Amicus Brief — Ohio v. Kovacs

Supreme Court brief1983

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

IN RE: WILLIAM LEE KOVACS,

Debtor,

STATE OF OHIO,

Petitioner-A ppellant,

V

WILLIAM LEE Kovacs, d/b/a B& W ENTERPRISES;

HAMILTON INDUSTRIAL REAL ESTATE COMPANY;

RESORT RENTALS; and WHITCO ENTERPRISES,

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit

BRIEF OF COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

AND FOURTEEN STATES AS AMICI CURIAE

Leroy S. ZIMMERMAN

Attorney General of Pennsylvania

1641 Strawberry Square

Harrisburg, PA 17120

Telephone: (717) 787-3391

JAMES D. Morris *

Assistant Counsel

Pennsylvania Department of

Environmental Resources

Suite 1200—1315 Walnut Street

Philadelphia, PA 19107

Telephone: (215) 875-7486

HOWARD J. WEIN

Assistant Counsel

Pennsylvania Department of

Environmental Resources

1200 Kossman Building

100 Forbes Avenue

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Telephone: (412) 565-5363

* Counsel of Record for Amici Curiae

WILSON - Eres PrintinG Co., Inc. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

RECITATION PURSUANT TO RULE 284(b) OF THE

RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

Because the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Re-

form Act, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seg., an Act of Congress,

is drawn in question by the instant brief, and because

neither the United States nor any department, office,

agency, officer or employee of the United States is a

party to this proceeding, 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) may be

applicable and a true and correct copy of the instant

brief has been served upon the Solicitor General, De-

partment of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530.

In this proceeding from the Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals, a court of the United States as defined by 28

U.S.C. § 451, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has not

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) certified to the Attorney

General the fact that the constitutionality of the Bank-

ruptcy Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 101 et seg., is drawn in

question.

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Recitation Pursuant to Rule 28.4(b) of the Rules of

the Supreme Court of the United States

e saeatelenelniea derembeaeh tiadachiesatiatie

The Interest of the Amici Curia

Fe satcemeaiicdiemniiiienaaniies

In conflict with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,

the Sixth Circuit has erroneously applied the auto-

matic stay to state police power actions ..................

The decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

will prevent the amici and the State of Ohio from

protecting their citizens from the hazards caused

by violations of stu ve police power enactments by

bankrupts despite the requirements of the Tenth

Amendment, 28 U.S.C. §959(b) and 11 U.S.C.

89900

In conflict with the decision of this Court in

Northern Pipeline Construction Company v. Mara-

thon Pipeline Company, 103 S. Ct. 199 (1982),

the Sixth Circuit has sanctioned the exercise of the

judicial power of the United States under Ariicle

III of the Constitution by an Article I judge

EESTI e OT EDN eR ea E aS

Appendix A In re: Penn Terra Limited, No. 82-845

(Western District of Pennsylvania)

Memorandum Opinion, Order and Judg-

ment dated November 4, 19822

Appendix B United Stutes, et al. v. Johns-Manville

Sales Corporation, et al. (District of

New Hampshire) Order dated Novem-

gS RR ee

iv

10

13

la

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Gillis v. California, 293 U.S. 62 (1934) 10

In re: Penn Terra Limited, Bankruptcy No. 82-

Be CI SD deci ccciarnlncnsconssensnentintonsnssseeceneed 4,7,12

In re: Reddale Company, Inc., Reddale Resources,

Inc., E. C. Dean Contractor, Inc., Bankruptcy

Nos. 79-330, 79-331 and 79-332 (Benkruptcy

R 6

In re: Saugus General Hospital, 4 BCD 1160, 19

CBC 651, 1 CBC 2d 26 (D. Mass. 1978) 6

Northern Pipeline Construction Company v. Mara-

thon Pipeline Company, 103 S. Ct. 199 (1982) 3, 10,

11, 12,13

Securities and Exchange Commission v. First Fi-

nancial Group of Texas, 645 F.2d 429 (5th Cir.

JJ ⁰Ä—I—— A 3

Queenside Hills Realty v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946) 6

United States, et al. v. Johns-Manville Sales Cor-

poration, et al., Civil No. 81-299-D (D. New

rr. 4, 7, 12

Statutes:

Federal:

I I 3,11, 12, 13

// 3, 11, 12, 13

I rr 3, 5, 6, 13

r 1 2, 11

— FFE rr 2, 3, 5, 13

I ne 8

J J Ee 3, 5, 9, 13

r 3, 5, 10, 13

r SEES ra As Oe 11. 12

e csentespunsbigien 4. 12

F crcciseiatinns 7

e a eC 7

. 17 3 7

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

i

Pennsylvania:

Be re IE

48, £50 f fo > ae

ff. § | ¥ 5 YS

3. GO — (ma! eeere ene

Fo BFF ......

ILIE ee

Other:

Wein, Environmental Regulation and the Bank-

ruptey Act, 17 Duq. L. Rev. 133 (1978-1979) 7

>

AAMAAAA

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

Case No. 82-815

IN RE: WILLIAM LEE Kovacs,

Debtor,

STATE OF OHIO,

Petitioner-A ppellant,

v.

WILLIAM LER Kovacs, d/b/a B & W ENTERPRISES;

HAMILTON INDUSTRIAL REAL ESTATE COMPANY;

RESORT RENTALS; and WHITCO ENTERPRISES,

Respondent-A ppellee.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit

BRIEF OF COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

AND FOURTEEN STATES AS AMICI CURIAE

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the states of

California, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri,

New York, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South

Carolina, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin file

this brief as amici curiae pursuant to Rule 36.4 of the

Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.

2

THE INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE

The amici curiae are the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-

vania and the states of California, Connecticut, Idaho,

Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North

Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Vermont, West Vir-

ginia and Wisconsin. The common interest of the amici

in the instant case is in redressing the erosion of their

states’ police powers by the Sixth Circuit’s misapplication

of Sections 105 and 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Reform

Act, 11 U.S.C. § 105 and 362(a). In essence, the Sixth

Cireuit's decision will prevent the amici from enforcing

various state laws concerning environmental protection

against bankrupt violators, no matter how great the im-

mediate danger to the public health and safety. As the

chief legal officers for their various states, the interests

of the amici lie in preserving their ability to protect the

citizenry through enforcement of various state police

power enactments.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In conflict with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,

the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has erroneously ap-

plied the “automatic” stay under section 362(a) of the

Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), to the State

of Ohio, by enjoining an Ohio proceeding against a bank-

rupt pursuant to a validly enacted police power statute

seeking the abatement of the dangers posed by an un-

lawful hazardous waste disposal operation. Because the

Sixth Circuit’s decision sanctions cont aing environ-

mental harm by the bankrupt, because the Sixth Circuit’s

reasoning has led to similar untoward decisions in Penn-

sylvania and New Hampshire and because the Sixth

Circuit’s decision will prevent the remaining amici from

enforcing the laws of their states in similar circum-

stances, the Court should settle the important question of

federal law presented by the applicability of section

362(a) now, in the context of the instant case.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision also contravenes the

Tenth Amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) and section 543(c)

of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. § 543(c).

Given the immediate danger to the citizens of Ohio posed

by the illegal disposal of hazardous waste, the exercise of

this Court’s supervisory powers is urgently required to

redress this extreme departure from the ordinarily ac-

eepted course of judicial proceedings by the Sixth Circuit.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision also conflicts with the

reasoning of this Court in Northern Pipeline Construc-

tion Company v. Marathon Pipeline Company, 103 S. Ct.

199 (1982), because the Sixth Circuit has sanctioned the

exercise of the judicial power of the United States under

Article III by an Article I judge. In order to rectify this

inconsistency, the Court should hear the instant case.

ARGUMENT

In conflict with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has erroneously applied

the automatic stay to state police power actions.

In the instant case, the Sixth Circuit has rendered a

decision in conflict with that of the Fifth Circuit on the

applicability of the “automatic” stay under section

362 (a) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C.

362 (a), to regulatory enforcement action by govern-

mental units. In Securities Exchange Commission v.

First Financial Group of Texas, 645 F.2d 429 (5th Cir.

1981), the Fifth Circuit ruled that the automatic stay

did not apply to an action against a bankrupt by the

Securities Exchange Commission seeking injunctive relief

and the appointment of a receiver to remedy various

securities law violations. As Ohio correctly notes in its

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at pages 15-19, there is

thus contradictory precedent in the Circuit Courts of

Appeal, requiring resolution of the conflict by this Court.

In sanctioning the application of the automatic stay

to state police power actions against bankrupt violators

of state law, the Sixth Circuit has also decided an im-

portant question of federal law which has not been, but

4

should be, settled by this Court. The practical result of

the Sixth Circuit’s decision is to afford the bankrupt an

absolute protection against a legitimate state enforce-

ment action and to expose the people of Ohio to the

continuing imminent danger posed by the illegal disposal

of hazardous waste at the Chem-Dyne site.

Moreover, the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation and ap-

plication of section 362(a) has unfortunately been read

and will be read by other courts for its suggestive au-

thority. Such use of the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning has

already occurred, with devastating impact in the Com-

monwealth of Pennsylvania and in the State of New

Hampshire.

In the case of In re: Penn Terra Limited, No. 82-845

(Western District of Pennsylvania, Memorandum Opin-

ion, Order and Judgment dated November 4, 1982—a

copy of this opinion appears as Appendix A to this brief),

the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Penn-

sylvania, held, inter alia, that the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania had violated the automatic stay provisions

of section 362(a) when it attempted to seek by injunc-

tion in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania the

enforcement of an administrative order requiring recla-

mation of an unlawful strip mine operation. Based upon

the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in the instant case,

the bankruptcy court stripped Pennsylvania’s Common-

wealth Court of jurisdiction despite the requirements of

28 U.S.C. § 1478 (a), adjudicated the Commonwealth in

contempt, fined the Commonwealth and enjoined the

Commonwealth from taking any of the steps necessary

to protect its citizens from the legislatively determined

dangers posed by the unlawful strip mine operation.

In the case of United States, et al. v. Johns-Manville

Sales Corporation, et al., Civil Action No. 81-299-D (Dis-

trict of New Hampshire, Order dated November 15,

1 See, e.g., section 1 of Pennsylvania's Surface Mining Conserva-

tion and Reclamation Act, 52 P.S. § 1396.1 (Cumulative Annual

Pocket Part 1982-1983).

5

1982—a copy of this order appears as Appendix B to

this brief), the United States District Court for the

District of New Hampshire affirmed a magistrate’s

ruling that both the United States and the plaintiff-

intervenor State of New Hampshire were enjoined from

proceeding with an action seeking an injunction against

the allowance or causation of disposal of asbestos and

other hazardous wastes and substances by the Johns-

Manville Sales Corporation, which is currently the sub-

ject of proceedings pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bank-

ruptey Reform Act. Again, the district Court cited with

approval the Sixth Circuit’s decision in the instant case.

Just as in the cases of Ohio and Pennsylvania, New

Hampshire (and the government of the United States)

are prohibited by the federal courts pursuant to section

362 (a) from enforcing laws designed to protect the

public health, safety and welfare.

The applicability of the automatic stay to such state

court police power and federal regulatory proceedings is

an important question of federal law which has been

decided by the Sixth Circuit in conflict with a decision

by the Fifth Circuit. This Court has not yet decided

the question. In order to redress the continuing environ-

mental harm sanctioned by the Sixth Circuit’s decision

in Ohio, as followed in Pennsylvania and New Hamp-

shire, the Court should resolve the conflict in the circuits

and settle this important question of federal law as

swiftly as possible, in the context of the instant case.

The decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals will

prevent the amici and the State of Ohio from protecting

their citizens from the hazards caused by violations of

state police power enactments by bankrupts despite the

requirements of the Tenth Amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 959(b)

and 11 U.S.C. § 543(¢)(1).

Tenth Amendment

State regulatory agencies throughout the nation are

faced every day with the urgent need to protect their

citizens from both the immediate dangers posed by the

illegal disposal of hazardous and industrial waste, as in

the instant case, and by violations of the other state

statu es? designed to protect the health, safety and wel-

fare of the public. All such statutes represent valid exer-

cises of the police power, reserved to the states under the

Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Traditionally recognized by this Court as the least

limitable of the reserved powers, Queenside Hills Realty

v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946), the police power broadly

authorizes the various states to regulate in order to pro-

tect the public health, safety and welfare.

However, legitimate state enforcement action to pro-

tect the public health, safety and welfare is thwarted

when illegal activities are sanctioned by the federal bank-

ruptey courts. The instant case illustrates the refusal

of the federal bankruptcy courts to show constitutionally

mandated deference towards the states in the exercise of

their police power.

In direct contravention of validly enacted state regu-

latory requirements, bankruptcy courts throughout the

nation have sanctioned such activities as the illegal op-

eration of highly polluting strip mines,“ the unlicensed

operation of unqualified hospitals* and preventing the

With respect to the example of Pennsylvania alone, see, e..

the Solid Waste Management Act, 35 P.S. § 6018.101 et seq.:; the

Clean Streams Law, 35 P.S. § 691.1 et seq.; the Air Pollution Con-

trol Act, 35 P.S. § 4018 et seq.; the Surface Mining Conservation

and Reclamation Act, 52 P.S. § 1396.1 et seq.; the Coal Refuse Dis-

posal Control Act, 52 P.S. § 30.51 et seq.; and the Bituminous

Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, 52 P.S. 1406.1 et seq.

In re: Reddale Company, Inc., Reddale Resources, Inc., F. C.

Dean Contractor, Inc., Nos. 79-330, 79-331, 79-332 (Bankruptcy

Court, W.D. Pa.) Memorandum Opinion and Order, March 31, 1980.

In re: Saugus General Hospital, Inc., 4 BCD 1160, 19 CBC 651,

1 CBC2d 26 (D. Mass. 1978).

7

cleanup of a hazardous asbestos disposal facility.“ The

most recent incursions by the federal bankruptcy courts

against state police power statutes and the Tenth Amend-

ment occurred on November 4, 1982, when the Bank-

ruptey Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania

adjudicated the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in con-

tempt and levied a substantial fine because the Common-

wealth sought in the courts of Pennsylvania an injunc-

tion enforcing an administrative order pursuant to Penn-

sylvania law to abate the hazardous conditions created by

an illegal and dangerous strip mine operated by a bank-

rupt,“ and on November 15, 1982, when the State of

New Hampshire and the government of the United

States were enjoined from proceeding with an injunctive

action seeking the cleanup of an unlawful asbestos dis-

posal operation.’

The foregoing examples are by no means exhaustive.

The federal bankruptcy courts have delayed, obstructed

and thwarted the states in their various efforts pursuant

to the police power to protect the public health, safety and

welfare against the illegal operation of hazardous enter-

prises, despite the restraints of the Tenth Amendment.

Many of these police power statutes, moreover, have been

enacted to implement federal legislative action under the

Commerce Clause.* Consequently, when the enforcement

of these statutes is enjoined by the federal bankruptcy

courts, it disrupts the constitutional scheme protecting

5 United States, et al. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation, et al.,

Civil No. 81-299-D (D. New Hampshire 1982).

n re: Penn Terra Limited, No. 82-845 (Bankruptcy Court W. D.

Pa.) Memorandum Opinion, Order and Judgment, November 4,

1982).

7 See n.5, supra.

8 See, e.g., the Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et

seq., the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq., the Surface Mining

Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. 1201 et seg. See also Wein,

both the police power of the states and the power of the

federal government to regulate interstate commerce. This

disruption of our constitutional scheme of government

demands the invocation of this Court’s supervisory

powers.

The Bankruptcy Reform Act

The Congress recognized and acknowledged the states’

police power when it enacted the Bankruptcy Reform

Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seg. The Act makes it

clear that bankrupts and bankruptcy courts may not

frustrate nor obstruct the legitimate enforcement by the

states of validly enacted police power statutes, in the

explicit declaration that the automatic stay under Sec-

tion 362 of the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 362, does not apply to

that class of actions. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (4):

[t]he filing of a petition under section 301, 302 or

303 of this title does not operate as a stay...

under subsection (a) (1) of this section, of the com-

mencement or continuation of an action or proceed-

ing by a governmental unit to enforce such govern-

mental unit’s police or regulatory power.“

The Sixth Circuit has ignored this express policy choice

by the Congress and this constitutionally mandated pro-

vision of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. Ohio stands unable

to protect its citizens against the depredations of Kovacs,

who by virtue of the Bankruptcy Court’s action, affirmed

by the Sixth Circuit, is completely insulated from his

duties under the Stipulation and Judgment of July 18,

1979. If the Sixth Cireuit's decision is permitted to

Environmental Regulation and the Bankruptcy Act, 17 Du. L. Rev.

133, 136 (1978-1979).

Indeed, as Ohio correctly states in its Petition for Writ of Cer-

tiorari at pages 8-11, the legislative history of this provision force-

fully underscores Congressional intent to protect state police power

actions from interference by the federal bonkruptey courts.

stand, the amici will find themselves in the same posi-

tion as Ohio: prevented from enforcing the valid laws

of their states enacted pursuant to their police power

because the federal bankruptcy courts have and will

prevent them from so doing. Pennsylvania and New

Hampshire have already suffered that fate.“

The Sixth Circuit has also rendered an implicit deci-

sion on the applicability of § 543 (e) (1) of the Bank-

ruptey Code, 11 U.S.C. § 543 (e) (1), which provides in

pertinent part that “[t]he court, after notice and a hear-

ing, shall . . . protect all entities to which a custodian

has become obligated with respect to” property turned

over to the bankruptcy court, 11 U.S.C. § 543 (e) (1). The

Ohio receivership was set up on February 4, 1980, and

the bankruptcy was filed on July 18, 1980. When the

Ohio receiver, as a “custodian” under 11 U.S.C. § 543,

turned over the state receivership assets to the bank-

ruptey court, no effort whatsoever was made by the

bankruptcy court to protect Ohio from the receiver’s

inability to carry out his obligations under the Febru-

ary 4, 1980 receivership order. To date, those obliga-

tions remain outstanding and unsatisfied. The “entity”

to which the receiver is obligated for the clean up of the

Kovac's hazardous waste dump the State of Ohio—was

not in any sense “protected” by the Bankruptcy court or

the Sixth Circuit, despite the clear requirements of

543 (e) (1).

The productive use of state court receiverships in

police power matters will inevitably be curtailed, with a

concomitant increase in danger to the public health and

safety, if neither the receiver nor the state to which the

receiver is obligated will be protected by the federal

bankruptcy courts. The Sixth Circuit has essentially

decided that § 543 (e) (1) of the Bankruptcy Code has no

applicability to such situations. Such a fundamental dis-

See text accompanying n.5 and n.6, supra.

10

mantling of the Bankruptcy Reform Act and thwarting

of the Congressional intent to protect the police power

demands the exercise of this Court’s supervisory powers.

28 U.S.C. 8 959(b)

Even prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Re-

form Act, the Congress recognized its obligation to the

states under the Tenth Amendment. Many years ago,

the Congress addressed the problems presented when a

bankrupt violates state law, in the enactment of

28 U.S.C. 8 959 (b), which provides in pertinent part

that:

... @ trustee, receiver or manager appointed in any

cause pending in any court of the United States,

including a debtor in possession, shall manage and

operate the property in his possession as such trus-

tee, according to the requirements of the valid laws

of the state in which the property is situated, in the

same manner that the owner or possessor thereof

would be bound to do so if in possession thereof.

This Court upheld the applicability of this provision

in Gillis v. California, 293 U.S. 62 (1934). The Sixth

Cireuit's decision ignores this Court’s decision in Gillis

and subverts the Congressional intent to vindicate the

states’ reserved police power under the Tenth Amend-

ment. Such a radical departure from the ordinary and

accepted course of judicial proceedings requires the exer-

cise of this Court’s supervisory powers.

In conflict with the decision of this Court in Northern

Pipeline Construction Company v. Marathor Pipeline

Company, 103 S. Ct. 199, the Sixth Circuit has sanctioned

the exercise of the judicial power of the United Siates

under Article III of the Constitution by an Article I

judge.

The plurality opinion in Northern V neline Construc-

tion Company v. Marathon Pipeline Comnany, 103 S. Ct.

199, expressed the gravest reservations over the con-

11

stitutionality of the grant of jurisdiction to the bank-

ruptcy judges under § 241(a) of the Bankruptcy Re-

form Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1471. The judgment of the Court

was that the exercise by bankruptcy judges of jurisdic-

tion over disputes of a purely state law nature violated

Article III of the United States Constitution. The exer-

cise of jurisdiction by the bankruptcy court below,

affirmed by the Sixth Circuit, illustrates with precision

the reasons why the bankruptcy courts should not be per-

mitted Article III powers.

The day-to-day administration of the affairs of the

bankrupt respecting property of the bankrupt in the ac-

tual or constructive possession of the federal bankruptcy

courts may well be sanctioned under Article I, and a

Congressional judgment that the federal bankruptcy

courts, as a matter of social policy, possess a sufficient

expertise to deal with such affairs might be justifiable.

However, the exercise of the judicial power of the

United States under Article III by the federal bank-

ruptey courts cannot be justified. An Article I tribunal

has no legitimate business in interfering with a state

agency’s effort to protect the public health, safety and

welfare by enforcing state law in state court against

bankrupt violators.

The Congressional grant of All Writs powers to the

federal bankruptcy courts pursuant to Section 105 of

the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. § 105, is consti-

tutionally deficient. In the instant case, Ohio presses in

behalf of its citizens a legitimate police power action to

abate the dangers posed by illegal hazardous waste

disposal by the bankrupt, in a state action sanctioned

under the Tenth Amendment. Ohio’s police power is as

independent of and antecedent to the reorganization

petition that conferred jurisdiction upon the bankruptcy

court”, Northern Pipeline Construction Company v. Mara-

thon Pipeline Company, 103 S. Ct. 199 (1982) as the pri-

vate dispute in Northern Pipeline. Yet, just as in Northern

Pipeline Construction, supra, in the instant case an

12

Article I judge exercised and continues to exercise in

an improper manner yet another Article III power: the

power to issue all writs and orders “necessary or appro-

priate” in support of the jurisdiction granted it under

§ 241 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1471,

which includes the power to enjoin any person from pro-

ceeding with any action on any theory in any court of

the various states or the United States against the bank-

rupt. In Pennsylvania, based upon the reasoning of

the Sixth Circuit in the instant case, a bankruptcy court

has sanctioned the improper removal of a pending state

court enforcement action, adjudicated Pennsylvania in

contempt, fined Pennsylvania, and applied the automatic

stay in such a manner as to enjoin Pennsylvania from

proceeding with a valid state covr+ action seeking to

eliminate the dangerous conditions, ed by an unlawful

strip mine operation.“ In New Hampshire, based again

on the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit, the State of New

Hampshire and the government of the United States

have been enjoined from seeking an injunction to compel

the cleanup of an unlawful asbestos disposal operation.“

More disasterous examples of the vice in the exercise of

Article III powers by an Article I judge are difficult to

imagine.

Combining the clear conflict with this Court’s plural-

ity opinion in Northern Pipeline, supra, together with

the disregard of the public health and safety and the

violations of the Tenth Amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 959 (b

and Section 543 (e) (3) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act,

the invocation of the supervisory power of this Court is

urgently required to redress the injustice and peril to

the public caused by the Sixth Circuit’s decision below.

11 The bankruptcy court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1478 did not deprive

it of removal power despite the express language of that provision

and also held that the automatic stay applied to the Pennsylvania

action. See also tert accompanying n.6, supra.

12 See text accompanying n.5, supra.

13

CONCLUSION

In conflict with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has erroneously applied

the automatic stay of section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy

Reform Act to state governments exercising their police

power. Because the Sixth Circuit’s decision sanctions

continuing environmental harm and danger to the peo-

ple of Ohio, because the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning has

led to similar decisions in Pennsylvania and New Hamp-

shire, and because the Sixth Circuit’s decision will frus-

trate the efforts of the remaining amici curiae as they

attempt to resolve closely similar cases as they arise

in their own states, the Court should settle this impor-

tant question of federal law now, in the context of the

instant case.

The Sixth Cireuit's decision also violates the Tenth

Amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) and section 543(c) of

the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. 5 543 (e) and

sanctions on a nationwide basis the extreme departure

by the federal bankruptcy courts from the ordinarily

accepted course of judicial proceedings. Given the

immediate and continuing danger to the health and

safety of the citizens of the several states, the exercise

of this Court’s supervisory powers is urgently needed.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision also conflicts with the

reasoning of the majority of this Court in Northern

Pipeline Construction Company v. Marathon Pipeline

Company, 103 S.Ct. 199 (1982), because the Sixth Cir-

cuit has sanctioned the exercise of the judicial power

under Article III by an Article I juage who possesses

neither the attribute of life tenure nor protection against

salary diminution. In order to 1ectify this gross incon-

sistency with the Northern Pipeline judgment, the Court

should hear this case.

For these reasons, the amici respectfully request that

this Court grant a writ of certiorari to review the

14

judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Sixth Circuit in this matter.

Respectfully submitted,

Leroy S. ZIMMERMAN

Attorney General of Pennsylvania

1641 Strawberry Square

Harrisburg, PA 17120

Telephone: (717) 787-3391

JAMEs D. Morris *

Assistant Counsel

Pennsylvania Department of

Environmental Resources

Suite 1200—1315 Walnut Street

Philadelphia, PA 19107

Telephone: (215) 875-7486

HOWARD J. WEIN

Assistant Counsel

Pennsylvania Department of

Environmental Resources

1200 Kossman Building

100 Forbes Avenue

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Telephone: (412) 565-5363

* Counsel of Record for Amici Curiae

APPENDICES

la

APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

Bankruptcy No. 82-845

Chapter 7

IN THE MATTER OF: PENN TERRA LIMITED, a corpora-

tion, also known as PENN COAL COMPANY, a division

of PENN TERRA LIMITED,

Debtor

PENN TERRA LIMITED,

Plaintiff

v.

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES,

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Patti J. SAUNDERS & DIANA J. STARES,

Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The matter presently before the Court is a Petition for

Contempt filed on behalf of debtor, Penn Terra Limited,

against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department

of Environmental Resources, hereinafter “DER”. The

Petition for Contempt arises from DER’s continued pur-

suit of a mandatory injunction against debtor in Com-

monwealth Court of Pennsylvania seeking debtor’s ex-

penditure of funds for correction of its violations of the

Pennsylvania Clean Streams Act and Surface Mining

Conservation and Reclamation Act. DER initiated the

action in Commonwealth Court subsequent to the debtor’s

filing of a petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy

Code; and pursued the litigation despite its receipt of the

trustee in bankruptcy’s petition to remove the action

2a

from Commonwealth Court to Bankruptcy Court. The

Commonwealth Court proceeding ultimately resulted in

that Court’s entry of an order requiring the debtor to

expend funds for correction of its violations.

At the June 29, 1982 hearing on the Petition for Con-

tempt, this Court dismissed the contempt proceedings

against Diana J. Stares and Patti J. Saunders, counsel

for DER. The Petition for Removal was remanded to

Commonwealth Court as to Harvey Taylor, alleged presi-

dent of debtor corporation; and retained as to Penn

Terra Limited, debtor herein. DER was enjoined from

enforcing the order of the Commonwealth Court of Penn-

sylvania entered against debtor and Margaret L.

McArdle, trustee, pending determination of the afore-

said matter.

The serious issues presented for determination involve

the applicability of the automatic stay provisions of

11 U.S.C. § 362, and removal provisions of 28 U.S.C.

1478 to the action brought by DER against debtor in

Commonwealth Court.

DER contends that it is neither subject to the auto-

matic stay provisions nor the removal provisions, for

it is a governmental! unit proceeding to enforce its police

and regulatory powers. Based upon the facts, legislative

history, and case law that follow, the Court concludes

that there is no sensible basis for its position. For the

reasons set forth below, the Court holds that the action

initiated by DER in Commonwealth Court wherein a

mandatory injunction requiring debtor’s expenditure of

funds was sought is in essence an attempt to enforce a

money judgment. As such, it is not exempt from the

automatic stay provisions of § 362 of the Bankruptcy

Code. Nor is it exempt from removal under 28 U.S.C.

1478.

The facts are as follows. Penn Terra Ltd. is a Penn-

sylvania corporation engaged in contract coal stripping.

3a

It filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy under Chap-

ter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on March 15, 1982. Debtor

had ceased all operations prior to that date. On Sched-

ule B-2, debtor lists personal property in the approxi-

mate amount of $14,000, $13,500 of which is designated

as “certificates of deposit on deposit with DER; bonds

for backfilling.” The schedules further note that the cost

of reclamation vastly exceeds the market and book value

of the bonds. Debts listed on the schedules exceed

$660,000.

In November, 1981, prior to the filing of the bank-

ruptey petition, DER, Penn Terra Ltd., and Harvey

Taylor, its president, executed a consent order and

agreement arising from Penn Terra’s violation of the

Clean Streams Law (Act of June 22, 1937, P. L. 1987,

as amended 35 P.S. § 691.1 et seq.) ; the Surface Mining

Conservation and Reclamation Act, (Act of May 31,

1945, P.L. 1198 as amended 52 P.S. § 1396.1 et seq.) ;

and Mining and Mine Drainage Permits. Among the

various violations cited therein are the following: min-

ing off bonded area; failure to maintain adequate back-

filling equipment; failure to maintain adequate erosion

and sedimentation controls; failure to pump pit water

accumulations; failure to properly treat mine drainage;

storage of top strata over gas lines; and failure to seal

a deep mine pit. The consent agreement required Penn

Terra to complete all backfilling by operating one D-8

bulldozer or its equivalent, and one tractor scraper for

eight hours a day, five days a week until reclamation of

said mines was completed. Penn Terra was also re-

quired to submit soil erosion and sedimentation control

plans; implement the same upon approval of DER; de-

water all pits; restore and revegetate original contour;

seal deep mine entry; submit plans for removal of top

strata stored over gas line; and implement said plan

upon DER approval. The agreement provided that fail-

ure to restore said mines by the date specified therein

4a

would result in Penn Terra’s rebonding of the entire

area.

On April 14, 1982, approximately one month subse-

quent to the commencement of the bankruptcy proceed-

ings, DER filed a complaint in equity against debtor at

No. 838 C.D. 1982. DER did not receive notice of the

bankruptcy petition until April 29, 1982. Included in the

various counts of the complaint were the following:

I) failure to comply with the consent order and agree-

ment; II) mining off permitted area; III) failure to

backfill concurrently with mining; IV) failure to main-

tain adequate backfilling equipment on the site; V) fail-

ure to revegetate affected areas; VI) failure to seal a

deep mine opening; VII) storage of top soil over gas

line; and VIII) mining within 100 feet of siream

barrier.

On April 27, 1982, the Commonwealth Court set the

hearing on DER’s complaint for May 24, 1982. Immedi-

ately prior to the May hearing date, the Trustee in

bankruptcy filed a petition for removal of the complaint

in equity from the Commonwealth Court to the Bank-

ruptey Court. Trustee alleges therein that the Bank-

ruptey Court has exclusive jurisdiction of all matters

which deal with assests of the debtor; and over all in-

junctions which require future use, distribution, or ex-

penditure of debtor’s funds.

On May 21, 1982, the petition for removal was per-

sonally served upon DER and Diana J. Stares, Esq. by

counsel for the debtor. A copy of the petition was mailed

to the Commonwealth on the same date. Nonetheless,

Diana J. Stares and Patti J. Saunders appeared at the

May 24, 1982 Commonwealth Court hearing on behalf

of DER to request that the Court issue a preliminary

injunction against Penn Terra Ltd. and Harvey Taylor

to enforce the terms of the November 1981 consent

agreement. During the Commonwealth Court proceed-

ing, Ms. Stares informed the Court that although she

5a

was in receipt of the petition for removal, she was un-

certain as to its effect upon the corporate defendant’s

liability. Penn Terra did not appear at the hearing,

nor did counsel appear on its behalf. Ms. Stares con-

tinued in the presentation of DER’s case, and extensive

testimony was offered on DER’s behalf. The Common-

wealth Court filed a Memorandum Opinion and Order

wherein relief requested was granted with respect to the

corporate defendant. By order of Commonwealth Court

of May 24, 1982, Penn Terra was ordered to perform

the following: 1) by October 15, 1982, complete all

backfilling and final grading at the Hilty Surface Mine;

2) within fifteen days of the date of order, submit ero-

sion and sedimentation plans, 3) within fifteen days,

seal the deep mine opening; submit plans for removal

of all strata stored over gas line; and effectuate such

plan upon approval from DER. All top soil spreading,

mulching, and seeding was to be completed no later than

October 15, 1982.

On May 27, 1982, Counsel for the debtor filed a peti-

tion for contempt against DER, Diana J. Stares and

Patti J. Saunders. Therein, Counsel for the debtor

alleges that DER proceeded with the application for pre-

liminary injunction in Commonwealth Court in disregard

of the trustee’s petition to remove the action to the

Bankruptcy Court.

At the June 29, 1982 hearing on the petition for con-

tempt, said petition was dismissed as to individuals

Diana J. Stares and Patti J. Saunders. The petition for

removal as to Harvey Taylor was remanded to the Com-

monwealth Court; and the petition for removal as to

Penn Terra was retained. This Court further ordered

that DER be enjoined from enforcing the May 24, 1982

Order from the Commonwealth Court pending final de-

termination of the aforesaid matter.

In its brief, DER argues that under 11 U.S. C.

§ 362(b) (4), the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not

6a

operate as a stay of a governmental unit’s proceeding to

enforce its police or regulatory power. DER further

avers that under 28 U.S.C. § 1478, the power to remove

does not extend to a civil action by a governmental unit

to enforce police powers; and as such, the attempted

removal is a nullity. Finally, DER asserts that since

it is subject to neither the automatic stay provisions of

§ 362, nor the removal provisions of § 1478, the Bank-

ruptey Court is presently without jurisdiction over the

action brought by DER in Commonwealth Court.

On the other hand, debtor argues that a mandatory

injunction requiring debtor to expend funds is in essence

an action by a regulatory agency for the enforcement

of a money judgment; and as such, DER’s action is

subject to the automatic stay. Debtor further argues

that DER cannot elect to disregard a removal petition,

but rather must litigate its effect before the Bankruptcy

Court. For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees.

Section 362(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code provides

as follows:

(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302,

or 303 of this title does not operate as a stay—

(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of

the commencement or continuation of an

action or proceeding by a governmental

unit to enforce such guvernmental unit’s

police or regulatory power;

The legislative history of § 362(b)(4) further pro-

vides: “Where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to

prevent or stop violation of a fraud, environmental pro-

tection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police

or regulatory laws, or atempting to fix damages for vio-

lation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not

stayed under the automatic stay.” House Report No.

95-595, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. at 343 (1977).

7a

Section 362 (b) (4) has been the subject of numerous

recent decisions. In various situations, the Courts have

upheld a governmental unit’s action against a debtor as

valid exercise of police or regulatory power. As such,

it is exempt from the automatic stay provisions of § 362.

The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panels of the

Ninth Circuit recently held that a proceeding initiated

by the State of California for purposes of examining the

conduct of debtor physician charged with gross negli-

gence was a valid exercise of police power necessary for

the health and safety of its residents. Accordingly, the

exemption from the automatic stay provisions set forth

in 362(b) (4) was applicable. In re Thomassen, 15 B R

907 (9 Cir. Bkrtcy. App. 1981). In NLRB v. Evans

Plumbing Co. 639 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1981) a National

Labor Relations Board’s petition for summary judgment

to enforce a Board’s decision ordering debtor’s reinstate-

ment of two employees who were discriminatorily dis-

charged fell within the § 362(b)(4) exception to the

automatic stay, although the NLRB’s actions were sub-

ject to certain limitations discussed below. In In re

Tauscher, 7 B R 918, 7 BCD 124, 3 CBC 2d 536 (E. D.

Wisc. 1981), the actions by the Secretary of Labor in

assessing civil money penalties against debtor for viola-

tion of child labor laws was excepted from the automatic

stay. The Secretary was permitted to fix penalties, up

to and including the entry of a money judgment. Simi-

larly, the administration of worker's compensation

claims by the State of Ohio is a valid exercise of a gov-

ernmental unit’s regulatory power, and is exempt from

the automatic stay. In re Mansfield Tire and Rubber

Co. 660 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir. 1981).

Although Congress has provided an exemption from

the automatic stay for governmental proceedings in the

exercise of police or regulatory power, the legislative his-

tory indicates that the exception must be narrowly

construed.

8a

This section is intended to be given a narrow con-

struction in order to permit governmental units to

pursue actions to protect the health and safety and

not to apply to actions by a governmental unit to

protect the pecuniary interest in the property of

the debtor or property of the estate. (124 Congres-

sional Record H 11089, 11 U.S. Code Congressional

Administrative News 660-61 [December, 1978] ).

In line with the narrow construction, some govern-

mental actions have not been excepted from the provi-

sions of the automatic stay. Thus, the Commissioner of

Motor Vehicles, who is authorized by statute to sus-

pend the license of an uninsured motorist involved in a

motor vehicle accident unless sufficient security is pro-

vided, is subject to the automatic stay. The Court con-

cludes: “if the focus of the police power is directed at

the debtor’s financial obligations rather than the state’s

health and safety concerns, the automatic stay is applica-

ble.” In re Sampson, 17 BR 528, 530, 8 BCD 992

(D. Conn. 1982). A housing authority’s action to seek

eviction of a tenant for nonpayment of rent is also sub-

ject to the automatic stay. In Matter of Gibbs 7 BCD

445 (D. Conn. 1981). Similarly, an action by a state

public health agency to terminate debtor hospital’s oper-

ating license violated the automatic stay. Although the

case was decided under the Bankruptcy Act, the Court

states that the same result would follow under the Code.

In re Saugus General Hospital, Inc. 4 BCD 1160, 19

CBC 651, 1 CBC 2d 26 (D. Mass. 1978). A state health

department’s action to forfeit debtor hospital’s exemp-

tion for certificate of need review in the construction of

a new hospital facility is also subject to the automatic

stay, for the § 362(b)(4) exception is narrow, and

applies only to those actions necessary for the protection

of public health and safety. In re King Memorial Hos-

pital, Inc. 4 BR 704, 6 BCD 634, 2 CBC 2d 639 (S.D.

Fla. 1980).

9a

Thus, it is clear that the Courts have reached different

results in determining whether various governmental ac-

tions fall within the exceptions to the automatic stay

set forth in § 362 (b) (4). However, on the basis of

§ 362(b) (5), the Courts are in agreement that the en-

forcement of a money judgment by a governmental unit

is impermissible. Section 362 (b) (5) provides as follows:

(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302,

or 303 of this title does not operate as a stay—

(5) under subsection (a) (2) of this section, of

the enforcement of a judgment, other than

a money judgment, obtained in an action

or proceeding by a governmental unit to

enforce such governmental unit’s police or

regulatory power.

The legislative history further provides:

Paragraph 5 makes clear that the exception ex-

tends to permit the entry of a money judgment, but

does not extend to permit the enforcement of a

money judgment. Since the assets of the debtor are

in the possession and control of the bankruptcy

court, and since they constitute a fund out of which

all creditors are entitled to share, enforcement by

a governmental unit of a money judgment would

give it preferential treatment to the detriment of all

other creditors.

House Report No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d

Sess. at 343 (1977).

Thus, in recent decisions the Courts have restrained

the state’s attempted enforcement of a money judgment.

In re Fintel, 10 BR 50, 7 BCD 531 (D. Ore. 1981);

In re Barber, 13 BR 962, 8 BCD 188, 5 CBC 2d 150

(N.D. Tex. 1981). As previously stated, in NLRB v.

Evans Plumbing, supra, the Fifth Circuit permitted the

entry of a judgment for injunctive relief and for back

10a

pay. However, the Court expressly refrained from rul-

ing upon whether an action to enforce a money judg-

ment would be exempt from the stay. Further, although

the Secretary of Labor may fix penalties for the debtor’s

violation of child labor laws, the enforcement of a money

judgment is stayed. In re Tauscher, supra. The Com-

monwealth of Pennsylvania’s attempt to enforce a money

judgment against debtor for violation of unfair trade

practices law is also stayed. In re Flick, 14 BR 912,

5 CBC 2d 494 (E. D. Pa. 1981).

Of particular interest in resolution of the case at bar

is the recent Sixth Circuit decision of In re William Lee

Kovacs 681 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1982). Therein, debtor,

engaged in the business of waste disposal, was sued by

the State of Ohio on the basis of its water pollution.

Debtor signed a stipulation and judgment entry in the

Common Pleas Court of Ohio wherein he was enjoined

from further pollution and required to remove indus-

trial waste from the specified site within twelve months.

As a result of debtor’s noncompliance, a receiver was

appointed and directed to correct the violations. Debtor

filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code

in the Southern District of Ohio in July, 1980. The case

was converted to a Chapter 7 in September, 1980. The

state of Ohio filed a motion in Common Pleas Court for

a hearing to determine debtor’s employment status and

income. In response thereto, debtor sought to restrain

the Ohio state court proceedings. The Bankruptcy Court

held that the actior by the state of Ohio was not exempt

from the automatic stay of § 362(a)(2). As stated by

the Bankruptcy Court: “There is no difference in sub-

stance between efforts to collect money from a debtor

by securing a court order, and efforts to enforce a

money judgment against him.” (p. 456) In affirming

the opinion of the Bankruptcy Court and District Court,

the Sixth Circuit reiterates that a governmental unit

is denied the power to collect money in their enforce-

ment efforts. “We further concur with the conclusion

lla

of the bankruptcy court and the district court that the

state of Ohio, in its state court proceeding, was seeking

what in essence amounted to a money judgment against

Kovacs, which was properly subject to the automatic

stay.” (p. 456)

This Court adopts the reasoning set forth in In re

Kovacs, and reaches a similar conclusion in the case at

bar. Although DER characterizes its action as a govern-

mental action in the exercise of its police or regulatory

powers, it seeks a mandatory injunction requiring the

debtor’s expenditure of funds for the correction of viola-

tions. This Court concludes that the mandatory injunc-

tion sought by DER requiring the debtor’s expenditure

of funds is in essence the attempted enforcement of a

money judgment. As such, it is subject to the automatic

stay by virtue of § 362(b) (5).

Assuming arguendo that the governmental action in

the case at bar was not stayed by § 362 of the Code,

§ 105 gives the Court broad powers to “issue any order,

process or judgment necessary or appropriate to carry

out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.” Further,

where government regulatory proceedings threaten assets

of the debtor’s estate, the Court can, in its discretion,

impose a stay. Matter of Shippers Interstate Service,

Inc. 618 F.2d 9 (6 Cir. 1980).

Having concluded that DER’s action in the case at

bar was subject to the automatic stay, the Court now

turns to the issue of removal. DER argues that on the

basis of 28 U.S.C. 1478, its action was not subject to

removal. It further argues that since the removal was

unauthorized, it is of no effect, and the Bankruptcy Court

is presently without jurisdiction over the case at bar.

The Court first examines the general principles of

removal. An order removing an action to federal court

holds the state court’s jurisdiction in abeyance until the

action is terminated or remanded to state court. Doerr v.

12a

Warner, 247 Minn. 98, 76 N.W. 2d 505 (1956), cert.

dismd. Warner v. Doerr, 352 U.S. 801 (1956). Any fur-

ther proceeding in state court is a nullity unless the

case is remanded. Hopson v. North American Co. 71

Idaho 461, 233 P.2d 799 (1951). If necessary the federal

tribunal may issue an injunction to prevent further

activity in the state court. Lowe v. Jacobs, 243 F.2d 432

(5th Cir. 1957), cert. den. Lowe v. Jacobs 355 U.S. 842

(1957).

Now turning to the removal statute as it appears in

the Bankruptcy Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1478 provides as fol-

lows:

(a) A party may remove any claim or cause of

action in a civil action, other than a proceeding

before the United States Tax Court or a civil

action by a governmental unit to enforce such

governmental unit’s police or regulatory power

to the bankruptcy court for the district where

such civil action is pending if the bankruptcy

courts have jurisdiction over such claims or

cause of action.

As previously determined, DER’s action is in essence the

attempted enforcement of a money judgment against the

debtor. As such, it cannot accurately be characterized

as a “civil action by a governmental unit to enforce such

governmental unit’s police power or regulatory power.”

Moreover, it is clearly not the type of action Congress

intended to bar from removal to the Bankruptcy Court.

As stated by the Eighth Circuit in State of Missouri v.

U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of

Arkansas, 647 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1981):

In light of the legislative history and court decisions

under the earlier bankruptcy act, we believe that the

term “regulatory or police powers” refers to the

enforcement of state laws affecting health, welfare,

morals, and safety, but not regulatory laws that

13a

directly confliet with the control of the res or prop-

erty. (p. 776).

For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that

DER’s action in the case at bar is of necessity removable

to the Bankruptcy Court. As of the commencement of a

bankruptcy action, the Bankruptcy Court acquires ex-

clusive jurisdiction over all property wherever located of

the debtor. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e). The underlying goals

are efficiency of administration and equality of distribu-

tion to creditors. A governmental unit’s enforcement of

a monetary judgment would give the governmental unit

an unfair advantage over other creditors and would

effectively subvert the scheme of priorities set forth in

507 of the Code. Collier on Bankruptcy, 362.05 at

362-40 (15th Ed. 1982). To bar removal of such an

action under the guise that it is a governmental action

in the enforcement of its police or regulatory power is

to effectively thwart the bankruptcy court’s exclusive

jurisdiction over property of the debtor.

In response to DER’s argument that this Court is

without jurisdiction in the matter at bar, it is clear that

the Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction to consider a gov-

ernmental unit’s activity which affects the assets of the

debtor. In re Mason, 18 BR 817, 8 BCD 1251 (W.D.

Tenn. 1982). Moreover, the bankruptcy removal statute

is a federal statute, and federal law governs its inter-

pretation. In re Tidwell, 4 BR 100, 6 BCD 2d 172 (N. D.

Tex. 1980). As stated in Moore’s Federal Practice:

Jurisdiction of the federal courts attaches when the

removal petition is filed with the state court. The

state court is deprived of juridiction to proceed with

the removal action unless or until remanded, irre-

spective of whether the action is removable, which

is a question for the federal court.

Vol. 1A 0.168[3-8].

14a

As a final note, it is unfortunate that DER has taken

it upon itself to interpret the applicability of the auto-

matie stay and removal provisions of the Code to its

action at bar. Its mistaken conelusion that it is immune

from the restrietions set forth in the Bankruptey Code

is an unfortunate display of bureaucratic arrogance. As

stated by the Third Circuit in In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d

72 (8rd Cir. 1982) “. . we will not enforce a (National

Labor Relations) Board order that cavalierly refuses to

recognize an outstanding federal court order directly re-

lating to the proceedings before it.” (p. 23)

Given the obvious insolvency of the debtor, DER’s pur-

suit of its action in state court subsequent to its receipt

of the removal petition has resulted in the Common-

wealth Court’s entry of a meaningless order. Unfortu-

nately, DER has sought to accomplish indirectly what it

is obviously not permitted to do directly. The result has

been a regrettable waste of judicial time.

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that DER’s

action is subject to both the provisions of the automatic

stay as set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 362, and the removal pro-

visions as set forth in 28 U.S.C. 1478. Accordingly, DER

is permanently enjoined from enforcing the order of the

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania entered against

Penn Terra Limited and Margaret L. McArdle, trustee,

on May 24, 1982. Further, on the basis of its contume-

lious conduct, the Court imposes a fine against DER in

the amount of $2,500. (Twenty-five hundred dollars).

The court further awards counsel fees in the amount of

$150. (One hundred fifty dollars) to T. Lawrence Palmer,

attorney for the debtor and $50. (Fifty dollars) to Mar-

garet L. McArdle, trustee.

Appropriate orders will be entered.

/s/ Gerald K. Gibson

GERALD K. GIBSON

Bankruptcy Judge

15a

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

Bankruptcy No. 82-845

Chapter 7

IN THE MATTER OF: PENN TERRA LIMITED, a corpora-

tion, also known as PENN COAL COMPANY, a division

of PENN TERRA LIMITED,

Debtor

PENN TERRA LIMITED,

Plaintiff

V.

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES,

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Patti J. SAUNDERS & DIANA J. STARES,

Defendants

ORDER OF COURT

At Pittsburgh in said district this 4th day of Novem-

ber, 1982

It is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that the De-

partment of Environmental Resources, Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania, is permanently enjoined from enforcing

the order of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

entered against Penn Terra Limited ad Margaret L.

McArdle, trustee, on May 24, 1982 at No. 838 C.D. 1982.

/s/ Gerald K. Gibson

GERALD K. GIBSON

Bankruptcy Judge

ce: Dennis W. Strain, Esq.

T. Lawrence Palmer, Esq.

Margaret L. McArdle, Esq.

16a

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

Bankruptcy No. 82-845

Debtor

Plaintiff

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES,

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Patti J. SAUNDERS & DIANA J. STARES,

Defendants

JUDGMENT

At Pittsburgh in said district this 4th day of Novem-

ber, 1982

Judgement is hereby entered against the Department of

Environmental Resources, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,

in the amount of Twenty-Five Hundred ($2,500.00) Dol-

lars, payable to the Clerk, U.S. Bankruptcy Court for

the Western District of Pennsylvania.

s, Gerald K. Gibson

GERALD K. GIBSON

Bankruptcy Judge

ec: Dennis W. Strain, Esq.

T. Lawrence Palmer, Esq.

Margaret L. McArdle, Esq.

17a

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

Bankruptcy No. 82-845

Chapter 7

IN THE MATTER OF: PENN TERRA LIMITED, a corpora-

tion, also known as PENN COAL COMPANY, a division

Debtor

Plaintiff

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES,

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Patti J. SAUNDERS & DIANA J. STAREs,

Defendants

JUDGMENT

At Pittsburgh in said district this 4th day of Novem-

ber, 1982

Judgement is hereby entered against the Department of

Environmental] Resources, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,

and in favor of T. Lawrence Palmer, attorney for the

debtor, in the amount of One Hundred Fifty ($150.00)

/s/ Gerald K. Gibson

GERALD K. GIBSON

Bankruptcy Judge

18a

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

Bankruptcy No. 82-845

Chapter 7

IN THE MATTER OF: PENN TERRA LIMITED, a corpora-

tion, also known as PENN COAL COMPANY, a division

of PENN TERRA LIMITED,

Debtor

PENN TERRA LIMITED,

Plaintiff

V.

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES,

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Patti J. SAUNDERS & DIANA J. STARES,

Defendants

JUDGMENT

At Pittsburgh in said district this 4th day of Novem-

ber, 1982

Judgement is hereby entered against the Department of

Environmental Resources, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,

and in favor of Margaret L. McArdle, trustee, in the

amount of Fifty ($50.00) Dollars.

/s/ Gerald K. Gibson

GERALD K. GIBSON

Bankruptcy Judge

ec: Dennis W. Strain, Esq.

T. Lawrence Palmer, Esq.

Margaret L. McArdle, Esq.

19a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Civil No. 81-299-D

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.

V.

JOHNS-MAN VILLE SALES CORPORATION, ET AL.

ORDER

This environmental litigation was commenced in this

court by the plaintiff United States of America, which

has been subsequently joined in invervention by the State

of New Hampshire. Contending that health and environ-

ment have been endangered by the disposal of certain as-

bestos wastes, plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to § 7003 of

the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 6973 (“RCRA”), and 106 (a) of the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act

of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §9606(a) (“CERCLA”). The relief

sought by New Hampshire is grounded in provisions of

its Solid Waste Management Act, RSA 147:45, et seq.

(“SWMA”), and Hazardous Waste Management Act,

RSA 147-A (Supp. 1981) (“HWMA”).'

Defendant Johns-Manville Sales Corporation (“Man-

ville“), described as a Delaware corporation which is reg-

istered to do business in New Hampshire, is alleged to

have disposed of the wastes at issue as the result of its

production facility in Nashua, New Hampshire. The in-

dividual defendants * are described as owners of the sites

New Hampshire also claims the right to recovery under the

doctrine of common law nuisance.

2 The individual defendants are: Anthony Matarazzo and Rose

Matarazzo; Arthur Bursey, Jr.; Thomas Baker; Stanley Alukonis

and Sophie Alukonis; Richard Lannan and Brenda Lannan; James

Choate and Joyce Choate; and Joseph Lemieux and Marie Lemieux.

20a

in Hudson, New Hampshire, upon or in which Manville

allegedly disposed of its asbestos waste. The initial com-

plaint was filed here in June of 1981 by the United

States, and subsequently New Hampshire was permitted

to intervene, various cross claims were filed among the

defendants, and United States was allowed to amend its

complaint,“ following which it sought to move for a pre-

liminary injunction.

As has been well publicized, however, Manville sought

relief from its creditors pursuant to the 1978 Bankruptcy

Code by filing a voluntary petition, 11 U.S.C. § 301, for

reorganization under Chapter XI of said Act, 11 U.S.C.

1101, et seg. On August 26, 1982, the Bankruptcy

Court in the Southern District of New York issued a

broad restraining order purporting to stay all persons

and governmental units, including the plaintiffs and de-

fendants, from commencing or continuing with any liti-

gation against Manville. Accordingly, under date of Sep-

tember 30, 1982, the Magistrate in this district ordered

that further proceedings herein be stayed pending the

outcome of the bankruptcy proceedings.

The matter is currently before the Court on the mo-

tion of the United States, joined by New Hampshire and

defendants Matarazzo, seeking vacation of the aforesaid

stay issued by the Magistrate. Manville and certain of

the defendants object to the vacation of said stay.“

*The amendment, granted on April 6, 1982, allowed the addi-

tion of the claim pursuant to CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).

A copy of the restraining order issued by the Bankruptcy Court

for the Southern District of New York was attached to the legal

memo filed in behalf of Manville herein.

5 Defendants Baker and Alukonis have joined in Manville’s ub-

jection to the vacation of stay. A'though certain of the parties

have requested further hearing, ti Court finds upon examination

of the well-crafted memos filed in behalf of the primary parties

and its own research that such hearing is not necessary and pro-

ceeds forthwith to resolution of the issues raised.

2la

The thrust of the request for relief from the stay here-

in is to the effect that the relief here sought falls within

the specific exception to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) (1),° which

is detailed in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (4) as follows:

The filing of 2 petition under section 301, 302, or

303 of this title does not operate as a stay—

(4) under subsection (a) (1) of this section, of

the commencement or continuation of an action

or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce

such governmental unit’s police or regulatory

power [emphassis added].

Movants urge that inasmuch as the relief here sought

is injunctive under federal and state laws which author-

ize abatement of imminent and substantial endangerment

to health caused by the disposal of hazardous asbestos

wastes, this Court must vacate the stay for protection of

the public. For reasons unclear,’ neither the United

States nor New Hampshire has sought to make use of its

own funds for the purpose of emergency clean-up, re-

moval, and containment action pursuant to section 104

and 107 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607, and New

11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) (1) provides:

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a peti-

tion filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title operates

as a stay, applicable to all entities, of.

(1) the commencement or continuation, including the

issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, adminis-

trative, or other proceeding against the debtor that was

or could have been commenced before the commencement

of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against

the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case

under this title.

It may well be that the respective government plaintiffs feel

that the funds available to them are inadequate to provide the

relief actually sought herein and that they must accordingly seek

to press the instant action against Manville. See United States v.

Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785, 792-94 and n. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1982).

22a

Hampshire’s Hazardous Waste Cleanup Fund, RSA

147-B (Supp. 1981) (“HWCF”). Manville argues that

as the actual relief here sought is not the injunction of

ongoing waste disposal on its part but is the expenditure

of funds to rectify what it depicts as long-past disposal

practices, the limited relief from bankruptcy stay out-

lined in 11 U.S.C. § 362 (b) (4) should not be here ap-

plied.

We commence our analysis with review of the relief

sought at pp. 8, et seg., of the amended complaint in

behalf of the United States, Document 59. While it is

true that movants seek injunction against the allowance

or causation of disposal of any asbestos or other hazard-

ous wastes or substances at the sites owned by the in-

dividual defendants and also request injunctive relief

from the allowance or causing of the alteration of any

part of the aforesaid sites without the approval of the

Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), {A and

B, a fair reading of the remainder of the relief sought

demonstrates that if found to be required, its implemen-

tation would require the exepnditure of substantial funds

on the part of Manville. Thus it is sought to require

Manville to prepare and implement a plan to be approved

by EPA for covering all of the sites at issue with soil

and vegetation and to maintain such cover in order to

prevent asbestos fibers from becoming airborne, . C, and

to erect fences and post warnings around each of the

aforesaid sites, J D(1-4).* Additionally, plaintiffs here

8 In the course of ordinary trial preparation prior to entry of the

stay herein, defendants Matarazzo’s disclosure of experts pursuant

to the applicable provisions of Rule 26(b) (4), Fed. R. Civ.P., Docu-

ment 110, has attached to it an estimate by an expert environ-

mental witness which purports to demonstrate that the cost of

removal and cover of the waste on the Matarazzo site alone would

exceed $1 million. While establishment of any such amount would

naturally require proof adduced in accord with proper trial proce-

dure, such estimate is here referred to merely to illustrate that if

the plaintiffs herein are successful in the relief sought, substantial

sums of money will be required to implement such relief.

23a

seek to require Manville to post a performance bond for

the accomplishment of all necessary remedial actions.

From the foregoing it can be seen that regardless of

its description the relief here sought actually seeks the

expenditure of substantial funds from the assets of Man-

ville which are now within the jurisdiction of the Bank-

ruptey Court for the Southern District of New Vork.“

And although the plaintiffs could easily seek to sever and

proceed with their claims against the defendants ** who

are allegedly the owners in possession of the premises

upon which threatened imminent danger exists, no such

suggestion is here made.“

The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act

of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, is substantially detailed in

1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, commencing at p.

5787. Referring respectively and selectively to identical

o At this point, the Court notes that even though it undoubtedly

possesses jurisdiction to review the issuance of the stay by its Magis-

trate pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636, even were such

relief to be afforded, it might well prove illusory, for it is the bank-

ruptcy judge “who is the most knowledgeable about the debtor’s

affairs, and about the effect that any judicial proceeding would have

on the debtor’s reorganization” and who ultimately, therefore, re-

tains the jurisdiction of determining whether an action against

the debtor may proceed or whether the bankruptcy court’s stay

should remain in effect. Association of St. Croix Condominium

Owners v. St. Croix Hotel Corporation, 682 F.2d 446, 448 (3d

Cir. 1982).

10 It is well established that the commencement of Chapter XI

proceedings with resulting stay as against the debtor therein does

not serve te stay proceedings against codefendants who are not

themseives seeking the relief of bankruptcy. Royal Truck & Trailer

v. Armadora Maritime Salvadorena, et al., 10 B.R. 488 (Bkrtcy.

N. O. III. 1981).

21 Indeed, the relief herein sought as against the individual de-

fendants appears to be limited to requiring them to note on their

deeds the existence of the hazardous waste on their premises and

to permit inspection of said premises for testing and monitoring

purposes.

24a

provisions set forth in both the Senate, id. at 5838, and

the House, id. at 6299, Reports, the plaintiffs stress that

it is obvious that this case is one in which automatic stay

is not applicable. Such argument overlooks the require-

ment that 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (4) must of necessity be

read in conjunction with 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (5), which

excepts from the automatic stay “of the enforcement of a

judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an

action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce

such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power”.

Thus, the identical, language in the Senate and House

Reports which immediately follows that relied on by the

plaintiffs herein states:

Paragraph (5) makes clear that the exception ex-

tends to permit an injunction and enforcement of an

injunction, and to permit the entry of a money judg-

ment, but does not extend to permit enforcement of

a money judgment. Since the assets of the debtor

are in the possession and control of the bankruptcy

court, and since they constitute a fund out of which

all creditors are entitled to share, enforcement by a

governmental unit of a money judgment would give

it preferential treatment to the detriment of all

other creditors.

1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, at 5838, id. at 6299.

Additionally, the legislative leaders who presented the

Bankruptcy Code, i.e., Representative Edwards and Sen-

ator DeConcini, made clear that the application oi 11

U.S.C. § 362(b) (4) “is intended to be given narrow con-

struction in order to permit governmental units to pursue

actions to protect the public health and safety and not to

apply to actions by a governmental unit to protect a

pecuniary interest in property of the debtor or property

of the estate”. 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, at

6444-45 (remarks of Representative Edwards), and at

6513 (remarks of Senator DeConcini). Such remarks

merely restate the well-established rule of law to the ef-

25a

fect that [a] plaintiff cannot transform a claim for

damages into an equitable action by asking for an in-

junction that orders the payment of money”. Jaffee v.

United States, 592 F.2d 712, 715 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,

441 U.S. 961 (1979), quoted in United States v. Price,

523 F. Supp. 1055, 1067 (D.N.J. 1981) (holding under

RCRA and CERCLA plaintiff not entitled to preliminary

injunction which would require past and current owners

of landfill to fund study to monitor extent of problem

posed by leachate emanating from landfill, to devise solu-

tion to such problem, or to provide alternate water sup-

ply to those home owners whose wells were contaminated

by such leachate).

The Court does not find persuasive the case authority

relied upon by the movants herein. In the Matter of

Canarico Quarries, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 1333 (D.P.R.

1979), concerns circumstances where an authorized ad-

ministrative agency which had been upheld by a local

court had entered a cease and desist order foreclosing

the continued operation of the debtor’s quarry as viola-

tive of the Federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401, et

seq. Subsequent to such administrative and judicial pro-

ceedings, the debtor sought relief under Chapter XI of

the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, and the bankruptcy court au-

thorized the debtor’s continued operation of its quarry.

In reversing the bankruptcy court, the district court pre-

dicted in dicta that 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (4) would man-

date exception to any stay. In the course of that portion

of its opinion, however, the court quoted language which

referred to the “narrow construction” which was to be

given 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (4). 466 F. Supp. at 1340.

In Re Mansfield Tire and Rubber Company, 660 F.2d

1108 (6th Cir. 1981), held that a bankruptcy court could

not stay the administration by the State of Ohio of its

workers’ compensation claims, but in the course of so

doing pointed out that the “insurance fund, not the

debtor’s estate, pays the claims for which the employer

has paid the premium”. 660 F.2d at 1113. In a subse-

26a

quent decision, the Sixth Circuit explained its decision in

the Mansfield case, in pertinent part, as follows:

The debtor in Mansfield was not subject to making

payments on its workers’ claims that would resem-

ble a money judgment, since payment of claims would

come from premium funds already deposited by the

debtor with the state, upon which the debtor had

no legal claim. Accordingly, the exception to the

automatic stay was applicable in that case, because

enforcement of a money judgment liability was not

imposed upon the debtor, and the administration of

the claims was pursuant to Ohio’s police power.

In ve Kovacs, 681 F.2d, 454, 456 (6th Cir. 1982).

The decision in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, De-

partment of Environmental Pesources v. Peggs Run

Coal, 423 A.2d 765 (Pa. Commw. 1980), involved a com-

plaint seeking injunctive relief and the posting of bonds

as against an ongoing mining operation which was pur-

portedly in violation of certain state environmental laws.

The Court held that such action was not automatically

stayed by the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings

and was within the exception of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (4)

and (5).% NLRB v. Evans Plumbing Company, 639

F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1981), held that an enforcement pro-

ceeding of an NLRB order reinstating two employees

with back pay was excepted from bankruptcy stay pur-

suant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (b) (4), as such action sought

enforcement of federal labor laws regulating the relation-

ship between employer and employee.

SEC v. First Financial Group of Texas, 645 F.2d 429

(5th Cir. 1981), held that the appointment of a receiver

12 More recently, the highest state court in New Jersey has held

that an action to fix damages for violation of Medicaid fraud stat-

utes is not automaticaily stayed by the filing of a petition for bank-

ruptey in behalf of the errant physician. In Re Garay, 89 N.J.

104, 444 A.2d 1107 (1982).

27a

for a securities dealer against which involuntary bank-

ruptcy had been filed was not precluded by the bankruptcy

stay as such appointment serves “to prevent dismember-

ment of the corporate estate by management personnel

who have been found to have acted fraudulently and

who could otherwise easily dispose of the assets to the

detriment of the debtor’s creditors. 645 F.2d at 439.

And In Re Bel Air Chateau Hospital, Inc., 611 F.2d 1248

(9th Cir. 1979), another case brought under the 1898

Bankruptcy Act, held that the regulatory proceedings of

the NLRB with reference to unfair labor practices in-

volving two employees of the debtor could not be stayed

in bankruptcy.

Were the circumstances of the instant case such that

the relief sought was an injunction which would require

Manville to cease and desist from ongoing deposit of

asbestos wastes on real property sites in New Hamp-

shire, together with the additional posting of a modest

performance bond to ensure compliance with such order,

this Court would agree that the above-cited cases relied

on by movants would indicate that such relief should not

be stayed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (4). Unfortunately,

this is not such a case. The circumstances herein depict

federal and state governments which are either unable or

unwilling to take the necessary financial steps to protect

the public from what are long extant but apparently re-

cently discovered dump sites containing hazardous wastes,

and the same plaintiffs are similarly unwilling to pro-

ceed against the current owners who are in possession of

such sites. Clearly the relief sought is directed against

Manville alone and will require it to divert substantial

of its assets now held in the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy

court from the claims of numerous creditors, many of

whom allege that they are themselves suffering serious

physical debilitation as a result of the inhalation of

asbestos fibers. Cast in this light, it is clear to this

Court. that the exception from stay detailed in 11 U.S.C.

§ 362(b) (4) is not here applicable.

Instructive in this regard is the opinion of the Sixth

Circuit in In Re Kovacs, supra. There the defendant and

certain entities controlled by him were engaged in the

business of industrial waste disposal and had been or-

dered by a state court to cease and desist operations and

to remove all industrial wastes from their business

premises. On the failure of defendant to do so, the state

sought appointment of a receiver over his business assets.

Defendant filed in bankruptcy and subsequently sought

to restrain in the bankruptcy court proceedings in the

state court directed toward inquiry into defendant’s cur-

rent assets and employment. On appeal of the stay

issued by the bankruptcy court, the Court of Appeals in

affirming such stay said in pertinent part:

We concur with the bankruptcy court’s conclusion

that § 362 indicates a clear intent to permit govern-

mental units to continue to enforce their police

power throvgh mandatery injunctions despite the

filing of a bankruptcy petition, but to deny those

units the power to collect money in their enforce-

ment efforts. We further concur with the conclusion

of the bankruptcy court and the district court that

the state of Ohio in its state court proceedings was

seeking what in essence amounted to a money judg-

ment against Kovacs, which was properly subject to

the monetary stay. We note that the state court’s

order appointing a receiver also ordered that Kovacs

turn over all his non-exempt assets to the receiver,

and authorized the receiver to collect any sums of

money that would become payable to Kovacs in the

future. There is very little in substance to distin-

guish that order and a money judgment.

Id. at 456.

As has been elsewhere stated, the term “police or

regulatory power” contained in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (4)

has reference to the enforcement of laws “affecting

health, welfare, morals, and safety, but not regulatory

laws that directly conflict with the control of the res or

property by the bankruptcy court”. State of Missouri v.

United States Bankruptcy Court, et al, 647 F.2d 769, 776

(8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 1035 (1982)

(state grain warehouse laws, although regulatory in

nature, held to primarily relate to the protection of the

pecuniary interest in the debtor’s property and not to

matters of public health and safety).

In sum, while plaintiffs herein could choose to amend

their pleadings and proceed pursuant to sections 104 and

107 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 8 9604, 9607, proceed im-

mediately with government funds to clean up the hazards

which they depict to be existing at the waste sites de-

scribed, and then seek reimbursement from Manville

pending resolution of the bankruptcy proceedings, they

have not chosen to do so.” In lieu of such proceedings,

they suggest that this Court may wrest from the bank-

ruptey jurisdiction the substantial assets which would

be required were the relief here sought to be ordered

after trial.“

This Court has no such jurisdiction, and it should be

noted that nothing in this Order seeks to prevent any

party in interest herein from seeking relief from the stay

of the bankruptcy court by proper application to such

court. The Court finds and rules, however, that in en-

tering its Order of September 30, 1982, the Magistrate

acted properly, and that the motion to vacate his stay

This was the procedure followed in City of Philadelphit v.

Stepan Chemical Company, 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982),

where the City expended its own funds to clean up the hazardous

wastes which had been illegally dumped by others and then sought

to recoup such under § 107 of CERCLA.

™ See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corporation, 546

F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982), for detailed indication of activities

which might be taken against solvent past disposers of hazardous

wastes.

_

in the instant proceedings must be and it is herewith

denied.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Illes ible]

Chief Judge

United States Distriet Court

November 15, 1982

ce: All Counsel

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.