Petition — General Dynamics Corp. v. Gary Aircraft Corp.

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a. Office - Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

ie: a eaten ia ake are SEP 29 1982

IN THE

ALEXANDER tL. STEVAS.,

Supreme Court of Che United States——

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

IN THE MATTER OF GARY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION,

Debtor.

GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

Vv.

GARY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari To The

United States Court of Appeals

For the Fifth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

GILBERT LANG MATHEWS

Attorney For Petitioner,

General Dynamics Corporation

Of Counsel:

LANG, CROSS, LADON, BOLDRICK

& GREEN, P. C.

1565 Frost Bank Tower

San Antonio, Texas 78205

(512) 227-3106

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1401, et seq.

assigns priorities to instruments involving title to aircraft,

thereby preempting ‘‘buyer in the ordinary course of business’’

provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code as enacted in

Texas?

LISTING OF PARTIES

All of the parties in the United States Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit are listed in the caption, with the exception of

the Victoria Bank and Trust Company which asserts an interest

in property which is the subject of these proceedings. Pursuant

to Supreme Court Rule 28.1, Petitioner lists the following of its

subsidiaries which are not wholly owned: Etudes Techniques et

Constructions, Aérospatiales Société Anonyme, Mansour-

General Dynamics Ltd, and Mines SNA Inc./SNA Mines Inc.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved .......

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Reasons for Granting the Writ .......................

There is a Conflict in Holdings Among the United

States Courts of Appeal and a State Court of Last

DE étagngdeuenedneieekebeeeneedsssiendees

There is a Conflict in Holdings Between at Least

Twenty-Eighi Lower and Intermediate State and

Federal Courts, and the Question Presented Is,

Accordingly, Timely and Important .............

The Decision Below is Incorrect Because ‘‘Buyer in

the Ordinary Course of Business’’ Provisions of

Texas Law Obstruct and Frustrate the Objectives

and Policies of the Federal Aviation Act, in

Derogation of the Supremacy Clause of the United

DD cvéccucausseusonenseseteees

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

Aircraft Investment Corp. v. Fisher Flying Service, Inc.,

183 So. 2d 441 (Ct.App.La. 1966). .......... 0c cece eens 9

American Aviation, Inc. v. Aviation Ins. Managers, Inc.

244 Ark. 829, 427 S.W.2d 544 (Ark. 1968)... 2... 6.600655. 8

Bank of Hendersonville v. Red Baron Flying Club, Inc.,

$71 S.W.2d 152 (Ct.App.Tenn. 1977), cert. denied,

EE, os0n60ceuveceseeesessescesseneos 7,9

Bitzer-Croft Motors v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co.,

82 ill.3d 1, 401 N.E. 2d 1340(Ct.App.Ill. 1980) ........... 8

Catlin Aviation Company v. Equilease Corporation,

EE, Cs oc ocnnecuseeeesseceesseseeeed i)

Cessna Finance Corp. v. Skyways Enterprises, Inc.,

23 UCC Rep.Serv. 1015 (Ky.Ct.App. 1978), aff'd,

SEE HUES cocccesccecceccceesecssccese 9

Chicago and North Western Transportation Company

v. Kalo Brick & Tile Company, 450 U.S. 311 (1981). ...... 14

Continental Radio Co. v. Continental Bank & Trust Co.,

369 S.W.2d 359 (Tex.Civ. App.—Houston 1963,

Is i cdcndédudedegedseeeteseeesesonees 5,10

Crescent City Aviation, Inc. v. Beverly Bank,

es IE, HEED occccoseccecescecoeses 5,9

Danning v. Pacific Propeller, Inc. (In re Holiday

Airlines), 620 F.2d 731 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

SEE 6.5 6ccestndvecvcerercesccacessst 4,6,7

Dawson v. General Discount Corp., 60 S.E.2d 653

GE, CE ccccccascovensesecccuseececsessees 8

Page

Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544,

476 P.2d 401 (1970), cert. denied,

Ss Es cccccvceceevececuéceuueud 4,7,13,14,15

Gary Aircraft Corporation v. General Dynamics

Corporation (In re Gary Aircraft Corporation),

Ge Sa wecoseséuccsscetacubecnuveseasess 1,6

Haynes v. General Electric Credit Corp., 432 F.Supp. 763

(W.D. Va. 1977), aff'd per curiam, 582 F.2d 869

os OP re ee er ee 10

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). .............0005- 14

Industrial National Bank vy. Butler Aviation International,

POO , Ts Ge CPs ce ccescesceceenenves 10

International Atlas Services, Inc. v. Twentieth Century

Aircraft Company, 251 Cal.App.2d 434,

es Gs ob veccceccunsacueescesssccenes 5

J.C. Equipment, Inc. v. Sky Aviation, Inc.,

SIG ae ae CO, CIFEE oc ve ccecevesccsacevess 9

Lochhead v. G.A.C. Finance Corp., 6 Ariz.App. 539,

434 P. 2d 655 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1967). ........ ccc ececceecees 8

Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978). ........ 14

Norris v. Insurance Company of North America,

BaD Dies CUO Felice TIVE co ccccccessecccscsse )

Northern Illinois Corp. v. Bishop Distributing Co.,

284 F.Supp. 121 (W.D.Mich. 1968)..................... 10

O’Neill v. Barnett Bank of Jacksonville, 360 So.2d 150

OT ee 5,8

vi

Page

Pope v. National Aero Finance Co.,

236 Cal. App.2d 722, 46 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1965) ............ 5

Sanders v. M.D. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 575 F.2d 1086

EES Pe 10

Shacket v. Roger Smith Aircraft Sales, 497 F Supp. 1262

eee ade ac kedoedecenedessos 10

Southern Jersey Airways, Inc. v. National Bank of

Secaucus, 261 A.2d 399 (Super.Ct.N.J. 1970) ............. y

State Securities Company v. Aviation Enterprises, Inc.,

i a in cece daseveooesees 10

Sun Bank v. Snell (In re Cone), 11 B.R. 925

EEE 5,10,14

Texas National Bank of Houston v. Aufderheide,

255 F Sapp. FIPCE.D.Ash. GG. nn ccc cccccccccees 10

Veterans’ Air Express Co., Inc., In re,

76 F.Supp. 684(D.N.J. 1948) .....................5,10,14

Statutes

EEE EE 2

Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. §§ 1302,

PER eSSeSeRSERCSEOS SSeS eCCecoceeeeees passim

Texas Business & Commerce Code ................... passim

Constitutions

es Grease BI, FE GS cc ccccccccccccccccccccccces 2,14

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

IN THE MATTER OF GARY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION,

Debtor.

GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

v.

GARY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari To The

United States Court of Appeals

For The Fifth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully petitions for a Writ of Certiorari to

review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit in Gary Aircraft Corporation v. General

Dynamics Corporation (No. 81-1378, In the Matter of Gary Air-

craft Corporation).

The opinion of the court of appeals (App. A., infra, la-21a)

is reported at 681 F.2d 365. The opinion of the district court

(App. B, infra, 22a-32a) is not reported. The opinion of the

bankruptcy court (App. C, infra, 33a-39a) is not reported.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The opinion and judgment of the court of appeals from

which this petition is brought was issued on July 28, 1982. No

rehearing was sought, and no extension of time for the filing of

this petition has been sought. The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United Siates

which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;..., shail

be the supreme law of the Land; and the Judges in

every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the

Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary not-

2. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1403, 1406 (App. D, injra,

40a-46a). TEX BUS. & COMM. CODE. ANN.,

§§ 1.201, 9.307 (Vernon Supp. 1982) (App. E,

infra, 47a-48a).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action concerns the priorities under the Federal Aviation

Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1401, ef seq., and under state law, between a

prior security holder, Petitioner, and a subsequent buyer in the

ordinary course of business, Respondent. Petitioner, General

Dynamics Corporation, and Respondent, Gary Aircraft Cor-

poration, dispute who has the right to $250,000.00 plus interest

from the sale of an airplane and the right to title of another air-

craft hull.

This case has its beginnings on February 20, 1969, when

Frederick B. Ayer & Associates, Inc. executed and delivered to

Petitioner an Aircraft Mortgage, granting Petitioner a security

interest in two Douglas DC-6B airplanes, bearing FAA

Registration Numbers N8221H and N8222H. Petitioner record-

ed its Aircraft Mortgage with the FAA Aircraft Registry in

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma on March 3, 1969, complying in all

respects with 49 U.S.C. § 1403. Upon the filing of the Aircraft

Mortgage, Petitioner held a perfected security interest in

Airplanes N8221H and N8222H.

On December 22, 1971 and January 4, 1972, Respondent’s

founder, Arthur W. Stewart, purchased in his own name

Airplanes N8221H and N8222H from Ayer & Associates. At the

same time Respondent requested a title search by telephone with

the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, which search was

reported to Respondent by Reports of Title Search dated

January 5, 1972, at 7:59 a.m. The search disclosed Petitioner’s

Aircraft Mortgage covering the two subject aircraft.

On March 12, 1974 and November 7, 1975, Stewart transfer-

red title to Airplanes N8221H and N8222H to Respondent. The

Victoria Bank and Trust Company recorded mortgages upon

the two subject aircraft on November 13, 1975. Subsequently on

October 28, 1976, Respondent initiated bankruptcy proceedings

under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. On April 25, 1978,

Respondent filed a complaint in the United States Bankruptcy

Court for the Western District of Texas to sell Airplane N8222H

free and clear of liens. Pursuant to bankruptcy court order,

Airplane N8222H was sold for the sum of $250,000.00, the

substantial portion of which was deposited in an interest bearing

account on June 1, 1978 where it has remained to date, subject

to the claims of Petitioner and the Victoria Bank. The other

airplane in controversy remains at Respondent's premises in

Hondo, Texas.

The bankruptcy court held that the Federal Aviation Act does

not address itself to the resolution of conflicting claims of

priority and that in accordance with provisions of the Uniform

Commercial Code as enacted in Texas, Respondent was entitled

to the proceeds of the sale of Airplane N8222H and to the

possession of Airplane N8221H. Affirming the bankruptcy

court, the district court held that the Federal Aviation Act, 49

U.S.C. § 1401 ef seg. does not preempt state substantive law on

lien priority. The court of appeals similarly determined that

there was no federal preemption of staie law and affirmed the

judgment of the district court. While other issues were

presented to the lower appellate courts for review, the federal

preemption question is the sole question before this Court.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1401, ef seq.

(‘the Act’’) provides for a comprehensive federal registration

system for all instruments affecting the title to civil aircraft in

this country. A purchaser or lienholder, by duly complying with

federal recordation provisions, perfects an interest upon filing

with the FAA registry and is thus protected against subsequent

claims. (App. D, infra, 43a-46a). The Texas Business and Com-

merce Code (The Uniform Commercial Code in Texas) pro-

vides: ‘‘A buyer in the ordinary course of busiress. . . takes free

and clear of a security interest created by his seller even though

the security interest is perfected and even though the buyer

knows of its existence’. (App. E, infra, 47a-48a).

The decision below of the Fifth Circuit denying federal

preemption of state law relating to the priority and enforceabili-

ty of liens, while supported by precedent, is in direct conflict

with decisions of the lower federal courts, the Ninth Circuit in

Danning v. Pacific Propeller, Inc. (In re Holiday Airlines Cor-

poration), 620 F.2d 731 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900

(1980), and several state court decisions, including the Supreme

Court of Ca‘:fornia in Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corpora-

tion, 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823

(1971), all of which have held that the provisions of the Act

preempt state laws insofar as they relate to the priority of liens

or other instruments affecting title to aircraft.'

The practical effect of this lack of judicial uniformity is to

lend complete uncertainty to the enforceability of interests in

aircraft filed in the single registry maintained by the Secretary of

Transportation. This Court has declined for at least a decade to

review the question presented; the Congress has failed to act in

the interim; and the result has been proliferation of litigation

with contradictory holdings by the state and federal courts of

this nation. It is appropriate for this Court to decide whether

the Act establishes a system of priority affecting title to aircraft

which preempts provisions of state law affecting the same sub-

ject matter.

THERE IS A CONFLICT IN HOLDINGS AMONG

THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEAL AND A

STATE COURT OF LAST RESORT

The Federal Aviation Act provides that, ‘‘No conveyance or

instrument. ..shall be valid...until such conveyance or other

instrument is filed for recordation...,’’ 49 U.S.C. § 1403(c);

and that, ‘‘Each conveyance or other instrument

recorded. ..shall from the time of its filing for recordation be

valid as to all persons without further or other recordation.’’ 49

U.S.C. § 1403(d).

' Sun Bank v. Snell (In re Cone), 11 B.R. 925 (M.D. Fla. 1981); Jn re

Veterans’ Air Express Co., Inc., 76 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1948);

O'Neill v. Barnett Bank of Jacksonville, 360 So.2d 150

(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1978); International Atlas Services, Inc. v.

Twentieth Century Aircraft Company, 251 Cal.App.2d 434, 59

Cal.Rptr. 495 (1967); Crescent City Aviation, Inc. v. Beverly

Bank, 219 N.E.2d 446 (Ind.App. 1966); Pope v. National Aero

Finance Co., 236 Cal.App.2d 722, 46 Cal.Rptr. 233 (1965); Con-

tinental Radio Co. v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 369 S.W.2d

359 (Tex.Civ. App. —Houston 1963, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

In Danning v. Pacific Propeller, Inc., supra, the lower

bankruptcy court was required to determine the rights of

various claimants to proceeds from the sale of a Lockheed Elec-

tra aircraft. Pacific Propeller urged that by reason of its filing

notice of its artisan’s lien for overhaul work with the FAA

facility in Oklahoma City, it held an enforceable lien against the

aircraft and was entitled to priority under the Federal Aviation

Act. The bankruptcy trustee, Danning, sought to invalidate

Pacific Propeller’s lien. The Ninth Circuit confirmed the lower

courts’ conclusion that the non-consensual lien was valid under

siate law and the notice properly recorded so as to entitle it to

priority under the Federal Aviation Act. Jd. at 732. In reaching

its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit did not apply state law affec-

ting priority of interests in the aircraft, but rather looked to

state law to determine whether the non-consensual lien was

validly created under state law. The Ninth Circuit expressly

held:

The provisions of the Federal Aviation Act preempts

State law insofar as they relate to the priority of liens.

State Securities Co. v. Aviation Enterprises, Inc., 355

F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 1966); Pope v. National Aero

Finance Co., Inc., 236 Cal.App.2d 722, 46 Cal.Rptr.

233 (1965).

Id. at 733.

On the identical question of federal law, the court below

relegated its discussion of Danning v. Pacific Propeller to a

footnote. Gary Aircraft Corporation v. General Dynamics Cor-

poration, (App. A, infra, Sa-6a). In attempting to explain away

the Danning decision, ihe court below stated:

Indeed, the Pacific Propeller Court proceeded to apply

State priority law after concluding that the FAA

sought only to provide a central recording system.

Id. This statement is incorrect. Nowhere in its opinion did the

Danning court apply state priority law. State law was applied

only to determine the underlying validity of the lien instrument

involved.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in its

decision below concluded that the Act does not preempt state

law insofar as state law assigns priorities to instruments affect-

ing title to aircraft. The Ninth Circuit in Danning v. Pacific Pro-

peller, Inc. held that the Act does preempt state law assignment

of priorities. The Ninth Circuit’s holding is supported by the

Supreme Court of California in Dowell v. Beech Acceptance

Corporation. The conflict in holdings is explicit and direct. The

Court should grant a writ of certiorari to resolve this conflict.

THERE IS A CONFLICT IN HOLDINGS BETWEEN

AT LEAST TWENTY-EIGHT LOWER AND

INTERMEDIATE STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS,

AND THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS, ACCORDINGLY,

TIMELY AND IMPORTANT

This Court has never ruled on whether the Federal Aviation

Act’s comprehensive provisions for regulating the conveyancing

of aircraft preempt state doctrines of buyer in the ordinary

cou..e of business in dealing with priorities between claimants

under successive transactions involving the same aircraft. On

three occasions in the past decade, however, this Court has had

the opportunity, but declined to hear cases presenting this ques-

tion.’ In the meantime, there has been an increase of litigation

involving interests in aircraft.

In addition to the conflicting results noted above between the

Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit and the California Supreme

* Danning v. Pacific Propeller, Inc. (In re Holiday Airlines), 620

F.2d 731 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900 (1980)

(preemption); Bank of Hendersonville v. Red Baron Flying Club,

Inc., 571 S.W.2d 152 (Ct.App.Tenn. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S.

1089 (1979) (1io preemption); Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp. , 3

Cal.3d 544, 476 P.2d 401 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971)

(preemption).

Court, Arizona,’ Arkansas,‘ Florida,’ Georgia,* Illinois,’ In-

diana,* Kentucky,’ Louisiana,” Missouri," New Jersey," North

Carolina,” Oklahoma,“ Tennessee,” and Texas” have also

reached conflicting results on the coverage of the Act, and

whether it grants priority to a security interest recorded under its

provisions. Moreover, the United States Courts of Appeals for

the Third” and Tenth” Circuits, as well as numerous federal

district and bankruptcy courts” have differed not only in result,

but also in interpretation and application of the Act.

Given this unwieldy state of law, parties holding security in-

terests in aircraft who have complied in all respects with 49

U.S.C. § 1401 ef seqg., can have no certainty as to the protection

afforded their collateral. In its wisdom Congress established a

unique system for streamlining the conveyancing of aircraft and

parts. There is one central recording place in the United States

which can be checked for disclosure of interests in such prop-

erty. The continued maintenance of this elaborate, centralized

system for the filing and recordation of aircraft conveyances is

* Lochhead v. G.A.C. Finance Corp., 6 Ariz.App. 539, 434 P.2d

655 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1967) (Act preempts field of registration of

conveyances).

‘American Aviation, Inc. v. Aviation Ins. Managers, Inc., 244

Ark. 829, 427 S.W.2d 544 (Ark. 1968) (Congress has preempted

field of recordation but left question of validity of the conveyance

to state law).

* O'Neill v. Barnett Bank of Jacksonville, N.A., 360 So.2d 150 (Fla.

Dist.Ct.App. 1978) (Act preempts state ‘‘buyer in ordinary

course’ law).

* Dawson v. General Discount Corp., 60 S.E.2d 653 (Ct.App.Ga.

1950) (;riority given to party who recorded instrument under Act).

" Bitzer-Croft Motors v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 82 Ill.3d 1, 401

N.E.2d 1340 (Ct.App.Ill. 1980) (federally recorded lien not deter-

minative in resolving priority dispute decided under state law).

9

meaningless if parties are not required to check that file prior to

dealing with interests in aircraft. The record here is appropriate

for deciding the broad and important federal question involved.

* Crescent City Aviation, Inc. v. Beverly Bank, 219 N.E.2d 446

(Ind.App. 1966) (federal preemption of mechanics’ lien created

under state law).

*Cessna Finance Corp. v. Skyways Enterprises, Inc., 23 UCC

Rep.Serv. 1015 (Ky.Ct.App. 1978), aff’d, 580 S.W.2d 491 (Ky.

1979) (Act does not preempt state ‘“‘buyer in ordinary course”’

law).

” Aircraft Investment Corp. v. Fisher Flying Service, Inc., 183

So.2d 441 (Ct.App.La. 1966) (Act preempts field of sale and recor-

dation of instruments affecting title or interest to aircraft).

"J.C. Equipment, Inc. v. Sky Aviation, Inc., 498 S.W.2d 73

(Mo.Ct.App. 1973) (Congress has preempted field of registering

and recording title documents).

" Southern Jersey Airways, Inc. v. National Bank of Secaucus, 261

A.2d 399 (Super.Ct.N.J. 1970) (federally recorded lien does not

preempt state created mechanics’ lien; relative priorities of parties

determined in accordance with state law).

" Norris v. Insurance Company of North America, 215 S.E.2d 379

(Ct.App.N.C. 1975) (Act is controlling over state law as to manner

in which recordation of conveyances and encumbrances on air-

craft are made).

* Catlin Aviation Company v. Equilease Corporation, 626 P.2d 857

(Okla. 1981) (Act is controlling over state law as to recordation

while state law determines inherent validity of conveyance).

' Bank of Hendersonville v. Red Baron Flying Club, Inc., 571

S.W.2d 152 (Ct.App.Tenn. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089

(1979) (Act does not preempt state “‘buyer in ordinary course’’

law).

10

A ruling from this Court in this case would provide the federal

and state courts with authoritative interpretation of 49 U.S.C.

§§ 1401, et seg. The question presented is a timely and impor-

tant one on which this Court should rule.

Continental Radio Co. v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 369

S.W.2d 359 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston 1963, writ ref’d n.r.e.)

(federal preemption of mechanics’ lien created under state con-

stitution).

" Sanders v. M.D. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 575 F.2d 1086 (3d Cir. 1978)

(Act does not preempt state ‘‘buyer in ordinary course’’ law).

'® State Securities Company v. Aviation Enterprises, Inc., 355 F.2d

225 (10th Cir. 1966) (federal preemption of state law registration

although state law applies to determine validity of title

documents).

* See, e.g., Sun Bank v. Snell (In re Cone), 11 B.R. 925 (M.D.Fla.

1981) (Act preempts state law relating to priority of liens);

Shacket v. Roger Smith Aircraft Sales, 497 F.Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ill.

1980) (no federal preemption of state law principles governing

priorities); Haynes v. General Electric Credit Corp., 432 F.Supp.

763 (W.D.Va. 1977), aff’d per curiam, 582 F.2d 869 (4th Cir.

1978) (no federal preemption of state ‘“‘buyer in ordinary course”’

doctrine); Jndustrial National Bank v. Butler Aviation Interna-

tional, 370 F.Supp. 1012 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (no federal preemption

of state possessory lien for storage charges); Jn re Veterans’ Air

Express Co. Inc., 76 F.Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1948) (federal preemp-

tion of possessory lien for repair work under state law); Texas Na-

tional Bank of Houston v. Aufderheide, 235 F.Supp. 599

(E.D.Ark. 1964) (Act does not preempt UCC ‘buyer in ordinary

course’ law); Northern Illinois Corp. v. Bishop Distributing Co..,

284 F.Supp. 121 (W.D.Mich. 1968) (Act does not preempt state

“*buyer in ordinary course’’ law).

THE DECISION BELOW IS INCORRECT BECAUSE

“‘BUYER IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS”

PROVISIONS OF TEXAS LAW OBSTRUCT AND

FRUSTRATE THE OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES OF THE

FEDERAL AVIATION ACT, IN DEROGATION OF THE

SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES

CONSTITUTION

The Federal Aviation Act unmistakably treats the subject of

priorities to instruments involving title to civil aircraft in this

country. Section 1403(c) and (f) of the Act state in pertinent part

as follows:

(c) No conveyance or instrument the recording of

(Emphasis added). Section 1403(d), when read in

which is provided for by section (a) of this Section

shall be valid in respect of such aircraft, aircraft

engine, or engines, propellers...against any per-

son...until such conveyance or other instrument is

filed for recordation in the office of the Secretary of

Transportation.

(f) The Secretary of Transportation shall keep a

record of the time and date of the filing of con-

veyances and other instruments with him and of the

time and date of recordation thereof. He shall record

conveyances and other instruments filed with him in

the order of their reception, in files to be kept for that

purpose, and indexed according to —

(1) the identifying description of the air-

craft, aircraft engine, or propeller, or in the

case of an instrument referred to in subsec-

tion (a) (3) of this section, the location or

locations specified therein, and

(2) the names of the parties to the con-

veyance or other instrument.

§ 1403(c) and (f), above, establishes © priority system:

light of

12

(d) Each conveyance or other instrument recorded

by means of or under the system provided for in

subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall from the time

of its filing for recordation be valid as to all persons

without further or other recordation... .

(Emphasis added).

Congress, by requiring the Secretary of Transportation to

**record conveyances and other instruments. ..in the order of

their reception’’ according to ‘‘the time and date of the filing’’

necessarily anticipates reliance on these provisions to establish

priority for claimants whose rights to aircraft are dependent

upon the fact or time of recordation ef conveyances. This

federal recording scheme (App. D, infra, 43a-46a) is in direct

conflict with operative provisions of the Uniform Commercial

Code as enacted in Texas (App. E, infra, 47a-48a).

The acceptance by the court below of state ‘‘buyer in the or-

dinary course of business’’ doctrine interferes with legitimate

national policy as set forth in the Federal Aviation Act. Specifi-

cally, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 requires the Civil Aeronautics Board to

consider certain matters ‘‘as being in the public interest’’, which

include:

(a) (5) The developmeni and maintenance of a

sound regulatory environment which is responsive to

the needs of the public and in which decisions are

reached promptly in order to facilitate adaption of the

air transportation sysiem to the present and future

needs of the domestic and foreign commerce of the

United States, the Postal Service, and the national

defense.

The superseding of a comprehensive system of centralized recor-

dation by state law neither promotes ‘‘a sound regulatory en-

vironment’’ nor facilitates the ‘‘needs of the domestic and

foreign commerce’’.

13

Precisely this type of analysis of the Act’s policies and objec-

tives was highlighted in Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp.,

supra. In that case, the Supreme Court of California discussed

at length these objectives:

...To bring order into the field of aircraft owner-

ship and finance, the federal governmient in a manner

within its sphere set up a comprehensive scheme of

centralized recordation, which, if properly used, pro-

vides adequate protection for all substantial property

interests in large aircraft,. . .

Here we have a complete and comprehensive system

of recordation which necessarily supersedes inconsis-

tent state law. Constitutionally, the federal govern-

ment may be said to have fully occupied the field of

recordation of interests in aircraft and of rights de-

rived from recordation, and to have established para-

mount law in this area. . .

.. Section i403 provides a comprehensive system of

recordation the purpose of which is to bring order to

the field of aircraft titles and to protect the holders of

substantial property interests in aircraft. Neither of

those purposes is served if we apply state law in a man-

ner virtually ignoring the existence of the federal

system. If prior recorded interests are not protected

against subsequent buyers who fail to search title, the

federal policy in favor of the recordation of aircraft

titles will be frustrated and subsequent purchasers. . .

will cavalierly decline to investigate title so as to avoid

**actual notice’’ under Commercial Code section 9307.

... It is clear that the Congress has prescribed the

only way in which aircraft may be transferred and in

which liens upon aircraft may be duly recorded. In this

manner, all persons dealing with aircraft are upon full

legal notice concerning possible liens and are charged

with the duty of inquiry at the central recording of-

14

fice... with respect to any aircraft in which they might

be concerned. (Court's emphasis).

see 8

... The federal policy to foster recordation and to

protect recorded interests is eviscerated by a rule which

relies on state laws to protect the buyer in the ordinary

course of business even though he fails to undertake a

simple title search which would have readily revealed

all encumbrances.

(Emphasis added). Jd. at 403-406. See also, In re Veterans’ Air

Express Co., Inc., 76 F.Supp. 684, 686-691 (D.N.J. 1948); Sun

Bank v. Snell (In re Cone), 11 B.R. 925, 929-930 (M.D.Fla.

1981).

The Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2, in-

validates any exercise of state power that unduly frustrates a

federal scheme or obstructs the objectives of legiiimate national

policy. Chicago and North Western Transportation Company

v. Kalo Brick & Tile Company, 450 U.S. 311, 316-317 (1981);

Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978); Hines

v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67-68 (1941). ‘*Buyer in the ordinary

course of business’’ provisions of the Uniform Commercial

Code as enacted in Texas unquestionably frustrate and obstruct

the Federal Aviation Act and should be preempted by the

Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.

15

CONCLUSION

Since the denial of writ of certiorari in the decision of Dowell

v. Beech Acceptance Corp., there have been more than twenty-

eight decisions on variations of the question presented. There is

no uniform law of the land. This Court should grant the peti-

tion for writ of certiorari in this case to resolve the conflicting

lines of reasoning, to give predictability to rights of ownership

in aircraft, and to uphold the supremacy of law enacted by the

Congress of the United States.

Respectfully submitted,

Gilbert Lang —_

Attorney For Petitioner,

General Dynamics Corporation

Of Counsel:

Lana, Cross, Lavon, Botprick « Green, P.C.

1565 Frost Bank Tower

San Antonio, Texas 78205

(512) 227-3106

16

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 26th day of September, 1982, true

and correct copies of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Cer-

tiorari were served upon the attorneys of record for Gary Air-

craft Corporation and Victoria Bank & Trust Company by

depositing the same in the United States Mail, first-class postage

prepaid, certified, return receipt requested, addressed as

follows:

Mr. Cecil Jay Olmstead

Fulbright & Jaworski

800 Bank of the Southwest Puilding

Houston, Texas 77002

Mr. john H. Bennett, Jr.

Gilpin, Maynard, Parsons, Pohl & Bennett

Three Riverway, Suite 400

Houston, Texas 77056

Mr. Munson Smith

Anderson, Smith, Null, Stofer & Smith

314 Victoria Bank & Trust Co. Bldg.

Victoria, Texas 79901

a

APPENDIX A

In THe Marrer of Gary Aircrart Corporation,

Debtor.

Gary Aircrart Corporation.

Plaintiff-Appelilee,

vs.

Generar Dynamics Corporation,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 81-1378.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

July 28, 1982.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Texas.

Before WISDOM, POLITZ and TATE, Circuit Judges.

WISDOM, Circuit Judge:

This dispute over the ownership of one airplane and of the

proceeds of the sale of another requires us to determine the

reach of the Federal Aviation Act and its impact on state law.

We also explore the protection accorded buyers against secured

creditors by state law.

In December 1971, Gary Aircraft Corporation (‘‘Gary’’), the

plaintiff-appellee, entered into a letter of understanding stating

its intention to purchase four airplanes from Frederick B. Ayer

& Associates, Inc. (‘‘Ayer’’), a dealer in aircraft. Two of these

airplanes are the subject of the controversy here. Gary did not

complete the purchase, but Arthur Stewart, its president, car-

ried out the transaction in his individual capacity, purchasing

the first plane in controversy here, N8222H, on December 22,

2a

1971 for $5,000, and the second, N8221H, on January 4, 1972,

also for $5,000. On the date of each sale, the airplane purchased

was subject to a security interest held by General Dynamics Cor-

poration (‘‘General Dynamics’’), the defendant-appellant.

General Dynamics held its interest under a security agreement

executed by Ayer on February 20, 1969. Under that agreement,

Ayer was authorized to sell the collateral, unless it was in

default on its obligations to General Dynamics. In case of

default, Ayer could not sell without the written consent of

General Dynamics. General Dynamics recorded its security

agreement with the Federal Aviation Administration on March

3, 1969. On the dates of the sales to Stewart, Ayer was in

default.'

Crawford, the vice-president of Gary, requested a title search

from the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association on January 4,

1972. The AOPA reported the results on January 5, 1972. On

August 3, 1972, approximately seven months after the sale,

Stewart recorded his bill of sale with the FAA. Over the next

four years, Crawford communicated periodically with Ayer, re-

questing that Ayer take action to secure the release of General

Dynamic’s security interest.

In March 1974, Stewart sold one of the group of four planes

to Gary for $13,275. He transferred the two planes at issue here

to Gary on November 7, 1975, apparently without considera-

tion. Gary executed a mortgage on the aircraft in favor of the

Victoria Bank and Trust Company, the third party defendant

The Victoria Bank recorded its interest with the FAA. On May

28, 1976, General Dynamics informed Gary that it had learned

that the aircraft were registered in Gary’s name and that

General Dynamics was asserting a security interest in the

property.

On October 28, 1976, Gary initiated Chapter XI proceedings

under the Bankruptcy Act. It brought this action in the bank-

ruptcy court, seeking to sell Airplane N8222H free and clear of

' There is some dispute as to whether the parties have stipulated that the sale

was unauthorized. We will assume, for purposes of this appeal, that Ayer

was in default and that the sale was unauthorized.

3a

liens. Upon the agreement of all interested parties, the court

permitted the sale of the airplane, and the proceeds were

deposited with the court. The second airplane remains in the

possession of Gary.

The bankruptcy court, affirmed by the district court, held

that Gary was entitled to the proceeds of the sale of Airplane

N8222H and to the possession of Airplane N8221H, free of any

interest asserted by General Dynamics. General Dynamics ap-

peals, presenting three theories. First, it contends that the

Federal Aviation Act grants it priority because it recorded its

security interest with the Federal Aviation Administration

before Stewart purchased the aircraft. Second, even if the FAA

does not govern the priority question but instead remits it to

Texas law, which protects a buyer in the ordinary course of

business against the perfected security interest of his seller’s

creditor, General Dynamics argues that Stewart could not take

free of its interest because, according to General Dynamics,

Stewart could not qualify as a buyer in the ordinary course of

business. Finally, General Dynamics contends that, even if

Stewart did qualify as a buyer in the ordinary course, he could

not transfer his status to Gary, and Gary did not qualify in its

own right so, in Gary’s hands, the aircraft are subject to the in-

terest of General Dynamics. Concluding that the FAA does not

govern priorities in interests in aircraft, that Stewart, as a buyer

in the ordinary course of business, took free of General

Dynamics’s interest, and that Gary takes the title of its

transferor, we affirm.

General Dynamics’s first theory presents this court, for the

first time, with the question to what extent the provisions of the

Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542, preempt state

regulation of interests in aircraft. The Civil Aeronautics Act of

1938, and its successor, the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, both

create a single national recording system for interests in aircraft.

Section 503 of the FAA, 49 U.S.C. § 1403, establishes the re-

cording system and provides,

4a

(c) No conveyance or instrument the recording of

which is provided for by subsection (a) of this section

shall be valid in respect of such aircraft. . .against any

person other than the person by whom the conveyance

or other instrument is made or given, his heir or

devisee, or any person having actual notice thereof,

until such conveyance or other instrument is filed for

recordation. . .

(d) Each conveyance or other instrument recorded

by means of or under the system provided for in

subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall from the time

of its filing for recordation be valid as to all , ersons

without further or other recordation.’

In 1964, Congress added section 506, 49 U.S.C. § 1406,

providing,

The validity of any instrument the recording of which

is provided for by section 1403 of this title shall be

governed by the laws of the State, District of Colum-

bia, or territory or possession of the United States in

which such instrument is delivered... .

Without question, section 506 reserves some areas of regulation

for the states by assigning questions of ‘‘validity’’ to state law.

At the same time, Congress has provided the exclusive means of

recordation and has preempted state laws providing filing

systems for interests in aircraft. See, e.g., Bank of Lexington v.

Jack Adams Aircraft Sales, Inc., 5 Cir. 1978, 570 F.2d 1220

(dictum); Scott, Liens in Aircraft: Priorities, 25 J.Air L. &

Com. 193, 200 (1958).

Whether Congress intended to preempt a broader field of

state law by federalizing also the assignment of priorities to

various interests in aircraft is not as clear. The courts have split

* In this respect, the Federal Aviation Act reenacted the Civil Aeronautics Act

without substantial change. The legislative history makes clear, however,

that the re-enactment is not to be taken as an endorsement of any judicial

construction of the CAA. See H.R.Rep.No. 2360, 85th cong., 2d Sess.

(1958), reprinted in [1958] U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3741, 3750.

Sa

on that question. Compare e.g., Sun Bank v. Snell (In re Cone),

Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla.1981, 11 B.R. 925 (FAA preempts state

priorities law); Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 1970, 3

Cal.3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal.Rptr. 1 (in banc) (same), cert.

denied, 1971, 404 U.S. 823, 92 S.Ct. 45, 30 L.Ed.2d 50; and

O’Neill v. Barnett Bank, Fla.App.1978, 360 So.2d 150 (same)

with, e.g., Danning v. World Airways, Inc. (In re Holiday

Airlines), 9 Cir.1981, 647 F.2d 977 (FAA does not preempt state

priorities law), cert. denied, 1982, — U.S. —, 102 S.Ct. 1009, 71

L.Ed.2d 299; Sanders v. M.D. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 3 Cir. 1978,

575 F.2d 1086 (same); Bitzer-Croft Motors v. Pioneer Bank &

Trust Co., 1980, 82 Ill.App.3d 1, 37 Ill.Dec. 247, 401 N.E.2d

1340 (same); and Southern Jersey Airways, Inc. v. National

Bank, 1970, 108 N.J.Super 369, 261 A.2d 399 (same). After con-

sidering the language of the FAA and the CAA as well as their

legislative history, we conclude that the FAA does not displace

state law assignment of priorities to interests in aircraft. That

conclusion is in accord with the weight of recent authority, see

cases cited above; CIM International v. United States, 9

Cir.1980, 641 F.2d 671, 675 n.6; Danning v. Pacific Propeller,

Inc. (In re Holiday Airlines Corp.), 9 Cir.1980, 620 F.2d 731,

cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900, 101 S.Ct. 269, 66 L.Ed.2d 130;

Haynes v. General Electric Credit Corp., W.D.Va.1977, 432

F.Supp. 763; Industrial National Bank v. Butler Aviation Inter-

national, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1974, 370 F.Supp. 1012, 1016-17;

Cessna Finance Corp. v. Skyways Enterprises, Inc., Ky.1979,

580 S.W.2d 491.° A majority of the commentators agree. See |

* Given the large number of cases on this point — some three dozen as of

1973, see Sigman, The Wild Blue Yonder: Interests in Aircraft Under Our

Federal System, 46 S.Cal.L. Rev. 316, 317 n.6 (1973) — it would not be prof-

itable to engage in lengthy examination of the facts of prior cases or in an

evaluation of the reasons relied upon in each case reaching a result different

from ours. Such exegesis is available elsewhere. See id. at 338-76; Annot., 22

A.L.R.3d 1270 (1968 & Supp.1981). It is, however, worth noting that the

only recent federal case we have found that holds state priorities law pre-

empted, Sun Bank v. Sneil (In re Cone), Bkrtcy.M.D.Fia. 1981, 11 B.R. 925,

did not examine the legislative history but simply asserted that the FAA pre-

empted priority rules. The single federal case it offered as authority was

Danning v. Pacific Propeller, Inc. (In re Holiday Airlines Corp.), 9 Cir.

1980, 620 F.2d 731, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900, 101 S.Ct. 269, 66 L.Ed. 2d

130, which did state ‘‘The provisions of the Federal Aviation Act preempt

6a

G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 13.5

(1965); J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code §

25-16 at 1077 (2d ed. 1980); Sigman, The Wild Blue Yonder: In-

terests in Aircraft Under Our Federal System, 46 S.Cal.L.Rev.

316 (1973); Note, Taking the Lender for a Ride: Section 1403 of

the Federal Aviation Act and the Buyer in the Ordinary Course

of Business, 36 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 205 (1979); Note, Federal

Protection of Security Interests in Carriers’ Mobile Equipment,

71 Harv.L.Rev. 1516, 1530-31 (1958).

Although Congress has acted in the general field of aircraft

interests, the supremacy clause, U.S.Const. art. VI, requires us

to invalidate‘ state law only if it conflicts with a federal statute,

if it would frustrate a federal scheme, or if the totality of the cir-

cumstances shows that Congress sought to occupy the field. The

state law insofar as they relate to the priority of liens.’’ /d. at 733. But that

statement simply repeats the truism that, fo the extent that federal law deals

with priorities, it preempts state law. Indeed, the Pacific Propeller court pro-

ceeded to apply state priority law after concluding that the FAA sought only

to provide a central recording system, see id. at 733, 735-36. The Ninth Cir-

cuit has relied on Pacific Propeller as authority for the proposition that the

FAA does not preempt state law on priorities, CIM International v. United

States, 9 Cir. 1980, 641 F.2d 671, 675 n.6, and has recently re-stated that pro-

position without seeing any need to explain Pacific Propeiler, Danning v.

World Airways, Inc. (In re Holiday Airlines), 9 Cir., 1981, 647 F.2d 977,

cert. denied, 1982, — U.S. —, 102 S.Ct. 1009, 71 L.Ed.2d 299. Conse-

quently, we think that Sun Bank is without foundation.

In this case, we would not have to invalidate state law, for chapter 9 of the

Texas Business and Commerce Code, which is the applicable state law, does

not apply ‘‘to a security interest subject to any statute of the United States

...to the extent that such statute governs the rights of parties to and third

parties affected by transactions in particular types of property’’. Tex. Bus. &

Comm.Code Ann. § 9.104(1) (Vernon Supp.1982). Thus, if we hold that

Congress intended to govern the rights of third parties, the Texas statute by

its own terms does not apply, and we need not invalidate it. Nonetheless, to

determine whether chapter 9 applies, we must engage in the analysis or-

dinarily applied to questions of preemption.

7a

intent of Congress is determinative.’ Malone v. White Motor

Corp., 1978, 435 U.S. 497, 504, 98 S.Ct. 1185, 1189, 55 L.Ed.2d

443, 450. The courts do not favor the preemption of state law,

however, and, in the absence of strong reasons to believe that

Congress intended to displace it, state law governs. Chicago and

Northwestern Transportation Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.,

1981, 450 U.S. 311, 315-316, 101 S.Ct. 1124, 1129, 67 L.Ed.2d

258, 264-65.

Before examining the statute itself, we reject General

Dynamics’s contention that it would be meaningless to create a

central recording system without according priority to earlier

recorded interests. Refusing to grant priority to recorded in-

terests over all others would make sense if Congress were at-

tempting to deal with the problems created by the mobility of

* The early leading case holding that the CAA preempted state law did not

undertake an examination of legislative intent. Jn re Veterans’ Air Express

Co., D.N.J.1948, 76 F.Supp. 684. Instead, the court established a proposi-

tion now indubitably true — that Congress had the power, under the com-

merce clause, to regulate the aircraft in question, even though they were not

at that time mobile in interstate commerce. Then, the Veterans’ court ap-

parently assumed that Congress had exercised that power to displace state

law. (The holder of the mortgage interest in the case was the federal govern-

ment, and, in the words of one court, the Veterans’ analysis is ‘‘beclouded

by allusions to priority of government-owned liens’’. Southern Jersey Air-

ways, Inc. v. National Bank, 1970, 108 N.J.Super. 369, 261 A.2d 399.) The

failure to analyze the key question of congressional intent diminishes the

value of the Veterans’ decision, just as it diminishes the value of Dawson v.

Gen. Discount Corp, 1950, 82 Ga.App. 29, 60 S.E.2d 653, and thus under-

mines later cases that rely on these opinions. Similarly, the foremost recent

cases holding that the FAA preempts state law fail to cite anything in the

legislative history or even to point to statutory language that supports the

asserted intention of Congress to protect recorded interests against all other

interests. See Sun Bank v. Snell (In re Cone), M.D.Fia.1981, 11 Bankr.925;

Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 1970, 3 Cal.3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 9!

Cal.Rptr. 1 (in bank), cert. denied, 1971, 404 U.S. 823, 92 S.Ct. 45, 30

L.Ed.2d 50; O'Neill v. Barnett Bank, Fia. App.1978, 360 So.2d 150.

In Bank of Lexington v. Jack Adams Aircraft Sales, Inc., 5 Cir.1978, 570

F.2d 1220, 1225, this court suggested that the FAA did not necessarily oc-

cupy the field as General Dynamics’s argument would suggest. There the

court stated, ‘‘The [Federal Aviation] Act preempts on/y that portion of

state law which con/flicts with its provisions.’’ (emphasis added).

aircraft. Before the enactment of the CAA, to be certain of pro-

tecting his interest insofar as an interest in an airplane was pro-

tectible by recordation, the holder had to record in all states in

which the aircraft might be located. Similarly, a subsequent

creditor or purchaser had to undertake a title search in all states

if he wished to be certain that no prior recorded interests ex-

isted. By creating a single federal recording system, Congress

eliminated the need for multiple recordation and multiple title

searches. If that was the only problem that Congress intended to

resolve, it would not be necessary to address the question of

priorities at all, for the establishment of a recording system does

not compel any given set of priority rules. The Uniform Com-

mercial Code is a case in point. Although it sets up a recording

system for interests in personal property, see U.C.C. §§

9-401-9-403 (1962), it also creates a priority system under which

a recorded interest does not take precedence over all unrecorded

interests or all interests recorded later, e.g., id. §§ 9-307(2),

9-310. These special priority rules further goais other than en-

couraging recordation, such as promoting the free alienability

of goods by protecting good faith buyers from the interests of

the creditors of their retailer-sellers. In enacting the CAA and

the FAA, Congress could have intended to eliminate the prob-

lems inherent in local recordation of mobile property but to

leave to the states the task of striking the balance between com-

peting interests that dictates the effect that recordation of an in-

terest will have on its priority.

Looking to the statute itself, we find that the language is am-

biguous. Subsections 503(c) and (d) provide that no instrument

shall be ‘‘valid’’ (except against the parties to the instrument

and parties with actual knowledge) until filed and that, once

filed with the Federal Aviation Administration, all instruments

shall be ‘‘valid’’ without further recordation. But ‘‘validity’’

need not establish priority. On the contrary, it may mean

nothing more than that recordation with the FAA will assure

the instrument such ‘‘validity’’ as state law grants a recorded in-

strument. As the district court noted, if the term ‘‘valid’’ refers

to enforceability, a literal interpretation of the language would

lead to irrational results — one could create an enforceable in-

terest in an aircraft without giving any value simply by record-

9a

ing it with the FAA.’ Still, we could read the statute as giving

**validity’’ in the sense of priority to recorded interests other-

wise ‘‘valid’’ under state law — that is, ‘‘valid’’ in the sense of

complying with formalities and requirements of consideration.

Under that interpretation, the choice of law rule in section 506,

which refers questions of ‘‘validity’’ to the law of the state

where the instrument was delivered, would mean only that the

law of that state governs these questions of formality and ade-

quacy of consideration.

The statute does undertake to assign some substantive

priorities. For instance, it recognizes and provides for recorda-

tion of the ‘‘basket lien’’ — a lien over stocks of spare parts

maintained for installation in aircraft, 49 U.S.C. § 1403(a)(3) —

and provides that a recorded interest in a specific engine shall

have priority over both previously and subsequently recorded

basket tiens. § 1403(d). See 1. G. Gilmore, Security Interests in

Personal Property § 13.5 (1965). But the treatment of this

special lien, see id., does not necessarily indicate that Congress

was legislating a full set of priority rules to cover all interests.

On the contrary, the use of specific language to cover this

special case could just as readily suggest that Congress meant to

leave other priority rules remain unchanged — that is, they are

left to state law."

" In fact, the pr ovisions of section 503 never state that recorded interests will

take priority over interests recorded subsequently. Instead, section 503

makes every recorded interest ‘‘valid’’ against a// persons; if *‘valid’’ means

**enforceable’’, section $03 makes all recorded interests enforceable against

all other recorded interests — a logical impossibility for a priority system.

Only by assuming the conclusion can one make section $03 a system accord-

ing priority to recorded interests in order of time of filing.

* Similarly, section 503(c) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. 1403(c), states that, until

recordation, an instrument shall not be valid except as to the parties and

their successors and persons with actual knowledge. That provision could be

read as providing a priority rule for persons with actual knowledge. It could,

however, also, be read as treating the instrument as recorded as to the party

with actual knowledge and leaving the question of the effect of that con-

structive recordation to state law.

10a

It is also instructive to compare the language and structure of

the FAA with that of the Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C. §§

911-984. In the SMA, Congress used language very similar to

section 503 of the FAA, stating,

(a) No sale, conveyance, or mortgage which, at the

time such sale, conveyance, or mortgage is made, in-

cludes a vessel of the United States, or any portion

thereof, as the whole or any part of the property sold,

conveyed, or mortgaged shall be valid, in respect to

such vessel, against any person other than the grantor

or mortgagor, his heir or devisee, and a person having

actual notice thereof, until such bill of sale, con-

veyance, or mortgage is recorded in the office of the

collector of customs of the port of documentation of

such vessel, as provided in subsection (1) of this

section.

46 U.S.C. § 921(a). Then, the Act defines the ‘‘preferred mort-

gage’’ as a mortgage on an entire vessel that meets certain other

requirements. /d., § 922. In section 953(b), the SMA specifies

the priority accorded the preferred mortgage in a judicial sale: it

prevails over all interests except costs allowed by the court and

**preferred maritime liens’’ (defined as liens arising prior in time

to the recording of the preferred mortgage), liens for tort

damages, and liens for wages of a stevedore, § 953(a). Also, the

preferred mor zage prevails over common law possessory liens,

such as a mechanic’s lien. §§ 952, 953(b). If the language of sec-

tion 921 sufficed to create a priority system, as General

Dynamics urges that the similar language of the FAA does, it is

difficult to see why Congress bothered to specify that preferred

maritime liens prevailed over the preferred mortgage, for, if

there is a priority system implicit in section 921, see note 6, it

already gives the earlier interest priority. Similarly, it should

have been unnecessary to grant the preferred mortgage priority

over a possessory lien, for such unrecorded liens would not be

enforceable against third parties if section 921 created a priority

system.

lla

Thus, though Congress has not spoken with the pristine clari-

ty desirable to a judiciary charged with the task of divining the

meaning of some Delphic congressional enactments, our ex-

amination of the language of the FAA favors construing it as

the creation of a central recording system and not as an attempt

to assign priorities to competing interests in aircraft. The

legislative history also supports that view.

The history of the FAA itself provides no guidance, for Con-

gress there simply re-enacted these provisions of the CAA

without substantial change. See note 1. The history of the CAA,

though, reflects the original consideration Congress gave to this

legislation. Nowhere does it indicate an attempt to deal with the

problem of priorities. See H.R.Rep.No.2254, 75th Cong., 3d

Sess. (1938); S.Rep.No.1661, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938);

H.R.Rep.No.2635, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) (Conference

Report).’ In fact, the Senate version of the bill was amended to

deiete language that would have created substantive priority

rules. 83 Cong.Rec.6757 (1938). In sum, the legislative history

suggests that the main concern of Congress was to create a cen-

tral filing system, leaving the effect of filing to the states. Con-

sequently, we conclude that the FAA does not preempt state law

* A later Congress, explaining the need for section 506, indicated that it

viewed the statute as creating only a recording system and compared it to the

Federal Motor Vehicle Lien Act, Pub.L. No.85-728 (repealed 1978), which

dealt with security interests in certain large buses and trucks by making en-

forceable in all states a security interest validated in one state. H.R.

Rep.No.1033, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 2-3 (1963). Under the FMVLA, as one

commentator put it

It is too clear for argument that the law applicable to security

transactions which may be perfected under 49 U.S.C. § 313 is the

law of some state and is not federal law.... It is improbable that

49 U.S.C. § 313 will ever pose any difficult problems in litigation.

It is certain that it provides not even a handhold for argument that

the law of motor vehicle liens has become federal law.

1. G. Gilmore, Security Interest in Personal Property § 13.7 (1965). Of

course, the view of a later Congress does not establish the intent of the enact-

ing Congress. Nonetheless, it does help to confirm our conclusion as would

opinions of other courts examining legislative intent.

12a

on priorities." Our conclusion does not, however, resolve this

case, for General Dynamics insists that it prevails even if Texas

law governs the priority of interests.

Under the Uniform Commercial Code, enacted as the Texas

Business and Commerce Code, a buyer in the ordinary course of

business is one who, in good faith and without knowledge that

the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security

interest of a third party, buys from a person in the business of

selling goods of that kind. Tex.Bus. & Com.Code Ann. §

1.201(9) (Vernon Supp.1982). Such a buyer takes free of a

security interest created by his seller, even if that interest is

perfected and even if the buyer knows of its existence. /d., §

9.307(a).

Since Gary claims its title through Stewart, it cannot hold the

aircraft and the proceeds free of General Dynamics’s lien unless

Stewart held the aircraft free of the lien, as a buyer in the or-

dinary course of business under section 9.307(a). General

Dynamics offers three arguments that it contends require rever-

sal of the holding that Stewart qualified as a buyer in the or-

dinary course of business.

First, General Dynamics contends that the bankruptcy court

misapplied the burden of proof. The burden on this issue does

rest with the party claiming the status of a buyer in the ordinary

course of business, as General Dynamics urges. See /nterna-

tional Harvester Co. v. Glendenning, Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas

1974, SOS S.W.2d 320, 2% Nonetheless, General Dynamics

cannot prevail on this argument, for we agree with the district

" We also reject the view that Congress created a federal filing system and left

priorities to federal common law. One major reason for creating a single fil-

ing system was to foster certainty in aircraft financing transactions. It hardly

seems likely that Congress would have sought certainty in recording but left

priorities to the slow and unceriain process of judicial development.

13a

court that an examination of the entire opinion of the bankrupt-

cy court shows that it did not misapply the burden of proof."

General Dynamics’s contention to the contrary relies exclusively

on one sentence in the opinion of the bankruptcy court: ‘‘The

preponderance of the evidence simply does not establish or

show that Stewart had any knowledge of any default by Ayer on

his obligation to General Dynamics at the time he purchased

these airplanes.’’ Taken out of context, the sentence could be

read as an allocation of the burden of proof, and such an alloca-

tion would be improper. But the sentence can just as easily be

read as a description of the evidence." The sentence is at most

ambiguous, and there is no other indication anywhere in the

opinion that the bankruptcy judge misapplied the burden of

proof. Consequently, we conclude that the bankruptcy judge

placed the burden where it belonged — on Gary.

Second, General Dynamics contends that, even if the

bankruptcy judge acted properly in his assignment of the

burden of proof, the holding must be reversed because the

bankruptcy court considered Stewart’s knowledge on December

22, 1971 and January 4, 1972, the dates of purchase, rather than

on August 3, 1972, the date of recordation. The district court

found some merit in General Dynamics’s argument that

“ Even if the bankruptcy court had misapplied the burden of proof, that fact

alone would not necessarily compe! reversal. This court has held in a recent

bankruptcy case that the allocation of the burden of proof is of concern

primarily in a trial before a jury. Katz v. Weil (In re Garfinkle), 5 Cir. 1978,

$77 F.2d 906, 910 (alternative holding).

" See Katz v. Weil (In re Garfinkle), 5 Cir. 1978, 577 F.2d 906. There, this

count considwed the Sellpwing sentence fem o tenhruptcy judge's epinion:

“The Court concludes that Curtis Katz has failed to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that he was vested with a valid beneficial

ownership interest in the Eden Roc Hotel”’ In the context of the sentence im-

mediately following — “‘On the contrary, the Court concludes that the

preponderance of the evidence establishes that Curtis Katz. . . failed to take

... action to cut off the redemptive rights of Barbara Garfinkle to protect

her ownership interest in the Eden Roc Hotel.’’ — the court viewed the first

sentence as a description of the evidence rather than as an allocation of the

burden of proof.

l4a

Stewart’s knowledge was to be evaluated as of August 3 but

declined to choose between the dates of purchase and the date

of recordation, holding that use of the date of purchase would

be harmless error because Stewart did not know of the default

by Ayer even on August 3. General Dynamics argues to us that

the district court’s disposition of this issue was improper

because August 3 was the relevant time, but the bankruptcy

court had made no finding on the state of Stewart's knowledge

in August. We disagree with General Dynamics on both

grounds.

We conclude that the dates of purchase were the relevant

dates. The rule of § 9.307(a) is designed to protect the innoceni

buyer against prior security interests in retail goods because he

cannot be expected to discover those interests, while the secured

party may generally be assumed to have authorized the sale of

inventory by a retailer. See generally, e.g., J. White & R. Sum-

mers, Uniform Commercial Code § 25-14 at 1070 (2d ed. 1980).

But this “‘protection’’ leaves the buyer vulnerable if he cannot

be certain of it until he records. Were that the rule, a buyer who

discovered a violated security agreement after purchasing but

before recording could have given consideration, in good faith

and without knowledge, and taken possession of the goods but

he would take a position subordinate to that of the secured

lender. Measuring knowledge at the time of sale or earlier,

however, prevents any gap in protection, for a potential buyer

who discovers a violated security interest at the time of purchase

can always decide not to buy.”

" We find additional support for our conclusion that the dates of purchase are

the relevant dates in the limited nature of the current controversy over when

the protection of the buyer in the ordinary course attaches. Although there is

some debate as to whether one who qualifies as a buyer in the ordinary

course prevails over the secured lender if the lender attempts to foreclose

before the buyer takes possession of the goods, no one seems to question

that, from the time of delivery, the buyer prevails. See T. Quinn, UCC Com-

mentary and Law Digest ¢ 3-307[A}[8] (1978); Note, When Does a Buyer

Become a Buyer in Ordinary Course? UCC §§ 1-201(9), 9-307(1): A Test and

@ Proposal, 6) Neb.L.Rev. 848, 875 (1981); compare, e.g., Jones v. One

Fifty Foot Gulfstar Motor Sailing Yacht, 5 Cir. 1980, 625 F.2d 44, 47 0.4

(dictum) (the date of contract marks the beginning of protection, at least

Sa

'n the alternative, we conclude that the bankruptcy judge did

find that in August Stewart was without knowledge of any

violation of the security agreement between Ayer and General

Dynamics. His opinion stated that Stewart was unaware of the

lien until after the time of purchase, ‘“‘and even then the mort-

gage appeared to authorize Ayer to sell free of any

lien. . .Stewart became and remained a buyer in ordinary course

of business.”’ Bankruptcy Court Op. at 6 (emphasis added).

Third, General Dynamics challenges the correctness of the

holding that Stewart bought in good faith and without knowl-

edge that the sale to him was in violation of the rights of General

where the buyer has made partial payment) with Martin Marietta Corp. v.

New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 3 Cir. 1979, 612 F.2d 745, 749 (assuming, without

deciding, that the date of identification of the goods to the contract marks

the beginning of protection) and with Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc.,

1973, 59 Wis.2d 219, 208 N.W.2d 97, 106-07 (the passage of title marks the

beginning of protection). Although one might argue that the buyer’s

qualification should be determined as of a date earlier than that on which the

protection takes effect, surely the qualification should not be determined as

of a later date.

General Dynamics cites no authority for its view that knowledge must be

determined as of the date of recordation. It seems to rely entirely on 49

U.S.C. § 1403(c), which provides that no conveyance shall be valid as against

third parties until recorded. Thus, according to General Dynamics, it could

not lose its rights by operation of section 9.307(a) until Stewart recorded the

conveyance, and Stewart would have to be without knowledge at the mo-

ment when General Dynamics would lose its righis if he is to take under sec-

tion 9.307(a). To the extent that this argument reiterates the pre-emption

argument, we have rejected it in Part Il. The validity of General Dynamics’s

interest is governed by state law, which as our discussion in text shows,

subordinates General Dynamics to a buyer in the ordinary course as of the

date of purchase. Of course section 1403(c) does not affirmatively grant in-

terests to third parties simply on the basis of the failure of the parties to the

conveyance to record, and General Dynamics has no other claim arising

after the failure to record; it did not in any way deal in reliance on recorded

title. See Peters v. Norris, Tex. Civ.App. — Houston 1966, 402 S.W .2d 216,

219-20.

16a

Dynamics."* Our holding above was based on alternative

grounds — that the dates of purchase are the dates on which

Stewart’s knowledge is relevant and that the bankruptcy court

found that Stewart acted in good faith and had no knowledge

on the date of recordation. In keeping with that alternative

holding, we will consider Stewart’s knowledge and good faith

on both dates, although General Dynamics’s argument deals

mainly with the date of recordation.

The holding that Stewart had no knowledge that the sale

violated the security agreement between Ayer and General

Dynamics is not clearly erroneous. There is nothing in the

record to show any knowledge on the dates of purchase, for the

results of the title search did not arrive until January 5, 1972, the

day after the second purchase. Once those results arrived, there

is nothing to indicate that Stewart saw the security agreement

before August 3, 1972, and, even if he did, that agreement ap-

peared to authorize the sale. The record supports the conclusion

that Stewart first learned of the default by Ayer from General

Dynamics’s letter of May 28, 1976. We cannot re-evaluate

Stewart’s credibility in denying knowledge; that was a question

for the trial judge.”

“ In its brief, General Dynamics urged that we hold these conclusions ‘‘clearly

erroneous”’. At oral argument, though, it changed its position, now con-

tending that tne determination of buyer in the ordinary course status is a

mixed question of law and fact, which would give us greater freedom to

substitute our judgment for that of the trial judge. In support of its new

position, it cites Associates Discount Corp. v. Rattan Chevrolet, Inc.,

Tex. 1970, 462 S.W.2d 546. That case held that summary judgment was im-

proper when supported only by conclusory assertions that the sale was in the

ordinary course of business because whether a sale is in the ordinary course

of business is a mixed question of law and fact. The case did not hold, and

we likewise refuse to hold, that the question of the buyer’s knowledge is a

mixed question. Some aspects of buyer in the ordinary course status may be

mixed questions, as is the case with the question of good faith, reviewed

below. See id.; Skilton, Buyer in the Ordinary Course of Business under Ar-

ticle 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1974 Wis.L. Rev. 1, 31.

“General Dynamics has referred us to a number of facts that it argues

establish that Stewart did not act in good faith and without knowledge. Most

of the facts relate to the question of good faith and will be discussed below.

17a

General Dynamics also contends that Stewart did not act in

good faith, suggesting that he knowingly bought the planes for

less than their value and that, though he was experienced in the

sale of aircraft, did not undertake a title search before pur-

chasing."* To show that Stewart purchased below market value,

General Dynamics relies on the gain on the later sale of one of

the planes and on the use of a higher value in the 1975 mortgage

agreement between Gary and its bank. Stewart apparently made

See note 17. None of them tend to establish that Stewart had knowledge on

the dates of purchase or on the date of recordation. Only one of the facts re-

quires any discussion at this point. General Dynamics asserts that ‘‘shortly

after receiving notice of the liens in January 1972"’ Stewart learned of a

lawsuit between Ayer and General Dynamics. The record is unclear as to

how soon after January Stewart learned of the lawsuit. Even if it was before

August 3, knowledge of the lawsuit still does not tend to show that Stewart

knew that the sale to him violated the security agreement. The remaining

facts relied upon by General Dynamics are simply irrelevant to Stewart's

knowledge.

"General Dynamics also notes a number of other facts that it views as

evidence of Stewart's bad faith: (1) Stewart purchased the planes in his in-

dividual capacity, (2) he waited seven months to record his title, (3) he gave

two planes to Gary and sold another one to Gary at a large gain, (4) in

August 1976, Stewart and Gary obtained an indemnification agreement from

Ayer, and (5) Gary’s files contained a rough draft of a letter, never sent, that

misrepresented the date on which Gary learned of the lien. The first three

facts are obviously completely irrelevant to the question of Stewart's good

faith. The indemnification agreement, obtained some four and a half years

after the purchase, shows little about Stewart's good faith on that date or on

the date of recordation; if anything, it tends to establish that he acted in

good faith because he saw no need for such an agreement at those times.

Finally, we are unmoved by General Dynamics’s arguments that the rough

draft of the letter establishes bad faith. First, the letter was clearly labeied a

draft and was never sent, so, at most, it could establish that Stewart thought

about acting in bad faith and decided not to do so. Second, the letter was

drafted in 1976, long after Stewart’s good or bad faith ceased to be relevant.

Third, examination of the letter indicates that the author was uncertain of

the date of the discovery of the liens, placed it shortly after Gary’s sale of

one of the planes and only later filled in that date, suggesting that there was

no purposeful misrepresentation of the date of the discovery. Finally, the

record does not establish that Stewart drafted the letter, and he denied hav-

ing done so.

no profit on the sale of the group of planes, and, indeed, his

profit on a sale four years down the line is but weak evidence

that he originally paid less than fair value for the planes and

even weaker evidence that he was aware that this was a bargain

too good to be true. Similarly, the use of a higher value in a

mortgage agreement consummated three years later is weak

evidence of the 1972 market value.

Stewart’s failure to undertake a title search presents a ques-

tion only slightly more troublesome. The Texas courts have

repeatedly stated that the test of good faith is not negligence or

diligence and that it is immaterial that the buyer was aware of

facts that would put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry. To

lose his status as a buyer in the ordinary course, the buyer must

have actual knowledge of facts or circumstances that amount to

bad faith. See, e.g., First State Bank & Trust Co. v. George,

Texas.Civ.App. — Corpus Christi 1974, 519 S.W.2d 198, writ

ref'd n. r. e.; Riley v. First State Bank, Tex.Civ.App. —

Amarillo 1971, 469 S.W.2d 812, 816; Richardson Co. v. First

National Bank, Tex. Civ.App. — Tyler 1974, 504 S.W.2d 812,

816, writ ref’d n. r. e.; cf. Citizens Bridge v. Guerra, 1953, 152

Tex. 361, 258 S.W.2d €4, 69 (decided under predecessor

statute). Thus, although a reasonably prudent person with

Stewart’s experience might have conducted a title search with

the FAA before purchasing, Stewart’s failure to do so does not,

without more, establish that he acted in bad faith. Accord,

Northern lIilinois Corp. v. Bishop Distributing Co.,

W.D.Mich. 1968, 284 F.Supp. 121, 125 (no duty to search FAA

records before purchasing aircraft from dealer); Texas National

Bank v. Aufderheide, E.D.Ark.1964, 235 F.Supp. 599, 604

(same); Cessna Finance Corp. v. Skyways Enterprises, Inc.,

Ky.1979, 580 S.W.2d 491, 494 n.7; Suburban Trust & Savings

Bank v. Campbell, Ct. Common Pleas 1969, 19 Ohio Misc. 74,

48 Ohio Ops.2d 250, 250 N.E.2d 118, 121 (same). Nor did

Stewart have actual knowledge of any circumstances that would

put him in bad faith. We decline to overrule the holding that

Stewart acted in good faith.”

" General Dynamics contends that the bankruptcy court and the district court

failed to recognize the cases upon which it relies in its argument that Stewart

19a

IV.

General Dynamics next argues that, even if Stewart qualifies

as a buyer in the ordinary course of business, Gary cannot take

good title for one of two reasons — first, the security interest

was not created by Gary’s seller and, second, Gary gave no con-

sideration for the planes. Neither argument has merit.

The first argument is based on the limitation in section

9.307(a): a buyer in the ordinary course of business takes free of

a security interest only if it was created by his seller. See, e.g.,

National Shawmut Bank v. Jones, 1967, 108 N.H. 386, 236

A.2d 484. General Dynamics, noting that the security interest it

asserts was not created by Stewart (Gary’s seller) but by Ayer,

contends that Gary cannot be protected against that interest.

This argument misses the mark, for Gary does not claim under

section 9.307(a). On the contrary, its position ~ that Stewart

took good title under section 9.307(a), and Ga.,, as Stewart's

transferee, took whatever title Stewart had, under section

2.403(a), the ‘‘shelter’’ provision. It is therefore of no conse-

quence that Gary’s seller did not create the security interest.

General Dynamics attempts to rebut this reasoning by relying on

language in National Shawmut Bank stating that section 2-403

acted in bad taith. We have considered those cases, and our conclusion is un-

changed. The only Texas case cited, /nternational Harvester Co. v. Glenden-

ning, Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1974, SOS S.W.2d 320, is easily

distinguishable. The buyer in that case acquiesced in the falsification of the

sale documents to show that he had traded in used tractors in his purchase of

a new one, when in fact he had not, and he repeated the misrepresentation to

his seller's creditor. There was no such dishonesty here. The cases from other

jurisdictions are similarly distinguishable. In Taylor Motor Rental, Inc. v.

Associates Discount Corp., 1961, 196 Pa.Super. 182, 173 A.2d 688, the party

seeking to qualify as a buyer in the ordinary course was merely an alter-ego

of the the seller, and the transaction had been undertaken in an attempt to

avoid the creditor's security interest. The opinion in Rex Financial Corp. v.

Marshall, N.D.Ark.1976, 406 F.Supp. 567, is not clear, but apparently the

buyer was informed of the secured creditor's interest before the purchase, id.

at 573, and the court held that Arkansas law, unlike Texas law, provided for

constructive notice, id. at 577. Finally, in Cosid, Inc. v. Bay Steel Products

Co., Fla.App. 1971, 252 So.2d 274, the court merely overturned summary

judgment for the buyer where he was aware of suspicious circumstances,

remanding to allow the fact-finder to determine whether the buyer acted in

good faith.

20a

of the Uniform Commercial Code cannot provide an escape

from the limitations of section 9-307. In National Shawmut

Bank an individual sold a car, subject to a security interest, to a

dealer, who then sold it to a buyer in the ordinary course of

business. Since the security interest was not created by his seller,

the last buyer in the chain could not take free and clear of the in-

terest under section 9-307 of the UCC. Section 2.403(a) provides

that a purchaser of goods acquires all title that his transferor

had or had power to transfer, and that a seller with voidable title

can transfer good title. If, under that provision, a retailer who

bought subject to a security interest was one with voidable title

and had the power to transfer good title, the ‘‘created by his

seller’’ limitation of section 9.307(a) would be without any ef-

fect, so the National Shawmut Bank court held that section

2.403(a) does not provide an escape to section 9.307(a). That

rule has been approved by the commentators, see J. White &

R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 25-15 (2d ed. 1980),

and we do not question it. But the rule is that section 2.403(a) is

not available to save one who buys when the seller’s title is sub-

ject to a security interest but who does not qualify under section

9.307(a). It certainly does not mean that section 2.403(a) is not

available to subsequent transferees from a successful section

9.307(a) buyer, as General Dynamics urges. See Skilton, Buyer

in the Ordinary Course of Business under Article 9 of the

Uniform Commercial Code, 1974 Wis.L. Rev. 1, 76 (viewing the

point as ‘‘obvious’’). If General Dynamics were correct, section

9.307(a) would be of scant benefit to the ‘‘protected’’ buyer in

the ordinary course, for good title means little if one cannot

transfer it. We hold that the lien of General Dynamics was ex-

tinguished upon the sale by Ayer to Stewart under section

9.307(a), and the subsequent sale to Gary could not resurrect it.

Finally, General Dynamics contends that Gary cannot take

good title under section 2.403(a) because it furnished no con-

sideration, receiving the aircraft as a gift."* We disagree. Section

“It is not clear how this argument would help General Dynamics if we ac-

cepted it. As we have already established, the sale to Stewart extinguished

General Dynamics’s lien. Even if Gary. took less than good title from

Stewart, we do not see how that would resurrect an extinguished lien; it

2la

2.403(a) applies to a ‘“‘purchaser’’ of goods, and section 1.201

defines a ‘‘purchaser’’ as one who takes by ‘“‘sale, discount,

negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or reissue, giff or any

other voluntary transaction’’. §§ 1.201(32), (33) (emphasis

added)."* The language could not be clearer. When the drafts-

men of the Code wished to require consideration, they used the

terms ‘‘buyer’’, ‘‘seller’’, and ‘‘sale’’, defined in sections

2.106(a) and 2.103(a)(1) to require consideration, instead of

**purchaser’’, “‘transferor’’, and ‘‘purchase’’. See, e.g., §§

2.313, 2.314, 2.315. We cannot imagine applying any rule other

than that a donee takes the title that his donor had.”

V.

We hold that the FAA does not preempt the provisions of the

Texas Business and Commerce Code relating to the priority of

interests in aircraft. Therefore, Stewart, as a buyer in the or-

dinary course of business, took the aircraft free and clear of the

lien of General Dynamics. And Gary, as the transferee of

Stewart, also took free and clear of the lien. Consequently,

Gary is entitled to the possession of the remaining airplane and

the proceeds of the airplane that was sold. The case is Affirmed.

* Although chapter 2 is entitled ‘*Sales’’, § 2.101, it expressly regulates pur-

chasers in section 2.403, and adopts the general definition of *‘purchaser’’

from chapter 1, see § 2.103(d). Furthermore, under section 2.102, the scope

of chapter 2 is defined as ‘‘transactions in goods’’, with no requirement of

consideration. See generaily J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial

Code § 1-1 at 22 (2d ed. 1980) (differentiating between ‘‘transactions in

goods”’ and “‘sales’’); T. Quinn, Uniform Commercial Code Commentary

and Law Digest { 2.102 [A] (1978).

*” The cases cited by General Dynamics as requiring a ‘‘sale’’ to invoke the

coverage of chapter 2 deal with the warranty provisions of the Code. Allen v.

Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., S.D.Tex. 1974, 387 F.Supp. 364; Harvey v.

Sears, Roebuck and Co., Del.Super.1973, 315 A.2d 599. Since those provi-

sions expressly require a sale, the cases are not instructive on the need for

consideration under section 2.403, which does not require a sale.

22a

APPENDIX B

In THE

Unrtep States District Court

For Tue Western District of Texas

San Antonio Division

In Re Gary Aircrart Corporation,

Debtor,

Genera Dynamics Corporation,

Defendant/Appellant,

vs.

Gary Aircrart CoRPoRATION,

Plaintiff/ Appellee.

Cause No. SA-79-CA-505

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the

Western District of Texas, San Antonio Division.

Memorandum Opinion and Order

SESSIONS, District Judge:

Came on to be heard Defendant/Appellant’s appeal from the

Judgment of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the

Western District of Texas, San Antonio Division in Cause No.

SA-76-443-BK-T, per Honorable Bert W. Thompson, United

States Bankruptcy Judge, dated October 4, 1979. The Court,

having carefully considered the record, and the appellate briefs

of the parties, enters the following Memorandum Opinion and

Order:

This action concerns ownership of one airplane and the pro-

ceeds of the sale of another. On Feburary 20, 1969, Frederick B.

Ayer & Associates (‘‘Ayer’’), a dealer and broker in airplanes,

used airplanes and airplane parts, executed a mortgage in favor

23a

of Defendant/Appellant General Dynamics Corporation

(‘‘General Dynamics’’) in two Douglas DC-6B Airplanes, FAA

Registration Nos. N8221H and N8222H, including after-

acquired property attached to or incorporated into the col-

lateral. General Dynamics recorded its aircraft mortgage with

the Federal Aviation Administration, as required by 49 U.S.C.

Section 1403, on March 3, 1969. The mortgage provided that

Ayer could not sell the collateral if in default under the mort-

gage. Arthur W. Stewart, founder and president of Plain-

tiff/Appellee Gary Aircraft Corporation (‘‘Gary’’), personally

bought Airplanes N8221H and N8222H from Ayer on

December 22, 1971 and January 4, 1972, respectively. William

E. Crawford, vice-president and secretary-treasurer of Gary, re-

quested a title search from the Aircraft Owners and Pilots

Association (‘‘AOPA’’) on the two airplanes on January 4,

1972. AOPA reported the next morning that General Dynamics

claimed liens on both planes. Stewart recorded his bills of sale

of Airplanes N8221H and N8222H on August 3, 1972. On

November 7, 1975, Stewart transferred the two planes to Gary

without consideration. G. V. Morton, associate counsel to

General Dynamics, sent Crawford a letter dated May 28, 1976

advising him that General Dynamics stiil claimed liens against

the aircraft and that Ayer’s note was in default. Gary initiated

Chapter XI bankruptcy proceedings on October 28, 1976. By

consent of the parties, the Bankruptcy Court on May 9, 1978

allowed Gary to sell Airplane N8222H and deposit most of the

proceeds in the registry of the Court. Gary had fitted the plane

in 1976 with new engines and propellers and sold it for

$250,000.00 on May 16, 1978. A creditor of Gary retained

$18,750.00. The remaining $231,250.00 (plus accumulated in-

terest) and the hull of Airplane N8221H (still in Gary’s posses-

sion) were awarded to Gary by the Bankruptcy Court.

The Bankruptcy Court held that the registration provision of

the Federal Aviation Act (49 U.S.C. 1401 et seq.) did not

preempt state substantive law on lien priority, and that Stewart

qualified as a buyer in the ordinary course of business under Ar-

24a

ticle 9.307(1), Texas Business and Commerce Code, taking free

of General Dynamics’ liens. In support of the holding of buyer

in the ordinary course status, the Bankruptcy Court held that

Ayer was a dealer in goods of that kind and that Stewart had

purchased the planes in good faith and without knowledge of

the security interests or that the sale was in violation of General

Dynamics’ rights. The Bankruptcy Court further held that Gary

acquired Stewart’s clear title by means of the transfer. General

Dynamics argues that the Bankruptcy Court erred in that:

1) The Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. 1401 et

seq., does preempt state lien priority law;

2) The wrong time frame was employed in deter-

mining buyer in ordinary course status;

3) The wrong burden of proof was applied to the

buyer in ordinary course ‘ssue;

4) The finding that S.ewart acted in good faith is

clearly erroneous;

5) The mortgage did not authorize sale of the

airplanes; and

6) Gary could not have acquired Stewart’s alleg-

edly clear title by means of the 1975 transfer.

The Federal Aviation Act provides at 49 U.S.C Section 1403

for a comprehensive federal registration system for all in-

struments affecting the title to civil aircraft in this country. It

further provides (in relevant part) that:

(c} No conveyance or instrument the recording of

which is provided for by subsection (a) of this section

shall be valid in respect of such aircraft...

against any person other than the person by whom the

conveyance or other instrument is made or given, his

heir or devisee, or any person having actual notice

thereof, until such conveyance or other instrument is

filed for recordation in the office of the Secretary of

Transporta.‘on...

25a

(d) Each conveyance or other instrument recorded

by means of or under the system provided for in

subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall from the time

of its filing for recordation be valid as to all persons

without further or other recordation,. . .

However, Section 1406 provides (in relevant part) that:

The validity of any instrument the recording of which

is provided for by section 1403 of this title shall be

governed by the laws of the State, District of Colum-

bia, or territory or possession of the United States in

which such instrument or the place of delivery of the

property which is the subject of such instrument. ..

There is a split of authority as to whether Section 1403

preempts state buyer in ordinary course doctrines. Compare

Sanders v. M. D. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 575 F.2d 1086 (3rd Cir.

1978); Haynes v. General Credit Corp., 432 F.Supp. 763 (W.D.

Va. 1977); and Bank of Hendersonville v. Red Baron Flying

Club, Inc., 571 S.W.2d 152 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1977) (no preemp-

tion) with Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal.3d 544, 476

P.2d 401; cert. denied 404 U.S. 823 (1971); O'Neil! v. Barnett

Bank of Jacksonville, 360 So.2d 150 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1978);

and Jn re Veterans’ Air Express Co., 76 F.Supp. 684 (D.N.J.

1948) (preemption). This Court considers Sanders, the only

federal appellate case directly on point, to be the most

authoritative statement. Even were this a case of first impres-

sion, however, this Court would hold that the recordation

system of the Federal Aviation Act does not preempt the Texas

buyer in ordinary course doctrine. The Third Circuit noted in

Sanders that the legislative | ‘story of Section 1406 (enacted in

1964) reflects that Congress assumed that state substantive law

controlled the legal effect of instruments recorded under Sec-

tion 1403 (enacted in 1958), and added Section 1406 only to

resolve thorny conflict of law problems. The Fifth Circuit held

in Bank of Lexington v. Jack Adams Aircraft Sales, Inc., 570

F.2d 1220, 1225 (Sth Cir. 1978), that the Federal Aviation Act

26a

preempts state law only insofar as it conflicts with provisions of

the Act. Since the Act did not address the question of viability

of assignments of security interests, the Court ruled that state

law controlled.

The absolute language of Section 1403(d) that any instrument

recorded under the Act, ‘‘shall from the time of its filing for

recordation be valid as to all persons...,’’ cannot be given

literal effect in light of Section 1406. Even without Section 1406,

it is difficult to imagine that Congress intended for aircraft liens

to be valid simply because they have been recorded. One could

argue that the Federal Aviation Act contemplates that state law

control only the original validity of an instrument recorded

under it, and not the effect of future events such as sale in the

ordinary course of business. The ‘‘valid as to all persons’’

language could be construed as negating a buyer in ordinary

course doctrine. However, the Court feels that the more

reasonable interpretation is that the Act establishes a unitary

and final recording system which all persons must search who

have a duty to search in the first place. Buyers in the ordinary

course have no such duty. Even a sophisticated buyer such as

Mr. Stewart would not expect to be bound by floor-plan financ-

ing arrangements entered into by a dealer in the type of goods

he purchases. Moreover, this Court cannot find that Congress

has preempted the venerable but still commercially important

doctrine of buyer in ordinary course, aow uniformly codified in

forty-nine states by adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code,

without a clearer indication than Section 1403 supplies.'

‘General Dynamics also argues that state law must be considered preempted

because even Texas courts hold that the Federal Aviation Act preempts the

field of conveyancing in aircraft, citing Continental Radio Co., Inc. v. Con-

tinental Bank and Trust Co., 369 S.W.2d 359 (Tex.Civ. App.—Houston,

1963) writ ref’d. n.r.e. However, the ‘preempt the field’’ statement in that

case is dictum. At issue was whether a Texas constitutional mechanic’s lien,

which is perfected without filing, was superior to a bank's lien subsequently

perfected by filing under Section 1403. This relates to the fact of recordation,

an area definitely preempted by Section 1403. Moreover, Continental

predates the enactment of Section 1406.

27a

General Dynamics’ next three points, that the Bankruptcy

Court applied the wrong time frame and wrong burden of proof

and was clearly erroneous in determining that Stewart qualified

as a buyer in the ordinary course, will be considered together.

General Dynamics argues that Stewart’s status as a buyer in the

ordinary course must be determined not as of December 22,

1971 and January 4, 1972 (the dates of tender of consideration

and delivery of the planes) but as of August 3, 1972, (the date

Stewart recorded his bills of sale with the FAA). This position

has merit in light of Section 1403(c)’s provision that no con-

veyance required to be recorded shall be valid against third par-

ties without notice until recorded. However, the only knowledge

acquired by Stewart in the period between January 4, 1972 and

August 3, 1972 was that General Dynamics did claim a lien

against Airplanes N8221H and N8222H. Article 9.307(a),

Tex.Bus.&Comm.Code, provides that a buyer in ordinary

course takes free of a security interest even though he knows of

its existence. The good faith requirement is contained in the

definition of ‘‘buyer in the ordinary course of business’’, Article

1.201(i): ‘‘a person who in good faith and without knowledge

that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or

security interest of a third party in the goods buys in ordinary

course from a person in the business of selling goods of that

kind. . .’’ The security agreement in this case allowed sale of the

collateral except when Ayer was in default. The Bankruptcy

Court found that, even after learning of the existence of the

liens, Stewart still had no reason to think the sale was

unauthorized. Bankruptcy Court Opinion, p. 4. Therefore,

unless this determination results from a misplacing of the

burden of proof or is clearly erroneous, the time frame for

determining buyer in ordinary course status is immaterial.

General Dynamics’ burden of proof argument centers on one

sentence in the Bankruptcy Court opinion:

The preponderance of the evidence simply does not

establish or show that Stewart had knowledge of any

28a

default by Ayer on his obligation to General Dynamics

at the time he purchased these airplanes.

Bankruptcy Court Opinion, p.4. General Dynamics maintains

that Texas law places the burden of proving buyer in ordinary

course status on the party seeking its protections. It cites Matter

of Garfinkle, 577 F.2d 906 (Sth Cir. 1978), for the proposition

that such a misplacement of the burden of proof by a Bank-

ruptcy Court is reversible error where the evidence is not so

overwhelming that the other party would have surpassed the

correct burden of proof. However, one-sidedness of the

evidence was only one basis for the holding in Garfinkle. The

Fifth Circuit noted that allocation of the burden of proof is

primarily a matter of concern in a jury trial. Jd. at 910. As in

Garfinkle, the contention here of error in allocation of burden

of proof is based on an isolated sentence. Taken as a whole, the

Bankruptcy Court opinion does not formally place the burden

of proof on General Dynamics on this issue. Therefore, it is un-

necessary to determine whether in fact Texas law places the

burden of proof on one seeking buyer in ordinary course status.

In support of its claim of error in the Bankruptcy Court’s

determination that Stewart acted in good faith and without

knowledge that the sale to him was in violation of the rights of a

third party, General Dynamics asserts, inter alia, that:

1) Stewart was a sophisticated aircraft buyer and a

founding member of AOPA, yet failed to make a title

check.

2) Stewart knew of a lawsuit and ‘‘a battle’’ be-

tween General Dynamics and Ayer shortly after learn-

ing of the existence of the liens in January, 1972.

3) Stewart paid $5,000 each for the aircraft when

their approximate market value was $25,000 each.

4) Gary’s files contained a rough draft letter in

response to the May 28, 1976 letter from General

Dynamics which misrepresented the time Gary learned

29a

of the existence of the liens. (The letter was apparently

never sent.)*

Point 2 is simply not supported by the record. The portion of

the transcript quoted by General Dynamics in its brief to show

Stewart’s knowledge is at worst ambiguous as to his knowledge:

Q: Well, what did they say in conversation with you

when you or Mr. Crawford spoke to them, what

did they say about the General Dynamics lien?

What was their explanation?

A: Well, I think Mr. Crawford told me that there

was some lawsuit, and it was all settled, and not

to worry about it. If we sold an airplane, they

would clear it, which is what happened the first

and second times.

Q: Now, when he said there was some lawsuit, what

lawsuit?

I don’t know. This could have been that year, the

next year, or three years. It is very difficult for me

to separate these things, but basically I think at

one time or another the air company told me they

were having a battle with General Dynamics.

Now whether—

Q: Who is “‘They were having a battle’’? Who do

you mean by ‘“‘they’’?

Frederick B. Ayer Company, somebody there

told Mr. Crawford that they were having a battle

with General Dynamics.

* The Court is unable to perceive any merit in General Dynamics other points,

concerning the fact that Stewart purchased the airpianes in his own name in-

stead of his company’s, the time between Stewart's purchase and his filing of

his bills of sale, the fact that Stewart sold another airplane (not involved in

this action) to Gary at a profit, the fact that there had been no consideration

for the transfer of Airplanes N8221H and N8222H from Stewart to Gary, the

fact that Stewart never contacted General Dynamics about the lien problems,

and the fact that Stewart and Gary obtained an indemnity agreement from

Ayer after learning of the title problems

30a

Transcript, 92-93; Defendant/Appellant’s Brief, 26. From this

and the faci that the liens had not been cleared within a

reasonable period, General Dynamics concludes that Stewart

**knew or reasonably should have known’”’ that the sale to him

had been in violation of its rights. However, Article 1.201(25)

provides that a person ‘‘knows’’ or has ‘“‘knowledge’”’ of a fact

when he has actual knowledge of it.

The Court does not agree with Gary that the alleged

misrepresentation in the rough draft letter composed some four

years after the purchases and never sent could not possibly be

probative of Stewart’s state of mind at the time of the pur-

chases. If Stewart had bought the airplanes in bad faith, it

would be in his interest to continue, four years later, to

misrepresent his state of mind. Likewise, the allegations that

Stewart was a sophisticated buyer, knew of the AOPA title

search service but did not use it, and bought the planes for less

than market value, if true, would permit an inference of bad

faith. However, to label the Bankruptcy Court’s finding ‘‘clear-

ly erroneous’’ on the basis of these inferences would be unwar-

ranted. The Bankruptcy Judge heard all the evidence, including

Stewart’s repeated protestations that he did not know that the

sale was in violation of General Dynamics’ rights until he saw

the May 28, 1976 letter. Deposition testimony of Frederick B.

Ayer, read into the record, tends to confirm Stewart’s lack of

knowledge. The Bankruptcy Judge observed and evaluated the

witnesses’ demeanor. This Court will not overturn his deter-

mination on the basis of permissible, but not compelling,

inferences.

General Dynamics relies on a stipulation that it never ‘‘con-

sented’’ to the transfer of the planes to Stewart and a judgment

of an Arizona state court that Ayer was in default on its obliga-

tion to General Dynamics beginning on December 31, 1970 in

support of its claim that the sale was not authorized. However,

since Stewart did not know that Ayer was in default, he qualifies

as a buyer in ordinary course. It is therefore not necessary to

decide whethe: General Dynamics consented to the sale of this

particular collateral.

3la

Finally, General Dynamics argues that Gary cannot claim

Stewart’s buyer in ordinary course protection because the

security interest at issue was not created by Gary’s seller, citing

National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Jones, 236 A.2d 484

(N.H., 1967) and United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804 (Sth Cir.

1971). However, both these cases involved buyers seeking buyer

in ordinary course protection whose sellers themselves did not

have buyer in ordinary course protection under UCC Article

9.307(1). Furthermore, Gary does not even claim buyer in or-

dinary course status*; rather, it contends that it succeeded to

whatever title Stewart had by virtue of Article 2.403(a), which

provides in relevant part:

A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his

transferor had or had power to transfer except that a

purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to

the extent of the interest purchased.

General Dynamics’ argument that Gary cannot come within Ar-

ticle 2.403(a) because the transfer was without consideration is

without merit. Article 1.201(33) defines ‘‘purchaser’’ as one

who takes by “‘purchase’’ and Article 1.201(33) includes taking

by gift within its definition of ‘‘purchase’’. There is an

understandable lack of case law for the proposition that one

who takes from another who had clear title also generally has

clear title. Article 2.403(a) is plain on its face, and it is impossi-

ble to defend any other rule either by formal logic or policy

arguments. Therefore,

* The fact that the lien had not been created by Stewart would not prevent

Gary from being a buyer in the ordinary course, anyway. It would merely

deny Gary the protection of Article 9.307(1). The reason Gary cannot be a

buyer in the ordinary course is that its seller, Stewart, was not personally in

the business of selling airplanes, and because of the lack of consideration. See

Art. 1.201(9).

32a

It is hereby ordered that the Judgment of the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas, San

Antonio Division, in Cause No. SA-76-443-BK-T is in all things

Affirmed;

It is further ordered that Defendant/Appellant reimburse

Plaintiff/ Appellee for costs of appeal, as provided in Rule 811

of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.

33a

APPENDIX C

In THe

Unrrep States District Court

For Tue Western District or Texas

San Antonio, Division

In Re

Gary Aircrart CorPorATION

Debtor

Gary Aircrart CorPoRATION

Plaintiff

vs.

Genera Dynamics CorporatION,

Defendant

In BANKRUPTCY

No. SA-76-443-BK-T

Chapter XI

(Adversary ‘‘A’’)

Memorandum Order and Opinion

THOMPSON, Bankruptcy Judge:

At San Antonio, in said District, on the Ist day of May, 1979,

came on for hearing and consideration the Debtor, Gary Air-

craft Corporation’s (Gary Aircraft) Complaint to Determine the

Validity and Extent of Lien of General Dynamics Corporation

in the above styled adversary proceeding. In Counts One and

Two of its Complaint, Gary Aircraft requested the Court’s con-

34a

sideration and determination of the existence and extent of a

lien asserted by Defendant, General Dynamics Corporation

(General Dynamics) against two DC-6B airplanes purchased by

Gary Aircraft. Only these two counts are considered herein as

Counts Three and Four were heretofore severed for separate

trial as to those issues by previous Order of the Court.

The Court having heard and considered the evidence

presented in open Court; the testimony of the witnesses; the

arguments of counsel and the legal authorities cited by the

respective parties, hereby renders the following Memorandum

Opinion and Order which shall constitute the Court’s Findings

of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. In this connection, all

Findings of Fact may be considered Conclusions of Law, if ap-

propriate. All Conclusions of Law may be considered as Find-

ings of Fact, if appropriate. All Findings of Fact and Conclu-

sions of Law not specifically made herein are deemed made in

support of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

This Controversy arises from the acquisition of two Douglas

DC-6B airplanes, FAA registry numbers N8221H and N8222H,

by Gary Aircraft. These two planes were purchased by Mr. Ar-

thur W. Stewart (Stewart), President of Gary Aircraft in

December, 1971 and January, 1972 respectively. Stewart pur-

chased these two airplanes for a price of Five Thousand Dollars

($5,000.00) each from Frederick B. Ayer & Associates (Ayer),

whose line of business included selling used airplanes, engines

and parts. Prior to said aircraft sales, Ayer had granted to

General Dynamics a security interest (Mortgage) in the two

airplanes. This security interest had been filed with the Recorda-

tion Office of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 1403 (1958)

in March, 1969. The mortgage included an after-acquired prop-

erty clause relating to all property subsequently attached to or

incorporated in the original collateral. Such mortgage further

contained and recited the mortgagee’s, General Dynamics, con-

sent to any sale made by Ayer except only when Ayer was in

default of his obligation to General Dynamics.

35a

After Stewart purchased the aircraft from Ayer, he and Gary

Aircraft jointly requested and received a ‘“‘Report of Title

Search’’ disclosing for the first time to Stewart and Gary Air-

craft, the aforementioned mortgage filed by General Dynamics

which encumbered airplanes N8221H and N8222H, as well as

other inventory held and owned by Ayer that was daily offered

for sale to the public. Stewart thereafter filed the bills of sale to

these two airplanes with the FAA on July 20, 1972, with

knowledge of the existence of said encumbrance. Thereafter, on

Ne -cmber 7, 1979, Stewart executed a bill of sale transferring ti-

tle to airplanes N8221H and N8222H to Gary Aircraft

whereby Gary Aircraft acquired all interests previously held and

owned by Stewart in and to such aircrafts. In late 1976, Gary

Aircraft overhauled airplane N8222H by installing four Pratt &

Whitney R2800 engines with quick engine change kits and four

Hamilton Standard Model 43E60 propellers. The airplane was

then sold for Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars

($250,000.00) pursuant to an Order of this Court, and the pro-

ceeds of sale were thereafter impounded pending a determina-

tion of proper disposition by this Court.

Defendant, General Dynamics, claimed a lien on the hulls of

both airplanes sold by Ayer in a writing to Gary Aircraft in May

1976. It also claimed an interest in four engines, the propellers

and related equipment installed on airplane N8222H pursuant

to the after-acquired property clause contained in its mortgage.

In Order to resolve this claim, Plaintiff, Gary Aircraft filed the

instant adversary proceeding under its authority as Debtor-In

Possession within the Chapter XI Arrangement it instituted on

October 28, 1976.

The threshold issue in the instant proceeding is whether

Stewart took the two airplanes subject to the security interest

held by the Defendant, General Dynamics. Stewart did not

make a title search, of the FAA records prior to purchasing the

aircraft from Ayer. Only after the sale was consummated and

completed did he request the title search, which thereafter

36a

reported the existence of the mortgage held by General

Dynamics.

The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. 1200 ef seq.,

preempts the state law concerning the registration and recording

of title instruments in commercial aircraft. Pacific Financial

Corp. v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 296 F2d 68,71 (Sth Cir.

1961). Section 503 of the Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C 1403, controls

the recordation requirements of all security and title interest in

the aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers and appliances. The

Aviation Act does not address itself to the resolution of conflict-

ing claims of priority however, and as a result, state substantive

law is applied in and to such situations. Sanders v. M.D. Air-

craft, Inc., 575 F2d 1086 (3rd Cir. 1978). The Court of Appeals,

Sth Circuit, has held that the Federal Aviation Act preempts

State law insofar as the state law conflicts with the federal provi-

sions. Bank of Lexington v. Jack Adams Aircraft Sales, Inc.,

$70 F2d 1220, 1224 (Sth Cir. 1978).

Under the facts in the case at bar, the priority of claims con-

flict is controlled by the Texas Business and Commerce Code

(T.B.C.C.), V.A.T.S., (1967). Section 9.307 of the Code pro-

vides that usually a buyer in the ordinary course of business

takes free and clear of a security interest created by his seller

even though the security interest is perfected and even though

the buyer Knows of the existence of the perfected security in-

terest. This general rule obtains under the facts now before the

Court. The buyer in ordinary course is defined as one who buys

**in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in

violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third

party in the goods, and who buys in the ordinary course of

business from a person in the business of selling goods of that

kind. ..”’ T.B.C.C. 1.201(9).

The resulting doctrine provides that one who buys from a

merchant dealing in goods of the kind takes free of any

perfected security interest in those unless he knows the transac-

tion is in violation of some term in the security agreement.

37a

T.B.C.C. 9.307, Comment 2. It is only reasonable that a pur-

chaser expects his seller’s floorplanner to encourage the turn-

over of inventory, allowing the merchant the right to sell the

particular commodity without requiring the purchaser to

research the terms of any security agreement. Texas National

Bank v. Aufderheide, 235 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Ark. 1964).

**The buyer in ordinary course doctrine’’ has been applied to

the sales of aircraft by dealers of same acting in the ordinary

course of business. Aufderheide, id. ‘‘The buyer in ordinary

course doctrine’ is only necessary where the security agreement

JSorbids the merchant to sell his inventory. For example, the

Aufderheide security agreement did not authorize the aircraft

dealer to sell his inventory without the consent of the secured

party. Nevertheless, the purchaser from the merchant took free

of the lien because he was a buyer in ordinary course of

business.

If the sale vo the mortgaged inventory is authorized either by

the security agreement or conduct, § 9.306 of the Business and

Commerce Code controls. Where the sale is authorized, the

transferee takes free of the lien and the secured party’s only

right will be to the proceeds of the sale in the hands of his

debtor, the selling merchant. 7:B.C.C. 9.306, Comment 3.

In applying these principles to the fact in the case at bar, the

Court finds that Ayer was a recognized dealer in aircraft and in

the sale of aircraft and was acting in the ordinary course of

business during the sale of said two used aircraft to Stewart. The

Court further finds that Stewart qualified for the classification

of a buyer in ordinary course by his good faith purchase of the

two airplanes. He had no knowledge at the time of purchase of

any security interest held by General Dynamics. Even after he

received knowledge of the existence of this security interest, he

still had no reason to think the sale was unauthorized. The

security agreement filed by General Dynamics with the FAA ex-

pressly allowed sales of the collateral, except only when Ayer

was in default on his obligations to General Dynamics.

38a

The preponderance of the evidence simply does not establish

or show that Stewart had knowledge of any default by Ayer on

his obligation to General Dynamics at the time he purchased

these airplanes. Therefore, he knew of no violation of the

security agreement between Ayer and General Dynamics and

was without knowledge with respect to same. Under the clear

mandate of § 9.307, Stewart took ownership and title to

airplanes N8221H and N8222H free and clear o* any security in-

terest or lien or claim of General Dynamics in and to said

aircraft.

When Stewart transferred all of his interest by his sale to Gary

Aircraft, there was and could be no possible revival of the lien

held or claimed by General Dynamics. The policy of the Texas

Business and Commerce Code in allowing transfers of full title

to a buyer in the ordinary course of business is to prevent confu-

sion or injustice within commerce. 7.B.C.C. 2.403, Comment

3. Gary Aircraft assumed and succeeded to the title and status

held and owned by Stewart upon its purchase of the two

airplanes. Therefore, General Dynamics has no claim against

the vendee of a buyer in ordinary course who himself took free

of its lien. The effect of a contrary rule would create havoc in

the marketplace.

The Court therefore concludes that both Stewart and Gary

Aircraft took free and clear of General Dynamics’ security in-

terest in the two specified DC-6B aircraft. The totality of the

evidence established that Stewart obtained knowledge of the ex-

istence of such lien only after he purchased the airplanes, and

even then the mortgage appeared to authorize Ayer to sell free

of any lien. By not knowing of any violation of the security

agreement, Stewart became and reniained a buyer in ordinary

course of business and the airplanes were relieved and dis-

charged from any encumbrance previously held by General

Dynamics. When Gary Aircraft purchased Stewart’s interest in

the airplanes, it received his full title unencumbered by any

claim or lien of General Dynamics.

39a

It is stipulated that General Dynamics’ claim to a security in-

terest in the propellers, engines, equipment and other ac-

cessories which Gary Aircraft attached to the improved airplane

depended entirely upon the terms and provisions of its FAA

mortgage against the hull of airplane N8222H. General

Dynamics did not attempt to file any separate security interest in

the engines and propellers which Gary Aircraft added to this air-

craft after becoming the owner of same. It is the conclusion and

opinion of the Court that since General Dynamics had no

security interest against the hull of the aircraft in the hands of

Gary Aircraft, it has nu security interest in the afterattached

equipment.

In view of the foregoing it is the Order and Judgment of the

Court that the Debtor, Gary Aircraft Corporation, holds and

owns the hull of airplane N8221H free and clear of any security

interest asserted and claimed by General Dynamics. It is the fur-

ther Order and Judgment of the Court that Gary Aircraft Cor-

poration is entitled to the entire Two Hundred Fifty Thousand

Dollars ($250,000.00) proceeds of sale of and from airplane

N8222H, plus all accrued interest thereon, and without any in-

debtedness to or claim of Defendant, General Dynamics in and

to such proceeds of sale.

40a

APPENDIX D

THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT

§ 1302. Consideration of matters in public interest

by Board

Factors for interstate, overseas, and foreign air transportation

(a) In the exercise and performance of its powers and

duties under this chapter, the Board shall consider the foilow-

ing, among other things, as being in the public interest, and in

accordance with the public convenience and necessity:

(1) The assignment and maintenance of safety as the

highest priority in air commerce, and prior to the

authorization of new air transportation services, full

evaluation of the recommendations of the Secretary of

Transportation on the safety implications of such new

services and full evaluation of any report or recommen-

dation submitted under section 1307 of this title.

(2) The prevention of any deterioration in establish-

ed safety procedures, recognizing the clear intent, en-

couragement, and dedication of the Congress to the fur-

therance of the highest degree of safety in air transporta-

tion and air commerce, and the maintenance of the safe-

ty vigilance that has evolved within air transportation

and air commerce and has come to be expected by the

traveling and shipping public.

(3) The availability of a variety of adequate,

economic, efficient, and low-price services by air carriers

and foreign air carriers without unjust discriminations,

undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or deceptive

practices, the need to improve relations among, and

coordinate transportation by, air carriers, and the need

to encourage fair wages and equitable working condi-

tions for air carriers.

(4) The placement of maximum reliance on com-

petitive market forces and on actual and potential com-

petition (A) to provide the needed air transportation

4la

system, and (B) to encourage efficient and well-managed

carriers to earn adequate profits and to attract capital,

taking account, nevertheless, of material differences, if

any, which may exist between interstate and overseas air

transportation, on the one hand, and foreign air

transportation, on the other.

(5) The development and maintenance of a sound

regulatory environment which is responsive to the needs

of the public and in which decisions are reached prompt-

ly in order to facilitate adaption of the air transportation

system to the present and future needs of the domestic

and foreign commerce of the United States, the Postal

Service, and the national defense.

(6) The encouragement of air service at mayor urban

areas in the United States through secondary or satellite

airports, where consistent with regional airport plans of

regional and local authorities, and when such encourage-

ment is endorsed by appropriate State entities encourag-

ing such service by air carriers whose sole responsibility

in any specific market is to provide service exclusively at

the secondary or satellite airport, and fostering an en-

vironment which reasonably enables such carriers to

establish themselves and to develop their secondary or

satellite airport services.

(7) The prevention of unfair, deceptive, predatory, or

anticompetitive practices in air transportation, and the

avoidance of —

(A) unreasonable industry concentration, exces-

sive market domination, and monopoly power; and

(B) other conditions;

that would tend to allow one or more air carriers or

foreign air carriers unreasonably to increase prices,

reduce services, or exclude competition in air transpor-

tation.

(8) The maintenance of a comprehensive and conve-

nient system of continuous scheduled interstate and

overseas airline service for small communities and for

isolated areas in the United States, with direct Federal

assistance where appropriate.

42a

(9) The encouragement, development, and

maintenance of an air transportation system relying on ac-

tual and potential competition to provide efficiency, in-

novation, and low prices, and to determine the variety,

quality, and price of air transportation services.

(10) The encouragement of entry into air transporta-

tion markets by new air carriers, the encouragement of en-

try into additional air transportation markets by existing

air carriers, and the continued strengthening of small air

carriers sO as to assure a more effective competitive airline

industry.

(11) The promotion, encouragement, and development

of civil aeronautics and a viable, privately owned United

States air transport industry.

(12) The strengthening of the competitive position of

United States air carriers to at least assure equality with

foreign air carriers, including the attainment of oppor-

tunities for United States air carriers to maintain and in-

crease their profitability, in foreign air transportation.

Factors for all-cargo air service

(b) In addition to the declaration of policy set forth in

subsection (a) of this section, the Board, in the exercise and

performance of its powers and duties under this chapter with

respect to all-cargo air service shall consider the following,

among other things, as being in the public interest:

(1) The encouragement and development of an ex-

pedited all-cargo air service system, provided by private

enterprise, responsive to (A) the present and future needs

of shippers, (B) the commerce of the United States, and (C)

the national defense.

(2) The encouragement and development of an in-

tegrated transportation system relying upon competitive

market forces to determine the extent, variety, quality, and

price of such services.

(3) The provision of services without unjust discrimina-

tions, undue preferences or advantages, unfair or deceptive

practices, or predatory pricing.

43a

§ 1403. Recordation of aircraft ownership

Establishment of recording system

(a) The Secretary of Transportation shall establish and

maintain a system for the recording of each and all of the

following:

(1) Any conveyance which affects the title to, or any in-

terest in, any civil aircraft of the United States;

(2) Any lease, and any mortgage, equipment trust, con-

tract of conditional sale, or other instrument executed for

security purposes, which lease or other instrument affects

the title to, or any interest in, any specifically identified air-

craft engine or engines of seven hundred and fifty or more

rated takeoff horsepower for each such engine or the

equivalent of such horsepower, or any specifically iden-

tified aircraft propeller capable of absorbing seven hundred

and fifty or more rated takeoff shaft horsepower, and also

any assignment or amendment thereof or supplement

thereto;

(3) Any lease, and any mortgage, equipment trust, con-

tract of conditional sale, or other instrument executed for

security purposes, which lease or other instrument affects

the title to, or any interest in, any aircraft engines, pro-

pellers, or appliances maintained by or on behalf of an air

carrier certificated under section 1424(b} of this title for in-

stallation or use in aircraft, aircraft engines, or propellers,

Or any spare parts maintained by or on behalf of such air

carrier, which instrument need only describe generally by

types the engines, propellers, appliances, and spare parts

covered thereby and designate the location or locations

thereof; and also any assignment or amendment thereof or

supplement thereto.

Recording of releases, cancellations, discharges, or satisfactions

(b) The Secretary of Transportation shall also record

under the system provided for in subsection (a) of this section

any release, cancellation, discharge, or satisfaction relating to

any conveyance or other instrument recorded under said

system.

44a

Validity of conveyances or other instruments; filing

(c) No conveyance or instrument the recording of which

is provided for by subsection (a) of this section shall be valid

in respect of such aircraft, aircraft engine or engines, pro-

pellers, appliances, or spare parts against any person other

than the person by whom the conveyance or other instrument

is made or given, his heir or devisee, or any person having ac-

tual notice thereof, until such conveyance or other instrument

is filed for recordation in the office of the Secretary of Trans-

portation: Provided, That previous recording of any con-

veyance or instrument with the Administrator of the Civil

Aeronautics Administration under the provisions of the Civil

Aeronautics Act of 1938 shall have the same force and effect

as though recorded as provided herein; and conveyances, the

recording of which is provided for by subsection (a) (1) of this

section made on or before August 21, 1938, and instruments,

the recording of which is provided for by subsections (a) (2)

and (a) (3) of this section made on or before June 19, 1948,

shall not be subject to the provisions of this subsection.

Effect of recording

(d) Each conveyance or other instrument recorded by

means of or under the system provided for in subsection (a)

or (b) of this section shall from the time of its filing for recor-

dation be valid as to all persons without further or other

recordation, except that an instrument recorded pursuant to

subsection (a) (3) of this section shall be effectively only with

respect to those of such items which may from time to time be

situated at the designated location or locations and only while

so situated: Provided, That an instrument recorded under

subsection (a) (2) of this section shall not be affected as to the

engine or engines, or propeller or propellers, specifically iden-

tified therein, by any instrument theretofore or thereafter

recorded pursuant to subsection (a) (3) of this section.

Form of conveyances or other instruments

(e) Except as the Secretary of Transportation may by

regulation prescribe, no conveyance or other instrument shall

be recorded unless it shall have been acknowledged before a

4Sa

notary public or other officer authorized by the law of the

United States, or of a State, territory, possession thereof, or

the District of Columbia, to take acknowledgment of deeds.

Index of conveyances and other instruments

(f) The Secretary of Transportation shall keep a record of

the time and date of the filing of conveyances and other in-

struments with him and of the time and date of recordation

thereof. He shall record conveyances and other instruments

filed with him in the order of their reception, in files to be

kept for that purpose, and indexed according to—

(1) the identifying description of the aircraft, aircraft

engine, or propeller, or in the case of an instrument refer-

red to in subsection (a) (3) of this section, the location or

locations specified therein, and

(2) the names of the parties to the conveyance or other

instrument.

Regulations

(g) The Secretary of Transportation is authorized to pro-

vide by regulation for the endorsement upon certificates of

registration, or aircraft certificates, of information with

respect to the ownership of the aircraft for which each cer-

tificate is issued, the recording of discharges and satistactions

or recorded instruments, and other transactions affecting title

to or interest in aircraft, aircraft engines, prope'lers, ap-

pliances, or parts, and for such other records, proceedings,

and details as may be necessary to facilitate the determination

of the rights of parties dealing with civil aircraft of the United

States, aircraft engines, propellers, appliances, or parts.

Previously unrecorded ownership of aircraft

(h) The person applying for the issuance or renewal of an

airworthiness certificate for an aircraft with respect to which

there has been no recordation of ownership as provided in

this section shall present with his application such informa-

tion with respect to the ownership of the aircraft as the

Secretary of Transportation shall deem necessary to show the

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persons who are holders of property interests in such aircraft

and the nature and extent of such interests.

§ 1406. Law governing validity of certain instruments

The validity of any instrument the recording of which is pro-

vided for by section 1403 of this title shall be governed by the

laws of the State, District of Columbia, or territory or posses-

sion of the United States in which such instrument is delivered,

irrespective of the location or the place of delivery of the pro-

perty which is the subject of such instrument. Where the place

of intended delivery of such instrument is specified therein, it

shall constitute presumptive evidence that such instrument was

delivered at the place so specified.

47a

APPENDIX E

TEXAS BUSINESS AND COMMERCE CODE

§ 1.201 General Definitions

(9) ‘‘Buyer in ordinary course of business’’ means a per-

son who in good faith and without knowledge that the

sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or

security interest of a third party in the goods buys in

ordinary course from a person in the business of sell-

ing goods of that kind but does not include a pawn-

broker. All persons who sell minerals or the like (in-

cluding oil and gas) at wellhead or minehead shall be

deemed to be persons in the business of selling goods

of that kind. ‘*Buying’’ may be for cash or by ex-

change of other property or on secured or unsecured

credit and includes receiving goods or documents of

title under a pre-existing contract for sale but does not

include a transfer in bulk or as security for or in total

or partial satisfaction of a money debt.

§ 9.307 Protection of Buyers of Goods

(a) A buyer in ordinary course of business (Subdivision

(9) of Section 1.201) other than a person buying farm pro-

ducts from a person engaged in farming operations takes free

of a security interest created by his seller even though the

security interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows

of its existence.

(b) In the case of consumer goods, a buyer takes free of a

security interest even though perfected if he buys without

knowledge of the security interest, for value and for his own

personal, family of household purposes unless prior to the

purchase the secured party has filed a financing statement

covering such goods.

(c) A buyer other than a buyer in ordinary course of busi-

ness (Subsection (a) of this section) takes free of a security in-

terest to the extent that it secures future advances made after

the secured party acquires knowledge of the purchase, or

48a

more than 45 days after the purchase, whichever first occurs,

unless made pursuant to a commitment entered into without

knowledge of the purchase and before the expiration of the 45

day period.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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