Appendix — Environmental Waste Control, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency

Supreme Court brief1991

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

ENVIRONMENTAL WASTE CONTROL, INC., d/b/a

FOUR COUNTY LANDFILL, STEPHEN W. SHAMBAUGH,

JAMES A. WILKINS, and WEST HOLDING COMPANY,

INC.,

Petitioners

versus

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY,

Respondent,

and

SUPPORTERS TO OPPOSE POLLUTION, INC.,

Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SEVENTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Timothy J. Paris

Plews & Shadley

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS

1346 N. Delaware Street

Indianapolis, IN 46202

(317) 637-0700

L/< JZ

Table of Contents

United States Environmental Protection

Agency and Supporters to Oppose Pollution,

Inc. v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc.,

et. al., 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990)

ee ee pages 1-14

United States of America and Supporters to

Oppose Pollution, Inc. v. Environmental

Waste Control, Inc. et. al., 710 F.Supp.

1172 (N.D. Ind. 1989)

cocccecccccecs pages 1-343

United States of America (EPA) and STOP,

Inc. v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc.,

et. al., 698 F.Supp. 1422 (N.D._ Ind.

October 26, 1988)

PP ee eee pages 1-85

United States of America and Supporters to

Oppose Pollution, Inc. v. Environmental

Waste Control, Inc., et. al., (N.D. Ind.

August 2, 1988)

ere ee ee pages 1-28

United States of America v. Environmental

Waste Control, Inc., et. al., (N.D. Ind.

1987)

In the | :

United States Court of Appeals

Fur the Scventh Circuit

Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

and

SUPPORTERS TO OPPOSE POLLUTION, INCORPORATED,

Intervenor/Plaintiff-A ppellee,

vU.

ENVIRONMENTAL WASTE CONTROL, INCORPORATED,

doing business as Four County Landfill,

STEVEN W. SHAMBAUGH, JAMES A. WILKINS,

West HOLDING COMPANY, INCORPORATED,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern Distriet of Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 87 C 55—Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge.

Arcurp JANUARY 25, 1990-—-DecipED OcToBER 31, 1990

Refore Woop, Jr., Cupany and Correy, Circuit Judges.

CubpaAny, Circuit Judge. The Environmental Protection

Agency, together with an environmental intervenor, Sup-

porters to Oppose Pollution, Inc., brought suit against En-

vironmental Waste Control (and its owners and operators)

2 Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197

in connection with a hazardous waste landfill operated by

Environmental Waste Control in Indiana. The district court

found against Environmental Waste Control, ordered the

offending landfill permanently closed (along with certain

other corrective measures) and assessed civil fines amount-

ing to almost $3,000,000. Environmental Waste Control

appeals. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This appeal arises from an enforcement action brought

by the United States, on behalf of the Environmental Pro-

tection Agency (the “EPA”’), to enforce hazardous waste

requirements under the Resource Conservation and Re-

covery Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87, at Environ-

mental Waste Control’s Four County Landfill (the “Land-

fill’’) in Fulton County, Indiana. The United States brought

this action against Environmental Waste Control, James

Wilkins, and the West Holding Company as the Landfill’s

owners, and against Environmental Waste Control and

Steven Shambaugh as the Landfill’s operators. (All are

referred to collectively as ““EWC.”’)

RCRA establishes a comprehensive federal program gov-

erning the generation, transportation, storage and treat-

ment of hazardous wastes “to minimize the present and

future threat to human health and the environment.”’ 42

U.S.C. § 6902(b). 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a) requires that a haz

ardous waste facility be operated only in accordance with

a permit. Recognizing that the EPA could not issue per-

mits to all applicants before RCRA’s effective date, Con-

gress provided that a facility in existence as of November

19, 1980, could obtain “interim status,” allowing it lo con-

tinue operating until final action on its permit application.

42 ULS.C. § 6925(e); see also Northside Sanitary Land-

fill, lnc. v. Thomas, 804 i°.2d 371, 378-74 (7th Cir. 1986).

To obtain interim status, a facility is required to file a

limited “Part A application,” and is then “treated as hav-

ing been issued a permit.” 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e); Northside

Sanitary Landfill, 804 F.2d at 374. An interim status

Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197 3

facility must comply with the standards set forth in 40

C.F.R. pt. 265, which, among other things, mandates that

such a facility have a “ground-water monitoring program

capable of determining the facility’s irmpact on the quality

of ground water in the uppermost aquifer underlying the

facility” and also requires that an interim status facility

meet certain financial responsibility requirements.

Following the submission of the “Part A application,”

a facility must file a “Part B application” to obtain a per-

mit. Northside Sanitary Landfill, 804 F.2d at 374. Upon

successful completion of the Part B process, a hazardous

waste permit is issued, and the facility must comply with

this permit and the regulatory standards set forth in 40

C.F.R. pt. 264.

In 1984, Congress passed the Hazardous and Solid Waste

Amendments (the ““HSWA”) to RCRA. The HSWA were

adopted in response to concerns about widespread ground-

water contamination from interim status facilities. The

HSWA provide, in part, that all land disposal facilities

granted interim status before November 8, 1984, would

automatically lose that status on November 8, 1985, unless

the facility: (A) applied for a final Part B permit determi-

nation before November 8, 1985; and (B) certified that it

was “In compliance with applicable groundwater monitor-

ing and financial responsibility requirements.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 6925(eX2). RCRA also requires the owners and operators

of hazardous waste landfills to comply with minimum tech-

nology requirements which mandate the installation of two

or more liners and a leachate collection system for the

lateral expansion of interim status landfills with respect to

waste received after May 8, 1985. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924(0X1)(A)

and 69360h). When the EPA determines that there has

been a release of hazardous waste from an interim status

facility, the EPA may seek corrective action. 42 U.S.C.

§ 69ZH(hX1). Accordingly, the EPA filed suit against EWC

in federal court, alleging basically: (1) that the Landfill

had lost its interim status by failing to comply with the

applicable financial responsibility and groundwater moni-

toring requirements; (2) that EWC had violated RCRA’s

4 Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197

minimum technology requirements between May 8, 1985

and August 16, 1986; (3) that the Landfill’s groundwater

monitoring system did not comply with the applicable reg-

ulations; and (4) that hazardous waste or hazardous waste

constituents had been released at the Landfill, thereby

permitting the court to order a corrective measure study.

The EPA sought civil penalties and an order closing the

Landfill, at least temporarily. The Supporters to Oppose

Pollution (“STOP”), the environmental intervenor, joined

the EPA’s claims, but asked for a permanent, instead of

temporary, closing of the Landfill. STOP also brought ad-

ditional claims relating to the Landfill’s alleged release

of hazardous waste into the environment.

A month-long trial was held. In its Memorandum Opin-

ion and Order, the district court noted its shock and dis-

may at EWC’s conduct, explaining that EWC, while “af-

furded repeated opportunities to comply with RCRA re-

quirements . . . has responded by developing a dismal

history of delay, mis-performance, and noncompliance.” U.S.

EPA v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 710 F. Supp.

1172, 1247 (N.D. Ind. 1989). The district court essential-

ly found: that the Landfill had lost its interim status as

of November 8, 1985 because, as of that date, it had not

fully complied with the required financial assurance and

groundwater monitoring standards (id. at 1178, 1240); that

IWC had failed to maintain an adequate monitoring sys-

tem and had illegally disposed of hazardous wastes in cells

lacking liners (id. at 1220-25); and that, as a result of

EWC’s violations, there was a release of hazardous wastes

which contaminated groundwater underlying the Landfill

and which had the potential for contaminating nearby pri-

vate drinking wells (id. at 1227-28). The district court as-

sessed civil penalties of nearly $3,000,000 against EWC.

The district court also ordered IWC to undertake certain

corrective measures and, most importantly, permanently

enjoined the operation of the Landfill.

EWC appeals on the grounds that: (1) a permanent in-

junction was improper; (2) the Four County Landfill should

not have lost its interim status: (3) its current ground-

Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197 5

‘ater monitoring system is fully adequate, and (4) the cor-

rective action plan mandated by the district court was in-

appropriate for the conditions existing at the Four County

Landfill.! We affirm the judgment of the district court

in all respects.

II]. LeEGAL ANALYSIS

A. The Propriety of the Permanent Injunction

EWC claims that the enforcement of a permanent in-

junction against its landfill is improper because: (1) RCRA

does not authorize permanent closure in interim enforce-

ment cases; (2) the district court did not adequately con-

sider, or properly weigh, the competing equities; and (3)

the evidence adduced at trial showed that there had been

no substantial harmful effects on the environment. None

of EWC’s claims has merit.

EWC first contends that RCRA does not authorize per-

manent closure in interim status cases. We are puzzled

how EWC can seriously advance this argument. First, it

should be noted that the district court held that EWC

“has not argued that permanent closure is not an available

remedy.” Environmental Waste Control, 710 F. Supp. at

1245. Hence, in all likelihood, EWC has waived this argu-

ment. Regardless, the text of the relevant statute plain-

ly allows for a permanent injunction in interim status

cases such as this one.

42 U.S.C. section 6928(h\(1) is entitled “Interim status

corrective action” and provides:

1 In addition, EWC alleges several jurisdictional and other related

errors. The district court, in its well-reasoned Memorandum Opin-

ion and Order of March 29, 1989, rejected EWC’'s jurisdictional

claims. Environmental Waste Control, 710 F. Supp. at 1184-1201.

Because the district court's order adequately addresses and prop-

erly disposes of all the jugisdictional and other related arguments

EWC raises on appeal, we adopt its reasoning and conclusions.

6 Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197

Whenever on the basis of any information the Admin-

istrator [of the EPA] determines that there is or has

been a release of hazardous waste into the environ-

ment from a facility authorized to operate under sec-

tion 6925(e) of this title, the Administrator may issue

an order requiring corrective action or such other re-

sponse measure as he deems necessary to protect

human health or the environment or the Administra-

tor may commence a civil action in the United States

district court in the district in which the facility 1s

located for appropriate relief, iecluding a temporary

or permanent injunction. (emphasis supplied).

Hence, it is clear from the language of this section that

a permanent injunction is an available remedy in interim

status cases. When the text and meaning of a statute are

clear, we will not look to legislative history. United States

v. Sager, 881 F.2d 364, 365-66 (7th Cir. 1989).

EWC’s next contention, that the district court did not

properly balance the competing equities, is simply incor-

rect. The record shows that the district court, in fact,

went to great pains to outline the reasons (which included

threats to the environment) for its decision to permanently

enjoin the operation of EWC’s landfill. Enwironmental Waste

Control, 710 F. Supp. 1245-47. Moreover, it is clear that

the district court specifically undertook to balance the

benefit to the public against the harm to the public in

this case. Jd. at 1247 (“The risk to the public of any con-

tinued operation of the Four County Landfill by EWC

greatly outweighs any harm from permanent closure.”’’).

In addition, we think it beyond question, given the district

court’s findings, that a remedy at law would have been

inadequate in this case. As the Supreme Court noted in

Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545

(1987):

Environmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be

adequately remedied by money damages and is often

permanent or at least of long duration, 7.e., irrepa-

rable. If such injury is sufficiently likely, therefore,

Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197 7

the balanee of harms will usually favor the issuance

of an injunction to protect the environment.

Hence, the record shows that the district court did bal-

ance the competing equities both thoroughly and correctly

in this case—notwithstanding that it may not have even

been required to undertake such a balance. It is an ac-

cepted equitable principle that a court does not: have to

balance the equities in a case where the defendant’s con-

duct has been willful. See Guam Scottish Rite Bodies v.

Flores, 486 F.2d 748, 749 (9th Cir. 1973). As noted earlier,

the district court essentially found that EWC’s conduct

had been willful. Moreover, as the Fourth Circuit noted,

relying on an opinion of ours:

the law of injunctions differs with respect to govern-

mental plaintiffs (or private attorneys general) as op-

posed to private individuals. Where the plaintiff is

a sovereign and where the activity may endanger the

public health, “injunctive relief is proper, without

resort to balancing.” I/linois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d

151, 166 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 451

U.S. 304 (1981). Second, in cases of public health leg-

islation, the emphasis shifts from irreparable injury

to concern for the general public interest .

Environmental Defense Fund, Ine. v. Lamphier, 714 F.2d

331, 337-38 (4th Cir. 1983).

For all the foregoing reasons, we find that the district

court’s decision to issue a permanent injunetion against

EWC was correct and was supported by the potential

danger to the environment and to public health.?

2 Our conclusion is in no way changed by the fact that it was

STOP, and not the (PA, that asked for permanent closure of the

Landfill. The right to intervene, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 96130)

(1987 Supp.), permits citizens to press the same procedural and

substantive claims that the United States may pursue. See also

Environmental Waste Control, 710 F. Supp. at 1245 n.73.

8 Nos. -89-1865 & &9-2197

B. The Loss of Environmental Waste Control’s “Interim

Status”’

EWC contends that the Four County Landfill never lost

its interim status, despite the contrary finding of the dis-

trict court, because (1) EWC’s insurance complied with

all applicable regulations as of November 8, 1985, or, in

the alternative, because the district court should have con-

sidered good faith a defense to the failure to carry the

required amount of insurance; and (2) because EWC was

actually in compliance with the applicable hazardous waste

groundw ater monitoring requirements as of November 8,

1985.

Under RCRA’s interim status provision, 42 U.S.C.

§ 6925(e\(2), the failure of a landfill to meet either the

applicable financial responsibility or groundwater monitor-

ing requirements, as of November 5, 1985, automatically

results in the loss of interim status. Because we find that

EWC failed to carry the required amount of insurance

and because good faith is not an adequate defense to com-

plianee with these financial regulations, EWC lost its in-

terim status as of November 8, 1985. We therefore need

not address EWC’s allegations concerning whether the

Landfill met the groundwater monitoring standards re-

quired of interim status facilities as of November 8, 1985.

With respect to RCRA’s financial responsibility require-

ments for interim status facilities, EWC makes five argu-

ments (all of which were rejected by the district court):

(1) that the applicable insurance regulations did not ex-

pressly require that the prescribed amounts of required

coverage be aggregated (and EWC, which had not aggre-

gated, therefore had enough); (2) that EWC’s coverage

was adequate because it was approved by the Indiana

Department of Environmental Management;? (3) that the

3 Given that the federal government has not delegated enforce-

ment of the strictures of the HSWA to the states, EWC cannot

rely on Indiana’s approval of its insurance policy as proof that it

complied with federal law. See Environmental Waste Control, 710

F. Supp. at 1183.

Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197 9

KPA was estopped from asserting that a higher amount

of insurance was necessary because an operator of the

EPA’s “hot line” assured EWC’s insurance broker that

$3,000,000/$6,000,000 was adequate; (4) that an endorsement

on I; WC’s primary policy was in force which provided an

assurance that EWC’s policy complied with RCRA’s re-

quirements; and (5) that another policy was in force which,

coupled with EWC’s primary policy, met the statutory

requirements.

EWC initially challenges the district court’s ruling that

the EPA’s interim status regulations required total cov-

erage for sudden and nonsudden occurrences of $4,000,000

per occurrence and $8,006,000 in the aggregate. The rele-

vant financial responsibility regulations are set forth in

40 C.FLR. § 265.147. Subpart (a) requires, with respect

to hazardous waste treatment, storage or disposal facil-

ities, that:

[t]he owner or operator must have and maintain lia-

bility coverage for sudden accidental occurrences in

the amount of at least $1 million per cecurrence with

an annual agyreyate of at least $2 million, exclusive

of legal defense costs.

Subpart (b) applies to surface impoundments, landfills or

land treatment facilities and requires that:

[t]he owner or operator must have and maintain lia-

bility coverage for nonsudden accidental occurrences

in the amount of at least $3 million per occurrence

with an annual aggregate of at least $6 million, exclu-

sive of legal defense costs.

The district court held that because both subparts applied

to the operations of “WC, EWC was required to comply

with the financial strictures of both, totaling $4,000,000

per occurrence with an annual aggregate of $4,000,000.

Environmental Waste Control, 710 F. Supp. at 1209-10.

EWC contends that the requirements “nowhere express-

ly stated that a total of $4 million per occurrence and $8

million annual aggregate was required for a combined lim-

10 Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197

its policy.”” Appellants’ Brief at 33. (EWC carried an in-

surance policy which covered only $3,000,000 per occur-

rence and had an annual aggregate of $6,000,000.) But we

think that the requirements were clear. The separate sub-

parts applied to different types of occurrences. Each sub-

part had to be satisfied. Aggregation was therefore re-

quired. As noted previously, we will not look past statu-

tory or regulatory language when the text is clear. See

United States v. Sager, 881 F.2d at 365-66.

EWC argues, however, that the 1988 amendment to

these regulations, which explicitly calls for aggregation

of the interim status insurance requirements, and the 1981

draft of the regulations (which also contained an aggrega-

tion provision that was later deleted) support its theory

that aggregation was not required uni the 1988 amend-

ment. Appellants’ Bricf at 33-36. We do not agree. Per-

haps Congress, or the EPA, thought that the regulation

was clear without a specific aggregation provision—clear,

that is, until interim status facilities’ operators tried to

avoid the requirement by arguing that aggregation was

not required. In sum, we think that the language of this

regulation was sufficiently clear to preclude a presump-

tion that the 1988 amendments were meant to change,

rather than clarify, existing law. Indeed, the 1988 rule

states that it is merely “specifying more clearly” the ag-

gregate coverage mechanisms required by combined cov-

erage mechanisms (53 Fed. Reg. at 33,939); that the EPA

decided “to maintain the present scope of coverage” (id.

at 33,946); and that the modification “does not add any

compliance requirements” (id. at 23,949).

KWC’s other arguments pertaining to the insurance -re-

quirements applicable to interim status facilities can be

similarly rejected. Information provided by a government

hot line cannot be enough to estop the government from

enforcing violations of federal law. See Crown v. United

States PR. FP. Retirement Bd., 811 F.2d 1017, 1021 (7th Cir.

1987). Moreover, we hold that reliance on such a hot line

here was not reasonable, given the clarity of the regula

tions. With respect to EWC’s claims regarding the en-

Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197 11

dorsement and the additicnal insurance policy, we find

that the district court was correct in rejecting these

arguments. The endursement, for example, clearly states

that it does not modify the policy, the terms of which

were only $3,000,000 per occurrence and $6,000,000 in the

aggregate. And, the district court expressly excluded evi-

dence regarding EWC’s second insurance policy, a policy

which had probably expired and which was never iden-

tified to the EPA (or to the district court until 169 weeks

into the instant lawsuit) as a source of coverage. Given

the facts, this exclusion was clearly appropriate. We there-

fore reject EWC’s claims that it complied with the appli-

cable financial responsibility regulations. Accordingly, the

Jour County Landfill lost its interim status as of Novem-

ber &, 1985.4

C. The Adequacy of EWC’s Groundwater Monitoring

System

The district court held that the groundwater monitor-

ing system at the Landfill did not meet the required stan-

dards as of November 8, 1985, and also held that, even

4 EWC asserts that its good faith should be a defense to non-

compliance with the groundwater monitoring and financial respon-

sibility requirements imposed upon interim status facilities. The

district court rejected this argument on the grounds that EWC’'s

“ood faith’ —while relevant to the scope of relief and penaltics—

was not relevant to whether EWC actually complied with the fed-

eral requirements. Environmental Waste Control, 710 F. Supp.

at 1212-15. We agree. The fact that EWC attempted to comply

with the insurance regulations and that no harm resulted from

EWC's uuder-insurance is simply irre ant. The facet still remains

that EWC failed to meet federal standards, a failure which de-

prived EWC of its interim status. Given the environmental prob-

lems facing the world today and the federal laws in question, we

think that it would be counterproductive to read a ‘“pood faith”

defense where none exists. We will not excuse EWC from failing

to satisfy the requirements of our environmental Jaws. Hence, we

think that the ‘district court’s decision not to recognize a “good

faith’’ defense here was eminently sound.

12 Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197

at. the start of trial. the Landfill did not have a compliant

groundwater monitoring system. In this regard, the dis-

trict court noted that

[tlhe purpose of a hazardous waste landfill’s ground-

water monitoring system is to detect immediately the

migration of hazardous waste or hazardous waste con-

stituents from the waste management area into the

environment so that any necessary corrective or re-

medial action can be taken. Among the major threats

a hazardous waste landfill may pose to public health

and the environment is the potential that hazardous

constituents may escape and contaminate the ground-

water beneath the facility.

oe ee ee

The design, construction, and depth of [the Landfill’s]

groundwater monitoring wells have prevented EWC

and its consultants from learning the extent and per-

meahility of the uppermost aquifer, which precludes

confident assessment of the groundwater flow’s hori-

zontal and vertical direction and velocity. One can-

not design a meaningful groundwater monitoring sys-

tem without knowing the location of the uppermost

aquifer and direction of the groundwater flow. EWC

has not aequired that knowledge.

Environmental Waste Control, 710 F. Supp. at 1222. Hence,

the district court found that EWC was in continuing viola-

tion of 40 C.F.R. section 265.90(a), which requires that

an interim status facility have a groundwater monitoring

program that is “capable of determining the facility’s im-

pact on the quality of ground water in the uppermost

aquifer."5 Id. at 1225.

5 The district court explained that

lalu aquifer is a geologic formation, group of formations, or

part of a formation capable of yielding a significant amount

of groundwater to wells or springs. The uppermost. aquifer is

that nearest the natural ground surface snd includes the lower

aquifers that are hydraulically interconnected to that aquifer

within the facility’s property boundary.

Environmental Waste Control, 710 F. Supp. at 1213 n.33.

Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197 13

The thrust of EWC’s complaint on appeal seems to be

that the district court erred in not admitting newly ob-

tained data into evidence or, in the alternative, that the

district court erred in finding EWC’s groundwater moni-

toring system to be inadequate. Whether EWC’s ground-

water monitoring system complied with federal law is a

question of fact which will not be disturbed unless clear-

ly erroneous. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Anderson v. City of

Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1984).

Our review of the record leads us to the conclusion that

there was no clear error here. The new data proffered

by EWC came too late for its probative value to outweigh

its prejudice. Appellee’s Brief at 37 (citing Tr. 3582-83,

3591-92). Moreover, the evidence in the record was suffi-

cient to-sustain the court’s extensive findings. We there-

fore affirm the district court’s decision as to the inade-

quacy of HWC’'s groundwater monitoring system.

D. The District Court’s Corrective Action Plan

Finally. EWC contends that the corrective action plan

imposed by the district court was inappropriate for the

conditions existing at the Landfili. Again, we disagree.

The assessment of penalties is committed to the informed

discretion of the trial court, and will be reversed only

upon a showing that the district court abused its discre-

tion. United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420

U.S. 228, 229 n.6 (1975). EWC has offered us no sceund

reason Which would justify a finding that the district court

abused its discretion in deciding om the corrective action

plan and other remedies, remedies which were clearly im-

posed only after thoughtful examination and assessment

of the evidence and applicable law. See Environmental

Waste Control, 710 F. Supp. 1241-49.

As to other matters raised by EWC, they have been

considered and have been found to be without merit.

14 Nos. 89-1865 & 89-2197

I1J. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the thorough and well-

reasoned opinion of the district court is AFFIRMED.

A true Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

USCA 79004—Midwest Law Prnting Co., Inc., Chicago—10-31-90—500

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

and

SUPPORTERS TO OPPOSE

POLLUTION, INC,

Intervenor-Plaintiff

CAUSE NO.

S$87-55

Vs.

ENVIRONMENTAL WASTE CONTROL,

ones Oe BL.,

meee ee ee ee eee ee ee ee

Defendant

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This cause came before the court

for trial without intervention of jury

commencing December 5, 1988. Following

thirty-one days of evidence and argument,

the court now enters this memorandum

opinion intended to comply with Fed. R.

Civ. P. 52(a).

The case involves several issues

of law on which no court has ruled before.

The United States Environmental Protection

Agency ("EPA") and a citizens' group known

as Supporters to Oppose Pollution, Inc.

("STOP") claim that federal statutes and

regulations have been violated in the

operation of a hazardous waste disposal

facility known as the Four County Landfill.

The EPA and STOP bring their claims under

the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 ("RCRA"), and its

implementing regulations. The court holds

that the EPA has proven that the Landfill

has cperated illegally since November 8,

1985 and so can operate no longer in its

present status. Further, hazardous waste

constituents buried at the Landfill have

been released into the groundwater and air.

Based on those and other violations of

federal law, as well as the history of the

Landfill's operation, the court concludes

that the Landfill should be closed per-

manently, that a civil penalty of

$2,778,000 should be assessed against the

defendants, and that the defendants should

be ordered to implement a plan of action to

correct their release of hazardous waste

constituents into the groundwater.

In Part I of this memorandum, the

court sets forth the claims brought by the

EPA and STOP and describes the location and

geography of the Four County Landfill, the

relationship between the defendants, and

the regulatory history of the Landfill. In

conjunction with the Landfill's regulatory

history, Part I of the memorandum also

discusses the general regulatory scheme of

RCRA.

Part II of the memorandum

discusses the defendants' various technical

challenges to the suit. In Part II, the

court concludes: (A) that it has

jurisdiction over the EPA's suit although

Indiana is an “authorized state" for

purposes of RCRA enforcement; (B) that

STOP's asserted failure to give notice to

the defendants or to the State of Indiana

does not deprive the court of jurisdiction

over its claims; (C) that the doctrines

collectively described as "primary

jurisdiction" do not preclude consideration

of the claims brought by the EPA and STOP;

and (D) that principles of collateral

estoppel do not preclude the claims brought

by the EPA and STOP, notwithstanding an

earlier agreed order in state

administrative proceedings.

Part III addresses whether

defendant Stephen Shambaugh may be held

liable under RCRA as an "operator" of the

Landfill although a corporate defendant

also iS an operator, and the court

determines that he may be held liable.

Part IV of the memorandum

addresses the EPA's.claims.

Part IV-A addresses the EPA's

claim that the Landfill has lost its

interim status (its basis for operation

pending final determination of its

application for a permit to _ operate)

because the certificate of compliance the

defendants filed pursuant to RCRA _ was

false. In Part IV-A-1, the court concludes

that the mere filing of a certificate does

not satisfy RCRA. The certificate must

have been true.

In Part IV-A-2, the court holds

that the Landfill's certificate was false

because its insurance coverage was insuffi-

cient to meet the financial responsibility

requirements that applied at the time of

the certification. In reaching that

conclusion, the court rejects the

defendants' arguments that its insurance

coverage amounted to the level the EPA

maintains was required, determines that the

EPA's interpretation of the regulatory -

requirements is correct, rejects the

defendants' argument that the EPA is

estopped from enforcing the regulations

because of misinformation provided to the

Landfill's insurance agent over the EPA's

"hot line", and rejects the defendants'

argument that its good faith constitutes a

defense to the EPA's claim.

In Part IV-A-2, the court

concludes that the Landfill's certificate

cf compliance was false because its

groundwater monitoring system was

inadequate at the time of its certification

in November, 1985. In reaching that

conclusion, the court rejects the

defendants' argument that the regulations

upon which the EPA relies were inapplicable

because the Landfill was in "assessment

mode" rather than "detection mode", rejects

the defendants' argument that a state

administrative order and subsequent state

inaction prevented them from complying with

the regulations, rejects the defendants'

argument that their groundwater monitoring

wells actually were in the best location to

detect migrating hazardous waste

constituents, and rejects the defendants'

argument that the EPA has mischaracterized

the "waste management area" for purposes of

placement of monitoring wells. The court

also concludes that one monitoring well

critical to compliance with the regulations

was inadequate under the’ regulations

because it was sealed improperly.

Part IV-B of the memorandum

discusses the EPA's claim that~ the

defendants violated RCRA | by placing

hazardous waste in unlined cells for a

period of several months. The court

earlier held, on summary -udgment, that the

defendants had violated that provision.

In Part IV-C of the memorandun,

the court addresses the EPA's contention

that the Landfill's groundwater monitoring

system failed, even in 1988, to satisfy

RCRA requirements. In that portion of the

memorandum, the court holds that because of

defects in the depth and construction of

the defendants' monitoring wells, and

because of the defendants' failure to

determine both the extent of the uppermost

aquifer and the permeability of the

materials beneath the Landfill, the defen-

dants have violated that RCRA regulation

requiring an adequate groundwater

monitoring system.

In Part IV-D of the memorandun,

the court finds that hazardous’ waste

constituents have been released into the

groundwater beneath the Four County

Landfill and that corrective action is

required.

Part V of the memorandum addresses

the additional claims raised by the

intervenor, STOP.

Part V-A addresses STOP's various

claims that hazardous waste constituents

have been released into the environment

beyond the Four County Landfill's

boundaries. In that portion of the

memorandum, the court finds that STOP has

not proven that hazardous waste

constituents have left the landfill site

through the groundwater, but that STOP has

proven that hazardous waste constituents

have been spread to areas surrounding the

Four County Landfill by wind dispersal and

by surface water leaving the landfill site

after coming into contact with hazardous

waste.

The remaining portions of Part V

address, and reject, STOP's other claims.

In Part V-B, the court discusses STOP's

claim that the defendants improperly

accepted ignitable waste. Part V-C

analyzes STOP's claim that the defendants

improperly accepted free liquids. Part V-

D addresses STOP's contention that the

defendants handled barrels of hazardous

waste negligently. Part V-E discusses

STOP's claim that the defendants improperly

accepted hazardous waste that was not

listed on the manifests that accompanied

the waste. In each of these parts, the

court concludes that STOP has not proven

its claim by a preponderance of the

evidence.

Part VI addresses the penalties to

be imposed on the defendants for the

violations that are found to have occurred.

In~—that portion of the memorandum, the

10

court determines that the Four County

Landfill must be closed immediately because

its failure to have sufficient insurance

and an adequate groundwater monitoring

system in November, 1985 ended its right to

continue to operate under "interim status",

that is until its final application for a

permit is granted. The court also

determines in Part VI that the seriousness

of the violations and the defendants' poor

performance record warrant closing the Four

County Landfill permanently. In Part VI,

the court also concludes that the

defendants must undertake a _ corrective

action sian to address the release of

hazardous waste constituents into’ the

groundwater, must pay civil penalties

amounting to $2,778,000, and must pay the

reasonable attorney fees and expenses

incurred by STOP.

11

I. BACKGROUND

The EPA initiated this action

pursuant to the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6901,

addressing a hazardous waste landfill known

as the Four County Landfill ("the

Landfill") located in Fulton County,

Indiana. © Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i),

the court allowed intervention by a citi-

zens' organization known as Supporters to

Oppose Pollution, Inc., or "STOP".

The four defendants are the

Landfill's alleged owners and operators.

Environmental Waste Control, inc.

("Environmental Waste") is an Indiana

corporation that operates the Landfill.

West Holding Company, an Indiana corpora-

tion, owns all Environmental Waste stock

and the land on which the Landfill is

located. James A. Wilkins is president of

12

West Holding Company and until recently

owned the land on which the Landfill is

located. Stephen W. Shambaugh is president

of Environmental Waste, vice-president of

West Holding Company, and until recently

was the sole shareholder of Environmental

Waste. The court will refer to the

defendants collectively as "EWC".

A. The EPA's Claims

The EPA's second amended complaint

states four claims for relief. In its

first claim, the EPA contends that the

Landfill should be closed, at least

temporarily, because the Landfill lost its

interim status to operate a land disposal

facility on November 8, 1985, and since

then has been operating illegally. The EPA

seeks civil penalties and an order closing

the Landfill until its final application

for a permit to operate is’ finally

resolved. In the second claim, the EPA

13

alleges that EWC violated RCRA's "minimum

technology" requirements by disposing of

hazardous wastes in areas not equipped with

liners and required equipment between May

8, 1985 and August 19, 1986. In this

claim, the EPA seeks civil penalties. The

third claim alleges that the Landfill's

groundwater monitoring system does not

comply with applicable regulations; the EPA

seeks civil penalties and injunctive relief

requiring the defendants to bring that

system into compliance. With respect to

each of these claims, the EPA seeks civil

penalties of $25,000 per day of violation.

The fourth claim alleges that a

release of hazardous waste or hazardous

waste constituents has occurred at the

Landfill and asks the court to order a

corrective measures study to determine the

steps needed to deal with that release.

14

B. STOP's Claims

STOP joins in the EPA's’ four

claims, but, unlike the EPA, seeks nothing

short of permanent closure. Most of STOP's

additional claims are based on allegations

that EWC has allowed hazardous waste or

hazardous waste constituents to be released

into the environment through the air,

groundwater, and surface water. STOP

contends that EWC failed to place cover

over hazardous wastes after the wastes were

deposited in the Landfill; that EWC has

failed to install and implement a proper

system for control of runoff from hazardous

waste areas and run-on that flows onto

hazardous waste areas; that EWC has allowed

the integrity of the Landfill's run-on and

runoff control systems to be impaired; and

that the Landfill has discharged

contaminated water into the waters of the

State of Indiana.

io

0 EE

STOP also claims that EWC

improperly accepted ignitable and self-

combustible materials; that EWC improperly

received uncontainerized liquid hazardous

wastes; that Landfill personnel have

handled containers of hazardous waste

negligently, allowing the containers to

rupture and leak; and that EWC has accepted

loads of hazardous waste without’ the

detailed chemical analysis required by

regulations.

Cc. The History of the Landfill's Requlation

and Ownership

1. Location and Geography

The Four County Landfill is

located near the communities of Culver,

DeLong, and Leiters Ford in Fulton County,

Indiana. The site on which the Landfill is

located consists of approximately 61.5

acres astride State Road 17. The area

surrounding the Landfill is rural and

16

agricultural, consisting of open fields,

wetlands, wooded lots and cultivated land,

and year-round and seasonal homes. No

hazardous waste generating industry is

located near the Landfill.

The Tippecanoe River runs less

than one mile north-northeast from the

Landfill; Kings Lake lies directly east of

the Landfill. Three residences with

domestic wells are located within 600 feet

of the site; several more private sells

that provide drinking water for local

residents and water for domestic stock and

farming are within one mile of the

Landfill. The regional terrain is hilly,

composed of sediments derived from Mest

glacial action. The highly variable size

and distribution of glacially derived

sediments can affect the direction and

velocity of groundwater flow. The earth

below the Landfill is directly relevant to

17

this action, but discussion of that geology

is deferred to the pertinent portion of the

opinion.

2. Relationship Between the Defendants

Mr. Wilkins and his father first

began operating a landfill on the Four

County Landfill site in 1973. When the

Wilkins' landfill began operations, it was

authorized to receive only non-hazardous

wastes. After 1978, the State of Indiana

required disposal facilities to separate

general refuse from “separate area waste"

consisting of commercial and industrial

wastes, which included what now is

designated "hazardous waste". The Landfill

did not, and was not required to, maintain

records of the location within the facility

of individual loads of "separate area

waste". Beginning in 1980, with occasional

exceptions, the Landfill began to dispose

only of hazardous wastes; late that year,

18

the Landfill began to record placement of

waste within the waste management area.

Mr. Wilkins acquired the land on

which the Landfill is located by way of

quitclaim deed from his mother in 1978. On

November 3, 1988, about a week after the

court found him to be an “owner" for RCRA

purposes, United States v. Environmental

Waste Control, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 1422,

1430 (N.D. Ind. 1988), he deeded the

property to West Holding Company in

exchange for half the stock of West Holding

Company. Mr. Wilkins testified that he

transferred the property to West because of

prior confusion his ownership interest

caused customers, regulators and others,

but the court finds his’ explanation

unconvincing. The transfer's only

reasonable purpose was -_ shield Mr.

Wilkins from post-transfer liability under

RCRA.

19

Mr. Shambaugh formed EWC with

Douglas—Johnson in 1978. On October 1,

1978, Mr. Shambaugh and Mr. Johnson signed

a ten-year lease with Mr. Wilkins that

allowed Mr. Johnson and Mr. Shambaugh to

operate a hazardous waste landfill on the

Wilkins land. In March, 1985, Mr. Johnson

transferred all his interest in the

Landfill, including his EWC stock and his

rights and duties under the lease, to Mr.

Shambaugh.

Mr. Shambaugh has been president

of EWC since its creation. EWC has had no

directors; its only other officers have

been Mr. Johnson (who served as vice-

president from 1978 to 1985) and Mr.

Shambaugh's wife (who served as secretary

for a period of time). Mr. Wilkins has

held no office with, and has owned no

shares in, EWC.

20

Mr. Shambaugh has been actively

involved in the Landfill's day-to-day

activities. He shares final responsibility

with Mr. Wilkins for virtually all

decisions concerning the Landfill's

operations, other than the locations at

which waste is to be placed. In 1985, when

a downturn in the Landfill's economic

fortunes led to a layoff of most of the

Landfill's employees, he even operated

heavy machinery at the Landfill.

In November, 1988, Mr. Shambaugh

transferred his EWC stock (consisting of

all the shares of EWC) to West Holding

Company in exchange for the half of West

shares Mr. Wilkins did not_ receive.

Although Mr. Shambaugh testified at trial,

he tendered no explanation for. that

transfer. The court finds that his purpose

must have been the same as Mr. Wilkins':

to shield himself from liability under

21

RCRA. Neither Mr. Shambaugh nor Mr.

Wilkins contributed cash to West, although

Mr. Wilkins contributed certain equipment

used in the Landfill's operation.

3. RCRA and the Four County Landfill

RCRA establishes a comprehensive

federal regulatory program applicable to

the generation, transportation, storage,

treatment, and disposal of hazardous waste.

RCRA and its implementing regulations

required all persons who generate,

transport, treat, store, or dispose of

hazardous waste to notify the EPA of such

The Resource

Conservation and Recovery

Act of 1976 is a multi-

faceted approach toward

solving the problems

associated with the 3-4

billion tons of discarded

materials generated each

year, and the problems

resulting from the

anticipated 8% annual

increase in the volume of

such waste.

House Report No. 94-1491, at 2.

22

activity by August 10, 1980. 42 U.S.C. §

6930.

a. Interim Status

A hazardous waste facility may be

operated only in accordance with a permit.

42 U.S.C. § 6925(a). Because the EPA could

noc issue permits to all hazardous waste

applicants before RCRA became effective,

hazardous waste facilities that were in

existence on November 19, 1980 benefit from

a "grandfathering" provision: such a

facility could obtain "interim status" to

continue operation until the EPA or an

authorized state takes final action with

respect to the facility's permit

application. 50 Fed. Reg. 38,946. A

facility must satisfy certain conditions to

obtain interim status, including the filing

of timely notice to the EPA that the

facility treats, stores, or disposes of

hazardous waste and the filing of an

23

application for a hazardous waste permit.

42 U.S.C. § 6925(e). This application, the

first stage of a two-stage process, has

come to be described as the "Part A

application" stage. Northside Sanitary

Landfill, Inc. v. Thomas, 804 F.2d 371, 373

(7th Cit. 1986); United States Vv.

Conservation Chemical Co. of Illinois, 660

F. Supp. 1236, 1237 (N.D. Ind. 1987).

A facility is granted interim

status if the EPA Administrator finds no

reason to believe that an existing

facility's Part A application does not meet

the disclosure requirements of 40 C.F.R. §

270.23. Such a facility is treated as

having been issued a permit upon the filing

of a Part A application and the giving of

proper notice of its hazardous waste

activities. 40 C.F.R. § 270.70.

EWC obtained interim status in

1980. On August 18, 1980, EWC notified the

24

EPA that it was disposing of hazardous

wastes at the Landfill. On November 18,

1980, EWC submitted Part A of an

application for authorization to treat,

store, or dispose of hazardous waste at the

Landfill. Accordingly, EWC was accorded

interim status pending final administrative

disposition of its permit application,

allowing it to operate its facility. See

42 U.S.C. § 6925(a), (e)(1): 40 C.F.R. §

270.10, 270.70(a).

Since then, EWC has disposed of

hazardous wastes within the meaning of 42

U.S.C. § 6903(5) at the Landfill, including

those ccnthbwhens barium, cadmium, chromium,

lead, mercury, certain waste water

treatment sludges’, emission control dust or

¢ The presence of cadmium, nickel,

hexavalent chromium, and cyanide renders

such sludges’ toxic. The defendants'

records for 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985

disclose that over 5.4 million pounds of

such sludge were disposed in the Landfill.

25

Sludge from secondary lead smelting’,

certain emission control dust and sludges

from the primary production of steel in

electric furnaces’, spent solvent trichlor-

oethylene and still bottoms from the

recovery of spent trichloroethylene, spent

solvent acetone and still bottoms from the

recovery of spent acetone solvent, spent

solvent creosols and still bottoms from the

recovery of spent solvent creosols, and

spent toluene solvent. The Landfill

received more than 16,000 cubic yards of

hazardous waste in 1986; from January 1 to

July 21, 1987, the Landfill reported

receiving about 30,000 cubic’ yards; the

> The presence of calcium, lead, and

hexavalent chromium renders such wastes

texic. In 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985, the

defendants reported disposal of 36,000

pounds of this material.

* The presence of calcium, lead, and

hexavalent chromium renders such waste

toxic. The defendants have disposed of

more than 37 million pounds’ of such

material.

26

defendants thereafter ceased reporting the

volumetric measurement of wastes received.

The presence of hazardous wastes at the

Landfill constitutes disposal within the

meaning of RCRA. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(33).

b. Regulation of Interim Status Facilities

Congress authorized the

Administrator of the EPA to. promulgate

regulations establishing performance

standards for interim status facilities.

42 U.S.C. § 6924. These regulations are

codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 265.

RCRA authorized the EPA to approve

state regulations that are substantially

equivalent to the federal interim status

regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 6926. Following

approval, the state enforces its

regulations in lieu of the _- federal

regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(c). On

August 18, 1982, the EPA granted Indiana

Phase I interim authorization to promulgate

27

interim status regulations. Indiana

received final authority to promulgate

interim status regulations on January 31,

1986.° Accordingly, owners and operators

who have interim status to operate under 42

U.S.C. § 6925(e) in the State of Indiana

generally must comply with the standards

and requirements of Title 320, Article 4.1-

22 of the Indiana Administrative Code (now

6

codified at 329 I.A.C. 3)” in operating

hazardous waste facilities.

. According to one commentator, the EPA

had granted final authorization to the

enforcement programs of twenty-five states

and the District of Columbia by August,

1985. Developments in the Law, Toxic Waste

Litigation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1458, 1476

n.56 (1986).

° At final argument in the trial of

this case, counsel agreed that the Indiana

regulations pertinent to this case differ

in no material respect from the federal

regulations; accordingly, the court will

limit its citation of regulations to the

federal regulations, while recognizing that

the Landfill's operation may have been

controlled by virtually identical state

regulations.

28

The EPA, however, retains

authority to enforce violaticns of

Subchapter III of RCRA in Indiana. The

delegation to Indiana of final authority to

promulgate interim status regulations did

not include responsibility for any of the

provisions added to RCRA by the Hazardous

and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984

("HSWA"), which include the provision

concerning loss of interim status. 42

U.S.C. § 6925(e)(2); Northside Sanitary

Landfill, Inc. v. Thomas, 804 F.2d at 382-

383.

40 C.F.R. § 265.147 required

owners and operators of hazardous waste

facilities to meet certain financial

responsibility requirements to establish

financial assurance for liability to third

parties. 42 | U.S. § 6924(0) (1) (A)

required owner-operators of existing

landfills who conduct lateral expansion to

29

install two or more liners and a leachate’

collection system above and between the

liners; 42 U.S.C. § 6936(b) made this

requirement applicable to interim status

facilities with respect to waste received

after May 8, 1985.

c. Certification and the Part B Application

Before Congress amended RCRA in

1984, a hazardous waste facility was not

required to submit a "Part B application"

seeking a final determination of its permit

application until six months after the EPA

requested it to do so. In 1984, Congress

decided that interim status should not be

allowed to last indefinitely. Accordingly,

the 1984 amendments provided that by

November 8, 1985, owners or operators of

’ "tLeachate' means any liquid,

including any suspended components in the

liquid, that has percolated through or

drained from hazardous waste." 40 C.F.R.

§ 260.10. Leachate from hazardous waste is

itself a hazardous waste.

30

land disposal facilities that had been

granted interim status were required to

file a Part B application and certify that

the facility was in compliance with all ap-

plicable groundwater monitoring and

financial responsibility requirements. 42

U.S.C. § 6925(e)(2). A facility's failure

to satisfy these requirements would result

in termination of its interim status on

November 8, 1985. On November 7, 1985, EWC

filed with the EPA its certificate of com-

pliance with applicable interim status

groundwater monitoring and financial

responsibility requirements. EWC also

filed its Part B application.

II. JURISDICTION

The court has jurisdiction

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6928 and 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1331, 1345, and 1355. Venue is proper

31

in this court; the Landfill is located’

within the Northern District of Indiana.

EWC, however, raises several

challenges to the court's jurisdiction.

The court must address each of the

defendants' theories challenging subject

matter jurisdiction because jurisdiction is

a matter that is to be determined at any

stage of a proceeding, Darryl H. v. Coler,

801 F.2d 893, 907 n.13 (7th Cir. 1986);

Jackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 717

F.2d 1045, 1055 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.

denied 465 U.S. 1007 (1984).

A. The EPA's Claims in an Authorized State

EWC has asserted throughout this

litigation that because the State of

Indiana was conferred with the statutory

authorization to promulgate interim status

regulations, the EPA lacks authority to

bring this suit. 42 U.S.C. § 6926. EWC

maintains that the EPA lacks authority to

32

determine issues of groundwater monitoring

and financial assurance because these

matters are now controlled exclusively by

state law.® As noted above, the EPA's first

claim alleges loss of interim status

because the Landfill's certification of

compliance with groundwater monitoring and

financial assurance requirements was false.

The EPA's third claim alleges that EWC has

failed to implement a groundwater

monitoring program capable of determining

8 At the conclusion of the trial, EWC

raised an additional argument that it has

a due process right to have its fate

decided by an administrative agency. The

only case cited provides no support for

that authority; Indiana _ Environmental

Management Board v. Bremen, 458 N.E.2d 672

(Ind. Ct. App. 1984), simply held that

Indiana's Administrative Adjudication Act

entitled the plaintiffs, who lived near the

landfill involved in that case, to certain

procedural rights. The fundamental

requirements of procedural due process are

notice and an opportunity to be heard at a

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333

(1976). Through this trial, EWC has

received the process due it.

33

aN NC

the Landfill's impact on the quality of the

groundwater in the uppermost aquifer

underlying the facility.’ EWC has not

argued that the EPA's second and fourth

claims are outside the court's

jurisdiction.

EWC also asserts that the court's

jurisdiction is impeded because Indiana's

enforcement referral to the EPA was

improper. According to the 1985 Menorandum

of Agreement between Indiana and the EPA,

the EPA could take enforcement action only

after it had determined that the state had

not taken "timely and appropriate action".

EWC argues that no provision in the

Agreement justifies any type of referral to

the EPA and further argues that the EPA

made no determination that Indiana had not

taken "timely and appropriate" action on

7 As to the meaning of "uppermost

aquifer", see note 33, infra.

34

the matters contained in the EPA's amended

complaint. EWC also argues that Indiana

did not authorize the enforcement referral.

Because EWC has never specified the claims

to which this argument is directed, the

court must assume that it is intended to

apply to the entire amended complaint.

1. The First Claim: Loss of Interim Status

EWC has argued repeatedly that the

EPA has no authority to determine whether

the Landfill complies with the groundwater

monitoring program requirements or the

financial assurance requirements of the

1984 amendments known as HSWA because state

law now governs those requirements. This

argument is no stranger to this litigation.

EWC raised this argument in its

unsuccessful summary judgment motion, then

renewed the argument at the close of the

case.

35

In the summary judgment ruling,

the court held that the EPA had the

authority under 42 U.S.C. § 6928 to proceed

on the issues of groundwater monitoring and

financial assurance requirements alleged in

its first claim. United States Vv.

Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 698 F.

Supp. at 1435-1438. Although authorized to

promulgate interim status regulations,

Indiana has no authority to enforce any

provisions found in the Hazardous and Solid

Waste Amendments of 1984; loss of interim

status is a provision contained in those

amendments. Although jurisdiction is a

matter that is to be determined at any

Stage of a proceeding, EWC has presented no

new authority or argument to persuade the

court to depart from its pretrial ruling

finding jurisdiction over the EPA's first

claim.

36

At trial, however, EWC raised a

separate attack on the EPA's ability to

take enforcement action for the RCRA

violations alleged in the EPA's’ amended

complaint. EWC contends that’ Indiana

improperly referred this matter to the EPA

for enforcement under the 1985 Memorandum

Agreement between Indiana and the EPA

because: (1) the assistant state agency

commissioner who signed the referral

letters had no authority to make a referral

that only the Commissioner could make; and

(2) under the Agreement, the EPA could take

enforcement action only after it determined

that the State had not taken "timely and

appropriate action".

The referral at issue came from

David Lamm, Assistant Commissioner for

Solid and Hazardous Waste Management,

Department of Environmental Management.

The referral, dated July 26, 1986, informed

the EPA that the Landfill apparently had

violated minimum technology requirements of

the 1984 amendments known as HSWA and

falsely certified compliance with the

groundwater monitoring requirements’) and

financial assurance requirements. (EPA

Exh. 36). This document was designated an

"enforcement referral". Mr. Lamm

reasserted his request for enforcement

action ina referral letter dated June 10,

1987. (STOP Exh. 47).

The 1985 Memorandum of Agreement

provided only that the EPA may _ take

enforcement action "upon determining that

the State has not taken timely = and

appropriate enforcement action". (EWC Exh.

IIIII, p. 26). EWC maintains that the EPA

did not determine whether the State had

taken "timely and appropriate action". [In

Support of this argument, EWC points to

language found in the more recent 1988

38

Memorandum of Agreement between the EPA and

Indiana: "EPA will take enforcement action

only upon determining that the State has

not taken timely and appropriate action or

upon request of the State." (EPA Exh. 38,

p. 26).

In denying EWC's summary judgment

motion, the court held that the EPA had the

authority under 42 U.S.C. § 6928 to proceed

on the issues of groundwater monitoring and

financial assurance requirements alleged in

its first claim. 698 F. Supp. at 1435-

1438. Section 6928(a) authorizes the EPA

to bring an independent enforcement action,

even in a RCRA authorized state. United

States v. Conservation Chemical Co. of

Illinois, 660 F. Supp. at 1244. See United

States v. Allegan Metal Finishing Co., 696

F. Supp. 275, 282 (W.D. Mich. 1988). The

sole restriction on this enforcement

authority is that the EPA must notify the

39

ee

state before commencing any action. 42

U.$.¢. § 6928(a) (2). Section 6928

"explicitly reserves federal authority in

the face of an authorized state program."

Wyckoff Co. v. Environmental Protection

Agency, 796 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir.

1986). EWC has not’ challenged the

sufficiency of the EPA's notice to Indiana.

Instead, EWC contends that this enforcement

proceeding is improper because it was -

triggered by a referral contrary to a

written agreement or by the wrong person.

That argument finds no support in the

statute; 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) neither

creates a need for referral by a state nor

designates the state official who must make

such a referral.

Further, Indiana, although

authorized to promulgate interim status

regulations, has no authority to enforce

any provisions found in the 1984 amendments

40

known as HSWA. Determining the loss of

interim status is a provision found in the

1984 amendments. Indiana could not have

determined whether the Landfill lost its

interim status. It is difficult to see how

Indiana's allegedly improper referral of a

matter within the EPA's exclusive

enforcement authority could affect the

EPA's right to act under HSWA.

2. The Second Claim: Minimum Technology

Requirements

The EPA's second claim alleges

violations of RCRA's minimum technology

requirements. This issue was-~ also

contained in the referral for enforcement

from Indiana to the EPA. For the same

reasons stated above, the court is vested

with jurisdiction under § 6928(a). The

minimum technology provision is a product

of the 1984 amendments known as HSWA and a

matter not delegated to the state for

41

enforcement. Accordingly, any challenge to

Indiana's attempted enforcement referral to

the EPA is immaterial.

3. The Third Claim: Groundwater Monitoring

Requirements

The third claim of the EPA's

amended complaint alleges that EWC failed

to implement a _=groundwater monitoring

program capable of determining the

Landfill's impact on the quality of the

groundwater in the uppermost aquifer

underlying the facility in violation of 40

C.F.R. § 265.90(a).

Again, EWC relies upon the 1985

Memorandum of Agreement between Indiana and

the EPA which provided that the EPA could

take enforcement action only after

determining that the State did not take

timely and appropriate action. EWC asserts

that the EPA did not determine whether

42

Indiana had taken "timely and appropriate

action".

The EPA does not suggest that the

matters raised by its third claim arise

under the 1984 HSWA provisions; the third

claim, unlike the first and second claims,

is not within the EPA's exclusive

administrative jurisdiction. This does not

defeat the district court's jurisdiction,

however. Although the EPA may not have

administrative authority over the violation

alleged in the third claim, see Northside

Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Thomas, 804 F.2d

371, 42 U.S.C. § 6928 vests jurisdiction in

the district court to entertain = an

enforcement action directed at violations

of RCRA. Rather, the proper inquiry is

whether the contractual agreement between

Indiana and the EPA controls when such an

enforcement action can occur.

43

la cae al iia

The 1985 Memorandum of Agreement

provides no interpretation of "timely and

appropriate action". William Muno, the

Chief of the Enforcement Branch for the

EPA's Region V, testified that the EPA's

interpretation of "timely and appropriate"

action under’ the 1985 Memorandum of

Agreement requires formal state action

within ninety days of discovery of

violation, and a notice of violation or

warning letter is not a formal action. The

record before the court does not suggest

that Indiana, the other party to the

Agreement, has ever objected to either the

EPA's interpretation of the Agreement or

the EPA's enforcement action. Mr. Muno

stated that the institution of this action

demonstrates that the EPA had made such a

determination.

Indiana addressed the allegations

of the EPA's third claim in Notice of

44

Violation V-209, contained in a letter

dated October 11, 1985 (STOP Exh. 17).

Notice of Violation V-209 alleged a failure

to implement a program capable of

determining the facility's impact- on

groundwater, constituting a violation of 40

C.F.R. § 265.90. EWC's principal

consultant, Michael Johnson, testified that

the state had taken no further action on V-

209. EWC argues that the June, 1985

administrative order resolving Notice of

Violation N-128"° incorporated the

violations contained in V-209, but

introduced nothing to support that

contention. Indiana took no- formal

enforcement action on V-209, and the EPA

commenced this suit based, in part, upon

the allegations contained in V-209,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6928. Indiana has

‘0 The order resolving Notice of

Violation N-128 is discussed in detail in

Part II-D-2-a of this memorandum.

45

a

©

taken no action, in its proceedings to

determine whether a final permit should be

issued » the Landfill, that is inconsis-

tent with the EPA's enforcement

proceedings. Finally, to eliminate the

possibility that EWC will face apparently

inconsistent directives from state and

federal regulators, the EPA has stipulated

that if its third claim is proven, the

court should order implementation of the

groundwater monitoring plan Indiana

recently approved pursuant to the

administrative order in Notice of Violation

N-128."'

Nothing in the referral procedure

deprives the court of its subject matter

jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 6928. See

United States v. Conservation Chemical Co.

"on July 28, 1988, Indiana approved

the groundwater monitoring plan submitted

by Four County Landfill. (EWC Exh. 5, Mot.

for Partial Summary Judgment).

46

of Illinois, 660 F. Supp. at 1244-1245.

The court has subject matter jurisdiction

over the EPA's third claim.

4. The Fourth Claim: Corrective Action

The EPA's fourth claim is based

upon the Administrator's determination that

a release has occurred at the Landfill. On

June 5, 1987, the Regional Administrator,

Valdas Adamkus, sent EWC a Determination of

Release of Hazardous Waste into’ the

Environment. (EPA Exh. 12).

Section 6928(h) vests the court

with subject matter jurisdiction. Once the

Administrator determines that there is or

has been a reiease of hazardous waste into

the environment from a hazardous waste

disposal facility, the Administrator may

commence a civil action in the "United

States district court in the district in

which the facility is located for

apprépriate reiief .. ." 42 U.S.C. §

47

6928(h)(1). This provision was enacted as

part of the 1984 amendments known as HSWA

to allow the EPA to seek corrective action

for release of hazardous wastes through

either an administrative order or court

order. United States v. Clow Water

Systems, 701 F. Supp. 1345 (S.D. Ohio

1988); see United States _v. Indiana

44

Woodtreating Corp., 686 F. Supp. 218 (S.D.

Ind. 1988). The court has subject matter

jurisdiction to entertain the allegations

of the EPA's fourth claim.

B. STOP's Failure to Give Notice

EWC suggests that STOP failed to

give timely notice as required of citizen

groups by 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b), and that

STOP's failure to comply with this

provision deprives the court of subject

matter jurisdiction over STOP's claims.

48

1. Notice Is Not Jurisdictional in Hazardous .

Waste Claim

On July 8, 1987, STOP moved to

intervene pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6972.

The EPA responded by noting that

intervention under this statutory provision

was inappropriate, but directed STOP to the

provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i). STOP

filed an amended motion to intervene

pursuant to § 9613(i) on October 21, 1987.

The EPA chose not to oppose STOP's

intervention as long as STOP introduced no

matters extraneous to the claims already

before the court. The court granted the

amended motion to intervene on November 6,

1987, and STOP's complaint was deemed filed

on November 13, 1987; its amended complaint

was filed on November 29, 1988. EWC sought

dismissal of STOP's claims because those

claims exceeded the scope of the EPA's

conditional accession to the intervention,

49

but the court found that EWC had =~»no

standing to raise that argument. See

United States Vv. Environmental Waste

Control, Inc., 698 F. Supp. at 1440-1441.

It was not until STOP had completed the

first portion of its closing argument that

EWC challenged the court's jurisdiction on

these grounds in its "Preliminary Tender of

Supplementary Authority".

If the notice issue is not

jurisdictional, EWC has waived it by

failing to raise it in a timely manner.

™ Midway through the trial, the court

informed counsel that, in light of the

extensive pretrial briefing already done,

the court would not allow the submission of

post-trial briefs in lieu of -final

argument. ~ The court indicated that it

would allow counsel to submit lists of

citations of authority concerning new

issues that had arisen during trial.

Because EWC did not file its list of

citations of authority until after counsel

for the EPA and STOP had completed the

opening portion of their final arguments

and because EWC's citations raised new

issues, the court granted the EPA and STOP

leave to address the new material in post-

trial submissions.

50

Indeed, if the issue is not jurisdictional,

it is doubtful that one could say the issue

has been raised at all. No motion has been

filed; EWC simply alluded to the issue on

the tenth page of their supporting

authorities.

If the matter of notice is

jurisdictional, however, the indefensible

untimeliness of the issue is of no moment.

Subject matter jurisdiction may be raised

at any stage of the proceedings. Principal

Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Juntunen, 838

F.2d 942, 944 (7th Cir. 1988). For that

matter, it is immaterial] that EWC still has

filed no motion to dismiss STOP's claims

for want of subject matter jurisdiction due

to failure to give notice; the court must

inguire into its jurisdiction whenever it

is called into doubt. Kanzelberger v.

Kanzelberger, 782 F.2d 774, 777 (7th Cir.

1986).

~ 2!

STOP offers a simple answer to

this challenge to its participation in this

Suit: notice is not required for interven-

tion. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(1), under which

STOP was permitted to intervene, provides:

In any action commenced under

this chapter or under the Solid

Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. §

6901 et segq.] in a court of the

United States, any person may

intervene as a matter of right when

such person claims an interest

relating to the subject of the

action and is so situated that the

disposition may, as a _ practical

matter, impair or impede the

person's ability to protect that

interest, unless the President or

the State shows that the person's

interest is adequately represented

by existing parties.

RCRA's intervention provision, 42 U.S.C. §

6972(b)(1), provides that any person may

intervene as of right in any action under

§ 6972(a)(1) (A). Neither § 6972(b)(1) nor

§ 9613(1) condition intervention on notice

to any party by the prospective intervenor.

The intervention provision of § 6972(b) (1)

is separate from the notice provision, §

52

6972(b)(1)(A). Because STOP intervened, it

contends, no notice requirement governed

a3.

This approach is too facile.

Under circumstances not presented here, a

citizen group need not give notice before

intervention. An intervenor might present

no new claims; notice of claims already

pending would be a pointless act. STOP's

role in this case, however, has exceeded

that of a mere intervenor. STOP has

presented its own claims and sought relief

beyond that sought by the EPA. STOP's

additional claims must be viewed more

properly as having been in the nature of a

citizen's suit under § 6972(a) (1) (A), which

contains certain notice requirements.

While STOP should not be penalized for

having intervened in an existing

enforcement action rather than filing a

separate suit, neither may it evade notice

53

requirements by doing so. Accordingly, the

court cannot accept STOP's facially

attractive argument that it needed to give

no notice to participate in this action.

EWC has not specified the notice

provision STOP allegedly failed to meet.

RCRA contains a provision that

conditionally allows citizens to commence

an action against "any person . . . who is

alleged to be in violation of any permit,

standard, regulation, condition,

requirement, prohibition, or order which

has become effective pursuant to this

chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1) (A). No

action may be commenced under §

6972(a)(1)(A) less than sixty days after

giving notice to the Administrator, the

state in which the alleged violation

occurred, and to any alleged violator. The

statute contains an important exception,

however:

54

. . . except that such action may

be brought immediately after such

notification in the case of an

action under this section

respecting a violation of

subchapter III of this chapter [42

U.S.C. §§ 6921-6934] .. .

42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1) (A). If the action

contains allegations concerning hazardous

waste management under 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-

6934, then, the action may be brought

immediately after notification to those

parties.

STOP's original and amended

complaints each alleged violations of 42

U.S.C. § 6928. Accordingly, STOP was not

required to give sixty days' notice to the

EPA, Indiana, and EWC.” STOP was required

'S The statute might be construed to

require one day's notice for claims under

42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6934, but requires sixty

days' notice for claims within the same

complaint alleging violations of other RCRA

provisions. The court does not so construe

the statute. In any event, STOP's notice,

discussed in the following subsection of

this memorandum, preceded the filing of its

intervenor's complaint sufficiently to meet

even a sixty day requirement.

55

to give notice before bringing suit, but

the statute sets forth no minimum notice

period.

The elimination of the sixty-day

notice requirement concerning hazardous

waste management resulted from the 1984

amendments known as HSWA. See Dedham Water

Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805

F.2d. 1074 (lst Cir. 1986) (addressing

retroactivity of elimination of sixty-day

requirement). No reported decision

addresses whether the resultant notice

requirement -- one that apparently can be

Satisfied by notice a day or an hour before

filing suit -- for such cases is a

jurisdictional matter or merely a condition

precedent to suit. Indeed, the Seventh

Circuit has not addressed directly whether

any of the notice provisions of §

6972(a)(1) (A) are jurisdictional or merely

a condition precedent to suit. In Highland

56

Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir.

1975), cert. denied 424 U.S. 927 (1976),

however, the court addressed a virtually

identical sixty-day notice provision in the

Clean Air Amendments to the National

Environmental Protection Act and concluded

that the notice requirement is

jurisdictional. See also Evansville v.

Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d

1008 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S.

1025 (1980) (same result under Federal

Water Pollution Control Act). The Highland

Park court reasoned:

The legislative history of

section 304 shows . . . that

Congress intended to provide for

citizens' suits in a manner that

would be least likely to clog

already burdened federal courts and

most likely to trigger governmental

action which would alleviate any

need for judicial relief. It was

in response to these concerns that

the statutory notice provisions

were included in section 304.

Congress's intention would be

frustrated if the statutory mandate

of section 304(b) were ignored.

57

519 F.2d at 690-691 (footnotes omitted).

The Ninth Circuit echoed these thoughts

twelve years later in holding RCRA's sixty-

day notice provision jurisdictional. In

Hallstrom _v. Tillamook County, 844 F.2d

598, 600-601 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted

57 U.S.L.W. 3619 (March 21, 1989), the

court reasoned that Congress intended to

provide a non-adversarial period in which

environmental conflicts might be resolved

administratively. Litigation, the court

held, "should be a last resort only after

other efforts have failed." 844 F.2d at

601. Accord, Walls v. Waste Resource

in. 761 F.2d 311, 317 (6th Cir. 1985)

(notice provisions "were intended to give

the EPA an opportunity to resolve issues

regarding the interpretation of complex

environmental standards by negotiation,

unhindered by the threat of an impending

lawsuit"); Garcia v. Cecos International,

58

Inc., 761 F.2d 76, 81 (ist Cir. 1985)

("Notice from potential private plaintiffs

gives the EPA and the state an opportunity

to investigate the alleged violation.").

This rationale vanishes, however,

when the requisite notice with respect to

hazardous waste may be satisfied by notice

only a day, or perhaps even an hour, before

filing suit. Environmental disputes

concerning hazardous waste management are

most unlikely to be resolved

administratively within a single day.

Accordingly, the court concludes’ that

RCRA's notice requirement is not a

jurisdictional matter when the alleged

violation involves hazardous waste

29

14

management, © and EWC cannot raise the issue

at this stage of the proceedings.

2. Adequate Notice Was Given

In any event, the record before

the court discloses that thos@ entitled to

notice under the statute had ample notice

of the violations undergirding STOP's

claims.

In Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,

844 F.2d at 600, the Ninth Circuit noted

“ The Ninth Circuit implied such a

distinction in Hallstrom _v. Tillamook

County, 844 F.2d 598, 600-601:

Strict application of the

[sixty day] notice requirement is

supported by an exception within §

6972 which waives the 60 day notice

requirement if the alleged

violation involves hazardous waste.

42 U.S.C. § 6972. This provision

makes clear that Congress

considered the 60-day notice

requirement and intended that it

apply in all cases, except those

involving hazardous waste.

In Highland Park, the court noted that the

statute at issue there had _ certain

exceptions to the notice requirement, which

did not apply to the circumstances of the

case. 519 F.2d at 690 n.3.

60

that with respect to RCRA's’ sixty-day

notice provision, the circuits have split

between the "pragmatic approach" of the

Second, Third, Eighth, and District of

Columbia Circuits, and the "jurisdictional

prerequisite approach" of the First, Sixth,

Seventh (and now the Ninth) Circuits. The

"pragmatic approach" allows post-filing

notice. For example, in Pymatuning Water

Shed Citizens for a Hygienic Environment v.

Eaton, 644 F.2d 995 (3rd Cir. 1981), the

district court had allowed notices to be

given after the filing of suit and stayed

the action until the notices were given and

the sixty days had passed. The court,

relying on an earlier Third Circuit case_

—>>

approving that practice, Susquehanna Valley

Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear

Reactor, 619 F.2d 231 (3rd Cir. 1980),

cert. denied 449 U.S. 1096 (1981), affirmed

the district court's action. Similarly, in

61

a

O'Leary v. Moyer's Landfill, Inc., 523 F.

Supp. 642 (E.D. Pa. 1981), the court found

post-filing notice sufficient when the

defendants were not called on to defend the

Claims until more than sixty days had

elapsed from the notice.

The Seventh Circuit's

jurisdictional view of the notice

requirement would preclude such an

approach, but the cases adopting the

"Jurisdictional" approach under RCRA have

addressed only the timing, and not the

adequacy, of the notice. See, e.g., Garcia

v. Cecos International, Inc., 761 F.2d 76

(plaintiff had amended his complaint after

removal to allege RCRA violations; court

concluded that § 6972 required notice sixty

days before the filing of suit, rather than

a delay of sixty days after post-filing

amendment); Highland Park v. Train, 519

F.2d 681 (no notice whatsoever).

62

As to the sufficiency of the

notice, the reported cases consistently

have found that sufficient notice was given

if the requisite parties had "notice-in-

fact" of the alleged violations. For

example, in Proffitt v. Commissioners,

Township of Bristol, 754 F.2d 504 (3rd Cir.

1985), the plaintiff showed that the county

health officials had reported the alleged

violations to the state agency and the EPA,

and the plaintiff had visited the EPA and

the state agency several times in the

months before suit to discuss environmental

problems at the defendant's facility. The

Third Circuit deemed this "notice-in-fact"

sufficient.

In Fishel v. Westinghouse Electric

Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1531, 1536 (M.D. Pa.

1985), the defendant contended that it

received insufficient notice because the

notice did not specify the, regulations

63

allegedly violated, the persons responsible

for the violations, or the dates of the

violations. The court held that the

notice, which provided adequate information

concerning the nature of the alleged

violations, was sufficient. The court also

noted that the EPA and the state agency had

been investigating such violations at the

defendant's facility for several months

before the notice. Accordingly, the court

refused to dismiss the suit on notice

grounds. See also Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F.

Supp. 1176, 1181 (M.D. Tenn. 1988); Utah

State Department of Health v. Ng, 649 F.

Supp. 1102 (D. Utah 1986) (series of

letters between the plaintiff state agency

and the defendants constituted notice-in-

fact to the defendants).

There must be some notice to the

defendant and the agencies, and oral notice

to some will not suffice. In Reeger v.

64

Mill Service, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 360 (W.D.

Pa. 1984), the plaintiffs conceded they had

given the defendants no written notice, but

argued that nothing more than their oral

complaints to the state agency and the EPA

should be required because written notice

would be useless. The court rejected the

argument and dismissed the suit. The

plaintiffs in McCastle Vv. Rollins

Environmental Services, 514 F. Supp. 936

(M.D. La. 1981), do not appear to have

realized that their complaint stated claims

under RCRA and so had given no pre-filing

notice to the EPA or the state. The court

held that the complaint's allegations

brought it within the scope of RCRA and

dismissed the complaint for want of notice.

The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration,

arguing that the state agency, which acts

in the EPA's stead, had received actual

notice of the suit three days after the

65

suit was filed. The court rejected that

argument, distinguishing the Third

Circuit's "pragmatic approach" cases.

The defendant and the agencies

must have actual notice; that they should

have known of the alleged violations is

insufficient. In Walls v. Waste Resource

Corp., 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1985), the

plaintiffs had alleged that the defendants,

the state, and the EPA had had constructive

notice for more than sixty days, but

apparently did not explain the basis for

that allegation. The court deemed the

allegation insufficient to establish actual

notice and affirmed the dismissal.

By these standards, all necessary

recipients of notice had notice~in-fact of

STOP's claims. STOP's motion to intervene

was not granted until almost four months

after STOP served its proposed complaint on

the EPA and EWC. STOP was not a party to

66

the suit during those four months. The EPA

and EWC had ample notice of STOP's intended

claim through receipt of the proposed

complaint nearly four months before it was

filed.

To suggest that the state agency

did not have notice-in-fact of STOP's

claims would be to ignore the record STOP

has presented. Much of STOP'sS' case

consisted of observations and reports by

state inspectors and correspondence between

the state agency and EWC’ concerning

violations such as STOP alleges; the state

agency even considered intervening in the

EPA's suit. (STOP Exh. 50). Indeed, as is

discussed in sections that follow, EWC

argues that the state agency had addressed

or was addressing the very allegations STOP

raises here. Indiana, although not served

with STOP's proposed intervenor's

complaint, had notice-in-fact of the

67

violations STOP asserts.

Accordingly, even if RCRA's

minimal notice provision in citizens' suits

concerning hazardous waste management is

deemed jurisdictional, STOP satisfied its

requirements.

3. Ancillary Jurisdiction

Even were the court to hold that

STOP failed to satisfy a jurisdictional

notice requirement with respect to those of

its claims that exceeded the EPA's claims,

the court would exercise its ancillary

jurisdiction over those claims.

When the right to intervene is

absolute, no independent ground of federal

jurisdiction need be shown to support the

intervention; the intervention is properly

regarded as coming within the court's

ancillary jurisdiction. 3B J. Moore & J.

Kennedy, Moore's Federal Practice q

24.18[1], at 24-198 (1987).

68

Section 9613(i) gives STOP the

right to intervene if its interest relating

to the subject matter of the action is so

situated that the disposition of the action

may, aS a practical matter, impair or

impede STOP's ability to protect that

interest. No right to intervene exists if

the President or the state shows that

existing parties adequately represent the

intervenor's interest, but § 9613(i) does

not require the intervenor to prove the

converse. The EPA chose not to object to

STOP's intervention and the court placed no

15

conditions upon STOP's intervention. As

"In Amoco Oil Company v. Dingwell,

690 F. Supp. 78, 84 (D. Me. 1988), the

court held that the conditions’ for

intervention under § 9613(i) are the same

as those in Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2): the

motion must be timely; the intervenor must

have a significantly protectable interest

relating to the subject of the action that

might be impaired if the action were

decided without their participation; and

their interest may be inadequately

represented by existing parties. The

record reflects that STOP's membership

included surrounding property owners who

69

Oe

discussed above, STOP was not required to

give pre-filing notice of its claims to the

extent those claims did not exceed the

scope of the EPA's claims.”

STOP's claims consist of alleged

additional RCRA violations. RCRA contains

no provision for citizen intervention in

enforcement proceedings in authorized

states. Middlesex County Board of Chosen

Freeholders Vv. New Jersey Dept. of

Environmental Protection, 645 F. Supp. 715,

7i9 (D.N.J. 1966). In response to the

court's inquiry in final argument, counsel

sought permanent closure based on claims

that hazardous waste constituents have been

released into the environment beyond the

Landfill's boundaries. The EPA did not

attempt to prove release into the

Surrounding area and sought no permanent

closure.

'© The condition that no extraneous

claim be raised was placed upon STOP by the

EPA in its response to STOP's motion to

intervene. Once STOP added further claims,

the EPA never objected, so the court never

addressed the propriety of the additional

claims.

70

were unable to inform the court whether

Indiana law allows citizen intervention in

such actions. Even if Indiana law provides

for such intervention,, however, nothing in

RCRA or the Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9601, et seq.,

suggests that states may restrict the broad

statutory intervention rights of citizens

by allowing intervention in state

enforcement proceedings.

Accordingly, even if STOP's

additional claims were subject to

jurisdictional notice provisions of RCRA,

dismissal is not required. Through the

court's ancillary jurisdiction, matters

raised by the case can be adjudicated even

if an independent basis for jurisdiction is

absent. 7¢C C. Wright, A. Miller and M.

Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §

1917, at 460-461 (1986). The exercise of

71

ancillary jurisdiction promotes judicial

economy and fairness. The EPA filed this

enforcement action alleging that’ the

defendants violated provisions of RCRA.

STOP's additional claims, while different

in nature, allege viclations of RCRA;

according to STOP witnesses, some of those

claims have gone unresolved for some time.

All alleged RCRA violations are contained

in the same lawsuit.

The exercise of ancillary

jurisdiction would offend no Congressional

purpose. As is discussed above, the notice

requirements contained in RCRA exist to

afford state and federal administrative

agencies the opportunity to address

citizens' complaints before federal fora

are called upon to act. Hallstrom v.

Tillamook County, 844 F.2d at 600. The

state and federal agencies had ample

opportunity to act before STOP intervened;

72

ee en ne

indeed, EWC premises its collateral

estoppel argument on the proposition that

Indiana already has acted. That the EPA

already had instituted this suit

demonstrates the EPA's opportunity to act.

With these principles in mind, the

court finds subject matter jurisdiction

exists over all of STOP's claims.

Cc. Primary Jurisdiction

EWC argued in its summary judgment

motion that the court should invoke the

doctrine of primary jurisdiction on the

first and third claims of the EPA's amended

complaint. EWC argued that the court

should accord deference to the Indiana

agency's actions against the _ Landfill

because of that agency's technical and

extensive experience on the specific issues

found in those claims. The court

disagreed. United States v. Environmental

Waste Control, Inc., 698 F. Supp. at 1439-

a3

OE nT

1440. The court's pretrial ruling only

addressed EPA's claims; EWC lodged no

primary jurisdiction challenge to STOP's

claims until STOP began to present its

evidence. EWC objected to the introduction

of any evidence related to claims that were

subject of ongoing state court or state

administrative proceedings. The court

deferred ruling on the primary jurisdiction

issue, overruled EWC's objections, and

allowed STOP's evidence to be introduced.

The doctrine of primary

jurisdiction was created by courts and is

designed to guide a court in determining

whether or when it should refrain from or

postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction

so. that an agency may first determine a

question. K. Davis, Administrative Law

Treatise § 22.1, at 81 (1983). The

doctrine usually does nothing more than

74

"allocate power between courts and agencies

‘to make initial determinations", which

usually does not affect final

determinations. ad. at 82.

The term "primary jurisdiction"

may be a “verbal coat of too many colors",

United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines,

344 U.S. 33, 39 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,

dissenting and describing "jurisdiction"),

in that it encompasses four major, but

distinguishable, doctrines: primary

exclusive jurisdiction, true primary

jurisdiction, statutory exemptions, and

agency immunizations. M. Botein, Primary

Jurisdiction: The Need for Better

Court/Agency Interaction, 29 Rutgers L.

Rev. 867, 868 (1976). "Primary exclusive

jurisdiction" deprives the court of all

power over a case except the very limited

power tc review an agency's determination.

"True primary jurisdiction" affords an

75

agency the initial opportunity to consider

a legal issue or find facts, but the court

retains the power to render a judgment.

id. EWC's assertions involving EPA's and

STOP's claims could only fall, if at all,

within the boundaries cf these two

doctrines.

1. The EPA's Claims

EWC has argued throughout these

proceedings that the claims advanced by the

EPA's amended complaint were matters that

Indiana has addressed or should address.

EWC contends that if the court does not

withhold judgment on the EPA's claims, the

Landfill will be subjected to inconsistent

determinations.

At the summary judgment stage, the

court held that application of the doctrine

of primary jurisdiction was inappropriate

in this case. United States Vv.

Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 698 F.

76

Supp. at 1438-1440. The court determined,

first, that Indiana was not empowered to

resolve the loss of interim status issues

presented in the first claim of the EPA's

amended complaint; second, that the third

claim was an enforcement matter that fell

within the provisions of the 1985 Memoran-

dum of Agreement between the EPA and

Indiana; and third, that the agency to

whose expertise the court would defer is

the very agency that initiated this action.

EWC maintains that Far East

Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570

(1952), and Bradford School Bus Transit,

Inc. v. Chicago Transit Authority, 537 F.2d

943 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S.

1066 (1977), require the court to withhold

judgment on claims that are subject to any

past or present state administrative agency

actions. EWC has not, however, articulated

or cited to any authority indicating that

77

the primary jurisdiction doctrines on which

they rely implicate a federal court's

deferral to a state administrative agency

in an action brought under federal law.

Cases cited by EWC do not convince the

court that the doctrines so apply. see

Montgomery Environmental Coalition Citizens

Coordinating Committee on Friendship

Heights v. Washington Suburban Sanitary

Commission, 607 F.2d 378 (D.C. Cir. 1979)

(court invoked doctrine due to ongoing EPA

administrative action involving a NDPES

permit that would determine the permit and

amount of discharge to be allowed at the

defendant's facility); Clark Oil Co. Inc.

Vv. Texaco, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1373 (D.C.

Del. 1985) (court stayed Economic

Stabilization Act suit against a private

defendant to allow Department of Energy to

make an initial determination); Illinois

Council on Long Term Care v. Miller, 579 F.

78

Supp. 1140 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (court invoked

doctrine to allow the Secretary of Health

and Human Services to determine whether

amended medicare reimbursement plan

formulated by State was adequate and

reasonable).

Far East Conference held that the

issue presented was within the Federal

Maritime Board's exclusive jurisdiction and

not subject to adjudication by a district

court. 342 U.S. at 576-577. Bradford

School Bus. Transit involved a federal

agency which had, subsequent to the pending

lawsuit, established complaint procedures

and remedies for complaints such as the one

presented in the action. In United States

v. Conservation Chemical Co. of Illinois,

660 F. Supp. at 1245, the court addressed

the issue briefly, but noted that the state

agency had placed its action "on hold"

pending the outcome of the federal suit.

79

Indiana is not authorized to

determine the issues raised by the first,

second, and fourth claims of the EPA's

complaint. No evidence has been submitted

to indicate that a state agency has

resolved any of those issues or would have

any authority to do so. The EPA would not

appear to have the authority to resolved

the third claim through its own administra-

tive procedures, Northside Sanitary

Landfill, Inc. v. Thomas, 804 F.2d 371, so

deference to the EPA would be pointless on

that claim. The Indiana agency could

address the third claim administratively

(and may feel it did so by referring it to

the EPA for enforcement), but this court

cannot review the Indiana agency's

administrative determinations. Under

either true primary jurisdiction or primary

exclusive jurisdiction, the court is to

retain the power to review the

80

determination of the agency to which the

court defers. EWC has advanced no theory

under which this court could review the

Indiana agency's determinations. EWC has

not convinced the court that the doctrines

of primary exclusive jurisdiction or true

primary jurisdiction should be invoked with

respect to the EPA's claims.

2. STOP's Claims

At trial, EWC argued for the first

time that because Indiana is pursuing or

already has resolved all claims indepen-

dently advanced by STOP, the court should

invoke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction

in regard to STOP's claims. EWC appears to

argue that the state agency has exclusive

primary jurisdiction over the matters

raised in STOP's amended complaint. As

noted above, the court deferred ruling on

the issue during trial, overruled the

defendants' objections, and admitted

81

ee

evidence on STOP's claims. A different

analysis governs this argument because STOP

added claims beyond those pressed by the

EPA. Nonetheless, the primary jurisdiction

doctrines are no more applicable to STOP's

claims than to the EPA's claims.

As noted above, STOP intervened in

this action pursuant to the 1986 amendments

to CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i). STOP could

have brought its own action against the

defendants in district court under 42

U.S.C. § 6972 because the EPA was not

pursuing any action to remedy the

additional violations STOP alleges.

In Middlesex County Board of

Chosen Freeholders v. New Jersey, 645 F.

Supp. 715, a citizen group withstood a

motion to dismiss an action filed against

a state agency and others for alleged

ongoing RCRA violations that posed imminent

and substantial danger at a landfill site.

82

The Middlesex court determined that

Congress did not contemplate that RCRA

suits would be brought in state courts, and

that the legislative history of RCRA

indicated that state proceedings relating

to a waste disposal site could proceed

simultaneously with a federal citizen suit

under RCRA relating to the same site. 645

F. Supp. at 719.

EWC has offered no authority for

its proposition that the primary

jurisdiction doctrines apply to claims

brought by citizen groups in federal court.

One court has said that if the primary

jurisdiction doctrines apply at all to

citizens' claims, it should be invoked

"Sparingly where it would serve to preempt

a citizens' suit". Merry v. Westinghouse

Electric Corp., 697 F. Supp. 180, 182 (M.D.

Pa. 1988). In Merry, the plaintiffs

brought an action under CERCLA, RCRA, and

the Clean Water Act. The defendants urged

the court to invoke the doctrine of primary

jurisdiction and defer to the EPA for its

expertise. The court refused to do so

because the EPA's inaction was the catalyst

for the citizens' decision to file suit.

The court held that when a citizens' group

or the federal government brings’ an

enforcement action in a state with permit

issuance authority, the primary

jurisdiction doctrine should be used with

great care. Otherwise, delay by the state

or federal government could frustrate the

congressional intent of broadened

enforcement.

Testimony and exhibits introduced

by STOP rang with frustration at the

ongoing alleged violations occurring at the

Landfill and STOP members' repeated

attempts to get Indiana to act; STOP's

additional claims would lie within the

84

i i alia

administrative enforcement authority of

Indiana rather than the EPA. Northside

Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Thomas, 804 F.2d

371. As noted above, EWC has provided no

authority for the proposition that federal

courts should defer to state agencies in

suits based on federal law. Further, RCRA

and CERCLA granted citizen groups neither

administrative enforcement authority nor

the right to intervene in state

administrative enforcement proceedings.

RCRA and CERCLA provided citizen groups

only with broad rights to bring their own

federal actions and to intervene in federal

actions. To deprive STOP the opportunity

to bring its claims in this proceeding

would thwart the legislative intent behind

the RCRA and CERCLA provisions for citizen

intervention; STOP would be foreclosed from

the only avenue of relief provided by

federal law.

85

D. Collateral Estoppel

EWC argues that the doctrines of

res judicata and collateral estoppel bar

certain of the EPA's claims and all of

STOP's additional claims. EWC contends

that those claims were resolved in an

agreed state administrative order entered

into between EWC and the Environmental

Board of the State of Indiana in June,

1985, in that agency's Cause N-128.

1. Waiver

EWC raised the collateral estoppel

defense in its answers to the EPA's amended

complaint and STOP's amended complaint.

The pretrial order, however, does. not

appear to have preserved the defense with

respect to STOP's claims. At page 35 of

the pretrial order, EWC contended,

EPA is estopped from proceeding

with its claim against the Four

County Landfill due to- prior

actions indicating acceptance of

the State of Indiana's resolution

86

of claims against the operations of

the Four County Landfill.

The pretrial order contains no reference to

an estoppel defense with respect to STOP's

additional claims; the defense did not

reappear as to STOP's claims until EWC

filed its supplemental citation of

authority during final argument. See 6 C.

Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 1526, at 596 (1971) (pre-trial

order controls subsequent course of the

action and court "need not consider any

matter that is not embodied in it").

STOP did not respond to the

collateral estoppel argument in its post-

rial supplemental response; whether its

silence reflects a belief that the issue

was waived by its absence from the pretrial

order is unclear. In its post-trial

supplemental response, the EPA argues that

it is not ccllaterally estopped from

litigating specific groundwater monitoring

87

violations because the agreed

administrative order did not’ address

specific groundwater monitoring violations

and, further, that the EPA may pursue its

own enforcement action in aé_- federal

district court despite any agreed

administrative order between a party and an

authorized state.

Because of counsel's’ in-trial

uncertainties as to whether the pretrial

order had been approved, because the

collateral estoppel issue properly was

raised at least with respect to some of the

claims, and because principles of collat-

eral estoppel do not bar the claims in this

case in any event, tne court declines to

hold that EWC has not’' preserved the

collateral estoppel defense.

2. Governing Principles

Once an issue is actually

litigated and determined, that

88

determination is conclusive in subsequent

suits based on a different cause of action

but involving a party or privy to the prior

litigation. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,

439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). Collateral

estoppel bars relitigation of factual

questions or mixed questions of law and

fact. See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127,

139 n.10 (1979).

EWC's collateral estoppel theory

is developed incompletely in the record

before the court. The court assumes the

argument is based on the agreed

administrative order in Cause N-128. If

89

’ it has

EWC relies on other proceedings, |

failed to satisfy its burden of proving the

existence of such proceedings. Indiana's

Notice of Violation No. V-209 was admitted

into evidence, but all testimony, including

that of EWC's chief consultant, indicates

that Indiana has taken no final action on

that notice. STOP sought to introduce

evidence concerning an action pending in

the Indiana courts, but EWC successfully

excluded those exhibits from evidence."

“vIn its "Preliminary Tender of

Supplemental Authority" filed during

closing arguments, EWC cited cases "[i]n

support of EWC's contention that EPA and

STOP are collaterally estopped or otherwise

barred from relitigation of claims that

EWC's groundwater monitoring did not meet

interim status requirements or other RCRA

Claims otherwise resolved by other prior

proceedings such as Cause N-128." No

"other prior proceedings" have been

specified.

"8 STOP sought to introduce a complaint

and answer from a pending state suit to

prove certain admissions by EWC concerning

the Landfill's capacity for more hazardous

waste. STOP sought to argue, from

inferences supported by other evidence,

that the Landfill had exceeded, or soon

90

The fundamental policy underlying

the doctrines of res judicata and

collateral estoppel is that a "right,

question or fact distinctly put in issue

and directly determined by a court of

competent jurisdiction . . . cannot be

disputed in a subsequent suit between the

Same parties or their privies . . ."

Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153

(1979). Because neither the EPA nor STOP

were parties in the state administrative

proceeding in Cause N-128 and the claims

presented here differ from those presented

would exceed, its permitted capacity. From

that, STOP sought to argue that the court

should consider, in exercising its

equitable discretion in determining the

ultimate remedy, that the Landfill could

accept only a small amount of hazardous

waste in the future. Because EWC's request

to increase the permissible capacity

presently pends in the state administrative

bodies, the court declined to admit the

evidence pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 403;

relevancy would depend upon the court's

ability to predict the outcome of the state

proceedings concerning an increase in

capacity.

91

there, the rules of collateral estoppel,

rather than res judicata, govern the

19

preclusion issue in this case. See Kerr-

McGee Chemical Corp. v. Hartigan, 816 F.2d

1177, 1180 (7th Cir. 1987).

The requirements for issue

preclusion under collateral estoppel

principles have been summarized as follows:

As useful a summary as any may be

that issue preclusion arises in a

second action on the basis of a

prior decision when the- same

"issue" is involved in both

actions; the issue was "actually

litigated" in the first action,

after a full and fair opportunity

for litigation; the issue was

"actually decided" in the first

action, by a disposition that is

sufficiently "€i1ne1,* "on the

merits," and "Valid"; it was

necessary to decide the issue in

disposing of the first action, and

-- in some decisions -- the issue

occupied a high position in the

logical hierarchy of abstract legal

rules applied in the first action;

the later litigation is between the

same parties or involves nonparties

that are subject to the binding

effect or benefit of the first

'? Purther, the issue of res judicata

was not raised in the pretrial order.

92

action; the role of the issue in

the second action was foreseeable

in the first action, or it occupies

a high position in the logical

hierarchy of abstract legal rules

applied in the second action; and

there are no special considerations

of fairness, relative judicial

authority, changes of law, or the

like, that warrant remission of the

ordinary rules of preclusion.

18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper,

Federal Practice and Procedure:

Jurisdiction § 4416, at 137-138 (1981)

20

(footnotes omitted). EWC bears the burden

of so showing, United States v. Athlone

Industries, Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3rd

Cir. 1984); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), and has

failed to meet that burden with respect to

many items.

20 The American Law Institute states

the rule more succinctly: "When an issue

of fact or law is actually litigated and

determined by a valid final judgment, and

the determination is essential to the

judgment, the determination is conclusive

in a subsequent action between the parties,

whether on the same or a different claim."

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27

(1982).

93 ‘

a. Same "Tssue"

One claiming collateral estoppel

must show, as a threshold matter, that the

suit at bar presents the same issue that

was resolved in an earlier proceeding. EWC

has made no such showing. It does not

appear that the administrative order in

Cause N-128 would preclude any issues the

EPA and STOP present in this action. On

close analysis, it is apparent that EWC

does not seek protection of the rules of

collateral estoppel, but rather seeks

immunity from suit by anyone but the State

of Indiana based on future violations.

The administrative order in Cause

N-128 (STOP Exh. 12) was entered in June,

1985. The order was based upon findings of

certain regulatory violations that had

occurred at the Landfill; necessarily,

those violations occurred before June,

1985. The Indiana agency found that:

94

(1) EWC had not taken

additional groundwater samples to

determine whether earlier

detections of significant

differences in total organic carbon

‘o>. levels between the

upgradient and downgradient samples

were due to laboratory error (STOP

Exh. 12, § 6a) and failed to notify

the Regional Administrator in

writing of confirmation of such

differences (STOP Exh. 12, § 6b),

although EWC had achieved

compliance with those requirements

by the time of the agreed ad-

ministrative order (STOP Exh. 12,

q 6r);

(2) EWC had not’ satisfied

several of the requirements with

respect to development | of a

sufficient groundwater assessment

95

plan pursuant to 40 C.F.R. §

265.93(d) (2) through (5) after

notification of Significant

differences in TOC levels (STOP

Exh. 12, § 6c) ;°'

(3) EWC had not’ evaluated

groundwater surface elevations as

required for a groundwater

assessment plan (STOP Exh. 12,

6d) or described a response to that

evaluation (STOP Exh. 12, 4 6e);

(4) the closure and post-

closure plans submitted by EWC were

deficient in several respects (STOP

" Among the shortcomings Indiana found

were the failure to provide sufficient

information to define the contaminant

plume, failure to provide a schedule of

implementation, failure to determine the

rate, extent or concentrations of migration

of hazardous waste or hazardous’ waste

constituents, and failure to implement an

assessment plan.

96

a a ne ee er ee ne ee a

Exh. 12, 99 6f, 6h, 61, 63, 6k, 61,

6m) ;°°

(5) EWC had failed show

compliance with the requirement of

maintenance of a runoff management

system capable of collecting and

controlling at least the water

volume resulting from a 24-hour,

25-year storm, 40 C.F.R. §

265.302(b), and the operation of

collection and holding facilities

associated with run-on and runoff

control, 40 C.F.R. § 265.302(c)

(STOP Exh. 12, § 6g), and was not

= Among the defects found in the

closure plan was the failure *o prepare a

written estimate of the cost of closing the

facility. The state found that the cost

estimates were inaccurate in light of the

Landfill's calculated design capacity.

(STOP Exh. 12, § 6h). EWC also had failed

to provide for submission of a plat

indicating the locations and dimensions of

landfill cells or other disposal areas with

respect to permanently surveyed benchmarks.

(STOP Exh. 12, § 6k).

97

OT

controlling run-on into the working

face, 40 C.F.R. § 265.302(a) (STOP

Exh.

12, G 6p);

(6) EWC had not kept a

sufficient record of manifests of

deliveries of hazardous waste to

the facility (STOP Exh. 12, 4 6n);

(7) EWC had not made available

for inspection since October, 1984,

the portion of the operating record

locating each hazardous waste

deposit in the facility as required

by 40 C.F.R. § 265.74(a);

23

(8) cover in the "'wet/winter'

area next to the on-site road at

the northwest corner of last year's

fill" was insufficient to satisfy

40 C.F.R. § 265.31 (STOP Exh. 12,

23

As is discussed in Part IV-B below,

hazardous waste was being placed illegally

in unlined cells at the Landfill in June,

1985.

98

ee a ee ne ea

{@ 6q).-

As a result of these findings, Indiana

fined EWC and ordered certain steps to be

taken to remedy the violations.

Some of the topics of the claims

in this case overlap the types of

violations found in the agreed

administrative order in Cause N-128: STOP

contends that EWC has violated regulations

concerning run-on and runoff control, and

EWC was found to have violated such

regulations in paragraphs 6g and 6p of the

agreed order; STOP contends that EWC has

violated requirements concerning manifests,

and EWC was found to have violated that

regulation in paragraph 6n of the agreed

order; STOP contends that EWC failed to

apply sufficient cover to prevent dispersal

into the air and surface water, and EWC was

found to have violated that regulation in

paragraph 6q of the agreed order; STOP and

99

the EPA argue that EWC has not evaluated

adequately the groundwater elevations at

the Landfill, and the Indiana agency found,

in paragraph 6d of the agreed order, that

EWC had failed to do so.

That the EPA and STOP allege

violations of the sort found in the agreed

order in Cause N-128 does not, however,

preclude the presentation of those issues.

To the extent the EPA's claims are similar

to issues resolved by the agreed order, the

EPA's claims relate to violations that

allegedly occurred after the agreed order

was entered. The EPA contends that the

groundwater elevations at the Landfill were

evaluated insufficiently as late as 1988,

not just in or before 1985. The June, 1985

administrative order did not address, and

could not have addressed, violations

occurring after June, 1985. Post-1985

violations simply were not issues in Cause

100 :

N-128, and the rules of collateral estoppel

apply only to issues addressed in the

earlier action. United States PF

International Building Co., 345 U.S. 502

(1953).

EWC essentially argues that as

long as it is in compliance with the

remedial steps provided by the agreed

administrative order (or, perhaps more

accurately, as long as Indiana takes no

further action based on the violations

giving rise to the agreed administrative

order), it is absolved from responsibility

for later violations, at least at the hands

of any party other than Indiana. LWC seeks

to expand the doctrine of collateral

estoppel into areas heretofore unimagined

and, by any definition, illogical. A party

found to have violated the law yesterday is

not thereby rendered immune as to

tomorrow's violations; even an injunctive

101

decree does not abrogate the law so as to

forgive tomorrow's violations.

STOP did not confine its evidence

to events occurring after June, 1985,

although the bulk of its evidence addressed

alleged violations occurring after the

agreed order. STOP's contentions in the

pretrial order are worded broadly, but the

court does not understand STOP to be

seeking relief for violations occurring

before the agreed order. The court views

STOP's evidence concerning alleged

violations before June, 1985 as going to

the matter of relief in the’ event

violations are found to have occurred after

June, 1985.

When STOP's case is so viewed, it

seems that STOP, rather than EWC, is

entitled to any benefits of the collateral

estoppel rules. Had Indiana found that EWC

had not committed certain violations,

102

collateral estoppel principles might

preclude STOP from asserting that those

violations had occurred.“ Indiana did not

so find, however; Indiana found that EWC

had violated regulations concerning runoff

and run-on control, manifests and cover.

If collateral estoppel applies at all to

STOP's claims, it would seem that it should

preclude the defendants from denying those

violations.

b. Actual Final Decision on the Merits

One claiming collateral estoppel

must show that the previous decision was an

actual final decision on the merits of the

** Collateral estoppel precludes only

issues that actually were litigated in the

earlier proceeding. Brubaker v. King, 505

F.2d 534, 538 (7th Cir. 1974).

Accordingly, the court need not consider

whether Indiana might have considered and

rejected other alleged violations by EWC.

The agreed administrative order itself

reflects none, and the defendants have

presented no other evidence indicating that

EWC prevailed on any issue.

103

issue. EWC's showing with respect to Cause

N-128 falls short.

First, the agreed order on which

EWC relies was entered by a state

administrative agency. State law

determines the preclusive effect of the

state's administrative agencies' determi-

nations or actions. United States v.

Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1307 (E.D. Mo.

1987). The Indiana Supreme Court has

approved four criteria for use in

determining whether an administrative

determination should estop subsequent

litigation: (1) whether the issues sought

to be estopped were within the agency's

statutory jurisdiction; (2) whether the

agency acted in a judicial capacity; (3)

whether both parties had a feir opportunity

to litigate the issues: and (4) whether the

decision of the administrative tribunal

could be appealed to a judicial tribunal.

- 104

McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines, 517

N.E.2d 390, 394 (Ind. 1988).

As noted in Part II-A-1i of this

memorandum, issues created by the 1984

amendments to RCRA were not within the

state agency's jurisdiction; accordingly,

the state agency's determination cannot

estop EPA's and STOP's claims based on

those amendments. As noted in the

preceding paragraphs, the parties cannot be

deemed to have had a fair opportunity to

litigate alleged violations that had not

yet occurred. Finally, EWC has made no

showing as to whether the agency's decision

could be appealed to a judicial tribunal.

Further, the agency's decision was

an agreed order, which EWC describes as a

consent decree. Consent decrees, which

reflect both a contract between the parties

and the exercise of judicial power, are not

treated as judicial decrees for all

105

purposes. Local No. 93, International

Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland,

478 U.S. 501, 519, 525 (1986). A court

accepting a consent decree need not decide

the merits of the action, Kaspar v. Board

of Election Commissioners of Chicago, 814

F.2d 332, 338 (7th Cir. 1987), and may

award relief against a party that admits no

wrongdoing. United States v. ITT Conti-

nental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236 n.10

f2O7S) . Indeed, parties' compromises may

produce a consent decree specifically

intended to avoid litigation of the issues

presented by the case. See United States

v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-682

(1971); Kasper Wire Works, Inc. v. LECO

Engineering & Machine, Inc., 575 F.2d 530,

539 (5th Cis. 19786). Because such an

approach produces the antithesis of

findings reached after a full and fair

opportunity to litigate the issue to be

106

iiss

precluded, special rules govern the

applicability of collateral estoppel rules

to consent decrees.

Indiana's courts do not appear to

have considered the preclusion effect of a

consent decree in more than a century. See

Fletcher v. Holmes, 25 Ind. 458 (1865)

(consent decree valid although facts would

not support judgment). Under the modern

view of the law, however, a consent decree

generally is treated as a final judgment on

the merits and accorded res judicata

effect. United States v. Fisher, 864 F.2d

434, 439 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v.

Athlone Industries, Inc., 746 F.2d at 983

n.5 (3rd Cir. 1984). Amalgamated Sugar Co.

v. NL Industries, Inc., 825 F.2d 634, 639

(2nd Cir. 1987), a case cited by EWC, so

holds, but that case dealt with claim

preclusion, not issue preclusion. In most

circumstances, however, consent agreements

107

are intended to preclude further litigation

only on the claim presented, not on any of

the issues presented. 18 C. Wright, A.

Miller and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 4443, at 385 (1981). The

Restatement states that,

In the case of a judgment entered

by confession, consent, or default,

none of the issues is actually

litigated. Therefore, [collateral

estoppel rules do] not apply with

respect to any issue in a

subsequent action. The judgment

may be conclusive, however, with

respect to one or more issues, if

the parties have entered an

agreement manifesting such an

intention.

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27,

comment e (1982). A leading treatise

states that consent judgments are res

judicata to causes of action contained

therein, but should not be given conclusive

effect under the doctrine of collateral

estoppel unless it was the _ parties'

specific intent to do so. 1B J. Moore, J.

108

re

Lucas & T. Currier, Moore's Federal

Practice § 0.443[3] (1988).

The parties' intent with respect

to the agreed administrative order in Cause

N-128 is not easily ascertained. Paragraph

19 of the order provides, "This Agreed

Order will have no force or effect until it

is approved by the Board, and timely

compliance with the terms of this Agreed

Order shall constitute a final resolution

of this cause." Assuming that some future

preclusion was intended -- an assumption

not easily made in light of that language -

- evidence Beresnces at trial indicates

that EWC did not come into compliance with

the terms of paragraph 3 of the order until

sometime in 1988, well after institution of

this suit. The evidence introduced at

trial indicates nothing with respect to

compliance with paragraphs 5-8 of the

order.

109

For all of the foregoing reasons,

the court concludes that EWC has made an

insufficient showing that the agreed

administrative order in Cause N-128

constitutes the type of actual final

decision on the merits required for issue

preclusion.

c. Nonparties Subject to Binding Effect of

First Action

As noted above, one claiming the

benefit of collateral estoppel must show

that "the later litigation is between the

Same parties or involves nonparties that

are subject to the binding effect or

benefit of the first action..." 18 C.

Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal

Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction §

4416, at 138 (1981). EWC relies upon cases

that have adopted the emerging rule that a

non-party may be bound by an earlier

judgment if a party to the earlier

110

te

litigation is so closely aligned with its

interests as to be its "virtual

representative". United States v. ITT

Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 1003 (9th

Cir. 1980); Nether Providence-Swarthmore

Alliance of Civil Associates Inc. Vv.

Quinby, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7348 (E.D.

Pa. 1988); Sierra Club v. Block, 576 F.

Supp. 959 (D. Ore. 1983); cf. 18 C. Wright,

A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and

Procedure: Jurisdiction § 4457 (1981)

(criticizing the emerging rule). The EPA

seeks to meet the argument head on, citing

district court cases holding that a state

consent order does not bar the EPA from

seeking federal relief for the same

violations. United States v. Town of

Lowell, 637 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. Ind. 1985);

United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F.

Supp. 734 (D. Del. 1981). As noted above,

STOP did not respond to EWC's’ closing

111

arguments on collateral estoppel.

The court need not determine

whether the Indiana agency was the "virtual

representative" of the EPA or STOP. A

federal court must give a state court

judgment (assuming the order in Cause N-128

to be such) the same preclusive effect it

would receive in the courts of the state in

which it was rendered; accordingly, the

court must examine Indiana law to determine

the preclusive effect of the order in Cause

N-128. 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Migra v. Warren

City School Dist. Bd. of Education, 465

U.S. 75, 81 (1984); Kremer _v. Chemical

Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466

(1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96

(1980); Morris v. Spratt, 768 F.2d 879, 882

(7th Cir. 1985); Hurt v. Pullman, Inc., 764

F.2d 1443, 1447 n.4 (11th Cir. 1985);

Russell v. United States, 626 F. Supp.

i217, 1220 (S.D. Ind. 1986).

Indiana's courts have specifically

declined to adopt any modification to the

traditional rules requiring identity of

parties for collateral estoppel purposes.

Burtram v. Wheeler, 440 N.E.2d 1147, 1153

(Ind. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Speidel, 181

Ind. App. 448, 392 N.E.2d 1172, 1176 n.4

(1979). The "virtual representative" test

upon which EWC relies simply is not a part

of Indiana _ law. The Speidel court

explained that a plea of collateral

estoppel under Indiana law rule is binding

only on parties to the action and persons

in privity with them and explained that a

"privy" is one who acquires an interest in

the subject matter of a judgment through or

under one of the parties, such as by

inheritance, succession, or purchase, and

one tied te a party through that party's

legal representative capacity as, for

example, trustee, executor, administrator,

113

guardian, conservator, or similar

fiduciary. State v. Speidel, 392 N.E.2d at

1176-1177 and n.5. STOP has not acquired

any interest in the Indiana agency's

"judgment" against EWC, and the Indiana

agency did not act as STOP's fiduciary in

the administrative proceeding.

The EPA might be deemed a party to

the state administrative action under

Indiana's collateral estoppel rules by

virtue of 42 U.S.C. § 6926(d), which

provides, "Any action taken by a State

under a hazardous waste program authorized

under this section shall have the same

force and effect as action taken by the

Administrator under’ this subchapter."

Arguably, the Indiana agency acted as the

EPA's legal representative as a matter of

law. Because the EPA alleges violations

outside the state agency's jurisdiction or

that occurred after the agreed admini-

114

strative order, however, the court need not

resolve that issue.

3. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the

court concludes that EWC has failed to

demonstrate that principles of collateral

estoppel preclude any of the issues raised

by the claims made by the EPA and STOP.

III. THE LANDFILL'S OWNERS AND OPERATORS

Having determined that no

jurisdictional impediment prevents this

suit, the court next must determine which

defendants properly may be held to answer

the claims. The pertinent provisions of

RCRA apply to "owners" and "operators" of

hazardous waste storage sites. 40 C.F.R.

115

§ 260.10 defines the terms:

"Operator" means the person

responsible for the overall

operation of a facility.

"Owner" means the person who

owns a facility or part of a

facility.

Environmental Waste, Mr. Shambaugh, Mr.

Wilkins, and West Holding Company each are

a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.

§ 6903(15) and 40 C.F.R. § 260.10.

The EPA's second amended complaint

sought to hold Environmental Waste

*

responsible as the Landfill's operator and

Mr. Wilkins responsible as the facility's

Owner, and the court has found them to be

so responsible. United States v. Environ-

mental Waste Control, Inc., 698 "» Supp. at

1430. EWC's contentions in the pretrial

order indicate a denial that Mr. Wilkins is

an owner or operator (Pretrial order, at

17-18, § 5), but the court already ruled to

the contrary in the summary judgment order.

EWC has offered no new evidence or argument

116

a ee

to challenge that holding. The EPA also

seeks to hold West Holding Company

responsible as the facility's owner, and

West plainly acquired that status through

Mr. Wilkins' conveyance of the property to

West. The EPA seeks to hold Mr. Shambaugh

responsible as the Landfill's operator, and

Mr. Shambaugh denies that he is an operator

of the Landfill.

Mr. Shambaugh renews his earlier

argument that there can be but one operator

of a facility under RCRA. He notes that 40

C.F.R. § 260.10 speaks of "the person

responsible . .. "™ From this, he

concludes that a facility can have no more

than one operator and Environmental Waste,

not he, is that person with respect to the

Landfill. He cannot be held liable merely

as a corporate officer of the operator. If

injunctive relief is granted, only

Environmental Waste, not he, can comply

117

with the order. He notes that no other

couxt has held that a facility can have

more than one operator for purposes of

RCRA.

Mr. Shambaugh moved for summary

judgment on these grounds, and the court

rejected them. United States v. Environ-

mental Waste Control, Inc., 698 F. Supp. at

1429-1430. Mr. Shambaugh has presented no

further argument that persuades the court

that the earlier entry was wrong. While

Mr. Shambaugh correctly notes that no other

court has held that a facility can have

more than one operator for RCRA purposes,

neither does he cite any contrary holding.

Mr. Shambaugh does not appear to dispute

that Mr. Wilkins was an owner, and thus

subject to injunctive relief under RCRA,

when he owned the land upon which the

Landfill was located; like Mr. Shambaugh,

Mr. Wilkins could not alone comply with an

injunction requiring, for example, the

installation of additional groundwater

monitoring wells. The court stands by, and

adopts, the reasoning set forth in the

summary judgment ruling:

it is difficult to believe

that if three persons operated a

hazardous waste facility as a joint

venture on property owned by four

other persons, only two of the

persons (one as an owner, another

as an operator) could be liable for

civil penalties under Section 3008

of RCRA. Not every act will render

a person an operator, but the court

is unpersuaded that no more than

one person may be an operator with

respect to a given hazardous waste

facility.

698 F. Supp. at 1429.

While holding, on the summary

judgment motions, that the Landfill could

have more than one operator for purposes of

RCRA, the court declined to grant the EPA's

summary judgment motion seeking a

declaration that Mr. Shambaugh was an

operator of the Landfill. That holding

awaited resolution in light of the evidence

i19

ee

at trial. That evidence convinces the

court that if any facility can have more

than one operator, the EPA and STOP have

shown Mr. Shambaugh to be an operator of

the Four County Landfill.

The government places its initial

reliance upon the November 7, 1985

certificate of compliance to the EPA made

necessary by 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e)(2). Mr.

Shambaugh signed that certificate below the

two certifications identifying him as

"operator of Four County Landfill..."

(EPA Exh. 70). Michael Johnson, a

consultant employed by Environmental Waste

who prepared the certification, testified

that the description of Mr. Shambaugh as

operator was simply his mistake, and Mr.

Shambaugh testified that he signed that

certification in his representative

capacity as President of Environmental

Waste, but such a limitation appears

120

——

nowhere on the certification.

It would seem inappropriate to

hold a person potentially liable for

millions of dollars in civil penalties and

corrective actions based on nothing more

than a failure to identify one's signature

as being in a representative capacity. The

record before the court, however, provides

considerably more evidence that Mr.

Shambaugh is, and always has been, an

operator of the Landfill within the meaning

of RCRA.

First, the November 7, 1985

certification itself presents more than a

mere omission of Mr. Shambaugh's

representative capacity. It affirmatively

identifies Mr. Shambaugh in three places as

the operator of the Landfill: in addition

to the two certification statements, the

first paragraph under "FACILITY

INFORMATION" states, "Name of Facility

121

Owner/Operator: James A. Wilkins, as

owner; Stephen W. Shambaugh, as operator."

More tellingly, the certification, which

was required to be filed on the Landfill's

behalf to preserve its interim status,

makes no reference to any role ~of

Environmental Waste apart from providing

the letterhead for the certification.

When Mr. Wilkins conveyed a

leasehold interest in the land on which the

Landfill is located, he leased it to Mr.

Shambaugh and Mr. Johnson. Mr. Shambaugh

executed the lease in his own name, not in

ute beet Capacity, and conceded

that he was personally liable under the

lease (EPA Exh. 17, Q@ 8). The lease

anticipated assignment to Environmental

Waste, but provided that such assignment

would not release Mr. Shambaugh from his

122

ee

obligations under the lease.”

In 1985,

when Mr. Johnson sought to disassociate

himself from the Landfill,” he conveyed his

” Paragraph ® of the lease provided:

8. That Lessees shall have —

the right to assign this lease to

ENVIRONMENTAL WASTE CONTROL, INC.,

an Indiana corporation, but that

notice of any such assignment shall

be rendered to Lessor and the names

of officers, directors and

shareholders of said corporation

shall be made known to Lessor and

that despite any assignment, the

covenants foregoing shall continue

to be binding on the said DOUGLAS

M. JOHNSON and STEPHEN K.

SHAMBAUGH.

EPA Exh. 17.

*6 EPA Exhibit 19, the agreement

whereby Mr. Johnson surrendered his EWC

stock to EWC, recited, inter alia:

WHEREAS, Johnson is employed

by the Corporation and has been so

employed for numerous years, and;

WHEREAS, Johnson is a

stockholder in said Corporation,

and;

WHEREAS, the Corporation has

experienced a substantial reduction

in its volume of business, and;

WHEREAS, EWC is unable to meet

various site standards imposed by

the Indiana Environmental Control

Board and by the EPA, a Federal

agency, upon hazardous waste

businesses, and;

123

interest in the Wilkins lease to Mr.

Shambaugh in exchange.for Mr. Shambaugh's

personal guarantee of Environmental Waste's

contractual payments to Mr. Johnson and

personal promise to perform all of Mr.

Johnson's obligations under the lease (EPA

Exh. 18).

Mr. Shambaugh testified that he

and Mr. Wilkins have exercised co-equal

WHEREAS, the Corporation

cannot meet all of its salary and

operating expense obligations, and;

WHEREAS, Johnson wishes’ to

discharge his obligation to the

Corporation, and to minimize his

personal responsibility in

connection with the legal

obligations imposed by the State of

Indiana and the Federal

Environmental Protection Agency

Mr. Johnson, apparently on the same day he

surrendered his shares of stock to

Environmental Waste, also assigned the

shares to Mr. Shambaugh by way of a

handwritten instrument providing, "Because

of the potential liability of the stock

ownership and the unsure future operation

of E.W.C., Inc. a value of One Dollar

($1.00) has been placed upon this transfer

of rights and shares of stock." EPA Exh.

20.

124

control over the Landfill, to which he now

devotes all of his business time. Mr.

Shambaugh testified in his deposition that

he could think of nothing Mr. Wilkins does

at the Landfill that he does not also do.”

Mr. Shambaugh and Mr. Wilkins each are paid

$200,000 per year for their work with the

Landfill. me 6 CRIA, Mr. Shambaugh

testified that he and Mr. Wilkins jointly

decide on who the Landfill will hire; Mr.

Shambaugh personally has principal say in

selecting consultants, accepting or

rejecting their advice, purchasing

equipment, and deciding whether

improvements will be carried out; he

devotes all of his business time to the

operation of the Landfill end spends five

to six hours a day, four days a week there.

a Doyle Flory, the Landfill's field

superintendent, also so testified in his

deposition, although he was able to think

of things at trial that Mr. Shambaugh does

not do.

125

When funds were short in 1985, Mr.

Shambaugh operated heavy equipment at the

Landfill. Mr. Shambaugh personally was a

named insured on the Landfill insurance

policy in effect on November 7, 1985.

Further, Mr. Shambaugh personally

guaranteed an open-ended loan to

Environmental Waste from Resources

Unlimited, Inc. That loan began at

$250,000 with all payments deferred for two

years; the balance now is approximately

$300,000, but has been as high as

$1,000,000. Through that loan agreement,

which was to last twelve years, Resources

Unlimited also became the Landfill's

exclusive broker for waste, became entitled

to a twenty percent commission, obtained

the right to deposit its own hazardous

waste at the Landfill at reduced rates, and

received a right of first refusal should

the Landfill be sold, with a right to share

126

the proceeds cf any sale to a third party

in excess of $8,000,000. Mr. Shambaugh,

with Mr. Wilkins, personally agreed to hold

harmless and indemnify Resource Unlimited

in the event the Landfill is placed on the

"Superfund" list or given ae clean-up

order.”

Mr. Shambaugh has been - more

involved in the lLandfill's day-to-day

operation, finances, and operation than has

any other person. He has personally

guaranteed its leases, its obligations

under those leases, and its loans. He

aa STOP elicited evidence that

Resources Unlimited is owned by an entity

known as The Heritage Group, which also

owns EMS Laboratories, a firm that EWC

retains for its chemical analyses. STOP

appeared to seek an inference that EMS

Laboratories' work for EWC was’ suspect

because of this connection. The EPA also

contracts with EMS Laboratories for

chemical analyses, however. The court has

not drawn the inference STOP appears to

seek, and finds no unreliability in EMS

reports as a result of its indirect ties to

the Landfill.

127

controls, with Mr. Wilkins,*’ the Landfill's

operation. He is an operator of the Four

County Landfill for purposes of the

enforcement provisions of RCRA.

IV. THE EPA'S CLAIMS: LIABILITY

As noted above, the EPA makes four

Claims for relief; the first of those

claims has two bases. STOP also raises

nine additional claims. Because most of

those claims invoke the court's equitable

discretion in determining the penalties to

*? EWC notes that despite Mr. Wilkins'

involvement in the Landfill's operation,

the EPA has not alleged or argued that Mr.

Wilkins is an operator; EWC appears to

believe that this somehow undercuts the

EPA's contention that Mr. Shambaugh is an

operator: "Such selective application of

the law is fast becoming an EPA trademark

in this case, and bespeaks the real lack of

substance of their claim." Defendants'

Trial Brief, at 86. EWC's argument does

not explain why, if Mr. Wilkins already is

on the RCRA hook as an owner, the EPA

should waste further judicial resources in

trying to prove him an operator as well.

128

be imposed if violations are found, the

court first addresses the violations that

the EPA and STOP allege and then turns to

the issue of penalty.

A. Loss of Interim Status

The EPA's argument that the

Landfill lost its interim status on

November 8, 1985 begins with the 1984

Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments to

RCRA, which added restrictions designed to

minimize further land disposal of hazardous

wastes and to address problems at existing

land disposal. sites. 130 Cong. Rec.

S13818-13819; 130 Cong. Rec. H11130-11142.

The 1984 amendments added the following

provision:

In the case of each land disposal

facility which has been granted

interim status under this

subsection before November 8, 1984,

interim status shall terminate on

the date twelve months”) after

November 8, 1984, unless the owner

or operator of such facility --

(A) applies for a

final determination

129

e

OT LO

regarding the issuance of

a permit under subsection

(c) of this section for

such facility before the

date twelve months after

November 8, 1984; and

(B) certifies that

such facility is in

compliance with all

applicable ground water

monitoring and financial

responsibility

requirements.

42 U.S.C. § 6925(e) (2). A land disposal

facility that has neither interim status

nor a final permit may not’ operate.

Vineland Chemical Co. v. United States

Environmental Protection Agency, 810 F.2d

402 (3rd Cir. 1987).

The parties do not dispute that

EWC applied in a timely manner for final

determination of its permit application and

filed a certificate of compliance with

applicable groundwater monitoring and

financial responsibility requirements. The

EPA contends, however, that the certificate

of compliance was false on both counts and

130

hence a nullity. Accordingly, the EPA

contends, the Landfill's interim status

terminated on November 8, 1985 (twelve

months after the date stated in the

statute) and, because the Landfill has no

final permit, the Landfill cannot operate.

EWC denies that its certification was false

and contends that, in any event, the filing

of a certification in good faith satisfies

the statute.

State and federal authorities have

denied EWC's Part B application for a final

permit; EWC is in the process of appealing

those denials. A facility may continue to

operate under its interim status (if any)

during the pendency of such an appeal. The

propriety of the denial of EWC's Part B

application is not in issue in this case.

The proceedings with respect to. that

application are pertinent only insofar as

they disclose that the Landfill has no

131

final permit. Accordingly, if the Landfill

lacks interim status, it has no basis to

continue operation.

1. Certification vs. Compliance

At final argument, EWC argued that

42 U.S.C. § 6925(e)(2) requires only

certification of compliance, not compliance

itself. EWC certified its compliance ina

timely manner and contends it did so in

good faith. Accordingly, EWC argues that

even if it was not in actual compliance

with financial responsibility and

groundwater monitoring requirements, its

certification of compliance precluded loss

of interim status under § 6925(e) (2).

Even before November 8, 1985, the

EPA adopted the position that § 6925(e) (2)

required both compliance and certification.

50 Fed. Reg. 38,946-49 (Sept. 25, 1985)

(EPA Exh. 73). When engaging in statutory

construction, a court shows great deference

132

to the interpretation of the agency

responsible for its administration,

Environmental Protection Agency v. Natignal

Crushed Stone Association, 449 U.S. 64, 83

(1980), as long as the agency's

interpretation is reasonable and does not

conflict with expressed Congressional

intent. United States v. Riverside Bayview

Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985). The

EPA's interpretation is reasonable. See

Vineland Chemical Co. v. United States

Environmental Protection Agency, 810 F.2d

at 409. If EWC is correct, Congress simply

intended to flood the EPA with meaningless

certifications and nee to assure compliance

with regulations governing hazardous enti:

42 U.S.C. § 6925(e)(2) required

facilities such as the Landfill to be in

compliance with applicable financial

responsibility and groundwater monitoring

requirements by November 8, 1985. If the

eA SL Sa | CERRO.

@ |

Landfill was not in such compliance on that

date, its certification to the contrary did

not satisfy the statutory requirement.

Ya Insurance Coverage

On November Ve 1985, when

Environmental Waste, Mr. Wilkins, and Mr.

Shambaugh certified compliance with

applicable interim status financial

responsibility requirements, they were

insured under a policy issued by St. Paul

Surplus Lines Insurance Company ("St.

Paul") covering the period from June 28,

1985 to June 28, 1986. St. Paul issued a

certificate intended to show the

defendants' (other than West, of course,

which did not then exist) compliance with

those interim status requirements as of

November 8, 1985. That certificate stated,

as did the policy's declarations page, that

coverage was provided for both sudden

accidental and non-sudden accidental

134

occurrences in the amount of $3,000,000 per

occurrence and $6,000,000 annual

aggregate.”

The EPA contends that regulations

in effect on November 8, 1985 required

insurance for both sudden and non-sudden

occurrences. EWC was required to obtain

insurance against sudden occurrences in the

amount of $1,000,000 per occurrence with an

annual aggregate of at least $2,000,000.

40 C.F.R. § 265.147(a). EWC was required

to obtain insurance against non-sudden

occurrences in the amount of $3,000,000 per

occurrence with an annual aggregate of

$6,000,000. 40 C.F.R. § 265.147(b). In

all, then, EWC was required to obtain

insurance against a total of $8,000,000 for

- trial, the EPA also argued that

the policy failed to satisfy regulatory

requirements because it expressly excluded

fire and explosion from coverage for sudden

accidental occurrences. Because this issue

was not raised in the pretrial order,

however, the court declines to address it.

iso

sudden and non-sudden occurrences. EWC's

St. Paul policy fell $2,000,000 short.

EWC raises several arguments in

opposition to this claim. It contends that

the policy conformed even with’ the

regulations as interpreted by EPA; that the

regulations did not’ clearly require

insurance in excess of $6,000,000; that the

EPA is estopped from enforcing that

regulation against EWC; and that it acted

in good faith in attempting to comply with

the regulations. EWC also argues that it

had adequate insurance before this suit was

brought and that there is no precedent for

loss of interim status under the

circumstances of this case.

a. Developments After November 8, 1985

EWC notes that its’ insurance

policies since June 28, 1986 have provided

adequate policy limits; the EPA and STOP so

stipulated. EWC has not articulated

136

precisely where it believes this argument

leads, however. The court must determine

the adequacy of the Landfill's insurance

coverage as of November 8, 1985. Insurance

coverage after the date made critical by

the 1984 amendments known as HSWA is

irrelevant to determination of the

truthfulness of EWC's November 7, 1985

certificate of compliance.

EWC also contends that no claim

was made on the St. Paul policy between

November 7, 1985 (the date of the

certification) and June 28, 1986 (the last

date of the allegedly insufficient

coverage) and that, accordingly, no damage

has resulted from any inadequate insurance

coverage. Again, however, it is unclear

where EWC believes this argument should

lead. The 1984 amendments required owners

and operators to certify compliance with

financial assurance requirements, not to

137

survive a period of underinsurance.

Accordingly, while EWC did not specifically

limit this argument to the issue of

penalty, the court will so view it and

defer further discussion to Part VI of this

opinion.

b. Extent of the Landfill's Actual Coverage

As is discussed below, EWC

Rineuves * that applicable regulations

required an aggregate $8,000,000 in

insurance coverage in November, 1985. EWC

also contends, however, that even if the

regulations did so require, its insurance

coverage satisfied the regulations.

(1) Endorsement 3

Item VI of the Declarations Page

of the St. Paul policy defined the limits

of liability as $3,000,000 for any one

claim and $6,000,000 aggregate for the

policy period or annual period, whichever

138

is shorter. Section VI of the body of the

policy incorporated Item VI of the

Declarations Page. EWC, however, points to

Endorsement 3 to the policy, effective June

28, 1985, which provided as follows:

IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PREMIUM

CHARGED, IT tS AGREED THAT THE

INSURER WILL ISSUE CERTIFICATE(S)

OF LIABILITY INSURANCE ATTESTING TO

THE INSURED'S COMPLIANCE WITH

LOCAL, STATE OR FEDERAL

ENVIRONMENTAL FINANCIAL

RESPONSIBILITY OBLIGATIONS.

IT IS FURThER AGREED THAT:

1. THE ISSUANCE OF SUCH

CERTIFICATES SHALL IN NO WAY

BE INTERPRETED TO MODIFY THE

TERMS, CONDITIONS AND

OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN THE

INSURED AND THE INSURER UNDER

THIS POLICY.

2. THE INSURED SHALL REIMBURSE

THE COMPANY .FOR ANY AND ALL

AMOUNTS ASSESSED AGAINST,

INCURRED BY OR PAID BY THE

COMPANY ON BEHALF OF THE

INSURED:

A. UP TO AND INCLUDING THE

AMOUNT OF DEDUCTIBLE AS

STATED IN ITEM VII OF THE

POLICY DECLARATIONS

AND/OR

B. WHICH DO NOT FALL WITHIN

THE COVERAGES AFFORDED BY

139

THE POLICY, TO WHICH THIS

ENDORSEMENT FORMS A PART.

3. AS RESPECTS THE LIMIT OF

LIABILITY STATED IN ITEM VI OF

THE POLICY DECLARATIONS:

A. WHEN A CERTIFICATE(S) OF

LIABILITY INSURANCE

IS/ARE ISSUED, THE LIMITS

OF LIABILITY STATED

THEREIN FOR EACH

OCCURRENCE/ANNUAL

AGGREGATE SHALL BE

AVAILABLE UNDER THIS

POLICY FOR COVERAGE OF

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPAIRMENT

LIABILITY IN ACCORDANCE

WITH THE APPLICABLE

LOCAL, STATE OR FEDERAL

ENVIRONMENTAL FINANCIAL

RESPONSIBILITY

OBLIGATIONS AND WILL NOT

BE AVAILABLE FOR OTHER

COVERAGES AFFORDED BY

THIS POLICY. HOWEVER,

THE TOTAL LIMITS OF

LIABILITY AS STATED IN

ITEM VI OF THE POLICY

DECLARATIONS ARE

APPLICABLE TO ALL COVERA-

GES AFFORDED UNDER THE

POLICY AND ARE THE

MAXIMUM LIMITS AVAILABLE

TO THE INSURED UNDER THIS

POLICY.

EPA Exh. 5.

EWC reasons that if the law

required any insurance in excess of that

140

provided by the original St. Paul policy,

Endorsement 3 provided it. EWC relies

principally upon Winecoff v. Nationwide

- Mutual Ins. Co., 223 Tenn. 267, 444 S.W.2da

84 (1969), in which an automobile insurance

policy carried language similiar to that

found in Endorsement 3 to the St. Paul

policy:

This policy does not comply

with motorists' financial

responsibility laws of your state

unless there iS a premium charge

shown for Coverages C(1) and C(2).

* * *

The limits of the Company's

liability under Coverages C(1) and

C(2) shall comply with the limits

of liability required under any

applicable motor vehicle financial

responsibility law.

When certified as proof of

financial responsibility” for the

future under the provisions of any

motor vehicle financial

responsibility law, such insurance

as is afforded by this Policy under

Coverages C(1) and C(2) shall

comply with the provisions of such

law to the extent of the coverage

— required by such law.

During the pendency of his coverage, the

insured moved from North Carolina, which

141

required insurance of at least $5,000, to

Tennessee, which required insurance of at

least $10,000. The Tennessee Supreme Court

interpreted the policy to provide coverage

of up to $10,000, holding that any contrary

interpretation would conflict with the

policy's provision that the coverage

complies with the limits required by

Tennessee law.

The St. Paul policy, however,

differs in four important respects from the

policy involved in Winecoff. First, the

main text of Endorsement 3 does not state

that the policy coverage "shall conform"

with regulatory requirements, but rather

that the insurer would issue a certificate

attesting to compliance. Second, the first

Clause following that text explicitly

provides, "The issuance of such

certificates shall in no way be interpreted

to modify the terms, conditions’ and

142

obligations between the insured and the

insurer under this’ policy." Third,

Endorsement 3 closes with the provision:

However, the total limits of

liability as stated in Item VI of

the Policy Declarations are ap-

plicable to all coverages afforded

under the policy and are _ the

maximum limits available to the

insured under this policy.

Finally, St. Paul filed a

certificate of liability insurance for EWC

that recited, "The coverage . . . for

sudden accidental occurrences and non-

sudden accidental occurrences. The limits

of liability are $3,000,00 each occurrence,

$6,000,000 annual aggregate exclusive of

legal defense costs." Government's Exh. 43

(underlining in original). If anyone

intended Endorsement 3 to increase the

policy's coverage by a third, it seems to

have escaped St. Paul's attention.

Endorsement 3 simply obligated St. Paul to

issue the certificates of liability

143

insurance attesting to EWC's compliance

with financial responsibility obligations.

It did not affe. the amount of coverage.

(2). Coverage under Other Policies

EWC made two efforts during the

trial to prove that coverage provided by

other insurance policies, combined with the

St. Paul policy, was sufficient to meet

even the EPA's’ construction of the

regulatory requirements.

(a) The Pacific Policy

During trial, the court sustained

an objection to the admission of one of the

policies, which had been issued by Pacific

Insurance Company. EWC sought to introduce

the Pacific policy on the twenty-eighth day

of trial. EWC contended that the Pacific

policy, which covered an earlier period,

remained in effect due to the insurer:s

failure to give notice, required by

144

regulations, of the policy's terminations.

Following a period of research made brief

by the untimeliness of the issue's

presentation, the court sustained the

objection of the EPA and STOP that a

exhibit was irrelevance in light of Part

VII-E of the St. Paul policy. The EPA and

STOP also complained that the tardiness of

the offer prevented them from presenting

opposing evidence. The matter of that

policy lingers, however, and the court must

address it again.

First, in its tender of

' supplemental authority submitted during

final argument, EWC cited four cases "[iJjn

support of EWC's argument that non-

termination of Pacific Indemnity's 1982-

1983 policy should be considered by this

Court in evaluating EWC's compliance with

RCRA financial assurance regulations."

Defendants' Preliminary Tender of

145

Supplemental Authority, at 8. The court

excluded the exhibit upon which the

argument in the defendants' supplemental

authority is based. Final argument is an

opportunity to discuss the evidence in the

case. It is not an occasion for re-arguing

the admissibility of evidence; that

opportunity was presented to EWC at the

time of the offer of the exhibit. EWC did

not then cite the cases to which it

sidevens in its supplemental authority.

Three weeks after the trial, EWC

filed a "Motion for Reconsideration/Motion

for Summary Judgment" asking the court to

reconsider its ruling excluding the Pacific

policy, admit the policy into evidence, and

grant summary judgment to EWC on the basis

of that policy and the additional evidence

indicating lack of notice of cancellation.

The court denied that motion, reserving its

statement of reasons to this memorandum.

146

A post-trial summary = judgment

motion simply is untimely. See Williams v.

Howard Johnson's, Inc., 323 F.2d 102 (4th

Cir. 1963). One can only wonder what

course would be appropriate were a post-

trial summary judgment motion deemed timely

and a genuine issue of material fact found

to exist.

EWC cites no authority for the

mction to reconsider, rendering it

difficult to identify the standard by which

timeliness is to be measured. The

appropriate starting place for the

timeliness of an evidentiary .ssue,

however, would seem to be Fed. R. Evid.

103(a), which requires, at the least, that

arguments for admission of evidence be made

before or during, and not after, the trial.

See Evanston Bank v. Brink's, Inc., 853

F.2d 512, 516 n.6 (7th Cir. 1988); Young v.

Rabideau, 821 F.2d 373, 375 (7th Cir.),

147

cert. denied 108 S. Ct. 263 (1987); Huff v.

White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 290 n.2

(7th. Cit. i979). The court invited

citation of authority when the evidence was

offered during trial, and the defense

failed to offer the authorities now cited.

See Wright v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity

Co., 580 F.2d 809, 810 (5th Cir. 1978)

("Defendant's failure to provide this

support when requested by the trial judge

precludes it from now arguing for admission

of the evidence."). Reconsideration and

admission of the evidence today, after the

evidence has been completed, would require

re-opening a trial that already exceeded

Six weeks or leaving the EPA and STOP

without the opportunity to meet the proof.

It would seem that if anyone should suffer

from a party's failure to have researched

an area thoroughly before offering

evidence, it should not be that party's

148

opponents.

The time to present evidence has

passed. Without addressing or considering

the ennnettios EWC cites concerning the

effect of the Pacific policy, the court

denies EWC's post-trial motion to

reconsider and for summary judgment.

(b) The Comprehensive General Liability

Policy

From December 1, 1984 to December

1, 1985, Mr. Shambaugh and Environmental

Waste were insured under a comprehensive

general liability insurance policy issued

by Auto-Owners Insurance Company. (EWC

Exh. D-9). The policy provided coverage

with limits of $1,000,000 per occurrence

for bodily injury and $250,000 per

occurrence for property damage liability.

It contained no annual aggregate limits.

EWC argues that this policy would provide

coverage for sudden accidental events

149

which, when combined with the St. Paul

policy's coverage for non-sudden accidental

events, would satisfy the regulations as

interpreted by the EPA.

Examination of the Auto-Owners

policy belies this contention, however. It

covers no occurrence away from the insured

premises; if the sudden accidental event

involved property damage, even on the

insured premises, the policy would not

provide coverage of $1,000,000 per

occurrence.

If the regulations required EWC to

have coverage of $4,000,000 per occurrence

and $8,000,000 per year, as the EPA

contends, its coverage was inadequate.

c. Lack of Regulatory Clarity

EWC argues that no

$4,000,000/$8,000,000 requirement ciearly

appeared in the regulations in effect in

November, 1985. The provisions in question

150

were found in consecutive sections of 40

C.F.R. § 265.147. The first, section (a),

provided:

The owner or operator must have and

maintain liability coverage for

sudden, accidental occurrences in

the amount of at least $1 million

per occurrence with an annual

aggregate of at least $2 million,

exclusive of legal defense costs.

Section (b) provided:

The owner or operator must have and

maintain liability coverage for

nonsudden, accidental occurrences

in the amount of at least $3

million per occurrence with an

annual aggregate of at least $6

million, exclusive of legal defense

costs.

The EPA contends that’- sudden

accidental coverage and non-sudden

accidental coverage are two different types

of coverage, and an owner or operator must

have both. Accordingly, minimal insurance

coverage under the regulations in November,

1985 would have been $1,000,000 per

occurrence/$2,000,000 per year for sudden

accidental and $3,000,000 per occurrence/

151

$6,000,000 per year for non-sudden

accidental, or a total of $4,000,000 per

occurrence/$8,000,000 per year.

EWC contends that the regulation

is not as clear as the EPA contends. To

the contrary, EWC maintains, the regulation

is too ambiguous to be enforceable. United

States v. Cumberland Farms, 826 F.2d 1151

(ist Cir. 1987), cert. denied 108 S. Ct.

1016 (1988); Rustad v. United States, 258

F.2d 563 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 358 U.S.

898 (1958); United States v. Messner, 428

F. Supp. 538 (E.D. Pa. 1977). EWC raises

several arguments in support of its

contention that the regulation is

ambiguous.

(1) No Requirement of Aqgqregation

First, EWC argues~ that the

regulations do not say what the EPA says

they do, and the St. Paul policy complies

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Appendix — Environmental Waste Control, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency · 499 U.S. 975 | Frix