Opposition Brief — Function Junction, Inc. v. Crowe

eupreme Court, US |

FILED

A MAR? 1993

No. 90-1269

OFFICE OF THE CLERX

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1990

a

vy

FUNCTION JUNCTION, INC., et al.,

Petitioners,

PAUL CROWE, et al.,

Respondents.

a

vy

Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United States

Court Of Appeals For The Eleventh Circuit

a

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RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

a.

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Office Of The City Attorney

The City Of Daytona Beach

301 South Ridgewood Avenue

P.O. Box 2451

Daytona Beach, Florida 32115

Phone: 904-258-3195

Telecopier: 904-258-3152

FRANK B. Gummey, III

City Attorney

Counsel of Record

Marit HARTMAN

Assistant City Attorney

Attorneys for Respondents

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-4964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Respondents would state the question presented as

number III. as follows:

III. Does the imposition of attorneys’ fees and dou-

ble costs upon appellants under Fed. R. App. P. 38, with-

out notice or an opportunity to be heard, violate due

process requirements where the court found that the

appellants’ brief contained only conclusory assertions

unsupported by argument or reason?

ii

LIST OF PARTIES BELOW

Petitioners identified one of respondents as “City of

Daytona Beach, a former municipal corporation”. The

City of Daytona Beach is currently in existence and is

correctly identified:

THE CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH, a Florida munici-

pal corporation.

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ........... i

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A ee ee ili

Rg 6 | ee iv

RE eee 1

ARGUMENT SUPPORTING DENIAL OF THE

re Lge Vee ey. 5.00bw sade s ste oe8 ss 3

EE ae er aa ae 13

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504 (10th Cir. 1987) ..2, 10

California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 93S. Ct. 390, 34 L.

es ee ee eh Dae ie eee e eee 5, 6

City of Daytona Beach v. Del Percio, 476 So. 2d 197

SEU ES os ah 564 PAS SEM eRST ETON SUR Co sae Kd 2, 6

City of iy v. Iacobucci, 479 U.S. 92, 107 S. Ct.

ce ee | ae ee 5

Corpus Christi Taxpayer’s Association v. City of

Corpus Christt, 858 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1988),

rehearing denied, 860 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.), cert. den.,

490 U.S. 1065, 109 S. Ct. 2064, 104 L. Ed. 2d 629

Co FP ee rr rere tr rere eee eer re ree 11

Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1987) ..2, 10

Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 95 S. Ct.

yoo a” a eo. | a 7

Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 442 U.S. 205, 95 S.

Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975)

Fillingim v. Boone, 835 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir. 1988)

Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409 (9th Cir.),

cert. den., 474 U.S. 1021, 106 S. Ct. 571, 88 L. Ed.

2d 555 (1985), motion for damages pursuant to

Sup. Ct. R. 49.2 granted, 474 U.S. 1048, 106 S.Ct.

TOs Ge ECA FOR CUPM) woes ices cde ceeieessssc 10

Hill v. Norfolk and Western Rv. Co., 814 F.2d 1192

PENN 6 5 Oy Cakeana says eUUES va eee TS’ 9, 11

Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 107 S. Ct. 2502, 96 L.

ee es ee One hee me: is. Se

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Hyde v. Van Wormer, 474 U.S. 992, 106 S. Ct. 403, 88

L.. BGs a Bee CP a eta see snsnwncesas ahaa 9, 10

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 75

Se Sk ee Or ee or 1, 3, 4

Lanier v. City of Newton, 842 F.2d 253 (11th Cir.

RON sis 5 Face v se Ske ache bun ena Shee Sena e een meee 4

Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th —~

Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Barnes v. Glenn

Theater, U.S. __, 111 S. Ct. 90, 112 L. Ed. 2d

US CURD nes nwkxs eenud oka ss he eee eeene tea 7

New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U.S.

714, 101 S. Ct. 2529, 69 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1981)

+ odie WW be ww ae See be ek a Oe ee ar a a» &

Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 82 S. Ct. 501, 7 L. Ed.

re i re Pee errr ey reer rey he eer 5

Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92

> Ce. Ge, 3h L. Bek. BE TNS Sees se cies 7

Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 100 S.

Cr. 2056, OF 1. Bee Be SD CI nc cca seceka ss a oe

Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephriam, 452 U.S. 61, 101 S.

Ct. 2576, 66 LL. Be. OR OF i ieee ia iseacccs 7

Toepfer v. Department of Transportation, 792 F.2d

See LPO. CAE SOR basus cuss esashessasee 6, 9, 11

United States v. Nesglo, Inc., 744 F.2d 887 (1st Cir.

i OTT eee PETE Pe ee ey er ne OR Ah ry 9

Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., 484 U.S. 383,

108 S. Ce. G36, SOL. Ba. Oe FOS CU, ois on canes 7

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

STATUTES

NT a, - : Saree ieee et cP > Pe

RULES

og a A eee err ce passim

ee nee a 10, 12

CMR. Oe Oe ee ake ee deve nee ee shih eed s phew aks 7

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meee. GA. BR. O92 Gow BR. 42.2) 2... ccc ccasccscsnses 9, 10

No. 90-1269

sa

bf

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1990

a

-

FUNCTION JUNCTION, INC., et al.,

Petitioners,

PAUL CROWE, et al.,

Respondents.

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Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United States

Court Of Appeals For The Eleventh Circuit

&-

4

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

a

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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

I. Petitioners have offered no applicable support for

their argument that the decision below conflicts with

precedent established by this Court on the issue of selec-

tive enforcement. The cases relied on by petitioners are

Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d

398 (1987), which found a city ordinance unconstitu-

tionally overbroad, and Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,

103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983), which held a state

statute unconstitutionally vague.

II. Petitioners urge that the City of Daytona Beach

ordinance prohibiting certain exposure in establishments

dealing in alcoholic beverages must be more narrowly

construed in order to meet constitutional requirements

established by this Court. Again, the cases relied on by

petitioners do not support their position. The City ordi-

nance was enacted pursuant to twenty-first amendment

authority to regulate alcohol as in New York State Liquor

Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 101 S.Ct. 2529, 69

L.Ed.2d 357 (1981); the cases relied on by petitioners to

limit the City’s authority to regulate nudity do not

involve such restrictions as a component of liquor regula-

tion. And the 1981-82 state court opinions which peti-

tioners argue were binding on the federal court were no

ionger viable after the Florida Supreme Court ruling in

City of Daytona Beach v. Del Percio, 476 So.2d 197 (Fla.

1985).

III. This case, in which double costs and attorneys’

fees were awarded against petitioners pursuant to Fed. R.

App. P. 38, does not conflict with Roadway Express, Inc. v.

Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980),

and the other cases cited by petitioners. Roadway Express

and Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1987),

dealt with sanctions imposed directly against an attorney

for disciplinary purposes pursuant to other provisions of

law. Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504 (10th Cir. 1987), was

concerned with the imposition of fees as a sanction

against an attorney pursuant to both 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and

Fed. R. App. P. 38, and required a hearing to determine

whether the attorney or the party was at fault. Courts

dealing solely with Fed. R. App. P. 38 have not required a

hearing prior to imposition of sanctions because no fac-

tual issues exist. In this case, a hearing would serve no

purpose since the court found the appeal frivolous as a

matter of law and awarded damages against the party

appellants.

a

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ARGUMENT SUPPORTING DENIAL

OF THE WRIT

I. THE DECISION OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT CONFLICT

WITH ANY PRECEDENT OF THIS COURT ON

THE ISSUE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL SELECTIVE

ENFORCEMENT.

The Eleventh Circuit denied petitioners’ claims that

the challenged ordinance is unconstitutionally vague,

unconstitutionally overbroad, and that the City enforced

the ordinance in an unconstitutionally selective manner.

Petitioners now merge these three distinct constitutional

theories and claim that the ordinance is selectively

enforced in violation of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 107

S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987), and Kolender v. Lawson,

461 U.S. 352, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983).

Selective or discriminatory enforcement is referred to

in Houston v. Hill and Kolender v. Lawson only as an effect

of vagueness or overbreadth.

Houston v. Hill is an overbreadth case. It involved a

Houston city ordinance which prohibited interrupting a

police officer. This Court found that the ordinance was

overbroad in that it was susceptible of regular application

to protected expression and therefore invalid. This Court

specifically found that the ordinance was not vague.

Selective enforcement as a constitutional violation in

itself was not discussed.

Kolender v. Lawson is a vagueness case. A California

statute requiring persons who loiter on streets to provide

“credible and reliable” identification was held to be

unconstitutionally vague on its face. Kolender did not

involve claims of overbreadth or unconstitutionally selec-

tive enforcement.

Petitioners cite no cases which deal with selective

enforcement as a constitutional violation. The Eleventh

Circuit stated:

According to the plaintiffs, this selective

enforcement violates their right to equal protec-

tion under the fourteenth amendment. The dis-

trict court analyzed this claim under the two-

part selective enforcement standard set out in

Fillingim [v. Boone, 835 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir. 1988)]

and Lanier [v. City of Newton, 842 F.2d 253 (11th

Cir. 1988)]. The court held that, although the

plaintiffs had demonstrated under the stan-

dard’s first element that they were singled out

for prosecution among others who were sim-

ilarly situated, the plaintiffs had not satisfied

the standard’s second requirement that this

selection was invidious or in bad faith. 715 F.

Supp. at 340. Again, the plaintiffs on appeal fail

to state, let alone demonstrate, how the district

court’s conclusion is erroneous. That failure

alone renders their appeal frivolous * * *

Petitioners’ App. A-19.

Petitioners have made a similarly unsupported argu-

ment to this Court. The district court and the Eleventh

Circuit followed precedent clearly established by this

Court in determining the selective enforcement issue, see

Oyler v. Boles, 368 U. S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 506, 7

L.Ed.2d 446 (1962), and petitioners have suggested no

basis for error.

Il. THE OPINION OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

APPROVING THE DISTRICT COURT’S INTER-

PRETATION OF THE CITY’S ORDINANCE PRO-

HIBITING NUDITY OR SEMI-NUDITY IN

ESTABLISHMENTS DEALING IN ALCOHOLIC

BEVERAGES CONFORMS TO THE PRECEDENTS

SET BY THIS COURT IN LaRUE, BELLANCA,

AND IACOBUCCI.

Petitioners present opinions written by state lower

court judges in 1981-82, and submit that the Eleventh

Circuit Court of Appeals erred in rejecting the judges’

narrowing constructions of the ordinance. This appears to

be an overbreadth argument.

In California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 93 S.Ct. 390, 34

L.Ed.2d 342 (1972), this Court found that the broad

powers of the states to regulate liquor under the twenty-

first amendment outweigh first amendment interests in

protecting nude dancing, and that a state could ban such

activity as part of its liquor regulation program. New York

State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 101 S.Ct.

2529, 69 L.Ed.2d 357 (1981), held that this authority sup-

ported a state statute prohibiting topless dancing in

licensed liquor establishments. And in City of Newport v.

lacobucci, 479 U.S. 92, 107 S.Ct. 383, 93 L.Ed.2d 862 (1986),

this Court found that a state could delegate its twenty-

first amendment powers to a city either in whole or in

part, and upheld a city ordinance prohibiting nude or

nearly nude activity in a business establishment licensed

to sell liquor for on-premises consumption.

At the time of the 1981-82 lower state court opinions

cited by petitioners, it had not been determined whether

the State of Florida had delegated to the City the author-

ity which was relied on in LaRue and Bellanca to regulate

liquor pursuant to the twenty-first amendment. This

issue reached the Florida Supreme Court in 1985. It was

held that the State of Florida has delegated its powers

under the twenty-first amendment to the City. City of

Daytona Beach v. Del Percio, 476 So.2d 197 (Fla. 1985).

The pre-1985 inferior state court decisions which

petitioners urge this Court to accept as the correct inter-

pretations of the ordinance were rendered without

reliance on the powers available via the twenty-first

amendment. In regard to these decisions, the Florida

Supreme Court stated:

The [Florida] district court [of Appeal] found

that the variant interpretations of the ordinance

demonstrated it was vague and therefore uncon-

stitutional. We conclude, on the other hand, that

the plain meaning of the ordinance is clear, and

that the variant interpretations are merely the

result of various courts attempting to limit the

reach of the ordinance to save it from constitu-

tional invalidity.

Del Percio, 476 So.2d at 200. The court found that the

ordinance was neither vague nor overbroad in light of the

twenty-first amendment, and that limiting constructions

were unnecessary. Id. Accordingly, the inferior state court

rulings prior to the 1985 Florida Supreme Court Del Percio

decision have no precedential effect.

Petitioners cite Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephriam, 452

U.S. 61, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981), Erznoznik v.

City of Jacksonville, 442 U.S. 205, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 L.Ed.2d

125 (1975), Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,

92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972), Houston v. Hill, 482

U.S. 451, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987), Doran v.

Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648

(1975), and Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., 484 U.S.

383, 108 S.Ct. 636, 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988), in support of

their argument. None of these cases supports their con-

tention that the ordinance is unconstitutional when the

City’s twenty-first amendment authority is considered.

Similarly, petitioners’ reference to Miller v. Civil City of

South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub

nom. Barnes v. Glenn Theater, me ban ot. 90, 112

L.Ed.2d 15 (1990), is inapposite. The Indiana statute chal-

lenged was not enacted pursuant to the twenty-first

amendment and applies to ail public places without

regard to alcohol.

Ill. THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITHOUT

PRIOR NOTICE OR A HEARING PURSUANT TO

FED. R. APP. P. 38 DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH

ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC. v. PIPER.

Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 100 S.Ct.

2455, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 41980), did not involve an award of

attorneys’ fees to be paid by an appellant pursuant to

Fed. R. App. P. 38. At issue in that case were the authority

of the trial court to tax attorneys’ fees directly against

counsel pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (sanctions for

discovery violations), 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (sanctions for

unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of proceedings

by attorney), and the inherent powers of the court.

The section of the opinion quoted by petitioners was

a discussion of inherent powers to award attorneys’ fees

for abuse of the process of the courts. 447 U.S. at 764-767,

100 S.Ct. at 2463-2465. This Court stated that these inher-

ent powers must be exercised with “restraint and discre-

tion”. Id. at 764, 100 S.Ct. at 2463. This Court also noted

that the trial court had not made a specific finding as to

whether the attorney’s conduct “constituted or was tanta-

mount to bad faith, a finding that would have to precede

any sanction under the court’s inherent power.” Id. at 767,

100 S.Ct. at 2465. The matter was returned to the district

court for further proceedings.

Unlike the award in Roadway Express, the award of

attorneys’ fees here under Fed. R. App. P. 38 did not

require a finding of bad faith. Sanctions imposed pur-

suant to Rule 38 have been distinguished.

In Toepfer v. Department of Transportation, 792 F.2d

1102 (Fed. Cir. 1988), the appellate court had awarded

damages and costs against counsel for a petitioner pur-

suant to Fed. R. App. P. 38. Counsel filed a motion for

hearing and other relief, claiming that sanctions could not

be imposed without notice and a hearing. The court

denied the motion, and stated:

The damages and costs assessed against

counsel were for bringing a frivolous appeal,

not as a disciplinary action for conduct

unbecoming an attorney or for violation of the

federal rules or rules of the court. Rule 38 pro-

vides that, if the appeal is frivolous, damages

and costs may be assessed. To require a hearing

for the assessment of such damages and costs

would impose on the opposing party and on the

court an even greater burden in dealing with a

frivolous appeal and entirely defeat the purpose

of Rule 38. See, e.g., Hyde v. Van Wormer, ___ US.

__, 106 S.Ct. 403, 88 L.Ed.2d 355 (1985)

(Supreme Court awarded damages under its

Rule 49.2 without a hearing).

** * Counsels’ assertion of a constitutional

violation by failure to provide a hearing is an

attack on the rule itself.

792 F.2d 1103.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals discussed its

procedures in Rule 38 cases as follows:

Where, as in this and most kule 38 cases, the

conduct that is sought to be sanctioned consists

of making objectively groundless legal argu-

ments in briefs filed in this court, there are no

issues that a hearing could illuminate. All the

relevant “conduct” is laid out in the briefs them-

selves; neither the mental state of the attorney

nor any other factual issue is pertinent to the

imposition of sanctions for such conduct. Where

a hearing is pointless it is not required, see

United States v. Nesglo, Inc., 744 F.2d 887 (1st Cir.

1964); ***

es & #

*** A hearing is required in a proceeding

concerning sanctions only if there is a contested

factual issue; there is not and cannot be one in

this case.

Hill v. Norfolk and Western Ry. Ce., 814 F.2d 1192, 1201-2

(7th Cir. 1987). The court imposed sanctions against an

appellant’s attorney without a hearing, recognizing that

this was its usual procedure. Id.

10

The Ninth Circuit has also imposed Rule 38 sanctions

without a hearing. See, e.g., Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758

F.2d 409 (9th Cir.) (double costs to be paid by appellants

and attorneys’ fees to be paid by appellants’ counsel,

awarded pursuant to Rule 38 without a hearing), cert.

den., 474 U.S. 1021, 106 S.Ct. 571, 88 L.Ed.2d 555 (1985),

motion for damages pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 49.2 granted, 474

U.S. 1048, 106 S.Ct. 782, 88 L.Ed.2d 761 (1986).

As mentioned by petitioners, the sanctions imposed

by the Eleventh Circuit in Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d

1551 (11th Cir. 1987), were pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.

The case contains a general discussion of due process in

the context of disciplinary sanctions imposed against an

attorney, but is of no particular assistance in resolving the

issue raised here. The Eleventh Circuit also decided the

present case, and imposed Rule 38 sanctions without a

hearing. Petitioners raised the due process issue before

the Eleventh Circuit in a petition for rehearing or rehear-

ing en banc; rehearing was denied. Petitioners’ App. B.

In Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504 (10th Cir. 1987), a

hearing was required prior to imposition of sanctions

against an attorney where the sanctions were imposed

with reliance on both Fed. R. App. P. 38 and 28 U.S.C.

§ 1927. The court discussed the due process requirements

without distinguishing between the two different provi-

sions for the imposition of sanctions, id. at 1513-15, and

stated:

In one sense notice may seem superfluous

when an appellate court has determined, after

considering briefs, argument and the record that

11

the appeal is so unmeritorious as to be frivo-

lous. The court’s determination is a judgment on

the state of the law as applied to the facts in the

record. The only possible rebuttal to the court’s

conclusion would be a demonstration that the

court overlooked controlling statute or case law

or misread the record. A petition for rehearing

would seem adequate to bring such errors to the

court’s attention.

Id. at 1514.

The Tenth Circuit, however, found that a hearing was

required for one purpose:

[T]he determination to impose sanctions on

an attorney for bringing a frivolous appeal

involves another step — placing the blame. And

there remains for consideration the defenses

which might absolve the lawyer for the respon-

sibility for taking the frivolous appeal. This, we

hold, justifies and requires notice and oppor-

tunity to be heard before final judgment.

Id. (emphasis supplied). Under the cases cited above

where sanctions were imposed solely on the authority of

Rule 38, no defense would be availabie. Hill, 814 F.2d

1192; Toepfer, 792 F.2d 1102.

The approach of the Fifth Circuit has been to assess

attorneys’ fees without a hearing against the party pur-

suant to Fed. R. App. P. 38 and against counsel citing 28

U.S.C. § 1927, and then to remand the case to the district

court for proceedings to apportion blame. See, e.g., Corpus

Christi Taxpayer's Association v. City of Corpus Christi, 858

F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1988), rehearing denied, 860 F.2d 437 (5th

Cir.), cert. den., 490 U.S. 1065, 109 S.Ct. 2064, 104 L.Ed.2d

629 (1989).

12

In the case at issue, the sanction imposed was against

petitioners only (appellants below), not their counsel,

although the court noted that Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions

had previously been imposed against petitioners’ attor-

ney by the district court in a case involving the same _

issues. Petitioners’ App. A-10 n.7. Petitioners have cited

no cases to suggest that parties can be absolved from

responsibility for their own litigation, the only issue

which Braley found necessitated a hearing.

The opinion of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

clearly sets forth the basis of its decision that the appeal

in this case was frivolous. The court found that peti-

tioners ignored established precedent, Petitioners’ App.

A-8, 9, 14, 18; cited inapplicable case law as support for

their arguments, Petitioners’ App. A-14; failed to distin-

guish authority which clearly rejected their position, Peti-

tioners’ App. A-14; and totally failed to provide legal

support or argument to support contentions of error,

Petitioners’ App. A-11, 14, 15, 19. Double costs and attor-

neys’ fees were awarded to the City against petitioners as

damages pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 38 upon the finding

that the appeal was frivolous. So distinguished, the opin-

ion in this case does not conflict with any precedent cited

by petitioners.

o

13

CONCLUSION

The opinion of the court below follows clearly estab-

lished precedent. No conflict with this or any other court

has been shown. The petition for certiorari in this case is

frivolous and should be denied, with damages awarded

to respondents in accordance with Supreme Court Rule

42.2 and respondents’ motion filed under separate cover.

Respectfully submitted,

Office Of The City Attorney

The City Of Daytona Beach

P.O. Box 2451

Daytona Beach, FL 32115-2451

(904) 258-3194

FRANK B. Gummey, III

City Attorney

Counsel of Record

MariE HARTMAN

Assistant City Attorney