Appendix — Provenzano v. United States

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Appendix A

Opinion of United States Court of Appeals

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 81-2411 and 81-2412

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v

NUNZIO PROVENZANO,

Appellant in 81-2411

and

IRVING COTLER,

Appellant in 81-2412

Appeal From The United States District Court

For The District of New Jersey

(D.C. Crim. Nos. 80-00315-01 and 80-00315-04)

Argued June 9, 1982

Before: ADAMS and WEIS, Circuit Judges and

CONABOY,* District Judge

(Opinion filed September 1, 1982)

Gerald L. Shargel, Esq. (Argued)

150 East 58th Street

New York, New York 10022

Jay Goldberg, Esquire

230 Park Avenue

New York, New York 10169

Attorneys for Appellant

Nunzio Provenzano

* The Honorable Richard P. Conaboy, United States District

Judge for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting in designation.

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Opinion of United States Court of Appeals

Irving Anolik, Esq. (Argued)

225 Broadway

New York, New York 10007

Donald R. Conway, Esquire

75 Essex Street

Hackensack, New Jersey 07106

Attorneys for Appellant

Irving Cotler

W. Hunt Dumont, Esq. (Argued)

United States Attorney

Thomas L. Weisenbeck, Esq.

Maryanne Trump Desmond, Esq.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys

Federal Building

970 Broad Street — Room 502

Newark, New Jersey 07102

Attorneys for Appellee

United States of America

OPINION OF THE COURT

WEIS, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal from their RICO convictions, defen-

dants raise a number of issues, including denials of a

severance, denial of psychiatric examinations of govern-

ment witnesses, and defective affidavits supporting

warrants for wiretaps. Another complaint is that not all

of the twelve grand jurors who voted for indictme:.t

attended every session at which evidence was received.

Although we do not find that circumstance sufficient to

vitiate the indictment, we suggest that in the future,

grand jury absentees be required to read transcripts of

missed sessions. There being no reversible error in any

of defendants’ contentions, however, we permit the con-

victions to stand.

Appellants and two others were indicted for viola-

tions of 18 U.S.C. §1962(c), as well as conspiracy. The

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Opinion of United States Court of Appeals

charges arose out of defendants’ activities in obtaining

illegal payments from four trucking companies in order

to secure labor peace. After a lengthy jury trial, two of

the — were convicted. Two others were ac-

quitted.

Appellant Nunzio Provenzano served in various

capacities in Teamsters Union Local 560 in northern

New Jersey, progressing from business agent to

secretary-treasurer, and then to president in 1975. The

other appellant, Irving Cotler, was the owner of several

trucking companies which had no contracts with Local

560. During the period covered by the indictment, the

labor contract between Local 560 and signatory compa-

nies contained a “city man rule.” This provision re-

quired any trucking company hauling iron, steel, and

special commodities within the jurisdiction of Local 560

to secure express authorization for its operations from

the union. Absent such permission, a company was

required to utilize the services of a Locai 560 “city man”

during pickup and delivery.

Ray Dee acted as the North Jersey agent for All

States Trucking Company. In 1972, after Provenzano

became the union’s business agent, the permanent “city

man” assigned to All States was discharged. Sometime

after this, Dee began making payments to defendant

Cotler in exchange for All States’ freedom to operate

without the use of a city man. In 1975, All States ex-

panded its operation, and began using an additional

agent named Joe Mabus. He made payments to

Provenzano through another intermediary until he was

imprisoned in early 1975. After that occurred, Mabus

made no further payments, and a few months later, Lo-

cal 560 struck All States. The strike ended when All

States’ president discharged Mabus and agreed to use

city men. The Ray Dee agency’s transactions, however,

were not affected by the strike.

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About a year later, All States’ vice-president met

with Provenzano in a preliminary step to reopen an iron

and steel agency in Local 560’s area. The company’s

overtures were rejected until a few weeks later when

Ray Dee, Jr. arranged a meeting between the vice-

president and Cotler. For $100 per day, Cotler, said All

States would not need a city man for any of its ship-

ments. He then took the vice-president to Local 560’s of-

fice, where they conferred with Provenzano, who stated

that Cotler was a “good friend” and advised the vice-

president to “listen to what he is telling you.” For the

next three years, All States arranged to have Ray Dee,

Jr. pay Cotler $100 per day in addition to Dee’s own pay-

ments to protect his agency.

In 1975, another trucking company, T.I.M.E.-D.C.,

began special commodity operations in North Jersey

and hired Joe Szapor as its agent. Through Teamster

contacts, Szapor had a meeting with Provenzano and

three other men. The agent was assured he would be con-

tacked, and sometime later, Szapor was introduced to

Cotler. Cotler said he would be collecting for Local 560,

and told Szapor not to travel to the union. During the

next year, Cotler was given $500 per month and T. LM. E.

was able to avoid using city men.

When T.I.M.E.’s business began to prosper, Cotler

said the monthly payment should be increased. T.I.M.E.

acquiesced and continued to make pay offs until April

1979. During this same period, T.I.M.E. had a number

of grievances with Local 560. Szapor protested to

Provenzano about these problems since T.I.M.E. was

making its regular payments. Provenzano told Szapor to

resolve the grievances at the terminal level. When

Szapor then spoke to a Local 560 business agent, the

grievances were settled.

Between 1977 and 1979, similar arrangements

were made with two other trucking companies, Helms

Express and Mason and Dixon, which paid Cotler

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Opinion of United States Court of Appeals

through the Szapor and Ray Dee agencies, respectively.

Mason and Dixon paid a fixed weekly fee, but Helms

was required to remit a percentage of its revenues.

The jury convicted Cotler and Provenzano on both

counts of the indictment. On appeal, the defendants al-

lege numerous trial errors. Cotler contends he was

prejudiced by denial of his motions for severance made

both before and during the trial. He also asserts that the

warrants used to secure court-authorized wiretaps were

not supported by adequate grounds. He further argues

that the district court erred in refusing to order psychiat-

ric examinations of Ralph Picardo and Joseph Szapor,

two witnesses who testified for the government. Finally,

he contends his privacy rights were violated by Szapor’s

use of recording devices during their conversations.

Provenzano also argues that there should have been

a severance. In addition, he contends that there was in-

sufficient evidence to show that the “enterprise” was

conducted “through a pattern of racketeering activity”

as required by RICO. As his last point, he asserts that

the trial judge erred in declining to disclose grand jury

minutes and transcripts. The defense contends that

there were two justifications for disclosure. First, some

of the witnesses who testified before the first grand jury

were not called before the succeeding indicting grand

jury; and second, not all of the twelve jurors who voted

for indictment were present at every session of the in-

dicting grand jury. |

I. THE SEVERANCE ISSUE

A.

Cotler argues that he was the victim of a concerted

attack at trial by the other three defendants, which,

when combined with the government’s effort, meant

that he was being prosecuted by four parties instead of

one. He points to the other co-defendants’ derogatory re-

marks about him and their efforts to disassociate

Appendix A

Opinion of United States Court of Appeals

themselves from him at the trial. In particular, Cotler

says that the co-defendants’ tactics in taking the wit-

ness stand, and their pointed comments about being

unable to cross-examine him, emphasized his decision

not to testify.

We are not persuaded, however, that there was a

real antagonism in the defense strategies of this case.

Rather, they were complementary, for if the jury had

been persuaded that Cotler alone received the payoffs

and was unconnected with any of the other defendants,

there would have been a failure of proof on the conspir-

acy and RICO counts. Not only his co-defendants, but

Cotler as well, would have walked away from the indict-

ment had sole culpability been fastened on him.

In short, the “ganging up” theory is unconvincing

when it is realized that Cotler stood to benefit if the jury

accepted the co-defendants’ theory that he was off on a

frolic of his own. Indeed, in his summation, Cotler’s

counsel argued that none of the money went to any of

the co-defendants. In light of the overwhelming evi-

dence against Cotler, putting as much distance between

him and the defendant union officials was probably the

best strategy to avoid conviction.

Cotler relies on United States v. Crawford, 581 F.2d

489, 491 (5th Cir. 1978), to support his contention that

antagonistic defenses can prejudice co-defendants to

such a degree that they are denied a fair trial. But, as the

court in Crawford noted, such defenses must conflict “to

the point of being irreconcilable and mutually exclu-

sive.” Id. (citations omitted). That is just not the situa-

tion here. In United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 530

(3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 846 (1971), we rejected

a similar argument saying, “the mere presence of hostil-

ity among defendants” is insufficient to require separate

trials. That is especially true in this case, where the hos-

tility exhibited at the trial, if accepted by the jury, would

be advantageous to the co-defendants.

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B.

Provenzano takes a different tack on the severance

issue. He contends that if there had been separate pro-

ceedings, Cotler would have testified. The fact that the

trials were joined, and that Cotler exercised his right not

to testify, Provenzano argues, amounted to an infring-

ment on his rights of confrontation and compulsory

process. At an earlier stage in the joint trial, Cotler’s

attorney did represent to the court that if there were sep-

arate trials, Cotler would take the stand at the request of

any defendant. Counsel apparently later had second

thoughts on this matter and declined to proceed nonjury

as to Cotler’s own case. Provenzano reasons that if

Cotler had been tried first, there would have been no

fifth amendment problem thereafter. But a defendant

cannot compel a co-defendant to testify even if their

trials are severed, United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d at

149, 156 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 434 US. 862 (1977).

We are not persuaded by Provenzano’ 8 contention

—— 2 —+

„reren „ Ape

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Opinion of United States Court of Appeals

In United States v. Boscia, 573 F.2d 827, 832 (3d

Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 911 (1978), we outlined four

factors that a district court should consider in deciding

whether a severance should be granted:

1. The likelihood of co-defendant testifying;

2. The degree to which such testimony would be

exculpatory;

3. The degree to which the testifying co-defendant

could be impeached;

4. Judicial economy.

It is apparent that on the record of this case items one

and four have not been satisfied.

At one point, it a that Cotler would testify if

— gee n

on of a suggestion that Cotler proceed non indi

— uncertainty that he actually would — 14 wit-

ness stand if a severance had been granted. Although

Cotler’s counsel did indicate that his client’s testimony

would be exculpatory in nature for Provenzano, Cotler

would also be subject to impeachment, particularly if he

had been tried first and convicted. Finally, judicial econ-

omy concerns were present, and in a case of this nature,

it is preferable to have all of the parties tried together so

that the full extent of the conspiracy may be developed.

See United States v. Rosa, 560 at 156; United States v.

Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 1981); United

States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,

423 U.S. 858 (1975); United States v. Somers, 496 F. 2d

723, 731 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 832 (1974).

We similarly find no merit to Cotler’s contention

that there was a misjoinder under Fed. R. Crim. P. 8.

record does not support — 24

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it is foreclosed by United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d at

729, where we rejected the position that is asserted here.

Thus, neither defendant has demonstrated any abuse of

discretion by the trial court. We therefore find no error in

the district court’s refusal to sever the cases.

II. THE RICO COUNT

Provenzano argues that the government failed to

prove that a nexus existed between the enterprise — Lo-

cal 560 — and the pattern of racketeering activity. Ac-

cording to his theory, the statute is not satisfied unless it

is shown that the enterprise was advanced or benefitted

by the pattern of racketeering activity. He contends that

even though the record would establish that he person-

ally profited from payoffs, ti aterests of the union

were not advanced. Thus, his actions in fact worked to

the detriment of the union and were contrary to the

obligations of his office.

The statute, 18 U.S.C. §1962(c) provides in perti-

nent part:

“It shall be unlawful for any person employed by

any enterprise the activities of which af.

fect interstate commerce, to conduct or partici-

pate, . in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs

through a pattern of racketeering activity... .”

Defendant relies upon United States v. Webster,

639 F.2d 174, cert. denied. US. (1981).

There, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-

cuit at first held that the statute does not extend to a

“situation where the racketeering activities are ad-

vanced through the assistance of the enterprise.” Id. at

184. The court focused on the word “through” in the

Note, 12 Seton Hali L.Rev. 116 (1981). Nor did the court

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Opinion of United States Court of Appeals

find any evidence of congressional! intent to reach cases

where “the racketeering activity made use of the re-

sources of the enterprise but did not provide the enter-

prise with any benefit. Id. at 184.

The panel later modified its original opinion, how-

ever, finding instead that the proper question should

have been whether the affairs of the enterprise “were

conducted through the pattern of racketeering activity,

not whether they were benefitted or advanced or wheth-

er profit to the [enterprise] resulted.” 669 F.2d 185, 186-

87 (4th Cir.), cert. denied. U.S» (1982).

We agree with the Fourth Circuit’s latter interpreta-

tion of the relevant statutory language. The record here

demonstrates that, by accepting bribes in exchange for

allowing violations of the collective bargaining agree-

ments to be overlooked, Provenzano was conducting his

union office through racketeering activity. The fact that

the union was harmed rather than benefitted does not

remove the conduct from RICO’s ambit.

A similar situation is presented when public offi-

cials accept bribes in the course of their duties. Thus, in

United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977),

cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978), the convictions of

state officials who participated in a cigarette smuggling

conspiracy to the detriment of the “enterprise,” the state

itself, were affirmed. Similarly, convictions pheld

in United States v. Salvitti, 451 F.Supp. 195(E.D. Pa.),

citer of Redevelopment, Antherity of Philadelphia ~

rector o t ty i *

of bribes); United States v. Vignola, 464

F.Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 605 F.2d 1199 (ad

Cir. 1979) (Traffic Court judge — acceptance of bribes).

Although these cases did not state that there can be cul-

pabilitywithout benefit to the enterprise, that premise is

implicit in the convictions which were affirmed.

In United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.

1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981), the defendant,

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a union officer, received illegal iabor payoffs. The Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that one conducts

the activities of an enterprise through a pattern of racke-

teering when:

“(1) One is enabled to commit the predicate

offenses solely by virtue of his position in the

enterprise or involvement in or control over the

affairs of the enterprise; or

(2) the predicate offenses are related to the activi-

ties of that enterprise.”

Id. at 54. It is only when the predicate acts are

unrelated to the enterprise or the actor’s association

with it that the nexus element is missing, and con-

sequently there is no RICO violation. That is clearly

and Vignoli. See also B. Tarlow, Rico: The New Dar-

ling of the Prosecutor’s Nursery, 49 FORD. L.REV.

165, 228-34 ((1980). Accordingly, the trial judge

did not err in submitting the RICO counts to the

III. GRAND JURY ISSUES

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Opinion of United States Court of Appeals

for indictment had attended every session of the grand

jury.

A

The district court accepted the response of the

government that the first grand jury heard testimony

from 19 individuals. The second grand jury heard

testimony from 51 people, two of whom had also

appeared before the first grand jury. The testimony of a

third prior witness was read in full to the indicting jury.

No summaries were used before the second grand jury,

but it had the o unity to review all of the testimony

received by the Because not all of the witnesses

to the use of summaries. The Glstrict court sscannlond

that abuse could occur through the use of successive

grand juries, but did not find any to exist in this case.

We have indicated our concern with the practice of

having a number of grand juries hear testimony which

the indicting grand jury ultimately uses as a basis for

indictment. See United States v. Helstoski, 635 F.2d 200,

202 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1980). We do not think that in this

4 —

addition, extensive proceedings before the indicting

C

to

— called before the the indicting jury, it ‘on not

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Appendix 4

Opinion of United States Court of Appeals

appear that the government was being “selective” when

it chose to limit the number of witnesses from the first to

appear before the second. We conclude, therefore, that

the trial judge properly determined that defendants had

not demonstrated particularized need for breaching

grand jury secrecy.

B.

A more difficult question is presented by the other

complaint against the grand jury — that not all who

voted for the indictment had attended all of the 23

sessions. The district judge examined the voting tallies

and attendance records in camera, and found that out of

the twelve votes necessary under Fed R. Crim. P 6(f),

three of the voting jurors attended every session, four

missed one session each, three were absent from two

sessions each, and two jurors were not present three

sessions each.

Although there was not a perfect attendance record

for the twelve voting jurors, the district judge, relying on

United States v. Leverage Funding Systems, Inc. 637

F. 2d 645 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981),

held that neither the Fifth Amendment nor the Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure imposed such a

requirement. As long as a quorum was present at every

session and at least twelve jurors voted to indict, both

the Constitution and the rules were satisfied. The court

did concede that there may be a situation where a grand

juror missed so much of the evidence that the Fifth

Amendment would not permit his vote to be counted, but

found no such demonstration had been made here. As

an additional reason for denying the defendant's

motion, the court pointed out the undesirability of

holding “preliminary” trials to determine the

competency and adequacy of the evidence before the

grand jury

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The necessity for insuring that the grand jury

be informed of all the evidence cannot be ignored.

As the Supreme Court said in Wood v. Georgia, 370

U.S. 375, 390 (1962), the grand jury] has been re-

garded as a primary security to the innocent against

hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution.” It is

that body which determines whether “a charge is

founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimi-

dating power or by malice and personal ill will.” We

have rejected the proposition that the grand jury is

simply a prosecutor’s tool and have noted its consti-

tutional role as a shield against unjustified charges.

See United States v. Goldstein, 502 F.2d 526 (3d Cir.

1974) (in banc); United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807

(3d Cir. 1979); In re: Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield),

486 F. 2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973). Yet it is clear that the criminal

process must not be bogged down by extensive pretrial

review of grand jury activity. United States v. Calandra,

414 U.S. 338 (1974); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S.

359 (1956).

The district court’s opinion in United States v.

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Opinion of United States Court of Appeals

believed that this duty could be performed even if a

grand juror was absent during the presentation of some

exculpatory evidence.

The Second Circuit in United States ex rel. McCann

v. Thompson, 144 F.2d 604 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 323

U.S. 790 (1944), expounded the approach later adopted

by the Ninth Circuit, observing that since it is quite re-

mote that exculpatory evidence would be presented to a

grand jury, it is unlikely that a defendant would be

harmed by the absence of a grand juror. The absentee

would merely not have heard all of the inculpatory evi-

dence. The court in United States v. Colasurdo, 453

F.2d 585, 596 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917

(1972), reaffirmed this position, adding that to permit a

review of attendance from voting records “would bog

down the courts in a morass, a veritable jungle of specu-

lation and conjecture.”

United States v. Lang, 644 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th

Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. (1981), said that the

requirements of Rule 6 belied any intention of imposing

a perfect attendance requirement, for the rule only man-

dates that a quorum be present at every session. The

court also noted that Congress had acted to extend

grand jury terms to allow adequate investigations of

complex criminal activity. To invalidate indictments be-

cause of jury attendance would frustrate that congres-

sional intent. Jd. at 1238.

The reasons advanced by the appellate courts which

have considered the problem are weighty ones but, nev-

ertheless, leave us somewhat uneasy. It is indeed specu-

lative to consider what bit of evidence might have per-

suaded a grand juror to vote for or against an indict-

ment. But the grand juror’s judgment is what the Con-

stitution requires, and the defendant is entitled to an

informed determination of probable cause.

We recognize the practical problems created by the

very nature of the grand jury’s investigative role. Not all

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Opinion of United States Court of Appeals

the evidence can be presented at one time — one wit-

ness’ testimony may lead in turn to an investigation

that extends over a period of time. Some witnesses may

be unavailable at a given point and other circumstances

may hinder prompt expedition. The longer the period of

service, the more absences may be expected.

The provisions of Rule 6(e (I), which require the

recordation of grand jury proceedings, aid us in reach-

ing agreement with the solution proposed by the Lang

court. As its opinion observed, “[p}rosecutors can insure

that the perception of fairness, as well as its substance,

are maintained by giving replacement and absent grand

jurors the opportunity to review transcripts . . of missed

sessions. That should go a long way to ameliorate the

concerns raised here.” 644 F.2d at 1239.' If a review of

the transcripts should raise questions in a juror’s mind

which could be resolved by recalling a witness, that al-

ternative would be available. Following this procedure

would insure that each grand juror is fully informed of

the evidence which has been presented.

It would have been better to utilize such a practice

in this case, but we cannot say that failure to do so viti-

ates the indictments. We rely on the judgment of the

district judge who had the opportunity to review the

grand jury records in camera. The grand jury here had

23 separate sessions, and although the number of ab-

sences may border the limits of acceptability, it does not

reach the point where we must say that the defendant’s

rights have been violated. As we note above, furnishing

transcripts to absent jurors is a practical way to avoid

attacks on grand jury voting in the future.

In view of all the circumstances here, we conclude

that the district court did not err in its refusal to unseal

the grand jury records.

1. Although the court approved the summaries as an alterna-

tive, we do not recommend their use unless for some valid reason

transcripts are not available.

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IV. PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES

Before trial, Provenzano’s attorney submitted a mo-

tion requesting psychiatric examinations of government

witnesses Ralph Picardo and Joseph Szapor. Support-

ing the motion was an affidavit which stated that

Picardo had been branded a “liar,” a little crazy”, “off-

the-wall”, and “a pathological liar,” by a number of

government witnesses in an earlier unrelated trial. In

addition, after his conviction in February of 1975 for

murder, Picardo was confined for psychiatric examina-

tion at the New Jersey State Prison at Trenton. As to

Szapor, the defense recited a number of bizarre actions

and an allegation that drugs prescribed for treatment

—— pain may have affected his competency and credi-

ility.

The trial judge refused to order the examinations,

finding that the attacks posed a credibility issue for jury

resolution. Cotler now asserts that the denial of his mo-

tion was an abuse of discretion. The defendant concedes

that the question of credibility is ultimately one for the

jury, but argues that the opinion of a psychiatrist would

be helpful in the deliverations.

We note that both witnesses were extensively cross-

examined. As a result, the jury heard about Picardo’s

murder conviction and his cocaine and marijuana use,

that he used relatives without their knowledge to further

his criminal schemes, and that he believed self-preserva-

tion was “the name of the game.” The record also

demonstrates his incentive to furnish information to the

federal authorities in order to avoid state prosecution.

The cross-examination of Szapor was so effective

that the trial judge commented that the witness’s credi-

bility was “certainly placed in doubt not only by the evi-

dence offered by the defendants, but certainly as a result

of his cross-examination. . . .” Thus, the evidence be-

fore the jury provided ample information for its task of

evaluating the truthfulness of the two witnesses.

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We find no abuse of discretion in the judge’s refusal

to order the psychiatric examinations. In United States

v. Pacelli, 521 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,

424 U.S. 911 (1976), the court said that the question is

within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be

disturbed unless it is plainly in error. We adopt that

standard also.

Even if the examination had been ordered, it is

doubtful at best that psychiatric testimony would have

been appropriate here. The use of such evidence at trial

to attack or support a witness’s credibility has not been

generally favored. In United States v. Barnard, 490 F. 2d

907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959

(1974), the court emphasized the jury’s responsibility to

assess credibility. Doubting that psychiatrists have

more expertise in this field than juries, the court pointed

out that such expert testimony might cause jurors to

surrender their common sense in weighing the evidence

and could produce a trial within a trial. The court con-

cluded that this type of testimony should only be re-

ceived in unusual cases. Jd. at 913. The record in this

case did not establish anything so out of the ordinary as

to require — or indeed justify — the use of psychiatric

te stimony. The eccentric behavior that might have been

deemed significant by a psychiatrist was fully explored

bei ore the jury. See also, United States v. Jackson, 576

F. 2d 46, 48-49 (5th Cir. 1978); United States u. Russo, 442

F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1023 (1972).

V. OTHER MATTERS

Cotler also contends that the affidavits supporting

the issurance of warrants for wiretapping and searches

were inadequate. In particular, one affidavit is alleged

to contain 26 pages of irrelevant and prejudicial mate-

rial. When that material is deleted, however, adequate

probable cause is demonstrated. See United States v.

Sterling, 369 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1966). We are not per-

suaded that the alleged prejudicial aspects unduly in-

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Opinion of United States Court of Appeals

fluenced the judge who issued the warrants. The de-

fendant’s contention that the evidence should have been

suppressed was properly rejected by the trial court.

Finally, defendant Cotler asserts that his right to

privacy was violated by the consensual recordings made

by witness Szapor. We find no merit to this contention.

See, e.g., United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 51-52

(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975).

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will

be affirmed.

A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States

Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

20a

Appendix B

Order of United States Court of Appeals

on Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for

Rehearing In Banc

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 81-2411

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1

NUNZIO PROVENZANO,

Appellant.

Sur Petition For Rehearing

Present: SEITZ, Chief Judge, ALDISERT, ADAMS,

GIBBONS, HUNTER, WEIS, GARTH,

HIGGINBOTHAM, SLOVITER and BECKER,

Circuit Judges, and CONABOY, District Judge.*

The petition for rehearing filed by

Nunzio Provenzano, Appellant

in the above entitled case having been submitted to the

judges who participated in the decision of this court

and to all the other available circuit judges of the

circuit in regular active service, and no judge who con-

curred in the decision having asked for rehearing, and a

majority of the circuit judges of the circuit in regular

*The Honorable Richard P. Conaboy, United States District

Judge for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designa-

tion.

the

ls

tion for

hied

is de

of

Ages

rehearing

is

oi:

ath

as i

8 =

ss 225

*

3

acti

court in

By the Court,

Judge

Dated:

22a

Appendix C

Letter of United States District Court

dated March 3, 1981

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Chambers of

H. Lee Sarokin, Judge

March 3, 1981

To All Counsel:

Re: U.S.A. v. Provenzano, et al.

Criminal No. 80-315

Gentlemen:

The following supplements and clarifies my ruling

from the bench on February 23, 1981 on defendants’

motion for disclosure of the transcripts of the grand jury

proceedings as well as the grand jury attendance rec-

ords and vote tallies. These motions are denied.

The motion for disclosure of the transcripts is based

upon the presentation of evidence by the government

23a

Appendix C

Letter of United States District Court

dated March 3, 1981

The defendants contend that the prosecutorial

decision to withhold from the second grand jury the

testimony of the other 16 witnesses violated the de-

fendants’ Fifth Amendment rights to be indicted by an

unbiased grand jury, or, alternatively, that the court

should exercise its supervisory powers to correct this

abuse of the grand jury process.

Insofar as the motion seeks disclosure of the tran-

scripts, it is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e) (3) (C) (ii).

The rule gives to the court discretion to release the

transcripts if and when a defendant demonstrates a

particularized need for the information which outweighs

the policies underlying the general rule of secrecy. See

United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677

(1058).

The court in this case has no reason to disbelieve the

representation of Mr. Weisenbeck that no summaries of

testimony were presented to the indicting grand jury.

Therefore, the defendants have not demonstrated a real

though this practice can be abused, see United States v.

Carcaise, 442 F.Supp. 1209 (M.D. Fla. 1978), the circum-

stances involved herein do not suggest that such abuse

24a

Appendix C

Letter of United States District Court

dated March 3, 1981

grand jurors voting for the indictment who were present

at every session of the grand jury. In fact, in order to

have the requisite number of qualified jurors voting for

the indictment,* it is necessary to include jurors who

missed as many as three out of the 23 sessions.** The

attendance records would give to the defendants no

further useful information.

The question then, is whether the indictment is

defective because several of the grand jurors missed

several sessions. Resolution of this issue is difficult, as

evidenced by the opinions of the district court and court

of appeals in United States v. Leverage Funding Sys-

tems, 478 F.Supp. 799 (C.D. Cal. 1079), rev'd, No. 79-1677

(9th Cir., filed Oct. 3, 1980).

A per se rule requiring dismissal of an indictment

whenever less than 12 grand jurors are present at every

session is neither constitutionally required nor practic-

able. United States ex rel McCann v. Thompson, 144

F.2d 604 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 323 US. 790 (1944).

jury”, Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956),

and is therefore rejected as a means to resolve the

*Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 (f) provides that laln indictment may found

only upon the concurrence of 12 or more

**To reach the required number of grand jurors, it is necessary

session, jurors who

f

i

1

f

ö

:

r

25a

Appendix C

Letter of United States District Court

dated March 3, 1981

The court accepts the view of the Ninth Circuit that

neither the Fifth Amendment nor the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure requires that at least 12 voting

grand jurors hear all the evidence in a case. It is

sufficient that the grand jury returning the indictment

consisted of between 16 and 23 grand jurors, that a

quorum was present at every session, and that at least

12 jurors voted to indict. The court can conceive of situa-

tions in which a grand juror missed so much of the

evidence that if he or she was permitted to vote for an

indictment, the Fifth Amendment rights of an accused

would be violated. No such demonstration has been

made in this case. The defendants’ motion for release

of the attendance records or for dismissal of the indict-

ment is therefore denied.

Very truly yours,

H. LEE SAROKIN

US.DJ.

Appendix D

Affidavit of Thomas L. Weisenbeck in

to Motions For Disclosure

of Grand Jury Transcripts

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v

NUNZIO PROVENZANO

SALVATORE PROVENZANO

MICHAEL SCIARRA and

IRVING COTLER,

Defendants

Criminal No. 80-315

Affide vit

STATE OF NEW JERSEY)

COUNTY OF ESSEX)

THOMAS L. WEISENBECK, upon his oath, de-

poses and says:

1. I am a Special Attorney in the United States

Department of Justice, assigned to the Newark Strike

Force and am familiar with the facts hereinafter stated.

2. I was assigned to investigate the within matter

during February, 1979. The April 13, 1978 Grand Jury

began hearing testimony and reviewing documents on

April 26, 1979, after the completion of Title III surveil-

lance and the execution of search warrants. This Grand

Jury heard testimony from 19 individuals and received

documents on ten separate days commencing April 26,

1979 and terminating on November 15, 1979.

3. The October 18, 1979 Grand Jury began hearing

testimony and receiving documents on November 8,

1979, and continued to do so through and including

27a

Appendix D

Affidavit of Thomas L. Weisenbeck in

Response to Motions For Disclosure

of Grand Jury Transcripts

September 4, 1980. During that period of time, this

Grand Jury heard testimony from 51 individuals and

received documents on 23 separate occasions.

4. Of the 19 witnesses who appeared before the April

13, 1978 Grand Jury, only 3 witnesses gave testimony

which was significant enough to re-present to the

October 18, 1979 Grand Jury. In those three instances,

two witnesses appeared before the October 18, 1979

Grand Jury, listened to their earlier testimony, affirmed

that testimony and were then available for -further

questioning by the Grand Jury. In the third instance,

the former testimony of that witness was read in full to

the October 18, 1979 Grand Jury. No summaries of

grand jury testimonies were ever given to the October

18, 1979 Grand Jury. Additionally, the October 18, 1979

Grand Jury was given the opportunity to review all

testimony and documents received by the April 13,

1978 Grand Jury.

5. „ Oat Oe eae ee

tion to extend the term of the April 13, 1978 Jury,

it was anticipated that this investigation had been su

stantially completed. Given that perspective, it would

have been an inefficient use of Grand Jury time to re-

present to a second Grand Jury all of the testimony and

documents previously heard by the former Grand Jury

and then only supplement such material with a rela-

tively smaller amount of information. However, shortly

after the Application of the United States was granted

extending the term of the April 13, 1978 Grand Jury,

new information came to light which vastly expanded

the scope of the existing investigation. At that time,

a decision was made to present all new information to

the October 18, 1979 Grand Jury and where

su certain witnesses to this new Grand Jury that

previously testified and re-present all previously

subpoenaed documents.

28a

Appendix D

Affidavit of Thomas L. Weisenbeck in

Response to Motions For Disclosure

of Grand Jury Transcripts

6. This Affidavit is made in response to the motion

by defense for disclosure of transcripts of Grand Jury

proceedings and Grand Jury attendance records and

vote tallies.

THOMAS L. WEISENBECK

Special Attorney

Notarized:

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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