and the

applicable standard of judicial review is whether the

agency’s decision is arbitrary and capricious. United

States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 810

F.2d at 748; United States v. Ward, 618 FSupp. 884, 900

(E.D. N.Car. 1985). See also, CERCLA § 113(j)(2), [42

U.S.C. § 9613(j)(2)]. By analogy, this reasoning would

seem to apply to actions initiated by the states, at least

after a threshold showing of expertise in the state lead

agency. Nevertheless, at a pretrial hearing, I indicated

that I also would review the State’s response plan on the

merits.

—————x— °°

App. 39

Pursuant to CERCLA § 113(j)(3), [42 U.S.C.

§ 9613(j)(3)], if the court determines that the selected

response action was arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise

not in accordance with the law, “the court shall award (A)

only the response costs or damages that are not inconsis-

tent with the National Contingency Plan, and (B) such

other relief as is consistent with the National Contin-

gency Plan.” Thus, it is within my authority to modify the

State’s proposed plan or, alternatively, remand the matter

to the State for further study. Costs or damages may be

disallowed if serious procedural errors were made relat-

ing to matters of significant relevance. CERCLA

§ 113(j)(4), [42 U.S.C. § 9613(j)(4)].

I have previously ruled that the defendants bear the

burden of proving that the State’s selected remedial plan

and response costs incurred are not consistent with the

NCP. See, United States v. Ward, 618 FSupp. at 901; United

States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 579

F.2d at 747. The focus of this lawsuit is on that narrow

issue.

As I ruled in Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., supra, Con-

gress mandated that the parties responsible for environ-

mental pollution be held strictly liable for governmental

costs incurred in responding to clean up hazardous waste

and for natural resource damage, regardless of fault. See

also United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 FSupp. 1361,

1401 (D. N.H. 1985). The government is not required,

however, “to match the waste found to each defendant as

if it were matching fingerprints.” United States v. Ottati &

Goss, Inc., 630 F.Supp. at 1402. The defendant polluter

App. 40

must have deposited his waste at the site, and the hazard-

ous material found in that waste also must be present at

the site. Id.

This strict liability standard, however, is not absolute.

Under CERCLA § 107(b), [42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)], available

defenses include acts of God, acts of war, and acts or

omissions by third parties other than the defendants’

employees or agents, or other persons whose causal acts

or omissions occur in connection with a contractual rela-

tionship with the defendants. State of New York v. Shore

Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1042. The available defenses thus

are strictly defined by statute.

Defendants here asserted the additional defenses of

laches, estoppel, failure to mitigate damages and the

State’s encouragement of mining, but at trial produced no

adequate evidence to support any of these purported

defenses. Thus, while I have concluded that these

“defenses” are not available under the statute, I further

find and conclude that even if they were available none

of them has been established by the evidence.

With respect to suits involving several defendants, |

have held that the removal and remedial action liabilities

imposed by CERCLA § 107(a), [42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)] are

joint and several. State of Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., Case

No. 83-C-2388 (D. Colo., Order of May T3, 1985). See also

United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co.,

810 F.2d at 742-44. Moreover, since SARA, CERCLA

§ 113(f)(1), [42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1)] expressly provides for

the right to contribution in cases of multiple liability.

During trial, I denied the defendants’ several

motions to dismiss this action on the asserted grounds

Seni.

App. 41

that the State was not entitled to a declaratory judgment

or to injunctive relief. CERCLA § 113(g)(2), [42 U.S.C.

§ 9613(g)(2)], indicates that a declaratory judgment may

be entered, where appropriate, in government initiated

cost-recovery actions. See also State ex rel. Brown v. Geor-

geoff, 562 F.Supp. at 1316 (declaratory judgment available

to State in suit filed prior to SARA).

The State has incurred initial response costs as a

result of its remedial investigation conducted at the

Idarado site. The defendants have challenged the results

of the State’s investigation and proposed remedy. A sub-

stantial controversy exists between the parties and the

matter is now ripe for decision. CERCLA § 121(e)(2), [42

U.S.C. § 9621(e)(2)], added by SARA, provides that “A

State may enforce any Federal or State standard, require-

ment, criteria, (sic) or limitation to which the remedial

action is required to conform under this Chapter in the

United States district court for the district in which the

facility is located.” Thus injunctive relief also is available

to the State under CERCLA.

II. Overview of the Site.

The Idarado Mine (“mine” or “site”) is located in San

Miguel, Ouray and San Juan Counties in southwestern

Colorado. Idarado currently owns 10,574.46 acres, or

16.5226 square miles, of the property in this area. The

property consists largely of patented and unpatented

mining claims, and generally includes the adits, shafts,

underground mine workings, mine portals, mine waste

rock, and tailings ponds. The site involves three distinct

App. 42

natural areas: (1) the Telluride Valley, (2, the Red Moun-

tain area, and (3) the High Country between the two.

A. The Telluride Valley.

The Telluride Valley is a box canyon. Defendants’

mining and milling facilities are located near the canyon

head. The Town of Telluride is located downstream from

the mine and mill, toward the open end of the canyon

below. The San Miguel River originates in the mountains

at the closed upper end of the canyon and flows down-

ward through Telluride. The San Miguel increases in size

as it is supplemented by tributaries over its 81 mile

length until ultimately it empties into the Dolores River

near Uravan, Colorado.

The Telluride Valley portion of the Idarado Mine

(elevation approximately 9,062 feet) includes two mine

openings, or portals, called the “Mill Level Tunnel” and

the “Meldrum Tunnel,” located at the valley head. Next

to the Mill Level Tunnel is the Pandora Millsite, which

includes a former mill, support buildings and storage

areas. Four infiltration lagoons are located up the valley

from the Millsite. Below the Millsite, and adjacent to the

San Miguel River, are four consecutive tailings piles (piles

nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4), and one very large merged or com-

bined tailings pile (pile no. 5/6). All of these tailings piles

are a short distance up the San Miguel river valley from

the Town of Telluride. The tailings piles contain deposits

of ground mine rock that remain after most of the valu-

able metals have been removed by milling.

At the lower end of the valley, below the Town, is an

area along the San Miguel River known as “Society

App. 43

Turn.” Tailings piles are located near Society Turn and

other locations along the San Miguel River as it flows

down the valley. These tailings are approximately five

miles or more downriver from the Pandora Millsite.

B. The Red Mountain Valley.

The Red Mountain Valley portion of the mine (eleva-

tion 10,650 feet) is located in an uninhabited area adjacent

to State Highway 550 and approximately twelve miles

southwest of the Town of Ouray. It includes a mill com-

plex of administrative offices and shop areas comprising

the Red Mountain yard. Downgradient from the Red

Mountain yard are four tailings piles (piles nos. 1, 2, 3

and 4) adjacent to Red Mountain Creek.

The tailings pile farthest from the yard area (Red

Mountain pile 4) is located at the head of Ironton Park,

approximately two miles down valley from the Red

Mountain mine office. Ironton Park is a marshy area that

adjoins the creek for about one and one-half miles. It is

located about two miles above Red Mountain Creek’s

confluence with the Uncompahgre River.

The Red Mountain Valley area also includes a

“buried” tailings pile, the “Treasury Tunnel” mine portal,

and several other scattered mines, tailings piles, mine

waste rock piles and portals.

The headwaters of Red Mountain Creek originate in

the Uncompahgre National Forest near the Ouray/San

Juan County line, which is the forest boundary. Red

Mountain Creek flows from Red Mountain Pass in a

App. 44

northerly direction to its confluence with the Uncom-

pahgre River about 2.75 miles upstream from the Town of

Ouray, Colorado.

The Uncompahgre River continues its course through

Ridgway, Colorado, emptying into the Gunnison River

which, in turn, flows inte the Colorado River near Grand

Junction, Colorado.

The Red Mountain Valley and the Telluride Valley are

separated by mountains. Both areas, however, are con-

nected by a maze of horizontal mine tunnels at various

depths interconnected by hoists and chutes for vertical

travel of staff or movement of materials. Although the

mine has not operated since about 1978, a skeleton crew

maintains it and one can travel from one end to the other

by underground railcar a horizontal distance of about

seventeen miles. However such a trip requires several

transfers from one mine tunnel level up or down to

another.

C. The High Country

The High Country consists of mountain basins gener-

ally above 10,000 feet between the Red Mountain and

Telluride Valleys. The High Country drains into the San

Miguel River and Red Mountain Creek watersheds.

Idarado owns much of the High Country land but has

never carried on mining activity there. The High Country

contains scattered waste rock piles, portals and relics of

past mining activities by prior owners or occupants.

App. 45

III. Brief History of the Idarado Mine.

The Telluride/Red Mountain area is highly miner-

alized, and has been extensively prospected and mined

for approximately 100 years.

Idarado was formed in 1939 by Telluride Black Bear

Mines, Inc., San Juan Metals Corporation, Newmont Min-

ing Corporation and Barstow-Imogene Mines, as a corpo-

rate entity under which they consolidated several mining

properties in the Red Mountain area. In 1953, Idarado

purchased the Telluride Mines. Between 1954 and 1956,

the Red Mountain mill was decommissioned, and the

Pandora milis**e, located in the Telluride Valley, was

reconstructed and expanded.

From 1956 until Idarado’s mining operations were

shut down, all ore was run through the Treasury and Mill

Level Tunnels and milled near Telluride at the Pandora

Mill. Zinc, copper, lead, silver and gold were produced.

In 1978, depressed metal prices necessitated cessation of

Idarado’s operations. In August 1986, approximately 80%

of Idarado’s mining and milling equipment and machin-

ery wis sold at public auction. As stated, it now retains

only a skeleton crew to perform maintenance at the site.

During its years of operation, Idarado had a net income

of $130 million.

IV. The State’s Remedial Investigation.

In 1984, the State, through the State Attorney Gen-

eral’s office, entered into contracts with independent

environmental consultants to develop or assist in the

development of the Remedial Investigation, Feasibility

App. 46

Study and Record of Decision regarding the Idarado

Mine. These consultants acted under the direction of sev-

eral state officials.

The Remedial Investigation included a review of his-

torical records with respect to mining and milling opera-

tions and a field investigation. That investigation

consisted of sampling all environmental media, including

the soil, air and water at the site, and determining the

sources, pathways and receptors of contaminants.

A Feasibility Study was conducted to analyze the

remediation alternatives. Initially, the State’s consultants

began with over 200 different possible response actions.

These alternatives were screened using the following fac-

tors: technical feasibility, practicality, technical reliability,

applicability, environmental effectiveness, short and long

term benefits, adverse impact, health effects, and costs.

Six alternatives ultimately were selected for each side of

the mountain.

The State issued the RI and FS for public comment.

Public meetings were held at Telluride and Ouray, and

comments were received.

Next, a Preliminary Record of Decision was prepared

as a preliminary draft of the State’s decision regarding

remedial action. The State’s consultants then performed

cost analyses and environmental effectiveness analyses

with respect to the proposed remedies. The cost analyses

were obtained by standard engineering and construction

practices and other methods approved by the USEPA’s FS

guidance documents.

App. 47

Finally, the State issued its Record of Decision as its

final remedial action decision with respect to the Idarado

site. The Colorado Department of Health served as the

lead agency in the ROD’s preparation. This ROD docu-

ment was admitted as a trial exhibit.

V. Areas of Contamination at the Idarado Facility, the

Parties’ Proposed Remedies and the Court’s Selected

Remediation Plan.

The State has identified three main sources of metals

contamination at the Idarado Facility: tailings, mine

drainage and waste rock. Tailings are the waste products

from the milling process and are composed of finely

crushed and ground waste rock containing the small frac-

tion of metals not recovered during milling as well as

chemical reagents and water used in the milling process.

Water, including water from rain, snow, underground

sources, and the mines, flows across and through the

tailings, eroding the tailings piles and picking up metals

to be deposited in the area’s rivers and creeks. The waters

that flow over and through the tailings contain cadmium,

copper, lead, zinc, and in some instances, arsenic, chro-

mium, nickel and silver. All of these metals are hazardous

substances within the meaning of CERCLA § 101(14), [42

U.S.C. § 9601(14)].

Water flows out of mine portals and crosses waste

piles, where it picks up metals and hazardous materials

on its downward course, ultimately carrying hazardous

waste and metals into the area’s streams.

With respect to the proposed remediation plans, |

heard separately the evidence as to each contamination

App. 48

source or affected area. The evidence was presented in

the following order: (1) the Telluride tailings piles; (2) the

Telluride soils; (3) the Society Turn tailings; (4) the mine

portal discharges and mine waste rock; (5) the millsite

cleanup; (6) the miscellaneous tailings along the San

Miguel River, stream bank cleanup and habitat enhance-

ment; and (7) the Red Mountain tailings. Evidence also

was presented on the State’s proposed monitoring sys-

tem. I now will address (albeit not in the order above

listed) each of the specific contamination sources or

affected areas, discussing the parties’ respective pro-

posals for remediation addressed to each source or area.

As to each I will then state my findings and conclusions

with respect to each source or area.

(A) The Telluride Tailing Piles.

On the Telluride side, there are six large tailings piles

located near the Pandora Millsite.

Piles one through four contain between 431,000 and

807,000 dry tons of tailings and cover a surface area of

between 14.3 and 18.1 acres. Considered individually, pile

1 contains approximately 72,000 dry tons of tailings and

covers a surface area of approximately 1.4 acres; pile 2

contains approximately 214,000 dry tons of mine tailings

and covers a surface area of approximately 2.2 acres; pile

3 contains approximately 327,000 dry tons of mine tail-

ings and covers a surface of approximately 6.1 acres; and

pile 4 contains approximately 194,000 dry tons of mine

tailings and covers a surface area of approximately 4.6

acres. Tailings were deposited in these piles between 1938

and 1944. Piles 1 and 2 have an average height of fifteen

App. 49

to thirty-five feet. The average height of piles 3 and 4 is

thirty-five feet.

The “merged” tailings pile formed from combining

piles 5 and 6 is approximately 100 feet high. It contains

approximately ten million tons of tailings and covers

between fifty and sixty-five acres. Tailings were depos-

ited in pile 5 between 1944 and 1952, and between 1955

and 1978. Pile 6 received tailings deposits between 1955

and 1976.

The metals concentration in piles 1 through 6 varies,

but all piles contain «zdmium, copper, lead, zinc, silver,

chromium and arsenic. Piles 5 and 6 contain 30 million

pounds of lead and zinc, over five million pounds of

arsenic and over two thousand pounds of cyanide.

The Telluride tailings piles are not lined and were not

required to be lined when they were constructed. All six

piles are the result of mining and milling activities at the

Idarado mine. No newly mined tailings have been added

to these piles since milling ended in 1978.

Oxidized acidic “hot spots” occur in the tailings

where water is seeping out from the piles’ sides or near

the basins of the tailings. Materials that are oxidized are

generally more soluble in water and thus are more mobile

in the environment. When water contacts the tailings,

hazardous substances are released into the water. These

six tailings piles are eroded by water caused by precipita-

tion, snowmelt and flood events. The piles show evidence

of erosion gullies. As a result, tailings have flowed

directly into the San Miguel River, contaminating its sedi-

ments. Tailings constitute the majority of sediment within

the San Miguel stream bed along piles 5 and 6. Sediment

App. 50

contamination extends as far as the confluence of the San

Miguel with its South Fork.

Water from run-on, snowmelt and precipitation flows

off the tailings piles, and seeps from the piles’ side

slopes. The water carries high concentrations of heavy

metals, including lead and zinc, leached from the tailings.

Metal sampling in the San Miguel River has indicated

heavy metal concentrations, including lead and zinc, over

the stream reach from above pile 1 to below pile 5/6.

Hazardous substances also are released into the

ground water from the six piles as a result of rain and

snow melt. The ground water is eventually discharged

into the San Miguel River.

Concentrations of zinc, cadmium and copper in the

San Miguel River were relatively low upstream but

increased downstream past the Pandora Mill site. The

high zinc concentration and the other heavy metals in the

surface water and sediments in the San Miguel River

have resulted in significant degradation of the water

quality as a habitat for aquatic life.

In the fall of 1985, the defendants’ experts, assisted

by the State’s experts, conducted a fish population esti-

mate by electro-shock fishing. The greatest number of

fish, insects and algae were found at the upstream edge

of the San Miguel River, below Bear Creek. Bear Creek is

a San Miguel tributary that enters the river from the

south below tailings pile 5/6 near the Town of Telluride.

Lower numbers of fish, insects and algae were found in

the smaller tributaries of the upper basin and in the

headwaters of the San Miguel River, upstream from Bear

Creek and adjacent to Idarado’s property. There was

App. 51

some evidence that natural barriers preclude fish migra-

tion.

Brook trout, the resident fish, were located in the San

Miguel River below Bear Creek. The State’s evidence

indicated that the fish population survives there because

the inflow from Bear Creek dilutes the heavy metal load,

and because the brook trout has been able to adjust to

stream waters with increased metal content. Brook trout

are fairly resistant to metals compared to other kinds of

trout. Liver tissue samples taken from fish indicated ele-

vated metal levels, and elevated cadmium and lead levels

were found in their other tissues. The metal levels in San

Miguel fish were 6 to 6,000 times higher than the metal

concentrations found in fish from Lake Powell (a large

recreational lake located across the Arizona-Utah border).

But for the metals concentration in the San Miguel River,

cut-throat, rainbow and brown trout would be expected

to be present. Toxic effects of metals on aquatic life

include death, growth reduction, diminished egg hatch-

ability and, in the case of lead, deformities as well as

breakdowns in the metabolic system.

Lower insect density on the river corresponded to the

lower fish density. Plant life density in the San Miguel

River also decreased substantially downstream from the

tailings piles, and this too is attributable to the presence

of heavy metals.

Flooding occurred in the Telluride Valley in 1911,

1914, 1923, 1927, 1964 and 1966. Future flooding of the

San Miguel River would cause more tailings pile erosion

and additional releases of hazardous metals into the

River.

atest ile

App. 52

The six tailings piles also are continually eroded by

wind. Blowing tailings contaminate soils and surface

water with cadmium, lead, zinc and copper. Water is

sprinkled on pile 5/6 as part of Idarado’s dust control

program. A portion of that water infiltrates the tailings,

enters the ground water and eventually flows into the

San Miguel.

Tailings are blown into the Town of Telluride, pro-

ducing a whitish-gray dust cloud that deteriorates the air

quality. Tailings also have been used as “fill” on Teiluride

properties and as ditch linings when sewer and water

lines have been laid in the town.

In 1977, the Town of Telluride constructed two wells

downgradient from pile six. The concentration of chro-

mium in Telluride’s drinking water wells was elevated

during the late 1970’s because of a slug release of chro-

mium from pile 5/6. However, chromium concentrations

in those wells have decreased steadily and they are now

within drinking water standards.

Tests indicated that tailing pile 5/6 is “EP toxic,”

meaning that it contains high concentrations of lead. The

EP toxicity test identifies wastes that are capable of pos-

ing a substantial hazard to the public health and environ-

ment when improperly managed.

The State has determined in its Record of Decision

that all activities must comply with the Colorado Water

Quality Control Act, C.R.S. §§ 25-8-101 through 25-8-612

(1986). Stream classification and water quality standards

apply for all pollutants except that certain numeric stan-

dards for zinc and lead have been selected for the San

Miguel River. The State also has determined that all point

App. 53

source discharges must, at a minimum, meet effluent

limitations and Colorado Discharge Permit System

Requirements, and that the antidegradation and basic

standards of 5 CCR 1002-8, at 3.1.8 and 3.1.11 (1-84) apply

to all surface water.

Regarding ground water, the Record of Decision indi-

cates that the Colorado Safe Drinking Water authorities

[C.R.S. §§ 25-1-107(1)(x) and (y); 25-1-114 - 25-1-114.1

(Supp. 1986)], and the Colorado Primary Drinking Water

Regulations apply to ground water at the site that may be

a source of municipal water supplies. The Basic Stan-

dards for Ground Water [5 CCR 1002-8, at 3.11.0 to 3.11.9

(1-87)] also are applicable.

Based on the evidence presented, I find and conclude

that the Telluride tailings piles 1 through 6 contain haz-

ardous substances as defined under CERCLA § 101(14),

[42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)], and that the release of those haz-

ardous substances poses a threat to and has harmed the

public welfare and the environment in the Telluride Val-

ley. As a result the State has incurred response costs. I

further find that the San Miguel River and the area

ground water are contaminated because of the presence

of these hazardous substances that have caused endan-

germent and injury to aquatic life. I conclude that the San

Miguel River contamination violates applicable, or rele-

vant and appropriate State standards. | further conclude

that the releases of hazardous substances from the Tell-

uride tailings piles constitute one source of this contam-

ination and that a cleanup remediation plan must be

implemented.

App. 54

(i) The State’s Proposed Plan.

Generally, the State’s Plan for the Telluride tailings

piles calls for isolating the approximately ten million tons

of tailings in piles 1 through 6 to prevent tailings dis-

persal into the environment. The plar. consists of:

(a) consolidating piles 1 through 4 at the loca-

tion of pile 5/6;

(b) constructing a multilayer cap on the consol-

idated tailings;

(c) constructing surface water run-on diver-

sion ditches; and

(d) constructing flood control measures

designed to withstand the probable maxi-

mum flood event to protect the consoli-

dated tailings impoundment from erosion

and structural failure.

With respect to the piles consolidation aspect, after

removal of the tailings, original soil material beneath the

piles would be removed to approximately a one foot

depth. The tailings would be moved by conveyor, trucks

or both. The conveyor would cross the San Miguel River,

using standard supports or culverts. To prevent discharg-

ing tailings into the environment while they are being

moved, the State proposes using a pipeline conveyor

system that encapsulates the moving tailings.

The multilayer cap covering the ultimate consoli-

dated pile or piles would consist of a low permeability

layer, an erosion resistant layer and a growth media layer.

As proposed, the low permeability layer would retard the

downward movement of water through the piles and

would thus reduce tailings oxidation and the leaching of

App. 55

hazardous substances from the tailings by water, thereby

preventing, or at least minimizing, any further metals

loading to surface and ground water. This layer also

would reduce root penetration into the tailings, and thus

prevent the uptake of hazardous substances by growing

plants. The State indicated that the low permeability

layer can be constructed using compacted tailings mate-

rial and slimes from piles 1 through 4.

The erosion resistant layer would provide a perma-

nent remedy to reduce long-term erosion by wind and

water. This layer would consist of coarse rock material

available from the Royer Gulch debris fan located on the

Idarado mill site near tailings piles 1 through 4. Theo-

retically, the erosion resistant layer would act like a

sponge, retaining water and providing moisture to the

vegetative cover.

The growth media layer would consist of locally

available soil and would provide for a self-sustaining

plant population on top of the cap. The soil could be

obtained from the Royer Gulch debris fan. The State

asserts that tree roots and vegetation would aid in ero-

sion control.

It appears undisputed that runoff and run-on diver-

sion control structures are necessary to prevent water

from running onto and standing on the tailings piles. The

State contends that the appropriate diversion remedy

should be designed to withstand the probable maximum

flood. The probable maximum flood is defined as the

largest flood that reasonably could be expected to occur

in an area.

App. 56

Under the State’s plan, diversion control structures

would be constructed on the south side of the consoli-

dated tailings impoundment. The impoundment’s base

would be lined with riprap, or large rock that is available

on-site. After consolidation, the tailings impoundment

would be approximately 120 feet above the surface of the

San Miguel River. Riprap would be placed 50 feet up the

side of the impoundment so that the impoundment could

withstand the effect of the probable maximum flood

event.

The State estimates that execution of its plan would

cost approximately $9.3 million.

(ii) Defendants’ Proposed Plan.

Defendants propose stabilizing Telluride tailings

piles 1 through 6 in place and revegetating the areas by

applying fertilizer, manure and straw to naturally manu-

facture soil. In fact, the defendants have begun to imple-

ment their revegetation plan on the surfaces and slopes of

piles 1 through 4, and some vegetation growth has

occurred. Defendants propose using limestone to neutral-

ize the piles’ acidic “hot spots.” Revegetation would

reduce water flow through the piles.

Defendants plan to control erosion from direct pre-

cipitation by modifying the drainage patterns on the

piles, contouring the piles’ surfaces and placing riprap on

the piles’ side slopes. Under this plan, run-on/runoff

contour ditches would be constructed for drainage and

App. 57

diversion. Erosion gullies would be backfilled and cov-

ered with erosion blankets. At trial, the defendants’ reme-

dial evidence addressed the issue of protection to

withstand the 100 year flood event. In subsequent papers

submitted to the court, it appears that the defendants

have agreed to construct flood protection for the area to

withstand the 500-year flood event, but not the probable

maximum flood event.

The over-all cost of the defendants’ plan is estimated

to be approximately $1.8 million.

(iii) The Court’s Remediation Plan.

Defendants do not appear to dispute the need for

cleanup of the Telluride tailings piles, or their liability for

that cleanup. Thus the issue is the scope of that cleanup.

At trial I expressed my concerns about the cost of the

State’s proposed remedy, and the disturbing and possibly

dangerous side effects of transporting huge amounts of

tailings, some by truck through the town. Specifically, I

am concerned about tailings being released into the air,

water and environment, even though the State’s plan

contemplates an encapsulated conveyor system to trans-

port the tailings for consolidation. Clearly tailings consol-

idation to the degree suggested by the state would

severely disrupt the Town of Telluride and the entire

valley because of heavy construction traffic, and other

factors, for an indefinite time. Based on the evidence

presented from both sides, a remediation plan such as the

State’s, designated to prevent contamination and insure

protection of the environment against even the worst of

App. 58

all imaginable or possible natural catastrophes does not

appear to be technically feasible or necessary. CERCLA

requires that the plan be cost-effective, taking into con-

sideration long and short-term costs, operation and main-

tenance.

I conclude that certain components of the State’s

plan, i.e., moving and consolidating the tailings piles and

use of a six-foot multilayer cap, do not comport with

CERCLA’s overall scheme and goal of achieving accept-

able health and environmental protection. Nor is the

state’s plan for consolidating tailings piles cost-effective.

In sum, the State’s plan would go too far.

On the other hand, I conclude that the defendants’

proposed plan does not go far enough. While stabilizing

these enormous tailings piles in place appears feasible,

doing so by merely “manufacturing” soil from mulch to

achieve revegetation is neither practical nor likely to

succeed.

I asked the parties to submit alternatives to their

proposals presented at trial. I find and conclude that the

State’s alternative proposal best satisfies CERCLA’s aims.

Generally, this alternative plan calls for stabilizing the six

tailings piles in place and constructing a multilayered

cover on each pile using locally available material. The

cover would contain a two-foot thick erosion resistant

(random fill) layer, amended by bentonite, and topped by

a plant growth media layer that is also two feet thick. The

sides of the combined tailings piles 5 and 6 would be

similarly covered, but without the bentonite, and a self-

sustaining vegetative cover would be established on the

top.

App. 59

Drainage and erosion control structures as described

by the State, would be utilized. They would be designed

to withstand the 500-year flood event and the forces of a

maximum credible earthquake. Flood protection design

would encompass the San Miguel River, Royer Gulch and

Marshall Creek. Monitoring activities for the Telluride

tailings piles would include surface water, ground waiter,

soils, vegetation, erosion, and construction aspects as out-

lined in the State’s alternative plan.

The State is ordered to submit, within thirty days, a

cost estimate for executing its alternative plan for these

tailings piles.

(B) The Society Turn Tailings.

The three Society Turn tailings piles are situated adja-

cent to the San Miguel River in the immediate vicinity of

the Highway 145 intersection. The three piles, each

located at the site of a glacial moraine and mostly barren

of vegetation, contain a total of approximately 120,000 to

160,000 tons of tailings.

These man-made tailings piles were formed around

1900 when tailings were impounded behind wooden tim-

ber dams that trapped the tailings previously deposited

upstream. The tailings settled in the calmer waters

behind the dams. Later, when the dams were breached or

removed, the San Miguel River, the natural course of

which had run through the tailings piles, returned to its

channel and washed out a renewed channel through the

tailings. The remaining tailings form the Society Turn

tailings.

App. 60

At Society Turn there are three tailings piles, one

upstream and two downstream. The upstream tailings

pile is one to five feet deep, and the first downstream pile

is up to fifteen feet deep. These two piles contain approx-

imately 90 to 95 percent of the total Society Turn tailings.

The third, or westernmost, downstream pile contains the

remainder.

The estimated total volume of tailings at Society Turn

is about 145,000 cubic yards. River meander continues to

erode the piles, particularly during spring snowmelt each

year. The Society Turn tailings contain heavy metals,

including cadmium, copper, lead and zinc. Lead content

is 3,338 mg/kg. The two large tailings piles are respec-

tively, thirty-two times and four times above the EP tox-

icity threshold for lead. The deepest pile is EP toxic for

cadmium.

The Colorado stream standards for cadmium, lead

and zinc applicable to the San Miguel River are violated

all the way past Society Turn. Stream bed sediments in

the Society Turn area are high in metals, including zinc,

copper, arsenic, cadmium and silver. In fact, the highest

silver concentration in sediments for the entire reach of

the San Miguel River occurs in the Society Turn area.

Sources of elevated metal concentrations in the sedi-

ments at Society Turn include previous tailings deposits

in the area, and erosion and transport of tailings from the

upper Marshall Basin and of materials from Idarado’s six

Telluride tailings piles. The materials from these six piles

either wash downstream through Society Turn or are

deposited in the area. Metals loading at Society Turn has

occurred continuously since tailings and sediments were

App. 61

first deposited there. Although metal concentrations

appear to decrease as the river proceeds downstream

toward Society Turn, metal toxicity increases because of

the sediments and tailings, the increased silver concentra-

tions, and the reduced role of organic materials in bind-

ing the metals.

The macroinvertebrate population at Society Turn is

approximately one-tenth of the population found

upstream. This indicates that the aquatic system, overall,

is in poor condition and there is probably a major disrup-

tion in the aquatic food chain for all fish species.

There was evidence that the Society Turn stream area,

if not polluted, should provide an excellent habitat for

various trout species. However, only brook trout are pres-

ent, and they are found at only half the rate of their

upstream population. Because of the presence of heavy

metals in the San Miguel, brook trout density is only one-

third the population density predicted by the defendants’

modeling analysis. There also was evidence that the cad-

mium and silver concentrations in sediments at Society

Turn are directly toxic to rainbow trout eggs.

Defendants contend that the Society Turn tailings do

not present a substantial danger to public health, welfare,

or the environment. They have attempted to absolve

themselves of cleanup liability by asserting that they do

not own any property at Society Turn. Defendants also

assert that the State cannot quantify any amount of

Idarado’s tailings at Society Turn, nor can the State

directly identify or trace any specific tailings as having

eroded from the six Telluride tailings piles and come to

App. 62

rest in the Society Turn area. I find and conclude, how-

ever, that the defendants’ arguments are not sufficient to

absolve them of responsibility for cleanup of the Society

Turn tailings.

When the Society Turn piles were first formed, the

general practice among mining companies operating

upstream from the area was to dump tailings into the San

Miguel River or its tributaries. By 1918, as much as 1,400

tons of tailings were being dumped daily. Smuggler

Union Company, Liberty Bell Gold Mining Company, and

The Tomboy Gold Mines Company, Ltd. (a corporation

organized under the laws of Great Britain) were among

the mining companies operating at the San Miguel’s

headwaters during the early 1900’s. All had placed tail-

ings in the river by 1904. Smuggler Union and Liberty

Bell were later acquired by Telluride Mines, Inc. Tomboy

England was acquired by Tomboy Gold Mines, Inc., a

Colorado corporation. In the 1950’s, Idarado ultimately

acquired the assets, and assumed the obligations and

liabilities of, Telluride Mines and Tomboy Colorado.

None of the defendants, nor any of their associated

concerns, currently own any of the property on which the

remaining Society Turn tailings piles are deposited. In

October 1967, however, an Idarado affiliate, on Idarado’s

behalf, acquired placer claims in the Society Turn area

that included the upstream tailings pile. Between 1967

and 1971, Idarado rechanneled the San Miguel River

upstream from the Society Turn tailings piles. Idarado

sold its placer claim property in December 1983, to Cor-

dillera Corporation, a company not associated with the

defendants.

App. 63

Defendants contend that neither Idarado nor any of

its affiliates disposed of tailings on that property, nor did

they move or disturb any of the existing tailings at Soci-

ety Turn, except as incidental to rechanneling the San

Miguel. Defendants, however, do not dispute that tailings

material from the six Telluride piles have eroded into the

San Miguel River and have been carried downstream

toward Society Turn.

As indicated in United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F.

Supp. at 1072, Congress made it clear when it initially

enacted CERCLA, that generators, transporters, con-

sumers, or dumpsite owners who have profited or other-

wise benefited from commerce involving hazardous

substances should bear the cleanup cost for affected

areas. Under CERCLA § 107(a), [42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)],

persons liable (other than a facility’s current owners or

operators) include past owners or operators of any facil-

ity at the time the hazardous waste was disposed; and

persons who by contract, or otherwise, arrange for the

disposal of hazardous substances by another party at a

facility. CERCLA § 101(9)(B), [42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(B)]

defines “facility” as “any site or area where a hazardous

substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or

placed, or otherwise come to be located... . ”

Contaminated tailings deposits have “come to be

located” in the Society Turn area because tailings were

“released” into the San Miguel River and ultimately set-

tled there behind the dams and in the river’s sediments.

(See CERCLA § 101(22), [42 U.S.C. § 9601(22)] for the

definition of “release,” which includes “spilling,” “dis-

charging,” “injecting,” “escaping,” “dumping” or “dis-

” “4

posing” into the environment). These tailings areas are

App. 64

the result of dumpings by Idarado’s predecessor mining

companies, for whom Idarado assumed all debts, lia-

bilities and obligations, at the time of acquisition in the

1950’s. Idarado continued its mining operations in the

area until 1978.

Moreover, Idarado, through its subsidiary, previously

owned property at Society Turn that included the

upstream tailings area. The evidence is undisputed that

the Society Turn tailings piles have eroded in the past and

continue to erode, into the San Miguel River. Tailings

from the defendants’ six Telluride piles also have eroded,

and continue to erode, into the San Miguel. This erosion

releases heavy metals into the waters and sediments.

Defendants are liable in part as past owners and opera-

tors of a “facility” at the time of waste disposal. CERCLA

§ 107(a)(2), [42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2)]. They also are liable

because they “otherwise arranged for . . . disposal,” of

hazardous waste by placing their contaminated tailings in

the San Miguel River and those tailings “have come to be

located” at Society Turn. CERCLA § 107(a)(3), [42 U.S.C.

§ 9607(a)(3)].

As I earlier indicated, the State is not required to

match specific waste found to a particular defendant, nor

is strict proof of causation required. See United States v.

Otatti [sic] & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. at 1402; State of New

York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F. 2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir.

1985).

In sum, the evidence establishes that the defendants

“released” contaminated tailings that “have come to be

located” at Society Turn, and that are being “released”

from Society Turn, a “facility” previously owned by the

App. 65

defendants. The release of contaminated waste from this

area is posing a threat to the environment and to the

public welfare for which the State has incurred response

costs. Defendants thus are liable under CERCLA for those

response costs and for cleaning up the affected area.

(i) The State’s Proposed Plan.

The keystone of the State’s plan is the removal of the

tailings from the area of active erosion to a hydrologically

and geologically suitable disposal site within one mile of

the tailings’ present location. The tailings will be consoli-

dated at this new site and placed in a lined impound-

ment. The State has suggested using Mancos shale to

construct the liner because it is indigenous and generally

suitable for the intended purpose. The soils beneath and

adjacent to the old tailings site will be cleaned to 1,000

parts per million (“ppm”) lead or less. During trial, the

State initially proposed consolidating the Society Turn

tailings piles onto Telluride tailings piles 5 and 6. That

preliminary proposal was changed, however, after the

public voiced objections because impiementing it would

have necessitated substantial truck traffic along the high-

way and through the Town of Telluride to transport the

Society Turn tailings upstream.

The State now proposes constructing a multilayer cap

six feet deep on top of the consolidated tailings, using

material excavated from the selected disposal site. The

cap’s design would include the same features proposed

for capping the Telluride tailings piles. The tailings

App. 66

impoundment would be designed to withstand the maxi-

mum credible earthquake, probable maximum precipita-

tion and probable maximum flood. Surface water run-on

and runoff diversion ditches would be installed.

_ All areas disturbed by the construction activities

would be recontoured and revegetated.

The State estimates that its proposed plan would cost

approximately $2,580,000.

The State considered rechanneling the San Miguel

River but that option was rejected because of the poten-

tial cost, the lack of permanence, and the negative fea-

sibility based on the area’s topography. Moreover, certain

permits would be required from the Army Corps of Engi-

neers. There was evidence that channelization would

negatively impact the aquatic habitat and reduce aquatic

biota.

As earlier discussed, none of the parties own the

subject property. The State has identified several avail-

able options for gaining access to the property to imple-

ment the remedy. One option calls for the State to

purchase the property at a cost of approximately $100,000

for ten acres. Other options include gaining access

through negotiations with the current land owners, con-

demnation proceedings and state injunctive relief to abate

a nuisance. The cost of obtaining property access is not

reflected in the State’s cost estimate.

(ii) Defendants’ Proposed Plan.

Defendants have not proposed a remedial plan for

the Society Turn tailings because they contend that they

App. 67

are not liable for the area’s cleanup. I have rejected the

defendants’ position in my above stated findings.!

(iii) The Court’s Remediation Plan.

The State has not asked for a mandatory injunction

requiring the defendants to begin cleanup of the Society

Turn tailings. Rather, the State asks that declaratory judg-

ment be entered in its favor addressing the scope of the

cleanup effort.

Since I have determined that the defendants are lia-

ble for cleanup of the Society Turn tailings, I further

conclude that declaratory relief must be entered in favor

of the State. I also conclude that the State’s cleanup plan

shall be implemented as proposed with the following

restrictions: (1) The State’s plan for moving and consol-

idating the three Society Turn tailings piles shall be

implemented, but rather than utilizing the six foot multi-

layer cap, the capping component shall be installed fol-

lowing the same guidelines as specified for capping the

Telluride tailings piles. Within six months, the State shall

select the site for the consolidated tailings. Selection of

that site must take into consideration the objections

voiced by Telluride citizens, and substantial construction

vehicle traffic shall not be permitted to traverse and

1 Defendants at trial did submit evidence suggesting

(without admitting liability) that it would be possible to divert

the San Miguel River away from the tailings piles. They sug-

gested the tailings could then be stabilized in place by covering

them with natural geological (glacial morainal) material and

buttressing the sides with riprap. The areas would then

become revegetated by grass growing on the covering material.

App. 68

disrupt the Town of Telluride or expose its people or their

homes to undue traffic hazards, or blowing or dropping

of tailings dust or material from trucks in or near the

town. In short, a site shall be selected that would not

involve hauling tailings through or near the town of

Telluride.

(C) Miscellaneous Tailings along the San Miguel

River, Stream Bank Cleanup and Aquatic Habi-

tat Enhancement.

The State estimates that there are between fifty and

seventy-five thousand tons of tailings material located

along the stream banks of the San Miguel River between

the Town of Telluride and Society Turn. Some of these

tailings have vegetation covers, are mixed with soil, or

have a “soil gravel cover.” The “barren tailings,” which

the State seeks to remove, are located in unvegetated or

sparsely vegetated areas. These barren tailings were

deposited during times of high water, and have eroded

into the San Miguel River. Defendants were once owners

of the affected stream bank areas, but the land is now

owned by persons not parties to this lawsuit.

These miscellaneous tailings are exposed to direct

precipitation, such as rain and snow melt. At least 1,000

cubic yards of the tailings are oxidized, causing the haz-

ardous substances to be more soluble and mobile in the

environment. The State contends that these stream bank

tailings cause significant metals loading to the San

Miguel River, especially during storm events and when-

ever water leaches through the tailings. The metals that

are being deposited into the San Miguel inciude zinc,

App. 69

copper and lead. Humans, livestock and wild animals

come into contact with the tailings, although there was no

direct evidence of resulting health problems.

Defendants contend that the miscellaneous tailings

are not responsible for elevated concentrations in, or

metals loading to, the San Miguel River. There was evi-

dence that once the San Miguel has flowed past Idarado’s

property, in the vicinity of Bear Creek, metals concentra-

tions in the water decline from there on downstream.

Defendants further assert that if indeed any metals con-

tribution at all occurs from the miscellaneous tailings, it

is from seepage or surface runoff (surface water washing

across the tailings), or other unidentified sources, includ-

ing groundwater recharge.

Defendants again emphasize that before Idarado’s

existence, the general practice of mining companies in the

area was to dump tailings directly into the San Miguel

River or its tributaries. I conclude, however, that the

defendants’ contention that the stream bank tailings con-

tribute a de minimus amount of hazardous substances to

the San Miguel River does not preclude their liability.

Defendants’ six tailings piles above the Town of Tell-

uride contribute major contamination to the San Miguel.

On the average, the tailings piles contribute less than fifty

per cent of the metals loading to the San Miguel River.

The major contributors are the Mill Level and Meldrum

Tunnel discharges. As compared to the tailings piles,

however, the stream bank tailings have greater surface

area per unit volume exposed to the atmosphere. More-

over, the State’s evidence, and common sense, indicate

that tailings are deposited on the stream banks during

App. 70

times of high water. The tailings are deposited either in,

or adjacent to, the river. As stated before, it is unnecess-

ary for the State to “fingerprint” waste. United States v.

Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. at 1402. Defendants,

whose waste is located along the San Miguel River stream

banks, are liable for clean up even as de minimus pollu-

ters. United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F.

Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985).

(i) The State’s Proposed Remedy.

Generally, the State’s plan would require removal of

tailings from stream banks that are not vegetated or that

are sparsley vegetated. The State, however, has not

clearly identified the areas targeted for tailings removal.

The removed tailings would be deposited on the Telluride

or Society Turn tailings piles. Disturbed areas would then

be revegetated.

The State proposes removing the tailings with a

track-mounted backhoe, and hauling them away in dump

trucks. The State estimates that, using ten-yard capacity

trucks, it will take approximately 5,000 truck loads to

remove the 50,000 cubic yards of tailings. Approximately

ten percent as many truck loads will be required to haul

the cover material to the affected areas.

The aquatic habitat will be restored and improved,

and fish, including species other than brook trout (brown

and rainbow trout), will be stocked in the San Miguel

River, between Bear Creek and Society Turn. All habitat

improvements will be designed to allow for channel sta-

bility at flows of up to the one hundred year flood level.

App. 71

Much of the land along the river is owned by Cor-

dillera Corporation, not the defendants. However, the

State asserts that access to the affected stream banks is

available from several side roads, and that an abandoned

railroad berm that extends for almost the full stretch of

the river can be used. In areas where there are no roads to

the river, tailings would be loaded on sleds and the sleds

would be hauled by backhoe to truck loading points on

the nearest road.

The State estimates that its plan will cost approx-

imately $582,000.

(ii) Defendants’ Proposed Plan.

Defendants did not submit a proposed remedy for

this area. However, the defendants suggest that it would

be feasible to vegetate the barren tailings deposits in

place. Defendants also have challenged the State’s plan

on several grounds.

First, the defendants contend that roads are not avail-

able to provide access to all areas. Nor has the State

presented any evidence that it has obtained, or could

obtain, access rights.

Next, the defendants argue, the State has not quan-

tified the extent of the-environmental disturbance that

would result from the extensive hauling activities

required. Defendants contend that it would be necessary

to remove trees and other vegetation existing on private

property, and that vehicles would have to be driven

across the San Miguel River, or bridges would have to be

i ee

App. 72

constructed, causing a significant adverse impact on the

environment.

In sum, the defendants assert that the State’s plan is

not cost-effective, nor is it the least environmentally dis-

ruptive alternative.

(iii) The Court’s Remediation Pian.

Since I have found and concluded that the defen-

dants are liable for the environmental arm caused by the

miscellaneous tailings, a cleanup remedy must be imple-

mented. I am persuaded by the evidence that the State’s

general cleanup proposal recommending tailings

removal, revegetation of affected areas, and general habi-

tat enhancement will be effective in restoring the environ-

mental balance to these areas, and reflects, overall, the

most cost-effective available remedy.

The State’s plan, however, is deficient in several

respects. To remedy these deficiencies, the State, within

ninety days of this order, shall provide to the court a

more specific plan that: (1) identifies the areas of tailings

removal, the site where removed tailings will be depos-

ited, and the areas to be revegetated; (2) sets forth the

methods by which the State will gain access to the

affected areas; and (3) addresses the extent of environ-

mental disturbance that will result from the State’s con-

struction activities. The State also shall submit, within

ninety days, a revised cost estimate of its proposed reme-

dial activities.

App. 73

(D) Telluride Soils.

In 1986, the State, using a grid pattern, sampled the

soil at approximately 100 locations within the Town of

Telluride. Surface and depth samples were taken, focus-

ing on high soil contact areas such has [sic] day care

centers and playgrounds. In approximations, 30% of the

samples indicated soil lead levels over 560 ppm (parts per

million), 20% indicated soil lead levels over 1,000 ppm,

and the remainder of the samples indicated soil lead

levels below 500 ppm. Three of ten garden soil samples

contained between 500 and 1,000 ppm lead, and one

sample contained over 1,000 ppm lead. Twenty-five per-

cent of the grid samples exceeded 3 ppm cadmium.

By comparison, the background concentration of lead

in Telluride soils is approximately 45 to 110 ppm, and the

background for cadmium is 0.4 ppm.

Through consultation with the Colorado Department

of Health and the United States Department of Health

and Human Services,:Center for Disease Control

(“CDC”), categories were developed for ascertaining

appropriate remediation levels. According to the State’s

evidence, soil sample groups reflecting 500 to 1,000 ppm

lead require reduced human exposure through some type

of remediation. The State asserts that soil lead levels that

exceed 1,000 ppm require remediation by soil removal.

The State’s case concerning the Telluride soils cen-

tered around the testimony of Dr. Ellen Jones Mangione,

acting director of the Division of Disease Control and

Environmental Epidemiology at the Colorado Depart-

ment of Health. She testified concerning the health risks

App. 74

posed to Telluride residents by the allegedly contami-

nated soil. In summary, she stated that lead is a contami-

nant; it is not required for life and has no biologic value.

_ Lead is toxic to all humans, but children, both born

and unborn, are at a much higher risk than adults. Lead

taken into the body can have a variety of effects. It can

disrupt enzymes, interfere with nucleic acids, cause can-

cer in animals, and kill nerves or disrupt their ability to

conduct impulses. Low exposure levels of lead can delay

a child’s neurological development, and can cause birth

defects, low birth weights, neuropsychological abnor-

malities, and hearing loss. Lead exposure in adults inter-

feres with nerve conduction and causes high blood

pressure.

Dr. Mangione testified that she does not believe that

current soil levels of cadmium or arsenic pose a threat to

Telluride citizens. She concluded, however, that lead did

pose a risk in areas where it occurs in the soil at greater

than 500 ppm. The potential pathways of lead exposure

in Telluride are primarily ingestion and inhalation. Chil-

dren are particularly susceptible because they may eat

soil or other non-food substances and they have a greater

exposure in relation to body weight. Furthermore chil-

dren tend to retain lead longer and excrete it less readily

than adults.

The State’s evidence indicated that tailings from the

defendants’ six tailings piles have been carried by the

wind into the Town of Telluride. Tailings from the piles

also have been deposited in the Town by San Miguel

River erosion. Defendants have permitted tailings to be

used in the Town for fill material and underground pipe

App. 75

bedding. There was evidence that plants growing in Tell-

uride soils absorb cadmium and lead in their tissues.

Metals concentrations in the soils near the defendanis’

tailings piles are high enough to be toxic to plants, and

livestock consuming the plants, on a long-term basis.

Based on this evidence, the State contends that iead-

bearing contaminated tailings have rendered the soils

toxic and are responsible for allegedly severe health risks

that threaten Telluride residents.

Defendants dispute this contention. Defendants’ evi-

dence indicated that lead in soils is attributable in part to

Telluride’s urbanization. Sampling locations where lead

levels exceeded 500 ppm contain construction materials,

paint chips, coal fragments and metal trash and debris.

Lead from paint was present in measurable quantities in

75% of the children-occupied homes tested. Defendants

assert that activities of the Rio Grande Southern Railroad,

which once ran through the Town of Telluride, contrib-

uted to the lead deposits in the area. Coal, a lead source,

was loaded and unloaded near the railroad depot in the

center of town, and the soils there contain coal fragments,

coal clinkers and slag. Automobile emissions, and coal

and wood product combustion, also are principal lead

sources.

Defendants admit that tailings from their piles have

been used in the Town for sealing road surfaces, bedding

of underground water pipes and for fill in grading prop-

erty. There also are tailings along the banks of the San

Miguel River in and near Telluride. Defendants contend

that these tailings are the result of deposits by mining

companies that operated near the San Miguel’s headwa-

ters before Idarado existed. They base this contention on

App. 76

the fact that the tailings material is buried by approx-

imately six inches of soil. The 1914 flood of Coronet

Creek also washed tailings into the Town of Telluride.

_ According to the guidelines published by the Federal

Center for Disease Control, an “elevated blood lead

level” is defined as blood lead concentration of 25 micro-

grams per deciliter of blood (ug/dl) or greater. The

guidelines define “lead toxicity” as a blood lead level of

25 ug/di, or more, together with a level of 3 free

erythrocyte protoporthryn (“FEP”) equal to or greater

than 35 ug/dl. These screening values are capable of

identifying persons who are particularly at risk of suffer-

ing adverse health effects from lead. In the United States,

a person’s average blood lead level is approximately 10

ug/dl.

In 1977 and 1978, the Cclorado Department of Health

and the CDC conducted a blood lead survey in Telluride

involving children between the ages of one and nine. An

average blood lead level of 19 ug/dl was found.

At the defendants’ request, a blood lead survey was

conducted in Telluride during late October and early

November 1986. The survey was conducted by the Uni-

versity of Cincinnati Medical School’s Lead Program Pro-

ject under the direction of Dr. Robert L. Bornschein.

Blood samples were taken from 258 recruited persons. Of

that total, ninety-four were children under seventy-two

months old who comprised approximately 80% of the

total number of children in that age group residing in the

Telluride area. Thirty-nine children between the ages of

six and nineteen years were tested. Six nursing women,

eleven pregnant and seventy-six non-pregnant women,

App. 77

and thirty-seven adult males also were tested. Of this

total number, 150 persons lived in the Town of Telluride,

twenty-six lived in the Pandora and Liberty Bell areas

near the Idarado tailings piles, and eighty-two lived in

down valley areas or communities west of Telluride.

The following results were obtained. All children

tested had blood lead levels below 25 ug/dl. The average

blood lead level for children under one year old was 5.4

ug/dl, with a range of 2 to 16 ug/dl. The average blood

lead concentration for Telluride children ages one year

through seventy-two months was 6.7 ug/dl, with a range

of 2 to 19 ug/dl.

All adults tested also had blood lead levels lower

than 25 ug/dl. None of the pregnant women had levels

over 6 ug/dl. The highest level for a nursing woman was

8.5 ug/dl. There was no significant difference in distribu-

tion cf blood lead levels between persons living in the

Town of Telluride and those living down valley. These

blood lead levels are among the lowest in the nation.

During trial on this issue, I expressed my concern

that the State had not produced sufficient evidence to

support its position that the toxicity of Telluride’s soils

demanded remedial action. Defendants, of course, had

the burden of proving that the costs incurred, or to be

incurred, by the State for soils cleanup in the town were

not justified because arbitrary or capricious, or not

according to law.

The threat of illness or disability caused by the envi-

ronment should not be considered lightly. I am especially

sympathetic to the concerns expressed by the citizens of

Telluride on this issue. However, the State did no health

App. 78

testing independent of the defendants’ testing. The State

produced no evidence, with the possible exception of Dr.

Mangione’s somewhat speculative opinions, that any Tell-

uride area residents are ill or disabled because of expo-

sure to lead contaminated soils, or are in danger of

becoming ill or disabled.

Based on the evidence presented, | find credible the

defendants’ blood level sampling tests. I reject the State’s

assertions that the sampling evidence was not convincing

because random sampling was not used and because the

sampling occurred two months after the peak season for

blood lead levels. I further find and conclude that the

defendants’ sampling established that at the time of test-

ing Telluride area residents were not suffering significant

adverse health effects from lead, such as elevated blood

lead levels or lead poisoning, as a result of being exposed

to the allegedly contaminated soils.

(i) The State’s Proposed Remedy.

The State’s proposed remedy consists of soil cleanup

and health monitoring. Soils with lead levels above 1,000

ppm would be removed, if necessary, or treated. Soils

with lead content between 500 ppm and 1,900 ppm would

be covered, treated with lime, sodded over or disked,

and/or restricted for use by institutional control such as

zoning. All other soils would not be remediated.

The plan also calls for a health study of Telluride

citizens. The State estimates that the soils cleanup pro-

gram would cost approximately $1.77 million, and the

health study would cost approximately $1.5 million.

iis

App. 79

(ii) Defendants’ Proposed Remedy.

Defendants propose implementing a five year blood

lead screening program for children in the community

under seventy-two months of age. This program also

would include iron deficiency screening.

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