Opposition — Russell Creek Land Co. v. Charjuan, Inc.
Supreme Court brief1983
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Office -Supreme Court, U.S.
FILLED
FEB 17 1083
ALEXAND’R L. ST VAS,
*K |
No. 82-853
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1982
RUSSELL CREEK LAND COMPANY
and BBF, INC.,
Petitioners,
Vs.
CHARJUAN, INC.,
Respondent
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT
COURT OF CABELL COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA
JAMES ALLAN COLBURN
Baer & Colburn, L.C.
731 Fifth Avenue
Huntington, West Virginia
(305) 523-8451
TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE... .
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS .. .
ARGUMENT:
A.
Procedural Due Process
Substantive Due Process
CONCLUSION ea oe 2 oe
14
16
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:
Application of the People of the
State of New York
F.Supp. 1 (1956) “a 2
Billingsley v. Wallace
1974, 554 So.2d 362,
292 Ala. 538, 95 S.Ct. 834 ...
Christianson v. King County
239 U.S. 356 (1915) ‘eu *« & 8
Hancock v. Muskogee
250 U.S. 454 {1519) oe ee ©
Kaufman v. Gross & Co.
1979, 591 P.2d 1229,
23 C.3d 750, 153 Cal. Rptr. 577
Leigh v. Green
Neb. 1904, 24 S.Ct. 390,
193 U.S. 92, 48 L.Ed. 623 eee
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and
Trust Compan
399 U.S. 506 (1950) > eS 6 6s
Outlook Irr. Dist. v. Fels
1934, 28 P.2d 996, 176 Wash. 211
People's National Bank v. Marye
‘107 F. 570 (4th Cir.),
191 U.S. 272 (1901) i a a a
Spitcaufsky v. Hatten
1944, 1e2 S.W.2d 86, 353 Mo. 94.
ii
Page
1l
1l
10
10
State v. Standard Oil company
N.J. , A. ,
aff'd 341 U.S. 428 (1950) .
The Mar
(U.S.) 9 Cranch 126,
144 3 L.Ed. 678, 684 ...
CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES:
U. S. Const. Amend. XIV ...
W. Va. Code 1l1A-3-l .... =.
W. Va. Code 11A-3-6 .....
W. Va. Code llA-4-l1 .... .
-1l
NO. 82-853
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1982
RUSSELL CREEK LAND COMPANY
AND BBF, INC.,
Petitioners,
Vs.
CHARJUAN, INC.,
Respondent.
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
CIRCUIT COURT OF CABELL COUNTY,
WEST VIRGINIA
DECISION BELOW
The lengthy finding of fact,
conclusions of law and order of the Circuit
Court of Cabell County is set _ forth
accurately in the Petition.
ale
QUESTION PRESENTED
There are no questions for review,
requiring granting of a Writ of Certiorari
to the Circuit Court of Cabell County, West
Virginia.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Circuit Court of Cabell County,
West Virginia, decided this matter by Order
dated November 6, 1981, after a hearing
held on November 20, 1980. This decision
was appealed to the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals twice and denied both
times. The petitioners were the landowner
and tenant of a parcel of improved real
estate located in Cabell County, West
Virginia. The petitioners assert a denial
of due process of law as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution by alleging that certain
provisions of the West Virginia Code are
unconstitutional. This Court's
jurisdiction is sought under 28 U.S.C.
Subsection 1257(3) and Rule 17.l(c) of the
Rules of the United States Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Paramount to an understanding of the
issues in this case is the time sequence of
various events, the duties of ownership of
real property, and the failure to execute
those duties by the petitioners herein.
Russell Creek was the fee simple
owner of the subject real estate which was
purchased in August of 1963. At that time,
Russell Creek leased the subject property
to BBHE, Inc., (a predecessor by merger of
BBF, Inc.). The obligation to pay the real
estate taxes assessed by the Cabell County
Assessor was made a provision of this Lease
and was the responsibility of BBHE and
subsequently BBF under that Lease. The
taxes were paid on the subject real estate
-3-
from 1963 to 1974, inclusive. The taxes
were not paid or tendered for 1975, 1976,
1977, 1978 and 1979. No effort was made
to pay these taxes or to contact the
billing or tax collecting authority (the
Cabell County Sheriff) by Russell Creek or
BBF during this time, notwithstanding the
written tax statement mailed to BBF in
September, 1975.
BBF, Inc., a national fast food
service chain operating out of Columbus,
Ohio, in fact, paid the 1973 and 1974 taxes
on September 14, 1974, and the Cabell
County Sheriff mailed a check for a tax
refund to BBF as a result of an
overpayment. The 1973 taxes were delinquent
when paid by BBF. Between July 15 and
August 1, 1975, the Cabell County Sheriff
mailed notice of the taxes due to BBHE,
Inc., the predecessor corporation to BBF,
Inc., receipt of the mailed notice was not
denied by BBF. The subject property
o§e
became delinquent for taxes on May 1, 1976.
On May 15, 1976, the first notice of
publication of the delinquent taxes was
prepared by the Cabell County Sheriff and
was published as a class 1-0 legal
advertisement. On September 22, 1976, a
second list of delinquent real estate taxes
for 1975 calendar tax year was prepared and
published likewise in the newspaper. On
October 18, 1976, a tax sale of various
lands delinquent for taxes in 1975 was held
by the Cabell County Sheriff. This
property was not purchased by anyone at the
sale and pursuant to West Virginia Code
Section 1ll(a)-3-6, the Cabell County
Sheriff on behalf of the State of West
Virginia bid in the property for the taxes
due, $1,345.78. From October 18, 1976,
until September 30, 1978, when the property
was certified by the West Virginia State
Auditor to be sold for the benefit of the
School Fund, the property was absolutely
-5-
redeemable by Kussell Creek or BBF upon the
payment of all past due taxes, interest and
charges due on the said real estate. After
the property was certified to be sold for
the benefit of the school fund under West
Virginia Code Section l11A-4-l, et. seq.
until April 3, 1979, the property was
redeemable as a matter of grace by either
BBF or Russell Creek. Taxes for
the year 1975 were computed on a fiscal
year basis between July 1, 1974 to June 30,
1975. They were not payable until after
July 1, 1975. From July l, 1975, until
April 3, 1979, no offer, contact, payment,
or other communication was made by either
Russell Creek or BBF to pay the real estate
taxes on the subject property.
On these facts BBF, Inc., and
Russell Creek now complain that the West
Virginia statutory scheme denies them due
process of law as guaranteed them by the
United States Constitution and Amendment
-6-
XIV thereto. The petitioners assert that
the West Virginia statutes deny them notice
and an opportunity to be heard both as to
the time, date and place of the Sheriff's
sale and a failure to provide notice of the
absolute right of redemption after the
property passed to the State of West
Virginia under West Virginia Code Section
11A-3-6. This is plainly a misapprehension
of the due process clause of Amendment IV
of the United States Constitution and the
West Virginia statutes.
ARGUMENT
A. Procedural Due Process:
The requirements of notice and an
opportunity to be heard as defined by
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust
Company, 399 U.S. 306 (1950) refer to a
judicial proceeding at which a right or
property interest will be adjudicated. In
that proceeding, either in rem or in
personam Mullane holds that publication is
not sufficient notification if the person
or persons to be affected are known and his
address can be obtained so that he receives
personal service. In the case at bar,
there was no judicial proceeding and none
was required.
The amount of taxes which the
petitioners owed on the subject’ real
property in Cabell County was a matter of
mathematical calculation which requires no
hearing. See Hancock v. Muskogee, 250 U.S.
454 (1919); People's National Bank v.
Marye, 107 F. 570 (4th Cir.) modified on
other grounds 191 U.S. 272 (1901).
When the taxes became delinquent,
the Sheriff, pursuant to statute, published
both in the newspaper and in notices on the
courthouse door.
-8-
At any time during the years in
question, either petitioner could have
attempted to pay the taxes and have been
told of the forfeiture to the state and of
its right to redeem the property. But for
years, neither party even attempted to do
so, notwithstanding they actively engaged
in the fast food business at that address.
In the instant case, Russell Creek's
property became vested in the State of West
Virginia (11A-3-6), when the property is
advertised for sale for delinquent taxes
and there are no bidders thereon. The
subject property was not purchased by a
third party at the Cabeli County Sheriff's
tax sale.
This provision is similar to escheat
statutes. See Christianson v. King County,
239 U.S. 356 (1915); Application of the
People of the State of New York, 138 F.Supp
661 (1956); State v. Standard Oil Company,
5 N.J. 281, 74 A.2d 565, aff'd 341 U.S. 428
-9-
(1950). The duty is on the landowner to
pay his taxes. The landowner's or his
assignees failure to perform a statutorily
required act cannot give the landowner or
his assignee the right to shift the burden
to the State of West Virginia to keep him
notified as to when to pay his taxes.
In addition, respondent notes that
in this case, for the years prior to 1975,
the taxes were paid by BBHE, Inc., or BBF,
Inc. The address of BBHE, Inc., was known.
BBHE, Inc., did in fact receive written,
mailed notice of the taxes due for 1975
from the Sheriff of Cabell County, West
Virginia.
It has long been the law that the
State may sell land for taxes; and notice
by publication is not violative of due
process. Leigh v. Green, Neb. 1904, 24 S.
ct. 390, 193 U.S. 92, 48 L.Ed. 623;
Outlook Irr. Dist. v. Fels, 1934 28 P.2d
996, 176 Wash. 211; Spitcaufsky v. Hatten,
-10-
1944 182 S.W.2d 86, 353 Mo. 94; This
matter was recently denied certiorari by
this Court. Billingsley v. Wallace, 1974
297 So.2d. 362, 292 Ala. 538, certiorari
denied, 95 S.Ct. 834.
The contention that statutory
requirements are insufficient to give due
process after a reasonable period in which
to act cannot be sustained. Kaufman v.
Gross & Co., 1979, 591 P.2d 1229, 23 C.3d.
750, 153 Cal. Rptr. 577. In this case the
petitioners had over three (3) years in
which to cure default.
It is a long established principle
of law in the United States that when a
party owns property, it is the
responsibility of the owner to preserve and
protect it.
In the words of Chief Justice John
Marshall in The Mary (U.S.) 9 Cranch 126,
144, 3 L.Ed. 678, 684, “It is the part of
common prudence for all persons who have any
-li-
interest in [a thing], to guard that
interest by persons who are in a situation
to protect it." Cited in Mullane, supra,
316.
The petitioners knew that taxes were
owed on the property, knew approximately
when they were due and knew to whom they
were payable. The petitioners, jointly or
severally, were in a situation to protect
their interests in the subject property.
They failed to do so and now maintain that
the State is at fault for their failure to
pay taxes for the last 3% years they owned
and/or operated a fast food restaurant on
the subject property.
In the consideration of these
questions presented to this Court, another
question must be asked.
“What could have been done by BBF
or Russell Creek, even if there
had been hand delivered per-
sonal notification to the Presi-
dents of both BBF and Russell
Creek concerning both matters
raised in the questions presented?”
-)2-
The answer is obvious. They could
have paid the taxes. There was no
appearance that could have been made.
There was no legal determination to
challenge. There was no pleading to
respond to. There was nothing to do
except to pay the taxes. This is exactly
what could have been done without such hand
delivered personal notification to the
Presidents of both corporations. The
responsibility is not on the State of West
Virginia to see that both domestic and
foreign corporations properly manage their
businesses and pay their taxes. The
petitioners lost nothing as a result of any
“lack of notice and opportunity to be
heard." They simply failed to pay their
taxes to the Cabell County Sheriff as they
had done for the previous eleven (ll) years
and could have done for the more than three
and a half (3-1/2) years in question and
saved their property.
-13-
Under the particular facts in this
case, Russell Creek and BBF have waived and
are estopped from claiming injury herein.
Both Russell Creek and BBF were required by
the State of West Virginia to annually
report to the State of West Virginia what
properties they owned and to assign a value
for those properties for the purposes of
taxation by Cabell County, West Virginia.
These duties to report and their previous
eleven (11) years of a history of paying
the taxes and their failure to deny any
knowledge of their responsibility to pay
real estate taxes overwhelmingly shows that
the petitioners herein do not have
requisite standing to assert a
constitutional challenge to the West
Virginia statutes.
B. Substantive Due Process.
There is no substantive due process
question presented in either question
because of the State's overriding interest
-14-
in requiring owners of real property to
timely pay their taxes. This state
interest is set forth in West Virginia Code
provision 11A-3-l. The only consideration
is whether or not there is a reasonable
period of time in which the property owner
can cure his default.
Under the West Virginia statutes,
the property owner has approximately two
and a half (2-1/2) years if the statutory
timetable is followed before the property
becomes irredeemable. This right would
exist for this period of time, even if the
property had been sold to a third party at
the Sheriff's sale. Under the facts in
this case, both Russell Creek and BBF had
the right to cure this default and pay the
taxes and/or redeem the property from the
State of West Virginia from July 1, 1975,
until September 30, 1978 or some three (3)
years and three (3) months.
-15-
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the
respondents respectfully submit that there
is no federal constitutional questions
involved and that any loss suffered by the
petitioners herein is a direct result of
their negligent operation of their
respective businesses. They voluntarily
became the owners of property in the State
of West Virginia; they voluntarily used
the property to make money in the State of
West Virginia; and they voluntarily failed
to make their annual tax payments to the
State of West Virginia after eleven (11)
years of so doing. For those reasons, it
is respectfully submitted that the
requested Writ of Certiorari should be
denied.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1982
No. 82-853
RUSSELL CREEK LAND COMPANY
AND BBF, INC.,
Pe tioners,
vs.
CHARJUAN, INC.,
Respondent
AFFIDAVIT OF FILING AND SERVICE
I, James Allan Colburn, counsel for
the above-named respondent, do hereby
certify that I did file the attached Brief
in Opposition to Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, by depositing same in the
United States Post Office with first class
postage prepaid and addressed to the Clerk
of the United States Supreme Court within
the time allowed for filing.
I do further certify that I did
serve copies of the attached Brief in
Opposition to Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, by depositing same in the
United States mails, first class postage
prepaid, addressed to each of the
attorneys at their addresses listed below,
on this the 7th day of March, 1983:
Counsel for BBF and Russell Creek Land
Company:
Bert M. Grimm, Jr.
Wood, Grimm & Delp
Penthouse Suites
The Frederick Building
Huntington, W. Va. 25701
Counsel for Smith-Eckard
Corporation:
Wesley F. Agee
P.O. Box 2688
Huntington, W. Va. 25726
West Virginia Attorney General:
The Hon. Chauncey H. Browning
Attorney General
State of West Virginia
Capitol Building
Charleston, W. Va. 25305
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,
COUNTY OF CABELL, TO-WIT:
I, Mindy Ann Napier, a Notary
Public in and for the County and State
aforesaid, do hereby certify that James
Allan Colburn, whose name is signed to the
foregoing writing, has this day
acknowledged the same before me in my
said County, on this the Th day of
March, 1983.
My commission expires April 18,
1990.
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