Appendix — Function Junction, Inc. v. Crowe

Supreme Court brief1991

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Text

Supreme Court, J.S,

FILED

FEB ¢ 1991

FFICE OF THE CLERK *

—— BROT LE NI, te

Tr

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No.

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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1990

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FUNCTION JUNCTION, INC., et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

PAUL CROWE, et al.,

Respondents.

f).

~

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 7

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

rg*

VV

Eric A. LaTINSKY, EsQuIRE

1206 South Ridgewood Avenue

Daytona Beach, Florida 32114

(904) 257-5555

Fla. Bar #302831

Attorney for Petitioners

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ADpenGix A. .......000c00e00

Appendix B ................

Se

Opinion of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Order of United States Court of Appeals

Denying Petition for Rehearing and

Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc dated

November 11, 1990

Memorandum Opinion and Order on

Motion for Summary Judgment of the

United States District Court, Middle

District of Florida, Orlando Division

Order of Dismissal of the United States

District Court, Middle District of Florida,

Orlando Division

Orders (of Dismissal) of County Court,

Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for

Volusia County, Flotida in Daytona

Beach v. Lesley Jennir.g Grier, #V82-

6880-DB

Order (of Dismissal) in Daytona Beach

v. Grier, #V82- 12397 -DB in the County

Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and

for Volusia County, Florida

Opinion in Keiser v. Daytona Beach,

#83-3161-CA-01 D, in the Circuit Court,

Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for

Volusia County, Flonda

APPENDIX A

Chris GEANEAS, Pink Pussycat, Inc,

d/b/a Red Garter Club, Del Percio,

Inc., d/b/a Shingle Shack, Function

Junction, Inc., Dawn Boido, Denise Del

Pinto, Leslie Grier, Plantiffs- Appellants,

Kinzey Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Oyster

Pub, Linnie Shiftlett, Lois Young, Plaintiffs,

Vv.

Charles W. WILLETS, The City of Daytona Beach,

Defendants-Appellees,

John M. Power, Lawrence Kelly,

Defendants.

No. 89-3308.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

September 10, 1990.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge,

TUTTLE, and RONEY* Senior Circuit

Judges.

TJOFLAT, Chief Judge:

The plaintiffs in this case own or manage bars

providing nude dancing, or work in those establishments as

nude dancers or bartenders. They brought suit in federal

APP. A-1

district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) claiming that a

Daytona Beach ordinance, which prohibits exposure of certain

body parts in establishments dealing in alcohol, violated their

rights under the first and fourteenth amendments. The district

court granted partial summary judgment for the defendants and,

following a bench triai on the remaining issues, dismissed the

plaintiffs' case. The plaintiffs appeal, and we affirm. We also

hold that the plaintiffs’ appeal is frivolous under Rule 38,

Fed.R.App.P. 38.

I.

In 1981, the City of Daytona Beach enacted an

ordinance prohibiting exposure of certain body parts in

establishments dealing in alcoholic beverages.'! Daytona Beach

1 The ordinance provides as follows:

Section 5-25. Nudity, Sexua! Conduct Prohibited.

(a) No person shall expose to public view his or her

genitals, pubic area, vulva, anus, anal cleft or cleavage or

buttocks or any simulation thereof in an establishment dealing in

alcoholic beverages

(b) No !emale person shall expose to public view any

portion of her breasts below the top of the areola or any

simulation therof in an establishment dealing in alcoholic

beverages

(c) No person maintaining, owning, or operating an

establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages shall suffer or permit

any person to expose to public view his or her genitals, pubic

area, vulva, anus, anal cleft or cleavage or buttocks or any

simulation thereof within the establishment dealing in alcoholic

beverages.

(d) No person maintaining, owning, or operating an

establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages shall suffer or permit

any female person to expose to public view any portion of her

breasts below the top of the areola or any simulation thereof

within the establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages.

APP. A-2

police then began enforcing the ordinance. They arrested

dancers, including two plaintiffs in this case, at several "topless

bars" for dancing partially nude in violation of the ordinance.

They arrested bartenders and managers, including plaintiffs in

(e) No person shall engage in and no person

maintaining, Owning, or operating an establishment dealing in

alcoholic beverages shall suffer or permit any sexual intercourse,

masturbation, sodomy, beastiality [sic], oral copulation,

flagellation, any sexual act which is prohibited by law, touching,

caressing or fondling of the breasts, buttocks, anus or genitals or

the simulation thereof within an establishment dealing in

alcoholic beverages.

(f) No person shall cause and no person maintaining,

owning or operating an establishment dealing in alcoholic

beverages sahll suffer or permit the exposition of any graphic

representation, including pictures or the projection of film, which

depicts human genitals, pubic area, vulva, anus, anal cleft or

cleavage, buttocks, female breasts below the top of the areola,

sexual intercourse, masturbation, sodomy, bestiality, oral

copulation, flagellation, any sexual act prohibited by law,

touching, caressing or fondling of the breasts, buttocks, anus, or

genitals, or any simulation thereof within any establishment

dealing in alcoholic beverages.

Section 5-1 of the Code further provides.

Establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages. Any business or

commercial establishment (whether open to the public at large or

where entrance is limited by cover charge or membership

requirement) including those licensed by the state for sale and/or

service of alcoholic beverages, and any bottle club; hotel; motel;

restaurant; night club; country club; cabaret; meeting facility

utilized by any religious, social, fraternal or similar organization;

business or commercial establishment where a product or article is

sold, dispensed, sezved or provided with the knowledge, actual or

implied, that the same will be, or is intended to be mixed,

combined with or drunk in connection or combination with an

alcoholic beverage on the premises of said business or commercial

establishment, or business or commercial establishment where the

consumption or alcoholic beverages is permitted. A private

residence, whether permanent or temporary in nature, is not an

establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages.

APP. A-3

this case, who were working at establishments when nude

dancing arrests were made. They cited owners, including

plaintiffs in this case, for permitting nude dancing in their

establishment, and they ordered the owner of one

establishment, a plaintiff here as well, to remove graphic

photographs from his walls and to stop selling calendars

featuring pictures of his exotic dancers.

In the prosecutions that followed, the state courts issued

various interpretations of the ordinance. In the case of one of

the dancers involved in the present action, the county court

dismissed the charges against her,@ holding that the ordinance's

prohibition of exposed female breasts was overbroad and that

the ordinance proscribed exposure of only the entire buttocks,

and nothing less. In 1984, the state district court of appeal held

the ordinance unconstitutional on grounds of vagueness and

overbreadth. See Del Percio v. City of Daytona Beach, 449

So.2d 323 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1984). A year later, the Florida

Supreme Court reversed that court and upheid the ordinance as

constitutional. See City of Daytona Beach v. Del Percio, 476

So.2d 197 (Fla.1985). The supreme court's decision in De/

Percio, however, specifically addressed only the ordinance's

prohibition on exposed breasts, which it defined as exposure of

the breast below an imaginary line drawn across the top of the

areolae. See id. at 200. The decision did not define the

ordinance 's prohibition on exposed buttocks.

. The charges against the other plaintiffs here are no longer pending

either.

APP. A-4

In May 1983, the plaintiffs filed this section 1983 suit

in federal district court. They claimed that the ordinance

violated their right of free expression under the first

amendment, and their rights to due process and equal protection

of the law under the fourteenth amendment. Specifically, the

plaintiffs claimed that the ordinance was overbroad and void for

vagueness under the first amendment and that the City had

selectively enforced the ordinance against "topless bars" in

violation of the fourteenth amendment. The plainuffs requested

a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages.

On the defendant's motion for partial summary

judgment, the district court held that the ordinance was

constitutionally valid on its face. In the court's view, the

ordinance was a valid exercise of the state's broad authority to

regulate alcohol sales under the twenty-first amendment, and,

in light of the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Del Percio,

the ordinance was not unconstitutionally broad. The district

court, however, like the Florida Supreme Court in Dei Percio,

addressed only the ordinance's proscription on exposed

breasts. The district court also denied summary judgment on

the defendant's affirmative defense that the Del Percio decision

rendered the present case res judicata.3

The case then went to trial before the court on the

remaining claims. The court held that, although the plaintiffs

had proved they were singled out for prosecution, they had not

3 The city does not raise this issue on appeal, and we therefore do

not address it.

APP. A-5

shown that this prosecution was invidious or conducted in bad

faith. The court thus denied their claim. In addition, the court

upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance's prohibition on

exposed buttocks, rejecting the plaintiff's contention that the

provision was impermissibly vague. The district court,

therefore, dismissed the plaintiff's case. 715 F.Supp. 334.

On appeal, the plaintiffs attack the district court's

decision on four grounds: they claim that (1) the district court

erred in analyzing the ordinance under the twenty-first

amendment rather that under the first amendment; (2) the court

erred in denying the plaintiffs' claim that the ordinance's

provisions were overbroad; (3) the court erred in denying the

plaintiffs’ void-for-vagueness claim; and (4) the court erred in

denying the plaintiffs’ selective enforcement claim. We hold

that the plaintiffs’ claims entirely lack merit. In addition,

because the plaintiffs' contentions are no more than conclusory

assertions, unsupported by argument or reason, we hold that

this appeal is frivolous under Rule 38 and instruct the district

court to award the appellee double costs and attorneys’ fees for

its appeal.

Il.

A.

The plaintiffs claim that the district court erred in

analyzing the ordinance under the twenty-first amendment

APP. A-6

rather than under the first amendment.* Under the Florida

Supreme Court's decision in Del Percio and existing United

States Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent, this

argument is clearly foreclosed.

In Del Percio, the court held that, as a matter of state

law, “Florida municipalities...have the authority to exercise the

regulatory power of the twenty-first amendment recognized in

New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 101

S.Ct. 2599, 69 L.Ed.2d 357 (1981)." 476 So.2d at 201. In

Bellanca, the Supreme Court held that, although nude dancing

implicates the first amendment, the states’ broad powers under

the twenty-first amendment to regulate alcohol outweigh any

first amendment interest in nude dancing. 452 U.S. at 717,

101 S.Ct. at 2601 (quoting Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422

U.S. 922, 932-33, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 2568, 45 L.Ed.2d 648

(1975); see City of Newport, Ky. v. lacobucci, 479 U.S. 92,

915-96, 107 S.Ct. 383, 385, 93 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986);

Jorgenson v. County of Volusia, 846 F.2d 1350, 1351 (11th

Cir.1988); Lanier v. City of Newton, Ala., 842 F.2d 253, 255

(llth Cir. 1988); Fillingim v. Boone, 835 F.2d 1389, 1394

(11th Cir.1988); Del Percio, 476 So.2d at 201. Following this

established precedent, the district court in the present case

4 The twenty-first amendment provides, in pertinent part: " The

transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of

the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in

violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” U.S. Const. amend.

21.

The first amendment provides, in pertinent part: “Congress shall

make no law...abridging the freedom of speech..." U.S. Const. amend. 1.

APP. A-7

properly analyzed the ordinance under the twenty-first

amendment and properly upheld it as a valid exercise of the

City's broad twenty-first amendment powers.

The plaintiffs, moreover, fail directly to join issue with

this precedent. Rather, they attempt to skirt this authority by

observing that the City Code broadly defines the term

“establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages," see supra note

1. The plaintiffs contend that, whereas the ordinances in

Bellanca and its progeny regulated only establishments licensed

to sell liquor, the ordinance in the present case is not limited to

establishments licensed to sell alcohol but also applies to

unlicensed establishments that permit alcohol consumption.

Consequently, they argue, the ordinance is an exercise of the

City's general police powers, which must be analyzed under

the first amendment rather than under the twenty-first

amendment.

The plaintiffs, however, provide no legal support for

this argument, and they fail to address the string of Eleventh

Circuit cases that have expressly analyzed virtually identical

ordinances under the twenty-first amendment. The plaintiffs

rely on this court's decision in Leverett v. City of Pinellas

Park, 755 F.2d 1536 () Ith Cir. 1985), a case that invalidated

under the first amendment an ordinance prohibiting nude

dancing in “any commercial establishment,': id. at 1540 n.2.

Aithough the ordinance in the present case is not limited to

licensed establishments like the ordinance in Bellanca, neither

does it apply to any commercial establishment like the

APP. A-8

ordinance in Leverett. Rather, the ordinance here falls in

between these other two categories of regulation: it applies to

establishments dealing in alcoholic beverages, and although

such establishments are not necessarily licensed to sell alcohol,

they must deal in alcoholic beverages. The regulation here thus

has a definite nexus to alcohol.

Not only is Leverett factually inapplicable to the present

case--a problem that the plaintiffs never address--but, in

addition, a string of cases in this circuit has clearly foreclosed

the plaintiffs' argument. The court in these cases has analyzed

this intermediate category of regulation of protected expression

by such an ordinance is incidental to the regulation of alcohol.

See, e.g., Lanier, 842 F.2d at 256-57 (ordinance applies to

"any business establishment...which sells, dispenses or

otherwise allows the consumption of alcoholic beverages on the

premises");° Fillingim, 835 F.2d at 1397 (ordinance

prohibited "nude or semi-nude entertainment in any commercial

establishment at which alcoholic beverages are, or are available

to be, sold dispensed, consumed, possessed or offered for sale

or consumption on the premises"); see also Jorgenson v.

County of Volusia, 625 F.Supp. 1543 1547 (M.D.Fla.1986)

(upholding ordinance identical to Daytona Beach ordinance).®

5 In Lanier, the court upheld the ordinance as applied. The court

expressly stated that it was not adopting the district court's holding that the

ordinance "clearly was passed as an incident to the regulation of alcohol,

and did not go beyond the bonds of the Twenty-first amendment.” 842

F.2d at 257.

6 On appeal in Jorgenson, this court in an unpublished opinion

reversed the district court for failure to provide the attomeys notice of

APP. A-9

These cases obviously foreclose the plaintiffs’ argument here,

and the plaintiffs have made no attempt to distinguish them.

_ Indeed, the plaintiffs’ briefs even fail to cite Fillingim and

Jorgenson.’

The plaintiffs also fail to address the Supreme Court's

statement in Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves that "[w]ithout doubt a state

may absolutely prohibit the manufacture of intoxicants, their

transportation, sale or possession, irrespective of when or

where produced or obtained," 308 U.S. 132, 138, 60 S.Ct.

163 167, 84 L.Ed. 128 (1939) (emphasis added). Ziffrin thus

indicates that the City's twenty-first amendment power extends

beyond licensed establishments and includes the power to

regulate the "possession" of alcohol even outside of licensed

establishments. In short, under established precedent, the

plaintiffs’ contention is entirely meritless.

The plaintiffs also attempt to argue that the ordinance

implicates the first amendment under the overbreadth doctrine.

The gist of the plaintiffs’ "argument" appears in a two-sentence

_ paragraph in their brief:

sanctions. See 824 F.2d 9973 (11th Cir.1987). On remand, the district

court reaffirmed the imposition of sanctions, and this court affirmed, see

846 F.2d at 1350.

References to Fillilngim appear only in block quotation and in

connection with the plaintiffs’ selective enforcement claim.

We also observe that the district court in Jorgenson imposed Rule

11 sanctions on Eric Latinsky, the same attorney who represents the

plaintiffs in this case, for failing to cite key cases (i.e. Bellanca and Del

Percio) in his memorandum of law attacking the Volusia County

ordinance. ies

APP. A-10

In general rigorous constitutional standards apply when

the government attempts to regulate expression and

precision of drafting and clarity of purpose are

essential... The definition of establishment dealing in

alcoholic beverages is not precisely drafted but includes

many establishments without liquor licenses or which

do not allow consumption on premises.

Charitably construed, this argument contends that the City's

broad definition of "establishment dealing in alcohol" creates

the possibility that the ordinance's application might, at the

margins, extend beyond the limits of the City's twenty-first

amendment powers. That is, the City might use the ordinance

to prohibit nude dancing in a context where alcohol is not in

fact consumed.® Such a use of the ordinance would

presumably extend beyond the City's twenty-first amendment

powers? and would implicate the first amendment as an

exercise of the City's general police powers. The plaintiffs

appear to be arguing that, because of this attenuated danger at

the extreme margins of the ordinance's possible applications,

any application of the ordinance--even an application to conduct

at the ordinance's core--must be analyzed under the strict

standards of the first amendment.

This argument, once fleshed out, is clearly frivolous.

Not only do the plaintiffs fail to provide any legal support for

8 Whether or not the ordinance would pruperly apply in such a

Situation, however, raises a question of state law, which the state courts

have not yet had occasion to address.

9 Of course, the plaintiffs would somehow have to explain away,

which they have not done, the Court's pronouncement in Ziffrin that the

States’ twenty-first amendment power includes the power to regulate the

mere possession of alcohol.

APP. A-11

such a contention, but the courts have carefully drawn the

contours of the overbreadth doctrine to exclude exactly such

claims. As the Supreme Court explained in Broadrick v.

Oklahoma:

Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional

adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a statute

may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to

chalienge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably

be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations

not before the Court... A closely related principle is that

constitutional rights are personal and may not be asserted

vicariously... These principles rest on more than the

fussiness of judges. They reflect the conviction that under

our constitutional system courts are not roving

commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of

the Nation's laws... Constitutional judgments, as Mr. Chief

Justice Marshall recognized, are justified only out of the

necessity of adjudicating rights in particular cases between

litigants brought before the Court...

413 U.S. 601, 610-11, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2915, 37 L.Ed.2d 830

(1973) (citations omitted). Only a few limited exceptions to

this rule exist, none of which the present case involves. For

example, a statute may be susceptible to a facial overbreadth

challenge if it threatens to chill protected speech in general.

Even then, as the Broadrick Court stated, "[a]pplication of the

overbreadth doctrine in this manner is, manifestly, strong

medicine. It has been employed by the court sparingly and

only as a last resort." /d. at 6113, 93 S.Ct. at 2916. As the

Court discussed, the doctrine's applicability becomes more and

more limited as the allegedly chilled expression “moves from

‘pure speech’ toward conduct and_ that conduct--even if

APP. A-12

expressive--falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal

laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining

comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally

unprotected conduct." /d. at 615, 93 S.Ct. at 2917.

The overbreadth doctrine clearly does not apply here.

As we discuss above, there can be no doubt that the Daytona

Beach ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of the City's

twenty-first amendment power to ban nude dancing in bars.

Such a proscription lies at the core of the City's powers under

the twenty-first amendment. The plaintiffs'conduct in the

present case, moreover, rests extremely close to this core.

Whether or not the ordinance reaches to conduct at a distance

from these core concerns, the plaintiffs clearly have no standing

under Broadrick to challenge, on this basis, the ordinance's

application to them. The plaintiffs’ overbreadth argument lacks

foundation.

As one last stab in support of their contention that the

district court should have analyzed this case under the first

amendment, the plaintiffs refer to a footnote in Justice Stevens’

Iacobucci dissent, in which he suggested that "[s]ince the

Twenty-first Amendment deals only with a State's power to

regulate ‘transportation or importation into’ the State, it would

have no effect on a Kentucky bar selling Kentucky Bourbon."

479 U.S. at 102 n. 7, 107 S.Ct. at 389 n. 7. Relying on this

footnote, the plaintiffs claim that the twenty-first amendment

does not apply in this case because the plaintiffs agreed to sell

only instate liquor in their establishments. The district court

APP. A-13

;

rejected this argument, observing that the plaintiffs cited no

legal support for their contention other than the footnote in

Justice Stevens'dissent.

Nor do the plaintiffs now provide any additional legal

support for their position or offer any argument explaining the

error of the district court's decision. They fail, moreover, to

distinguish, let alone cite, legal authority that explicitly rejects

their position. Based on a definitive review of the twenty-first

amendment, Judge Melton of the Middle District of Florida

concluded: "Certainly, the ‘twenty-first amendment power

over alcohol consumption is broad enough to embrace state

power to zone strong sexual stimuli away from places where

liquor is served,'...without being forced to distinguish between

domestic and imported alcohol." W.D.C., Inc. v. City of

Jacksonville, 710 F.Supp. 782, 789 (M.D. Fla.1989) (quoting

L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-225, at 478 n. 15

92d ed. 1988)). As Judge Melton also observed, the

ordinances at issue in /Jucobucci, Lanier, and Fillingim made. no

distinction between in-state and out-of-state liquor. The

plaintiffs’ contention on this point is meritless as well.

B.

The plaintiffs next raise another variation of an

overbreadth attack: they claim that the ordinance prohibits

forms of attire that are socially acceptable and that are regularly

worn on the beaches. They assert, for example, that a bar

owner would violate the ordinance simply by showing a

television newscast of people at the beach. In addition, they

APP. A-14

argue that patrons wearing such generally accepted attire subject

themselves to arrest for violating the ordinance once they enter

an establishment dealing in alcohol. The district court rejected

this claim, and we affirm.

With respect to the first argument, demonstrated by the

newscast hypothetical, the plaintiffs have asserted no basis for

challenging the City's broad powers to regulate alcohol under

the twenty-first amendment. As we discuss, "the Amendment

confers broad regulatory powers on the States," /acobucci, 479

US. at 95, 107 S.Ct. at 385, and those broad powers outweigh

the free speech interest in nude and semi-nude dancing, thus

enabling the states to ban that conduct. The plaintiffs,

however, fail to demonstrate any first amendment interest on

the bar owners’ part in allowing their patrons to wear revealing

attire. If the City can exercise its twenty-first amendment

power to ban conduct that implicates the first amendment, then

it can certainly exercise that power to ban conduct that does not

implicate the first amendment.

With respect to the plaintiffs’ assertion that the

ordinance violates their patrons' own right to wear revéaling

clothing, the plaintiffs lack standing to attack the ordinance on

that basis. As we discuss above, the Supreme Court in

Broadrick held that “a person to whom a statute may

constitutionally be applied will not be heard to chalienge that

Statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied

unconstitutionally to others, in situations not before the Court."

413 US. at 610, 93 S.Ct. at 2915. A party may bring such a

APP. A-15

challenge only when the broad language of a regulation chills

expression protected by the first amendment. The doctrine's

application becomes more unlikely as the allegedly chilled

expression "moves from ‘pure speech’ toward conduct and that

conduct--even if expressive--falls within the scope of otherwise

valid criminal laws." /d. at 615, 93 S.Ct. at 2917. Here, the

chilled expression--the conduct of wearing revealing clothing--

rests at a pronounced distance from the "pure speech" at the

first amendment's core; in fact, this conduct does not implicate

the first amendment at all and no one contends otherwise. '°

In addition, this conduct falls within the scope of the City's

otherwise valid ordinance proscribing exposure of certain body

parts in establishments dealing in alcohol.'' These

circumstances, obviously, justify no exception to the traditional

tules of standing articulated in Broadrick. We thus hold that

the district court properly rejected this overbreadth claim.

xf

The plaintiffs also attack the district court's decision to

deny their void-for-vagueness claim. The plaintiffs contend

that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague in defining the

10 The plaintiffs claim only that the conduct implicates a liberty

interest under the fourteenth amendment.

11 As the district court reasoned, even if this conduct implicates a

liberty interest under the fourteenth amendment, that liberty interest would

be entitled to no greater deference than the free speech interest in nude

dancing under the first amendment. Because the City's power under the

twenty-first amendment outweighs that free speech interest, it would also

outweigh this liberty interest. The ordinance would remain a valid exercise

of the City's twenty-first amendment powers.

APP. A-16

prohibition on exposed breasts and the prohibition on exposed

buttocks. By way of argument, the plaintiffs assert that various

Florida state courts have interpreted these provisions differently

and that this proliferation of interpretations demonstrates the

ordinance's vagueness.

In pointing to the various judicial interpretations of this

ordinance, however, the plaintiffs fail to mention that the

Florida Supreme Court in Del Percio and the district court in

this case defined these two provisions. With respect to the

ordinance's prohibition on exposure of breasts, the Florida

Supreme Court in Del Fercio held that the provision meant that

"no portion of the breast directly or laterally below the top of

the areola may be exposed to public view." 476 So.2d at 200.

In granting partial summary judgment, the district court held

that the Del Percio court's construction was clear and thus

rejected the plaintiffs’ void-for-vagueness claim regarding this

provision.

With respect to the ordinance's proscription on

exposure of buttocks, the district court ir. its final decision

acknowledged that the provision was somewhat vague. The

court observed that the ordinance did not specify "whether the

entire buttocks, or what portion thereof, must be covered" and

that the ordinance did not define the word 'buttocks.'" 715

F.Supp. at 337. The court, however, concluded that the

provision was not "unconstitutionally” vague, that is, it was

"not ‘impermissibly vague in all of its applications." /d.

(quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman

APP. A-17

Estates, Inc., 445 U.S. 489, 495-95, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191,

71 L.Id..2d 362 (1982). Although the Florida Supreme Court

had not addressed the provision at issue, the district court was

able to “extrapolate [the ordinance's] allowable meaning." See

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110,92 S.Ct.

2294, 2300, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (quoting Garner v.

Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 174, 82 S.Ct. 248, 257, 7 L.Ed.2d

207 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). The court decided

that the Florida Supreme Court would interpret the ordinance to

"prohibit exposure of any portion of the buttocks." 715

F.Supp. at 339. The court then determined that the Florida

Supreme Court would define "buttocks" to include:

the area at the rear of the body which lies between two

imaginary lines running parallel to the ground when a

person is standing, the first or top such line drawn at

the the top of the cleavage of the nates [i.e., the

prominence formed by the muscies running from the

back of the hip to the back of the leg] and the second or

bottom line drawn at the lowest visible point of this

cleavage or the lowest point of the curvature of the

fleshy protuberance, whichever is lower, and between

two imaginary lines on each side of the body, which

lines are perpendicular to the ground and to the

horizontal lines described above, and which

perpendicular lines are drawn through the point at

which each nate meets the outer side of each leg. The

Ordinance would be violated, therefore, if any portion

of this area is visible from any vantage point.

Id. at 339.

On appeal, however, the plaintiffs fail entirely to

mention, let alone critique, these discussions of the ordinance.

APP. A-18

The plaintiffs fail to explain how the ordinance remains vague,

let alone unconstitutionally vague, in light of the Florida

Supreme Court and the district court's statements. Those

statements, in our view, are persuasive. The plaintiffs are

merely groping in the dark. Accordingly, we reject the void-

for-vagueness attack and affirm the district court's decision on

that issue.

D.

Finally, the plaintiffs claim that the district court erred in

denying their selective enforcement claim. The plaintiffs

contend that the City of Daytona Beach has enforced the statute

only against "topless bars" and not against other, similarly

situated establishments dealing in alcohol but not providing

nude dancing. According to the plaintiffs, this selective

enforcement violates their right to equal protection under the

fourteenth amendment. The district court analyzed this claim

under the two-part selective enforcement standard set out in

Fillingim and Lanier. The court held that, although the

plaintiffs had demonstrated under the standard's first element

that they were singled out for prosecution among others who

were similarly situated, the plaintiffs had not satisfied the

standard's second requirement that this selection was invidious

or in bad faith. 715 F.Supp. at 340. Again, the plaintiffs on

appeal fail even to state, let alone to demonstrate, how the

district court's conclusion is erroneous. That failure alone

renders their appeal frivolous, but we find a more fundamental

problem with this claim as well.

APP. A-19

A selective enforcement claim generally arises in the

criminal context, when a defendant challenges the enforcement

of a criminal statute or ordinance against him. In that context,

the defendant does not claim that the ordinance itself is invalid;

rather, the defendant attacks the prosecution against him

pursuant to that ordinance. The defendant bases his attack on

the grounds that the prosecution against him constitutes a

selective enforcement and thus violates his right to equal

protection under the fourteenth amendment. If the court

decides to grant the defendant relief, then it dismisses the

criminal indictment against the defendant. The court, however,

does not strike down the statute itself: the selective

enforcement claim challenges the manner in which the state

enforces the statute, and not the statute itself.

In the present case, the plaintiffs bring a selective

enforcement claim in the civil context. Just as in the criminal

context, this selective enforcement claim provides no basis for

the court to invalidate the City ordinance: a selective

enforcement claim challenges the enforcement of the ordinance

and not the ordinance itself. Nor do the plaintiffs contend, on

selective enforcement grounds, that criminal prosecutions

against them should be dismissed: although the City did bring

criminal charges agairst some of the plaintiffs, no charges are

currently pending. Ranher, the plaintiffs request a declaratory

judgment that the City's selective enforcement is

APP. A-20

unconstitutional and an injunction preventing the City from

selectively enforcing the ordinance against them.'@

The district court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove a

selective enforcement claim, but even if the plaintiffs could

prove their claim, an injunction would not necessarily prevent

the City from enforcing the ordinance against them. The court

would enjoin the City not to enforce the ordinance against the

plaintiffs selectively. The City could satisfy such a mandate

simply by enforcing the ordinance against all similarly situated

violators. Thus, even if the plaintiffs were to succeed on this

selective enforcement claim, they could not escape the

ordinance's application to them; they could only require the

City to enforce it more widely--a result that is clearly not what

the plaintiffs desire.

As this discussion demonstrates, the plaintiffs’ selective

enforcement claim is entirely without purpose. In the context

of this civil suit, such a claim is an inappropriate basis for the

relief sought by the plaintiffs. We therefore affirm the district

court's disposition of this claim as well.

ITI.

For the forgoirg reasons, we hold that the plaintiffs’

contentions are wholly meritless and therefore AFFIRM the

12 In Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930, 95 S.Ct. 2561,

2567, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975), the Supreme Court held that the Younger

abstention doctrine, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27

L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), did not apply when a plaintiff requested an injunction

of future state criminal prosecutions. The doctrine of course applies when

a State criminal prosecution is pending.

APP. A-21

district court's disposition in this case. In addition, because the

plaintiffs’ claims are entirely without merit, we hold under Rule

38 that this appeal is frivolous and that plaintiffs be assessed

double costs and attorneys’ fees for this appeal. The Clerk of

this Court shall fix the double costs, and the District Court on

receipt of our mandate, shall determine the amount of the

defendants’ attorneys’ fee. for this appeal.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

APP. A-22

APPENDIX B

THE UNITED STATES COURT CF ‘PEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

iT

No. 89-3208

NOV -9

CHRIS GEANEAS, PINK PUSSYCAT, 1990

INC., d/b/a Red Garter Club, i

DEL PERCIO, INC., d/b/a Shingle

Shack, FUNCTION JUNCTION, INC., MIGUEL J. CORTEZ

DAWN BOIDO, DENISE DEL PINTO, CLERK

LESLIE GRIER,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

KINZEY ENTERPRISES, INC.,

@/b/a Cyster Pub, LINNIE SHIFTLETT,

LOIS YOUNG,

Plaintiffs,

versus

CHARLES @. W

ILLETS

THE CITY OF DAYT

ONA BEACH,

Defendants-Appellees,

JCHN M. POWER,

LAWRENCE KELLY,

pefendants.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the

} 5 : re! F

lobed

(November 9, 1 )

CN PETITION(S) FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTION(S) OF REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion_Seprember 10,1990, ~- llth Cir., 19490, it a

Before: TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, TUTTLE, and RONEY*, Senior Circuit

Judges.

PER CURIAM:

(YA The Petition(s) for Rehearing are DENIED and no member of

this panel nor other Judge in regular active service on the Court

having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing er: banc

(Rule 35, Federal Rules of Apvellate Procedure; Eleventh Circuit

Rule 35-5), the Suggestion(s) of Rehearing En Banc are DENIED.

( ) The Petition(s) for Rehearing are DENIED and the Court having

been polled at the request of one of the members of the Court and

a majority of the Circuit Judges who are in regular active service

not having voted in favor of it (Rule 35, Federal Rules cf

Appellate Procedure; Eleventh Circuit Rule 35-5), the Suggestiocn(s)

of Rehearing En Banc are also DENIED.

( ) <A member of the Court in active service having requested a

poll on the reconsideration of this cause en banc, and a majority

of the judges in active service not having voted in favor of it,

Rehearxfg En Banc is

UNITED $&%

ORD-42

(9/90)

"See Rule 34-2(b), Rules of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit.

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

CHRIS GEANEAS, et al

)

)

Plaintiffs , )

)

Vv. )

Case No. 83-344-Civ-Orl-11

)

CHARLES W. WILLETS, etal )

)

)

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM. OPINION

AND ORDER ON MOTIONS

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This cause is before the Court upon Defendants’ Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment, filed March 16, 1987, the

Memorandum of Law filed therewith in support of the

Defendants’ Motion, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment, filed April 10, 1987, the Memorandum of Law filed

therewith in opposition to the Defendants’ Motion and in

support of the Plaintiffs’ Motion, and the Defendants’

Opposition to the Plaintiffs’ Motion, filed April 23, 1987. The

Court has reviewed the following documents, filed in relation

to the motions, and the exhibits to which they refer: the

Affidavits of Chris Geaneas and Leonard Del Percio filed in

opposition to the Defendants' Motion and in support of the

Plaintiffs’ Motion, filed with the Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of

Law on April 10, 1987; the Supplemental Affidavit of Leonard

Del Percio in support of the Plaintiffs' Motion, filed May 11,

1987; Plaintiffs’ Notice of Supplemental Authority, filed June

25, 1987; Defendants’ Notice of Supplemental Authority, filed

June 29, 1987; Plaintiffs’ Response to Court Order of

September 18, 1987, Pertaining to Motions for Summary

Judgment, filed October 5, 1987 and the documents referenced

therein; Plaintiffs' Notice of Filing exhibits, filed October 5,

1987, and the Memorandum of Law filed therewith;

Defendants’ Supplemental Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Summary Judgment, filed October 7, 1987; the Joint

APP. C-1

Stipulation filed by the parties in reference to the Plaintiffs’

Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, filed October 27, 1987!

and the Defendant's Notice of Supplemental Authority, filed

November 12, 1987.

The Motions for Summary Judgment were taken under

advisement following the Court's Order of September 18,

1987.

BACKGROUND

This is an action brought primarily under 42 U.S.C.

1983 for damages and for declaratory and injunctive relief. At

issue is Daytona Beach Ordinance 81-334, enacted on October

21, 1981, codified as City of Daytona Beach Code section 5-

25, which prohibits certain kinds of nudity and sexual

behavior, and the simulation and graphic depiction thereof, in

an establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages.2 An

1 Although this stipulation was filed in reference to the Plaintiffs’ Motion

for a Preliminary Injunction, at the hearing on the preliminary injunction

the parties represented to the Court that they would have no objection to

the use of the Joint Supulati mn in deciding the cross motions for summary

judgment. Furthermore, the Joint Stipulation provides that the parties did

not limit the Joint Stipulation to the issues raised in the Motion for a

Preliminary Injunction.

2 In its entirety, Section 5-25 (created by Ordinance 81-334) reads:

Section 5-25, Nudity. S | Conduct Prohibited

(a) No person shall expose to public view his or her

genitals, pubic area, vulva, anus, anal cleft or cleavage or buttocks or any

simulation thereof in an establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages.

APP. C-2

establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages is broadly defined

(b) No female person shall expose to public view any

portion of her breasts below the top of the areola or any simulation thereof

in an establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages.

(c) No person maintaining, owning, or operating an

establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages shall suffer or permit any

person to expose to public view his or her genitals, pubic area, vulva,

anus, anal cleft or cleavage or buttocks or any simulation thereof within

the establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages.

(d) No person maintaining, owning, or operating an

establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages shall suffer or permit any

female person to expose to public view any portion of her breasts below

the top of the ireola or any simulation thereof within the establishment

dealing in alcoholic beverages.

(e) No person shall engage in and no person maintaining,

Owning or operating an establishment deaj‘ng in alcoholic beverages shall

suffer or permit any sexual intercourse, masturbation, sodomy, beastiality

[sic], oral copulation, flagellation, any sexual act which is prohibited by

law, touching, caressing or fondling of the beasts, buttocks, anus or

genitals or the simulation thereof within an establishment dealing in

alcoholic beverages.

(f) No person shall cause and no person maintaining,

owning or operating an establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages shall

suffer or permit the exposition of any graphic representation, including

pictures or the projection of film, which depicts human genitals, pubic

area, vulva, anus, anal cleft or cleavage, butt@®xs, female breasts below

the top the areola, sexual in.ercourse, masturbation, sodomy, beastiality

[sic], oral copulation, flagellation, any sexual act prohibited by 'aw,

touching, caressing or fondling of the breasts, buttocks, anus, or genitals,

or any simulation thereof within any establishment dealing in alcoholic

beverages.

APP. C-3

as almost any establishment where alcoholic beverages are sold

or consumed, Together, these ordinances have broad reach in

terms of both establishments covered end activities prohibited.

Plaintiffs assert that ordinance 81-334 is so overbroad that it

restricts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms, rendering it

constitutionally infirm. Plaintiffs further claim that the

ordinance violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments in that

it is vague, is being selectively enforced, and is preempted by

certain Florida Statutes.

Plaintiffs are a varied collection of individuals and

corporations. The three corporations involved,4 (the Corporate

Plaintiffs) (1) Pink Pussycat, Inc., d/b/a the Red Garter club,

3 City of Daytona Beach Code section 5-1 reads in pertinent part:

Section 5-1 Definit

Establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages, Any

business or commercial establishment (whether open to the public or

where entrance is limited by cover charge or membership requirement)

including those licensed by th? state for the sale and/or service of alcoholic

beverages, and any bottle cluh: hotel; motel; restaurant; night club;

country club; cabaret; meeting facility utilized by ary religious, social,

fraternal or similar organization; business or commercial establishment

where a product or article is sold, dispensed, served or provided with the

knowledge, actual or implied, that the same will be, or is intended to be

mixed, combined with or drunk in connection or combination with an

alcoholic beverage on the p-emises of said business or commercial

establishment; or business o* commercial establishment where the

consumption or alcoholic beverages is permitted A private residence,

whether permanent or temporary in nature, is not an est2vlishment dealing

in alcoholic beverages.

4 Initially a fourth corporation, Kinzey Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Oyster Pub,

was involved. This party was voluntarily dismissed in a Court Order filed

July 27, 1983.

APP. C-4

(2) Del Percio, Inc. d/b/a the Shingle Shack, and (3) Function

Junction, Inc., are establishments which at one time, that is

before section 5-25 was enacted, served alcohol in connection

with topless dancing by female entertainers. All are Florida

corporations doing business in Daytona Beach, Florida.

Plaintiff Chris Geaneas is the owner and operator of Pink

Pussycat, Inc., d/b/a the Red Garter Club. The remainder of the

Plaintiffs were during relevant periods employees of the

Corporate Plaintiffs (the Employee Plaintiffs). Plaintiffs Dawn

Boido (a bartender) and Leslie Grier (a dancer) were arrested

for violating section 5-25 while acting as employees of Del

Percio, Inc. d/b/a the Shingle Shack. Plaintiffs Denise Del

Pinto (a dancer) and Linnie Shiftlett (a bartender) were arrested

for violating section 5-25 while acting as employees of Plaintiff

Pink Pussycat, Inc. d/b/a the Red Garter Club. Plaintiff Lois

Young (a dancer) was similarly arrested for violating section 5-

25 while performing at the Function Junction, Inc.

Defendants are the City of Daytona Beach, Charles W.

Willets, the Chief of Police of Daytona Beach, and John M.

Power, an individual police officer of that city.

Plaintiffs initially filed their complaint on May 9, 1983.

They sought a temporary restraining order, a preliminary

injunction, a permanent injunction, a declaratory judgment, and

money damages from the Defendants. However, because of a

variety of state court proceedings then extant? this Court, per

5 On the date of the stay, each of the corporate plaintiffs involved

in this case was party to a state court declaratory judgment action seeking

Judge Reed, stayed this case on July 27, 1983. After the

termination of the state court proceedings at issue,© the Stay

was vacated by Order of this Court on July 1, 1986.

This cause is now before the Court upon the parties’

cross motions for partial summary judgment. The Defendants

seek summary judgment on two grounds: (1) that this action is,

at least in part, barred by the res judicata and collateral estoppel

effect of the decision of the Florida Supreme Court in _City of

Daytona Beach v. Del Percio, 476 So. 2d 197 (Fla 1985); and

(2) that the ordinance is facially constitutional, both in terms of

overbreadth and vagueness. Plaintiffs contend to the contrary

that the ordinance is both unconstitutionally overbroad and

vague. After careful consideration the Court has determined that

the present state of the record does not indicate that the

an interpretation of the ordinance as it might apply to semi-nude dancers.

Each of the individual Plaintiffs in this action, except Chris Geaneas, were

involved as defendants in state court criminal enforcement proceedings

(then on appeal). See the Court's Order of July 27, 1983.

6 Plaintiff's represented in their two Motions to vacate the stay that the

State court proceedings had terminated. Apparently the declaratory judgment

action was dismissed for want of prosecution. See Plaintiff's Motion to

Vacate Stay, filed November 25, 1985. The criminal proceedings against

the five individual defendants were, according to the Plaintiffs, voluntarily

dismissed. Id. The disposition of those proceedings is not of primary

importance to this case in its current posture.

Of more importance are the criminal proceedings against Leonard

Del Percio and Laura Iris Muo,e, who are nominally not parties in this

case. Those criminal proceedings terminated in a decision by the Florida

Supreme Court on October 28, 1985, which upheld parts of section 5-25

against claims that it was vague and overbroad. See city of Daytona Beach

vy, Del Percio, 476 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1985).

APP. C-6

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the res judicata

issue, but that, on the merits, the ordinance is facially

constitutional, entitling the Defendants to partial summary

judgment as a matter of law.

RES JUDICATA

While this case was formerly stayed in deference toa

variety of state proceedings, Defendants raise herein only the

decision of the Florida Supreme Court in Del Percio as res

judicata, barring this action. Del Percio arose out of criminal

prosecutions against two defendants, Leonard Del Perc’ > and

Laura Iris Moore, for violations of section 5-25. Neither of

these individuals is a party to this case. However, Leonard Del

Percio was and is President of two of the Corporate Plaintiffs,

Del Percio, Inc., and Function Junction, Inc., involved in this

action. Furthermore, Defendant relies on the opinion of the

Florida Supreme Court for the proposition that Laura Iris

Moore was when arrested a bartender at Plaintiff Pink

Pussycat, Inc. d/b/a a Re.J Garter Club. Because of the close

relations of the parties in Del Percio. with the parties in this

case, and the similarity of issues involved, Defendant contends

that this action is barrec by the principles of res judicata.

Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on

this ground. Defendants make two separate arguments that

partial summary judgment should be granted based on res

judicata. First, Defendants contend that under the federal law of

preclusion as expressed in Montana v. United States, 440

APP. C-7

U.S. 147 (1979), Plaintiffs in this action are collaterally

estopped from asserting that section 5-25 is unconstitutional by

the result in Del Percio, Montana held that a nonparty to a prior

suit who assists in the prosecution or defense of that action in

aid of his own interest is as much bound by the result as if he

had been a party of record.’ Defendants contend that because

Leonard Del Percio was a party to Del Percio, the two

corporations of which he is President should be bound, as

should their employees. Similarly, Defendants contend that

Laura Iris Moore, the other defendant in Del Percio, was in

actuality the "manager" of Pink Pussycat, Inc. d/b/a the Red

Garter Club, and so it is also appropriate to bind that club, its

president Plaintiff Chris Geaneas, and the club's employees to

the result of Del Percio. Since section 5-25 was held to be

constitutional by the Florida Supreme Court in that case,

Defendants claim this action is barred in part.

Assuming arguendo that Montana is applicable,8 the

Defendants have not demonstrated that they are entitled to

7 Montana gleaned from the federal cases a four part standard designed to

determine whether it is appropriate to bind nonparties to the result of a

prior litigation. First, the nonparty must have been sufficiently involved in

the conduct of the prior litigation to actuate principles of estoppel. Second,

the issue involved must be the same in substance. Third, the controlling

facts and law must not have vhanged significantly. Fourth, other special

circumstances must not warrant an exception to the general rule. 440 U.S.

at 154-155.

8 Montana created a federal rule by examining federal cases. However, a

variety of recent Supreme Court cases have held that the full faith and

credit statute, 28 U.S.C. 1738, requires that the preclusive effect of a

State court judgment be determined under the law of the state which

APP. C-8

summary judgment thereunder. The first part of the Montana

test is that the nonparty must have been sufficiently involved in

the conduct of the prior litigation to actuate principles of

estoppel. 440 U.S. at 155? This is Clearly a question of fact

for the Court. Astron Industrial Associated, Inc, v, Chrysler

Motor Corp, 405 F.2d 958, 961 (Sth Cir. i968): C. Wright, A.

Miller & E. Cooper, 18 Federal Practice and Procedure 4451,

at 429-430 & n. 7 (1981). The Defendants have not sufficiently

proven control of the defense in Del Percio. by the Corporate

rendered the judgment. E.g., Marrese v, American Academy of Orthopaedic

Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 165 s. Ct. 1327, 1331-1335 (1985); Migra v.

Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75, 81-84

(1984); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96-105 (1980). But see DeWeese

v. Town of Palm Beach, 688 F.2d 731, 733 (11th Cir. 1982) (in a decision

subsequent to Allen, the Eleventh Circuit applied federal law to determine

the collateral estoppel effect of a state court criminal judgment in a later

federal action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). These cases in the main

address the question of whether a particular claim or issue is precluded by

the state court judgment, and not whether a particular party is bound.

However, their rationale applies equally well to the latter question.

Since the prior judgment at issue in Montana was a State court

judgment, and its preclusive effects were determined under federal law, there

exists a latent conflict between that decision and the later decisions cited

above. Montana may be disti guishable since it involved the preclusive

effects of a judgment as to th. ' Jnited States. Traditionally special rules of

res judicata and collateral estoppel are applied to the United States. See

¢.g.. United States v, Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984) (doctrine of

nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel does not apply the United States).

However, neither party has briefed this issue in any manner, and so the

Court will not closely examine it. The question need not be reached since

the Court concludes that the Defendants have not demonstrated their

entitlement to summary judgment under state or federal law.

9 See supra, note 7.

APP. C-9

Plaintiffs to justify preclusion even as to them.!0 No real

evidence of actual control has been presented to the Court.

Rather, the Defendants rely on the positions and employment of

the various Plaintiffs to argue that the Corporate Plaintiffs must

have controlled the defense in Del Percio, ! 1 The positions and

employment of the defendants in Del Percio_ do not create a

sufficiently strong inference of control to justify summary

judgment. See Ransburg Lectro-Coating Corp. v. Lansdale

Finishers, Inc., 484 F.2d 1037, 1038 (3rd Cir. 1973)

(reversing a district court's granting of summary judgment

where the movant failed to affirmatively establish sufficient

control). Cf, Concordia v. Bendekovic, 693 F.2d 1073, 1076

(11th Cir. 1982) (burden on the movant to introduce evidence

sufficient to establish defense of res judicata).

Defendants' second argument is that these parties are

precluded from bringing this suit by Florida law on res judicata

and collateral estoppel.'* Defendant cites Seaboard Coast Line

10 Therefore the Court does not reach the question of whether a collateral

estoppel bar to the Corporate Plaintiffs would also be a bar to their

employees.

11 For example, the Defendarts argue: "... [I]t would be naive to assume

that Moore brought her case all the way to the State Supreme Court

without any involvement by her employer, since the employer would have

received the primary benefit from a favorable ruling - that is, to operate a

topless bar.” Defendants’ Mj morandum of Law, p.6. Naive as the Court

may be, it will not assume hat Moore's employer was involved without

any evidence to that effect. A fortiori, the court will not find that Moore's

einployer controlled the Del Percio litigation.

12 Florida law on preclusion is said to be applicable since a Florida court

rendered the judgment alleged to have preclusive effect. See supra note 8.

APP. C-10

Railroad Co, v, Industrial Contracting Co,, 260 so. 2d 860

(Fla. 4th DCA 1972) for the proposition that nonparties to a

prior litigation can be held to be parties under certain

circumstances. In this respect, the case is similar to Montana.

Furthermore, as in Montana, the question of nonparty control

(here called "privity") is one of fact for the trial court.

Seaboard, 260 So. 2d at 864 (citing Astron Industrial

Associates, 405 F.2d at 961). As discussed above, the

evidence is insufficient to establish the requisite level of

involvement necessary to treat these Plaintiffs as parties to Del

Percio.

Defendants also cite Atlantic Cylinder Corp. v. Hetner,

438 So. 2d 922 (Fla. lst DCA 1983), review denied, 447 So.

2d 885 (1984), for the proposition that a corporation and one of

its corporate officers should (be) treated as the same party for

res judicata and collateral estoppel purposes. In Atlantic

Cylinder the plaintiff had formerly brought suit against a

corporation, and was partially successful and partially

unsuccessful. Then that plaintiff brought suit against several

corporate officers for the same conduct. The court held that the

former judgment on ‘'¢ merits for the corporation barred a

subsequent action against the corporate officers to the extent

that it seeks "... to relitigate issues adversely determined on the

previous action." Id., at 923. However, at issue in Hetner was

the allegedly tortious conduct of the officers. As such, the court

APP. C-11

relied heavily on notions of respondent superior and joint

tortfeasor liability. These doctrines could be extended to the

present case, which concerns criminal liability, but neither party

has sufficiently briefed the issue for the Court to be able to

determine whether such an action would generally be in accord

with Florida Law. Therefore the Court will not grant summary

judgment based on collateral estoppel or res judicata.

FACIAL CONSTITUTIONALITY

Defendants’ second ground for summary judgment is

that section 5-25 is wholly constitutional on its face. They

contend that the ordinance regulates nudity in conjunction with

the regulation of alcoholic beverages, and therefore the

ordinance must be reviewed deferentially given the "'added

presumption in favor of the validity of state regulation’

conferred by the Twenty-first Amendment, ..." New York

State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 718 (1981),

citing, California v. LaRue. 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972).

The Plaintiffs assert to the contrary that the ordinance is

unconstitutional on its face because it is overbroad and vague.

They contend that section 5-25 must be strictly reviewed,

because it regulates conduct in all establishments "dealing in"

alcoholic beverages, us opposed to those establishments

licensed_to serve alcoholic beverages. Plainuffs argue that only

the latter are reviewed under the Twenty-first Amendment.

APP. C-12

Twenty-first Amendment Authority

Plaintiffs contend, inter alia, that the statute restricts

exercise of their first amendment rights. 13 Nude dancing is not

without its first amendment protection. Schad v, Borough of

Mount Ephriam, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981); Krueger v, City of

Pensacola, 759 F.2d 851, 854 (11th Cir. 1985). However, the

Supreme Court has held that states may regulate nude

entertainment under tieir broad powers, conferred by the

Twenty-First Amendment, to regulate the sale of liquor. E.g.,,

Bellanca, 452 U.S. at 717. The states’ power to regulate

pursuant to the Twenty-First Amendment outweighs any first

amendment protection afforded to nude entertainment. Id,

In order to review an ordiance which restricts protected

expression under the less strict standard of the Twenty-first

Amendment, two requirements must be met. First, the

legislative body must have been delegated the state's Twenty-

first Amendment authonty to regulate behavior in conjunction

13 Plaintiffs also attempt to assert the First Amendment rights of patrons

whose dress is regulated by *he ordinance. To the extent that the defendants

are entitled to raise these claims, the First Amendment interest of patrons

in their dress is no more, and almost certainly less, than that of nude

dancers who can claim some element of expression in their attire, or lack

thereof. See, South Floriga Free Beaches. Inc, v, City of Miami, 734 F.

2d 608, 610 (11th Cir. 1984) (nude sunbathing is not protected by the

First Amendment). Accordingly, even if Plaintiffs can raise the claims of

patrons, those claims present a weaker case for overturning the ordinance

than claims of the Plaintiffs.

APP. C-13

a.)

Ne

with the regulation of alcohol. Second, the regulation of

expression must actually be incidental to the regulation of

alcohol. These requirements are discussed below.

With respect to the first question, in Florida,

municipalities such as Daytona Beach are authorized to exercise

the power conferred by the Twenty-first Amendment. The

Florida Supreme Court held in Del Percio_ that, as a matter of

state law, municipalities have Twenty-first Amendment

authority to regulate behavior in "bars" despite the fact that they

lack the power to totally ban liquor sales. 476 So. 2d at 201.

Such allocation is clearly permissible under the Twenty-First

Amendment:

... [T]his court has never attached any constitutional

significance to a State's division of its authority over

alcohol. The Twenty-first Amendment has given broad

power to the States and generally they may delegate

this power as they see fit.

There is certainly no constitutional requirement that

the same governmental unit must grant liquor licenses,

revoke licenses, and regulate the circumstances under

which liquor may be sold."

ity of New Vv . 8. - wire ee. 23,

385 (1986) (footnote omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has

recognized this delegation of power. International Food &

Beverage Systems v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 794 F.2d 1520,

1527 (11th Cir. 1986). Thus, the City of Daytona Beach has

the Twenty-first Amendment authority to regulate behavior as

an incident to the regulation of alcohol.

Plaintiffs cite several Eleventh Circuit cases for the

proposition that an ordinance such as section 5-25 must be

APP. C-14

reviewed under a Stricter standard than that employed in

Bellanca, Because the ordinance restricts the exercise of a

fundamental right, Plaintiffs contend that the court must strictly

review the ordinance under First Amendment standards, such

as those set out in Leverett v, City of Pinellas Park, 775 F.2d

1536 (11th Cir. 1985), Krueger, 759 F.2d at 855-856, and

Grand Faloon Tavern, Inc, v, Wicker, 670 F.2d 943 (11th

Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982). However, in

these cases the statutes at issue were not reviewed under the

Bellanca _ standard for reasons inapplicable in this case.

Krueger. was based upon the belief that the State of

Florida had not delegated any of its Twenty-first Amendment

authority to municipalities, and so the court reviewed the

legislation at issue in that case under the stricter standard

employed when legislation infringing on protected liberty

interests is justified solely under the police power. 759 F.2d at

854. As noted above, this view of Florida law was rejected in

Del Percio. Grand Faloon was based on the same

misconception. 670 F. 2d at 944. Therefore, neither case is

strictly applicable here.

In Leverett, the court examined a municipal ordinance

which prohibited nude or semi-nude entertainment in any

commercial establishinent. The regulation of protected

expression involved was therefore not incidental to the

regulation of alcohol. 775 F.2d at 1540, at n.2. Accordingly,

the court applied the sirict standard of Krueger as opposed to

the Twenty-first Amendment standard of LaRue and Bellanca.

APP. C-15

a

Leverett is clearly in line with the weight of authority. When an

ordinance regulates protected expression in a manner not

incidental to the regulation of alcohol, a strict review of the

ordinance must be undertaken. See e.g,, Doran v. Salem Inn,

Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (ordinance applied to "any public

place"); Chase v. Davelaar, 645 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1981)

(resolution at issue applied to all non-theatrical establishments

selling food or beverages); Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 522

F.2d 1045 (2nd Cir. 1975) (ordinance applied to

establishments such as coffee shops).

However, section 5-25 regulates nudity and nude

expression only in establishments dealing in alcoholic

beverages. Therefore, the regulation is incidental to the

regulation of alcohol, and the second requirement for the

application of Twenty-first amendment analysis is met.

Accordingly, since the City of Daytona Beach posses the

Twenty-first Amendment authority to regulate behavior in

establishments which dal in alcoholic beverages, the ordinance

must be reviewed within the context of the Twenty-first

Amendment.

Analysis under Bellanca

In Bellanca, the Supreme Court held valid under the

Constitution a statute sirailar to the section 5-25:

No retail licensee for on premises consumption shall

suffer or permit any person to appear on licensed

APP. C-16

premises in such manner or attire as to expose to view

any portion of the pubic area, anus, vulva, or genitals,

or any simulation thereof, nor shall suffer or permit

any female to appear on licensed premises in such

manner or attire as to expose to view any portion of

breast below the top of the areola, or any simulation

thereof.

452 U.S. at 714, n.l. The Court held that the powers conferred

by the Twenty-first amendment to regulate the sale of alcohol

outweighed any First Amendment interest in nude dancing. No

specific factual evidence need be presented to the legislature.

Instead, the court aprroved as sufficient the following

legislative finding contained in the memorandum which

accompanied the statute at issue:

"Nudity is the kind of conduct that is a proper

subject for legislative action as well as regulation by

the State Liquor Authority as a phase of liquor

licensing. It has long been held that sexual acts and

performances may constitute disorderly behavior

within the meaning of the Alcoholic Beverage Control

Law ...

“Common sense indicates that any form of nudity

coupled with alcohol in a public place begets

undesirable behav or. This legislation prohibiting

nudity in public will once and for all, outlaw conduct

which is now quite out of hand."

Bellanca, 452 U.S. at 7:7-718. In the context of the Twenty-

first Amendment, the ~ourt found this "common sense"

rationale sufficient. "In short, the elected representatives of the

State of New York have chosen to avoid the disturbances

associated with mixing alcohol and nude dancing by means of a

APP. C-17

BEST AVAILABLE COP

reasonable restriction upon establishments which sell liquox for

on-premises consumption.” [d,. at 718.

Judged by this standard, the ordinance is clearly

constitutionally valid or its face. Section 2 of Ordinance 81-

334, which created section 5-25, contains sufficient rationale

on its face!4 to satisfy scrutiny under Bellanca, !5 The

prevention of rape, prostitution, and assaults on police officers

are legitimate legislative ends. The means chosen are within the

wide latitude given a legislative body under the Twenty-first

Amendment. See LaRue, 409 U.S. at 116. The city has not

totally prohibited nudity and sexual conduct, but has instead

proscribed such things in establishments dealing in alcoholic

beverages. See Del Percio, 476 So. 2d at 203.

14 Section 2 of the ordinance reads:

SECTION 2. It is hereby found that the acts prohibited in Section

1 above encourage the conduc: of prostitution, attempted rape, rape,

murder, and assaults on police officers in and around establishments dealing

in alcoholic beverages, that actual and simulated nudity and sexual conduct

and the depiction thereof coupled with alcohol in public places begets

undesirable behavior, that s *<ual, lewd, lascivious, and salacious conduct

among patrons and employe 2s within establishments dealing in alcoholic

beverages results in violation of law and dangers to the health, safety and

welfare of the public, and it is the intent of this ordinance to prohibit

nudity, gross sexuality, and the simulation and depiction thereof in

establishments dealing in alcoholic beverages.

15 The Defendants have filed a copy of the legislative history of the

ordinance as Exhibit 5 to their Memorandum in opposition to the

Plainuffs' Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. The court has not

justified its holding based on this record, however, because under Bellanca

the legislative findings contained in the ordinance itself are sufficient.

APP. C-18

Overbreadth as to Scope of Establishment

Plaintiffs further contend that the type of examination

conducted in Krueger, Leverett, and Grand Faloon must [be]

engaged in reference to section 5-25 because the ordinance

regulates behavior in establishments which are not licensed to

sell alcoholic beverages, but instead applies to all

establishments which deal in alcoholic beverages. In other

words, the Plaintiffs argue that in order to engage in a Twenty-

first Amendment analysis, it is not enough that the ordinance at

issue be incidental to the regulation of alcohol. Instead, the

ordinance must only apply to establishments licensed to sell

alcoholic beverages.

No appellate court decisions have been cited to this

Court which resolve the issue of whether the added

presumption of validity under the Twenty-first Amendment can

be applied to a statute which applies to establishments such as

bottle clubs, where alcohol is consumed but not sold.!6

However , after a review of the case law and the rationale

behind Bellanca, the court concludes that a Twenty-first

Amendment analysis is properly conducted in this case.

The Court in B-:llanca expressed its holding in a short

statement: "The State's power to ban the sale of alcoholic

beverages entirely includes the lesser power to ban the sale of

liquor on premises where topless dancing occurs." 452 U.S. at

717. In so holding, the Court relied on its prior statement that

16 Bellanca also did not reach this issue.

APP. C-19

BEST AVAILABLE COP

. a state has absolute power under the Twenty-first

Amendment to prohibit totally the sale of liquor within its

boundaries. Ziffrin, Inc. v, Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138

(1939)." However, the holding of _Ziffrin went farther than the

synopsis provided by the Court in _Bellanca, In _Ziffrin, the

Court stated: "Without a doubt a state may absolutely prohibit

the manufacture of intoxicants, their transportation, sale, or

possession, irrespective of when or where produced or

obtained, or the use to which they are put." 308 U.S. at 138

(emphasis added). Since the Twenty-first Amendment gave the

states broad powers with respect to the regulation of the

possession of alcoholic beverages, the court holds that, under

the analysis of Bellanca, this power entirely includes the lesser

power to ban the possession (and consumption) of liquor on

premises where nude entertainment occurs.

It is important to note that the evils sought to be

redressed by this ordinance arise not merely from the

combination of the sale of alcohol with nudity, but from the

combination of the consumption of alcohol with nudity in

establishments. See supra_ note 14.

The Court's conclusion herein is supported by several district

court opinions that have applied a Twenty-first Amendment

analysis under similar circumstances. First, in Patch

Enterprises, Inc. v. McCall, 447 F. Supp. 1075 ( M.D. Fila.

1978), the court held that a county's regulation of the business

hours of a bottle club was fortified by the Twenty-first

Amendment. Second, this Court in _Jorgenson v. County of

APP. C-20

Volusia, Case No. 86-41-Civ-Orl-19 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 16,

1986), held that a statute very similar to section 5-25, which

also applied to any establishment dealing in alcoholic

beverages, was valid under a Twenty-first Amendment

analysis. Third, in G,P.Y.. Inc, y, City of Jacksonville, Case

No. 87-792-Civ-J-16 (M.D. Fla. October 13, 1987), the court,

per Judge Moore, denied a preliminary injunction against

enforcement of an ordinance which prohibited topless dancing

in any commercial establishment where alcoholic beverages are

consumed. The Court relied upon LaRue and Bellanca for its

holding, indicating it engaged in a Twenty-first Amendment

analysis. This ruling was upheld on appeal to the Eleventh

Circuit on December 9, 1987, No. 87-3715, in an unpublished

per curiam opinion. 17

Overbreadth as to Type of Liquor

Plaintiffs next contend that the ordinance may not be

analyzed under the Twenty-first Amendment because it applies

to establishments that serve only liquor produced in state,

rendering it overbroad. Plaintiffs have filed affidavits

suggesting that they are willing to so limit their sales to liquor

produced in the State of Florida.

Plaintiffs cite no case, other than Justice Stevens'

dissent in Iacobucci, for the proposition that the Twenty-first

17 The court did not review the merits of the case, but held that the district

court's order was not abuse of discretion.

APP. C-21

etna

Amendment gives no added presumption of validity where no

liquor is imported. The Court will not so limit Bellanca. !8

Ziffrin explicitly stated that a state may absolutely prohibit the

sale or possession of intoxicants "irrespective of when or

where produced or obtained, ..." 308 U.S. at 138. Under the

rationale of Bellanca, the power to ban the sales of liquor

produced in state entirely includes the power to ban its sale on

premises where nude entertainment occurs.

Overbreadth as to Graphic Representations

Plaintiffs next a-gue that the ordinance is overbroad in

that it prohibits graphic representations of nudity or sexual

conduct, such as movies or photographs. Plaintiffs cite

Erznoznik v, City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), for

the proposition that section 5-25 cannot be applied to restrict the

showing of movies which contain nudity. However, Erznoznik

was not a Twenty-firs: Amendment case, as the ordinance at

18 The Court, of course, itt::nds no criticism of Justice Stevens’ dissent.

Indeed, that dissent is a pers iasive critique on the entire course of Twenty-

first Amendment analysis, especially as applied in Bellanca. See

International Food &Beverige Systems v, City of Fort Luderdaie, 664F.

Supp. 482, 484 (S.D. Fla. 1987). However, Justice Stevens’ views have

not been accepted by a majority of the Supreme Court. While this Court is

concemed with the implications of Bellanca for First Amendment

freedoms, the Court is bound by that holding, and will not place an

irrational limitation on Bellanca merely for the purpose of reducing the

ambit of that decision.

APP. C-22

a

issue there applied to all drive-in theaters regardless of whether

the theater dealt in alcoholic beverages. Furthermore, Bellanca

itself involved a statute which prohibited the display of

simulations of nudity. 452 U.S. at 714, n.l. The regulation at

issue in LaRue explicitly prohibited the display of films or

pictures depicting nudity or sexual conduct. 409 U.S. at 112.

Here the legislative concern was the conjunction of

nudity with alcohol, whether or not the nudity was "live."

Accordingly, given the wide latitude as to choice of means to

achieve a permissible end which law-makers possess under the

Twenty-first Amendment, the ordinance is not facially invalid

as to graphic representations. Dramatic performances

containing nudity are not prohibited but are merely proscribed

when presented in connection with the sale or consumption of

alcohol. As set out above, this permissible.

Liberty Interest of Employees and Patrons

Plaintiffs filed a notice of supplemental authority, citing

DeWeese v. Town of Palm Beach, 812 F.2d 1365 (11th Cir.

1987), for the propos:rion that there is a liberty interest in

personal dress. To the extent that Plaintiffs are now claiming

that the ordinance is unconstitutional as an infrigement of their

liberty interests, or those of their customers, !9 the Court notes

19 The Florida Supreme Court held in Del Percio that persons in the

position of Plaintiffs here could not raise the liberty interests of customers

under the overbreadth doctrine. 476 S. 2d at 206-207. The Court agrees

APP. C-23

that usually such due process claims are subjected to less strict

scrutiny than First Amendment claims. Since nude dancing is

entitled to First Amendment protection, statutes which regulate

such behavior are subject to an analysis which requires, among

other things, the statute to further an important or substantial

government interest. Grand Faloon, 670 F.2d at 947. Yet

under Bellanca, legislative findings in a preamble to a statute

are sufficient given the waded presumption of validity to sustain

regulation uncer the Twenty-first Amendment. Where,

however, infringement of a substantive liberty interest is at

issue, the plaintiff bears the greater burden of establishing that

an ordinance is arbitrary and irrational. DeWeese, 812 F.2d at

1367. Because the government interest advanced by this statute

is considered under Bellanca to be_a substanuial interest actually

furthered by the ordinance. then a fortiori, the regulation is not

arbitrary or irrational. Therefore, the restriction on the liberty

interests in dress of the employees, owners and customers is

not sufficient to overturn the ordinance.

Vagueness

with this holding of Del Pervio for the reasons stated in that opinion, but

discusses the general constitutionality of the ordinance since the Plaintiffs

can raise infringement of their own liberty interests to attack the ordinance.

Since the Court must determine the effect of liberty interests in general, it

also discusses the effect of customers’ liberty interests.

APP. C-24

Plaintiffs contend that the ordinance is unduly vague.

However, after interpretation by the lower Florida courts and

by the Florida Supreme Court in Del Percio, the Court

concludes that the ordinance is clear. The Plaintiffs stated at the

hearing on the preliminary injunction that, subsequent to

rulings by the lower Florida courts, they have had no problems

with the enforcement of the "buttocks" part of the ordinance.

The Florida Supreme Court has, however, expansively

interpreted the "topless" sections of the ordinance.29 In neither

case is the construction of the ordinance unclear. In some

ways, the ordinance as interpreted is given very broad

aplication in terms of the scope of nudity prohibited, see Del

Percio, 476 So. 2d at 199-200, but that affects the Court's

determination of overbreadth, not vagueness. The ordinance is

not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the Plaintiffs in this

case, who desire to present topless dancing in the context of

consumption of alcohol. See South Florida Free Beaches v.

City of Miami,734 F.2d 608, 611 (11th Cir. 1984) (ordinance

which proscribed beirg "insufficiently clothed to prevent

improper exposure" not unduly vague as applied to public

nudity). See also Villa f Hoffman Estates v. Flipside

Hoffman Estates, Inc... 455 U.S. 489, 494-495 (1982). As

interpreted, the ordinance gives fair notice of its prohibitions

20 In Del Percio, The Florida Supreme Court interpreted sections (b) and

(d) of the ordinance to prohibit exposure of any portion of the breast

directly or laterally below the top of the areola. 476 So. 2d at 199.

APP. C-25

and supplies standards for its enforcement to the same extent as

any other criminal statute. See Grayned v, City of Rockford,

408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972).

The ordinance also does not fall within the ambit of

Papachristou v. City of Jacsonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163

(1972), which overturned the ordinance that made "criminal

activities which by modern standards are normally innocent."

While the instant ordinance as interpreted may prevent

employees of a bar from topless dancing, or even from wearing

clothes in the bar that could be wor on the street, such a

prohibition does not rise to the level of the vagrancy statute at

issue in Papachristou, 2! which made criminaQactivities such

as taking a midnight stroll and was much broader in scope of

possible enforcement and conduct prohibited. While the Court

may doubt the wisdom of prohibiting low-cut gowns in bars,

the question of the advisability of any such ordinance is for the

legislature, unless, of course the ordinance infringes upon

protected constitutional freedoms. See Village of Hoffman

Estates, 455 U.S. at 474-495. In this regard, the Court has

above determined that the ordinance is constitutional under the

applicable standards.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial

Suthmary Judgment is DENIED, and the Defendants' Motion

21 Furthermore, although the Supreme Court did not discuss vagueness in

Bellanca, the ordinance approved in that decision was very similar in\scope

of prohibition to section 5-25.

APP. C-26

for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The issues not

disposed of in this order, including selective enforcement and

the individual damage claims, remain for trial or later

disposition in this matter.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at

Orlando, Florida, this 12th day of January, 1988.

PATRICIA C. FAWSETT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Frank B. Gummey, III

Eric A. Latinsky

APP. C-27

-_—_

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

CHRIS GEANEAS, etc., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. CASE NO. 83-344-CIV-ORL-19

CHARLES W. WILLETS, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

This case was presented to the Court sitting as jury for

trial on February 22, 23 and 28, 1989.’ In its previous Order

dated January 12, 1988, this Court determined that Daytona

Beach Ordinance 81-334, codified as City of Daytona Beach

Code Section 5-25, is not unconstitutional on its face. As to

the contention of vagueness, however, the Court at that time

focused primarily on the provisions of the Ordinance dealing

with exposure of the female breast, as the parties had stated that

they were not then in contention concerning the provision of the

Ordinance prohibiting exposure of buttocks. However, the

Plaintiffs now claim tha! the City has revived its enforcement of

' At trial Plaintiffs’ oral motion to voluntarily dismiss their claims

against John M. Power was granted.

APP. D-1

the buttocks portion of the Ordinance, and therefore this

additional issue has been presented to this Court.

This Order is limited to determination of two issues: (1)

whether the portion of the Ordinance prohibiting exposure of

buttocks is unconstitutionally vague; and (2) whether the

Ordinance has been selectively enforced against the Plaintiffs.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Effective October 21, 1981, the City of Daytona Beach

enacted City Code Section 5-25 (Daytona Beach Ordinance No.

81-334), which provides in pertinent part:

"(a) No person shall expose to

public view his or her genitals,

pubic area, vulva, anus, anal

cleft or cleavage or buttocks or

any simulation thereof in an

establishment dealing in

alcoholic beverages.

(b) Ne female person shall

expose to public view any

portion of her breasts below the

top of the areola or any

Simulation thereof in an

establishment dealing in

alcoholic beverages."

The Ordinance also prchibits persons maintaining, owning, or

operating an establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages from

suffering or permitting such conduct. The practical result of

this enactment was to create a clash between those responsible

for enforcing the laws of the City and the owners and

APP. D-2

employees of the then "topless go go" establishments located

within the city.

Partly because of the social context in which this

Ordinance was enacted, there was a period of uncertainty as to

the meaning of the prohibitions contained in the enactment. On

May 22, 1982 Leslie Grier, now Hamlin, was arrested for

performing an exotic dance during which a portion of her

buttocks was exposed. The charges were dismissed pursuant

to an order of the state County Court Judge Josephson dated

April 23, 1982 in which it was determined that the entire

buttocks must be exposed before a violation of the Ordinance

occurred. On October 2, 1982 Ms. Grier-Hamlin was again

arrested for exposure of a portion of her breast below the areola

and for exposure of her buttocks during a performance in one

of the Plaintiffs' establishments. On Aprii 21, 1983 state

County Court Judge McDermott dismissed the carges, ruling

that the prohibition against exposure of the female breast in the

Ordinance was overly broad and the prohibition against

exposure of buttocks required the entire buttocks to be exposed

to constitute a violation.

On October 8, 1982 Denise Carol Del Pinto, now

Ferraro, was arrested and charged with violating this

Ordinance, and on August 14, 1982 Donna Michelle Boido,

now Heiser, a bartende: was arrested as a person in charge of

one of the Plaintiff establishments when a violation of the

Ordinance occurred. Further, in November of 1982, Mr.

Leonard Paul Del Percio, principal shareholder and owner of

APP. D-3

the Shingle Shack and the Function Junction, removed

photographs from the walls of his establishments and ceased a

sale of calendars featuring pictures of his exotic dancers

pursuant to direction of officers of the City of Daytona Beach

Police Department under authority of the Ordinance.

Other arrests followed and led to contradictory orders of

the state courts as to the meaning of the Ordinance and the

conduct which was prohibited.2 On March 29, 1984 the

Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal determined that the

Ordinance was "vague, overbroad, not fairly enforceable, and

thus unconstitutional." Del Percio v, City of Daytona Beach,

449 So.2d 323 (Fla. Sth DCA 1984). Thereafter, the Supreme

Court of Florida issued its opinion on August 30, 1985

upholding the constitutionality of the Ordinance and

determining that exposure of the female breast below a line

drawn across the top of the areolae was prohibited conduct.

City of Daytona Beach v, De! Percio. 476 So.2d 197 (Fla.

1985).

More recently, exotic dancers in the Plaintiffs’

establishments have been arrested for exposure of their

buttocks while wearing t-straps, making the provision of the

Ordinance prohibiting exposure of buttocks in establishments

- The empioyees of the commercial establishments dealing in

alcoholic beverages which also afforded exotic dance as entertainment

changed the types of costumes being worn in response to court orders,

utilizing, inter alia, flesh colored surgical tape to cover the breasts and t-

straps to cover the dancer's posteriors.

APP. D-4

dealing in alcoholic beverages an issue properly presented for

determination by this Court.

With one exception, the evidence reflects that the City

of Daytona Beach police enforce the Ordinance only against

employees of establishments dealing in alcoholic beverages

which also feature exotic dancing as entertainment for their

patrons, although the officers acknowledged that the Ordinance

could be enforced in other areas of the City.2 Both former

Police Chief Willits and present Police Chief Crowe testified

that there was no policy precluding enforcement of the

Ord nance in pool bars and other establishments dealing in

alcoholic beverages in addition to its enforcement in the

establishments affording exotic_dance as entertainment. The

officers also testified that Ordinance 29-5, prohibiting exposure

of the areola of the female breast, was the ordinance of choice

enforced in other commercial estaablishments dealing in

~ alcohoiic beverages, excluding the exotic dance bars.

The evidence was undisputed that in commercial

establishments dealing in alcohol, excluding such

establishments which rf. -ovided exotic dance as entertainment,

3Other than a recent arrest at an establishment known as Razzies, there is

no evidence that Section 5 25 has been enforced in any establishments

other than those featuring exotic dancers. Although Captain Barry Neal of

the Daytona Beach Police Department, who was not an arresting officer,

testified that he thought O:Jinance 5-25 was enforced in establishments

dealing in alcoholic beverages other than those.featuring exotic dancing,

especially during bike week and spring break, the remaining officers who

testified on the subject stated that while the Ordinance could be enforced in

other establishments dealing in alcoholic beverages, it was actually

enforced only in those establishments which also featured exotic dancing.

APP. D-5

portions of the female breast below the areola and portions of

th- buttocks were exposed without arrests being made, even

| gh the violations were known to Daytona Beach police

ofticers who were present at the time. These violations of the

Ordinance were more prevalent during "bike week" and "spring

break", when wet t-shirt contests and bikini contests at the

pool-side bars along the city's famous beach resulted in

numerous technical violations of the Ordinance, with an

estimated fifty percent or more of the females present at these

events wearing bathing suits exposing a portion of the

buttocks.

No malice, bad faith, or racial or religious

discrimination attributable to Defendants was shown by the

evidence. Defendants explain their enforcement of the

Ordinance only in the non-residential establishments dealing in

alcoholic beverages which also afford exotic dancing as

entertainment on the grounds, inter alia, (1) that such

establishments and their employees have knowledge of the

Ordinance whereas tou ists and other persons present at other

commercial establishments dealing in alcoholic beverages do

not; (2) that the police department is aware of a history of

flagrant and consistent violations of the Ordinance occurring in

commercial establishments dealing in alcoholic beverages

which also offer exotic dancing as entertainment; (3) that the

manpower constraints of a police force numbering two hundred

and ten officers for a city of sixty-two thousand regular

inhabitants, which number swells to between three and seven

APP. D-6

hundred thousand during spring break, bike week and other

special events, make it impossible to cause an arrest for every

violation of the Ordinance; and (4) that the police officers,

exercising their discretion, choose not to enforce the Ordinance

at Certain crowded and raucous events where there is, in their

view, a significant risk that such enforcement would cause

danger to the safety of the officers and/or the public.

The police officers who were questioned on the subject

testified that if any part of the buttocks were exposed in a non-

residential establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages, an

arrest could be made for a technical violation of the Ordinance,

and that it was left to each officer's discretion as to how much

of the buttocks must be exposed before an arrest under the

Ordinance would be made. While all agreed that the arrests

actually made under the Ordinance were only for "flagrant" or

"obvious" violations, the officers differed in their opinions as

to what constituted a "fiagrant" or "obvious" violation.

At the conclusiov of the trial the Court questioned the

parties, indicated the Court's preliminary and tentative views,

allowed the parties to present further argument to rebut or

strengthen the court's initial analysis, and requested that the

parties submit to the Curt any additional law supporting their

respective positions. Upon further reflection and consideration

of the evidence, the arguments, and the authorities presented by

the parties, the Court rules as follows.

I. Facial Constitutionality of Provision

Prohibiting Exposure of Buttocks

APP. D-7

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the portion of this

Ordinance prohibiting exposure of buttocks is somewhat

vague. First, the Ordinance does not specify whether the entire

buttocks, or what portion thereof, must be covered. Secondly,

the Ordinance does not define the word "buttocks," and this

term is not easily reduced to precise definition. The Court finds

that the buttocks provision is not unconstitutionally vague,

however. 3

The Ordinance is not "impermissibly vague in all of its

applications." Vill f Hoffman Estates v. Flipsi

Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982).4 There

is no question that the Daytona Beach Ordinance would prohibit

complete exposure of the entire buttocks, and there could be no

claim of vagueness or ambiguity as to such application of the

Ordinance. Since the Ordinance is capable of at least this one

valid application, it could not be held unconstituticnally vague

on its face under the test in Hoffman Estates.

It is true that enactments which interfere with

constitutionally protected conduct should be held to a more

stringent test for vagueness than other enactments. Hoffman

Estates, supra, at 499. While the Twenty-first Amendment

augments the City's power to restrict the Plaintiffs’ exercise of

LY

4 At least where an enactment "implicates no constitutionally

protected conduct,” it shoulc not be held facially unconstitutional if it is

capable of any valid applicauon. See Hoffman Estates, supra, at 494 n. 5,

citing Steffel v, Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474 (1974). See also High Ol’

Times, Inc, v, Busbee, 673 F.2d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 1982).

APP. D-8

their First Amendment rights in connection with the sale of

liquor,® it does not obliterate those rights entirely, nor does it

affect the Plaintiffs’ due process right to fair notice of what is

prohibited. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding

that the Twenty-first Amendment does not alter the application

of equal protection standards). The Court finds, however, that

Section 5-25 withstands even a stringent test for vagueness.

The rationale benind the "void for vagueness" doctrine

was discussed by the Supreme Court in Grayned v. City of

Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972). "First, because we

assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful

conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary

intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is

prohibited, so that he may act accordingly." Id. "Second, if

arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented,

laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply

them." Id. Third, vague laws may tend to chill the exercise of

constitutionally protected conduct. Id. With th *se underlying

concerns in mind, the Court finds that the language of the

Ordinance is not impernussibly vague.

Webster's New ‘nternational Dictionary (2nd Edition,

unabridged, 1942) defines "buttock" as: "1. The part at the

back of the hip, which in man forms one of the protuberances

on which he sits; in pl., the rump." In Stedman's Medical

Dictionary (Fifth Urabridged Lawyers' Edition, 1982),

5 California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972); New_York State

Liquor Authority v, Bellance, 452 U.S. 714 (1981).

APP. D-9

"buttock" is defined as "nates," and "nate" is defined at "...the

prominence formed by the gluteal muscles on either side." The

gluteal muscles, in turn, consist of the gluteus medius and the

gluteus maximus, and run from the back of the hip to the back

of the leg. Admittedly, it is not easy to pinpoint for all persons

the exact place on the body where the "prominence formed by

the gluteal muscles" begins and where it ends, given the

interwoven nature of the human musculature and the variation

of the contours of human flesh.

The fact that the word "buttocks" may be difficult to

define in words does not mean that it is impermissibly vague,

however. While it is cumbersome to articulate a precise

definition which conforn.s to the common understanding of the

word "buttocks" as commonly understood can be defined, the

term is not so vague as to make compliance with the Ordinance

unduly difficult or enforcement unduly arbitrary, nor is it so

vague as to chill the Plaintiffs’ conduct.®

While the City of Daytona Beach could perhaps have

drafted a more prec.se statute, the "prohibition against

excessive vagueness does not invalidate every statute which a

reviewing court believes could have been drafted with greater

precision." Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49 (1975). See also

United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 94 (1975); United

States v. Petrillo, 332 'J.S. 1, 7 (1947). Indeed, "few words

6 There has been no testimony suggesting that the dancers cover

more than the buttocks in order to be sure they are in compliance, nor that

exotic dancing has been chiiled.

APP. D-10

possess the precision of mathmatical symbols, most statutes

must deal with untold and unforeseen variations in factural

situations, and the practical necessities of discharging the

business of government inevitably limit the specificity with

which legislators can spell out prohibitions. Consequently, no

more than a reasonable degree of certainty can be demanded.

Nor it it unfair to require that one who deliberately goes

perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the

risk that he may cross the line." B Motor Lines v. United

States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952).

"In evaluating a facial challenge to a state law, a federal

court must, of course, consider any limiting construction that a

state court or enforcement agency has proferred." Hoffman

Estates, supra, at 494 n. 5, citing Grayned v, City of

Rockford, supra, 110 (1972). The Florida Supreme Court in

City of Daytona Beach v, Del Percio, 476 So.2d 197 (Fla.

1985) gave its interpretation of the breast portion of the

Ordinance, but did not interpret the buttocks portion. since this

Court is unable to certify the question, it must attempt to

extrapolate the meaning the state's highest court would most

likely give to the buttocks provisions. See Grayned, supra, at

110.

After consideration of the wording of the Ordinance

itself, the various interpretations of the Ordinance by the state

trial courts, and the Florida Supreme Court's ruling on the

breast portion of the Ordinance, this Court is of the opinion that

the Florida Supreme Court would interpret the buttocks portion

s

7

APP. D-11

of the ordinance to prohibit exposure of any portion of the

buttocks. Further, the state's highest court would probably

define the word "buttocks" to include the area at the rear of the

body which lies between two imaginary lines running parallel

to the ground when a person is standing, the first or top such

line drawn at the top of the cleavage of the nates and the second

or bottom line drawn at the lowest visible point of this cleavage

or the lowest point of the curvature of the fleshy protuberance,

whichever is lower, and between two imaginary lines on each

side of the body, which lines are perpendicular to the ground

and to the horizonta,: lines described above, and which

perpendicular lines are drawn through the point at which each

nate meets the outer side of each leg. The Ordinance would be

violated, therefore, if any portion of this area is visible from

any vantage point. Since this is the "core meaning" which

“persons of ordinary intelligence" would draw from the

language of the Ordinance as it is written, the Ordinance is not

impermissible vague. See High Ol’ Times v.Busbee, 673 F.2d

1225 (11th Cir. 1982).

As to the questwcn whether the Ordinance prohibits

partial or only total exp ssure of the buttocks, since it would be

unreasonable to imagine that the City Council intended to

permit partial exposur> of the genitals, pubic area, vulva, anus

or anal cleft or cleavage, in light of the stated legislative

purpose to prohibit “nudity and sexual conduct and depiction

thereof coupled with alcohol in public place," and since the

words "or buttocks" appear as words in a series within the

APP. D-12

same clause as "genitals, public area, vulva, anus, or anal cleft

or cleavage,” a person of ordinary intelligence would assume

that the legislature intended to prohibit exposure of any portion

of the buttocks.

This construction is also consistent with the

interpretation of the buttocks provision by those charged with

enforcing the Ordinance. The officers who testified on the

subject stated that they interpreted the Ordinance as prohibiting

exposure of any portion of the buttocks. While the officers had

difficulty giving a precise definition of the term "buttocks," and

while they differed as to what would amount to a flagrant

violation for which they would arrests were made for, exposure

of areas of the buttocks outside the lines described above.

While two state trial courts have interpreted the

Ordinance to allow partial exposure of the buttocks and to

prohibit only exposure of the entire buttocks,’ the converse of

this Court's ruling, these state trial courts were apparently

straining to construe the statute narrowly in order to save it

from unconstitutional overbreadth. Later, in City of Daytona

Beach v. Del Percio, supra, the Florida Supreme Court

indicated that such narrow constructions were unnecessary in

light of the Twenty-first Amendment cases. The state Supreme

Court in that case was wil.ing to draw an imaginary line across

the top of the areolas, ad it seems probable that it would draw

7 See Order of County Judge Josephson dated September 23, 1982,

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 5-C' and Order of County Judge McDermoit dated April

21, 1983, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 5-K and L.

APP. D-13

the lines described here as to the buttocks portion of the

Ordinance.

Il, SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE

ORDINANCE

Plaintiffs have also argued that the Ordinance has been

selectively enforced against them. To establish their claim of

selective enforcement, the Plaintiffs would have to show (1)

that they have been sing!ed out for prosecution while others

who are similarly situated have not been prosecuted while

others who are similarly situated have not been prosecuted, and

(2) that the selection of Plaintiffs for prosecution was invidious

or in bad faith. Fillingim v, Boone, 835 F.2d 1389, 1399

(11th Cir. 1988); Lanier v, City of Newton, 842 F.2d 253, 256

(11th Cir. 1988).

The court finds that Plaintiffs have set forth evidence

sufficient to meet the first prong of the selective enforcement

test. Section 5-25 has been enforced almost exclusively against

those presenting partially nude, non-obscene dance as

entertainment, even though by its terms the Ordinance is

applicable to all non-residential establishments dealing in

alcoholic beverages and even though violations of the

Ordinance do occur in other such establishments.

Plaintiffs have not shown, however, that the City's

prosecution of Plainti1's was invidious or in bad faith. The

United States Supreme Court has made clear that "the

conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in

itself a federal constitutional violation." Oyler v, Boles, 368

U.S. 448, 456 (1962); see also Owen v, Wainnght, 806 F.2d

APP. D-14

1519 (11th Cir. 1986), cert, denied sub nom, Owen v, Dugger,

481 U.S. 1071 (1987). As stated by the Eleventh Circuit,

"(t]he invidiousness requirement is satisfied oniy if-it can be

established that the government's selective prosecution is

motivated by constitutionally impermissible motives such as

racial or religious discrimination or interference with the

legitimate exercise of constitutional rights." Fillingim, supra at

1399, citing United States v. Lichtenstein, 610 F.2d 1272,

1281 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom, Bella v. United

States, 447 U.S. 907 (1980). While the Ordinance here affects

the exercise of constitutional rights, the selectivity evidenced by

the City in enforcing this Ordinance was not shown to have

been motivated by an intent to interfere with such nghts. Nor

have Plaintiffs suggested any other impermissible motive on the

part of the Defendants.

Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that Defendants

attempted to do anything other than effectuate the intent of the

Ordinance. While the Plaintiffs have offered no evidence of an

invidious motive, the City has indicated that it chose to enforce

the Ordinance against these particular Plaintiffs because the

violations of the Ordinance by these Plaintiffs have been

longstanding and flagrant and because these Plaintiffs have had

knowledge and fair w:rning of the Ordinance's provisions.®

Defendants have also convincingly demonstrated that

8 These warning include, but are not limited to, letters sent by

police officers to the Plaintiffs’ establishments prior to initiating

enforcement of the Ordinance. See Defendants’ Exhibit 3.

APP. D-15

enforcement of the Ordinance in other establishments dealing in

alcoholic beverages would involve persons unaware of the

Ordinance and, during events such as bike week and spring

break, would often be impractical, in some circumstances

endangering the safety of the officers and/or the public. The

burden of proof in establishing a claim of selective prosecution

is a heavy one. Fillingim, supra at 1398, citing United States

v. Johnson, 577 F.2d '304, 1308 (Sth Cir. 1978). Plaintiffs

have not met it here.

III. Conclusion

In summary, the Court not concludes that the

provisions of Daytona Beach City code Section 5-25

prohibiting buttocks exposure, as well as the provisions

prohibiting breast exposure, are not unconstitutional facially or

as applied, and that the Ordinance has not been selectively

enforced in a manner violative of Plaintiffs’ constitutional

rights. The issue of damages, therefore, is moot, and the case

is DISMISSED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chamber at Orlando,

Florida, this 15 day of March, 1989.

PATRICIA C. FAWSETT

{JNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

All counsel of Record

APP. D-16

APPENDIX E

IN THE COUNTY COURT,

SEVENTH JUDICIAL

CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR

VOLUSIA COUNTY,

FLORIDA

THE CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH,

v.

LENA LENORA DUCILLE, CASE NO. V82-6886-DB

Defendant.

THE CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH

v.

LESLIE JENNINGS GRIER, CASE NO. V82-6880-DB

Defendant.

ORDER

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the Defendant's

Motions to Dismiss the carges filed against them by the City of

Daytona Beach. This is the case of the bottomless ordinance.

The Defendants are charged with Violation of City

Ordinance 5-25 (a) which provides as follows:

"No person shall expose to public view his or her

genitals, pubic area, vulva, anus, anal cleft or cleavage

or buttocks or any simulation thereor in an

establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages."

APP.E-1

The cnarging instrument (SA-751) alleges that Ms.

Ducille “while employed by the above establishment and

performing on state in front of an audience of approx. 20

people perform three dances where her buttocks were exposed

to view. The small panties that the def. was wearing would

Slide into the anal cleft and the def. made made no attempt to

correct the violation.”

_ With reference to Ms. Grier, the charging instrument

(SA-751) states, "Def. wore a G-string type lower panty set

that clearly revealed def's buttocks. Panty covered the front

area of def., but oniy had a thin string down rear buttocks area.

The Defendants Motions to Dismiss raises several

points, one of which can be referred to as a C-4 Motion in

which it is asserted that there are no material disputed facts and

the undisputed facts failed to establish a prima facie case. One

of the facts asserted in the Motions to Dismiss was that the

defendant's buttocks were at least "partially covered."

The City did not traverse the Motion to Dismiss so that

the factual matters alleged in the Motion to Dismiss are deemed

admitted. (See Rule 3.190(d) FrCP).

The defendants also assert in their Motions to Dismiss

the constitutionality of the Ordinance on several grounds.

The constitution:'ity of the Ordinance and Ordinances

of similar nature have already been declared constitutional by

our Appellate Courts and the constitutionality of this particular

ordinance is now pending in the Circuit Court in this Judicial

APP.E-2

Circuit. (See Board of Commissioners of Lee County v.

Dexterhouse 348 So.2d 916 affirmed, Martin v, Board of

County Commissioners of Lee County, 364 So.2d 449, appeal

dismissed, 99 S.Ct. 2024, Del Percio v, City of Daytona

Beach, V81-11598-DB appeal number 82-1243-CA-0i-D)

It is a long established rule that Courts will not consider

the constitutionality of an ordinance unless it is necessary to do

so in order to dispose of the problem at hand (North American

Company v. Green 120 So.2d 603)

In the case at bar, the Court finds that it is not necessary

to consider the Constitutionality of the specific section of the

ordinance attacked in order to dispose of the matter. This

matter can be disposed of on a factual basis, rather than as a

matter of law.

The City, by failing to file a traverse to the Motions to

Dismiss admits that the defendant's buttocks were partially

covered.

"Buttocks" as defined in Webster's Seventh New

Collegiate Dictionary is as follows:

"Either rounded hal‘ of the lower part-of the back

together forming the part on which a person sits.”

It is also defined in Gould Medical Dictionary 3rd

Edition, McGraw-Hill, Inc., as being:

ret

"One of the two fleshy parts of the bodys posteria to

the hip joint."

APP.E-3

By the definitions there is no precise point at which the

buttocks begins or ends and covers a wide undefined area.

At least the ordinance in question, by proscribing the

exposure of breasts has a reference point by prohibiting the

exposing of the breast "below the top of the areola" (See

Section 5-25(g)) This is a reasonable restraint, otherwise any

person entering an establishment where alcoholic beverages are

served and wearing a low cut dress would be subject to

violation, having exposed the upper portion of her breast.

In todays society where the female dress code is quite

liberal, especially in bathing suit wear where female persons

waear bikinis and french cut bathing suits, much of their

buttocks are exposed to public view and can even be seen on

television advertisemeats. One might even include females

who wear "short shorts" and do their shopping in supermarkets

where alcoholic beverages are sold (See Steffens v. State 343

So.2d 90)

In Florida State Racing Commission v. McLaughlin

120 So.2d 574 it was held that the use by the Legislature of a

comprehensive term ordinarily indicates everything embraced

within the term.

In construing an ambiguous statute it is proper to take

into consideration the pa‘ticular evils at which the legislation is

aimed or mischief soug!it to be awarded (30) Fla Jur, Page

203)

The word buttocks by medical definition and common

language is to say the least ambiguous for one cannot define the

APP.E-4

beginning or ending of that part of the anatomy. The evil

sought to be avoided by this ordinance is nude dancing, not

semi-nude dancing. To construe the ordinance to read partially

exposed buttocks would please an unbridled discretion upon

the Courts to determine how much of the buttocks should be

partially exposed in order to find a violation of the ordinance.

It is therefore the interpretation of this Court that in

order to find any person in violation of the ordinance, all of his

or her buttocks must be exposed.

Admitting that the defendant's buttocks were partially

covered the Court finds that the City is unable to prove a prime

facia case.

With reference to the Defendant Ducille, she is charged

with a second violation of Ordinance 5-25 in that the charging

instrument (SA-751) alleges as follows:

"While employed by the above establishment approach

an unidentified white male in the area of the pin ball

machine and allow inerself to be hugged and kissed.

The white male was further observed to caress and

fondle the co-def around the ; f the buttocks in

plain view of approx. 30 patrons in the establishment."

underlines supplied.

Section 5-25(c) which s.ates:

"No person shall er.gage in and no person maintaining,

owning, or operating an establishment dealing in

alcoholic beverages shall suffer or permit any sexual

intercourse, masturbation, sodomy, beastiality, oral

copulation, flageliation, any sexual act which is

prohibited by law, touching, carressing or fondling of

the breast, buttocks, anus or genitals or the simulation

APP.E-S5

thereof within an establishment dealing in alcoholic

beverages."

The ordinance requires the touching or fondling of the

"buttocks" not the "area of the buttocks" as alleged in the

charging instrument. It is therefore the opinion of this Court

that the charging instrument is defective in failing to state a

violation of 5-25(c) of the ordinance, it is therefore

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motions to

Dismiss against these defendants on the charges pending

against them, be and the same, are hereby dismissed.

DONE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED in Chambers at

Halifax Law Center, Holly Hill, Volusia County, Florida this

23rd day of September, 1982.

NORTON JOSEPHSON

COUNTY COURT JUDGE

Copies to:

Frank B. Gummey, Esquire

City Attorney

Suite 213, City Hall

Post Office Box 551

Daytona Beach, Florida 32015

Eric A. Latinsky, Esquire

Attorney for Defendants

404 S. Atlantic Avenue

Ormond Beach, Flordida 32074

APP.E-6

APPENDIX F

IN THE COUNTY COURT

OF VOLUSIA COUNTY,

FLORIDA

CASE NO: V82-12397-DB

CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH,

Plaintiff,

VS.

LESLIE JENNINGS GRIER,

Defendant.

ORDER

THIS CAUSE came on the be heard on Defendant's

Motion to Dismiss. Defendant is charged with violating

Daytona Beach Ordinance #5-25(a) and 5-25(b) which provide:

(a) No person shall expose to public view his or her

genitals, public area, vulva, anus, anal cleft or cleavage

or buttocks or any simulation thereof in an

establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages.

(b) No female person shall expose to public view any

portion of her breasts below the top of the areola or

any simulation thereof in an establishment dealing in

alcoholic beverages.

Defendant's Motior: to Dismiss contends:

a. That the undisputed facts do not establish a prima

facie case of guilt;

APP.F-1

b. That the Ordinance is unconstitutionaliy overbroad

as applied to this Defendant, in violation of the United States

and Florida Constitutions;

c. That the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague as

applied to this Defendant, in violation of the United States and

Florida Constitutions;

d. That the charging document does not state an

offense under ordinance 5-25.

The Motion alleges as undisputed the following facts:

A. Defendant did not expose her entire buttocks;

B. Defendant did not expose her areola (or any portion

thereof);

C. Defendant did not expose that area directly

underneath her arecla.

The Court has considered the memoranda of law

prepared by counsel for the City and the Defendant, the City's

response to the Motion to Dismiss, the charging document and

the deposition in the court file as well as the arguments of

counsel at hearing.

In the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in

Schad v, City of Moun, Ephraim 68 L. Ed 2d 671 (1981)

which finds nude dancing to be a form of expression which is

constitutionally protected by the First Amendment, this

Ordinance is overbroa } if the incidental restriction on First

Amendment freedoms is greater than what is essential to the

furtherance of a substantial governmental interest.

The Court has determined, however, that any

constitutional infirmities presented by the ordinance can be

resolved by construing the Ordinance as written while

considering the City's Announced purpose to prohibit nudity

APP.F-2

and sexual conduct in establishments dealing in alcoholic

beverages.

The Florida Supreme Court has held in State v Cotney

104 So. 2d 346 (Fl. 1958) that it is a court's duty to adopt an

interpretation that in order for a person to be in violation of

Section (a) of the Ordinance all of his or her buttocks must be

exposed. This Court finds persuasive the reasoning of Judge

Josephson in the combined cases of City of Daytona Beach vs

Ducille and Grier (attached).

With this limitation engrafted on Section (a) the Court

finds that the Ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague or

overbroad.

The case of Spees v State (attached) in which Circuit

Court Judge Kaney in Orange County, Florida narrowly

construed Orange Cour.ty Ordinance 77-8 in reliance on Foley

v_State 50 So. 2d 179 (Fl. 1951) was also considered as

persuasive authority by this Court. In Spees the court

construed the phrase "at or below the areola thereof" to require

only that the areola itselt be covered.

The Court construes Section (b) of the Ordinance to

require a female person to expose at least a portion of her areola

to the public view in order to be in violation. With these

limitations engrafted the Court finds the Ordinance is not

unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.

The Court finds that the City's having failed to traverse

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, it is admitted that Defendant's

buttocks were partially covered and that no part of the areola

APP.F-3

was uncovered. Therefore, the City is unable to prove a prima

facie case.

It is therefore ordered and adjudged that the Motion is

granted and the pending charge dismissed.

DONE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED in Chambers

this ___ at the Courthouse Annex, New Smyrna Beach, Volusia

County, Florida this 21 day of April 1983.

Judge Michael McDermott

cc: Eric A. Latinsky, Esq.

Reginald Moore, Esq.

APP.F-4

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT IN

THE NINTH JUDICIAL

CIRCUIT IN AND FOR

ORANGE COUNTY,

FLORIDA

CASE NO. CJAP 78-72

JULIE ANN SPEES,

Appellant,

VS.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

OPINION

THE APPELLANT, hereinafter referred to as

Defendant, was charged with two violations of the anti-nude

dancing ordinance of Orange County, 77-8. She filed motions

to dismiss. Upon the cenial of these motions, she pled Nolo

Contendere, reserving the right to appeal these denials. She did

so directly to the Supreme Court on the basis that the trial court

ruled on the constitutionality of the ordinance. The Supreme

Court found no jurisdictional basis for the appeal, and

transferred the cause to tnis court. She raises three points on

this appeal:

The ordinance is unconstitutional due to vagueness and

overbreadth; it violates equal protection because it applies only

to establishments serving liquor for on premises consumption;

APP.F-5

and there was a lack of evidence that the beer served was an

alcoholic beverage. She looses on all three.

I affirm.

I shall deal with these in inverse order. The second

motion to dismiss dealt with the fact that the State could not

prove that the beer being sold was an “alcoholic beverage". It

did not have to. The ordinance dealt with the offering for sale

of alcoholic beverages and that does not require proof that the

beer here was an alcoholic beverage.

Defendant's next point goes to the violation of the equal

protection clause and is twofold. First, she complains that the

ordinance is directed only at establishments offering alcoholic

beverages for sale, i.e., nightclubs, and then only nightclubs in

the unincorporated areas of the county.

The equal protection clause does not outlaw all

classifications or distinctions, only the unreasonable in dealing

with parties similarly situated. Atlantic Coastline Railroad

Company vs. Coachman 1910 59 Fla. 130 52 So 377. The

Orange County Ordini:.ice is not unreasonable or arbitray. It

applies equaily to all "persons" similarly situated, that is, all

commercial establishments offering alcoholic beverage for sale

for on-premises consumption. The classification in that the

activities sought to be regulated occurs in those establishments,

not in garden shops, be: uty parlors, or five and dime stores.

Defendant contends that the ordinance must fall because

it applies only in the unincorporated areas of the county. She

Cites article section | (F) as authority for this contention. That

APP.F-6

section does not prevent the county from enacting an ordinance

applying only to the areas outside the municipalities. As a

matter of fact, the section provides that if there is a conflict

between the two governments, the county ordinance does not

apply within the municipal limits. In the present case none of

the municipalities have spoken on this subject one way or the

other. Orange County Ordinance 77-8 climates the possibility

of a conflict by exempting those areas wherein a municipality

has superior right to regulate the conduct of establishments

offering alcoholic beverages for sale for on the premises

consumption. o

Her last point deals with the claim of vagueness and

overbreadth of the ordir.ance.

Defendant contends that the word areola is not a word

of common understanding, and so the ordinance is vague. This

word is the anatomical word for tha: portion of the human

breast to which it applies. There can be no better word. But

this is a rather minor point.

Her primary thrust on the vagueness is that the words

“at or below the areola thereof" are not clear and concise and

that the ordinance as worded, makes criminal the wearing of a

padded bra and the excnsing of the anal cleft in the ladies

restroom.

A principle of judicial construction of laws is that the

court should construe the wishes of the legislative body in a

manner that would make the legislatiou constitutionally

permissible. The court has a duty to avoid a holding on

APP.F-7

unconstitutionality if a fair construction of the legislation will so

allow. As our Supreme Court said in Foley vs, State (951,

Fla.) 50 So 2d 179 "The general legislative intent will control

the strict letter of the statute where an advertence to the strict

letter would lead to absurdities or unreasonable conclusions."

"If the language of a particular provision imports an

absurd intent or one which leads to civil consequences, the

strict letter of the law may yield to the clear legislative intent."

It is clear to this court that the county commission did

not intend to prohibit ihe use of the restroom facilities in the

regulated establishments. In such restroom facilities it would

be necessary to expose certain portions of the anatomy thus the

ordinance could not be used to regulate ordinary or normal

conduct in such restrooms.

In accordance with the principles laid down in Foley the

court interprets the phrase "at or below the areola" to mean

from the upper portion oi the areola to the bottom of it on each

breast. This would not require a covering on a line running

from the top of one arcola across to the top of the other. That

interpretation would require more covering than is presently

seen on our beaches or vehind ski towboats.

With these limi:ations engrafted on the court finds and

so rules that the ordinance is constitutional and that the County

Court was correct in denying the motions to dismiss.

The order appealed from is affirmed.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Orlando,

Orange County, Florida this 7th day of September, 1979.

APP.F-8

FRANK N. KANEY, CIRCUIT JUDGE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing

Opinion has been furnished by mail/hand delivery to the office

of the State Attorney, 250 N. Orange Avenue, Orlando,

Florida, and to Richard L. Wilson, Esq., 27 E. Pine Street,

Orlando, Florida 32801, this 7th day of September, 1979.

Secretary

APP.F-9

APPENDIX G

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT,

SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIKCUIT, IN

AND FOR VOLUSIA COUNTY,

FLORIDA

APPEAL NO: 83-3161-CA-01-D

COUNTY CASE NO: V83-5736-DD

SUZANNE M. KEISER

Appeliant,

VS.

CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH,

Appellee.

OPINION

THIS CAUSE is an appeal from a "Final Order of

Disposition" entered in the county Court of volusia County on

August 22, 1983. That Order refers to and "clarifies" a prior

Order entered by the same Judge in April of 1983. Based on

this clarification the Defendant entered her plea of no contest,

reserving her right to appeal the denial of her motions to

dismiss.

APP.G-1

The appellant, the defendant below, was arrested on

May 3, 1983 and charged with violating Section 5-25(B)!' of

the Daytona Beach Municipal Code. The appellant had

performed a dance on stage at the Shingle Shack lounge in

Daytona Beach wearing "pasties," which covered only the

areola of her breasts. The appellant performed in this matter in

reliance on a prior ruling of the trial Judge in City of Daytona

Beach Vs. DelPinto, Case No: V82-13010-DB.2@

On the date of the trial, the trial Judge clarified this prior

ruling and agreed to withhold adjudication of guilt and waive

sanctions if the Defendant pled no contest. The clarification

(paragraph (5) of the Order being appealed) reads as follows:

"(S) that the undersigned hereby clarifies his Orders

entered in April of 1983 to rule that the areolae must be

concealed by a brassiere-type cover made of an opaque

fabric which does not and cannot adhere directly to the

breasts without the aid of supporting straps, for a

defendant to be found not to have violated the pertinent

sub-sections of the Code:”

The main issue for this Court's determination is of

whether the ordinace as interpreted by the trial court is

unconsttutionally overbroad.

1 "No female person shall expose to public view any portion of her

breasts below the top of the areola or any simulation thereof in an

establishment dealing in alconolic beverages."

2 "The Court construes Section (B) of the Ordinance to require a

female person to expose at least a portion of her areola to the public view

in order to be in violation.

APP.G-2

a a

The basic task for any court reviewing a statue of

ordinace which has been challenged as being overbroad, is

to attempt to give effect to the ordinance as written, while

at the same time interpreting the statute or ordinance as

written, while at the same time interpreting the statute or

ordinance so that its constitutionality is preserved. Here

that task involves reading the ordinance so that it prohibits

the exposure of breasts as described in the ordinance, but

without extending the prohibition to include those types of

attire which are commonly accepted by modern society.3

In todays society, women's dress standards are

quite liberal, especial in bathing suits and evening or

"cocktail" wear. The modern women is free to wear brief

bikinis, french cui bathing suits and varying degrees of

lowdresses and gowns.4

In its clarifying order of August 22, 1983 the tral

court interpreted the ordinance to require a certain type of

clothing-a brassier-type top with supporting straps. In

making this interpretation the trial court added terms to the

ordinance which were not placed there by the City of

Daytona Beach; and in so doing, the trial court brought

into the ordinance's prohibition many types of female attire

which are commonly accepted by modern society, thereby

3 Broadrick V. Okiahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.

2d 830, (1973): Schad V. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 L.Ed. 2d 67,

101 S.Ct. (1981).

4 City of Daytona Beach Vs. Ducille and Grier, Case No: V82-

6886-DB.

APP.G-3

rendering the ordinance overbroad. The City uf Daytona

Beach need not be accused of enacting an ordinace which

would outlaw in lounges and restaurants clothing which is

seen daily in public and even on prime-time television.

The trial court failed to apply the ancient doctrines of casus

Omissus, ¢xpressio unius est exclusio alterius. and ut res

magis valeat Quam pereat.

ACCORDINGLY, the Order of the trial court is

reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings

not inconsistent herewitn.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers at Daytona

Beach, Volusia County, Florida this 21 day of November,

A.D., 1983.

C. MCFERRIN SMITH, III

CIRCUIT JUDGE

APP.G-4

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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