Amicus Brief — Ohio v. Kovacs
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OCTOBER TERM, 1982
IN RE: WILLIAM LEE KOVACS,
Debtor,
STATE OF OHIO,
Petitioner-A ppellant,
V
WILLIAM LEE Kovacs, d/b/a B& W ENTERPRISES;
HAMILTON INDUSTRIAL REAL ESTATE COMPANY;
RESORT RENTALS; and WHITCO ENTERPRISES,
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit
BRIEF OF COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
AND FOURTEEN STATES AS AMICI CURIAE
Leroy S. ZIMMERMAN
Attorney General of Pennsylvania
1641 Strawberry Square
Harrisburg, PA 17120
Telephone: (717) 787-3391
JAMES D. Morris *
Assistant Counsel
Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Resources
Suite 1200—1315 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19107
Telephone: (215) 875-7486
HOWARD J. WEIN
Assistant Counsel
Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Resources
1200 Kossman Building
100 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Telephone: (412) 565-5363
* Counsel of Record for Amici Curiae
WILSON - Eres PrintinG Co., Inc. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001
RECITATION PURSUANT TO RULE 284(b) OF THE
RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES
Because the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seg., an Act of Congress,
is drawn in question by the instant brief, and because
neither the United States nor any department, office,
agency, officer or employee of the United States is a
party to this proceeding, 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) may be
applicable and a true and correct copy of the instant
brief has been served upon the Solicitor General, De-
partment of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530.
In this proceeding from the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, a court of the United States as defined by 28
U.S.C. § 451, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has not
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) certified to the Attorney
General the fact that the constitutionality of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 101 et seg., is drawn in
question.
(i)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Recitation Pursuant to Rule 28.4(b) of the Rules of
the Supreme Court of the United States
e saeatelenelniea derembeaeh tiadachiesatiatie
The Interest of the Amici Curia
Fe satcemeaiicdiemniiiienaaniies
In conflict with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
the Sixth Circuit has erroneously applied the auto-
matic stay to state police power actions ..................
The decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
will prevent the amici and the State of Ohio from
protecting their citizens from the hazards caused
by violations of stu ve police power enactments by
bankrupts despite the requirements of the Tenth
Amendment, 28 U.S.C. §959(b) and 11 U.S.C.
89900
In conflict with the decision of this Court in
Northern Pipeline Construction Company v. Mara-
thon Pipeline Company, 103 S. Ct. 199 (1982),
the Sixth Circuit has sanctioned the exercise of the
judicial power of the United States under Ariicle
III of the Constitution by an Article I judge
EESTI e OT EDN eR ea E aS
Appendix A In re: Penn Terra Limited, No. 82-845
(Western District of Pennsylvania)
Memorandum Opinion, Order and Judg-
ment dated November 4, 19822
Appendix B United Stutes, et al. v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corporation, et al. (District of
New Hampshire) Order dated Novem-
gS RR ee
iv
10
13
la
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page
Gillis v. California, 293 U.S. 62 (1934) 10
In re: Penn Terra Limited, Bankruptcy No. 82-
Be CI SD deci ccciarnlncnsconssensnentintonsnssseeceneed 4,7,12
In re: Reddale Company, Inc., Reddale Resources,
Inc., E. C. Dean Contractor, Inc., Bankruptcy
Nos. 79-330, 79-331 and 79-332 (Benkruptcy
R 6
In re: Saugus General Hospital, 4 BCD 1160, 19
CBC 651, 1 CBC 2d 26 (D. Mass. 1978) 6
Northern Pipeline Construction Company v. Mara-
thon Pipeline Company, 103 S. Ct. 199 (1982) 3, 10,
11, 12,13
Securities and Exchange Commission v. First Fi-
nancial Group of Texas, 645 F.2d 429 (5th Cir.
JJ ⁰Ä—I—— A 3
Queenside Hills Realty v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946) 6
United States, et al. v. Johns-Manville Sales Cor-
poration, et al., Civil No. 81-299-D (D. New
rr. 4, 7, 12
Statutes:
Federal:
I I 3,11, 12, 13
// 3, 11, 12, 13
I rr 3, 5, 6, 13
r 1 2, 11
— FFE rr 2, 3, 5, 13
I ne 8
J J Ee 3, 5, 9, 13
r 3, 5, 10, 13
r SEES ra As Oe 11. 12
e csentespunsbigien 4. 12
F crcciseiatinns 7
e a eC 7
. 17 3 7
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
i
Pennsylvania:
Be re IE
48, £50 f fo > ae
ff. § | ¥ 5 YS
3. GO — (ma! eeere ene
Fo BFF ......
ILIE ee
Other:
Wein, Environmental Regulation and the Bank-
ruptey Act, 17 Duq. L. Rev. 133 (1978-1979) 7
>
AAMAAAA
In THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1982
Case No. 82-815
IN RE: WILLIAM LEE Kovacs,
Debtor,
STATE OF OHIO,
Petitioner-A ppellant,
v.
WILLIAM LER Kovacs, d/b/a B & W ENTERPRISES;
HAMILTON INDUSTRIAL REAL ESTATE COMPANY;
RESORT RENTALS; and WHITCO ENTERPRISES,
Respondent-A ppellee.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit
BRIEF OF COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
AND FOURTEEN STATES AS AMICI CURIAE
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the states of
California, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri,
New York, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin file
this brief as amici curiae pursuant to Rule 36.4 of the
Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.
2
THE INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE
The amici curiae are the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania and the states of California, Connecticut, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Vermont, West Vir-
ginia and Wisconsin. The common interest of the amici
in the instant case is in redressing the erosion of their
states’ police powers by the Sixth Circuit’s misapplication
of Sections 105 and 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act, 11 U.S.C. § 105 and 362(a). In essence, the Sixth
Cireuit's decision will prevent the amici from enforcing
various state laws concerning environmental protection
against bankrupt violators, no matter how great the im-
mediate danger to the public health and safety. As the
chief legal officers for their various states, the interests
of the amici lie in preserving their ability to protect the
citizenry through enforcement of various state police
power enactments.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In conflict with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has erroneously ap-
plied the “automatic” stay under section 362(a) of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), to the State
of Ohio, by enjoining an Ohio proceeding against a bank-
rupt pursuant to a validly enacted police power statute
seeking the abatement of the dangers posed by an un-
lawful hazardous waste disposal operation. Because the
Sixth Circuit’s decision sanctions cont aing environ-
mental harm by the bankrupt, because the Sixth Circuit’s
reasoning has led to similar untoward decisions in Penn-
sylvania and New Hampshire and because the Sixth
Circuit’s decision will prevent the remaining amici from
enforcing the laws of their states in similar circum-
stances, the Court should settle the important question of
federal law presented by the applicability of section
362(a) now, in the context of the instant case.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision also contravenes the
Tenth Amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) and section 543(c)
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. § 543(c).
Given the immediate danger to the citizens of Ohio posed
by the illegal disposal of hazardous waste, the exercise of
this Court’s supervisory powers is urgently required to
redress this extreme departure from the ordinarily ac-
eepted course of judicial proceedings by the Sixth Circuit.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision also conflicts with the
reasoning of this Court in Northern Pipeline Construc-
tion Company v. Marathon Pipeline Company, 103 S. Ct.
199 (1982), because the Sixth Circuit has sanctioned the
exercise of the judicial power of the United States under
Article III by an Article I judge. In order to rectify this
inconsistency, the Court should hear the instant case.
ARGUMENT
In conflict with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has erroneously applied
the automatic stay to state police power actions.
In the instant case, the Sixth Circuit has rendered a
decision in conflict with that of the Fifth Circuit on the
applicability of the “automatic” stay under section
362 (a) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C.
362 (a), to regulatory enforcement action by govern-
mental units. In Securities Exchange Commission v.
First Financial Group of Texas, 645 F.2d 429 (5th Cir.
1981), the Fifth Circuit ruled that the automatic stay
did not apply to an action against a bankrupt by the
Securities Exchange Commission seeking injunctive relief
and the appointment of a receiver to remedy various
securities law violations. As Ohio correctly notes in its
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at pages 15-19, there is
thus contradictory precedent in the Circuit Courts of
Appeal, requiring resolution of the conflict by this Court.
In sanctioning the application of the automatic stay
to state police power actions against bankrupt violators
of state law, the Sixth Circuit has also decided an im-
portant question of federal law which has not been, but
4
should be, settled by this Court. The practical result of
the Sixth Circuit’s decision is to afford the bankrupt an
absolute protection against a legitimate state enforce-
ment action and to expose the people of Ohio to the
continuing imminent danger posed by the illegal disposal
of hazardous waste at the Chem-Dyne site.
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation and ap-
plication of section 362(a) has unfortunately been read
and will be read by other courts for its suggestive au-
thority. Such use of the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning has
already occurred, with devastating impact in the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania and in the State of New
Hampshire.
In the case of In re: Penn Terra Limited, No. 82-845
(Western District of Pennsylvania, Memorandum Opin-
ion, Order and Judgment dated November 4, 1982—a
copy of this opinion appears as Appendix A to this brief),
the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Penn-
sylvania, held, inter alia, that the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania had violated the automatic stay provisions
of section 362(a) when it attempted to seek by injunc-
tion in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania the
enforcement of an administrative order requiring recla-
mation of an unlawful strip mine operation. Based upon
the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in the instant case,
the bankruptcy court stripped Pennsylvania’s Common-
wealth Court of jurisdiction despite the requirements of
28 U.S.C. § 1478 (a), adjudicated the Commonwealth in
contempt, fined the Commonwealth and enjoined the
Commonwealth from taking any of the steps necessary
to protect its citizens from the legislatively determined
dangers posed by the unlawful strip mine operation.
In the case of United States, et al. v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corporation, et al., Civil Action No. 81-299-D (Dis-
trict of New Hampshire, Order dated November 15,
1 See, e.g., section 1 of Pennsylvania's Surface Mining Conserva-
tion and Reclamation Act, 52 P.S. § 1396.1 (Cumulative Annual
Pocket Part 1982-1983).
5
1982—a copy of this order appears as Appendix B to
this brief), the United States District Court for the
District of New Hampshire affirmed a magistrate’s
ruling that both the United States and the plaintiff-
intervenor State of New Hampshire were enjoined from
proceeding with an action seeking an injunction against
the allowance or causation of disposal of asbestos and
other hazardous wastes and substances by the Johns-
Manville Sales Corporation, which is currently the sub-
ject of proceedings pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptey Reform Act. Again, the district Court cited with
approval the Sixth Circuit’s decision in the instant case.
Just as in the cases of Ohio and Pennsylvania, New
Hampshire (and the government of the United States)
are prohibited by the federal courts pursuant to section
362 (a) from enforcing laws designed to protect the
public health, safety and welfare.
The applicability of the automatic stay to such state
court police power and federal regulatory proceedings is
an important question of federal law which has been
decided by the Sixth Circuit in conflict with a decision
by the Fifth Circuit. This Court has not yet decided
the question. In order to redress the continuing environ-
mental harm sanctioned by the Sixth Circuit’s decision
in Ohio, as followed in Pennsylvania and New Hamp-
shire, the Court should resolve the conflict in the circuits
and settle this important question of federal law as
swiftly as possible, in the context of the instant case.
The decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals will
prevent the amici and the State of Ohio from protecting
their citizens from the hazards caused by violations of
state police power enactments by bankrupts despite the
requirements of the Tenth Amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 959(b)
and 11 U.S.C. § 543(¢)(1).
Tenth Amendment
State regulatory agencies throughout the nation are
faced every day with the urgent need to protect their
citizens from both the immediate dangers posed by the
illegal disposal of hazardous and industrial waste, as in
the instant case, and by violations of the other state
statu es? designed to protect the health, safety and wel-
fare of the public. All such statutes represent valid exer-
cises of the police power, reserved to the states under the
Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Traditionally recognized by this Court as the least
limitable of the reserved powers, Queenside Hills Realty
v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946), the police power broadly
authorizes the various states to regulate in order to pro-
tect the public health, safety and welfare.
However, legitimate state enforcement action to pro-
tect the public health, safety and welfare is thwarted
when illegal activities are sanctioned by the federal bank-
ruptey courts. The instant case illustrates the refusal
of the federal bankruptcy courts to show constitutionally
mandated deference towards the states in the exercise of
their police power.
In direct contravention of validly enacted state regu-
latory requirements, bankruptcy courts throughout the
nation have sanctioned such activities as the illegal op-
eration of highly polluting strip mines,“ the unlicensed
operation of unqualified hospitals* and preventing the
With respect to the example of Pennsylvania alone, see, e..
the Solid Waste Management Act, 35 P.S. § 6018.101 et seq.:; the
Clean Streams Law, 35 P.S. § 691.1 et seq.; the Air Pollution Con-
trol Act, 35 P.S. § 4018 et seq.; the Surface Mining Conservation
and Reclamation Act, 52 P.S. § 1396.1 et seq.; the Coal Refuse Dis-
posal Control Act, 52 P.S. § 30.51 et seq.; and the Bituminous
Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, 52 P.S. 1406.1 et seq.
In re: Reddale Company, Inc., Reddale Resources, Inc., F. C.
Dean Contractor, Inc., Nos. 79-330, 79-331, 79-332 (Bankruptcy
Court, W.D. Pa.) Memorandum Opinion and Order, March 31, 1980.
In re: Saugus General Hospital, Inc., 4 BCD 1160, 19 CBC 651,
1 CBC2d 26 (D. Mass. 1978).
7
cleanup of a hazardous asbestos disposal facility.“ The
most recent incursions by the federal bankruptcy courts
against state police power statutes and the Tenth Amend-
ment occurred on November 4, 1982, when the Bank-
ruptey Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
adjudicated the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in con-
tempt and levied a substantial fine because the Common-
wealth sought in the courts of Pennsylvania an injunc-
tion enforcing an administrative order pursuant to Penn-
sylvania law to abate the hazardous conditions created by
an illegal and dangerous strip mine operated by a bank-
rupt,“ and on November 15, 1982, when the State of
New Hampshire and the government of the United
States were enjoined from proceeding with an injunctive
action seeking the cleanup of an unlawful asbestos dis-
posal operation.’
The foregoing examples are by no means exhaustive.
The federal bankruptcy courts have delayed, obstructed
and thwarted the states in their various efforts pursuant
to the police power to protect the public health, safety and
welfare against the illegal operation of hazardous enter-
prises, despite the restraints of the Tenth Amendment.
Many of these police power statutes, moreover, have been
enacted to implement federal legislative action under the
Commerce Clause.* Consequently, when the enforcement
of these statutes is enjoined by the federal bankruptcy
courts, it disrupts the constitutional scheme protecting
5 United States, et al. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation, et al.,
Civil No. 81-299-D (D. New Hampshire 1982).
n re: Penn Terra Limited, No. 82-845 (Bankruptcy Court W. D.
Pa.) Memorandum Opinion, Order and Judgment, November 4,
1982).
7 See n.5, supra.
8 See, e.g., the Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et
seq., the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq., the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. 1201 et seg. See also Wein,
both the police power of the states and the power of the
federal government to regulate interstate commerce. This
disruption of our constitutional scheme of government
demands the invocation of this Court’s supervisory
powers.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act
The Congress recognized and acknowledged the states’
police power when it enacted the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seg. The Act makes it
clear that bankrupts and bankruptcy courts may not
frustrate nor obstruct the legitimate enforcement by the
states of validly enacted police power statutes, in the
explicit declaration that the automatic stay under Sec-
tion 362 of the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 362, does not apply to
that class of actions. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (4):
[t]he filing of a petition under section 301, 302 or
303 of this title does not operate as a stay...
under subsection (a) (1) of this section, of the com-
mencement or continuation of an action or proceed-
ing by a governmental unit to enforce such govern-
mental unit’s police or regulatory power.“
The Sixth Circuit has ignored this express policy choice
by the Congress and this constitutionally mandated pro-
vision of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. Ohio stands unable
to protect its citizens against the depredations of Kovacs,
who by virtue of the Bankruptcy Court’s action, affirmed
by the Sixth Circuit, is completely insulated from his
duties under the Stipulation and Judgment of July 18,
1979. If the Sixth Cireuit's decision is permitted to
Environmental Regulation and the Bankruptcy Act, 17 Du. L. Rev.
133, 136 (1978-1979).
Indeed, as Ohio correctly states in its Petition for Writ of Cer-
tiorari at pages 8-11, the legislative history of this provision force-
fully underscores Congressional intent to protect state police power
actions from interference by the federal bonkruptey courts.
stand, the amici will find themselves in the same posi-
tion as Ohio: prevented from enforcing the valid laws
of their states enacted pursuant to their police power
because the federal bankruptcy courts have and will
prevent them from so doing. Pennsylvania and New
Hampshire have already suffered that fate.“
The Sixth Circuit has also rendered an implicit deci-
sion on the applicability of § 543 (e) (1) of the Bank-
ruptey Code, 11 U.S.C. § 543 (e) (1), which provides in
pertinent part that “[t]he court, after notice and a hear-
ing, shall . . . protect all entities to which a custodian
has become obligated with respect to” property turned
over to the bankruptcy court, 11 U.S.C. § 543 (e) (1). The
Ohio receivership was set up on February 4, 1980, and
the bankruptcy was filed on July 18, 1980. When the
Ohio receiver, as a “custodian” under 11 U.S.C. § 543,
turned over the state receivership assets to the bank-
ruptey court, no effort whatsoever was made by the
bankruptcy court to protect Ohio from the receiver’s
inability to carry out his obligations under the Febru-
ary 4, 1980 receivership order. To date, those obliga-
tions remain outstanding and unsatisfied. The “entity”
to which the receiver is obligated for the clean up of the
Kovac's hazardous waste dump the State of Ohio—was
not in any sense “protected” by the Bankruptcy court or
the Sixth Circuit, despite the clear requirements of
543 (e) (1).
The productive use of state court receiverships in
police power matters will inevitably be curtailed, with a
concomitant increase in danger to the public health and
safety, if neither the receiver nor the state to which the
receiver is obligated will be protected by the federal
bankruptcy courts. The Sixth Circuit has essentially
decided that § 543 (e) (1) of the Bankruptcy Code has no
applicability to such situations. Such a fundamental dis-
See text accompanying n.5 and n.6, supra.
10
mantling of the Bankruptcy Reform Act and thwarting
of the Congressional intent to protect the police power
demands the exercise of this Court’s supervisory powers.
28 U.S.C. 8 959(b)
Even prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act, the Congress recognized its obligation to the
states under the Tenth Amendment. Many years ago,
the Congress addressed the problems presented when a
bankrupt violates state law, in the enactment of
28 U.S.C. 8 959 (b), which provides in pertinent part
that:
... @ trustee, receiver or manager appointed in any
cause pending in any court of the United States,
including a debtor in possession, shall manage and
operate the property in his possession as such trus-
tee, according to the requirements of the valid laws
of the state in which the property is situated, in the
same manner that the owner or possessor thereof
would be bound to do so if in possession thereof.
This Court upheld the applicability of this provision
in Gillis v. California, 293 U.S. 62 (1934). The Sixth
Cireuit's decision ignores this Court’s decision in Gillis
and subverts the Congressional intent to vindicate the
states’ reserved police power under the Tenth Amend-
ment. Such a radical departure from the ordinary and
accepted course of judicial proceedings requires the exer-
cise of this Court’s supervisory powers.
In conflict with the decision of this Court in Northern
Pipeline Construction Company v. Marathor Pipeline
Company, 103 S. Ct. 199, the Sixth Circuit has sanctioned
the exercise of the judicial power of the United Siates
under Article III of the Constitution by an Article I
judge.
The plurality opinion in Northern V neline Construc-
tion Company v. Marathon Pipeline Comnany, 103 S. Ct.
199, expressed the gravest reservations over the con-
11
stitutionality of the grant of jurisdiction to the bank-
ruptcy judges under § 241(a) of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1471. The judgment of the Court
was that the exercise by bankruptcy judges of jurisdic-
tion over disputes of a purely state law nature violated
Article III of the United States Constitution. The exer-
cise of jurisdiction by the bankruptcy court below,
affirmed by the Sixth Circuit, illustrates with precision
the reasons why the bankruptcy courts should not be per-
mitted Article III powers.
The day-to-day administration of the affairs of the
bankrupt respecting property of the bankrupt in the ac-
tual or constructive possession of the federal bankruptcy
courts may well be sanctioned under Article I, and a
Congressional judgment that the federal bankruptcy
courts, as a matter of social policy, possess a sufficient
expertise to deal with such affairs might be justifiable.
However, the exercise of the judicial power of the
United States under Article III by the federal bank-
ruptey courts cannot be justified. An Article I tribunal
has no legitimate business in interfering with a state
agency’s effort to protect the public health, safety and
welfare by enforcing state law in state court against
bankrupt violators.
The Congressional grant of All Writs powers to the
federal bankruptcy courts pursuant to Section 105 of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. § 105, is consti-
tutionally deficient. In the instant case, Ohio presses in
behalf of its citizens a legitimate police power action to
abate the dangers posed by illegal hazardous waste
disposal by the bankrupt, in a state action sanctioned
under the Tenth Amendment. Ohio’s police power is as
independent of and antecedent to the reorganization
petition that conferred jurisdiction upon the bankruptcy
court”, Northern Pipeline Construction Company v. Mara-
thon Pipeline Company, 103 S. Ct. 199 (1982) as the pri-
vate dispute in Northern Pipeline. Yet, just as in Northern
Pipeline Construction, supra, in the instant case an
12
Article I judge exercised and continues to exercise in
an improper manner yet another Article III power: the
power to issue all writs and orders “necessary or appro-
priate” in support of the jurisdiction granted it under
§ 241 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1471,
which includes the power to enjoin any person from pro-
ceeding with any action on any theory in any court of
the various states or the United States against the bank-
rupt. In Pennsylvania, based upon the reasoning of
the Sixth Circuit in the instant case, a bankruptcy court
has sanctioned the improper removal of a pending state
court enforcement action, adjudicated Pennsylvania in
contempt, fined Pennsylvania, and applied the automatic
stay in such a manner as to enjoin Pennsylvania from
proceeding with a valid state covr+ action seeking to
eliminate the dangerous conditions, ed by an unlawful
strip mine operation.“ In New Hampshire, based again
on the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit, the State of New
Hampshire and the government of the United States
have been enjoined from seeking an injunction to compel
the cleanup of an unlawful asbestos disposal operation.“
More disasterous examples of the vice in the exercise of
Article III powers by an Article I judge are difficult to
imagine.
Combining the clear conflict with this Court’s plural-
ity opinion in Northern Pipeline, supra, together with
the disregard of the public health and safety and the
violations of the Tenth Amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 959 (b
and Section 543 (e) (3) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act,
the invocation of the supervisory power of this Court is
urgently required to redress the injustice and peril to
the public caused by the Sixth Circuit’s decision below.
11 The bankruptcy court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1478 did not deprive
it of removal power despite the express language of that provision
and also held that the automatic stay applied to the Pennsylvania
action. See also tert accompanying n.6, supra.
12 See text accompanying n.5, supra.
13
CONCLUSION
In conflict with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has erroneously applied
the automatic stay of section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act to state governments exercising their police
power. Because the Sixth Circuit’s decision sanctions
continuing environmental harm and danger to the peo-
ple of Ohio, because the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning has
led to similar decisions in Pennsylvania and New Hamp-
shire, and because the Sixth Circuit’s decision will frus-
trate the efforts of the remaining amici curiae as they
attempt to resolve closely similar cases as they arise
in their own states, the Court should settle this impor-
tant question of federal law now, in the context of the
instant case.
The Sixth Cireuit's decision also violates the Tenth
Amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) and section 543(c) of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. 5 543 (e) and
sanctions on a nationwide basis the extreme departure
by the federal bankruptcy courts from the ordinarily
accepted course of judicial proceedings. Given the
immediate and continuing danger to the health and
safety of the citizens of the several states, the exercise
of this Court’s supervisory powers is urgently needed.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision also conflicts with the
reasoning of the majority of this Court in Northern
Pipeline Construction Company v. Marathon Pipeline
Company, 103 S.Ct. 199 (1982), because the Sixth Cir-
cuit has sanctioned the exercise of the judicial power
under Article III by an Article I juage who possesses
neither the attribute of life tenure nor protection against
salary diminution. In order to 1ectify this gross incon-
sistency with the Northern Pipeline judgment, the Court
should hear this case.
For these reasons, the amici respectfully request that
this Court grant a writ of certiorari to review the
14
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in this matter.
Respectfully submitted,
Leroy S. ZIMMERMAN
Attorney General of Pennsylvania
1641 Strawberry Square
Harrisburg, PA 17120
Telephone: (717) 787-3391
JAMEs D. Morris *
Assistant Counsel
Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Resources
Suite 1200—1315 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19107
Telephone: (215) 875-7486
HOWARD J. WEIN
Assistant Counsel
Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Resources
1200 Kossman Building
100 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Telephone: (412) 565-5363
* Counsel of Record for Amici Curiae
APPENDICES
la
APPENDIX A
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Bankruptcy No. 82-845
Chapter 7
IN THE MATTER OF: PENN TERRA LIMITED, a corpora-
tion, also known as PENN COAL COMPANY, a division
of PENN TERRA LIMITED,
Debtor
PENN TERRA LIMITED,
Plaintiff
v.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES,
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Patti J. SAUNDERS & DIANA J. STARES,
Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The matter presently before the Court is a Petition for
Contempt filed on behalf of debtor, Penn Terra Limited,
against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department
of Environmental Resources, hereinafter “DER”. The
Petition for Contempt arises from DER’s continued pur-
suit of a mandatory injunction against debtor in Com-
monwealth Court of Pennsylvania seeking debtor’s ex-
penditure of funds for correction of its violations of the
Pennsylvania Clean Streams Act and Surface Mining
Conservation and Reclamation Act. DER initiated the
action in Commonwealth Court subsequent to the debtor’s
filing of a petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code; and pursued the litigation despite its receipt of the
trustee in bankruptcy’s petition to remove the action
2a
from Commonwealth Court to Bankruptcy Court. The
Commonwealth Court proceeding ultimately resulted in
that Court’s entry of an order requiring the debtor to
expend funds for correction of its violations.
At the June 29, 1982 hearing on the Petition for Con-
tempt, this Court dismissed the contempt proceedings
against Diana J. Stares and Patti J. Saunders, counsel
for DER. The Petition for Removal was remanded to
Commonwealth Court as to Harvey Taylor, alleged presi-
dent of debtor corporation; and retained as to Penn
Terra Limited, debtor herein. DER was enjoined from
enforcing the order of the Commonwealth Court of Penn-
sylvania entered against debtor and Margaret L.
McArdle, trustee, pending determination of the afore-
said matter.
The serious issues presented for determination involve
the applicability of the automatic stay provisions of
11 U.S.C. § 362, and removal provisions of 28 U.S.C.
1478 to the action brought by DER against debtor in
Commonwealth Court.
DER contends that it is neither subject to the auto-
matic stay provisions nor the removal provisions, for
it is a governmental! unit proceeding to enforce its police
and regulatory powers. Based upon the facts, legislative
history, and case law that follow, the Court concludes
that there is no sensible basis for its position. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court holds that the action
initiated by DER in Commonwealth Court wherein a
mandatory injunction requiring debtor’s expenditure of
funds was sought is in essence an attempt to enforce a
money judgment. As such, it is not exempt from the
automatic stay provisions of § 362 of the Bankruptcy
Code. Nor is it exempt from removal under 28 U.S.C.
1478.
The facts are as follows. Penn Terra Ltd. is a Penn-
sylvania corporation engaged in contract coal stripping.
3a
It filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy under Chap-
ter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on March 15, 1982. Debtor
had ceased all operations prior to that date. On Sched-
ule B-2, debtor lists personal property in the approxi-
mate amount of $14,000, $13,500 of which is designated
as “certificates of deposit on deposit with DER; bonds
for backfilling.” The schedules further note that the cost
of reclamation vastly exceeds the market and book value
of the bonds. Debts listed on the schedules exceed
$660,000.
In November, 1981, prior to the filing of the bank-
ruptey petition, DER, Penn Terra Ltd., and Harvey
Taylor, its president, executed a consent order and
agreement arising from Penn Terra’s violation of the
Clean Streams Law (Act of June 22, 1937, P. L. 1987,
as amended 35 P.S. § 691.1 et seq.) ; the Surface Mining
Conservation and Reclamation Act, (Act of May 31,
1945, P.L. 1198 as amended 52 P.S. § 1396.1 et seq.) ;
and Mining and Mine Drainage Permits. Among the
various violations cited therein are the following: min-
ing off bonded area; failure to maintain adequate back-
filling equipment; failure to maintain adequate erosion
and sedimentation controls; failure to pump pit water
accumulations; failure to properly treat mine drainage;
storage of top strata over gas lines; and failure to seal
a deep mine pit. The consent agreement required Penn
Terra to complete all backfilling by operating one D-8
bulldozer or its equivalent, and one tractor scraper for
eight hours a day, five days a week until reclamation of
said mines was completed. Penn Terra was also re-
quired to submit soil erosion and sedimentation control
plans; implement the same upon approval of DER; de-
water all pits; restore and revegetate original contour;
seal deep mine entry; submit plans for removal of top
strata stored over gas line; and implement said plan
upon DER approval. The agreement provided that fail-
ure to restore said mines by the date specified therein
4a
would result in Penn Terra’s rebonding of the entire
area.
On April 14, 1982, approximately one month subse-
quent to the commencement of the bankruptcy proceed-
ings, DER filed a complaint in equity against debtor at
No. 838 C.D. 1982. DER did not receive notice of the
bankruptcy petition until April 29, 1982. Included in the
various counts of the complaint were the following:
I) failure to comply with the consent order and agree-
ment; II) mining off permitted area; III) failure to
backfill concurrently with mining; IV) failure to main-
tain adequate backfilling equipment on the site; V) fail-
ure to revegetate affected areas; VI) failure to seal a
deep mine opening; VII) storage of top soil over gas
line; and VIII) mining within 100 feet of siream
barrier.
On April 27, 1982, the Commonwealth Court set the
hearing on DER’s complaint for May 24, 1982. Immedi-
ately prior to the May hearing date, the Trustee in
bankruptcy filed a petition for removal of the complaint
in equity from the Commonwealth Court to the Bank-
ruptey Court. Trustee alleges therein that the Bank-
ruptey Court has exclusive jurisdiction of all matters
which deal with assests of the debtor; and over all in-
junctions which require future use, distribution, or ex-
penditure of debtor’s funds.
On May 21, 1982, the petition for removal was per-
sonally served upon DER and Diana J. Stares, Esq. by
counsel for the debtor. A copy of the petition was mailed
to the Commonwealth on the same date. Nonetheless,
Diana J. Stares and Patti J. Saunders appeared at the
May 24, 1982 Commonwealth Court hearing on behalf
of DER to request that the Court issue a preliminary
injunction against Penn Terra Ltd. and Harvey Taylor
to enforce the terms of the November 1981 consent
agreement. During the Commonwealth Court proceed-
ing, Ms. Stares informed the Court that although she
5a
was in receipt of the petition for removal, she was un-
certain as to its effect upon the corporate defendant’s
liability. Penn Terra did not appear at the hearing,
nor did counsel appear on its behalf. Ms. Stares con-
tinued in the presentation of DER’s case, and extensive
testimony was offered on DER’s behalf. The Common-
wealth Court filed a Memorandum Opinion and Order
wherein relief requested was granted with respect to the
corporate defendant. By order of Commonwealth Court
of May 24, 1982, Penn Terra was ordered to perform
the following: 1) by October 15, 1982, complete all
backfilling and final grading at the Hilty Surface Mine;
2) within fifteen days of the date of order, submit ero-
sion and sedimentation plans, 3) within fifteen days,
seal the deep mine opening; submit plans for removal
of all strata stored over gas line; and effectuate such
plan upon approval from DER. All top soil spreading,
mulching, and seeding was to be completed no later than
October 15, 1982.
On May 27, 1982, Counsel for the debtor filed a peti-
tion for contempt against DER, Diana J. Stares and
Patti J. Saunders. Therein, Counsel for the debtor
alleges that DER proceeded with the application for pre-
liminary injunction in Commonwealth Court in disregard
of the trustee’s petition to remove the action to the
Bankruptcy Court.
At the June 29, 1982 hearing on the petition for con-
tempt, said petition was dismissed as to individuals
Diana J. Stares and Patti J. Saunders. The petition for
removal as to Harvey Taylor was remanded to the Com-
monwealth Court; and the petition for removal as to
Penn Terra was retained. This Court further ordered
that DER be enjoined from enforcing the May 24, 1982
Order from the Commonwealth Court pending final de-
termination of the aforesaid matter.
In its brief, DER argues that under 11 U.S. C.
§ 362(b) (4), the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not
6a
operate as a stay of a governmental unit’s proceeding to
enforce its police or regulatory power. DER further
avers that under 28 U.S.C. § 1478, the power to remove
does not extend to a civil action by a governmental unit
to enforce police powers; and as such, the attempted
removal is a nullity. Finally, DER asserts that since
it is subject to neither the automatic stay provisions of
§ 362, nor the removal provisions of § 1478, the Bank-
ruptey Court is presently without jurisdiction over the
action brought by DER in Commonwealth Court.
On the other hand, debtor argues that a mandatory
injunction requiring debtor to expend funds is in essence
an action by a regulatory agency for the enforcement
of a money judgment; and as such, DER’s action is
subject to the automatic stay. Debtor further argues
that DER cannot elect to disregard a removal petition,
but rather must litigate its effect before the Bankruptcy
Court. For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees.
Section 362(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code provides
as follows:
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302,
or 303 of this title does not operate as a stay—
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of
the commencement or continuation of an
action or proceeding by a governmental
unit to enforce such guvernmental unit’s
police or regulatory power;
The legislative history of § 362(b)(4) further pro-
vides: “Where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to
prevent or stop violation of a fraud, environmental pro-
tection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police
or regulatory laws, or atempting to fix damages for vio-
lation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not
stayed under the automatic stay.” House Report No.
95-595, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. at 343 (1977).
7a
Section 362 (b) (4) has been the subject of numerous
recent decisions. In various situations, the Courts have
upheld a governmental unit’s action against a debtor as
valid exercise of police or regulatory power. As such,
it is exempt from the automatic stay provisions of § 362.
The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panels of the
Ninth Circuit recently held that a proceeding initiated
by the State of California for purposes of examining the
conduct of debtor physician charged with gross negli-
gence was a valid exercise of police power necessary for
the health and safety of its residents. Accordingly, the
exemption from the automatic stay provisions set forth
in 362(b) (4) was applicable. In re Thomassen, 15 B R
907 (9 Cir. Bkrtcy. App. 1981). In NLRB v. Evans
Plumbing Co. 639 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1981) a National
Labor Relations Board’s petition for summary judgment
to enforce a Board’s decision ordering debtor’s reinstate-
ment of two employees who were discriminatorily dis-
charged fell within the § 362(b)(4) exception to the
automatic stay, although the NLRB’s actions were sub-
ject to certain limitations discussed below. In In re
Tauscher, 7 B R 918, 7 BCD 124, 3 CBC 2d 536 (E. D.
Wisc. 1981), the actions by the Secretary of Labor in
assessing civil money penalties against debtor for viola-
tion of child labor laws was excepted from the automatic
stay. The Secretary was permitted to fix penalties, up
to and including the entry of a money judgment. Simi-
larly, the administration of worker's compensation
claims by the State of Ohio is a valid exercise of a gov-
ernmental unit’s regulatory power, and is exempt from
the automatic stay. In re Mansfield Tire and Rubber
Co. 660 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir. 1981).
Although Congress has provided an exemption from
the automatic stay for governmental proceedings in the
exercise of police or regulatory power, the legislative his-
tory indicates that the exception must be narrowly
construed.
8a
This section is intended to be given a narrow con-
struction in order to permit governmental units to
pursue actions to protect the health and safety and
not to apply to actions by a governmental unit to
protect the pecuniary interest in the property of
the debtor or property of the estate. (124 Congres-
sional Record H 11089, 11 U.S. Code Congressional
Administrative News 660-61 [December, 1978] ).
In line with the narrow construction, some govern-
mental actions have not been excepted from the provi-
sions of the automatic stay. Thus, the Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles, who is authorized by statute to sus-
pend the license of an uninsured motorist involved in a
motor vehicle accident unless sufficient security is pro-
vided, is subject to the automatic stay. The Court con-
cludes: “if the focus of the police power is directed at
the debtor’s financial obligations rather than the state’s
health and safety concerns, the automatic stay is applica-
ble.” In re Sampson, 17 BR 528, 530, 8 BCD 992
(D. Conn. 1982). A housing authority’s action to seek
eviction of a tenant for nonpayment of rent is also sub-
ject to the automatic stay. In Matter of Gibbs 7 BCD
445 (D. Conn. 1981). Similarly, an action by a state
public health agency to terminate debtor hospital’s oper-
ating license violated the automatic stay. Although the
case was decided under the Bankruptcy Act, the Court
states that the same result would follow under the Code.
In re Saugus General Hospital, Inc. 4 BCD 1160, 19
CBC 651, 1 CBC 2d 26 (D. Mass. 1978). A state health
department’s action to forfeit debtor hospital’s exemp-
tion for certificate of need review in the construction of
a new hospital facility is also subject to the automatic
stay, for the § 362(b)(4) exception is narrow, and
applies only to those actions necessary for the protection
of public health and safety. In re King Memorial Hos-
pital, Inc. 4 BR 704, 6 BCD 634, 2 CBC 2d 639 (S.D.
Fla. 1980).
9a
Thus, it is clear that the Courts have reached different
results in determining whether various governmental ac-
tions fall within the exceptions to the automatic stay
set forth in § 362 (b) (4). However, on the basis of
§ 362(b) (5), the Courts are in agreement that the en-
forcement of a money judgment by a governmental unit
is impermissible. Section 362 (b) (5) provides as follows:
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302,
or 303 of this title does not operate as a stay—
(5) under subsection (a) (2) of this section, of
the enforcement of a judgment, other than
a money judgment, obtained in an action
or proceeding by a governmental unit to
enforce such governmental unit’s police or
regulatory power.
The legislative history further provides:
Paragraph 5 makes clear that the exception ex-
tends to permit the entry of a money judgment, but
does not extend to permit the enforcement of a
money judgment. Since the assets of the debtor are
in the possession and control of the bankruptcy
court, and since they constitute a fund out of which
all creditors are entitled to share, enforcement by
a governmental unit of a money judgment would
give it preferential treatment to the detriment of all
other creditors.
House Report No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. at 343 (1977).
Thus, in recent decisions the Courts have restrained
the state’s attempted enforcement of a money judgment.
In re Fintel, 10 BR 50, 7 BCD 531 (D. Ore. 1981);
In re Barber, 13 BR 962, 8 BCD 188, 5 CBC 2d 150
(N.D. Tex. 1981). As previously stated, in NLRB v.
Evans Plumbing, supra, the Fifth Circuit permitted the
entry of a judgment for injunctive relief and for back
10a
pay. However, the Court expressly refrained from rul-
ing upon whether an action to enforce a money judg-
ment would be exempt from the stay. Further, although
the Secretary of Labor may fix penalties for the debtor’s
violation of child labor laws, the enforcement of a money
judgment is stayed. In re Tauscher, supra. The Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania’s attempt to enforce a money
judgment against debtor for violation of unfair trade
practices law is also stayed. In re Flick, 14 BR 912,
5 CBC 2d 494 (E. D. Pa. 1981).
Of particular interest in resolution of the case at bar
is the recent Sixth Circuit decision of In re William Lee
Kovacs 681 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1982). Therein, debtor,
engaged in the business of waste disposal, was sued by
the State of Ohio on the basis of its water pollution.
Debtor signed a stipulation and judgment entry in the
Common Pleas Court of Ohio wherein he was enjoined
from further pollution and required to remove indus-
trial waste from the specified site within twelve months.
As a result of debtor’s noncompliance, a receiver was
appointed and directed to correct the violations. Debtor
filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
in the Southern District of Ohio in July, 1980. The case
was converted to a Chapter 7 in September, 1980. The
state of Ohio filed a motion in Common Pleas Court for
a hearing to determine debtor’s employment status and
income. In response thereto, debtor sought to restrain
the Ohio state court proceedings. The Bankruptcy Court
held that the actior by the state of Ohio was not exempt
from the automatic stay of § 362(a)(2). As stated by
the Bankruptcy Court: “There is no difference in sub-
stance between efforts to collect money from a debtor
by securing a court order, and efforts to enforce a
money judgment against him.” (p. 456) In affirming
the opinion of the Bankruptcy Court and District Court,
the Sixth Circuit reiterates that a governmental unit
is denied the power to collect money in their enforce-
ment efforts. “We further concur with the conclusion
lla
of the bankruptcy court and the district court that the
state of Ohio, in its state court proceeding, was seeking
what in essence amounted to a money judgment against
Kovacs, which was properly subject to the automatic
stay.” (p. 456)
This Court adopts the reasoning set forth in In re
Kovacs, and reaches a similar conclusion in the case at
bar. Although DER characterizes its action as a govern-
mental action in the exercise of its police or regulatory
powers, it seeks a mandatory injunction requiring the
debtor’s expenditure of funds for the correction of viola-
tions. This Court concludes that the mandatory injunc-
tion sought by DER requiring the debtor’s expenditure
of funds is in essence the attempted enforcement of a
money judgment. As such, it is subject to the automatic
stay by virtue of § 362(b) (5).
Assuming arguendo that the governmental action in
the case at bar was not stayed by § 362 of the Code,
§ 105 gives the Court broad powers to “issue any order,
process or judgment necessary or appropriate to carry
out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.” Further,
where government regulatory proceedings threaten assets
of the debtor’s estate, the Court can, in its discretion,
impose a stay. Matter of Shippers Interstate Service,
Inc. 618 F.2d 9 (6 Cir. 1980).
Having concluded that DER’s action in the case at
bar was subject to the automatic stay, the Court now
turns to the issue of removal. DER argues that on the
basis of 28 U.S.C. 1478, its action was not subject to
removal. It further argues that since the removal was
unauthorized, it is of no effect, and the Bankruptcy Court
is presently without jurisdiction over the case at bar.
The Court first examines the general principles of
removal. An order removing an action to federal court
holds the state court’s jurisdiction in abeyance until the
action is terminated or remanded to state court. Doerr v.
12a
Warner, 247 Minn. 98, 76 N.W. 2d 505 (1956), cert.
dismd. Warner v. Doerr, 352 U.S. 801 (1956). Any fur-
ther proceeding in state court is a nullity unless the
case is remanded. Hopson v. North American Co. 71
Idaho 461, 233 P.2d 799 (1951). If necessary the federal
tribunal may issue an injunction to prevent further
activity in the state court. Lowe v. Jacobs, 243 F.2d 432
(5th Cir. 1957), cert. den. Lowe v. Jacobs 355 U.S. 842
(1957).
Now turning to the removal statute as it appears in
the Bankruptcy Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1478 provides as fol-
lows:
(a) A party may remove any claim or cause of
action in a civil action, other than a proceeding
before the United States Tax Court or a civil
action by a governmental unit to enforce such
governmental unit’s police or regulatory power
to the bankruptcy court for the district where
such civil action is pending if the bankruptcy
courts have jurisdiction over such claims or
cause of action.
As previously determined, DER’s action is in essence the
attempted enforcement of a money judgment against the
debtor. As such, it cannot accurately be characterized
as a “civil action by a governmental unit to enforce such
governmental unit’s police power or regulatory power.”
Moreover, it is clearly not the type of action Congress
intended to bar from removal to the Bankruptcy Court.
As stated by the Eighth Circuit in State of Missouri v.
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas, 647 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1981):
In light of the legislative history and court decisions
under the earlier bankruptcy act, we believe that the
term “regulatory or police powers” refers to the
enforcement of state laws affecting health, welfare,
morals, and safety, but not regulatory laws that
13a
directly confliet with the control of the res or prop-
erty. (p. 776).
For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that
DER’s action in the case at bar is of necessity removable
to the Bankruptcy Court. As of the commencement of a
bankruptcy action, the Bankruptcy Court acquires ex-
clusive jurisdiction over all property wherever located of
the debtor. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e). The underlying goals
are efficiency of administration and equality of distribu-
tion to creditors. A governmental unit’s enforcement of
a monetary judgment would give the governmental unit
an unfair advantage over other creditors and would
effectively subvert the scheme of priorities set forth in
507 of the Code. Collier on Bankruptcy, 362.05 at
362-40 (15th Ed. 1982). To bar removal of such an
action under the guise that it is a governmental action
in the enforcement of its police or regulatory power is
to effectively thwart the bankruptcy court’s exclusive
jurisdiction over property of the debtor.
In response to DER’s argument that this Court is
without jurisdiction in the matter at bar, it is clear that
the Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction to consider a gov-
ernmental unit’s activity which affects the assets of the
debtor. In re Mason, 18 BR 817, 8 BCD 1251 (W.D.
Tenn. 1982). Moreover, the bankruptcy removal statute
is a federal statute, and federal law governs its inter-
pretation. In re Tidwell, 4 BR 100, 6 BCD 2d 172 (N. D.
Tex. 1980). As stated in Moore’s Federal Practice:
Jurisdiction of the federal courts attaches when the
removal petition is filed with the state court. The
state court is deprived of juridiction to proceed with
the removal action unless or until remanded, irre-
spective of whether the action is removable, which
is a question for the federal court.
Vol. 1A 0.168[3-8].
14a
As a final note, it is unfortunate that DER has taken
it upon itself to interpret the applicability of the auto-
matie stay and removal provisions of the Code to its
action at bar. Its mistaken conelusion that it is immune
from the restrietions set forth in the Bankruptey Code
is an unfortunate display of bureaucratic arrogance. As
stated by the Third Circuit in In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d
72 (8rd Cir. 1982) “. . we will not enforce a (National
Labor Relations) Board order that cavalierly refuses to
recognize an outstanding federal court order directly re-
lating to the proceedings before it.” (p. 23)
Given the obvious insolvency of the debtor, DER’s pur-
suit of its action in state court subsequent to its receipt
of the removal petition has resulted in the Common-
wealth Court’s entry of a meaningless order. Unfortu-
nately, DER has sought to accomplish indirectly what it
is obviously not permitted to do directly. The result has
been a regrettable waste of judicial time.
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that DER’s
action is subject to both the provisions of the automatic
stay as set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 362, and the removal pro-
visions as set forth in 28 U.S.C. 1478. Accordingly, DER
is permanently enjoined from enforcing the order of the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania entered against
Penn Terra Limited and Margaret L. McArdle, trustee,
on May 24, 1982. Further, on the basis of its contume-
lious conduct, the Court imposes a fine against DER in
the amount of $2,500. (Twenty-five hundred dollars).
The court further awards counsel fees in the amount of
$150. (One hundred fifty dollars) to T. Lawrence Palmer,
attorney for the debtor and $50. (Fifty dollars) to Mar-
garet L. McArdle, trustee.
Appropriate orders will be entered.
/s/ Gerald K. Gibson
GERALD K. GIBSON
Bankruptcy Judge
15a
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Bankruptcy No. 82-845
Chapter 7
IN THE MATTER OF: PENN TERRA LIMITED, a corpora-
tion, also known as PENN COAL COMPANY, a division
of PENN TERRA LIMITED,
Debtor
PENN TERRA LIMITED,
Plaintiff
V.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES,
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Patti J. SAUNDERS & DIANA J. STARES,
Defendants
ORDER OF COURT
At Pittsburgh in said district this 4th day of Novem-
ber, 1982
It is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that the De-
partment of Environmental Resources, Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, is permanently enjoined from enforcing
the order of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
entered against Penn Terra Limited ad Margaret L.
McArdle, trustee, on May 24, 1982 at No. 838 C.D. 1982.
/s/ Gerald K. Gibson
GERALD K. GIBSON
Bankruptcy Judge
ce: Dennis W. Strain, Esq.
T. Lawrence Palmer, Esq.
Margaret L. McArdle, Esq.
16a
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Bankruptcy No. 82-845
Debtor
Plaintiff
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES,
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Patti J. SAUNDERS & DIANA J. STARES,
Defendants
JUDGMENT
At Pittsburgh in said district this 4th day of Novem-
ber, 1982
Judgement is hereby entered against the Department of
Environmental Resources, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
in the amount of Twenty-Five Hundred ($2,500.00) Dol-
lars, payable to the Clerk, U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania.
s, Gerald K. Gibson
GERALD K. GIBSON
Bankruptcy Judge
ec: Dennis W. Strain, Esq.
T. Lawrence Palmer, Esq.
Margaret L. McArdle, Esq.
17a
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Bankruptcy No. 82-845
Chapter 7
IN THE MATTER OF: PENN TERRA LIMITED, a corpora-
tion, also known as PENN COAL COMPANY, a division
Debtor
Plaintiff
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES,
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Patti J. SAUNDERS & DIANA J. STAREs,
Defendants
JUDGMENT
At Pittsburgh in said district this 4th day of Novem-
ber, 1982
Judgement is hereby entered against the Department of
Environmental] Resources, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
and in favor of T. Lawrence Palmer, attorney for the
debtor, in the amount of One Hundred Fifty ($150.00)
/s/ Gerald K. Gibson
GERALD K. GIBSON
Bankruptcy Judge
18a
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Bankruptcy No. 82-845
Chapter 7
IN THE MATTER OF: PENN TERRA LIMITED, a corpora-
tion, also known as PENN COAL COMPANY, a division
of PENN TERRA LIMITED,
Debtor
PENN TERRA LIMITED,
Plaintiff
V.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES,
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Patti J. SAUNDERS & DIANA J. STARES,
Defendants
JUDGMENT
At Pittsburgh in said district this 4th day of Novem-
ber, 1982
Judgement is hereby entered against the Department of
Environmental Resources, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
and in favor of Margaret L. McArdle, trustee, in the
amount of Fifty ($50.00) Dollars.
/s/ Gerald K. Gibson
GERALD K. GIBSON
Bankruptcy Judge
ec: Dennis W. Strain, Esq.
T. Lawrence Palmer, Esq.
Margaret L. McArdle, Esq.
19a
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Civil No. 81-299-D
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.
V.
JOHNS-MAN VILLE SALES CORPORATION, ET AL.
ORDER
This environmental litigation was commenced in this
court by the plaintiff United States of America, which
has been subsequently joined in invervention by the State
of New Hampshire. Contending that health and environ-
ment have been endangered by the disposal of certain as-
bestos wastes, plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to § 7003 of
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6973 (“RCRA”), and 106 (a) of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §9606(a) (“CERCLA”). The relief
sought by New Hampshire is grounded in provisions of
its Solid Waste Management Act, RSA 147:45, et seq.
(“SWMA”), and Hazardous Waste Management Act,
RSA 147-A (Supp. 1981) (“HWMA”).'
Defendant Johns-Manville Sales Corporation (“Man-
ville“), described as a Delaware corporation which is reg-
istered to do business in New Hampshire, is alleged to
have disposed of the wastes at issue as the result of its
production facility in Nashua, New Hampshire. The in-
dividual defendants * are described as owners of the sites
New Hampshire also claims the right to recovery under the
doctrine of common law nuisance.
2 The individual defendants are: Anthony Matarazzo and Rose
Matarazzo; Arthur Bursey, Jr.; Thomas Baker; Stanley Alukonis
and Sophie Alukonis; Richard Lannan and Brenda Lannan; James
Choate and Joyce Choate; and Joseph Lemieux and Marie Lemieux.
20a
in Hudson, New Hampshire, upon or in which Manville
allegedly disposed of its asbestos waste. The initial com-
plaint was filed here in June of 1981 by the United
States, and subsequently New Hampshire was permitted
to intervene, various cross claims were filed among the
defendants, and United States was allowed to amend its
complaint,“ following which it sought to move for a pre-
liminary injunction.
As has been well publicized, however, Manville sought
relief from its creditors pursuant to the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code by filing a voluntary petition, 11 U.S.C. § 301, for
reorganization under Chapter XI of said Act, 11 U.S.C.
1101, et seg. On August 26, 1982, the Bankruptcy
Court in the Southern District of New York issued a
broad restraining order purporting to stay all persons
and governmental units, including the plaintiffs and de-
fendants, from commencing or continuing with any liti-
gation against Manville. Accordingly, under date of Sep-
tember 30, 1982, the Magistrate in this district ordered
that further proceedings herein be stayed pending the
outcome of the bankruptcy proceedings.
The matter is currently before the Court on the mo-
tion of the United States, joined by New Hampshire and
defendants Matarazzo, seeking vacation of the aforesaid
stay issued by the Magistrate. Manville and certain of
the defendants object to the vacation of said stay.“
*The amendment, granted on April 6, 1982, allowed the addi-
tion of the claim pursuant to CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
A copy of the restraining order issued by the Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of New York was attached to the legal
memo filed in behalf of Manville herein.
5 Defendants Baker and Alukonis have joined in Manville’s ub-
jection to the vacation of stay. A'though certain of the parties
have requested further hearing, ti Court finds upon examination
of the well-crafted memos filed in behalf of the primary parties
and its own research that such hearing is not necessary and pro-
ceeds forthwith to resolution of the issues raised.
2la
The thrust of the request for relief from the stay here-
in is to the effect that the relief here sought falls within
the specific exception to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) (1),° which
is detailed in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (4) as follows:
The filing of 2 petition under section 301, 302, or
303 of this title does not operate as a stay—
(4) under subsection (a) (1) of this section, of
the commencement or continuation of an action
or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce
such governmental unit’s police or regulatory
power [emphassis added].
Movants urge that inasmuch as the relief here sought
is injunctive under federal and state laws which author-
ize abatement of imminent and substantial endangerment
to health caused by the disposal of hazardous asbestos
wastes, this Court must vacate the stay for protection of
the public. For reasons unclear,’ neither the United
States nor New Hampshire has sought to make use of its
own funds for the purpose of emergency clean-up, re-
moval, and containment action pursuant to section 104
and 107 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607, and New
11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) (1) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a peti-
tion filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title operates
as a stay, applicable to all entities, of.
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the
issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, adminis-
trative, or other proceeding against the debtor that was
or could have been commenced before the commencement
of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against
the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case
under this title.
It may well be that the respective government plaintiffs feel
that the funds available to them are inadequate to provide the
relief actually sought herein and that they must accordingly seek
to press the instant action against Manville. See United States v.
Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785, 792-94 and n. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
22a
Hampshire’s Hazardous Waste Cleanup Fund, RSA
147-B (Supp. 1981) (“HWCF”). Manville argues that
as the actual relief here sought is not the injunction of
ongoing waste disposal on its part but is the expenditure
of funds to rectify what it depicts as long-past disposal
practices, the limited relief from bankruptcy stay out-
lined in 11 U.S.C. § 362 (b) (4) should not be here ap-
plied.
We commence our analysis with review of the relief
sought at pp. 8, et seg., of the amended complaint in
behalf of the United States, Document 59. While it is
true that movants seek injunction against the allowance
or causation of disposal of any asbestos or other hazard-
ous wastes or substances at the sites owned by the in-
dividual defendants and also request injunctive relief
from the allowance or causing of the alteration of any
part of the aforesaid sites without the approval of the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), {A and
B, a fair reading of the remainder of the relief sought
demonstrates that if found to be required, its implemen-
tation would require the exepnditure of substantial funds
on the part of Manville. Thus it is sought to require
Manville to prepare and implement a plan to be approved
by EPA for covering all of the sites at issue with soil
and vegetation and to maintain such cover in order to
prevent asbestos fibers from becoming airborne, . C, and
to erect fences and post warnings around each of the
aforesaid sites, J D(1-4).* Additionally, plaintiffs here
8 In the course of ordinary trial preparation prior to entry of the
stay herein, defendants Matarazzo’s disclosure of experts pursuant
to the applicable provisions of Rule 26(b) (4), Fed. R. Civ.P., Docu-
ment 110, has attached to it an estimate by an expert environ-
mental witness which purports to demonstrate that the cost of
removal and cover of the waste on the Matarazzo site alone would
exceed $1 million. While establishment of any such amount would
naturally require proof adduced in accord with proper trial proce-
dure, such estimate is here referred to merely to illustrate that if
the plaintiffs herein are successful in the relief sought, substantial
sums of money will be required to implement such relief.
23a
seek to require Manville to post a performance bond for
the accomplishment of all necessary remedial actions.
From the foregoing it can be seen that regardless of
its description the relief here sought actually seeks the
expenditure of substantial funds from the assets of Man-
ville which are now within the jurisdiction of the Bank-
ruptey Court for the Southern District of New Vork.“
And although the plaintiffs could easily seek to sever and
proceed with their claims against the defendants ** who
are allegedly the owners in possession of the premises
upon which threatened imminent danger exists, no such
suggestion is here made.“
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, is substantially detailed in
1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, commencing at p.
5787. Referring respectively and selectively to identical
o At this point, the Court notes that even though it undoubtedly
possesses jurisdiction to review the issuance of the stay by its Magis-
trate pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636, even were such
relief to be afforded, it might well prove illusory, for it is the bank-
ruptcy judge “who is the most knowledgeable about the debtor’s
affairs, and about the effect that any judicial proceeding would have
on the debtor’s reorganization” and who ultimately, therefore, re-
tains the jurisdiction of determining whether an action against
the debtor may proceed or whether the bankruptcy court’s stay
should remain in effect. Association of St. Croix Condominium
Owners v. St. Croix Hotel Corporation, 682 F.2d 446, 448 (3d
Cir. 1982).
10 It is well established that the commencement of Chapter XI
proceedings with resulting stay as against the debtor therein does
not serve te stay proceedings against codefendants who are not
themseives seeking the relief of bankruptcy. Royal Truck & Trailer
v. Armadora Maritime Salvadorena, et al., 10 B.R. 488 (Bkrtcy.
N. O. III. 1981).
21 Indeed, the relief herein sought as against the individual de-
fendants appears to be limited to requiring them to note on their
deeds the existence of the hazardous waste on their premises and
to permit inspection of said premises for testing and monitoring
purposes.
24a
provisions set forth in both the Senate, id. at 5838, and
the House, id. at 6299, Reports, the plaintiffs stress that
it is obvious that this case is one in which automatic stay
is not applicable. Such argument overlooks the require-
ment that 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (4) must of necessity be
read in conjunction with 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (5), which
excepts from the automatic stay “of the enforcement of a
judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an
action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce
such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power”.
Thus, the identical, language in the Senate and House
Reports which immediately follows that relied on by the
plaintiffs herein states:
Paragraph (5) makes clear that the exception ex-
tends to permit an injunction and enforcement of an
injunction, and to permit the entry of a money judg-
ment, but does not extend to permit enforcement of
a money judgment. Since the assets of the debtor
are in the possession and control of the bankruptcy
court, and since they constitute a fund out of which
all creditors are entitled to share, enforcement by a
governmental unit of a money judgment would give
it preferential treatment to the detriment of all
other creditors.
1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, at 5838, id. at 6299.
Additionally, the legislative leaders who presented the
Bankruptcy Code, i.e., Representative Edwards and Sen-
ator DeConcini, made clear that the application oi 11
U.S.C. § 362(b) (4) “is intended to be given narrow con-
struction in order to permit governmental units to pursue
actions to protect the public health and safety and not to
apply to actions by a governmental unit to protect a
pecuniary interest in property of the debtor or property
of the estate”. 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, at
6444-45 (remarks of Representative Edwards), and at
6513 (remarks of Senator DeConcini). Such remarks
merely restate the well-established rule of law to the ef-
25a
fect that [a] plaintiff cannot transform a claim for
damages into an equitable action by asking for an in-
junction that orders the payment of money”. Jaffee v.
United States, 592 F.2d 712, 715 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 961 (1979), quoted in United States v. Price,
523 F. Supp. 1055, 1067 (D.N.J. 1981) (holding under
RCRA and CERCLA plaintiff not entitled to preliminary
injunction which would require past and current owners
of landfill to fund study to monitor extent of problem
posed by leachate emanating from landfill, to devise solu-
tion to such problem, or to provide alternate water sup-
ply to those home owners whose wells were contaminated
by such leachate).
The Court does not find persuasive the case authority
relied upon by the movants herein. In the Matter of
Canarico Quarries, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 1333 (D.P.R.
1979), concerns circumstances where an authorized ad-
ministrative agency which had been upheld by a local
court had entered a cease and desist order foreclosing
the continued operation of the debtor’s quarry as viola-
tive of the Federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401, et
seq. Subsequent to such administrative and judicial pro-
ceedings, the debtor sought relief under Chapter XI of
the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, and the bankruptcy court au-
thorized the debtor’s continued operation of its quarry.
In reversing the bankruptcy court, the district court pre-
dicted in dicta that 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (4) would man-
date exception to any stay. In the course of that portion
of its opinion, however, the court quoted language which
referred to the “narrow construction” which was to be
given 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (4). 466 F. Supp. at 1340.
In Re Mansfield Tire and Rubber Company, 660 F.2d
1108 (6th Cir. 1981), held that a bankruptcy court could
not stay the administration by the State of Ohio of its
workers’ compensation claims, but in the course of so
doing pointed out that the “insurance fund, not the
debtor’s estate, pays the claims for which the employer
has paid the premium”. 660 F.2d at 1113. In a subse-
26a
quent decision, the Sixth Circuit explained its decision in
the Mansfield case, in pertinent part, as follows:
The debtor in Mansfield was not subject to making
payments on its workers’ claims that would resem-
ble a money judgment, since payment of claims would
come from premium funds already deposited by the
debtor with the state, upon which the debtor had
no legal claim. Accordingly, the exception to the
automatic stay was applicable in that case, because
enforcement of a money judgment liability was not
imposed upon the debtor, and the administration of
the claims was pursuant to Ohio’s police power.
In ve Kovacs, 681 F.2d, 454, 456 (6th Cir. 1982).
The decision in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, De-
partment of Environmental Pesources v. Peggs Run
Coal, 423 A.2d 765 (Pa. Commw. 1980), involved a com-
plaint seeking injunctive relief and the posting of bonds
as against an ongoing mining operation which was pur-
portedly in violation of certain state environmental laws.
The Court held that such action was not automatically
stayed by the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings
and was within the exception of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (4)
and (5).% NLRB v. Evans Plumbing Company, 639
F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1981), held that an enforcement pro-
ceeding of an NLRB order reinstating two employees
with back pay was excepted from bankruptcy stay pur-
suant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (b) (4), as such action sought
enforcement of federal labor laws regulating the relation-
ship between employer and employee.
SEC v. First Financial Group of Texas, 645 F.2d 429
(5th Cir. 1981), held that the appointment of a receiver
12 More recently, the highest state court in New Jersey has held
that an action to fix damages for violation of Medicaid fraud stat-
utes is not automaticaily stayed by the filing of a petition for bank-
ruptey in behalf of the errant physician. In Re Garay, 89 N.J.
104, 444 A.2d 1107 (1982).
27a
for a securities dealer against which involuntary bank-
ruptcy had been filed was not precluded by the bankruptcy
stay as such appointment serves “to prevent dismember-
ment of the corporate estate by management personnel
who have been found to have acted fraudulently and
who could otherwise easily dispose of the assets to the
detriment of the debtor’s creditors. 645 F.2d at 439.
And In Re Bel Air Chateau Hospital, Inc., 611 F.2d 1248
(9th Cir. 1979), another case brought under the 1898
Bankruptcy Act, held that the regulatory proceedings of
the NLRB with reference to unfair labor practices in-
volving two employees of the debtor could not be stayed
in bankruptcy.
Were the circumstances of the instant case such that
the relief sought was an injunction which would require
Manville to cease and desist from ongoing deposit of
asbestos wastes on real property sites in New Hamp-
shire, together with the additional posting of a modest
performance bond to ensure compliance with such order,
this Court would agree that the above-cited cases relied
on by movants would indicate that such relief should not
be stayed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (4). Unfortunately,
this is not such a case. The circumstances herein depict
federal and state governments which are either unable or
unwilling to take the necessary financial steps to protect
the public from what are long extant but apparently re-
cently discovered dump sites containing hazardous wastes,
and the same plaintiffs are similarly unwilling to pro-
ceed against the current owners who are in possession of
such sites. Clearly the relief sought is directed against
Manville alone and will require it to divert substantial
of its assets now held in the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy
court from the claims of numerous creditors, many of
whom allege that they are themselves suffering serious
physical debilitation as a result of the inhalation of
asbestos fibers. Cast in this light, it is clear to this
Court. that the exception from stay detailed in 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(b) (4) is not here applicable.
Instructive in this regard is the opinion of the Sixth
Circuit in In Re Kovacs, supra. There the defendant and
certain entities controlled by him were engaged in the
business of industrial waste disposal and had been or-
dered by a state court to cease and desist operations and
to remove all industrial wastes from their business
premises. On the failure of defendant to do so, the state
sought appointment of a receiver over his business assets.
Defendant filed in bankruptcy and subsequently sought
to restrain in the bankruptcy court proceedings in the
state court directed toward inquiry into defendant’s cur-
rent assets and employment. On appeal of the stay
issued by the bankruptcy court, the Court of Appeals in
affirming such stay said in pertinent part:
We concur with the bankruptcy court’s conclusion
that § 362 indicates a clear intent to permit govern-
mental units to continue to enforce their police
power throvgh mandatery injunctions despite the
filing of a bankruptcy petition, but to deny those
units the power to collect money in their enforce-
ment efforts. We further concur with the conclusion
of the bankruptcy court and the district court that
the state of Ohio in its state court proceedings was
seeking what in essence amounted to a money judg-
ment against Kovacs, which was properly subject to
the monetary stay. We note that the state court’s
order appointing a receiver also ordered that Kovacs
turn over all his non-exempt assets to the receiver,
and authorized the receiver to collect any sums of
money that would become payable to Kovacs in the
future. There is very little in substance to distin-
guish that order and a money judgment.
Id. at 456.
As has been elsewhere stated, the term “police or
regulatory power” contained in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (4)
has reference to the enforcement of laws “affecting
health, welfare, morals, and safety, but not regulatory
laws that directly conflict with the control of the res or
property by the bankruptcy court”. State of Missouri v.
United States Bankruptcy Court, et al, 647 F.2d 769, 776
(8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 1035 (1982)
(state grain warehouse laws, although regulatory in
nature, held to primarily relate to the protection of the
pecuniary interest in the debtor’s property and not to
matters of public health and safety).
In sum, while plaintiffs herein could choose to amend
their pleadings and proceed pursuant to sections 104 and
107 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 8 9604, 9607, proceed im-
mediately with government funds to clean up the hazards
which they depict to be existing at the waste sites de-
scribed, and then seek reimbursement from Manville
pending resolution of the bankruptcy proceedings, they
have not chosen to do so.” In lieu of such proceedings,
they suggest that this Court may wrest from the bank-
ruptey jurisdiction the substantial assets which would
be required were the relief here sought to be ordered
after trial.“
This Court has no such jurisdiction, and it should be
noted that nothing in this Order seeks to prevent any
party in interest herein from seeking relief from the stay
of the bankruptcy court by proper application to such
court. The Court finds and rules, however, that in en-
tering its Order of September 30, 1982, the Magistrate
acted properly, and that the motion to vacate his stay
This was the procedure followed in City of Philadelphit v.
Stepan Chemical Company, 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982),
where the City expended its own funds to clean up the hazardous
wastes which had been illegally dumped by others and then sought
to recoup such under § 107 of CERCLA.
™ See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corporation, 546
F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982), for detailed indication of activities
which might be taken against solvent past disposers of hazardous
wastes.
_
in the instant proceedings must be and it is herewith
denied.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Illes ible]
Chief Judge
United States Distriet Court
November 15, 1982
ce: All Counsel
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