Appendix — Environmental Waste Control, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1990
ENVIRONMENTAL WASTE CONTROL, INC., d/b/a
FOUR COUNTY LANDFILL, STEPHEN W. SHAMBAUGH,
JAMES A. WILKINS, and WEST HOLDING COMPANY,
INC.,
Petitioners
versus
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY,
Respondent,
and
SUPPORTERS TO OPPOSE POLLUTION, INC.,
Respondent
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Timothy J. Paris
Plews & Shadley
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS
1346 N. Delaware Street
Indianapolis, IN 46202
(317) 637-0700
L/< JZ
Table of Contents
United States Environmental Protection
Agency and Supporters to Oppose Pollution,
Inc. v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc.,
et. al., 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990)
ee ee pages 1-14
United States of America and Supporters to
Oppose Pollution, Inc. v. Environmental
Waste Control, Inc. et. al., 710 F.Supp.
1172 (N.D. Ind. 1989)
cocccecccccecs pages 1-343
United States of America (EPA) and STOP,
Inc. v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc.,
et. al., 698 F.Supp. 1422 (N.D._ Ind.
October 26, 1988)
PP ee eee pages 1-85
United States of America and Supporters to
Oppose Pollution, Inc. v. Environmental
Waste Control, Inc., et. al., (N.D. Ind.
August 2, 1988)
ere ee ee pages 1-28
United States of America v. Environmental
Waste Control, Inc., et. al., (N.D. Ind.
1987)
In the | :
United States Court of Appeals
Fur the Scventh Circuit
Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
and
SUPPORTERS TO OPPOSE POLLUTION, INCORPORATED,
Intervenor/Plaintiff-A ppellee,
vU.
ENVIRONMENTAL WASTE CONTROL, INCORPORATED,
doing business as Four County Landfill,
STEVEN W. SHAMBAUGH, JAMES A. WILKINS,
West HOLDING COMPANY, INCORPORATED,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern Distriet of Indiana, South Bend Division.
No. 87 C 55—Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge.
Arcurp JANUARY 25, 1990-—-DecipED OcToBER 31, 1990
Refore Woop, Jr., Cupany and Correy, Circuit Judges.
CubpaAny, Circuit Judge. The Environmental Protection
Agency, together with an environmental intervenor, Sup-
porters to Oppose Pollution, Inc., brought suit against En-
vironmental Waste Control (and its owners and operators)
2 Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197
in connection with a hazardous waste landfill operated by
Environmental Waste Control in Indiana. The district court
found against Environmental Waste Control, ordered the
offending landfill permanently closed (along with certain
other corrective measures) and assessed civil fines amount-
ing to almost $3,000,000. Environmental Waste Control
appeals. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This appeal arises from an enforcement action brought
by the United States, on behalf of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (the “EPA”’), to enforce hazardous waste
requirements under the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87, at Environ-
mental Waste Control’s Four County Landfill (the “Land-
fill’’) in Fulton County, Indiana. The United States brought
this action against Environmental Waste Control, James
Wilkins, and the West Holding Company as the Landfill’s
owners, and against Environmental Waste Control and
Steven Shambaugh as the Landfill’s operators. (All are
referred to collectively as ““EWC.”’)
RCRA establishes a comprehensive federal program gov-
erning the generation, transportation, storage and treat-
ment of hazardous wastes “to minimize the present and
future threat to human health and the environment.”’ 42
U.S.C. § 6902(b). 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a) requires that a haz
ardous waste facility be operated only in accordance with
a permit. Recognizing that the EPA could not issue per-
mits to all applicants before RCRA’s effective date, Con-
gress provided that a facility in existence as of November
19, 1980, could obtain “interim status,” allowing it lo con-
tinue operating until final action on its permit application.
42 ULS.C. § 6925(e); see also Northside Sanitary Land-
fill, lnc. v. Thomas, 804 i°.2d 371, 378-74 (7th Cir. 1986).
To obtain interim status, a facility is required to file a
limited “Part A application,” and is then “treated as hav-
ing been issued a permit.” 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e); Northside
Sanitary Landfill, 804 F.2d at 374. An interim status
Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197 3
facility must comply with the standards set forth in 40
C.F.R. pt. 265, which, among other things, mandates that
such a facility have a “ground-water monitoring program
capable of determining the facility’s irmpact on the quality
of ground water in the uppermost aquifer underlying the
facility” and also requires that an interim status facility
meet certain financial responsibility requirements.
Following the submission of the “Part A application,”
a facility must file a “Part B application” to obtain a per-
mit. Northside Sanitary Landfill, 804 F.2d at 374. Upon
successful completion of the Part B process, a hazardous
waste permit is issued, and the facility must comply with
this permit and the regulatory standards set forth in 40
C.F.R. pt. 264.
In 1984, Congress passed the Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments (the ““HSWA”) to RCRA. The HSWA were
adopted in response to concerns about widespread ground-
water contamination from interim status facilities. The
HSWA provide, in part, that all land disposal facilities
granted interim status before November 8, 1984, would
automatically lose that status on November 8, 1985, unless
the facility: (A) applied for a final Part B permit determi-
nation before November 8, 1985; and (B) certified that it
was “In compliance with applicable groundwater monitor-
ing and financial responsibility requirements.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 6925(eX2). RCRA also requires the owners and operators
of hazardous waste landfills to comply with minimum tech-
nology requirements which mandate the installation of two
or more liners and a leachate collection system for the
lateral expansion of interim status landfills with respect to
waste received after May 8, 1985. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924(0X1)(A)
and 69360h). When the EPA determines that there has
been a release of hazardous waste from an interim status
facility, the EPA may seek corrective action. 42 U.S.C.
§ 69ZH(hX1). Accordingly, the EPA filed suit against EWC
in federal court, alleging basically: (1) that the Landfill
had lost its interim status by failing to comply with the
applicable financial responsibility and groundwater moni-
toring requirements; (2) that EWC had violated RCRA’s
4 Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197
minimum technology requirements between May 8, 1985
and August 16, 1986; (3) that the Landfill’s groundwater
monitoring system did not comply with the applicable reg-
ulations; and (4) that hazardous waste or hazardous waste
constituents had been released at the Landfill, thereby
permitting the court to order a corrective measure study.
The EPA sought civil penalties and an order closing the
Landfill, at least temporarily. The Supporters to Oppose
Pollution (“STOP”), the environmental intervenor, joined
the EPA’s claims, but asked for a permanent, instead of
temporary, closing of the Landfill. STOP also brought ad-
ditional claims relating to the Landfill’s alleged release
of hazardous waste into the environment.
A month-long trial was held. In its Memorandum Opin-
ion and Order, the district court noted its shock and dis-
may at EWC’s conduct, explaining that EWC, while “af-
furded repeated opportunities to comply with RCRA re-
quirements . . . has responded by developing a dismal
history of delay, mis-performance, and noncompliance.” U.S.
EPA v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 710 F. Supp.
1172, 1247 (N.D. Ind. 1989). The district court essential-
ly found: that the Landfill had lost its interim status as
of November 8, 1985 because, as of that date, it had not
fully complied with the required financial assurance and
groundwater monitoring standards (id. at 1178, 1240); that
IWC had failed to maintain an adequate monitoring sys-
tem and had illegally disposed of hazardous wastes in cells
lacking liners (id. at 1220-25); and that, as a result of
EWC’s violations, there was a release of hazardous wastes
which contaminated groundwater underlying the Landfill
and which had the potential for contaminating nearby pri-
vate drinking wells (id. at 1227-28). The district court as-
sessed civil penalties of nearly $3,000,000 against EWC.
The district court also ordered IWC to undertake certain
corrective measures and, most importantly, permanently
enjoined the operation of the Landfill.
EWC appeals on the grounds that: (1) a permanent in-
junction was improper; (2) the Four County Landfill should
not have lost its interim status: (3) its current ground-
Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197 5
‘ater monitoring system is fully adequate, and (4) the cor-
rective action plan mandated by the district court was in-
appropriate for the conditions existing at the Four County
Landfill.! We affirm the judgment of the district court
in all respects.
II]. LeEGAL ANALYSIS
A. The Propriety of the Permanent Injunction
EWC claims that the enforcement of a permanent in-
junction against its landfill is improper because: (1) RCRA
does not authorize permanent closure in interim enforce-
ment cases; (2) the district court did not adequately con-
sider, or properly weigh, the competing equities; and (3)
the evidence adduced at trial showed that there had been
no substantial harmful effects on the environment. None
of EWC’s claims has merit.
EWC first contends that RCRA does not authorize per-
manent closure in interim status cases. We are puzzled
how EWC can seriously advance this argument. First, it
should be noted that the district court held that EWC
“has not argued that permanent closure is not an available
remedy.” Environmental Waste Control, 710 F. Supp. at
1245. Hence, in all likelihood, EWC has waived this argu-
ment. Regardless, the text of the relevant statute plain-
ly allows for a permanent injunction in interim status
cases such as this one.
42 U.S.C. section 6928(h\(1) is entitled “Interim status
corrective action” and provides:
1 In addition, EWC alleges several jurisdictional and other related
errors. The district court, in its well-reasoned Memorandum Opin-
ion and Order of March 29, 1989, rejected EWC’'s jurisdictional
claims. Environmental Waste Control, 710 F. Supp. at 1184-1201.
Because the district court's order adequately addresses and prop-
erly disposes of all the jugisdictional and other related arguments
EWC raises on appeal, we adopt its reasoning and conclusions.
6 Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197
Whenever on the basis of any information the Admin-
istrator [of the EPA] determines that there is or has
been a release of hazardous waste into the environ-
ment from a facility authorized to operate under sec-
tion 6925(e) of this title, the Administrator may issue
an order requiring corrective action or such other re-
sponse measure as he deems necessary to protect
human health or the environment or the Administra-
tor may commence a civil action in the United States
district court in the district in which the facility 1s
located for appropriate relief, iecluding a temporary
or permanent injunction. (emphasis supplied).
Hence, it is clear from the language of this section that
a permanent injunction is an available remedy in interim
status cases. When the text and meaning of a statute are
clear, we will not look to legislative history. United States
v. Sager, 881 F.2d 364, 365-66 (7th Cir. 1989).
EWC’s next contention, that the district court did not
properly balance the competing equities, is simply incor-
rect. The record shows that the district court, in fact,
went to great pains to outline the reasons (which included
threats to the environment) for its decision to permanently
enjoin the operation of EWC’s landfill. Enwironmental Waste
Control, 710 F. Supp. 1245-47. Moreover, it is clear that
the district court specifically undertook to balance the
benefit to the public against the harm to the public in
this case. Jd. at 1247 (“The risk to the public of any con-
tinued operation of the Four County Landfill by EWC
greatly outweighs any harm from permanent closure.”’’).
In addition, we think it beyond question, given the district
court’s findings, that a remedy at law would have been
inadequate in this case. As the Supreme Court noted in
Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545
(1987):
Environmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be
adequately remedied by money damages and is often
permanent or at least of long duration, 7.e., irrepa-
rable. If such injury is sufficiently likely, therefore,
Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197 7
the balanee of harms will usually favor the issuance
of an injunction to protect the environment.
Hence, the record shows that the district court did bal-
ance the competing equities both thoroughly and correctly
in this case—notwithstanding that it may not have even
been required to undertake such a balance. It is an ac-
cepted equitable principle that a court does not: have to
balance the equities in a case where the defendant’s con-
duct has been willful. See Guam Scottish Rite Bodies v.
Flores, 486 F.2d 748, 749 (9th Cir. 1973). As noted earlier,
the district court essentially found that EWC’s conduct
had been willful. Moreover, as the Fourth Circuit noted,
relying on an opinion of ours:
the law of injunctions differs with respect to govern-
mental plaintiffs (or private attorneys general) as op-
posed to private individuals. Where the plaintiff is
a sovereign and where the activity may endanger the
public health, “injunctive relief is proper, without
resort to balancing.” I/linois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d
151, 166 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 451
U.S. 304 (1981). Second, in cases of public health leg-
islation, the emphasis shifts from irreparable injury
to concern for the general public interest .
Environmental Defense Fund, Ine. v. Lamphier, 714 F.2d
331, 337-38 (4th Cir. 1983).
For all the foregoing reasons, we find that the district
court’s decision to issue a permanent injunetion against
EWC was correct and was supported by the potential
danger to the environment and to public health.?
2 Our conclusion is in no way changed by the fact that it was
STOP, and not the (PA, that asked for permanent closure of the
Landfill. The right to intervene, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 96130)
(1987 Supp.), permits citizens to press the same procedural and
substantive claims that the United States may pursue. See also
Environmental Waste Control, 710 F. Supp. at 1245 n.73.
8 Nos. -89-1865 & &9-2197
B. The Loss of Environmental Waste Control’s “Interim
Status”’
EWC contends that the Four County Landfill never lost
its interim status, despite the contrary finding of the dis-
trict court, because (1) EWC’s insurance complied with
all applicable regulations as of November 8, 1985, or, in
the alternative, because the district court should have con-
sidered good faith a defense to the failure to carry the
required amount of insurance; and (2) because EWC was
actually in compliance with the applicable hazardous waste
groundw ater monitoring requirements as of November 8,
1985.
Under RCRA’s interim status provision, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6925(e\(2), the failure of a landfill to meet either the
applicable financial responsibility or groundwater monitor-
ing requirements, as of November 5, 1985, automatically
results in the loss of interim status. Because we find that
EWC failed to carry the required amount of insurance
and because good faith is not an adequate defense to com-
plianee with these financial regulations, EWC lost its in-
terim status as of November 8, 1985. We therefore need
not address EWC’s allegations concerning whether the
Landfill met the groundwater monitoring standards re-
quired of interim status facilities as of November 8, 1985.
With respect to RCRA’s financial responsibility require-
ments for interim status facilities, EWC makes five argu-
ments (all of which were rejected by the district court):
(1) that the applicable insurance regulations did not ex-
pressly require that the prescribed amounts of required
coverage be aggregated (and EWC, which had not aggre-
gated, therefore had enough); (2) that EWC’s coverage
was adequate because it was approved by the Indiana
Department of Environmental Management;? (3) that the
3 Given that the federal government has not delegated enforce-
ment of the strictures of the HSWA to the states, EWC cannot
rely on Indiana’s approval of its insurance policy as proof that it
complied with federal law. See Environmental Waste Control, 710
F. Supp. at 1183.
Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197 9
KPA was estopped from asserting that a higher amount
of insurance was necessary because an operator of the
EPA’s “hot line” assured EWC’s insurance broker that
$3,000,000/$6,000,000 was adequate; (4) that an endorsement
on I; WC’s primary policy was in force which provided an
assurance that EWC’s policy complied with RCRA’s re-
quirements; and (5) that another policy was in force which,
coupled with EWC’s primary policy, met the statutory
requirements.
EWC initially challenges the district court’s ruling that
the EPA’s interim status regulations required total cov-
erage for sudden and nonsudden occurrences of $4,000,000
per occurrence and $8,006,000 in the aggregate. The rele-
vant financial responsibility regulations are set forth in
40 C.FLR. § 265.147. Subpart (a) requires, with respect
to hazardous waste treatment, storage or disposal facil-
ities, that:
[t]he owner or operator must have and maintain lia-
bility coverage for sudden accidental occurrences in
the amount of at least $1 million per cecurrence with
an annual agyreyate of at least $2 million, exclusive
of legal defense costs.
Subpart (b) applies to surface impoundments, landfills or
land treatment facilities and requires that:
[t]he owner or operator must have and maintain lia-
bility coverage for nonsudden accidental occurrences
in the amount of at least $3 million per occurrence
with an annual aggregate of at least $6 million, exclu-
sive of legal defense costs.
The district court held that because both subparts applied
to the operations of “WC, EWC was required to comply
with the financial strictures of both, totaling $4,000,000
per occurrence with an annual aggregate of $4,000,000.
Environmental Waste Control, 710 F. Supp. at 1209-10.
EWC contends that the requirements “nowhere express-
ly stated that a total of $4 million per occurrence and $8
million annual aggregate was required for a combined lim-
10 Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197
its policy.”” Appellants’ Brief at 33. (EWC carried an in-
surance policy which covered only $3,000,000 per occur-
rence and had an annual aggregate of $6,000,000.) But we
think that the requirements were clear. The separate sub-
parts applied to different types of occurrences. Each sub-
part had to be satisfied. Aggregation was therefore re-
quired. As noted previously, we will not look past statu-
tory or regulatory language when the text is clear. See
United States v. Sager, 881 F.2d at 365-66.
EWC argues, however, that the 1988 amendment to
these regulations, which explicitly calls for aggregation
of the interim status insurance requirements, and the 1981
draft of the regulations (which also contained an aggrega-
tion provision that was later deleted) support its theory
that aggregation was not required uni the 1988 amend-
ment. Appellants’ Bricf at 33-36. We do not agree. Per-
haps Congress, or the EPA, thought that the regulation
was clear without a specific aggregation provision—clear,
that is, until interim status facilities’ operators tried to
avoid the requirement by arguing that aggregation was
not required. In sum, we think that the language of this
regulation was sufficiently clear to preclude a presump-
tion that the 1988 amendments were meant to change,
rather than clarify, existing law. Indeed, the 1988 rule
states that it is merely “specifying more clearly” the ag-
gregate coverage mechanisms required by combined cov-
erage mechanisms (53 Fed. Reg. at 33,939); that the EPA
decided “to maintain the present scope of coverage” (id.
at 33,946); and that the modification “does not add any
compliance requirements” (id. at 23,949).
KWC’s other arguments pertaining to the insurance -re-
quirements applicable to interim status facilities can be
similarly rejected. Information provided by a government
hot line cannot be enough to estop the government from
enforcing violations of federal law. See Crown v. United
States PR. FP. Retirement Bd., 811 F.2d 1017, 1021 (7th Cir.
1987). Moreover, we hold that reliance on such a hot line
here was not reasonable, given the clarity of the regula
tions. With respect to EWC’s claims regarding the en-
Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197 11
dorsement and the additicnal insurance policy, we find
that the district court was correct in rejecting these
arguments. The endursement, for example, clearly states
that it does not modify the policy, the terms of which
were only $3,000,000 per occurrence and $6,000,000 in the
aggregate. And, the district court expressly excluded evi-
dence regarding EWC’s second insurance policy, a policy
which had probably expired and which was never iden-
tified to the EPA (or to the district court until 169 weeks
into the instant lawsuit) as a source of coverage. Given
the facts, this exclusion was clearly appropriate. We there-
fore reject EWC’s claims that it complied with the appli-
cable financial responsibility regulations. Accordingly, the
Jour County Landfill lost its interim status as of Novem-
ber &, 1985.4
C. The Adequacy of EWC’s Groundwater Monitoring
System
The district court held that the groundwater monitor-
ing system at the Landfill did not meet the required stan-
dards as of November 8, 1985, and also held that, even
4 EWC asserts that its good faith should be a defense to non-
compliance with the groundwater monitoring and financial respon-
sibility requirements imposed upon interim status facilities. The
district court rejected this argument on the grounds that EWC’'s
“ood faith’ —while relevant to the scope of relief and penaltics—
was not relevant to whether EWC actually complied with the fed-
eral requirements. Environmental Waste Control, 710 F. Supp.
at 1212-15. We agree. The fact that EWC attempted to comply
with the insurance regulations and that no harm resulted from
EWC's uuder-insurance is simply irre ant. The facet still remains
that EWC failed to meet federal standards, a failure which de-
prived EWC of its interim status. Given the environmental prob-
lems facing the world today and the federal laws in question, we
think that it would be counterproductive to read a ‘“pood faith”
defense where none exists. We will not excuse EWC from failing
to satisfy the requirements of our environmental Jaws. Hence, we
think that the ‘district court’s decision not to recognize a “good
faith’’ defense here was eminently sound.
12 Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197
at. the start of trial. the Landfill did not have a compliant
groundwater monitoring system. In this regard, the dis-
trict court noted that
[tlhe purpose of a hazardous waste landfill’s ground-
water monitoring system is to detect immediately the
migration of hazardous waste or hazardous waste con-
stituents from the waste management area into the
environment so that any necessary corrective or re-
medial action can be taken. Among the major threats
a hazardous waste landfill may pose to public health
and the environment is the potential that hazardous
constituents may escape and contaminate the ground-
water beneath the facility.
oe ee ee
The design, construction, and depth of [the Landfill’s]
groundwater monitoring wells have prevented EWC
and its consultants from learning the extent and per-
meahility of the uppermost aquifer, which precludes
confident assessment of the groundwater flow’s hori-
zontal and vertical direction and velocity. One can-
not design a meaningful groundwater monitoring sys-
tem without knowing the location of the uppermost
aquifer and direction of the groundwater flow. EWC
has not aequired that knowledge.
Environmental Waste Control, 710 F. Supp. at 1222. Hence,
the district court found that EWC was in continuing viola-
tion of 40 C.F.R. section 265.90(a), which requires that
an interim status facility have a groundwater monitoring
program that is “capable of determining the facility’s im-
pact on the quality of ground water in the uppermost
aquifer."5 Id. at 1225.
5 The district court explained that
lalu aquifer is a geologic formation, group of formations, or
part of a formation capable of yielding a significant amount
of groundwater to wells or springs. The uppermost. aquifer is
that nearest the natural ground surface snd includes the lower
aquifers that are hydraulically interconnected to that aquifer
within the facility’s property boundary.
Environmental Waste Control, 710 F. Supp. at 1213 n.33.
Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197 13
The thrust of EWC’s complaint on appeal seems to be
that the district court erred in not admitting newly ob-
tained data into evidence or, in the alternative, that the
district court erred in finding EWC’s groundwater moni-
toring system to be inadequate. Whether EWC’s ground-
water monitoring system complied with federal law is a
question of fact which will not be disturbed unless clear-
ly erroneous. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1984).
Our review of the record leads us to the conclusion that
there was no clear error here. The new data proffered
by EWC came too late for its probative value to outweigh
its prejudice. Appellee’s Brief at 37 (citing Tr. 3582-83,
3591-92). Moreover, the evidence in the record was suffi-
cient to-sustain the court’s extensive findings. We there-
fore affirm the district court’s decision as to the inade-
quacy of HWC’'s groundwater monitoring system.
D. The District Court’s Corrective Action Plan
Finally. EWC contends that the corrective action plan
imposed by the district court was inappropriate for the
conditions existing at the Landfili. Again, we disagree.
The assessment of penalties is committed to the informed
discretion of the trial court, and will be reversed only
upon a showing that the district court abused its discre-
tion. United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420
U.S. 228, 229 n.6 (1975). EWC has offered us no sceund
reason Which would justify a finding that the district court
abused its discretion in deciding om the corrective action
plan and other remedies, remedies which were clearly im-
posed only after thoughtful examination and assessment
of the evidence and applicable law. See Environmental
Waste Control, 710 F. Supp. 1241-49.
As to other matters raised by EWC, they have been
considered and have been found to be without merit.
14 Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197
I1J. CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the thorough and well-
reasoned opinion of the district court is AFFIRMED.
A true Copy:
Teste:
Clerk of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
USCA 79004—Midwest Law Prnting Co., Inc., Chicago—10-31-90—500
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff
and
SUPPORTERS TO OPPOSE
POLLUTION, INC,
Intervenor-Plaintiff
CAUSE NO.
S$87-55
Vs.
ENVIRONMENTAL WASTE CONTROL,
ones Oe BL.,
meee ee ee ee eee ee ee ee
Defendant
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This cause came before the court
for trial without intervention of jury
commencing December 5, 1988. Following
thirty-one days of evidence and argument,
the court now enters this memorandum
opinion intended to comply with Fed. R.
Civ. P. 52(a).
The case involves several issues
of law on which no court has ruled before.
The United States Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") and a citizens' group known
as Supporters to Oppose Pollution, Inc.
("STOP") claim that federal statutes and
regulations have been violated in the
operation of a hazardous waste disposal
facility known as the Four County Landfill.
The EPA and STOP bring their claims under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 ("RCRA"), and its
implementing regulations. The court holds
that the EPA has proven that the Landfill
has cperated illegally since November 8,
1985 and so can operate no longer in its
present status. Further, hazardous waste
constituents buried at the Landfill have
been released into the groundwater and air.
Based on those and other violations of
federal law, as well as the history of the
Landfill's operation, the court concludes
that the Landfill should be closed per-
manently, that a civil penalty of
$2,778,000 should be assessed against the
defendants, and that the defendants should
be ordered to implement a plan of action to
correct their release of hazardous waste
constituents into the groundwater.
In Part I of this memorandum, the
court sets forth the claims brought by the
EPA and STOP and describes the location and
geography of the Four County Landfill, the
relationship between the defendants, and
the regulatory history of the Landfill. In
conjunction with the Landfill's regulatory
history, Part I of the memorandum also
discusses the general regulatory scheme of
RCRA.
Part II of the memorandum
discusses the defendants' various technical
challenges to the suit. In Part II, the
court concludes: (A) that it has
jurisdiction over the EPA's suit although
Indiana is an “authorized state" for
purposes of RCRA enforcement; (B) that
STOP's asserted failure to give notice to
the defendants or to the State of Indiana
does not deprive the court of jurisdiction
over its claims; (C) that the doctrines
collectively described as "primary
jurisdiction" do not preclude consideration
of the claims brought by the EPA and STOP;
and (D) that principles of collateral
estoppel do not preclude the claims brought
by the EPA and STOP, notwithstanding an
earlier agreed order in state
administrative proceedings.
Part III addresses whether
defendant Stephen Shambaugh may be held
liable under RCRA as an "operator" of the
Landfill although a corporate defendant
also iS an operator, and the court
determines that he may be held liable.
Part IV of the memorandum
addresses the EPA's.claims.
Part IV-A addresses the EPA's
claim that the Landfill has lost its
interim status (its basis for operation
pending final determination of its
application for a permit to _ operate)
because the certificate of compliance the
defendants filed pursuant to RCRA _ was
false. In Part IV-A-1, the court concludes
that the mere filing of a certificate does
not satisfy RCRA. The certificate must
have been true.
In Part IV-A-2, the court holds
that the Landfill's certificate was false
because its insurance coverage was insuffi-
cient to meet the financial responsibility
requirements that applied at the time of
the certification. In reaching that
conclusion, the court rejects the
defendants' arguments that its insurance
coverage amounted to the level the EPA
maintains was required, determines that the
EPA's interpretation of the regulatory -
requirements is correct, rejects the
defendants' argument that the EPA is
estopped from enforcing the regulations
because of misinformation provided to the
Landfill's insurance agent over the EPA's
"hot line", and rejects the defendants'
argument that its good faith constitutes a
defense to the EPA's claim.
In Part IV-A-2, the court
concludes that the Landfill's certificate
cf compliance was false because its
groundwater monitoring system was
inadequate at the time of its certification
in November, 1985. In reaching that
conclusion, the court rejects the
defendants' argument that the regulations
upon which the EPA relies were inapplicable
because the Landfill was in "assessment
mode" rather than "detection mode", rejects
the defendants' argument that a state
administrative order and subsequent state
inaction prevented them from complying with
the regulations, rejects the defendants'
argument that their groundwater monitoring
wells actually were in the best location to
detect migrating hazardous waste
constituents, and rejects the defendants'
argument that the EPA has mischaracterized
the "waste management area" for purposes of
placement of monitoring wells. The court
also concludes that one monitoring well
critical to compliance with the regulations
was inadequate under the’ regulations
because it was sealed improperly.
Part IV-B of the memorandum
discusses the EPA's claim that~ the
defendants violated RCRA | by placing
hazardous waste in unlined cells for a
period of several months. The court
earlier held, on summary -udgment, that the
defendants had violated that provision.
In Part IV-C of the memorandun,
the court addresses the EPA's contention
that the Landfill's groundwater monitoring
system failed, even in 1988, to satisfy
RCRA requirements. In that portion of the
memorandum, the court holds that because of
defects in the depth and construction of
the defendants' monitoring wells, and
because of the defendants' failure to
determine both the extent of the uppermost
aquifer and the permeability of the
materials beneath the Landfill, the defen-
dants have violated that RCRA regulation
requiring an adequate groundwater
monitoring system.
In Part IV-D of the memorandun,
the court finds that hazardous’ waste
constituents have been released into the
groundwater beneath the Four County
Landfill and that corrective action is
required.
Part V of the memorandum addresses
the additional claims raised by the
intervenor, STOP.
Part V-A addresses STOP's various
claims that hazardous waste constituents
have been released into the environment
beyond the Four County Landfill's
boundaries. In that portion of the
memorandum, the court finds that STOP has
not proven that hazardous waste
constituents have left the landfill site
through the groundwater, but that STOP has
proven that hazardous waste constituents
have been spread to areas surrounding the
Four County Landfill by wind dispersal and
by surface water leaving the landfill site
after coming into contact with hazardous
waste.
The remaining portions of Part V
address, and reject, STOP's other claims.
In Part V-B, the court discusses STOP's
claim that the defendants improperly
accepted ignitable waste. Part V-C
analyzes STOP's claim that the defendants
improperly accepted free liquids. Part V-
D addresses STOP's contention that the
defendants handled barrels of hazardous
waste negligently. Part V-E discusses
STOP's claim that the defendants improperly
accepted hazardous waste that was not
listed on the manifests that accompanied
the waste. In each of these parts, the
court concludes that STOP has not proven
its claim by a preponderance of the
evidence.
Part VI addresses the penalties to
be imposed on the defendants for the
violations that are found to have occurred.
In~—that portion of the memorandum, the
10
court determines that the Four County
Landfill must be closed immediately because
its failure to have sufficient insurance
and an adequate groundwater monitoring
system in November, 1985 ended its right to
continue to operate under "interim status",
that is until its final application for a
permit is granted. The court also
determines in Part VI that the seriousness
of the violations and the defendants' poor
performance record warrant closing the Four
County Landfill permanently. In Part VI,
the court also concludes that the
defendants must undertake a _ corrective
action sian to address the release of
hazardous waste constituents into’ the
groundwater, must pay civil penalties
amounting to $2,778,000, and must pay the
reasonable attorney fees and expenses
incurred by STOP.
11
I. BACKGROUND
The EPA initiated this action
pursuant to the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6901,
addressing a hazardous waste landfill known
as the Four County Landfill ("the
Landfill") located in Fulton County,
Indiana. © Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i),
the court allowed intervention by a citi-
zens' organization known as Supporters to
Oppose Pollution, Inc., or "STOP".
The four defendants are the
Landfill's alleged owners and operators.
Environmental Waste Control, inc.
("Environmental Waste") is an Indiana
corporation that operates the Landfill.
West Holding Company, an Indiana corpora-
tion, owns all Environmental Waste stock
and the land on which the Landfill is
located. James A. Wilkins is president of
12
West Holding Company and until recently
owned the land on which the Landfill is
located. Stephen W. Shambaugh is president
of Environmental Waste, vice-president of
West Holding Company, and until recently
was the sole shareholder of Environmental
Waste. The court will refer to the
defendants collectively as "EWC".
A. The EPA's Claims
The EPA's second amended complaint
states four claims for relief. In its
first claim, the EPA contends that the
Landfill should be closed, at least
temporarily, because the Landfill lost its
interim status to operate a land disposal
facility on November 8, 1985, and since
then has been operating illegally. The EPA
seeks civil penalties and an order closing
the Landfill until its final application
for a permit to operate is’ finally
resolved. In the second claim, the EPA
13
alleges that EWC violated RCRA's "minimum
technology" requirements by disposing of
hazardous wastes in areas not equipped with
liners and required equipment between May
8, 1985 and August 19, 1986. In this
claim, the EPA seeks civil penalties. The
third claim alleges that the Landfill's
groundwater monitoring system does not
comply with applicable regulations; the EPA
seeks civil penalties and injunctive relief
requiring the defendants to bring that
system into compliance. With respect to
each of these claims, the EPA seeks civil
penalties of $25,000 per day of violation.
The fourth claim alleges that a
release of hazardous waste or hazardous
waste constituents has occurred at the
Landfill and asks the court to order a
corrective measures study to determine the
steps needed to deal with that release.
14
B. STOP's Claims
STOP joins in the EPA's’ four
claims, but, unlike the EPA, seeks nothing
short of permanent closure. Most of STOP's
additional claims are based on allegations
that EWC has allowed hazardous waste or
hazardous waste constituents to be released
into the environment through the air,
groundwater, and surface water. STOP
contends that EWC failed to place cover
over hazardous wastes after the wastes were
deposited in the Landfill; that EWC has
failed to install and implement a proper
system for control of runoff from hazardous
waste areas and run-on that flows onto
hazardous waste areas; that EWC has allowed
the integrity of the Landfill's run-on and
runoff control systems to be impaired; and
that the Landfill has discharged
contaminated water into the waters of the
State of Indiana.
io
0 EE
STOP also claims that EWC
improperly accepted ignitable and self-
combustible materials; that EWC improperly
received uncontainerized liquid hazardous
wastes; that Landfill personnel have
handled containers of hazardous waste
negligently, allowing the containers to
rupture and leak; and that EWC has accepted
loads of hazardous waste without’ the
detailed chemical analysis required by
regulations.
Cc. The History of the Landfill's Requlation
and Ownership
1. Location and Geography
The Four County Landfill is
located near the communities of Culver,
DeLong, and Leiters Ford in Fulton County,
Indiana. The site on which the Landfill is
located consists of approximately 61.5
acres astride State Road 17. The area
surrounding the Landfill is rural and
16
agricultural, consisting of open fields,
wetlands, wooded lots and cultivated land,
and year-round and seasonal homes. No
hazardous waste generating industry is
located near the Landfill.
The Tippecanoe River runs less
than one mile north-northeast from the
Landfill; Kings Lake lies directly east of
the Landfill. Three residences with
domestic wells are located within 600 feet
of the site; several more private sells
that provide drinking water for local
residents and water for domestic stock and
farming are within one mile of the
Landfill. The regional terrain is hilly,
composed of sediments derived from Mest
glacial action. The highly variable size
and distribution of glacially derived
sediments can affect the direction and
velocity of groundwater flow. The earth
below the Landfill is directly relevant to
17
this action, but discussion of that geology
is deferred to the pertinent portion of the
opinion.
2. Relationship Between the Defendants
Mr. Wilkins and his father first
began operating a landfill on the Four
County Landfill site in 1973. When the
Wilkins' landfill began operations, it was
authorized to receive only non-hazardous
wastes. After 1978, the State of Indiana
required disposal facilities to separate
general refuse from “separate area waste"
consisting of commercial and industrial
wastes, which included what now is
designated "hazardous waste". The Landfill
did not, and was not required to, maintain
records of the location within the facility
of individual loads of "separate area
waste". Beginning in 1980, with occasional
exceptions, the Landfill began to dispose
only of hazardous wastes; late that year,
18
the Landfill began to record placement of
waste within the waste management area.
Mr. Wilkins acquired the land on
which the Landfill is located by way of
quitclaim deed from his mother in 1978. On
November 3, 1988, about a week after the
court found him to be an “owner" for RCRA
purposes, United States v. Environmental
Waste Control, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 1422,
1430 (N.D. Ind. 1988), he deeded the
property to West Holding Company in
exchange for half the stock of West Holding
Company. Mr. Wilkins testified that he
transferred the property to West because of
prior confusion his ownership interest
caused customers, regulators and others,
but the court finds his’ explanation
unconvincing. The transfer's only
reasonable purpose was -_ shield Mr.
Wilkins from post-transfer liability under
RCRA.
19
Mr. Shambaugh formed EWC with
Douglas—Johnson in 1978. On October 1,
1978, Mr. Shambaugh and Mr. Johnson signed
a ten-year lease with Mr. Wilkins that
allowed Mr. Johnson and Mr. Shambaugh to
operate a hazardous waste landfill on the
Wilkins land. In March, 1985, Mr. Johnson
transferred all his interest in the
Landfill, including his EWC stock and his
rights and duties under the lease, to Mr.
Shambaugh.
Mr. Shambaugh has been president
of EWC since its creation. EWC has had no
directors; its only other officers have
been Mr. Johnson (who served as vice-
president from 1978 to 1985) and Mr.
Shambaugh's wife (who served as secretary
for a period of time). Mr. Wilkins has
held no office with, and has owned no
shares in, EWC.
20
Mr. Shambaugh has been actively
involved in the Landfill's day-to-day
activities. He shares final responsibility
with Mr. Wilkins for virtually all
decisions concerning the Landfill's
operations, other than the locations at
which waste is to be placed. In 1985, when
a downturn in the Landfill's economic
fortunes led to a layoff of most of the
Landfill's employees, he even operated
heavy machinery at the Landfill.
In November, 1988, Mr. Shambaugh
transferred his EWC stock (consisting of
all the shares of EWC) to West Holding
Company in exchange for the half of West
shares Mr. Wilkins did not_ receive.
Although Mr. Shambaugh testified at trial,
he tendered no explanation for. that
transfer. The court finds that his purpose
must have been the same as Mr. Wilkins':
to shield himself from liability under
21
RCRA. Neither Mr. Shambaugh nor Mr.
Wilkins contributed cash to West, although
Mr. Wilkins contributed certain equipment
used in the Landfill's operation.
3. RCRA and the Four County Landfill
RCRA establishes a comprehensive
federal regulatory program applicable to
the generation, transportation, storage,
treatment, and disposal of hazardous waste.
RCRA and its implementing regulations
required all persons who generate,
transport, treat, store, or dispose of
hazardous waste to notify the EPA of such
The Resource
Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976 is a multi-
faceted approach toward
solving the problems
associated with the 3-4
billion tons of discarded
materials generated each
year, and the problems
resulting from the
anticipated 8% annual
increase in the volume of
such waste.
House Report No. 94-1491, at 2.
22
activity by August 10, 1980. 42 U.S.C. §
6930.
a. Interim Status
A hazardous waste facility may be
operated only in accordance with a permit.
42 U.S.C. § 6925(a). Because the EPA could
noc issue permits to all hazardous waste
applicants before RCRA became effective,
hazardous waste facilities that were in
existence on November 19, 1980 benefit from
a "grandfathering" provision: such a
facility could obtain "interim status" to
continue operation until the EPA or an
authorized state takes final action with
respect to the facility's permit
application. 50 Fed. Reg. 38,946. A
facility must satisfy certain conditions to
obtain interim status, including the filing
of timely notice to the EPA that the
facility treats, stores, or disposes of
hazardous waste and the filing of an
23
application for a hazardous waste permit.
42 U.S.C. § 6925(e). This application, the
first stage of a two-stage process, has
come to be described as the "Part A
application" stage. Northside Sanitary
Landfill, Inc. v. Thomas, 804 F.2d 371, 373
(7th Cit. 1986); United States Vv.
Conservation Chemical Co. of Illinois, 660
F. Supp. 1236, 1237 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
A facility is granted interim
status if the EPA Administrator finds no
reason to believe that an existing
facility's Part A application does not meet
the disclosure requirements of 40 C.F.R. §
270.23. Such a facility is treated as
having been issued a permit upon the filing
of a Part A application and the giving of
proper notice of its hazardous waste
activities. 40 C.F.R. § 270.70.
EWC obtained interim status in
1980. On August 18, 1980, EWC notified the
24
EPA that it was disposing of hazardous
wastes at the Landfill. On November 18,
1980, EWC submitted Part A of an
application for authorization to treat,
store, or dispose of hazardous waste at the
Landfill. Accordingly, EWC was accorded
interim status pending final administrative
disposition of its permit application,
allowing it to operate its facility. See
42 U.S.C. § 6925(a), (e)(1): 40 C.F.R. §
270.10, 270.70(a).
Since then, EWC has disposed of
hazardous wastes within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 6903(5) at the Landfill, including
those ccnthbwhens barium, cadmium, chromium,
lead, mercury, certain waste water
treatment sludges’, emission control dust or
¢ The presence of cadmium, nickel,
hexavalent chromium, and cyanide renders
such sludges’ toxic. The defendants'
records for 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985
disclose that over 5.4 million pounds of
such sludge were disposed in the Landfill.
25
Sludge from secondary lead smelting’,
certain emission control dust and sludges
from the primary production of steel in
electric furnaces’, spent solvent trichlor-
oethylene and still bottoms from the
recovery of spent trichloroethylene, spent
solvent acetone and still bottoms from the
recovery of spent acetone solvent, spent
solvent creosols and still bottoms from the
recovery of spent solvent creosols, and
spent toluene solvent. The Landfill
received more than 16,000 cubic yards of
hazardous waste in 1986; from January 1 to
July 21, 1987, the Landfill reported
receiving about 30,000 cubic’ yards; the
> The presence of calcium, lead, and
hexavalent chromium renders such wastes
texic. In 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985, the
defendants reported disposal of 36,000
pounds of this material.
* The presence of calcium, lead, and
hexavalent chromium renders such waste
toxic. The defendants have disposed of
more than 37 million pounds’ of such
material.
26
defendants thereafter ceased reporting the
volumetric measurement of wastes received.
The presence of hazardous wastes at the
Landfill constitutes disposal within the
meaning of RCRA. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(33).
b. Regulation of Interim Status Facilities
Congress authorized the
Administrator of the EPA to. promulgate
regulations establishing performance
standards for interim status facilities.
42 U.S.C. § 6924. These regulations are
codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 265.
RCRA authorized the EPA to approve
state regulations that are substantially
equivalent to the federal interim status
regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 6926. Following
approval, the state enforces its
regulations in lieu of the _- federal
regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(c). On
August 18, 1982, the EPA granted Indiana
Phase I interim authorization to promulgate
27
interim status regulations. Indiana
received final authority to promulgate
interim status regulations on January 31,
1986.° Accordingly, owners and operators
who have interim status to operate under 42
U.S.C. § 6925(e) in the State of Indiana
generally must comply with the standards
and requirements of Title 320, Article 4.1-
22 of the Indiana Administrative Code (now
6
codified at 329 I.A.C. 3)” in operating
hazardous waste facilities.
. According to one commentator, the EPA
had granted final authorization to the
enforcement programs of twenty-five states
and the District of Columbia by August,
1985. Developments in the Law, Toxic Waste
Litigation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1458, 1476
n.56 (1986).
° At final argument in the trial of
this case, counsel agreed that the Indiana
regulations pertinent to this case differ
in no material respect from the federal
regulations; accordingly, the court will
limit its citation of regulations to the
federal regulations, while recognizing that
the Landfill's operation may have been
controlled by virtually identical state
regulations.
28
The EPA, however, retains
authority to enforce violaticns of
Subchapter III of RCRA in Indiana. The
delegation to Indiana of final authority to
promulgate interim status regulations did
not include responsibility for any of the
provisions added to RCRA by the Hazardous
and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984
("HSWA"), which include the provision
concerning loss of interim status. 42
U.S.C. § 6925(e)(2); Northside Sanitary
Landfill, Inc. v. Thomas, 804 F.2d at 382-
383.
40 C.F.R. § 265.147 required
owners and operators of hazardous waste
facilities to meet certain financial
responsibility requirements to establish
financial assurance for liability to third
parties. 42 | U.S. § 6924(0) (1) (A)
required owner-operators of existing
landfills who conduct lateral expansion to
29
install two or more liners and a leachate’
collection system above and between the
liners; 42 U.S.C. § 6936(b) made this
requirement applicable to interim status
facilities with respect to waste received
after May 8, 1985.
c. Certification and the Part B Application
Before Congress amended RCRA in
1984, a hazardous waste facility was not
required to submit a "Part B application"
seeking a final determination of its permit
application until six months after the EPA
requested it to do so. In 1984, Congress
decided that interim status should not be
allowed to last indefinitely. Accordingly,
the 1984 amendments provided that by
November 8, 1985, owners or operators of
’ "tLeachate' means any liquid,
including any suspended components in the
liquid, that has percolated through or
drained from hazardous waste." 40 C.F.R.
§ 260.10. Leachate from hazardous waste is
itself a hazardous waste.
30
land disposal facilities that had been
granted interim status were required to
file a Part B application and certify that
the facility was in compliance with all ap-
plicable groundwater monitoring and
financial responsibility requirements. 42
U.S.C. § 6925(e)(2). A facility's failure
to satisfy these requirements would result
in termination of its interim status on
November 8, 1985. On November 7, 1985, EWC
filed with the EPA its certificate of com-
pliance with applicable interim status
groundwater monitoring and financial
responsibility requirements. EWC also
filed its Part B application.
II. JURISDICTION
The court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6928 and 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1345, and 1355. Venue is proper
31
in this court; the Landfill is located’
within the Northern District of Indiana.
EWC, however, raises several
challenges to the court's jurisdiction.
The court must address each of the
defendants' theories challenging subject
matter jurisdiction because jurisdiction is
a matter that is to be determined at any
stage of a proceeding, Darryl H. v. Coler,
801 F.2d 893, 907 n.13 (7th Cir. 1986);
Jackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 717
F.2d 1045, 1055 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied 465 U.S. 1007 (1984).
A. The EPA's Claims in an Authorized State
EWC has asserted throughout this
litigation that because the State of
Indiana was conferred with the statutory
authorization to promulgate interim status
regulations, the EPA lacks authority to
bring this suit. 42 U.S.C. § 6926. EWC
maintains that the EPA lacks authority to
32
determine issues of groundwater monitoring
and financial assurance because these
matters are now controlled exclusively by
state law.® As noted above, the EPA's first
claim alleges loss of interim status
because the Landfill's certification of
compliance with groundwater monitoring and
financial assurance requirements was false.
The EPA's third claim alleges that EWC has
failed to implement a groundwater
monitoring program capable of determining
8 At the conclusion of the trial, EWC
raised an additional argument that it has
a due process right to have its fate
decided by an administrative agency. The
only case cited provides no support for
that authority; Indiana _ Environmental
Management Board v. Bremen, 458 N.E.2d 672
(Ind. Ct. App. 1984), simply held that
Indiana's Administrative Adjudication Act
entitled the plaintiffs, who lived near the
landfill involved in that case, to certain
procedural rights. The fundamental
requirements of procedural due process are
notice and an opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333
(1976). Through this trial, EWC has
received the process due it.
33
aN NC
the Landfill's impact on the quality of the
groundwater in the uppermost aquifer
underlying the facility.’ EWC has not
argued that the EPA's second and fourth
claims are outside the court's
jurisdiction.
EWC also asserts that the court's
jurisdiction is impeded because Indiana's
enforcement referral to the EPA was
improper. According to the 1985 Menorandum
of Agreement between Indiana and the EPA,
the EPA could take enforcement action only
after it had determined that the state had
not taken "timely and appropriate action".
EWC argues that no provision in the
Agreement justifies any type of referral to
the EPA and further argues that the EPA
made no determination that Indiana had not
taken "timely and appropriate" action on
7 As to the meaning of "uppermost
aquifer", see note 33, infra.
34
the matters contained in the EPA's amended
complaint. EWC also argues that Indiana
did not authorize the enforcement referral.
Because EWC has never specified the claims
to which this argument is directed, the
court must assume that it is intended to
apply to the entire amended complaint.
1. The First Claim: Loss of Interim Status
EWC has argued repeatedly that the
EPA has no authority to determine whether
the Landfill complies with the groundwater
monitoring program requirements or the
financial assurance requirements of the
1984 amendments known as HSWA because state
law now governs those requirements. This
argument is no stranger to this litigation.
EWC raised this argument in its
unsuccessful summary judgment motion, then
renewed the argument at the close of the
case.
35
In the summary judgment ruling,
the court held that the EPA had the
authority under 42 U.S.C. § 6928 to proceed
on the issues of groundwater monitoring and
financial assurance requirements alleged in
its first claim. United States Vv.
Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 698 F.
Supp. at 1435-1438. Although authorized to
promulgate interim status regulations,
Indiana has no authority to enforce any
provisions found in the Hazardous and Solid
Waste Amendments of 1984; loss of interim
status is a provision contained in those
amendments. Although jurisdiction is a
matter that is to be determined at any
Stage of a proceeding, EWC has presented no
new authority or argument to persuade the
court to depart from its pretrial ruling
finding jurisdiction over the EPA's first
claim.
36
At trial, however, EWC raised a
separate attack on the EPA's ability to
take enforcement action for the RCRA
violations alleged in the EPA's’ amended
complaint. EWC contends that’ Indiana
improperly referred this matter to the EPA
for enforcement under the 1985 Memorandum
Agreement between Indiana and the EPA
because: (1) the assistant state agency
commissioner who signed the referral
letters had no authority to make a referral
that only the Commissioner could make; and
(2) under the Agreement, the EPA could take
enforcement action only after it determined
that the State had not taken "timely and
appropriate action".
The referral at issue came from
David Lamm, Assistant Commissioner for
Solid and Hazardous Waste Management,
Department of Environmental Management.
The referral, dated July 26, 1986, informed
the EPA that the Landfill apparently had
violated minimum technology requirements of
the 1984 amendments known as HSWA and
falsely certified compliance with the
groundwater monitoring requirements’) and
financial assurance requirements. (EPA
Exh. 36). This document was designated an
"enforcement referral". Mr. Lamm
reasserted his request for enforcement
action ina referral letter dated June 10,
1987. (STOP Exh. 47).
The 1985 Memorandum of Agreement
provided only that the EPA may _ take
enforcement action "upon determining that
the State has not taken timely = and
appropriate enforcement action". (EWC Exh.
IIIII, p. 26). EWC maintains that the EPA
did not determine whether the State had
taken "timely and appropriate action". [In
Support of this argument, EWC points to
language found in the more recent 1988
38
Memorandum of Agreement between the EPA and
Indiana: "EPA will take enforcement action
only upon determining that the State has
not taken timely and appropriate action or
upon request of the State." (EPA Exh. 38,
p. 26).
In denying EWC's summary judgment
motion, the court held that the EPA had the
authority under 42 U.S.C. § 6928 to proceed
on the issues of groundwater monitoring and
financial assurance requirements alleged in
its first claim. 698 F. Supp. at 1435-
1438. Section 6928(a) authorizes the EPA
to bring an independent enforcement action,
even in a RCRA authorized state. United
States v. Conservation Chemical Co. of
Illinois, 660 F. Supp. at 1244. See United
States v. Allegan Metal Finishing Co., 696
F. Supp. 275, 282 (W.D. Mich. 1988). The
sole restriction on this enforcement
authority is that the EPA must notify the
39
ee
state before commencing any action. 42
U.$.¢. § 6928(a) (2). Section 6928
"explicitly reserves federal authority in
the face of an authorized state program."
Wyckoff Co. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 796 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir.
1986). EWC has not’ challenged the
sufficiency of the EPA's notice to Indiana.
Instead, EWC contends that this enforcement
proceeding is improper because it was -
triggered by a referral contrary to a
written agreement or by the wrong person.
That argument finds no support in the
statute; 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) neither
creates a need for referral by a state nor
designates the state official who must make
such a referral.
Further, Indiana, although
authorized to promulgate interim status
regulations, has no authority to enforce
any provisions found in the 1984 amendments
40
known as HSWA. Determining the loss of
interim status is a provision found in the
1984 amendments. Indiana could not have
determined whether the Landfill lost its
interim status. It is difficult to see how
Indiana's allegedly improper referral of a
matter within the EPA's exclusive
enforcement authority could affect the
EPA's right to act under HSWA.
2. The Second Claim: Minimum Technology
Requirements
The EPA's second claim alleges
violations of RCRA's minimum technology
requirements. This issue was-~ also
contained in the referral for enforcement
from Indiana to the EPA. For the same
reasons stated above, the court is vested
with jurisdiction under § 6928(a). The
minimum technology provision is a product
of the 1984 amendments known as HSWA and a
matter not delegated to the state for
41
enforcement. Accordingly, any challenge to
Indiana's attempted enforcement referral to
the EPA is immaterial.
3. The Third Claim: Groundwater Monitoring
Requirements
The third claim of the EPA's
amended complaint alleges that EWC failed
to implement a _=groundwater monitoring
program capable of determining the
Landfill's impact on the quality of the
groundwater in the uppermost aquifer
underlying the facility in violation of 40
C.F.R. § 265.90(a).
Again, EWC relies upon the 1985
Memorandum of Agreement between Indiana and
the EPA which provided that the EPA could
take enforcement action only after
determining that the State did not take
timely and appropriate action. EWC asserts
that the EPA did not determine whether
42
Indiana had taken "timely and appropriate
action".
The EPA does not suggest that the
matters raised by its third claim arise
under the 1984 HSWA provisions; the third
claim, unlike the first and second claims,
is not within the EPA's exclusive
administrative jurisdiction. This does not
defeat the district court's jurisdiction,
however. Although the EPA may not have
administrative authority over the violation
alleged in the third claim, see Northside
Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Thomas, 804 F.2d
371, 42 U.S.C. § 6928 vests jurisdiction in
the district court to entertain = an
enforcement action directed at violations
of RCRA. Rather, the proper inquiry is
whether the contractual agreement between
Indiana and the EPA controls when such an
enforcement action can occur.
43
la cae al iia
The 1985 Memorandum of Agreement
provides no interpretation of "timely and
appropriate action". William Muno, the
Chief of the Enforcement Branch for the
EPA's Region V, testified that the EPA's
interpretation of "timely and appropriate"
action under’ the 1985 Memorandum of
Agreement requires formal state action
within ninety days of discovery of
violation, and a notice of violation or
warning letter is not a formal action. The
record before the court does not suggest
that Indiana, the other party to the
Agreement, has ever objected to either the
EPA's interpretation of the Agreement or
the EPA's enforcement action. Mr. Muno
stated that the institution of this action
demonstrates that the EPA had made such a
determination.
Indiana addressed the allegations
of the EPA's third claim in Notice of
44
Violation V-209, contained in a letter
dated October 11, 1985 (STOP Exh. 17).
Notice of Violation V-209 alleged a failure
to implement a program capable of
determining the facility's impact- on
groundwater, constituting a violation of 40
C.F.R. § 265.90. EWC's principal
consultant, Michael Johnson, testified that
the state had taken no further action on V-
209. EWC argues that the June, 1985
administrative order resolving Notice of
Violation N-128"° incorporated the
violations contained in V-209, but
introduced nothing to support that
contention. Indiana took no- formal
enforcement action on V-209, and the EPA
commenced this suit based, in part, upon
the allegations contained in V-209,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6928. Indiana has
‘0 The order resolving Notice of
Violation N-128 is discussed in detail in
Part II-D-2-a of this memorandum.
45
a
©
taken no action, in its proceedings to
determine whether a final permit should be
issued » the Landfill, that is inconsis-
tent with the EPA's enforcement
proceedings. Finally, to eliminate the
possibility that EWC will face apparently
inconsistent directives from state and
federal regulators, the EPA has stipulated
that if its third claim is proven, the
court should order implementation of the
groundwater monitoring plan Indiana
recently approved pursuant to the
administrative order in Notice of Violation
N-128."'
Nothing in the referral procedure
deprives the court of its subject matter
jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 6928. See
United States v. Conservation Chemical Co.
"on July 28, 1988, Indiana approved
the groundwater monitoring plan submitted
by Four County Landfill. (EWC Exh. 5, Mot.
for Partial Summary Judgment).
46
of Illinois, 660 F. Supp. at 1244-1245.
The court has subject matter jurisdiction
over the EPA's third claim.
4. The Fourth Claim: Corrective Action
The EPA's fourth claim is based
upon the Administrator's determination that
a release has occurred at the Landfill. On
June 5, 1987, the Regional Administrator,
Valdas Adamkus, sent EWC a Determination of
Release of Hazardous Waste into’ the
Environment. (EPA Exh. 12).
Section 6928(h) vests the court
with subject matter jurisdiction. Once the
Administrator determines that there is or
has been a reiease of hazardous waste into
the environment from a hazardous waste
disposal facility, the Administrator may
commence a civil action in the "United
States district court in the district in
which the facility is located for
apprépriate reiief .. ." 42 U.S.C. §
47
6928(h)(1). This provision was enacted as
part of the 1984 amendments known as HSWA
to allow the EPA to seek corrective action
for release of hazardous wastes through
either an administrative order or court
order. United States v. Clow Water
Systems, 701 F. Supp. 1345 (S.D. Ohio
1988); see United States _v. Indiana
44
Woodtreating Corp., 686 F. Supp. 218 (S.D.
Ind. 1988). The court has subject matter
jurisdiction to entertain the allegations
of the EPA's fourth claim.
B. STOP's Failure to Give Notice
EWC suggests that STOP failed to
give timely notice as required of citizen
groups by 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b), and that
STOP's failure to comply with this
provision deprives the court of subject
matter jurisdiction over STOP's claims.
48
1. Notice Is Not Jurisdictional in Hazardous .
Waste Claim
On July 8, 1987, STOP moved to
intervene pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6972.
The EPA responded by noting that
intervention under this statutory provision
was inappropriate, but directed STOP to the
provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i). STOP
filed an amended motion to intervene
pursuant to § 9613(i) on October 21, 1987.
The EPA chose not to oppose STOP's
intervention as long as STOP introduced no
matters extraneous to the claims already
before the court. The court granted the
amended motion to intervene on November 6,
1987, and STOP's complaint was deemed filed
on November 13, 1987; its amended complaint
was filed on November 29, 1988. EWC sought
dismissal of STOP's claims because those
claims exceeded the scope of the EPA's
conditional accession to the intervention,
49
but the court found that EWC had =~»no
standing to raise that argument. See
United States Vv. Environmental Waste
Control, Inc., 698 F. Supp. at 1440-1441.
It was not until STOP had completed the
first portion of its closing argument that
EWC challenged the court's jurisdiction on
these grounds in its "Preliminary Tender of
Supplementary Authority".
If the notice issue is not
jurisdictional, EWC has waived it by
failing to raise it in a timely manner.
™ Midway through the trial, the court
informed counsel that, in light of the
extensive pretrial briefing already done,
the court would not allow the submission of
post-trial briefs in lieu of -final
argument. ~ The court indicated that it
would allow counsel to submit lists of
citations of authority concerning new
issues that had arisen during trial.
Because EWC did not file its list of
citations of authority until after counsel
for the EPA and STOP had completed the
opening portion of their final arguments
and because EWC's citations raised new
issues, the court granted the EPA and STOP
leave to address the new material in post-
trial submissions.
50
Indeed, if the issue is not jurisdictional,
it is doubtful that one could say the issue
has been raised at all. No motion has been
filed; EWC simply alluded to the issue on
the tenth page of their supporting
authorities.
If the matter of notice is
jurisdictional, however, the indefensible
untimeliness of the issue is of no moment.
Subject matter jurisdiction may be raised
at any stage of the proceedings. Principal
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Juntunen, 838
F.2d 942, 944 (7th Cir. 1988). For that
matter, it is immaterial] that EWC still has
filed no motion to dismiss STOP's claims
for want of subject matter jurisdiction due
to failure to give notice; the court must
inguire into its jurisdiction whenever it
is called into doubt. Kanzelberger v.
Kanzelberger, 782 F.2d 774, 777 (7th Cir.
1986).
~ 2!
STOP offers a simple answer to
this challenge to its participation in this
Suit: notice is not required for interven-
tion. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(1), under which
STOP was permitted to intervene, provides:
In any action commenced under
this chapter or under the Solid
Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. §
6901 et segq.] in a court of the
United States, any person may
intervene as a matter of right when
such person claims an interest
relating to the subject of the
action and is so situated that the
disposition may, as a _ practical
matter, impair or impede the
person's ability to protect that
interest, unless the President or
the State shows that the person's
interest is adequately represented
by existing parties.
RCRA's intervention provision, 42 U.S.C. §
6972(b)(1), provides that any person may
intervene as of right in any action under
§ 6972(a)(1) (A). Neither § 6972(b)(1) nor
§ 9613(1) condition intervention on notice
to any party by the prospective intervenor.
The intervention provision of § 6972(b) (1)
is separate from the notice provision, §
52
6972(b)(1)(A). Because STOP intervened, it
contends, no notice requirement governed
a3.
This approach is too facile.
Under circumstances not presented here, a
citizen group need not give notice before
intervention. An intervenor might present
no new claims; notice of claims already
pending would be a pointless act. STOP's
role in this case, however, has exceeded
that of a mere intervenor. STOP has
presented its own claims and sought relief
beyond that sought by the EPA. STOP's
additional claims must be viewed more
properly as having been in the nature of a
citizen's suit under § 6972(a) (1) (A), which
contains certain notice requirements.
While STOP should not be penalized for
having intervened in an existing
enforcement action rather than filing a
separate suit, neither may it evade notice
53
requirements by doing so. Accordingly, the
court cannot accept STOP's facially
attractive argument that it needed to give
no notice to participate in this action.
EWC has not specified the notice
provision STOP allegedly failed to meet.
RCRA contains a provision that
conditionally allows citizens to commence
an action against "any person . . . who is
alleged to be in violation of any permit,
standard, regulation, condition,
requirement, prohibition, or order which
has become effective pursuant to this
chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1) (A). No
action may be commenced under §
6972(a)(1)(A) less than sixty days after
giving notice to the Administrator, the
state in which the alleged violation
occurred, and to any alleged violator. The
statute contains an important exception,
however:
54
. . . except that such action may
be brought immediately after such
notification in the case of an
action under this section
respecting a violation of
subchapter III of this chapter [42
U.S.C. §§ 6921-6934] .. .
42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1) (A). If the action
contains allegations concerning hazardous
waste management under 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-
6934, then, the action may be brought
immediately after notification to those
parties.
STOP's original and amended
complaints each alleged violations of 42
U.S.C. § 6928. Accordingly, STOP was not
required to give sixty days' notice to the
EPA, Indiana, and EWC.” STOP was required
'S The statute might be construed to
require one day's notice for claims under
42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6934, but requires sixty
days' notice for claims within the same
complaint alleging violations of other RCRA
provisions. The court does not so construe
the statute. In any event, STOP's notice,
discussed in the following subsection of
this memorandum, preceded the filing of its
intervenor's complaint sufficiently to meet
even a sixty day requirement.
55
to give notice before bringing suit, but
the statute sets forth no minimum notice
period.
The elimination of the sixty-day
notice requirement concerning hazardous
waste management resulted from the 1984
amendments known as HSWA. See Dedham Water
Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805
F.2d. 1074 (lst Cir. 1986) (addressing
retroactivity of elimination of sixty-day
requirement). No reported decision
addresses whether the resultant notice
requirement -- one that apparently can be
Satisfied by notice a day or an hour before
filing suit -- for such cases is a
jurisdictional matter or merely a condition
precedent to suit. Indeed, the Seventh
Circuit has not addressed directly whether
any of the notice provisions of §
6972(a)(1) (A) are jurisdictional or merely
a condition precedent to suit. In Highland
56
Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied 424 U.S. 927 (1976),
however, the court addressed a virtually
identical sixty-day notice provision in the
Clean Air Amendments to the National
Environmental Protection Act and concluded
that the notice requirement is
jurisdictional. See also Evansville v.
Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d
1008 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S.
1025 (1980) (same result under Federal
Water Pollution Control Act). The Highland
Park court reasoned:
The legislative history of
section 304 shows . . . that
Congress intended to provide for
citizens' suits in a manner that
would be least likely to clog
already burdened federal courts and
most likely to trigger governmental
action which would alleviate any
need for judicial relief. It was
in response to these concerns that
the statutory notice provisions
were included in section 304.
Congress's intention would be
frustrated if the statutory mandate
of section 304(b) were ignored.
57
519 F.2d at 690-691 (footnotes omitted).
The Ninth Circuit echoed these thoughts
twelve years later in holding RCRA's sixty-
day notice provision jurisdictional. In
Hallstrom _v. Tillamook County, 844 F.2d
598, 600-601 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted
57 U.S.L.W. 3619 (March 21, 1989), the
court reasoned that Congress intended to
provide a non-adversarial period in which
environmental conflicts might be resolved
administratively. Litigation, the court
held, "should be a last resort only after
other efforts have failed." 844 F.2d at
601. Accord, Walls v. Waste Resource
in. 761 F.2d 311, 317 (6th Cir. 1985)
(notice provisions "were intended to give
the EPA an opportunity to resolve issues
regarding the interpretation of complex
environmental standards by negotiation,
unhindered by the threat of an impending
lawsuit"); Garcia v. Cecos International,
58
Inc., 761 F.2d 76, 81 (ist Cir. 1985)
("Notice from potential private plaintiffs
gives the EPA and the state an opportunity
to investigate the alleged violation.").
This rationale vanishes, however,
when the requisite notice with respect to
hazardous waste may be satisfied by notice
only a day, or perhaps even an hour, before
filing suit. Environmental disputes
concerning hazardous waste management are
most unlikely to be resolved
administratively within a single day.
Accordingly, the court concludes’ that
RCRA's notice requirement is not a
jurisdictional matter when the alleged
violation involves hazardous waste
29
14
management, © and EWC cannot raise the issue
at this stage of the proceedings.
2. Adequate Notice Was Given
In any event, the record before
the court discloses that thos@ entitled to
notice under the statute had ample notice
of the violations undergirding STOP's
claims.
In Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,
844 F.2d at 600, the Ninth Circuit noted
“ The Ninth Circuit implied such a
distinction in Hallstrom _v. Tillamook
County, 844 F.2d 598, 600-601:
Strict application of the
[sixty day] notice requirement is
supported by an exception within §
6972 which waives the 60 day notice
requirement if the alleged
violation involves hazardous waste.
42 U.S.C. § 6972. This provision
makes clear that Congress
considered the 60-day notice
requirement and intended that it
apply in all cases, except those
involving hazardous waste.
In Highland Park, the court noted that the
statute at issue there had _ certain
exceptions to the notice requirement, which
did not apply to the circumstances of the
case. 519 F.2d at 690 n.3.
60
that with respect to RCRA's’ sixty-day
notice provision, the circuits have split
between the "pragmatic approach" of the
Second, Third, Eighth, and District of
Columbia Circuits, and the "jurisdictional
prerequisite approach" of the First, Sixth,
Seventh (and now the Ninth) Circuits. The
"pragmatic approach" allows post-filing
notice. For example, in Pymatuning Water
Shed Citizens for a Hygienic Environment v.
Eaton, 644 F.2d 995 (3rd Cir. 1981), the
district court had allowed notices to be
given after the filing of suit and stayed
the action until the notices were given and
the sixty days had passed. The court,
relying on an earlier Third Circuit case_
—>>
approving that practice, Susquehanna Valley
Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear
Reactor, 619 F.2d 231 (3rd Cir. 1980),
cert. denied 449 U.S. 1096 (1981), affirmed
the district court's action. Similarly, in
61
a
O'Leary v. Moyer's Landfill, Inc., 523 F.
Supp. 642 (E.D. Pa. 1981), the court found
post-filing notice sufficient when the
defendants were not called on to defend the
Claims until more than sixty days had
elapsed from the notice.
The Seventh Circuit's
jurisdictional view of the notice
requirement would preclude such an
approach, but the cases adopting the
"Jurisdictional" approach under RCRA have
addressed only the timing, and not the
adequacy, of the notice. See, e.g., Garcia
v. Cecos International, Inc., 761 F.2d 76
(plaintiff had amended his complaint after
removal to allege RCRA violations; court
concluded that § 6972 required notice sixty
days before the filing of suit, rather than
a delay of sixty days after post-filing
amendment); Highland Park v. Train, 519
F.2d 681 (no notice whatsoever).
62
As to the sufficiency of the
notice, the reported cases consistently
have found that sufficient notice was given
if the requisite parties had "notice-in-
fact" of the alleged violations. For
example, in Proffitt v. Commissioners,
Township of Bristol, 754 F.2d 504 (3rd Cir.
1985), the plaintiff showed that the county
health officials had reported the alleged
violations to the state agency and the EPA,
and the plaintiff had visited the EPA and
the state agency several times in the
months before suit to discuss environmental
problems at the defendant's facility. The
Third Circuit deemed this "notice-in-fact"
sufficient.
In Fishel v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1531, 1536 (M.D. Pa.
1985), the defendant contended that it
received insufficient notice because the
notice did not specify the, regulations
63
allegedly violated, the persons responsible
for the violations, or the dates of the
violations. The court held that the
notice, which provided adequate information
concerning the nature of the alleged
violations, was sufficient. The court also
noted that the EPA and the state agency had
been investigating such violations at the
defendant's facility for several months
before the notice. Accordingly, the court
refused to dismiss the suit on notice
grounds. See also Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F.
Supp. 1176, 1181 (M.D. Tenn. 1988); Utah
State Department of Health v. Ng, 649 F.
Supp. 1102 (D. Utah 1986) (series of
letters between the plaintiff state agency
and the defendants constituted notice-in-
fact to the defendants).
There must be some notice to the
defendant and the agencies, and oral notice
to some will not suffice. In Reeger v.
64
Mill Service, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 360 (W.D.
Pa. 1984), the plaintiffs conceded they had
given the defendants no written notice, but
argued that nothing more than their oral
complaints to the state agency and the EPA
should be required because written notice
would be useless. The court rejected the
argument and dismissed the suit. The
plaintiffs in McCastle Vv. Rollins
Environmental Services, 514 F. Supp. 936
(M.D. La. 1981), do not appear to have
realized that their complaint stated claims
under RCRA and so had given no pre-filing
notice to the EPA or the state. The court
held that the complaint's allegations
brought it within the scope of RCRA and
dismissed the complaint for want of notice.
The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration,
arguing that the state agency, which acts
in the EPA's stead, had received actual
notice of the suit three days after the
65
suit was filed. The court rejected that
argument, distinguishing the Third
Circuit's "pragmatic approach" cases.
The defendant and the agencies
must have actual notice; that they should
have known of the alleged violations is
insufficient. In Walls v. Waste Resource
Corp., 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1985), the
plaintiffs had alleged that the defendants,
the state, and the EPA had had constructive
notice for more than sixty days, but
apparently did not explain the basis for
that allegation. The court deemed the
allegation insufficient to establish actual
notice and affirmed the dismissal.
By these standards, all necessary
recipients of notice had notice~in-fact of
STOP's claims. STOP's motion to intervene
was not granted until almost four months
after STOP served its proposed complaint on
the EPA and EWC. STOP was not a party to
66
the suit during those four months. The EPA
and EWC had ample notice of STOP's intended
claim through receipt of the proposed
complaint nearly four months before it was
filed.
To suggest that the state agency
did not have notice-in-fact of STOP's
claims would be to ignore the record STOP
has presented. Much of STOP'sS' case
consisted of observations and reports by
state inspectors and correspondence between
the state agency and EWC’ concerning
violations such as STOP alleges; the state
agency even considered intervening in the
EPA's suit. (STOP Exh. 50). Indeed, as is
discussed in sections that follow, EWC
argues that the state agency had addressed
or was addressing the very allegations STOP
raises here. Indiana, although not served
with STOP's proposed intervenor's
complaint, had notice-in-fact of the
67
violations STOP asserts.
Accordingly, even if RCRA's
minimal notice provision in citizens' suits
concerning hazardous waste management is
deemed jurisdictional, STOP satisfied its
requirements.
3. Ancillary Jurisdiction
Even were the court to hold that
STOP failed to satisfy a jurisdictional
notice requirement with respect to those of
its claims that exceeded the EPA's claims,
the court would exercise its ancillary
jurisdiction over those claims.
When the right to intervene is
absolute, no independent ground of federal
jurisdiction need be shown to support the
intervention; the intervention is properly
regarded as coming within the court's
ancillary jurisdiction. 3B J. Moore & J.
Kennedy, Moore's Federal Practice q
24.18[1], at 24-198 (1987).
68
Section 9613(i) gives STOP the
right to intervene if its interest relating
to the subject matter of the action is so
situated that the disposition of the action
may, aS a practical matter, impair or
impede STOP's ability to protect that
interest. No right to intervene exists if
the President or the state shows that
existing parties adequately represent the
intervenor's interest, but § 9613(i) does
not require the intervenor to prove the
converse. The EPA chose not to object to
STOP's intervention and the court placed no
15
conditions upon STOP's intervention. As
"In Amoco Oil Company v. Dingwell,
690 F. Supp. 78, 84 (D. Me. 1988), the
court held that the conditions’ for
intervention under § 9613(i) are the same
as those in Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2): the
motion must be timely; the intervenor must
have a significantly protectable interest
relating to the subject of the action that
might be impaired if the action were
decided without their participation; and
their interest may be inadequately
represented by existing parties. The
record reflects that STOP's membership
included surrounding property owners who
69
Oe
discussed above, STOP was not required to
give pre-filing notice of its claims to the
extent those claims did not exceed the
scope of the EPA's claims.”
STOP's claims consist of alleged
additional RCRA violations. RCRA contains
no provision for citizen intervention in
enforcement proceedings in authorized
states. Middlesex County Board of Chosen
Freeholders Vv. New Jersey Dept. of
Environmental Protection, 645 F. Supp. 715,
7i9 (D.N.J. 1966). In response to the
court's inquiry in final argument, counsel
sought permanent closure based on claims
that hazardous waste constituents have been
released into the environment beyond the
Landfill's boundaries. The EPA did not
attempt to prove release into the
Surrounding area and sought no permanent
closure.
'© The condition that no extraneous
claim be raised was placed upon STOP by the
EPA in its response to STOP's motion to
intervene. Once STOP added further claims,
the EPA never objected, so the court never
addressed the propriety of the additional
claims.
70
were unable to inform the court whether
Indiana law allows citizen intervention in
such actions. Even if Indiana law provides
for such intervention,, however, nothing in
RCRA or the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9601, et seq.,
suggests that states may restrict the broad
statutory intervention rights of citizens
by allowing intervention in state
enforcement proceedings.
Accordingly, even if STOP's
additional claims were subject to
jurisdictional notice provisions of RCRA,
dismissal is not required. Through the
court's ancillary jurisdiction, matters
raised by the case can be adjudicated even
if an independent basis for jurisdiction is
absent. 7¢C C. Wright, A. Miller and M.
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §
1917, at 460-461 (1986). The exercise of
71
ancillary jurisdiction promotes judicial
economy and fairness. The EPA filed this
enforcement action alleging that’ the
defendants violated provisions of RCRA.
STOP's additional claims, while different
in nature, allege viclations of RCRA;
according to STOP witnesses, some of those
claims have gone unresolved for some time.
All alleged RCRA violations are contained
in the same lawsuit.
The exercise of ancillary
jurisdiction would offend no Congressional
purpose. As is discussed above, the notice
requirements contained in RCRA exist to
afford state and federal administrative
agencies the opportunity to address
citizens' complaints before federal fora
are called upon to act. Hallstrom v.
Tillamook County, 844 F.2d at 600. The
state and federal agencies had ample
opportunity to act before STOP intervened;
72
ee en ne
indeed, EWC premises its collateral
estoppel argument on the proposition that
Indiana already has acted. That the EPA
already had instituted this suit
demonstrates the EPA's opportunity to act.
With these principles in mind, the
court finds subject matter jurisdiction
exists over all of STOP's claims.
Cc. Primary Jurisdiction
EWC argued in its summary judgment
motion that the court should invoke the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction on the
first and third claims of the EPA's amended
complaint. EWC argued that the court
should accord deference to the Indiana
agency's actions against the _ Landfill
because of that agency's technical and
extensive experience on the specific issues
found in those claims. The court
disagreed. United States v. Environmental
Waste Control, Inc., 698 F. Supp. at 1439-
a3
OE nT
1440. The court's pretrial ruling only
addressed EPA's claims; EWC lodged no
primary jurisdiction challenge to STOP's
claims until STOP began to present its
evidence. EWC objected to the introduction
of any evidence related to claims that were
subject of ongoing state court or state
administrative proceedings. The court
deferred ruling on the primary jurisdiction
issue, overruled EWC's objections, and
allowed STOP's evidence to be introduced.
The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction was created by courts and is
designed to guide a court in determining
whether or when it should refrain from or
postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction
so. that an agency may first determine a
question. K. Davis, Administrative Law
Treatise § 22.1, at 81 (1983). The
doctrine usually does nothing more than
74
"allocate power between courts and agencies
‘to make initial determinations", which
usually does not affect final
determinations. ad. at 82.
The term "primary jurisdiction"
may be a “verbal coat of too many colors",
United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines,
344 U.S. 33, 39 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting and describing "jurisdiction"),
in that it encompasses four major, but
distinguishable, doctrines: primary
exclusive jurisdiction, true primary
jurisdiction, statutory exemptions, and
agency immunizations. M. Botein, Primary
Jurisdiction: The Need for Better
Court/Agency Interaction, 29 Rutgers L.
Rev. 867, 868 (1976). "Primary exclusive
jurisdiction" deprives the court of all
power over a case except the very limited
power tc review an agency's determination.
"True primary jurisdiction" affords an
75
agency the initial opportunity to consider
a legal issue or find facts, but the court
retains the power to render a judgment.
id. EWC's assertions involving EPA's and
STOP's claims could only fall, if at all,
within the boundaries cf these two
doctrines.
1. The EPA's Claims
EWC has argued throughout these
proceedings that the claims advanced by the
EPA's amended complaint were matters that
Indiana has addressed or should address.
EWC contends that if the court does not
withhold judgment on the EPA's claims, the
Landfill will be subjected to inconsistent
determinations.
At the summary judgment stage, the
court held that application of the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction was inappropriate
in this case. United States Vv.
Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 698 F.
76
Supp. at 1438-1440. The court determined,
first, that Indiana was not empowered to
resolve the loss of interim status issues
presented in the first claim of the EPA's
amended complaint; second, that the third
claim was an enforcement matter that fell
within the provisions of the 1985 Memoran-
dum of Agreement between the EPA and
Indiana; and third, that the agency to
whose expertise the court would defer is
the very agency that initiated this action.
EWC maintains that Far East
Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570
(1952), and Bradford School Bus Transit,
Inc. v. Chicago Transit Authority, 537 F.2d
943 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S.
1066 (1977), require the court to withhold
judgment on claims that are subject to any
past or present state administrative agency
actions. EWC has not, however, articulated
or cited to any authority indicating that
77
the primary jurisdiction doctrines on which
they rely implicate a federal court's
deferral to a state administrative agency
in an action brought under federal law.
Cases cited by EWC do not convince the
court that the doctrines so apply. see
Montgomery Environmental Coalition Citizens
Coordinating Committee on Friendship
Heights v. Washington Suburban Sanitary
Commission, 607 F.2d 378 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(court invoked doctrine due to ongoing EPA
administrative action involving a NDPES
permit that would determine the permit and
amount of discharge to be allowed at the
defendant's facility); Clark Oil Co. Inc.
Vv. Texaco, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1373 (D.C.
Del. 1985) (court stayed Economic
Stabilization Act suit against a private
defendant to allow Department of Energy to
make an initial determination); Illinois
Council on Long Term Care v. Miller, 579 F.
78
Supp. 1140 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (court invoked
doctrine to allow the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to determine whether
amended medicare reimbursement plan
formulated by State was adequate and
reasonable).
Far East Conference held that the
issue presented was within the Federal
Maritime Board's exclusive jurisdiction and
not subject to adjudication by a district
court. 342 U.S. at 576-577. Bradford
School Bus. Transit involved a federal
agency which had, subsequent to the pending
lawsuit, established complaint procedures
and remedies for complaints such as the one
presented in the action. In United States
v. Conservation Chemical Co. of Illinois,
660 F. Supp. at 1245, the court addressed
the issue briefly, but noted that the state
agency had placed its action "on hold"
pending the outcome of the federal suit.
79
Indiana is not authorized to
determine the issues raised by the first,
second, and fourth claims of the EPA's
complaint. No evidence has been submitted
to indicate that a state agency has
resolved any of those issues or would have
any authority to do so. The EPA would not
appear to have the authority to resolved
the third claim through its own administra-
tive procedures, Northside Sanitary
Landfill, Inc. v. Thomas, 804 F.2d 371, so
deference to the EPA would be pointless on
that claim. The Indiana agency could
address the third claim administratively
(and may feel it did so by referring it to
the EPA for enforcement), but this court
cannot review the Indiana agency's
administrative determinations. Under
either true primary jurisdiction or primary
exclusive jurisdiction, the court is to
retain the power to review the
80
determination of the agency to which the
court defers. EWC has advanced no theory
under which this court could review the
Indiana agency's determinations. EWC has
not convinced the court that the doctrines
of primary exclusive jurisdiction or true
primary jurisdiction should be invoked with
respect to the EPA's claims.
2. STOP's Claims
At trial, EWC argued for the first
time that because Indiana is pursuing or
already has resolved all claims indepen-
dently advanced by STOP, the court should
invoke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
in regard to STOP's claims. EWC appears to
argue that the state agency has exclusive
primary jurisdiction over the matters
raised in STOP's amended complaint. As
noted above, the court deferred ruling on
the issue during trial, overruled the
defendants' objections, and admitted
81
ee
evidence on STOP's claims. A different
analysis governs this argument because STOP
added claims beyond those pressed by the
EPA. Nonetheless, the primary jurisdiction
doctrines are no more applicable to STOP's
claims than to the EPA's claims.
As noted above, STOP intervened in
this action pursuant to the 1986 amendments
to CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i). STOP could
have brought its own action against the
defendants in district court under 42
U.S.C. § 6972 because the EPA was not
pursuing any action to remedy the
additional violations STOP alleges.
In Middlesex County Board of
Chosen Freeholders v. New Jersey, 645 F.
Supp. 715, a citizen group withstood a
motion to dismiss an action filed against
a state agency and others for alleged
ongoing RCRA violations that posed imminent
and substantial danger at a landfill site.
82
The Middlesex court determined that
Congress did not contemplate that RCRA
suits would be brought in state courts, and
that the legislative history of RCRA
indicated that state proceedings relating
to a waste disposal site could proceed
simultaneously with a federal citizen suit
under RCRA relating to the same site. 645
F. Supp. at 719.
EWC has offered no authority for
its proposition that the primary
jurisdiction doctrines apply to claims
brought by citizen groups in federal court.
One court has said that if the primary
jurisdiction doctrines apply at all to
citizens' claims, it should be invoked
"Sparingly where it would serve to preempt
a citizens' suit". Merry v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp., 697 F. Supp. 180, 182 (M.D.
Pa. 1988). In Merry, the plaintiffs
brought an action under CERCLA, RCRA, and
the Clean Water Act. The defendants urged
the court to invoke the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction and defer to the EPA for its
expertise. The court refused to do so
because the EPA's inaction was the catalyst
for the citizens' decision to file suit.
The court held that when a citizens' group
or the federal government brings’ an
enforcement action in a state with permit
issuance authority, the primary
jurisdiction doctrine should be used with
great care. Otherwise, delay by the state
or federal government could frustrate the
congressional intent of broadened
enforcement.
Testimony and exhibits introduced
by STOP rang with frustration at the
ongoing alleged violations occurring at the
Landfill and STOP members' repeated
attempts to get Indiana to act; STOP's
additional claims would lie within the
84
i i alia
administrative enforcement authority of
Indiana rather than the EPA. Northside
Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Thomas, 804 F.2d
371. As noted above, EWC has provided no
authority for the proposition that federal
courts should defer to state agencies in
suits based on federal law. Further, RCRA
and CERCLA granted citizen groups neither
administrative enforcement authority nor
the right to intervene in state
administrative enforcement proceedings.
RCRA and CERCLA provided citizen groups
only with broad rights to bring their own
federal actions and to intervene in federal
actions. To deprive STOP the opportunity
to bring its claims in this proceeding
would thwart the legislative intent behind
the RCRA and CERCLA provisions for citizen
intervention; STOP would be foreclosed from
the only avenue of relief provided by
federal law.
85
D. Collateral Estoppel
EWC argues that the doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel bar
certain of the EPA's claims and all of
STOP's additional claims. EWC contends
that those claims were resolved in an
agreed state administrative order entered
into between EWC and the Environmental
Board of the State of Indiana in June,
1985, in that agency's Cause N-128.
1. Waiver
EWC raised the collateral estoppel
defense in its answers to the EPA's amended
complaint and STOP's amended complaint.
The pretrial order, however, does. not
appear to have preserved the defense with
respect to STOP's claims. At page 35 of
the pretrial order, EWC contended,
EPA is estopped from proceeding
with its claim against the Four
County Landfill due to- prior
actions indicating acceptance of
the State of Indiana's resolution
86
of claims against the operations of
the Four County Landfill.
The pretrial order contains no reference to
an estoppel defense with respect to STOP's
additional claims; the defense did not
reappear as to STOP's claims until EWC
filed its supplemental citation of
authority during final argument. See 6 C.
Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1526, at 596 (1971) (pre-trial
order controls subsequent course of the
action and court "need not consider any
matter that is not embodied in it").
STOP did not respond to the
collateral estoppel argument in its post-
rial supplemental response; whether its
silence reflects a belief that the issue
was waived by its absence from the pretrial
order is unclear. In its post-trial
supplemental response, the EPA argues that
it is not ccllaterally estopped from
litigating specific groundwater monitoring
87
violations because the agreed
administrative order did not’ address
specific groundwater monitoring violations
and, further, that the EPA may pursue its
own enforcement action in aé_- federal
district court despite any agreed
administrative order between a party and an
authorized state.
Because of counsel's’ in-trial
uncertainties as to whether the pretrial
order had been approved, because the
collateral estoppel issue properly was
raised at least with respect to some of the
claims, and because principles of collat-
eral estoppel do not bar the claims in this
case in any event, tne court declines to
hold that EWC has not’' preserved the
collateral estoppel defense.
2. Governing Principles
Once an issue is actually
litigated and determined, that
88
determination is conclusive in subsequent
suits based on a different cause of action
but involving a party or privy to the prior
litigation. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). Collateral
estoppel bars relitigation of factual
questions or mixed questions of law and
fact. See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127,
139 n.10 (1979).
EWC's collateral estoppel theory
is developed incompletely in the record
before the court. The court assumes the
argument is based on the agreed
administrative order in Cause N-128. If
89
’ it has
EWC relies on other proceedings, |
failed to satisfy its burden of proving the
existence of such proceedings. Indiana's
Notice of Violation No. V-209 was admitted
into evidence, but all testimony, including
that of EWC's chief consultant, indicates
that Indiana has taken no final action on
that notice. STOP sought to introduce
evidence concerning an action pending in
the Indiana courts, but EWC successfully
excluded those exhibits from evidence."
“vIn its "Preliminary Tender of
Supplemental Authority" filed during
closing arguments, EWC cited cases "[i]n
support of EWC's contention that EPA and
STOP are collaterally estopped or otherwise
barred from relitigation of claims that
EWC's groundwater monitoring did not meet
interim status requirements or other RCRA
Claims otherwise resolved by other prior
proceedings such as Cause N-128." No
"other prior proceedings" have been
specified.
"8 STOP sought to introduce a complaint
and answer from a pending state suit to
prove certain admissions by EWC concerning
the Landfill's capacity for more hazardous
waste. STOP sought to argue, from
inferences supported by other evidence,
that the Landfill had exceeded, or soon
90
The fundamental policy underlying
the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel is that a "right,
question or fact distinctly put in issue
and directly determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction . . . cannot be
disputed in a subsequent suit between the
Same parties or their privies . . ."
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153
(1979). Because neither the EPA nor STOP
were parties in the state administrative
proceeding in Cause N-128 and the claims
presented here differ from those presented
would exceed, its permitted capacity. From
that, STOP sought to argue that the court
should consider, in exercising its
equitable discretion in determining the
ultimate remedy, that the Landfill could
accept only a small amount of hazardous
waste in the future. Because EWC's request
to increase the permissible capacity
presently pends in the state administrative
bodies, the court declined to admit the
evidence pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 403;
relevancy would depend upon the court's
ability to predict the outcome of the state
proceedings concerning an increase in
capacity.
91
there, the rules of collateral estoppel,
rather than res judicata, govern the
19
preclusion issue in this case. See Kerr-
McGee Chemical Corp. v. Hartigan, 816 F.2d
1177, 1180 (7th Cir. 1987).
The requirements for issue
preclusion under collateral estoppel
principles have been summarized as follows:
As useful a summary as any may be
that issue preclusion arises in a
second action on the basis of a
prior decision when the- same
"issue" is involved in both
actions; the issue was "actually
litigated" in the first action,
after a full and fair opportunity
for litigation; the issue was
"actually decided" in the first
action, by a disposition that is
sufficiently "€i1ne1,* "on the
merits," and "Valid"; it was
necessary to decide the issue in
disposing of the first action, and
-- in some decisions -- the issue
occupied a high position in the
logical hierarchy of abstract legal
rules applied in the first action;
the later litigation is between the
same parties or involves nonparties
that are subject to the binding
effect or benefit of the first
'? Purther, the issue of res judicata
was not raised in the pretrial order.
92
action; the role of the issue in
the second action was foreseeable
in the first action, or it occupies
a high position in the logical
hierarchy of abstract legal rules
applied in the second action; and
there are no special considerations
of fairness, relative judicial
authority, changes of law, or the
like, that warrant remission of the
ordinary rules of preclusion.
18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure:
Jurisdiction § 4416, at 137-138 (1981)
20
(footnotes omitted). EWC bears the burden
of so showing, United States v. Athlone
Industries, Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3rd
Cir. 1984); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), and has
failed to meet that burden with respect to
many items.
20 The American Law Institute states
the rule more succinctly: "When an issue
of fact or law is actually litigated and
determined by a valid final judgment, and
the determination is essential to the
judgment, the determination is conclusive
in a subsequent action between the parties,
whether on the same or a different claim."
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27
(1982).
93 ‘
a. Same "Tssue"
One claiming collateral estoppel
must show, as a threshold matter, that the
suit at bar presents the same issue that
was resolved in an earlier proceeding. EWC
has made no such showing. It does not
appear that the administrative order in
Cause N-128 would preclude any issues the
EPA and STOP present in this action. On
close analysis, it is apparent that EWC
does not seek protection of the rules of
collateral estoppel, but rather seeks
immunity from suit by anyone but the State
of Indiana based on future violations.
The administrative order in Cause
N-128 (STOP Exh. 12) was entered in June,
1985. The order was based upon findings of
certain regulatory violations that had
occurred at the Landfill; necessarily,
those violations occurred before June,
1985. The Indiana agency found that:
94
(1) EWC had not taken
additional groundwater samples to
determine whether earlier
detections of significant
differences in total organic carbon
‘o>. levels between the
upgradient and downgradient samples
were due to laboratory error (STOP
Exh. 12, § 6a) and failed to notify
the Regional Administrator in
writing of confirmation of such
differences (STOP Exh. 12, § 6b),
although EWC had achieved
compliance with those requirements
by the time of the agreed ad-
ministrative order (STOP Exh. 12,
q 6r);
(2) EWC had not’ satisfied
several of the requirements with
respect to development | of a
sufficient groundwater assessment
95
plan pursuant to 40 C.F.R. §
265.93(d) (2) through (5) after
notification of Significant
differences in TOC levels (STOP
Exh. 12, § 6c) ;°'
(3) EWC had not’ evaluated
groundwater surface elevations as
required for a groundwater
assessment plan (STOP Exh. 12,
6d) or described a response to that
evaluation (STOP Exh. 12, 4 6e);
(4) the closure and post-
closure plans submitted by EWC were
deficient in several respects (STOP
" Among the shortcomings Indiana found
were the failure to provide sufficient
information to define the contaminant
plume, failure to provide a schedule of
implementation, failure to determine the
rate, extent or concentrations of migration
of hazardous waste or hazardous’ waste
constituents, and failure to implement an
assessment plan.
96
a a ne ee er ee ne ee a
Exh. 12, 99 6f, 6h, 61, 63, 6k, 61,
6m) ;°°
(5) EWC had failed show
compliance with the requirement of
maintenance of a runoff management
system capable of collecting and
controlling at least the water
volume resulting from a 24-hour,
25-year storm, 40 C.F.R. §
265.302(b), and the operation of
collection and holding facilities
associated with run-on and runoff
control, 40 C.F.R. § 265.302(c)
(STOP Exh. 12, § 6g), and was not
= Among the defects found in the
closure plan was the failure *o prepare a
written estimate of the cost of closing the
facility. The state found that the cost
estimates were inaccurate in light of the
Landfill's calculated design capacity.
(STOP Exh. 12, § 6h). EWC also had failed
to provide for submission of a plat
indicating the locations and dimensions of
landfill cells or other disposal areas with
respect to permanently surveyed benchmarks.
(STOP Exh. 12, § 6k).
97
OT
controlling run-on into the working
face, 40 C.F.R. § 265.302(a) (STOP
Exh.
12, G 6p);
(6) EWC had not kept a
sufficient record of manifests of
deliveries of hazardous waste to
the facility (STOP Exh. 12, 4 6n);
(7) EWC had not made available
for inspection since October, 1984,
the portion of the operating record
locating each hazardous waste
deposit in the facility as required
by 40 C.F.R. § 265.74(a);
23
(8) cover in the "'wet/winter'
area next to the on-site road at
the northwest corner of last year's
fill" was insufficient to satisfy
40 C.F.R. § 265.31 (STOP Exh. 12,
23
As is discussed in Part IV-B below,
hazardous waste was being placed illegally
in unlined cells at the Landfill in June,
1985.
98
ee a ee ne ea
{@ 6q).-
As a result of these findings, Indiana
fined EWC and ordered certain steps to be
taken to remedy the violations.
Some of the topics of the claims
in this case overlap the types of
violations found in the agreed
administrative order in Cause N-128: STOP
contends that EWC has violated regulations
concerning run-on and runoff control, and
EWC was found to have violated such
regulations in paragraphs 6g and 6p of the
agreed order; STOP contends that EWC has
violated requirements concerning manifests,
and EWC was found to have violated that
regulation in paragraph 6n of the agreed
order; STOP contends that EWC failed to
apply sufficient cover to prevent dispersal
into the air and surface water, and EWC was
found to have violated that regulation in
paragraph 6q of the agreed order; STOP and
99
the EPA argue that EWC has not evaluated
adequately the groundwater elevations at
the Landfill, and the Indiana agency found,
in paragraph 6d of the agreed order, that
EWC had failed to do so.
That the EPA and STOP allege
violations of the sort found in the agreed
order in Cause N-128 does not, however,
preclude the presentation of those issues.
To the extent the EPA's claims are similar
to issues resolved by the agreed order, the
EPA's claims relate to violations that
allegedly occurred after the agreed order
was entered. The EPA contends that the
groundwater elevations at the Landfill were
evaluated insufficiently as late as 1988,
not just in or before 1985. The June, 1985
administrative order did not address, and
could not have addressed, violations
occurring after June, 1985. Post-1985
violations simply were not issues in Cause
100 :
N-128, and the rules of collateral estoppel
apply only to issues addressed in the
earlier action. United States PF
International Building Co., 345 U.S. 502
(1953).
EWC essentially argues that as
long as it is in compliance with the
remedial steps provided by the agreed
administrative order (or, perhaps more
accurately, as long as Indiana takes no
further action based on the violations
giving rise to the agreed administrative
order), it is absolved from responsibility
for later violations, at least at the hands
of any party other than Indiana. LWC seeks
to expand the doctrine of collateral
estoppel into areas heretofore unimagined
and, by any definition, illogical. A party
found to have violated the law yesterday is
not thereby rendered immune as to
tomorrow's violations; even an injunctive
101
decree does not abrogate the law so as to
forgive tomorrow's violations.
STOP did not confine its evidence
to events occurring after June, 1985,
although the bulk of its evidence addressed
alleged violations occurring after the
agreed order. STOP's contentions in the
pretrial order are worded broadly, but the
court does not understand STOP to be
seeking relief for violations occurring
before the agreed order. The court views
STOP's evidence concerning alleged
violations before June, 1985 as going to
the matter of relief in the’ event
violations are found to have occurred after
June, 1985.
When STOP's case is so viewed, it
seems that STOP, rather than EWC, is
entitled to any benefits of the collateral
estoppel rules. Had Indiana found that EWC
had not committed certain violations,
102
collateral estoppel principles might
preclude STOP from asserting that those
violations had occurred.“ Indiana did not
so find, however; Indiana found that EWC
had violated regulations concerning runoff
and run-on control, manifests and cover.
If collateral estoppel applies at all to
STOP's claims, it would seem that it should
preclude the defendants from denying those
violations.
b. Actual Final Decision on the Merits
One claiming collateral estoppel
must show that the previous decision was an
actual final decision on the merits of the
** Collateral estoppel precludes only
issues that actually were litigated in the
earlier proceeding. Brubaker v. King, 505
F.2d 534, 538 (7th Cir. 1974).
Accordingly, the court need not consider
whether Indiana might have considered and
rejected other alleged violations by EWC.
The agreed administrative order itself
reflects none, and the defendants have
presented no other evidence indicating that
EWC prevailed on any issue.
103
issue. EWC's showing with respect to Cause
N-128 falls short.
First, the agreed order on which
EWC relies was entered by a state
administrative agency. State law
determines the preclusive effect of the
state's administrative agencies' determi-
nations or actions. United States v.
Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1307 (E.D. Mo.
1987). The Indiana Supreme Court has
approved four criteria for use in
determining whether an administrative
determination should estop subsequent
litigation: (1) whether the issues sought
to be estopped were within the agency's
statutory jurisdiction; (2) whether the
agency acted in a judicial capacity; (3)
whether both parties had a feir opportunity
to litigate the issues: and (4) whether the
decision of the administrative tribunal
could be appealed to a judicial tribunal.
- 104
McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines, 517
N.E.2d 390, 394 (Ind. 1988).
As noted in Part II-A-1i of this
memorandum, issues created by the 1984
amendments to RCRA were not within the
state agency's jurisdiction; accordingly,
the state agency's determination cannot
estop EPA's and STOP's claims based on
those amendments. As noted in the
preceding paragraphs, the parties cannot be
deemed to have had a fair opportunity to
litigate alleged violations that had not
yet occurred. Finally, EWC has made no
showing as to whether the agency's decision
could be appealed to a judicial tribunal.
Further, the agency's decision was
an agreed order, which EWC describes as a
consent decree. Consent decrees, which
reflect both a contract between the parties
and the exercise of judicial power, are not
treated as judicial decrees for all
105
purposes. Local No. 93, International
Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland,
478 U.S. 501, 519, 525 (1986). A court
accepting a consent decree need not decide
the merits of the action, Kaspar v. Board
of Election Commissioners of Chicago, 814
F.2d 332, 338 (7th Cir. 1987), and may
award relief against a party that admits no
wrongdoing. United States v. ITT Conti-
nental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236 n.10
f2O7S) . Indeed, parties' compromises may
produce a consent decree specifically
intended to avoid litigation of the issues
presented by the case. See United States
v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-682
(1971); Kasper Wire Works, Inc. v. LECO
Engineering & Machine, Inc., 575 F.2d 530,
539 (5th Cis. 19786). Because such an
approach produces the antithesis of
findings reached after a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue to be
106
iiss
precluded, special rules govern the
applicability of collateral estoppel rules
to consent decrees.
Indiana's courts do not appear to
have considered the preclusion effect of a
consent decree in more than a century. See
Fletcher v. Holmes, 25 Ind. 458 (1865)
(consent decree valid although facts would
not support judgment). Under the modern
view of the law, however, a consent decree
generally is treated as a final judgment on
the merits and accorded res judicata
effect. United States v. Fisher, 864 F.2d
434, 439 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Athlone Industries, Inc., 746 F.2d at 983
n.5 (3rd Cir. 1984). Amalgamated Sugar Co.
v. NL Industries, Inc., 825 F.2d 634, 639
(2nd Cir. 1987), a case cited by EWC, so
holds, but that case dealt with claim
preclusion, not issue preclusion. In most
circumstances, however, consent agreements
107
are intended to preclude further litigation
only on the claim presented, not on any of
the issues presented. 18 C. Wright, A.
Miller and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 4443, at 385 (1981). The
Restatement states that,
In the case of a judgment entered
by confession, consent, or default,
none of the issues is actually
litigated. Therefore, [collateral
estoppel rules do] not apply with
respect to any issue in a
subsequent action. The judgment
may be conclusive, however, with
respect to one or more issues, if
the parties have entered an
agreement manifesting such an
intention.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27,
comment e (1982). A leading treatise
states that consent judgments are res
judicata to causes of action contained
therein, but should not be given conclusive
effect under the doctrine of collateral
estoppel unless it was the _ parties'
specific intent to do so. 1B J. Moore, J.
108
re
Lucas & T. Currier, Moore's Federal
Practice § 0.443[3] (1988).
The parties' intent with respect
to the agreed administrative order in Cause
N-128 is not easily ascertained. Paragraph
19 of the order provides, "This Agreed
Order will have no force or effect until it
is approved by the Board, and timely
compliance with the terms of this Agreed
Order shall constitute a final resolution
of this cause." Assuming that some future
preclusion was intended -- an assumption
not easily made in light of that language -
- evidence Beresnces at trial indicates
that EWC did not come into compliance with
the terms of paragraph 3 of the order until
sometime in 1988, well after institution of
this suit. The evidence introduced at
trial indicates nothing with respect to
compliance with paragraphs 5-8 of the
order.
109
For all of the foregoing reasons,
the court concludes that EWC has made an
insufficient showing that the agreed
administrative order in Cause N-128
constitutes the type of actual final
decision on the merits required for issue
preclusion.
c. Nonparties Subject to Binding Effect of
First Action
As noted above, one claiming the
benefit of collateral estoppel must show
that "the later litigation is between the
Same parties or involves nonparties that
are subject to the binding effect or
benefit of the first action..." 18 C.
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal
Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction §
4416, at 138 (1981). EWC relies upon cases
that have adopted the emerging rule that a
non-party may be bound by an earlier
judgment if a party to the earlier
110
te
litigation is so closely aligned with its
interests as to be its "virtual
representative". United States v. ITT
Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 1003 (9th
Cir. 1980); Nether Providence-Swarthmore
Alliance of Civil Associates Inc. Vv.
Quinby, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7348 (E.D.
Pa. 1988); Sierra Club v. Block, 576 F.
Supp. 959 (D. Ore. 1983); cf. 18 C. Wright,
A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Jurisdiction § 4457 (1981)
(criticizing the emerging rule). The EPA
seeks to meet the argument head on, citing
district court cases holding that a state
consent order does not bar the EPA from
seeking federal relief for the same
violations. United States v. Town of
Lowell, 637 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. Ind. 1985);
United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F.
Supp. 734 (D. Del. 1981). As noted above,
STOP did not respond to EWC's’ closing
111
arguments on collateral estoppel.
The court need not determine
whether the Indiana agency was the "virtual
representative" of the EPA or STOP. A
federal court must give a state court
judgment (assuming the order in Cause N-128
to be such) the same preclusive effect it
would receive in the courts of the state in
which it was rendered; accordingly, the
court must examine Indiana law to determine
the preclusive effect of the order in Cause
N-128. 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Migra v. Warren
City School Dist. Bd. of Education, 465
U.S. 75, 81 (1984); Kremer _v. Chemical
Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466
(1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96
(1980); Morris v. Spratt, 768 F.2d 879, 882
(7th Cir. 1985); Hurt v. Pullman, Inc., 764
F.2d 1443, 1447 n.4 (11th Cir. 1985);
Russell v. United States, 626 F. Supp.
i217, 1220 (S.D. Ind. 1986).
Indiana's courts have specifically
declined to adopt any modification to the
traditional rules requiring identity of
parties for collateral estoppel purposes.
Burtram v. Wheeler, 440 N.E.2d 1147, 1153
(Ind. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Speidel, 181
Ind. App. 448, 392 N.E.2d 1172, 1176 n.4
(1979). The "virtual representative" test
upon which EWC relies simply is not a part
of Indiana _ law. The Speidel court
explained that a plea of collateral
estoppel under Indiana law rule is binding
only on parties to the action and persons
in privity with them and explained that a
"privy" is one who acquires an interest in
the subject matter of a judgment through or
under one of the parties, such as by
inheritance, succession, or purchase, and
one tied te a party through that party's
legal representative capacity as, for
example, trustee, executor, administrator,
113
guardian, conservator, or similar
fiduciary. State v. Speidel, 392 N.E.2d at
1176-1177 and n.5. STOP has not acquired
any interest in the Indiana agency's
"judgment" against EWC, and the Indiana
agency did not act as STOP's fiduciary in
the administrative proceeding.
The EPA might be deemed a party to
the state administrative action under
Indiana's collateral estoppel rules by
virtue of 42 U.S.C. § 6926(d), which
provides, "Any action taken by a State
under a hazardous waste program authorized
under this section shall have the same
force and effect as action taken by the
Administrator under’ this subchapter."
Arguably, the Indiana agency acted as the
EPA's legal representative as a matter of
law. Because the EPA alleges violations
outside the state agency's jurisdiction or
that occurred after the agreed admini-
114
strative order, however, the court need not
resolve that issue.
3. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the
court concludes that EWC has failed to
demonstrate that principles of collateral
estoppel preclude any of the issues raised
by the claims made by the EPA and STOP.
III. THE LANDFILL'S OWNERS AND OPERATORS
Having determined that no
jurisdictional impediment prevents this
suit, the court next must determine which
defendants properly may be held to answer
the claims. The pertinent provisions of
RCRA apply to "owners" and "operators" of
hazardous waste storage sites. 40 C.F.R.
115
§ 260.10 defines the terms:
"Operator" means the person
responsible for the overall
operation of a facility.
"Owner" means the person who
owns a facility or part of a
facility.
Environmental Waste, Mr. Shambaugh, Mr.
Wilkins, and West Holding Company each are
a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.
§ 6903(15) and 40 C.F.R. § 260.10.
The EPA's second amended complaint
sought to hold Environmental Waste
*
responsible as the Landfill's operator and
Mr. Wilkins responsible as the facility's
Owner, and the court has found them to be
so responsible. United States v. Environ-
mental Waste Control, Inc., 698 "» Supp. at
1430. EWC's contentions in the pretrial
order indicate a denial that Mr. Wilkins is
an owner or operator (Pretrial order, at
17-18, § 5), but the court already ruled to
the contrary in the summary judgment order.
EWC has offered no new evidence or argument
116
a ee
to challenge that holding. The EPA also
seeks to hold West Holding Company
responsible as the facility's owner, and
West plainly acquired that status through
Mr. Wilkins' conveyance of the property to
West. The EPA seeks to hold Mr. Shambaugh
responsible as the Landfill's operator, and
Mr. Shambaugh denies that he is an operator
of the Landfill.
Mr. Shambaugh renews his earlier
argument that there can be but one operator
of a facility under RCRA. He notes that 40
C.F.R. § 260.10 speaks of "the person
responsible . .. "™ From this, he
concludes that a facility can have no more
than one operator and Environmental Waste,
not he, is that person with respect to the
Landfill. He cannot be held liable merely
as a corporate officer of the operator. If
injunctive relief is granted, only
Environmental Waste, not he, can comply
117
with the order. He notes that no other
couxt has held that a facility can have
more than one operator for purposes of
RCRA.
Mr. Shambaugh moved for summary
judgment on these grounds, and the court
rejected them. United States v. Environ-
mental Waste Control, Inc., 698 F. Supp. at
1429-1430. Mr. Shambaugh has presented no
further argument that persuades the court
that the earlier entry was wrong. While
Mr. Shambaugh correctly notes that no other
court has held that a facility can have
more than one operator for RCRA purposes,
neither does he cite any contrary holding.
Mr. Shambaugh does not appear to dispute
that Mr. Wilkins was an owner, and thus
subject to injunctive relief under RCRA,
when he owned the land upon which the
Landfill was located; like Mr. Shambaugh,
Mr. Wilkins could not alone comply with an
injunction requiring, for example, the
installation of additional groundwater
monitoring wells. The court stands by, and
adopts, the reasoning set forth in the
summary judgment ruling:
it is difficult to believe
that if three persons operated a
hazardous waste facility as a joint
venture on property owned by four
other persons, only two of the
persons (one as an owner, another
as an operator) could be liable for
civil penalties under Section 3008
of RCRA. Not every act will render
a person an operator, but the court
is unpersuaded that no more than
one person may be an operator with
respect to a given hazardous waste
facility.
698 F. Supp. at 1429.
While holding, on the summary
judgment motions, that the Landfill could
have more than one operator for purposes of
RCRA, the court declined to grant the EPA's
summary judgment motion seeking a
declaration that Mr. Shambaugh was an
operator of the Landfill. That holding
awaited resolution in light of the evidence
i19
ee
at trial. That evidence convinces the
court that if any facility can have more
than one operator, the EPA and STOP have
shown Mr. Shambaugh to be an operator of
the Four County Landfill.
The government places its initial
reliance upon the November 7, 1985
certificate of compliance to the EPA made
necessary by 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e)(2). Mr.
Shambaugh signed that certificate below the
two certifications identifying him as
"operator of Four County Landfill..."
(EPA Exh. 70). Michael Johnson, a
consultant employed by Environmental Waste
who prepared the certification, testified
that the description of Mr. Shambaugh as
operator was simply his mistake, and Mr.
Shambaugh testified that he signed that
certification in his representative
capacity as President of Environmental
Waste, but such a limitation appears
120
——
nowhere on the certification.
It would seem inappropriate to
hold a person potentially liable for
millions of dollars in civil penalties and
corrective actions based on nothing more
than a failure to identify one's signature
as being in a representative capacity. The
record before the court, however, provides
considerably more evidence that Mr.
Shambaugh is, and always has been, an
operator of the Landfill within the meaning
of RCRA.
First, the November 7, 1985
certification itself presents more than a
mere omission of Mr. Shambaugh's
representative capacity. It affirmatively
identifies Mr. Shambaugh in three places as
the operator of the Landfill: in addition
to the two certification statements, the
first paragraph under "FACILITY
INFORMATION" states, "Name of Facility
121
Owner/Operator: James A. Wilkins, as
owner; Stephen W. Shambaugh, as operator."
More tellingly, the certification, which
was required to be filed on the Landfill's
behalf to preserve its interim status,
makes no reference to any role ~of
Environmental Waste apart from providing
the letterhead for the certification.
When Mr. Wilkins conveyed a
leasehold interest in the land on which the
Landfill is located, he leased it to Mr.
Shambaugh and Mr. Johnson. Mr. Shambaugh
executed the lease in his own name, not in
ute beet Capacity, and conceded
that he was personally liable under the
lease (EPA Exh. 17, Q@ 8). The lease
anticipated assignment to Environmental
Waste, but provided that such assignment
would not release Mr. Shambaugh from his
122
ee
obligations under the lease.”
In 1985,
when Mr. Johnson sought to disassociate
himself from the Landfill,” he conveyed his
” Paragraph ® of the lease provided:
8. That Lessees shall have —
the right to assign this lease to
ENVIRONMENTAL WASTE CONTROL, INC.,
an Indiana corporation, but that
notice of any such assignment shall
be rendered to Lessor and the names
of officers, directors and
shareholders of said corporation
shall be made known to Lessor and
that despite any assignment, the
covenants foregoing shall continue
to be binding on the said DOUGLAS
M. JOHNSON and STEPHEN K.
SHAMBAUGH.
EPA Exh. 17.
*6 EPA Exhibit 19, the agreement
whereby Mr. Johnson surrendered his EWC
stock to EWC, recited, inter alia:
WHEREAS, Johnson is employed
by the Corporation and has been so
employed for numerous years, and;
WHEREAS, Johnson is a
stockholder in said Corporation,
and;
WHEREAS, the Corporation has
experienced a substantial reduction
in its volume of business, and;
WHEREAS, EWC is unable to meet
various site standards imposed by
the Indiana Environmental Control
Board and by the EPA, a Federal
agency, upon hazardous waste
businesses, and;
123
interest in the Wilkins lease to Mr.
Shambaugh in exchange.for Mr. Shambaugh's
personal guarantee of Environmental Waste's
contractual payments to Mr. Johnson and
personal promise to perform all of Mr.
Johnson's obligations under the lease (EPA
Exh. 18).
Mr. Shambaugh testified that he
and Mr. Wilkins have exercised co-equal
WHEREAS, the Corporation
cannot meet all of its salary and
operating expense obligations, and;
WHEREAS, Johnson wishes’ to
discharge his obligation to the
Corporation, and to minimize his
personal responsibility in
connection with the legal
obligations imposed by the State of
Indiana and the Federal
Environmental Protection Agency
Mr. Johnson, apparently on the same day he
surrendered his shares of stock to
Environmental Waste, also assigned the
shares to Mr. Shambaugh by way of a
handwritten instrument providing, "Because
of the potential liability of the stock
ownership and the unsure future operation
of E.W.C., Inc. a value of One Dollar
($1.00) has been placed upon this transfer
of rights and shares of stock." EPA Exh.
20.
124
control over the Landfill, to which he now
devotes all of his business time. Mr.
Shambaugh testified in his deposition that
he could think of nothing Mr. Wilkins does
at the Landfill that he does not also do.”
Mr. Shambaugh and Mr. Wilkins each are paid
$200,000 per year for their work with the
Landfill. me 6 CRIA, Mr. Shambaugh
testified that he and Mr. Wilkins jointly
decide on who the Landfill will hire; Mr.
Shambaugh personally has principal say in
selecting consultants, accepting or
rejecting their advice, purchasing
equipment, and deciding whether
improvements will be carried out; he
devotes all of his business time to the
operation of the Landfill end spends five
to six hours a day, four days a week there.
a Doyle Flory, the Landfill's field
superintendent, also so testified in his
deposition, although he was able to think
of things at trial that Mr. Shambaugh does
not do.
125
When funds were short in 1985, Mr.
Shambaugh operated heavy equipment at the
Landfill. Mr. Shambaugh personally was a
named insured on the Landfill insurance
policy in effect on November 7, 1985.
Further, Mr. Shambaugh personally
guaranteed an open-ended loan to
Environmental Waste from Resources
Unlimited, Inc. That loan began at
$250,000 with all payments deferred for two
years; the balance now is approximately
$300,000, but has been as high as
$1,000,000. Through that loan agreement,
which was to last twelve years, Resources
Unlimited also became the Landfill's
exclusive broker for waste, became entitled
to a twenty percent commission, obtained
the right to deposit its own hazardous
waste at the Landfill at reduced rates, and
received a right of first refusal should
the Landfill be sold, with a right to share
126
the proceeds cf any sale to a third party
in excess of $8,000,000. Mr. Shambaugh,
with Mr. Wilkins, personally agreed to hold
harmless and indemnify Resource Unlimited
in the event the Landfill is placed on the
"Superfund" list or given ae clean-up
order.”
Mr. Shambaugh has been - more
involved in the lLandfill's day-to-day
operation, finances, and operation than has
any other person. He has personally
guaranteed its leases, its obligations
under those leases, and its loans. He
aa STOP elicited evidence that
Resources Unlimited is owned by an entity
known as The Heritage Group, which also
owns EMS Laboratories, a firm that EWC
retains for its chemical analyses. STOP
appeared to seek an inference that EMS
Laboratories' work for EWC was’ suspect
because of this connection. The EPA also
contracts with EMS Laboratories for
chemical analyses, however. The court has
not drawn the inference STOP appears to
seek, and finds no unreliability in EMS
reports as a result of its indirect ties to
the Landfill.
127
controls, with Mr. Wilkins,*’ the Landfill's
operation. He is an operator of the Four
County Landfill for purposes of the
enforcement provisions of RCRA.
IV. THE EPA'S CLAIMS: LIABILITY
As noted above, the EPA makes four
Claims for relief; the first of those
claims has two bases. STOP also raises
nine additional claims. Because most of
those claims invoke the court's equitable
discretion in determining the penalties to
*? EWC notes that despite Mr. Wilkins'
involvement in the Landfill's operation,
the EPA has not alleged or argued that Mr.
Wilkins is an operator; EWC appears to
believe that this somehow undercuts the
EPA's contention that Mr. Shambaugh is an
operator: "Such selective application of
the law is fast becoming an EPA trademark
in this case, and bespeaks the real lack of
substance of their claim." Defendants'
Trial Brief, at 86. EWC's argument does
not explain why, if Mr. Wilkins already is
on the RCRA hook as an owner, the EPA
should waste further judicial resources in
trying to prove him an operator as well.
128
be imposed if violations are found, the
court first addresses the violations that
the EPA and STOP allege and then turns to
the issue of penalty.
A. Loss of Interim Status
The EPA's argument that the
Landfill lost its interim status on
November 8, 1985 begins with the 1984
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments to
RCRA, which added restrictions designed to
minimize further land disposal of hazardous
wastes and to address problems at existing
land disposal. sites. 130 Cong. Rec.
S13818-13819; 130 Cong. Rec. H11130-11142.
The 1984 amendments added the following
provision:
In the case of each land disposal
facility which has been granted
interim status under this
subsection before November 8, 1984,
interim status shall terminate on
the date twelve months”) after
November 8, 1984, unless the owner
or operator of such facility --
(A) applies for a
final determination
129
e
OT LO
regarding the issuance of
a permit under subsection
(c) of this section for
such facility before the
date twelve months after
November 8, 1984; and
(B) certifies that
such facility is in
compliance with all
applicable ground water
monitoring and financial
responsibility
requirements.
42 U.S.C. § 6925(e) (2). A land disposal
facility that has neither interim status
nor a final permit may not’ operate.
Vineland Chemical Co. v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency, 810 F.2d
402 (3rd Cir. 1987).
The parties do not dispute that
EWC applied in a timely manner for final
determination of its permit application and
filed a certificate of compliance with
applicable groundwater monitoring and
financial responsibility requirements. The
EPA contends, however, that the certificate
of compliance was false on both counts and
130
hence a nullity. Accordingly, the EPA
contends, the Landfill's interim status
terminated on November 8, 1985 (twelve
months after the date stated in the
statute) and, because the Landfill has no
final permit, the Landfill cannot operate.
EWC denies that its certification was false
and contends that, in any event, the filing
of a certification in good faith satisfies
the statute.
State and federal authorities have
denied EWC's Part B application for a final
permit; EWC is in the process of appealing
those denials. A facility may continue to
operate under its interim status (if any)
during the pendency of such an appeal. The
propriety of the denial of EWC's Part B
application is not in issue in this case.
The proceedings with respect to. that
application are pertinent only insofar as
they disclose that the Landfill has no
131
final permit. Accordingly, if the Landfill
lacks interim status, it has no basis to
continue operation.
1. Certification vs. Compliance
At final argument, EWC argued that
42 U.S.C. § 6925(e)(2) requires only
certification of compliance, not compliance
itself. EWC certified its compliance ina
timely manner and contends it did so in
good faith. Accordingly, EWC argues that
even if it was not in actual compliance
with financial responsibility and
groundwater monitoring requirements, its
certification of compliance precluded loss
of interim status under § 6925(e) (2).
Even before November 8, 1985, the
EPA adopted the position that § 6925(e) (2)
required both compliance and certification.
50 Fed. Reg. 38,946-49 (Sept. 25, 1985)
(EPA Exh. 73). When engaging in statutory
construction, a court shows great deference
132
to the interpretation of the agency
responsible for its administration,
Environmental Protection Agency v. Natignal
Crushed Stone Association, 449 U.S. 64, 83
(1980), as long as the agency's
interpretation is reasonable and does not
conflict with expressed Congressional
intent. United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985). The
EPA's interpretation is reasonable. See
Vineland Chemical Co. v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency, 810 F.2d
at 409. If EWC is correct, Congress simply
intended to flood the EPA with meaningless
certifications and nee to assure compliance
with regulations governing hazardous enti:
42 U.S.C. § 6925(e)(2) required
facilities such as the Landfill to be in
compliance with applicable financial
responsibility and groundwater monitoring
requirements by November 8, 1985. If the
eA SL Sa | CERRO.
@ |
Landfill was not in such compliance on that
date, its certification to the contrary did
not satisfy the statutory requirement.
Ya Insurance Coverage
On November Ve 1985, when
Environmental Waste, Mr. Wilkins, and Mr.
Shambaugh certified compliance with
applicable interim status financial
responsibility requirements, they were
insured under a policy issued by St. Paul
Surplus Lines Insurance Company ("St.
Paul") covering the period from June 28,
1985 to June 28, 1986. St. Paul issued a
certificate intended to show the
defendants' (other than West, of course,
which did not then exist) compliance with
those interim status requirements as of
November 8, 1985. That certificate stated,
as did the policy's declarations page, that
coverage was provided for both sudden
accidental and non-sudden accidental
134
occurrences in the amount of $3,000,000 per
occurrence and $6,000,000 annual
aggregate.”
The EPA contends that regulations
in effect on November 8, 1985 required
insurance for both sudden and non-sudden
occurrences. EWC was required to obtain
insurance against sudden occurrences in the
amount of $1,000,000 per occurrence with an
annual aggregate of at least $2,000,000.
40 C.F.R. § 265.147(a). EWC was required
to obtain insurance against non-sudden
occurrences in the amount of $3,000,000 per
occurrence with an annual aggregate of
$6,000,000. 40 C.F.R. § 265.147(b). In
all, then, EWC was required to obtain
insurance against a total of $8,000,000 for
- trial, the EPA also argued that
the policy failed to satisfy regulatory
requirements because it expressly excluded
fire and explosion from coverage for sudden
accidental occurrences. Because this issue
was not raised in the pretrial order,
however, the court declines to address it.
iso
sudden and non-sudden occurrences. EWC's
St. Paul policy fell $2,000,000 short.
EWC raises several arguments in
opposition to this claim. It contends that
the policy conformed even with’ the
regulations as interpreted by EPA; that the
regulations did not’ clearly require
insurance in excess of $6,000,000; that the
EPA is estopped from enforcing that
regulation against EWC; and that it acted
in good faith in attempting to comply with
the regulations. EWC also argues that it
had adequate insurance before this suit was
brought and that there is no precedent for
loss of interim status under the
circumstances of this case.
a. Developments After November 8, 1985
EWC notes that its’ insurance
policies since June 28, 1986 have provided
adequate policy limits; the EPA and STOP so
stipulated. EWC has not articulated
136
precisely where it believes this argument
leads, however. The court must determine
the adequacy of the Landfill's insurance
coverage as of November 8, 1985. Insurance
coverage after the date made critical by
the 1984 amendments known as HSWA is
irrelevant to determination of the
truthfulness of EWC's November 7, 1985
certificate of compliance.
EWC also contends that no claim
was made on the St. Paul policy between
November 7, 1985 (the date of the
certification) and June 28, 1986 (the last
date of the allegedly insufficient
coverage) and that, accordingly, no damage
has resulted from any inadequate insurance
coverage. Again, however, it is unclear
where EWC believes this argument should
lead. The 1984 amendments required owners
and operators to certify compliance with
financial assurance requirements, not to
137
survive a period of underinsurance.
Accordingly, while EWC did not specifically
limit this argument to the issue of
penalty, the court will so view it and
defer further discussion to Part VI of this
opinion.
b. Extent of the Landfill's Actual Coverage
As is discussed below, EWC
Rineuves * that applicable regulations
required an aggregate $8,000,000 in
insurance coverage in November, 1985. EWC
also contends, however, that even if the
regulations did so require, its insurance
coverage satisfied the regulations.
(1) Endorsement 3
Item VI of the Declarations Page
of the St. Paul policy defined the limits
of liability as $3,000,000 for any one
claim and $6,000,000 aggregate for the
policy period or annual period, whichever
138
is shorter. Section VI of the body of the
policy incorporated Item VI of the
Declarations Page. EWC, however, points to
Endorsement 3 to the policy, effective June
28, 1985, which provided as follows:
IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PREMIUM
CHARGED, IT tS AGREED THAT THE
INSURER WILL ISSUE CERTIFICATE(S)
OF LIABILITY INSURANCE ATTESTING TO
THE INSURED'S COMPLIANCE WITH
LOCAL, STATE OR FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY OBLIGATIONS.
IT IS FURThER AGREED THAT:
1. THE ISSUANCE OF SUCH
CERTIFICATES SHALL IN NO WAY
BE INTERPRETED TO MODIFY THE
TERMS, CONDITIONS AND
OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN THE
INSURED AND THE INSURER UNDER
THIS POLICY.
2. THE INSURED SHALL REIMBURSE
THE COMPANY .FOR ANY AND ALL
AMOUNTS ASSESSED AGAINST,
INCURRED BY OR PAID BY THE
COMPANY ON BEHALF OF THE
INSURED:
A. UP TO AND INCLUDING THE
AMOUNT OF DEDUCTIBLE AS
STATED IN ITEM VII OF THE
POLICY DECLARATIONS
AND/OR
B. WHICH DO NOT FALL WITHIN
THE COVERAGES AFFORDED BY
139
THE POLICY, TO WHICH THIS
ENDORSEMENT FORMS A PART.
3. AS RESPECTS THE LIMIT OF
LIABILITY STATED IN ITEM VI OF
THE POLICY DECLARATIONS:
A. WHEN A CERTIFICATE(S) OF
LIABILITY INSURANCE
IS/ARE ISSUED, THE LIMITS
OF LIABILITY STATED
THEREIN FOR EACH
OCCURRENCE/ANNUAL
AGGREGATE SHALL BE
AVAILABLE UNDER THIS
POLICY FOR COVERAGE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPAIRMENT
LIABILITY IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE APPLICABLE
LOCAL, STATE OR FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY
OBLIGATIONS AND WILL NOT
BE AVAILABLE FOR OTHER
COVERAGES AFFORDED BY
THIS POLICY. HOWEVER,
THE TOTAL LIMITS OF
LIABILITY AS STATED IN
ITEM VI OF THE POLICY
DECLARATIONS ARE
APPLICABLE TO ALL COVERA-
GES AFFORDED UNDER THE
POLICY AND ARE THE
MAXIMUM LIMITS AVAILABLE
TO THE INSURED UNDER THIS
POLICY.
EPA Exh. 5.
EWC reasons that if the law
required any insurance in excess of that
140
provided by the original St. Paul policy,
Endorsement 3 provided it. EWC relies
principally upon Winecoff v. Nationwide
- Mutual Ins. Co., 223 Tenn. 267, 444 S.W.2da
84 (1969), in which an automobile insurance
policy carried language similiar to that
found in Endorsement 3 to the St. Paul
policy:
This policy does not comply
with motorists' financial
responsibility laws of your state
unless there iS a premium charge
shown for Coverages C(1) and C(2).
* * *
The limits of the Company's
liability under Coverages C(1) and
C(2) shall comply with the limits
of liability required under any
applicable motor vehicle financial
responsibility law.
When certified as proof of
financial responsibility” for the
future under the provisions of any
motor vehicle financial
responsibility law, such insurance
as is afforded by this Policy under
Coverages C(1) and C(2) shall
comply with the provisions of such
law to the extent of the coverage
— required by such law.
During the pendency of his coverage, the
insured moved from North Carolina, which
141
required insurance of at least $5,000, to
Tennessee, which required insurance of at
least $10,000. The Tennessee Supreme Court
interpreted the policy to provide coverage
of up to $10,000, holding that any contrary
interpretation would conflict with the
policy's provision that the coverage
complies with the limits required by
Tennessee law.
The St. Paul policy, however,
differs in four important respects from the
policy involved in Winecoff. First, the
main text of Endorsement 3 does not state
that the policy coverage "shall conform"
with regulatory requirements, but rather
that the insurer would issue a certificate
attesting to compliance. Second, the first
Clause following that text explicitly
provides, "The issuance of such
certificates shall in no way be interpreted
to modify the terms, conditions’ and
142
obligations between the insured and the
insurer under this’ policy." Third,
Endorsement 3 closes with the provision:
However, the total limits of
liability as stated in Item VI of
the Policy Declarations are ap-
plicable to all coverages afforded
under the policy and are _ the
maximum limits available to the
insured under this policy.
Finally, St. Paul filed a
certificate of liability insurance for EWC
that recited, "The coverage . . . for
sudden accidental occurrences and non-
sudden accidental occurrences. The limits
of liability are $3,000,00 each occurrence,
$6,000,000 annual aggregate exclusive of
legal defense costs." Government's Exh. 43
(underlining in original). If anyone
intended Endorsement 3 to increase the
policy's coverage by a third, it seems to
have escaped St. Paul's attention.
Endorsement 3 simply obligated St. Paul to
issue the certificates of liability
143
insurance attesting to EWC's compliance
with financial responsibility obligations.
It did not affe. the amount of coverage.
(2). Coverage under Other Policies
EWC made two efforts during the
trial to prove that coverage provided by
other insurance policies, combined with the
St. Paul policy, was sufficient to meet
even the EPA's’ construction of the
regulatory requirements.
(a) The Pacific Policy
During trial, the court sustained
an objection to the admission of one of the
policies, which had been issued by Pacific
Insurance Company. EWC sought to introduce
the Pacific policy on the twenty-eighth day
of trial. EWC contended that the Pacific
policy, which covered an earlier period,
remained in effect due to the insurer:s
failure to give notice, required by
144
regulations, of the policy's terminations.
Following a period of research made brief
by the untimeliness of the issue's
presentation, the court sustained the
objection of the EPA and STOP that a
exhibit was irrelevance in light of Part
VII-E of the St. Paul policy. The EPA and
STOP also complained that the tardiness of
the offer prevented them from presenting
opposing evidence. The matter of that
policy lingers, however, and the court must
address it again.
First, in its tender of
' supplemental authority submitted during
final argument, EWC cited four cases "[iJjn
support of EWC's argument that non-
termination of Pacific Indemnity's 1982-
1983 policy should be considered by this
Court in evaluating EWC's compliance with
RCRA financial assurance regulations."
Defendants' Preliminary Tender of
145
Supplemental Authority, at 8. The court
excluded the exhibit upon which the
argument in the defendants' supplemental
authority is based. Final argument is an
opportunity to discuss the evidence in the
case. It is not an occasion for re-arguing
the admissibility of evidence; that
opportunity was presented to EWC at the
time of the offer of the exhibit. EWC did
not then cite the cases to which it
sidevens in its supplemental authority.
Three weeks after the trial, EWC
filed a "Motion for Reconsideration/Motion
for Summary Judgment" asking the court to
reconsider its ruling excluding the Pacific
policy, admit the policy into evidence, and
grant summary judgment to EWC on the basis
of that policy and the additional evidence
indicating lack of notice of cancellation.
The court denied that motion, reserving its
statement of reasons to this memorandum.
146
A post-trial summary = judgment
motion simply is untimely. See Williams v.
Howard Johnson's, Inc., 323 F.2d 102 (4th
Cir. 1963). One can only wonder what
course would be appropriate were a post-
trial summary judgment motion deemed timely
and a genuine issue of material fact found
to exist.
EWC cites no authority for the
mction to reconsider, rendering it
difficult to identify the standard by which
timeliness is to be measured. The
appropriate starting place for the
timeliness of an evidentiary .ssue,
however, would seem to be Fed. R. Evid.
103(a), which requires, at the least, that
arguments for admission of evidence be made
before or during, and not after, the trial.
See Evanston Bank v. Brink's, Inc., 853
F.2d 512, 516 n.6 (7th Cir. 1988); Young v.
Rabideau, 821 F.2d 373, 375 (7th Cir.),
147
cert. denied 108 S. Ct. 263 (1987); Huff v.
White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 290 n.2
(7th. Cit. i979). The court invited
citation of authority when the evidence was
offered during trial, and the defense
failed to offer the authorities now cited.
See Wright v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co., 580 F.2d 809, 810 (5th Cir. 1978)
("Defendant's failure to provide this
support when requested by the trial judge
precludes it from now arguing for admission
of the evidence."). Reconsideration and
admission of the evidence today, after the
evidence has been completed, would require
re-opening a trial that already exceeded
Six weeks or leaving the EPA and STOP
without the opportunity to meet the proof.
It would seem that if anyone should suffer
from a party's failure to have researched
an area thoroughly before offering
evidence, it should not be that party's
148
opponents.
The time to present evidence has
passed. Without addressing or considering
the ennnettios EWC cites concerning the
effect of the Pacific policy, the court
denies EWC's post-trial motion to
reconsider and for summary judgment.
(b) The Comprehensive General Liability
Policy
From December 1, 1984 to December
1, 1985, Mr. Shambaugh and Environmental
Waste were insured under a comprehensive
general liability insurance policy issued
by Auto-Owners Insurance Company. (EWC
Exh. D-9). The policy provided coverage
with limits of $1,000,000 per occurrence
for bodily injury and $250,000 per
occurrence for property damage liability.
It contained no annual aggregate limits.
EWC argues that this policy would provide
coverage for sudden accidental events
149
which, when combined with the St. Paul
policy's coverage for non-sudden accidental
events, would satisfy the regulations as
interpreted by the EPA.
Examination of the Auto-Owners
policy belies this contention, however. It
covers no occurrence away from the insured
premises; if the sudden accidental event
involved property damage, even on the
insured premises, the policy would not
provide coverage of $1,000,000 per
occurrence.
If the regulations required EWC to
have coverage of $4,000,000 per occurrence
and $8,000,000 per year, as the EPA
contends, its coverage was inadequate.
c. Lack of Regulatory Clarity
EWC argues that no
$4,000,000/$8,000,000 requirement ciearly
appeared in the regulations in effect in
November, 1985. The provisions in question
150
were found in consecutive sections of 40
C.F.R. § 265.147. The first, section (a),
provided:
The owner or operator must have and
maintain liability coverage for
sudden, accidental occurrences in
the amount of at least $1 million
per occurrence with an annual
aggregate of at least $2 million,
exclusive of legal defense costs.
Section (b) provided:
The owner or operator must have and
maintain liability coverage for
nonsudden, accidental occurrences
in the amount of at least $3
million per occurrence with an
annual aggregate of at least $6
million, exclusive of legal defense
costs.
The EPA contends that’- sudden
accidental coverage and non-sudden
accidental coverage are two different types
of coverage, and an owner or operator must
have both. Accordingly, minimal insurance
coverage under the regulations in November,
1985 would have been $1,000,000 per
occurrence/$2,000,000 per year for sudden
accidental and $3,000,000 per occurrence/
151
$6,000,000 per year for non-sudden
accidental, or a total of $4,000,000 per
occurrence/$8,000,000 per year.
EWC contends that the regulation
is not as clear as the EPA contends. To
the contrary, EWC maintains, the regulation
is too ambiguous to be enforceable. United
States v. Cumberland Farms, 826 F.2d 1151
(ist Cir. 1987), cert. denied 108 S. Ct.
1016 (1988); Rustad v. United States, 258
F.2d 563 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 358 U.S.
898 (1958); United States v. Messner, 428
F. Supp. 538 (E.D. Pa. 1977). EWC raises
several arguments in support of its
contention that the regulation is
ambiguous.
(1) No Requirement of Aqgqregation
First, EWC argues~ that the
regulations do not say what the EPA says
they do, and the St. Paul policy complies
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