Petitioners Brief — United States v. Mendoza

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Office Supreme Court, US,

FILED

| MAY 18 i993

No.

0 82-849 Ae KANOER a STEVAS,

—$—_—_—_—_—_—_—_—_—_—_—_—_—_———————

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER

SERGIO ELEJAR MENDOZA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FORTHE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

Rex E. LEE

Solicitor General

KENNETH S. GELLER

Deputy Solicitor General

JOSHUA I. SCHWARTZ

Assistant to the Solicitor General

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the United States may be collaterally estopped

from litigating a question of constitutional law of public

importance by the judgment of a district court in a prior

case, involving different parties, in which the question

was resolved adversely to the United States.

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I l

EEE 1

Statutes and regulation involved 2.0.0.0... ccecccceceeeee 2

EEE 2

A. The background of this case 2000.0... 3

B. Prior Filipino veteran litigation ........................ 7

a seutincmenunsesounons 14

EE 17

Argument:

The United States may not be collaterally estopped

from litigating the legal question whether respond-

ent is entitled to become a naturalized citizen by

the judgment of a district court in a prior case in-

volving different parties ...20..0.........ccccccccccccceeeeeeceees 20

A. Collateral estoppel is inapplicable to an unmixed

question of law arising upon the successive

claims of different parties 2.000000... cece 20

B. Collateral estoppel should not be applied against

the government to preclude determination of

recurring questions of public law 2.000000... 25

“. The court of appeals’ decision disregards other

established limitations on the issue preclusion

EE SS 37

EEE 43

EEE eT la

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Allen V. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 20. 39

American Medical International, Inc. v. Secretary

ae 28, 30

Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212 200000000000... 32

(m1)

IV

Cases—Continued Page

Barretto Vv. United States. 694 F.2d 603, rev’g

Pet. No. 248806 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 1980)... 22, 37,

38, 41

Barter v. Palm igiano, 425 U.S. 308. 24

Blonder-Tongue Laboratories. Inc. V. University of

Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. eee 26

Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, 658 F.2d 1280, aff’g Civ.

No. 80-2087 (D. Idaho Oct. 15, a 33

Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 ) | =e 29

Colmenar, In re, No. 808-P-22551 (S.D. Cal. Mar.

BR BIPUUD <cescinssansnensostenseeninetinnsiteentssnssse toss 13

Commissioner Vv. Sunnen, 333 fe 40

Divine v. Commissioner, 500 i) ze 20

Dizon Vv. United States, 381 na 32

El. duPont de Nemours & Co. Vv. Train, 430 U.S.

SD wcessscsesensnscsemsessnsisetnsseateunssttesnsadsenmmmneimeasss.... 29

Federated Department Stores vy. Moitie, 452 U.S.

END ‘<sssvirvnimnaanetnenliniesnnatioenice ies 32

Fedorenko v. United States, 449U.S.490... 27

Frock v. United States Railroad Retirement Board,

so eile adl <, Cen 28

Hickman V. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495... 33

Howe Vv. Smith, 452 U.S. 473 31

INS Vv. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, rev’g 475 F.2d 7... 8, 18, 22, 27,

32, 42, 43

INS v. Miranda, No. 82-29 ( a6 oe. 27

Kapili, In re, 473 F. tk 37

Lewis vV. United States, 445 <a 31

Litonjua v. INS, Pet. No. 23358-GT (S.D. Cal.

Apr. 8, 1981), rev’d, 694 F.2d — 37

Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 17, 21, 22, 23,

25, 40

Munoz, In re, 156 F. > eee ees 10

NLRB Vv. Iron Workers, 434 RATT 32

NLRB Vv. Enterprise Ass’n of Pipefitters, 429 U.S.

SDT <covsnenscsesemnsustenereesinessetensintenntenmenseamaamesiassesaniis 34

Naturalization of Inton, In re, No. SA-79-CA-284

(W.D. Tex. July 3, Sa 37

Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans, In re,

cecereaisbe i EES ent 38, 9, 10, 11, 22

Nisperos, In re, 471 F. Supp. 296 13

Vv

Cases—Continued

North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512......

Olegario Vv. United States, 473 F. Supp. 185, rev'd,

629 F.2d 204, cert. denied, 450 U.S. 980 ....12, 13, 14, 33

Pangilinan v. INS, Pet. No. 251849 (N.D. Cal.

Sept. 24, 1980). rev’d, 694 F.2d 603 _................

37

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 .....13, 15, 16,

17, 20, 24, 26, 28, 37, 43

Santiago V. INS, S26 F.2d 466 ..................-.-0c-e0-.00-0-

ll

Standefer v. United States, 447 U S. 10 ...18, 20-21, 26, 32

Stauffer Chemical Co. v. United States, 647 F.2d

1075, aff’'g 14 Env’t Rep. Cases 1737 _...............

Steadman ¥. SEC, 450 US. 91 .............-....22---.-2-.--- ;

Tuten Vv. United States, No. 81-6756 (Mar. 30,

1983) _... a a

United States v. Foster Lumber Co.. 429 U.S. 32...

31

United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236 —................ 17, 21, 23

United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 684 F.2d

1174, cert. granted, No. 82-1448 (Apr. 18,

ES ae ee ee es ene ee eID

United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, No. 81-450

Aeon ae

Western O'! & Gas Ass'n V. EPA, 633 F.2d 803......

Constitution, statutes. regulations and rules:

U.S. Const.:

te | OF

FS TU stininctnnieeetemeepeniternimmremasvnnimnsennses

Amend. V (Due Process Clause) ................. 10, 22,

Act of Dec. 28, 1945, ch. 590, Section 202(c) (1),

yg A EE ee Se

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 7607 (b) (1).

Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. 1094

First Supplementa! Surnlus Appropriation Rescis-

sion Act. 1946. ch. 30, 60 Stat. 6. 14 00.000...

Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C.

(& Supp. V) 1101 et seq.:

42

30

Section 319/(e). 8 U.S.C. 1421(e) _........ 2, 8, 14, 15, 39

Section 329. 8 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 1440 ..........

Nationality Act of 1940. 8 U.S.C. (1940 ed. &

Supp. V 1945) 501 et seq.:

7,14

Section 701, 8 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1945) 1001_...passim

VI

Constitution, statutes, regulations

and rules—Continued Page

Section 701 et seq., 8 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1945)

BODE GO GO, cccccccccscccscceseecnsessesscesasesssssscssasseeee 4

Sections 701-705, 8 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1945)

OEE . 9,38

Section 702, 8 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1945) 1002...... _passim

Section 705, 8 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1945) 1005......2, 4, 3a

Philippine, Independence Act of 1934, ch. 84, Sec-

IIR 3

Second War Powers Act, 1942, ch. 199, Section

AIG (SEE 4

__————————————— 33

28 C.F.R.:

ee

a seiiaabaicteneninaihiat ll, la

SG eeEEyEE—————— 33

AIG IR SE, EE iste elaiinie itt 29

Miscellaneous:

Administrative Office of the United States Courts,

Annual Report cf the Director (1982) ................ 27-28

Bork, The Problems and Pleasures of Being Solici-

tor General, 42 A.B.A. Antitrust L. J. 701

(—( 31

Carrington, United States Appeals in Civil Cases,

11 Hous. L. Rev. 1101 (1974) ..................---......--- 31

Note, Government Litigation in the Supreme Court:

The Roles of the Solicitor General, 78 Yale L. J.

ff _ 31

Note, The Solicitor General and Intragovernmental

Conflict, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 324 (1977) ...............-.. 31

Oversight of INS Programs and Activities, Hear-

ings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citi-

zenship and International Law of the House

Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.

ETTIIE cxccccisscessenerenststenneunteanensiinisnesmumeniniaipmceinnetnts 12

Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1980) .......... 21, 30

Sobeloff, Attorney for the Government: The Work

of the Solicitor General's Office, 41 A.B.A.J. 229

I ———————————————————— 31

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

No. 82-849

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER

v.

SERGIO ELEJAR MENDOZA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-

2la) is reported at 672 F.2d 1320. The opinion of the

district court (Pet. App. 22a-24a) is not officially re-

ported. The findings of fact, conclusions of law and rec-

ommendations of the designated naturalization examiner

(Pet. App. 25a-33a) are likewise unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 34a)

was entered on April 2, 1982, and a timely petition for

rehearing was denied on July 22, 1982 (Pet. App. 35a).

On October 13, 1982, Justice Rehnquist extended the time

in which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and

including November 19, 1982. The petition was filed on

(1)

the latter date and was granted on January 24, 1983.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

1254/1).

STATUTES AND REGULATION INVOLVED

Sections 701, 702 and 705 of the Nationality Act of

1940, 8 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1945) 1001, 1002 and 1005; Sec-

tion 310‘e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of

1952, 8 U.S.C. 1421/e) ; and 28 C.F.R. 0.20(b) are repro-

duced in an appendix to this brief, infra, la-3a.

STATEMENT

Respondent, a Filipino national, entered the United

States in 1975 in a nonimmigrant status. On May 10,

1978, after other legal avenues intended to prolong his

stay in the United States had been exhausted or aban-

doned, respondent filed a petition for naturalization un-

der Section 701 of the Nationality Act of 1940. Section

701, a provision then no longer in force, had relaxed the

norma! naturalization requirements for certain individ-

uals who fought in the United States armed forces in

World War II. Respondent claimed that he was entitled

to naturalization based upon his service during World

War II in the Army of the Commonwealth of the Philip-

pines. The designated naturalization examiner recom-

mended that the petition be denied, noting that respond-

ent was not eligible for naturalization under the provi-

sions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952

then in effect and that naturalization under Section 701

of the 1940 Act was unavailable because petitioner had

not filed for naturalization by December 31, 1946, the

date on which that provision expired. The examiner also

rejected respondent’s argument that naturalization was

necessary to remedy an alleged denial of due process in

the administration of Section 701 in the Philippines at

the close of World War II.

The district court rejected the naturalization exam-

iner’s recommendation and granted the petition without

reaching “the Constitutional issues or other merits of

the petition” (Pet. App. 22a). The district court con-

cluded that the United States was collaterally estopped

to oppose respondent’s naturalization petition because the

constitutional question presented by that petition had

been resolved adversely to the United States in a case

involving the naturalization petitions of different indi-

viduals, In re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veter-

ans, 406 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Cal. 1975). The court of

appeals affirmed, like the district court relying solely

upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

A. The Background of this Case

1. Respondent served as a physician with the Philip-

pine Commonwealth Army from December 1, 1941, until

June 30, 1946. During that time, as the United States

became involved in World War II, the Commonwealth

Army, which was ordinarily under the control of the

semi-autonomous Commonwealth government in peace-

time, was incorporated into the armed forces of the

United States pursuant to the order of President Roose-

velt.' Respondent was held prisoner by Japanese forces

from Apri] 1942 until February or March 1945. Upon

his release respondent remained in the Commonwealth

Army. In the fall of 1945 the United States Army sent

respondent to Pennsylvania for approximately six months

of medica] training. Shortly after his return to the Phil-

ippines, on June 30, 1946, respondent secured his dis-

charge from the Commonwealth Army. Pet. App. 7a.

1 Pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Philippine Independence Act

of 1934, ch. 84, 48 Stat. 463, the Philippines were scheduled to be-

come a fully independent, self-governing nation on July 4, 1946. Al-

though the Philippines was a United States possession prior to the

latter date, it enjoyed considerable autonomy under the terms of the

Independence Act.

4

2. The statute upon which respondent’s petition for

naturalization rests is Section 701 et seg. of the Nation-

ality Act of 1940, 8 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1945) 1001 et seq.,

as added by the Second War Powers Act, 1942, ch. 199,

Section 1001, 56 Stat. 182-183. Section 701 exempted

from some of the usual requirements for naturalization

(including literacy in English and a period of residence

in the United States) certain alien servicemen who had

served honorably in the United States armed forces dur-

ing World War II in locations beyond the continental

limits of the United States. As amended by Section

202(c) (1) of the Act of Dec. 28, 1945, ch. 590, 59 Stat.

658, the Act specified that any petition thereunder was to

be filed no later than December 31, 1946.

Section 702 of the 1940 Act provided for the overseas

naturalization of persons actually serving in the United

States armed forces who were eligible for naturalization

under Section 701 but who were beyond the jurisdiction

of the United States courts vested with naturalization

authority. Representatives designated by the Commis-

sioner of Immigration and Naturalization were author-

ized to receive petitions, conduct hearings, and grant nat-

uralization outside the United States. Pursuant to Sec-

tion 705 of the 1940 Act, the Commissioner and the At-

torney Genera] implemented the provisions of Sections

701 and 702. Between 1943 and 1946 immigration offi-

cers traveled on rotation through Great Britain, Ireland,

North America and the Pacific Islands, admitting thou-

sands of foreign nationals serving in the United States

armed forces to citizenship.

Naturalization of alien servicemen in the Philippines

was, of course, impossible during the Japanese occupa-

tion.’ The liberation of the Philippines by Allied forces

began in February 1945. After resolution of some thresh-

2 Between 1942 and 1945, however, approximately 7,000 Filipino

servicemembers were naturalized under Section 701 at locations out-

side the occupied Philippines.

5

old questions respecting the application of Section 701 to

Filipino servicemen,’ the Immigration and Naturaliza-

tion Service, in early August 1945, designated George

Ennis, an American vice-consul in Manila, to naturalize

aliens pursuant to Section 702. Almost immediately, the

Philippine government expressed its concern to the State

Department about the possibility that large numbers of

young Filipino men, perhaps as many as 250,000, would

be naturalized and leave for America on the eve of the

scheduled Philippine independence ‘see page 3 note l,

supra). On September 13, 1945, the Commissioner of

Immigration and Naturalization recommended to Attor-

ney General Clark that the situation be handled by revok-

ing the authority previously granted to Ennis. The Attor-

ney General approved the Commissioner’s recommendation

on September 26, 1945, and Ennis’ authority to naturalize

alien servicemen was thereafter revoked. Naturalizations

ceased by October 27, 1945.

The INS subsequently reconsidered and abandoned its

prior position ‘see note 3, supra) that members of the

Commonwealth Army were eligible for citizenship under

3 One question was whether service in the Army of the Common-

wealth of the Philippines qualified as service in the military forces

of the United States for purposes of Section 701. Doubt existed be-

cause the Army of the Commonwealth, an instrumentality of the

Philippine government, was simply incorporated as a unit into the

United States armed forces by Presidential order. By contrast, a

separate unit known as the Philippine Scouts was an integral unit

of the United States Army; its members thus had individually en-

listed in the armed forces of the United States, and their status for

this purpose was comparatively free from doubt. In 1945 the INS

concluded that members of both Philippine units were covered by

Section 701 (but see page 6 & note 4, infra).

A second question concerned the eligibility for naturalization un-

der Section 701 of Filipinos who had never resided in the United

States. The Attorney J neral concluded that prior residence in the

Philippines, then an American possession, satisfied the statute's re-

quirements on that score.

6

Section 701.* The revised administrative interpretation

substantially diminished the foreign relations difficulties

posed by the presence in the Philippines of a United

States official authorized to naturalize alien servicemen.

Accordingly, in August 1946, the Service once again des-

ignated a naturalization representative for the Philip-

pines. The representative remained on duty until Decem-

ber 1946 and naturalized many Philippine Scouts (see

page 5, note 3, supra) who were still on active duty at

that time and were still regarded as eligible under Section

702."

3. Although respondent was present in the Philippines

between August and October 1945, when naturalization

under Section 702 was possible there, it is undisputed that

he made no effort to take advantage of that opportunity.

Nor did he make any effort to avail himself of the sub-

stantive provisions of Section 701, which were available

to him without any need for recourse to the special over-

seas naturalization provisions of Section 702, during the

time he was stationed in Pennsylvania.*

* The agency’s action was triggered by enactment of the First

Supplemental Surplus Appropriation Rescission Act, 1946, ch. 30,

60 Stat. 6, 14, which provided in part that service in the Army of

the Commonwealth of the Philippines was not to be deemed service

in the United States Armed Forces for purposes of any United States

statute conferring benefits on military veterans. But see page 10

note 9, infra.

© Neither the First Supplemental Surplus Appropriation Rescis-

sion Act nor the altered administrative interpretation of Section 701

prompted by that Act (see note 4, supra) had any application to

members of the Philippine Scouts.

* The INS did not adopt its revised interpretation of Section 701,

excluding members of the Commonwealth Army from the benefits

of that provision, until] after the date of respondent’s return to the

Philippines and his discharge from service.

By the time naturalization was again available in the Philippines

under Section 702, respondent was doubly ineligible. First, he was

no longer in service. Second, the INS regarded service in the Com-

7

Respondent returned to the United States in 1975 in a

nonimmigrant status. His right to remain was extended

by the INS through June 9, 1976. During this time re-

spondent operated a restaurant and attempted to start

an export-import business. On July 15, 1976, respondent

sought to change his status to that of a Treaty Investor.

This application was denied by the INS District Director

on August 29, 1977, because respondent had not complied

with the conditions of his nonimmigrant status. Respond-

ent took an administrative appeal from that decision, but

subsequently abandoned that appeal and filed the petition

for naturalization under Section 701 that gave rise to

this case.

B. Prior Filipino Veteran Litigation

Because Section 701 required filing of a naturalization

petition prior to the close of 1946, its provisions did not

give rise to litigation in the ensuing years. In the late

1960's, however, there commenced a significant flow of lit-

igation under Section 701 involving novel arguments rest-

ing upon the manner in which Section 702 had been ad-

ministered in the Philippines during 1945 and 1946. In

every case, the immigration petitioner, a Filipino veteran,

asserted that naturalization should be granted notwith-

standing the expiration of Section 701.’

monwealth Army as nonqualifying under Section 701. In any event,

respondent made no application for naturalization at this time ei-

ther.

7 Section 329 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8

U.S.C. 1440, currently authorizes naturalization of aliens who fought

in this nation’s armed forces during World War II. Unlike its

predecessor, Section 701 of the 1940 Act, however, the benefits

of Section 329 are available only to those who either (1) en-

listed or were inducted in certain geographical areas (which do

not include the Philippines) or (2) are lawfully admitted to the

United States for permanent residence. It is accordingly signifi-

cantly more restrictive than Section 701. Respondent does not claim

eligibility for naturalization under the current provision.

1. In INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973), this Court con-

sidered the ramifications of the course of administration

of Section 702 in the Philippines upon facts strikingly

similar to those of the present case. Hibi, a veteran of

the Philippine Scouts, entered the United States in 1964

and petitioned for naturalization under Section 701 in

1967. He argued that despite 8 U.S.C. 1421/e), which

expressly precludes naturalization under provisions of law

no longer in effect, the United States was estopped from

enforcing the statutory time limit for filing a petition

under Section 701. Hibi claimed that an estoppel arose

from the alleged failure of government officials to inform

him of his opportunity for naturalization, and from the

revocation of Vice-Consul Ennis’ naturalization authority

in October 1945 and the failure to provide a substitute

until August 1946. The district court granted Hibi’s peti-

tion, adopting his estoppel argument, and the court of ap-

peals affirmed. 475 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1973).

This Court summarily reversed, explaining that no es-

toppel could lie against the government in these circum-

stances (414 U.S. at 8-9):

It is well settled that the Government is not in a

position identical to that of a private litigant with

respect to its enforcement of laws enacted by Con-

gress. * * * Here [the INS) has been charged by

Congress with administering an Act which both made

available benefits of naturalization to persons in

[Hibi’s] class and established a cutoff date for the

claiming of such benefits. [The INS], in enforcing

the cutoff date established by Congress, * * * is en-

forcing public policy established by Congress.

While the issue of whether “affirmative misconduct”

on the part of the Government might estop it from

denying citizenship was left open in Montana v. Ken-

nedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314, 315 (1961), no conduct of

the sort there adverted to was involved here. We do

not think that the failure to fully publicize the rights

which Congress accorded under the Act of 1940, or

the failure to have stationed in the Philippine Islands

during all of the time those rights were available an

authorized naturalization representative, can give rise

to an estoppel against the Government.

{Hibi’s] effort to claim naturalization under a stat-

ute which by its terms had expired more than 20

years before he had filed his lawsuit must therefore

fail.

2a. In In re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Vet-

erans, 406 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (hereinafter

“68 Filipinos”), the district court (Renfrew, J.) consid-

ered petitions for naturalization resting upon Sections

701-705 of the Nationality Act of 1940 filed by 68 Filipino

veterans who had served in the Commonwealth Army or

the Philippine Scouts during World War II.* Rejecting

the recommendations of the naturalization examiners, the

district court granted the petitions with certain excep-

tions.

The district court first considered the claims of those

who it found to have filed timely preliminary applications

for naturalization that had not been acted upon. 406 F.

Supp. at 937-940. As to these “Category I” veterans, the

court held in the alternative that: (1) the failure to proc-

ess the submitted applications was “affirmative miscon-

duct,” which, notwithstanding JNS v. Hibi, supra, “estop-

ped [the United States] from relying upon the expiration

date of Sections 701-705 as grounds for denial of their pe-

titions for naturalization” ‘406 F. Supp. at 939; footnote

omitted), and (2) because they had done all that was

practical to avail themselves of the opportunity provided

by Section 701 at the proper time, they should be deemed

to have “constructively filed” formal petitions for natural-

ization within the statutory time limit (id. at 940).

The district court defined a second category to include

53 veterans who, like respondent Mendoza, made no ef-

fort to secure naturalization under Section 702 in a timely

manner. These “Category II” veterans claimed that the

* 68 Filipinos was not a class action.

10

absence from the Philippines during the period October

1945 through August 1946 of an official empowered to ef-

fect naturalizations denied them equal protection in viola-

tion of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,

and that because of that violation they were entitled to

have their tardy naturalization petitions granted. In re-

sponse the government argued that: ‘1) Filipinos were

overseas aliens unprotected by the Due Process Clause at

the time in question because of the enactment, in 1934, of

the Philippine Independence Act; (2) the veterans’ claims

were foreclosed by INS v. Hibi, supra: (3) because At-

torney General Clark’s decision to withdraw naturaliza-

tion authority from Vice-Consul Ennis responded to the

complaint of a foreign government and was based upon

considerations of foreign policy, the veterans’ claims pre-

sented a nonjusticiable political question; and (4) the At-

torney General’s action did not deny the veterans’ due

process.”

The district court rejected each of these contentions

(406 F. Supp. at 940-951). The court acknowledged that

“the actions of the Commissioner of the INS were moti-

vated by reasonable concern for the maintenance of ami-

cable relations between the United States and the Philip-

pine Islands” (id. at 951). Nevertheless, the court, apply-

ing a strict scrutiny standard,’® held that “the failure of

the Government to have stationed in the Philippine Islands

a representative of the INS authorized to naturalize mem-

* ..fter the decision in Jn re Munoz, 156 F. Supp. 184 (N.D. Cal.

1957), the INS abandoned the argument that provisions of the First

Supplemental! Surplus Appropriation Rescission Act, 1946, rendered

the benefits of Section 701 unavailable to veterans of the'Common-

wealth Army, and did not otherwise argue thereafter that service in

the Commonwealth Army was nonqualifying for purposes of Sec-

tion 701. Compare pages 5-6 & notes 3-4, supra.

1 In the district court’s view, absence of a naturalization officer

from the Philippines constituted discrimination upon the basis of

race, alienage or nationality, and was accordingly subject to strict

scrutiny (406 F. Supp. at 950).

ll

bers of the American armed forces pursuant to Section

702 of the 1940 Act during all of the time those statutory

rights were available denied petitioners due process of

law” (406 F. Supp. at 951). Thus, the district court

granted the naturalization petition of each of the Cate-

gory II veterans. Only those (“Category III”) veterans

who were unable to show that they had ever been eligible

for naturalization under Section 701 were denied natural-

ization (id. at 937, 951).™

b. Pursuant to authority delegated by the Attorney

General to determine whether an appeal should be taken

from a judgment adverse to the interests of the United

States, see 28 C.F.R. 0.20(b), in March 1976 the Solicitor

General authorized an appeal from the district court’s de-

cision. An appeal to the Ninth Circuit was docketed and

the case was briefed and readied for oral argument.

In the interim, however, a new Administration had

taken office. By memorandum dated September 21, 1977

(Pet. App. 36a-42a), newly appointed INS Commissioner

Castillo sought authorization to withdraw the pending ap-

peal (see id. at 30a). Noting that “[t)he desire expressed

by the Philippine Government in 1945 to hold onto its

young manpower in the post-war period” was no longer

an operative consideration (id. at 41a), the INS Commis-

sioner stressed that acquiescence in the naturalization of

the 68 Filipinos petitioners “would be in keeping with the

policy of the [new] Administration,” described as “a

course of compassion and amnesty” (id. at 42a). Commis-

sioner Castillo’s request provoked considerable discussion,

and some dissent, within the Department of Justice. The

11 Shortly after rendering its opinion, the district court issued an

addendum thereto, responding to the decision in Santiago v. INS,

526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc), which apparently had given

it cause to reconsider its application of equitable estoppel to the

claims of Category I veterans. In the addendum (406 F. Supp. at

951), the district court reaffirmed its alternative holding that the

Category I veterans had constructively met the stautory time limit,

and observed that the court’s due process ruling respecting Category

II veterans was applicable, as well, to the Category I veterans.

12

memoranda prepared for the Solicitor General’s considera-

tion reflect the conviction that the district court’s legal

conclusions were legally erroneous, but that acquiescence

in naturalization of the petitioners would be an acceptable

accommodation in light of the inequities perceived by the

officials vested by law with policy making authority, and

would not affect significant numbers of individuals or es-

tablish a binding precedent. In response to these recom-

mendations, on November 14, 1977, the Solicitor General

authorized withdrawal of the pending appeal. On Novem-

ber 30, 1977, the court of appeals granted the government’s

motion to dismiss the appeal.

ce. In the aftermath of these events, Commissioner

Castillo was questioned during congressional oversight

hearings about his recommendation that the appeal in 68

Filipinos be dismissed.** The government’s position re-

specting Filipino veterans’ naturalization petitions under

Section 701 was also reconsidered within the Department

of Justice. The position ultimately adopted in 1978, after

thorough reexamination, was that the Department would

not ordinarily oppose naturalization of Filipino veterans

who had actually attempted to become naturalized United

States citizens pursuant to Sections 701 and 702 while

those provisions were in effect—i.e., “Category I” veter-

ans. Contrary to the position adopted in withdrawing the

appeal in 68 Filipinos, however, the Department instructed

the INS thereafter to oppose naturalization of all those

who could not satisfy this prerequisite, including “Cate-

gory II” veterans. See Pet. App. 30a; Olegario v. United

States, 629 F.2d 204, 214 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,

450 U.S. 980 (1981).

12 Commissioner Castillo explained that his recommendation had

been based on equitable considerations “aside from the legal argu-

ment of, was correct procedure of process used.” Oversight of INS

Programs and Activities, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immi-

gration, Citizenship and International Law of the House Comm. on

the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 272 (1978).

18 To mitigate any hardship that might otherwise result from this

change in policy, the Solicitor General adopted a “grandfather rule”

13

3. The issues presented by the filing of tardy naturali-

zation petitions by Filipino veterans resting on Section 701

were next considered by the Second Circuit in Olegario v.

United States, supra. Adopting Judge Renfrew’s reason-

ing in 68 Filipinos, the district court had granted Ole-

gario’s petition for naturalization, 473 F. Supp. 185 (S.D.

N.Y. 1979), and the government appealed.** On appeal,

the Second Circuit considered the argument that under

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), the

unappealed final judgment in 68 Filipinos should be given

collateral estoppel effect, so as to preclude denial of nat-

uralization to any “Category II” Filipino veteran. The

Second Circuit rejected this contention, observing that

“(i]n contrast to Parklane, the government is the defend-

ant here, and the case raises issues of national concern.”

629 F.2d at 215. The court noted that the government’s

failure to appeal an adverse decision may rest upon policy

exception to this general rule, declining to authorize appeal] from or-

ders granting naturalization to Category II F ilipino veterans who

had filed naturalization petitions prior to the withdrawal of the gov-

ernment’s appeal in 68 Filipinos. See Olegario v. United States, su-

pra, 629 F.2d at 214-215. The grandfather exception was adopted

because there was reason to believe that processing of at least some

such petitions had been delayed by INS, either unilaterally or by

agreement with opposing counsel, in anticipation of securing a defi-

nitive ruling upon appeal in 68 Filipinos. It was further recognized

that absent that procedure some of the petitions involved would have

been granted at the time the government withdrew its 68 Filipinos

appeal. Because it was thought difficult to determine with conf-

dence which naturalization petitioners had relied to their detriment

upon such procedural understandings, the Solicitor General author-

ized withdrawal of previously authorized appeals in all cases falling

within the “grandfather rule” and declined to authorize appeal in

other such cases. Among the appeals withdrawn were those in Jn re

Nisperos, 471 F. Supp. 296 (C.D. Cal. 1979), and Jn re Colmenar,

No. 308-P-22551 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 1979). See Pet. App. 8a.

14 Olegario was a “Category II” veteran—i.e., he had not made a

timely effort to avai] himself of the benefits of Section 701. Nor was

his petition filed in time to benefit from the “grandfather rule”

adopted by the Solicitor General (see page 12 note 13, supra).

14

considerations, rather than acquiescence in the decision’s

legal reasoning, and that the invocation of collateral es-

toppel would compel the Solicitor General to authorize ap-

peal from adverse decisions in an uncritical manner

(ibid.). The court also stressed that the United States has

broad discretion whether to pursue an appeal in a partic-

ular case and remains free to change positions previously

adopted whenever a prior position is determined to have

been ill-advised ‘id. at 216). Turning to the merits, the

Second Circuit concluded that the absence of a naturaliza-

tion officer from the Philippines during part of the period

when naturalization under Section 701 was authorized did

not violate the statute itself or work a denial of due proc-

ess or equal protection. 629 F.2d at 223-233. Accordingly,

the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s decision

and directed that Olegario’s petition be denied.

C. Proceedings Below

1. Respondent filed his naturalization petition, invok-

ing Section 701 of the 1940 Act, on May 10, 1978. The

designated naturalization examiner recommended denial

of the petition (Pet. App. 25a-33a'. The examiner noted

that respondent could not qualify for naturalization under

the current provision for naturalization of alien service-

men, 8 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 1440 ‘see page 7 note 7,

supra), and that 8 U.S.C. 1421‘e) precludes naturaliza-

tion under expired or superseded statutory authority. Be-

cause respondent had not claimed that he sought naturali-

zation under Section 701 in a timely manner, and because

respondent had actually been in Pennsylvania for much

of the time overseas naturalization under the extraordi-

nary provisions of Section 702 was unavailable in the

Philippines, the examiner concluded that respondent could

not be deemed constructively to have timely filed his peti-

tion under the 1940 Act; respondent’s petition was there-

fore barred by 8 U.S.C. 1421/e). Similarly, given these

facts, the examiner found that Hibi barred relief on an

15

estoppel theory and, notwithstanding ¢8 Filipinos, that

respondent had not suffered any denial of due process.

The district court granted respondent's petition without

reaching the merits of respondent's constitutional claim,

treating the matter as a routine application of the doctrine

of offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel governed by

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, supra.” Although the nat-

uralization examiner had noted (Pet. App. 3la! that the

effect of 8 U.S.C. 1421\e) hed not been considered in 68

Filipinos, and that respondent, unlike the 6° Filipinos

petitioners, had been in Pennsylvania for most of the rele-

vant time period, the district court did not address the

legal effect of these circumstances.

2 The Solicitor General authorized an appeal.’* The

government once again argued that respondent’s constitu-

tional claim was nonjusticiable, and in any event without

merit. Several arguments not considered in 68 Filipinos

were also advanced. The government argued that: (1)

respondent’s constitutional claim was barred by laches ;

(2) naturalization under Section 701 was barred by 8

U.S.C. 1421(e:; (3) the remedy awarded for the alleged

constitutional violation—naturalization—was tantamount

to an equitable estoppel. and thus inconsistent with Hibi;

and (4) respondent lacked standing to complain of the

withdrawal of a naturalization officer from the Philip-

pines, and had suffered no personal deprivation of rights,

because he was in Pennsylvania for most of the period in

question. The court of appeals affirmed, reaching only the

collateral estoppel issue.”

18 The district court’s decision was rendered prior to the Second

Circuit's ruling in Olegario.

16 Like Olegario, respondent is a “Category II” veteran and had

not filed his petition in time to benefit from the Solicitor General's

“grandfather rule” (see page 13 note 14, supra).

17 The court of appeals stated that because respondent may have

been in the Philippines for as much as three months during which

time he was eligible for naturalization but no naturalization official

16

The court of appeals concluded that, under Parklane

Hosiery, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

applying collateral estoppel to bar consideration of the

government’s arguments against respondent’s naturaliza-

tion. The court of appeals stated that none of the circum-

stances listed by this Court in Parklane Hosiery (439

U.S. at 329-331 & nn. 14 & 15) as factors precluding

an estoppel was present here. The court also stressed the

lack of record support for the government’s suggestion

that the withdrawal of the appeal in 68 Filipinos was

based in part upon a misapprehension of the practical

consequences of doing so, and it questioned whether the

underlying issue was of sufficient practical importance to

warrant a fresh determination of the legal issue ( Pet.

App. 12a-15a). The court of appeals acknowledged the

conflicting decision of the Second Circuit in Olegario, but

it rejected the Second Circuit’s analysis of the collateral

estoppel issue (id. at 18a) and held that the Second Cir-

cuit’s ruling on the underlying merits, although contrary

to 68 Filipinos, was not sufficient reason to deny preclu-

sive effect to 68 Filipinos (id. at 16a-18a).

Finally, the court of appeals rejected the government’s

contention that Parklane Hosiery is inapposite because of

the special attributes and interests of the United States

as a litigant, and the purely legal character of the ques-

tions presented here (Pet. App. 18a-20a). Although it

acknowledged that “the government is frequently involved

in cases raising issues of great public importance, and

that in such cases the public interest in permitting the

government to relitigate those issues may outweigh the

public interest in avoiding needless litigation” (id. at

18a), the court concluded that this is not such a case be-

cause it found “no ‘critical’ need for redetermination” of

was present, “this is * * * sufficient * * * to implicate his due process

rights and place him in the same situation as [the] Category II

veterans” whose rights were litigated in 68 Filipinos (Pet. App. 12a

n.8). The court did not address the remaining issues raised by the

government that had not been decided in 68 Filipinos.

17

the issue and “no compelling public interest in opposirg

naturalization” of persons such as respondent (id. at 19a,

20a). On the contrary, the court thought that the equities

strongly supported preclusion (id. at 20a-2la).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The decision of the court of appeals is without prece-

dent. To our knowledge no other appellate court has ever

held that the United States may be estopped from litigat-

ing a pure question of law, much less a question of con-

stitutional law affecting the special prerogatives of the

Executive in the sphere of foreign relations, by the un-

appealed adverse decision of a trial level court rendered

in a different action involving a different opposing party.

A. Contrary to the view of the court of appeals, Park-

lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), is not

controlling here. In Parklane Hosiery, the issues upon

which preclusion was upheld were factual ‘see id. at

324) ; here, the underlying issue in dispute is an unmixed

question of law, indeed a significant question of constitu-

tional law. This Court has recognized that powerful con-

siderations militate against extension of the preclusion

doctrine to purely legal issues—especially those of consti-

tutional import—even when the parties in the successive

lawsuits are the same. Montana v. United States, 440

U.S. 147, 162-163 (1979); United States v. Moser, 266

U.S. 236, 242 (1924). Application of the preclusion doc-

trine to a legal issue where there is no identity of parties

is especially inappropriate.

B. In Montana v. United States, supra, 440 U.S. at

155, and Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, supra, 489 U.S.

at 331, this Court stressed that issue preclusion should

not be applied in circumstances where such application

would be unfair to a litigant or contrary to significant

public policies. The unique attributes and role of the

United States as a litigant constitute a special factor that

warrants such an exception.

18

First, application of the issue preclusion doctrine in

eases involving the United States must take account of

the public interest in the uniform and rigorous enforce-

ment of laws of general importance and applicability. See

Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 24-25 (1980);

INS vy. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973). Here, as in Stande-

fer, this public interest outweighs the considerations that

ordinarily underlie the preclusion doctrine.

Second, critical practical and legal considerations, ap-

plicable whenever the United States is engaged in liti-

gation on questions of public law, argue strongly against

the estoppel invoked by the court of appeals. The govern-

ment is involved in far more litigation than any other

party. Moreover, many legal! issues of substantial public

importance arise only in government litigation. There is

a substantial likelihood that, in litigating a recurring is-

sue, the government will at some point encounter an ad-

verse decision. Application of collateral estoppel to bar

determination of a legal question in such cases, which

include the present one, would substantially disrupt the

existing process of development of the law through reso-

lution of conflicts by appeal, en banc review and certi-

orari, by supplanting the more flexible doctrine of stare

decisis and the persuasive effect of decisions of coordi-

nate courts with the rigid doctrine of issue preclusion.

Third, invocation of collateral estoppel against the gov-

ernment on recurring legal issues is inappropriate be-

cause, through the Office of the Solicitor General, the

government, unlike any other litigant, employs a formal

and selective mechanism for determining whether to take

an appeal from or seek certiorari review of an adverse

judgment. The Solicitor General frequently decides

against appeal or certiorari even though the legal conclu-

sions of the deciding court are believed to be erroneous.

Such decisions rest upon factors including a substantial

measure of prosecutorial discretion, equitable and policy

considerations, the practical importance of the decision,

the limited resources of the government and sensitivity to

19

crowded dockets of the courts. The decision not to pur-

sue an appeal in 68 Filipinos was based on several of

these factors.

The court of appeals’ ruling, if sustained, would re-

quire the United States to reconsider its practice of selec-

tive pursuit of appeals and certiorari. The existing prac-

tice benefits the public interest and facilitates sound ju-

dicial management. The alternative—an inflexible policy

of appealing (and even seeking certiorari on) the first

adverse decision rendered on a legal issue—would burden

the courts of appeals and this Court unnecessarily. Judi-

cial economy—the touchstone of the preclusion doctrine—

would be disserved.

C. Even if, contrary to our submission, the special

status of the government does not warrant consideration

in the application of collateral estoppel, and Parklane

Hosiery is controlling here, the court of appeals erred in

approving application of the issue preclusion doctrine in

the circumstances of this case.

First, the district court’s decision in 68 Filipinos given

preclusive effect is contrary to intervening decisions of a

court of appeals and numerous district courts. Second,

the court below improperly precluded the United States

from litigating not only the issues decided in 68 Filipinos

but also alternative contentions that were never ad-

dressed in the earlier case. Third, the facts of this case

are materially different from those considered in 68 Fili-

pinos because respondent was not prejudiced by the chal-

lenged government actions. Finally, the court of appeals

overlooked the substantial tension between the district

court’s decision in 68 Filipinos and this Court’s decision

in INS v. Hibi, supra. Due regard for the authority of

this Court’s rulings required the court of appeals inde-

pendently to assess the merits of respondent’s claim.

20

ARGUMENT

THE UNITED STATES MAY NOT BE COLLATER-

ALLY ESTOPPED FROM LITIGATING THE LEGAL

QUESTION WHETHER RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED

TO BECOME A NATURALIZED CITIZEN BY THE

JUDGMENT OF A DISTRICT COURT IN A PRIOR

CASE INVOLVING DIFFERENT PARTIES

A. Collateral Estoppel is Inapplicable to an Unmixed

Question of Law Arising upon the Successive Claims

of Different Parties

The court of appeals viewed this case as a routine ap-

plication of the doctrine of nonmutual offensive collat-

eral estoppel, which this Court sanctioned—albeit condi-

tionally—in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322

(1979). See Pet. App. 9a-lla. The issue in Parklane

Hosiery, however, was whether the potential for unfair-

ness that infects the issue preclusion doctrine when a

plaintiff seeks to foreclose a defendant from litigating

an issue that the defendant has previously litigated un-

successfully in an action with another party is so perva-

sive that resort to the doctrine should be barred in all

cases. 429 U.S. at 324, 326 n.4, 331. In providing a

negative answer to that question, the Court stressed that

care must be taken to ensure that collateral estoppel is

not applied in circumstances where such use would for

any reason “be unfair to a defendant.” Jd. at 331. More-

over, nothing in the Court’s opinion dispenses with the

established limitations on the issue preclusion doctrine de-

veloped in other cases. The court of appeals erred in dis-

regarding these established exceptions to and limitations

upon the rule of collateral estoppel.

For instance, the issue whose redetermination was

barred in Parkiane Hosiery was, unlike the underlying

issue in this case, factual. 439 U.S. at 324.

focus in cautioning against improper resort

estoppel accordingly was upon circumstances that

militate against precluding relitigation of factual

439 U.S. at 331. See Standefer v. United States,

i

shi

21

U.S. 10, 21 (1980). Thus, it is hardly surprising that

the court of appeals was able to conclude (Pet. App. 1la-

16a & n.11) that none of the arguments against use of

collateral estoppel specifically mentioned in Parklane

Hosiery is present here.** This case, by contrast, is gov-

erned by the pre-existing exception to the rule of collat-

eral estoppel applicable to pure questions of law arising

in successive actions on substantially unrelated claims—

an exception recognized in United States v. Moser, 266

U.S. 236, 242 (1924), and recently acknowledged in

Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162-163 (1979).

1. The Court defined the “unmixed questions of law”

exception to the rule of collateral estoppel in Montana v.

United States, supra, 440 U.S. at 162, quoting United

States v. Moser, supra, 266 U.S. at 242 (emphasis added

by the Montana Court) :

Where * * * a court in deciding a case has enunciated

a rule of law, the parties in a subsequent action upon

a different demand are not estopped from insisting

that the law is otherwise, merely because the parties

are the same.

See also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(2) &

comments b & c, § 29/7) & comment i (1982). This

rule applies with special force when the issues of law are

of constitutional dimensions {Montana v. United States,

supra, 440 U.S. at 163) :

Unreflective invocation of collateral estoppel against

parties with an ongoing interest in constitutional is-

sues could freeze doctrine in areas of the law where

veness to changing patterns of conduct or

mores is critical.

The question presented to the district court for deci-

sion in this case—whether the Attorney General violated

18 As explained below (pages 37-38), however, the court of appeals’

decision does not in fact comport with the Court’s cautionary warn-

ings in Parklane Hosiery.

22

the Due Process Clause by failing to station an author-

ized naturalization representative in the Philippine Is-

lands throughout the time citizenship was available under

Section 701—is an unmixed question of law. This Court

treated the closely related question presented in Hibi in

terms of equitable estoppel doctrine as purely legal. 414

U.S. at &9; compare id. at 9-11 ‘ Douglas, J., dissenting).

Similarly, the district court in 68 Filipinos regarded the

,sestion decided there as one of purely legal dimensions.

406 F. Supp. at 948-951. The court of appeals did not

suggest that the issue presented in this case is other than

purely legal. See Pet. App. 17a & n.14, 20a n.15, 21a

(estoppel applied to “the constitutional issues decided in

68 Filipinos”); see also Barretto v. United States, 694

F.2d 603, 607 (9th Cir. 1982).'* Instead, the court below

simply asserted (Pet. App. 18a), in reliance on Montana,

that “[i]t is by now well settled * * * that collateral es-

toppel * * * may be invoked on * * * pure issues of law.”

Contrary to the court of appeals’ assertion, however,

Montana v. United States, supra, does not support this

sweeping proposition. It is true that the Court there up-

held the application of collatera] estoppe] to preclude de-

termination of a question of law. But the doctrine applied

in Montana was, in practical effect, res judicata. The

Court applied the collateral estoppel label because the

government had undertaken the first round of litigation

through a proxy (see page 23, infra). 440 U.S. at 154-

155. Moreover, the Court’s decision in Montana rests

upon its conclusion that the case entailed an effort to

relitigate a claim not meaningfully distinguishable from

that previously adjudicated. The Cuurt explained (440

U.S. at 163): “[T]he legal ‘demands’ of this litigation

are closely aligned in time and subject matter to those

1% The court of appeals’ decision in Barretto, which reaffirms and

extends its decision in this case, is reproduced in the appendix to the

government's reply brief in support of the petition in this case.

23

in [the prior case].”” The Court’s holding thus rests upon

the distinction, recognized in Moser itself, between re-

consideration of a “rule of law” announced in a prior

case “upon a different demand,” and redetermination of

“a fact, question or right distinctly adjudged in the ori-

ginal action.” Under Moser, as reaffirmed in Montana,

preclusion is impermissible in the former situation, but

permissible in the latter. 440 U.S. at 162-163, quoting

266 U.S. at 242.

The Court recognized in Montana (440 U.S. at 163)

that “the scope of the Moser exception may be difficult to

delineate, particularly where there is partial congruence

in the subject matter of successive disputes.” But in the

circumstances of this case there can be little doubt that

preclusion is improper, for respondent’s claim of eligi-

bility to become a naturalized citizen presents, by defini-

tion, a “different demand” from the separate naturaliza-

tion petitions of the individual petitioners in 68 Filipinos.

See Montana v. United States, supra, 440 U.S. at 154.

The rights of respondent were in no sense “distinctly ad-

judged” in the earlier litigation.

Of course, in Montana itself the Court applied preclu-

sion even though the plaintiff, the United States, had

not formally participated as a named party in the prior

adjudication. 440 U.S. at 155. The Court concluded that

there was no reason to prevent the operation of collateral

estoppel simply because the causes of action in successive

cases against the same defendant were technically dis-

tinct, because in the first action the government had liti-

gated by proxy, financing and controlling the earlier case.

Id. at 154-155. Here, however, respondent’s claim was

not presented vicariously or otherwise in the prior ac-

tion. There is accordingly no reason to treat that claim

as indistinguishable for preclusion purposes from the in-

dividual claims of the veterans that were before the dis-

24

class action of sorts, holding that the 68 Filipinos judg-

ment binds the United States as against any Filipino

veteran who may hereafter seek naturalization under

Section 701. But 68 Filipinos was not certified as a class

action and the government accordingly had no reason to

expect that its failure to prosecute the appeal in 68 Fili-

pinos would bind it in all future cases. See Baxter v.

Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 311 n.1 (1976). Thus, by

lending preclusive force to the legal holding of 68 Fili-

pinos in litigation brought by unrelated claimants, the

court of appeals upset the reasonable expectations of the

government as a litigant.

2. In treating the naturalization petitions of different

individuals as presenting a single “demand” for purposes

of the “unmixed question of law” exception to collateral

estoppel, the court of appeals also divorced collateral es-

toppel from the fundamental purposes served by the pre-

clusion doctrine: “protecting litigants from the burden

of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or

his privy” and “promoting judicial economy.” Parklane

Hosiery Vv. Shore, supra, 439 U.S. at 326. Plainly the

first of these purposes is not served by preclusion on the

legal issue in this case—respondent is not asked to bear

the burden of relitigating any issue that he has previ-

ously litigated. In fact, respondent cannot fairly be said

to bear any untoward burden at all; assuming that collat-

eral estoppel does not apply he will merely be required

to establish his qualifications for admission to United

States citizenship.

Judicial economy is likewise little served by preclusion

in the circumstances of this case, because no trial or

other evidentiary proceedings would have been required

to decide respondent’s legal claim. The underlying legal

issues were fully briefed and argued to the district court

and the court of appeals. To be sure, the courts below

were spared the labor of actually deciding the claim, but

any economy achieved is a false one. As we explain be-

low pages 30-34), if collateral estoppel bars redetermi-

25

nation of legal issues such as that presented here in sub-

sequent unrelated cases, the government will be obliged

to pursue appeals in an uncritical manner, abandoning

the selective appeal policy currently in effect, and im-

posing substantial burdens upon the courts of appeals

and this Court. In short, the court of appeals’ analysis

will retard rather than advance the pursuit of judicial

economy.

3. The underlying issue in this case—whether respond-

ent is entitled to naturalization because of an alleged

denial of due process in the administration of Section

702 in the Philippines in 1945 and 1946—is, of course,

one of constitutional law. Because Congress has no

power to correct the decision in 68 Filipinos by legisla-

tion, the effect of the court of appeals’ decision is espe-

cially onerous. And it is significant that the decision in

68 Filipinos, which is effectively accorded the force of a

decision of this Court by the decision below, trenches

upon the constitutional authority of the Executive to

conduct the foreign relations of the United States ( Art.

II, §2) and the authority of Congress to “establish a

uniform Rule of Naturalization” (Art. I, § 8, Cl. 4). Ace-

cordingly, the court’s warning against “[{u]nreflective in-

vocation of collateral estoppel against parties with an

ongoing interest in constitutional issues” (Montana v.

United States, supra, 440 U.S. at 163) applies with spe-

cial force here.

B. Collateral Estoppel Should Not Be Applied Against

The Government To Preclude Determination Of Re-

curring Questions Of Public Law

Any ambiguity in the application of the Moser excep-

tion to the issue preclusion doctrine is removed by con-

sideration of the additional circumstances that set this

case apart from Parklane Hosiery and Montana. As the

Court recognized in Montana, collateral estoppel is inap-

plicable whenever “special circumstances warrant an ex-

ception to the normal rules of preclusion.” 440 U.S. at

26

155. And in Parklane Hosiery, the Court stated that courts

should not apply collateral estoppel whenever for the rea-

sons there discussed or for any “other reasons, the appli-

cation of offensive [collateral] estoppel would be unfair

to a defendant.” 439 U.S. at 331. We submit that the

unique attributes and role of the United States as a liti-

gant strongly militate against application of the issue pre-

clusion doctrine to the government, particularly when it is

engaged in the uniquely sovereign function of enforcing

the public law.

1. This Court recognized these unique attributes in

Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980), in de

clining to apply the rule of nonmutual collateral estoppel

announced in Parklane Hosiery and Blonder-Tongue La-

boratories, Inc. Vv. University of Illinois Foundation, 402

U.S. 313 (1971), against the government in a criminal

case. The Court stated, in terms that are fully applicable

here (447 U.S. at 24-25):

Finally, this case involves an ingredient not present

in either Blonder-Tongue or Parklane Hosiery: the

important federal interest in the enforcement of the

criminal law. Blonder-Tongue and Parklane Hosiery

were disputes over private rights between private lit-

igants. In such cases, no significant harm flows from

enforcing a rule that affords a litigant only one full

and fair opportunity to litigate an issue, and there is

no sound reason for burdening the courts with repeti-

tive litigation.

That is not so here. The court of appeals put the

point well:

“(T]he purpose of a criminal court is not to pro-

vide a forum for the ascertainment of private

rights. Rather it is to vindicate the public inter-

est in the enforcement oi the criminal law while

at the same time safeguarding the rights of the

individual defendant. The public interest in the

accuracy and justice of criminal results is greater

27

than the concern for judicial economy professed

in civil cases and we are thus inclined to reject,

at least as a general matter, a rule that would

spread the effect of an erroneous acquittal to all

those who participated in a particular criminal

transaction. To plead crowded dockets as an ex-

cuse for not trying criminal! defendants is in our

view neither in the best interests of the courts,

nor the public.” 610 F.2d. at 1093.

In short, this criminal case involves “competing pol-

icy considerations” that outweigh the economy con-

cerns that undergird the estoppel doctrine.

The fact that this case is not a criminal prosecution

does not dilute the strength of the factors canvassed in

Standefer. Whenever the government acts in its sovereign

capacity to enforce the public laws, public policy dictates

the applicability of the Standefer analysis. This is es-

pecially so where, as here, the government acts to ensure

enforcement of the immigration and naturalization laws,

which this Court has recognized as “[a]n increasingly

important interest * * * of broad public concern.” INS Vv.

Miranda, No. 82-29 ‘Nov. 8, 1982), slip op. 5; see also

Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 506-507 (1981).

As the Court recognized in INS v. Hibi, supra, 414 US.

at 8: “{T)}he Government is not in a position identical

to that of a private litigant with respect to its enforce-

ment of laws enacted by Congress. * * * [I)n enforcing

the cutoff date established by Congress [in Section 701,

the INS] is enforcing public policy established by Con-

gress.”

Numerous practical and legal considerations, applicable

in criminal and non-criminal cases alike, also set the

United States apart from any other litigant and argue

strongly against the estoppel invoked by the court of ap-

peals. First, the government is involved in far more liti-

gation than any other party.” In 1982, for instance, the

2 In 1982, the United States was a party to 75,773 civil cases filed

in the United States District Courts, out of a total of 206, 193 filings.

Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report of

Solicitor General acted upon recommendations respecting

the desirability of appellate, en banc or certiorari review

of a decision adverse to the government in over 2,100

cases. Second, many of the issues of greatest public im-

portance, including constitutional issues, arise only in liti-

gation to which the government is a party: others are

characteristically associated with government litigation.

See American Medical International, Inc. v. Secretary of

HEW, 677 F.2d 118, 121 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Third,

the government, unlike other litigants, necessarily finds

itself in litigation presenting a particular legal issue in a

host of jurisdictions—indeed potentially ‘and not uncom-

monly) in every district and circuit. In such cases, which

include the present one, the potential unfairness of invok-

ing the preclusion doctrine absent mutuality ‘see Park-

lane Hosiery Co. Vv. Shore, supra, 439 U.S. at 330 & n.14)

is necessarily present, for there is a substantial likelihood

that in litigating a recurring issue, the government will

at some point encounter an adverse decision.

Because of these unique attributes of government litiga-

tion, application of collateral estoppel in the circumstances

of cases such as the present one would substantially dis-

rupt the existing process of development of the public law.

In that system courts of coordinate rank are not bound by

each other’s decisions on questions of law. See, e¢.g., Frock

v. United States Railroad Retirement Board, 685 F.2d

1041, 1046 (7th Cir. 1982) (“Federal appellate courts

can, and do, differ in their conclusions as to the law * * *”

(footnote omitted)). Instead, the courts apply the more

flexible doctrine of stare decisis, and give such persuasive

effect as is due in a particular case to the decisions of

coordinate courts from other jurisdictions and the decisions

the Director 98 (1982). In the same year the United States was a

party to 5,517 of 18,784 civil cases appealed from the district courts

to the courts of appeals as well as 4,767 criminal appeals and 3,118

original actions to review the decision of an administrative agency.

Id. at 79, 82.

29

of inferior courts.“ The law emerges through the hiera-

chical process of appeal, en banc review and, in proper

cases, certiorari.

Issue preclusion in private litigation—even if extended

to legal questions—ordinarily does not unduly undermine

this process of development of the law because no sin-

gle litigant is party to more than a small fraction of fac-

tually unrelated cases presenting a common legal question.

By contrast, the government is characteristically, if not

invariably, a party to litigation on public law questions.

Accordingly, application of collateral estoppel when the

government has unsuccessfully litigated a question of law

in any court inferior to this one would freeze the develop-

ment of the law. Yet this Court has repeatedly recognized

the value of allowing independent consideration of legal

issues by the various courts of appeals. See, e¢.g., Califano

v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979); E.J. duPont de

Nemours & Co. Vv. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 185 & n.26

(1977). Of course, that practice is a centerpiece of the

Court’s scheme for administering its certiorari jurisdic-

tion. Sup. Ct. R. 17.1/a).#

Like the Second Circuit in Olegario ‘see pages 13-14,

supra), the courts of appeals have generally recognized

that these considerations preclude application of collateral

21 The court of appeals’ suggestion (Pet. App. 17a) that the con-

siderations we have canvassed might be more weighty when an

issue arises in two different circuits simply illustrates the court’s

failure to recognize the difference between collateral estoppel and

stare decisis. Under the court of appeals’ analysis the decision of a

single district court may be binding upon a court of appeals, while

the authority of decisions of one or more courts of appeals, even

those rendered en banc, may be regarded as merely persuasive.

2 On those rare occasions when Congress has wished to make the

decision of a single court of appeals respecting a particular issue

final save only for review by this Court, it has done so explicitly, by

designating a single forum for litigation of questions of nationwide

importance. See, ¢.g., Section 211/b)(1) of the Economic Stabiliza-

tion Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. 1904 note; Section 307(b) (1) of the

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 7607(b) (1).

80

estoppel to the government on recurring legal issues.

American Medical International, Inc. v. Secretary of

HEW, supra, 677 F.2d at 121-124; Western Oil & Gas

Ass’n V. EPA, 633 F.2d 803, 808 (9th Cir. 1980) ; Divine

v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974). The

American Law Institute also Nas recognized that preclu-

sion is inappropriate when

The issue is one of law and treating it as conclusively

determined would inappropriately foreclose opportu-

nity for obtaining reconsideration of the legal rule

upon which it was based * * *.

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29/7) (1980).

Thus, when “the party against whom the rule of preclu-

sion is to be applied is a government agency responsible

for continuing administration of a body of law applicable

to many similarly situated persons * * * the rule of pre-

clusion should ordinarily be superseded by the less limit-

ing principle of stare decisis.” Id. at § 29 comment i; see

also id. at § 28(2) & comment c.~

2. Furthermore, invocation of collateral estoppel against

the government on legal issues of public importance is in-

appropriate because, through the Office of the Solicitor

General, the government, unlike any other litigant, em-

ploys a formal mechanism for determining whether to take

an appeal from or seek certiorari review of an adverse

judgment. See 28 C.F.R. 0.20. This process is rather se-

lective, particularly at the certiorari stage.** Moreover,

23 The Restatement also cautions against use of collateral estoppel

“when the issue was determined in the first action by a trial court

and in the second action will probably be taken to an appellate

court,” and when “the issue is of general interest and has not been

resolved by the highest appellate court that can resolve it.” Restate-

ment (Second) of Judgments, § 29 comment i. The decision of the

court of appeals disregards these strictures as well.

24In 1982 the Solicitor General decided against appeal to a court

of appeals from an adverse district court judgment in 621 of the

1,118 cases submitted for his consideration. Moreover, notwithstand-

ing the substantial volume of appellate litigation in which the gov-

31

to a degree not approached by any private party, the gov-

ernment regularly takes into account factors other than

its narrow interest in prevailing in a particular lawsuit

in determining whether to seek further judicial review.

As a result, the Solicitor General frequently decides against

appeal or certiorari, in cases where the legal conclusions

of the deciding court are believed to be erroneous.” Such

decisions rest upon a host of other factors, including: a

substantial measure of prosecutorial discretion, equitable

and policy considerations, the perceived practical impor-

tance of the decision, recognition of the limited resources

of the government and sensitivity to crowded dockets of

the courts.** As we have explained above (pages 11-12 &

note 12), the decision not to pursue an appeal in 68 Fili-

pinos was just such a decision.

The fact that the Solicitor General authorized with-

drawal of the appeal in 68 Filipinos does not affect the

ernment is engaged (see page 28 note 20, supra), the Solicitor Gen-

eral authorized filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari in only

64 of the 579 cases in which formal consideration was given to

seeking such review in 1982.

*% The Solicitor General often acquiesces in the grant of a petition

for a writ of certiorari to review a judgment favorable to the United

States where a conflict between the circuits has developed. In many

such instances, the conflicting decision adverse to the government is

one that, although regarded as (and later held by this Court to be)

erroneous, did not provoke the filing of a petition for a writ of cer-

tiorari. See, ¢.g., Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 479 (1981); Stead-

man V. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 95 (1981); Lewis v. United States, 445

U.S. 55, 58 & n.4 (1980). See also Tuten v. United States, No. 81-

6756 (Mar. 30, 1983), slip op. 3 n.3.

26 See, e.g., Note, The Solicitor General and Intragovernmental

Conflict, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 324, 324-330 (1977) ; Carrington, United

States Appeals in Civil Cases, 11 Hous. L. Rev. 1101, 1101-1105

(1974); Bork, The Problems and Pleasures of Being Solicitor Gen-

eral, 42 A.B.A. Antitrust L. J. 701 (1973) ; Note, Government Liti-

gation in the Supreme Court: The Roles of the Solicitor General,

78 Yale L. J. 1442, 1453-1457 (1969); Sobeloff, Attorney for the

Government: The Work of the Solicitor General's Office, 41 A.B.A.J.

229 (1955).

proper analysis here. The United States, even as a liti-

gant, does not abandon its role as the government. JNS

v. Hibi, supra, 414 U.S. at 8. As this Court has remarked,

“{t}here is, of course, no rule of law to the effect that the

Government must be consistent in its stance in litigation

over the years. It has changed positions before.” Barrett

v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 222 n.6 (1976). See also

NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 351 (1978) ; Dixon

v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 70-75 (1965) ; Automobile

Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 183 (1957). As this

case illustrates, the political process by which the United

States changes policies from time to time in a democratic

society is itself a powerful reason to preclude collateral

estoppel against the government on matteis of public law.

Indeed, the decision of the court of appeals permits one

administration to bind its successors even on questions of

constitutional law. Contrary to respondent’s suggestion

(Br. in Opp. 13), the government did not in any relevant

sense “concede[] the validity of the district court’s judg-

ment” by withdrawing the appeal in 68 Filipinos. Of

course, the government thereby bound itself not to chal-

lenge the judgment itself (see Federated Department

Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981) )—an obligation the

government has more than fulfilled (see p.ge 12 note 13,

supra)—but it did not acquiesce thereby in the correct-

ness of the district court’s legal ruling.”

Nor is there any anomaly in the Department of Jus-

tice’s reconsideration of its legal position on naturaliza-

tion of Filipino veterans. The present position of the

United States is quite simply that 68 Filipinos was wrongly

decided; the withdrawal of the earlier appeal did not

reflect any different view. Respondent’s suggestion (Br.

27“The estoppel doctrine,” as this Court noted in Standefer v.

United States, supra, 447 U.S. at 23 n.18, “is premised upon an

underlying confidence that the result achieved in the initial litigation

was substantially correct.” As this case shows, the government’s

failure to seek appellate review is not an accurate indicator that the

adverse decision was correctly decided. See also page 31 & note

25, supra.

33

in Opp. 14), echoing the court of appeals ‘Pet. App. 12a,

13a, 15a), that the government has not adequately justi-

fied its change in position assumes that the United States

has an obligation to justify its litigating conduct to the

courts. That assumption is inconsistent with fundamental

principles of our adversary system of justice, see Hickman

v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-512 (1947); cf. 5 U.S.C.

552(\b) (5); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26/b) (3), and raises serious

questions of separation of powers.

The government’s practice of selective pursuit of appel-

late review benefits the public interest and facilitates sound

judicial management. Adoption of the broad preclusion

rule applied by the court of appeals would compel the

United States to reconsider this salutary practice. In-

stead, the government would be obliged to consider an in-

flexible policy of appealing ‘and even seeking certiorari

on) the first adverse decision rendered on a legal issue

lest further review be foreclosed. See Olegario v. United

States, supra, 629 F.2d at 215. As a result, the courts of

appeals and this Court would be burdened prematurely

and unnecessarily, and judicial economy—the touchstone

of the preclusion doctrine—would be disserved. More-

2% United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 684 F.21 1174 (6th Cir.

1982) (“Stauffer IJ”), cert. granted, No. 82-1448 (Apr. 18, 1983),

well illustrates these considerations. There the court of appeals held

that the government was collaterally estopped on a question of inter-

pretation of a provision of the Clean Air Act by the decision of the

Tenth Circuit on the same issue in Stauffer Chemical Co. v. United

States, 647 F.2d 1075 (1981), aff’'g 14 Env’t Rep. Cases 1737 (D.

Wyo. 1980) (“Stauffer I”), notwithstanding the contrary decision

of the Ninth Circuit on that same issue in Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA,

658 F.2d 1280 (1981), aff’'g Civ. No. 80-2087 (D. Idaho Oct. 15,

1980). The Sixth Circuit commented (684 F.2d at 1181):

If EPA really believed that the decision of the Tenth Circuit in

Stauffer I was wrong, it could have petitioned the Supreme

Court for certiorari, but it did not avail itself of that remedy,

and it is too late to do so now. EPA cannot collaterally attack

the Tenth Circuit decision in the present case.

It is true that the government did not seek certiorari in Stauffer I.

But at the time the case us decided there was no conflicting deci-

34

over, because of the limited docket of this Court, and the

proliferation of statutes and litigation in recent years,

constructions of the law that this Court might ultimately

determine to be erroneous would more often be given fi-

nality. See, e.g., North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456

U.S. 512 (1982) ‘rejecting the view of four courts of

appeals); United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S.

32 (1976) ‘rejecting the view of three courts of appeals) ;

NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507

(1977) ‘rejecting the view of five courts of appeals).

Plainly, there is no interest served by invocation of col-

lateral estoppel in the circumstances of this case that

would justify these detrimental consequences.”

3. Contrary to respondent’s contention (Br. in Opp.

5-7) and the view of the court of appeals ‘ Pet. App. 18a),

Montana Vv. United States, supra, does not support the ap-

plication of collateral estoppel in the circumstances of this

case. As explained above ‘pages 21-25), this case, un-

like Montana itself, plainly calls for the application of the

“unmixed question of law” exception to the doctrine of

issue preclusion.*”” Montana is also distinguishable be-

sion of any court of appeals. Moreover, the pendency in the Ninth

Circuit of Bunker Hill—an appeal from a district court decision

favorable to the government on the statutory question—together

with the pendency in the Sixth Circuit of Stauffer’s appeal from the

district court decision in Stauffer J] that also favored the govern-

ment necessarily counseled against application to this Court for fur-

ther review in Stauffer J]. Any other course would have disserved

both the Court and those litigants who compete for a spot on its

limited docket.

# At a minimum there is no basis for the court of appeals’ asser-

tion (Pet. App. 15a) that “[i]t should have come as no surprise to

the government” that Judge Renfrew’s decision in 68 Filipinos

would reach the claim of every Filipino veteran. As noted above,

68 Filipinos was not a class action. Moreover, Parklane Hosiery had

not been decided at the time the 64 Filipinos appeal was withdrawn.

* As explained below (pages 39-42), the applicability of the

Moser exception is especially clear here for the additional reason

that the facts of this case are materially different from those ad-

dressed in 68 Filipinos.

35

cause the circumstances presented there may essentially

have called for application of res judicata principles.

More fundamentally, the policy and practical considera-

tions we have outlined above (pages 25-34) had little ap-

plication in Montana, for the issue presented in that case

could arise in only two forums—the Montana state courts

and the United States District Court for Montana. This

consideration is especially significant because in Montana,

unlike here, the government had engaged in conduct

that may implicate the core concerns underlying the pre-

clusion doctrine. It had litigated the issue to a conclu-

sion in the Supreme Court of Montana, noted an appeal

to this Court, then dismissed the appeal and pursued its

parallel action in the federal court. The federal action,

moreover, was filed just after the action in state court

had been filed, and was stayed upon the government’s

stipulation pending resolution of the state court litigation.

Montana is further disinguishable because the issue there

was not one involving a body of law applicable to a class

of similarly situated persors, but one affecting the pro-

prietary interest of the United States. Accordingly, the

government did not argue in Montana, as it does here,

that application of the preclusion doctrine was inappro-

priate in light of its special attributes and responsibilities,

and the Court’s opinion does not reflect any view respect-

ing our present contentions.

4. Both the court of appeals (Pet. App. 19a) and re-

spondent (Br. in Opp. 12, 16) appear to acknowledge that

collateral estoppel should not be applied against the gov-

ernment in some cases presenting legal issues. But be-

cause the court below saw no “ ‘critical’ need for redeter-

mination” of the underlying constitutional issue (Pet.

App. 19a), saw no “compelling public interest in opposing

the naturalization” of persons such as respondent (id. at

20a) and believed that the equities favored respondent

(id. at 20a-21a), it held that the government was pre-

cluded from relitigating the constitutional issues pre-

36

sented here. None of these considerations justifies the

court of appeals’ decision.

The court of appeals’ necessarily subjective conclusions

regarding the “critical need for redetermination” and

“compelling public interest” provide no standard for ac-

curate prediction of which legal rulings, if not appealed by

the government, would be given collateral estoppel effect

in the future. Nor has respondent identified any objective

criterion that could guide the government in its litigating

decisions in the wake of the decision below. Because it is

too late to reconsider whether to appeal by the time a

court has decided in a subsequent case that a prior deci-

sion is binding, the decision of the court of appeals places

the government in an unacceptable position. The court of

appeals has arrogated to itself a standardless discretion to

determine with the benefit of hindsight whether a fresh

determination of the merits of a particular legal issue is

in the public interest (see Pet. App. 20a).

In any event, the court of appeals erred in concluding

that determination of the merits of the instant case is

unwarranted. As explained above (page 27), the deci-

sions of this Court, including Hihi, reflect that the en-

forcement of the naturalization laws in every individual

case is of utmost public importance. The district court’s

holding in 68 Filipinos that the actions of an Attorney

General, taken for foreign policy reasons that the court

acknowledged to be valid, violated the Due Process Clause

is necessarily significant, without regard for the number

of persons involved or the court of appeals’ assessment of

the equities. Moreover, while this Court’s decision in Hibi

makes clear that the equitable considerations mentioned

by the court below are irrelevant to the merits of respond-

ent’s claim, it is particularly clear that these equities have

no place in the calculus of decision where the issue is not

whether respondent is entitled to naturalization, but only

whether the United States is foreclosed from securing an

adjudication of that question.

37

C. The Court of Appeals’ Decision Disregards Other

Established Limitations on the Issue Preclusion

Doctrine

We have explained thus far that, because of the unique

role of the government in enforcing the public law, non-

mutual collateral estoppel on issues of law should never be

applied against the United States. But even if that were

not so generally, and Parklane Hosiery were regarded as

controlling in government litigation, the court of appeals

erred in approving application of that doctrine here.

1, The Court emphasized in Parklane Hosiery that the

doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel must always be

applied selectively and cautiously. 439 U.S. at 329-331.

The Court mentioned, for example, that issue preclusion

would be inappropriate when “the judgment relied upon

as a basis for the estoppel is itself inconsistent with one

or more previous judgments in favor of the defendant.”

Id. at 330; footnote omitted. Here, as the court of ap-

peals acknowledged (Pet. App. 16a), Judge Renfrew’s

decision conflicts with the Second Circuit’s subsequent

decision in Olegario. See pages 13-14, supra. In addition,

decisions inconsistent with 68 Filipinos were rendered in

In re Kapili, 473 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. N.Y. 1979); In re

Naturalization of Inton, No. SA-79-CA-284 (W.D. Tex.

July 3, 1980) ; Pangilinan v. INS, Pet. No. 251849 (N.D.

Cal. Sept. 24, 1980); Barretto v. United States, Pet. No.

248806 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 1980), and Litonjua v. INS,

Pet. No. 23358-GT (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 1981). In view of

this division of authority, the court of appeals should have

taken an independent look at the merits of respondent’s

constitutional claim.

Of course, the district court decisions in the last three

cases mentioned above were reversed by the Ninth Circuit,

in reliance upon the decision in this case, citing stare

decisis as the governing principle. Barretto v. United

States, supra, 694 F.2d at 607." But at the time the dis-

%1In Barretto the court of appeals considered the naturalization

applications of 16 Filipino “Category II” war veterans resting, like

trict court decisions in Pangilinan, Barretto, and Litonjua

were rendered, the Second Circuit’s decision in Olegario

created a precedent in conflict with 68 Filipinos. (By

contrast, Olegario had not been decided when the district

court ruled in the present case, although it had been de-

cided prior to the time the court of appeals rendered its

own decision.) Although the Ninth Circuit in Barretto

refused to hold that the district courts’ rejection of col-

lateral estoppel was erroneous (694 F.2d at 607 n.9), the

court of appeals, quite properly concerned about consist-

ency of decision between this case and Barretto, invoked

stare decisis to achieve the same result. In extending the

holding of this case by means of stare decisis to cover

cases first decided after Olegario, however, the court of

appeals highlighted its original error in invoking colla-

teral estoppel in this case.

The dilemma faced by the court of appeals in Barretto

was of its own making. Because the claim presented in

this case arises under a scheme of public law applicable

to a class of persons, it was foreseeable (if not inevitable)

when the court decided this case that cases such as Bar-

retto would arise. Rather than employing stare decisis to

extend the troublesome holding of this case to cover cir-

cumstances where the application of collateral estoppel

was properly rejected by the district court, the court of

appeals should have recognized that the very policies of

“consistency and fairness” it invoked in Barretto (694

F.2d at 607) required it to reach the merits in the present

case, rather than relying upon the artifice of collateral

estoppel.

2. Other factors also should have precluded any estoppel

here. As we have noted (page 15 & note 17), the court of

appeals rested its decision entirely upon the preclusive

respondent Mendoza’s, upon Sections 701-705 of the 1940 Act and

the due process theory endorsed by the district court in 68 Fili-

pinos. The facts and proceedings in Barretto are described in

detail in our reply brief in support of the petition in this case

(at 2-5).

effect of 68 Filipinos, even though significant legal con-

tentions not addressed by Judge Renfrew in that case

were presented by the government throughout the litiga-

tion of respondent’s claim. The court of appeals thus ef-

fectively applied the broader res judicata (“claim preclu-

sion”) doctrine, rather than collateral estoppel, to bar all

arguments the United States might raise in answer to

respondent’s claim. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,

94 & n.5 (1980). There can be no justification for the

court of appeals’ refusal to consider legal arguments that

might have been, but were not, addressed in 68 Filipinos.

Among the points the court of appeals simply did not

address were arguments that respondent's claim is ex-

pressly barred by 8 U.S.C. 1421(e) and by laches, and

that respondent is not entitled to naturalization because

he suffered no prejudice, which is an essential] element

of any due process claim. The government also made ad-

ditional arguments, not considered in 68 F ilipinos, that

respondent’s due process claim cannot be reconciled with

this Court’s decision in Hibi. The issues raised by the

government that the court of appeals ignored are impor-

tant ones, not previously litigated, that bear upon the uni-

form'ty and Stability of administration of our nation’s

naturalization laws, the availability of judicial oversight

of executive action in the sensitive sphere of foreign rela-

tions, and the stare decisis effect of this Court’s rulings.

Accordingly, the court of appeals’ failure to limit the

Scope of collateral estoppel to those issues actually liti-

gated and determined in a prior action is particularly

troublesome.

3a. An equally remarkable feature of the decision below

is the court’s conclusion (Pet. App. lla-12a n.8) that

respondent’s residence in Pennsylvania during most of the

time a naturalization examiner was absent from the

Philippines does not serve to distinguish him sufficiently

from the petitioners in 68 Filipinos to require an inde-

pendent determination of his right to naturalization. It

is fundamental that collateral estoppel has no application

40

where the facts of successive cases are in material respects

different. Montana v. United States, supra, 440 U.S. at

158-159; Commissioner V. Sunnen, supra, 333 U.S. at 601.

While we question whether any person who made no

effort to avail himself of the opportunity for naturaliza-

tion provided by Section 701 of the 1940 Nationality Act

should be heard to complain of the temporary absence of

a naturalization official from the Philippines, it is far

clearer that persons such as respondent can make no such

claim. And even if, as the court of appeals thought, the

facts of this case “implicate” respondent’s due process

rights (Pet. App. 12a n.8; emphasis added), there is no

reason whatever to conclude that the holding of 68 Fili-

pinos, which takes no account of these facts, precludes a

determination whether those rights were actually violated.

By invoking collateral estoppel, the court of appeals thus

failed to discharge its duty to determine whether, on the

facts of this case, respondent is entitled to naturalization

under the laws of the United States.*

b. Again the court of appeals’ error is highlighted by

its subsequent decision in Barretto. In that case individ-

ual petitioner Barretto, unlike the 15 other naturaliza-

tion petitioners whose claims were considered, had filed

his naturalization petition prior to withdrawal of the

appeal in 68 Filipinos. He thus arguably fell within the

grandfather rule applied by the Solicitor General in cases

arising before that date ‘see page 12 note 13, supra).

Barretto’s naturalization petition was nevertheless opposed

by the INS because he could establish no prejudice resulting

from the manner in which Section 702 had been admin-

istered in the Philippines. Barretto had spent the period

February 1945 through June 10, 1946, in the United

32 Because of the differences between the facts of this case and

those considered in 68 Filipinos, this case, unlike Montana v. United

States, supra, 440 U.S. at 163, plainly calls for application of the

“unmixed question of law” exception to the doctrine of issue preclu-

sion. See pages 20-25, supra.

41

States undergoing flight training, and had actually filed

a preliminary application for naturalization under the

1940 Act while in the United States. That application

had evidently been rejected because it lacked the neces-

sary signature of his commanding officer. Twenty days

after his return to the Philippines, Barretto was dis-

charged from the United States armed forces and be-

came ineligible for overseas naturalization under Section

702 of the 1940 Act. He thus was stationed in the Philip-

pines for only 20 days when naturalization there under

Section 702 was impossible because of the absence of a

naturalization official.

The court of appeals nevertheless held that Barretto’s

situation was indistinguishable from that of other Cate-

gory II veterans who filed their petitions in time to avail

themselves of the “grandfather rule,” and that Mendoza

required that Barretto’s petition be granted. 694 F.2d at

608-609. The court explained ‘id. at 608; emphasis

added} :

In Mendoza we found that Dr. Mendoza’s presence in

the Philippines for as much as three months, after

having been in the United States for several months,

was sufficient to implicate Dr. Mendoza’s due process

rights, 672 F.2d at 1326 n.8; we know of no princi-

pled basis—and the government offers none—for draw-

ing a line between three months in Dr. Mendoza’s

case and three weeks in this case. If the govern-

ment’s conduct violated the constitutional rights of

Filipinos serving in the United States armed forces

in the Philippines, it violated their rights whether

they were in the Philippines for nine months or nine

days.

The court of appeals’ holding that neither respondent

nor Barretto is situated sufficiently differently from the

Category II veterans in 68 Filipinos to warrant an in-

dividualized determination of his rights is nothing short

of bizarre. Barretto was deprived of the opportunity for

overseas naturalization for only 20 days, had ample op-

portunity for naturalization in the United States, and

actually made such an application. Despite these material

distinctions from 68 Filipinos, the court of appeals or-

dered the government to grant Barretto’s naturalization

petition, even though the district court had found, after

reaching the merits, that he was not entitled to that bene-

fit. The court of appeals’ decision in this case thus indi-

cates that all Filipino veterans are entitled to naturaliza-

tion notwithstanding the absence of any showing of prej-

udice in a particular case. That result squarely conflicts

with this Court’s teaching that a showing of prejudice is

a necessary element of a due process claim. See Lnited

States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, No. 81-450 ‘July 2, 1982),

slip op. 10.

4. A final factor that should have caused the courts

below to eschew reliance upon collateral estoppel and to

make a fresh determination of the merits is the substan-

tial tension between the holding of 68 Filipinos and this

Court’s decision in Hibi. In Hibi this Court confronted

a claim identical to respondent’s in all respects, except

one—the label attached to the legal theory employed,

which has now been changed from “estoppel” to “denial of

due process”. But the Court’s conclusion in Hibi, stated

without qualification, was that Hibi’s “effort to claim

naturalization under a statute which by its terms had

expired more than 20 years before he filed his lawsuit

must * * * fail.” 414 U.S. at 9. Moreover, neither the

Court’s opinion nor the argument of Hibi’s counsel was

dependent upon the technica] elements of equitable estop-

pel doctrine. On the contrary, the argument advanced by

Hibi and rejected by this Court is not meaningfully dis-

tinguishable from the arguments later adopted in 68 Fili-

pinos.**

33 In this Court Hibi argued that under Section 701 the INS had

an absolute duty to make naturalization possible for servicemen eli-

gible under Section 701 except where wartime conditions made that

impractical(Memo. in Opp. at 3-5, INS v. Hibi, No. 72-1652 (1973

Term) ); that the Attorney General impermissibly “single'd) out

Filipino soldiers in the Philippines * * * to deny to all of them the

It is difficult to reconcile Judge Renfrew’s conclusion

in 68 Filipinos that Attorney Genera] Clark’s actions de-

nied due process of law to Filipino veterans with this

Court’s conclusion (414 U.S. at 8-9) that the very same

actions did not constitute “affirmative misconduct.” For

present purposes, however, we need not conclude that Hibi

is dispositive of the merits of respondent's claim. It is

enough to conclude that due regard for the authority of

this Court’s decisions required the district court and court

of appeals in this case to treat the decision in 68 Filipinos

as one at least potentially “inconsistent with * * * [a]

previous judgment!) in favor of” the United States

(Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, supra, 439 U.S. at 330),

and thus to consider respondent's claim against the United

States on its merits.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be re-

versed.

Respectfully submitted.

Rex E. Lee

Solicitor General

KENNETH S. GELLER

Deputy Solicitor General

JosHva I. SCHWARTZ

Assistant to the Solicitor General

May 1983

opportunity to accept the offer of citizenship tendered them by Con-

gress” (id. at 6; emphasis added) ; that the Executive’s action vio-

lated the principle of separation of powers: and that the Executive

“failed to obey his constitutional mandate to enforce the laws”

(ibid.; emphasis added). Hibi also disavowed any narrow or tech-

nical construction of his “equitable estoppel” claim, arguing that

“Ce]quitable estoppel is only the name for a legal principle employed

by the courts below to enforce [the] promise” to alien servicemen

said to be contained in Section 701 (Mem. in Opp. at 12).

la

APPENDIX

STATUTES AND REGULATION INVOLVED

1. 28 C.F.R. 0.20 provides in pertinent part:

The following-described matters are assigned to,

and shall be conducted, handled, or supervised by

the Solicitor General, in consultation with each

agency or official concerned:

(b) Determining whether, and to what extent, ap-

peals will be taken by the Government to all

appellate courts (including petitions for rehear-

ing en bane and petitions to such courts for the

issuance of the extraordinary writs) * * *.

2. Sections 701, 702, and 705 of the Nationality Act

of 1940, as amended, ch. 199, 56 Stat. 182-183, 8 U.S.C.

(Supp. V 1945) 1001, 1002 and 1005, provided in per-

tinent part: '

Sec. 701. * * * [A]ny person not a citizen regard-

less of age, who has served or hereafter serves hon-

orably in the military or naval forces of the United

States during the present war and Who shall have

been at the time of his enlistment or induction a

resident thereof and who (a) was lawfully admitted

into the United States, including its Territories and

possessions, or (b) having entered the United States,

including its Territories and possessions, prior to

September 1, 1943, being unable to establish lawful

admission into the United States serves honorably in

such forces beyond the continental limits of the

United States or has so served may be naturalized

upon compliance with all the requirements of the

1 The Nationality Act of 1940 was repealed by Section 403(a) (42)

of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414,

66 Stat. 280.

2a

naturalization laws except that (1) no declaration

of intention, no certificate of arrival for those de-

scribed in group (b) hereof, and no period of resi-

dence within the United States or any State shall

be required; (2) the petition for naturalization may

be filed in any court having naturalization jurisdic-

tion regardless of the residence of the petitioner;

(3) the petitioner shall not be required to speak the

English language, sign his petition in his own hand-

writing, or meet any educational test; * * * Pro-

vided, however, That * * * the petition shall be filed

not later than December 31, 1946. * * *

Sec. 702. During the present war, any person en-

titled to naturalization under Section 701 of this

Act, who while serving honorably in the military

* * * forces of the United States is not within the

jurisdiction of any court authorized to naturalize

aliens, may be naturalized in accordance with all

the applicable provisions of section 701 without ap-

pearing before a naturalization court. The petition

for naturalization of any petitioner under this sec-

tion shall be made and sworn to before, and filed

with, a representative of the Immigration and Nat-

uralization Service designated by the Commissioner

or a Deputy Commissioner, which designated repre-

sentative is hereby authorized to receive such peti-

tion in behalf of the Service, to conduct hearings

thereon, to take testimony concerning any matter

touching or in any way affecting the admissibility

of any such petitioner for naturalization, to call

witnesses, to administer oaths, including the oath

of the petitioner and his witnesses to the petition

for naturalization and the oath of renunciation and

allegiance prescribed by section 335 of this Act, and

to grant naturalization, and to issue certificates of

citizenship; * * *

3a

Sec. 705. The Commissioner, with the approval of

the Attorney General, shall prescribe and furnish

such forms and shal] make such rules and regula-

tions, as may be necessary to carry into effect the

provisions of this Act.

3. Section 310(e) of the Immigration and Nationality

Act of 1952, as added by Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 656,

8 U.S.C. 1421(e), provides:

Notwithstanding the provisions of section 405

(a)'! any petition for naturalization filed on or

after September 21, 1961, shall be heard and deter-

mined in accordance with the requirements of this

subchapter.

2 Section 405(a) of the Immigration ard Nationality Act of 1962,

. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 280, was a general savings clause that

the legal effectiveness of certain acts taken under provi-

prior law that were in other respects superseded by the

iF

of

Act.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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