Appendix — Carpentier v. United States

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For THE SECOND CircuIT

No. 1266—Aucust Term, 1981

(Argued June 15, 1982 Decided September 20, 1982)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appeliee,

vs.

ALFRED CARPENTIER,

Defendant-Appeilant.

Before:

NEWMAN AND Pierce, Circuit Judges,

and Knapp, District Judge.*

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of New York, Mark A.

Costantino, District Judge, entered after a jury trial.

Appellant was convicted of conspiracy to commit bribery

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §371 and conflict of interest in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §203(a).

Affirmed.

* The Honorable Whitman Knapp of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

la

2a

James A. Pascareia, Garden City, N.Y., for defend-

ant-appellant.

Laura A. Breverti, Special Attorney, Eastern District

of New York (Edward R. Korman, United States Attor-

ney for the Eastern District of New York, Edward A.

McDonald, Attorney-in-Charge, Department of Justice,

Organized Crime Strike Force, Eastern District of New

York, Lawrence H. Sharf, Special Attorney, Eastern Dis-

trict of New York, Brooklyn, N.Y., of counsel) for Plain.

tiff-Appellee.

Pierce, Circuit Judge:

Among those caught in the sweep of the ABSCAM net

was appellant Alfred Carpentier.! ABSCAM was a Fed-

eral Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) undercover opera-

tion which came into existence during the summer of

1978. The initial goal of ABSCAM was the recovery of

stolen property, particularly securities and certificates of

deposit. By the end of 1978, however, the focus of the

operation had been turned towards the growing presence

of organized crime in Atlantic City. This aspect of the

operation led in turn to the investigations into political

and public corruption which thrust ABSCAM into na-

tional prominence.

ABSCAM operated behind a cover organization, Ab-

dul Enterprises, which purportedly represented the in-

1. ABSCAM is an acronym taken from the “first two letters of

‘Abdul Enterprises Ltd.,’ the name given to the fictitious Middle

Eastern business that the undercover agents invented for the pur-

poses of the investigation that led to [this indictment] and the word

‘scam,’ a slang expression, derived from ‘scheme’ meaning a

confidence game or swindle. W "s New World Dictionary 1270

(2d college ed. 1978).” United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932, 934 n.1

(2d Cir.) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980).

3a

vestment interests in the United States of two Arab

sheiks, Kamad Abdul Rahman and Yassir Habib. These

sheiks were fictitious characters. In fact, at no time were

any Arabs connected with Abdul Enterprises.? The un-

dercover agents who were involved with ABSCAM told

various individuals that the sheiks had supplied Abdul

Enterprises with $400 million for the purpose of invest-

ment into various ventures. This money was supposedly

on deposit at the Chase Manhattan Bank.’

In 1978 Carpentier was apparently the owner of the

Beefalo Cattle and Land Company (“Beefalo”), a farm

in upstate New York. Sometime during the latter part of

1978, a banker friend of Carpentier introduced him to

Melvin Weinberg, a self-confessed confidence man who

worked as a paid consultant in the ABSCAM operation.

According to the testimony of both Weinberg and FBI

Agent Anthony Amoroso, it seems apparent that Carpen-

tier’s initial aim with regard to Abdul Enterprises, at

least in part, was to persuade the “officers” of the organi-

zation to invest in Beefalo.

On March 23, 1979, at Weinberg’s invitation, Carpen-

tier attended a party in Florida on the yacht “Left

Hand,” which was employed by the FBI in connection

with its ABSCAM activities. At that party, Carpentier

told Weinberg and FBI Agent Anthony Amoroso‘ that he

was able to obtain passports and green cards*® through

2. Weinberg testified that Kamad Abdul Rahman was actually

the name of a Lebanese businessman and friend. Weinberg sug-

gested the use of the name in conjunction with ABSCAM.

3. FBI Agent Anthony Amoroso testified that Abdul Enterprises

had an arrangement with the bank with respect to verification of

this representation.

4. For the purposes of his role as president of Abdul Enterprises,

Amoroso used the cover name Tony DeVito.

5. A “green card” is a document which evidences an alien's per-

manent residence status in the United States.

4a

two employees of the United States Immigration and

Naturalization Service (“INS”), Alexander A. Alexandro,

Sr. and his son Alexander, Jr.°

This information was conveyed to John Good, Amoro-

so’s superior, and the FBI decided to attempt to arrange

a meeting, via Carpentier, between the agents and Alex-

andro, Jr. (hereinafter “Alexandro”). Weinberg tele-

phoned Carpentier and asked him to meet with himself

and Amoroso at the Abdul Enterprises offices in

Holbrook, Long Island.’ This meeting, at which Carpen-

tier, Weinberg, Amoroso and Agent Carol DeRosa were

present, was taped. During the meeting, Weinberg and

Amoroso explained to Carpentier that they wished to

avail themselves of Alexandro’s aid in facilitating the

illegal entry into the United States of Thomas Foley, an

“Irish kid” who was the son of a friend of one of the

“Arabs.”*

The transcript of the tape of the May 30th meeting

shows that Carpentier was aware that Alexandro was to

be paid for obtaining a green card for Foley: at one point

Carpentier stated, “[c]an you get ten grand from [Fo-

ley]? By the way, some people pay 50 to 100 grand for

6. Alexandro, Sr., was apparently working at the INS’s Honolulu,

Hawaii, office when the events relevant to the present case occurred.

The record does not indicate that Alexandro, Sr., was a target of the

ABSCAM investigation or that he was in any way involved with the

matter.

7. It is not entirely clear from the record whether the office was in

Holbrook or in Hauppauge, Island. However, Amoroso stated

that the office was located in

8. During the May 30th meeting, Carpentier asked if Foley was

5a

this green card, ya know.” He assured Amoroso that

Alexandro was a “nice guy” who would not “rob” Amo-

roso in the transaction. Amoroso gave Carpentier $500

for “expenses,” and Carpentier stated that Amoroso was

to give him his “usual ten percent.”

Carpentier contacted Alexandro and on the following

day, May 31, 1979, Alexandro met with Carpentier,

Amoroso and Weinberg at the Colon{ie] Hill Hotel on

Long Island. During this meeting, which was taped,

various ways and means of providing Foley with a green

card were discussed. Carpentier participated actively in

the discussion: at one point, when they were considering

the possibility of providing Foley with a corporate spon-

sor, Carpentier stated that “Beefalo Cattle and Land will

hire him.” By the end of the meeting, Alexandro had

indicated his willingness to use his position to provide

Foley with a green card.

During the subsequent three months, an elaborate

scheme was concocted for the purpose of bringng Foley

illegally into the United States. It was ultimately decided

that the best plan would be to arrange a sham marriage

between Foley and an American woman. The two would

divorce once Foley was safely established as a resident of

the United States. Alexandro arranged for all necessary

papers and went so far as to find a young woman who

was willing to become Foley's wife. Alexandro was to

personally conduct Foley through customs and immigra-

tion. The final price for the entire package was $15,000.

Amoroso gave Alexandro a $2,000 downpayment on this

sum.

During the course of planning the scheme, at least two

telephone calls, on June 19th and on June 29th, were

made by Carpentier to Weinberg. These calls, which

Weinberg taped, were for the purpose of coordinating

arrangements between Amoroso and Alexandro. In addi-

6a

tion, several telephone calls between Alexandro and

Amoroso were taped, and, ultimately, a meeting at the

International Hotel at New York's Kennedy Airport was

videotaped. Only Alexandro, Amoroso and Weinberg

were present at this meeting. The videotape and the

audio tapes of the various meetings and telephone calls

discussed herein were admitted into evidence against

each defendant at the subsequent trial of Alexandro and

Carpentier.

On March 3, 1980, an Eastern District of New York

grand jury indicted both Carpentier and Alexandro on

each of three counts: (1) conspiracy to receive bribes in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371;° (2) receiving bribes in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c);'® and (3) conflict of

interest in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 203(a).'' They were

9. 18 U.S.C. § 371 provides in pertinent part that:

[i}f two or more conspire either to commit any offense

‘against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any

Geckesmavtede at eaibaiecems doch ameter,

persons do any act to conspiracy ,

each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more

than five years, or both.

10. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) provides that:

des ga being a public official . . . directly or indirectly, cor-

ruptly asks exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or

ages to cessive eaything of vebeo far bimll ox far ony othe

, in return for: (1) influenced in his perform-

Sevel au act; or (2) uenced to commit or aid in

committing, or to collude in, or , any fraud, or make oppor

tunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United States; or

(3) being induced to uo or omit to do any act in violation of his

official duty . . . (e) [s}hall be fined not more than $20,000 or

three times the monetary equivalent of the thing of value, which-

ever is greater, or imprisoned for not more than fifteen years, or

both, and may be from holding any office of honor,

trust, or profit under the United States.

11. 18 U.S.C. § 203 provides in pertinent part that:

Jhoover, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper

pA Lee ee egy det dae Anthro

7a

tried jointly by a jury before Federal District Judge Mark

A. Costantino. Carpentier was convicted on the charges

in counts one and three and acquitted of bribery as

charged in count two. Alexandro was convicted on all

three counts.'* Carpentier was sentenced to four years

imprisonment and fined $5000 on the first count and to

two years imprisonment and an additional $5000 fine on

the third count. Execution of the judgment of imprison-

ment imposed on count three was suspended. Carpentier

timely appealed the judgment of conviction against him

to this Court.

For the reasons set forth hereinbelow, we affirm.

DISCUSSION

Carpentier presents four arguments on appeal: (1) the

government's conduct in the ABSCAM investigation as it

related to this case was so intrusive that it violated appel-

lant’s due process rights under the fifth amendment; (2)

appellant was entrapped “as a matter of law”; (3) the

trial judge abused his discretion by refusing to sever the

trial of appellant from that of Alexandro; and (4) the

trial judge committed reversible error when he refused to

permit an individualized in camera voir dire of prospec-

tive jurors. These points shall be considered seriatim.

to receive, or asks, demands, solicits, or seeks, any compensation

for any services rendered or to be rendered either by himself or

another— . . . (2) at a time when he is an officer or employee of

the United States in the executive, ve, or judicial branch of

the Government, or in any agency of the United States, . . . Shall

be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than

two years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office of

honor, trust or profit under the United States.

12. Alexandro to this Court and an opinion affirming

his conviction was on March 18, 1982. This opinion is reported

at 675 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1982).

8a

Carpentier’s main argument on appeal is that the gov-

ernment’s conduct in this case was “so outrageous that

due process principles . . . absolutely bar the govern-

ment from invoking judicial processes to obtain a convic-

tion.” United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32

(1973). In his brief on appeal, Carpentier points to what

he describes as the “uncontrolled” use of the “archetypi-

cal, amoral, fast-buck artist” Melvin Weinberg, quoting

United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1193 (E.D.

Pa. 1980), rev'd, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc),

cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 102 S. Ct. 2906 (1982),'* as an

offense against the principles of due process. He also

maintains that a government investigation becomes “out-

rageous” when, as he sees it, it manufactures crime

rather than attempts to prevent or arrest criminal behav-

ior.

We note at the outset that, as Justice Powell stated in

his concurrence in Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S.

484 (1976), “the cases, if any, in which proof of predis-

13. The entire thrust of defense counsels’ cross-examination of

Weinberg at trial as to discredit him and to show that he

within ABSCAM without substantial supervision from the FBI. Dur-

ing cross-examination, Wein testified that he had been a confi-

dence man for 20-25 years. He itted to committing “swindles” in

Europe and South America as well as in the United States. Weinberg

also testified that he had done informant work for the FBI since the

mid-1960s, and that he had continued to swindle while so

employed. In response to defense counsel's questions, he also indi-

cated that he had a good deal of discretion when he would

tape conversations with potential targets of the investigation. Addi-

tionally, he apparently had some discretion in selecting those targets.

On direct examination, the government's attorney elicited from

Weinberg that in 1977 he had pleaded guilty to an indictment for

mail fraud and wire fraud in the Federal District Court for the

Western District of Pernsylvania. He received probation for the

offense. Wein testified that at no other time in his career had he

been convicted of a crime.

9a

position is not dispositive will be rare. Police overin-

volvement in crime would have to reach a demonstrable

level of outrageousness before it could bar conviction.”

Id. at 495 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring). This is not such a

case.

This Court has consistently rejected the defense urged

here in a variety of contexts. In United States v. Nunez-

Rios, 622 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1980), a Drug Enforcement

Administration (“DEA”) informant had supplied defend-

ants with a quantity of cocaine which they in turn sold to

a DEA agent. There was little question of defendants’

predisposition to commit the crime; the government's

involvement was limited to supplying them with the

means. The Court stated that these “facts fall far short of

the kind of outrageous conduct which would violate de-

fendant’s due process rights.” Id. at 1097.

In United States v. Corcione, 592 F.2d 111 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 440 U.S. 975, 985 (1979), government

agents supplied heroin to the defendants while they were

in Thailand, and the government assisted in the plans for

its transportation to and sale in the United States. This

Court again held that this did not rise to the level of

outrageousness contemplated in Russell.

Appellant relies on United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d

670 (2d Cir. 1973), as support for his due process claim.

In Archer, undercover officers told lies to police officials,

grand jurors and judges during the course of their inves-

tigation into official corruption. Judge Friendly indi-

cated strong disapproval of the agents’ behavior in his

opinion reversing defendants’ convictions, and he further

indicated that the case might be one in which due proc-

ess grounds would alone require reversal. However, since

the Court had determined that the convictions should be

reversed for lack of evidence of actionable interstate tele-

phone calls, the due process question was left for resolu-

tion at another time. Jd. at 677.

10a

After Archer’s federal indictment was dismissed, he

was indicted by the State of New York for state crimes

similar to those in the federal indictment. After convic-

tion and unsuccessful appeals through the New York

courts, Archer returned to this Court via the federal

habeas corpus route. Judge Friendly again wrote for the

Court in Archer v. Commissioner of Correction, 646

F.2d 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, _. U.S. __, 102 S. Ct.

291 (1981). There, the Court held that with respect to

“due process applicable to the states,” the governmental

conduct at issue was not “so outrageous as to constitute a

denial of due process.” Id. at 46-47.

Carpentier also relies on the district court opinion in

United States v. Jannotti, supra. At issue therein was the

ABSCAM investigation, and the conduct of Melvin

Weinberg was closely scrutinized by the district court in

dismissing the indictment. However, in a thorough opin-

ion carefully analyzing claims quite similar to those

made here, the Third Circuit, en banc, reinstated the

convictions. Cautioning that “[w]e must necessarily exer-

cise scrupulous restraint before we denounce law en-

forcement conduct as constitutionally unacceptable,” Id.

at 607, the court noted that “ ‘(t]he limitations of the

Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment come into

play only when the Government activity violates some

protected right of the defendant.’ ” Id. at 610 (quoting

United States v. Hampton, supra, 425 U.S. at 490 (em-

phasis in original)).

Undercover operations for the purpose of exposing

bribery among public officials certainly are not per se

unconstitutional. United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932,

939 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980). (Myers

also arose from the ABSCAM investigation. However,

the due process issue presented here was not directly

before the Court in that case.) In any event, Carpentier’s

appeal in the due process issue must be assessed in terms

lla

of this Court’s decision in United States v. Alexandro,

675 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1982). There, reviewing the same

record on appeal as is before us in this case, we consid-

ered facts substantially similar to those which underlie

the due process claim made on the present appeal. We

find here, as we noted therein, that Carpentier “initiated

the fraudulent scheme to obtain the green card for Fo-

ley.” Id. at 41, We also find here, as we found in Alexan-

dro’s case, that the facts presented on this appeal fall “far

short of indicating conduct that would violate [appel-

lant’s] rights pursuant to the due process clause.” Id. at

It is clear that Alexandro’s claim of due process vioia-

tion, while ultimately found to be lacking, was if any-

thing stronger than is Carpentier’s: Alexandro could at

least claim that the contact with him regarding the

scheme was initiated at the behest of the government;

Carpentier, on the other hand, initiated the suggestion

that he could obtain false green cards.

To recapitulate, the government’s behavior with re-

spect to Carpentier was as follows: he was invited to a

party on a yacht in Florida; while there, he volunteered,

apparently without solicitation, that he could put inter-

ested persons in contact with a source of illegal green

cards and passports; when asked, he did in fact act as a

go-between in a scheme to obtain an illegal green card.

The government merely followed up on his own proposal

of criminal activity.

As to whether other aspects of the ABSCAM operation

rose to the level of outrageous overinvolvement that

could bar a criminal conviction is not a question that

need be answered by the Court in this case. See United

States v. Hampton, supra, 425 U.S. at 490; United States

v. Myers, No. 81-1342 (2d Cir. Sept. 3, 1982); United

States v. Jannotti, supra, 673 F.2d at 610. It simply did

not rise to that level here.

12a

Appellant claims that he is entitled to have the judg-

ment of conviction against him reversed “as a matter of

law” because the government entrapped him. This claim

is made despite an acknowledgement by appellant that

he did not raise the defense of entrapment at the trial

level.

Having failed to raise the defense of entrapment be-

low, appellant is precluded from raising it here. United

States v. Myers, No. 81-1342 (2d Cir. Sept. 3, 1982);

United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1172 (2d Cir.

1980); United States v. Bishop, 367 F.2d 806, 809 (2d

Cir. 1966). When entrapment is asserted as a defense,

the government is entitled to notice of the proposed de-

fense so that it may offer evidence of predisposition in

rebuttal. United States v. Bishop, supra, 367 F.2d at

809.

Furthermore, even if we were to reach the substantive

question, the record demonstrates that appellant was

predisposed to commit the crimes for which he was in-

dicted and convicted, thereby rendering any entrapment

claim unmeritorious, since “[i]t is only when the Govern-

ment’s deception actually implants the criminal design in

the mind of the defendant that the defense of entrap-

ment comes into play.” United States v. Russell, supra,

423 U.S. at 436.

Ill

Carpentier moved for a severance of his trial from that

of Alexandro’s on one occasion before trial and on three

separate occasions thereafter. These motions were de-

nied. Carpentier now claims that because of Alexandro’s

defense strategy, this failure to grant him a severance

denied him a fair trial.

13a

Co-defendant Alexandro’s defense at trial was that he

pretended to go along with the illegal green card scheme

in order to carry out his own investigation into corrup-

tion. Carpentier asserts that this defense was directly in

conflict with his own because, for reasons not fully made

clear, “[i]f the jury were to acquit appellant Carpentier,

they had to disregard Alexandro’s defense and find [ Alex-

andro] guilty,” (In fact, the jury did convict Alexandro

as charged on all three counts. See footnote 12, supra).

Appellant concedes that the standard for appellate

review of a denial of a motion to sever made pursuant to

Rule 14 of the Fed. R. Crim. P. is “an abuse of discre-

tion” on the part of the trial judge. In order to meet his

“extremely difficult burden of showing on appeal that

the lower court’s action [of refusing to grant a motion to

sever] was an abuse of discretion,” defendant must dem-

onstrate that there was “substantial prejudice” resulting

from the denial of the motion. United States v. Werner,

620 F.2d 922, 928 (2d Cir. 1980). A certain amount of

prejudice to a defendant is regarded as acceptable given

the judicial economies that result from joinder. Id. at

929.

A simple showing of some antagonism between de-

fendants’ theories of defense does not require severance.

“(T]he defense of a defendant reaches a level of antago-

nism [with respect to the defense of a co-defendant] that

compels severance of that defendant, if the jury, in order

to believe the core of testimony offered on behalf of that

defendant, must necessarily disbelieve the testimony of-

fered on behalf of his co-defendant.” United States v.

Berkowitz, 662 F.2d 1127, 1134 (5th Cir. 1981).

It is difficult to see how Alexandro’s defense that he

was himself ferreting out corruption prejudiced Carpen-

tier in the least; it certainly failed to rise to the standard

enunciated by the Berkowitz court. Further, there is no

l4a

necessary incompatability between Alexandro’s defense

and that offered by Carpentier, namely that the latter

was simply spending time with Weinberg and Amoroso

in hopes of interesting the “sheik” in purchasing or in-

vesting in his Beefalo Cattle and Land Company.

The most damaging evidence against both Carpentier

and Alexandro consisted of the taped conversations and

the testimony of Weinberg and Amoroso. With regard to

Carpentier, this evidence, as noted, showed Carpentier

to have first suggested the possibility of obtaining illegal

green cards to the undercover agents. The tapes demon-

strated that he was a willing participant in arranging a

meeting between Alexandro and the agents, and in help-

ing to formulate the illegal green card scheme thereafter.

AJexandro’s defense did not exacerbate the impact of that

evidence. There appears to be no reason why the jury

could not have believed Alexandro’s story and yet still

have found that Carpentier lacked the requisite intent to

commit the crimes with which he was charged. The

simple fact is that both Carpentier and Alexandro were

convicted on the basis of an abundance of evidence pre-

sented as to each defendant. We conclude that the dis-

trict judge did not abuse his discretion in denying appel-

lant’s motions to sever.

CONCLUSION

Appellant Carpentier’s attack on the investigative pro-

cedures employed in ABSCAM raises substantial ques-

tions about the proper role of law enforcement in our

society. As discussed herein, the Supreme Court has on

more than one occasion indicated that those procedures

may at times become so intrusive as to violate an individ-

ual’s due process rights, irrespective of the person’s guilt

or innocence, and without regard to his predisposition to

commit the offense with which he is charged.

l5a

ABSCAM has received intense publicity since the in-

vestigation first reached the public eye. We must be

careful not to lose sight of the specific facts of this case

when viewing them in the broader context of ABSCAM.

As the Supreme Court has stated, the courts may not

employ the principles of due process or entrapment as a

“veto over law enforcement practices” of which they

may or may not approve. United States v. Russell, supra,

411 U.S. at 435.

We find that the government's actions with reference

to appellant were not so outrageously intrusive as to

violate his rights to due process. In addition, appellant's

entrapment claim is without merit, and the trial judge

did not abuse his discretion by denying the motions to

sever, or by the manner in which he conducted the jury

selection process.

Affirmed.

16a

APPENDIX B

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1. Title 28 U.S.C. §1254. Courts of appeals; certiorari;

appeal; certified questions

Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the

Supreme Court by the ollowing methods:

(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of

any party to any civil or criminal case, before or after

rendition of judgment or decree;

(2) By appeal by a party relying on a State statute

held by a court of appeals to be invalid as repugnant to

the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States,

but such appeal shall preclude review by writ of certio-

rari at the instance of such appellant, and the review on

appeal shall be restricted to the Federal questions pre-

sented;

(3) By certification at any time by a court of appeals

of any question of law in any civil or criminal case as to

which instructions are desired, and upon such certifica-

tion the Supreme Court may give binding instructions or

require the entire record to be sent up for decision of the

entire matter in controversy. (June 25, 1948, c. 646, §1,

62 Stat. 928.)

2. Title 18 U.S.C. §201(c). Bribery of public officials

and witnesses

. . . (ec) Whoever, being a public official or person

selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly,

corruptly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts,

receives, or agrees to receive anything of value for him-

self or for any other person or entity, in return for:

(1) being influenced in his performance of any offi-

cial act; or

l7a

(2) being influenced to commit or aid in commit-

ting, or to allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the

commission of any fraud, on the United States; or

(3) being induced to do or omit to do any act is

violation of his official duty . . .

3. Title 28 U.S.C. §371. Conspiracy to commit offense

or to defraud United States

If two or more persons conspire either to commit

any offense against the United States, or to defraud the

United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or

for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any

act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be

fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more

than five years, or both.

If, however, the offense, the commission of which is

the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the

punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the

maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.

(June 25, 1948, ch 645, §1, 62 Stat. 701.)