Appendix — Provenzano v. United States
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Appendix A
Opinion of United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 81-2411 and 81-2412
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v
NUNZIO PROVENZANO,
Appellant in 81-2411
and
IRVING COTLER,
Appellant in 81-2412
Appeal From The United States District Court
For The District of New Jersey
(D.C. Crim. Nos. 80-00315-01 and 80-00315-04)
Argued June 9, 1982
Before: ADAMS and WEIS, Circuit Judges and
CONABOY,* District Judge
(Opinion filed September 1, 1982)
Gerald L. Shargel, Esq. (Argued)
150 East 58th Street
New York, New York 10022
Jay Goldberg, Esquire
230 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10169
Attorneys for Appellant
Nunzio Provenzano
* The Honorable Richard P. Conaboy, United States District
Judge for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting in designation.
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Opinion of United States Court of Appeals
Irving Anolik, Esq. (Argued)
225 Broadway
New York, New York 10007
Donald R. Conway, Esquire
75 Essex Street
Hackensack, New Jersey 07106
Attorneys for Appellant
Irving Cotler
W. Hunt Dumont, Esq. (Argued)
United States Attorney
Thomas L. Weisenbeck, Esq.
Maryanne Trump Desmond, Esq.
Assistant U.S. Attorneys
Federal Building
970 Broad Street — Room 502
Newark, New Jersey 07102
Attorneys for Appellee
United States of America
OPINION OF THE COURT
WEIS, Circuit Judge.
In this appeal from their RICO convictions, defen-
dants raise a number of issues, including denials of a
severance, denial of psychiatric examinations of govern-
ment witnesses, and defective affidavits supporting
warrants for wiretaps. Another complaint is that not all
of the twelve grand jurors who voted for indictme:.t
attended every session at which evidence was received.
Although we do not find that circumstance sufficient to
vitiate the indictment, we suggest that in the future,
grand jury absentees be required to read transcripts of
missed sessions. There being no reversible error in any
of defendants’ contentions, however, we permit the con-
victions to stand.
Appellants and two others were indicted for viola-
tions of 18 U.S.C. §1962(c), as well as conspiracy. The
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Opinion of United States Court of Appeals
charges arose out of defendants’ activities in obtaining
illegal payments from four trucking companies in order
to secure labor peace. After a lengthy jury trial, two of
the — were convicted. Two others were ac-
quitted.
Appellant Nunzio Provenzano served in various
capacities in Teamsters Union Local 560 in northern
New Jersey, progressing from business agent to
secretary-treasurer, and then to president in 1975. The
other appellant, Irving Cotler, was the owner of several
trucking companies which had no contracts with Local
560. During the period covered by the indictment, the
labor contract between Local 560 and signatory compa-
nies contained a “city man rule.” This provision re-
quired any trucking company hauling iron, steel, and
special commodities within the jurisdiction of Local 560
to secure express authorization for its operations from
the union. Absent such permission, a company was
required to utilize the services of a Locai 560 “city man”
during pickup and delivery.
Ray Dee acted as the North Jersey agent for All
States Trucking Company. In 1972, after Provenzano
became the union’s business agent, the permanent “city
man” assigned to All States was discharged. Sometime
after this, Dee began making payments to defendant
Cotler in exchange for All States’ freedom to operate
without the use of a city man. In 1975, All States ex-
panded its operation, and began using an additional
agent named Joe Mabus. He made payments to
Provenzano through another intermediary until he was
imprisoned in early 1975. After that occurred, Mabus
made no further payments, and a few months later, Lo-
cal 560 struck All States. The strike ended when All
States’ president discharged Mabus and agreed to use
city men. The Ray Dee agency’s transactions, however,
were not affected by the strike.
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Opinion of United States Court of Appeals
About a year later, All States’ vice-president met
with Provenzano in a preliminary step to reopen an iron
and steel agency in Local 560’s area. The company’s
overtures were rejected until a few weeks later when
Ray Dee, Jr. arranged a meeting between the vice-
president and Cotler. For $100 per day, Cotler, said All
States would not need a city man for any of its ship-
ments. He then took the vice-president to Local 560’s of-
fice, where they conferred with Provenzano, who stated
that Cotler was a “good friend” and advised the vice-
president to “listen to what he is telling you.” For the
next three years, All States arranged to have Ray Dee,
Jr. pay Cotler $100 per day in addition to Dee’s own pay-
ments to protect his agency.
In 1975, another trucking company, T.I.M.E.-D.C.,
began special commodity operations in North Jersey
and hired Joe Szapor as its agent. Through Teamster
contacts, Szapor had a meeting with Provenzano and
three other men. The agent was assured he would be con-
tacked, and sometime later, Szapor was introduced to
Cotler. Cotler said he would be collecting for Local 560,
and told Szapor not to travel to the union. During the
next year, Cotler was given $500 per month and T. LM. E.
was able to avoid using city men.
When T.I.M.E.’s business began to prosper, Cotler
said the monthly payment should be increased. T.I.M.E.
acquiesced and continued to make pay offs until April
1979. During this same period, T.I.M.E. had a number
of grievances with Local 560. Szapor protested to
Provenzano about these problems since T.I.M.E. was
making its regular payments. Provenzano told Szapor to
resolve the grievances at the terminal level. When
Szapor then spoke to a Local 560 business agent, the
grievances were settled.
Between 1977 and 1979, similar arrangements
were made with two other trucking companies, Helms
Express and Mason and Dixon, which paid Cotler
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Opinion of United States Court of Appeals
through the Szapor and Ray Dee agencies, respectively.
Mason and Dixon paid a fixed weekly fee, but Helms
was required to remit a percentage of its revenues.
The jury convicted Cotler and Provenzano on both
counts of the indictment. On appeal, the defendants al-
lege numerous trial errors. Cotler contends he was
prejudiced by denial of his motions for severance made
both before and during the trial. He also asserts that the
warrants used to secure court-authorized wiretaps were
not supported by adequate grounds. He further argues
that the district court erred in refusing to order psychiat-
ric examinations of Ralph Picardo and Joseph Szapor,
two witnesses who testified for the government. Finally,
he contends his privacy rights were violated by Szapor’s
use of recording devices during their conversations.
Provenzano also argues that there should have been
a severance. In addition, he contends that there was in-
sufficient evidence to show that the “enterprise” was
conducted “through a pattern of racketeering activity”
as required by RICO. As his last point, he asserts that
the trial judge erred in declining to disclose grand jury
minutes and transcripts. The defense contends that
there were two justifications for disclosure. First, some
of the witnesses who testified before the first grand jury
were not called before the succeeding indicting grand
jury; and second, not all of the twelve jurors who voted
for indictment were present at every session of the in-
dicting grand jury. |
I. THE SEVERANCE ISSUE
A.
Cotler argues that he was the victim of a concerted
attack at trial by the other three defendants, which,
when combined with the government’s effort, meant
that he was being prosecuted by four parties instead of
one. He points to the other co-defendants’ derogatory re-
marks about him and their efforts to disassociate
Appendix A
Opinion of United States Court of Appeals
themselves from him at the trial. In particular, Cotler
says that the co-defendants’ tactics in taking the wit-
ness stand, and their pointed comments about being
unable to cross-examine him, emphasized his decision
not to testify.
We are not persuaded, however, that there was a
real antagonism in the defense strategies of this case.
Rather, they were complementary, for if the jury had
been persuaded that Cotler alone received the payoffs
and was unconnected with any of the other defendants,
there would have been a failure of proof on the conspir-
acy and RICO counts. Not only his co-defendants, but
Cotler as well, would have walked away from the indict-
ment had sole culpability been fastened on him.
In short, the “ganging up” theory is unconvincing
when it is realized that Cotler stood to benefit if the jury
accepted the co-defendants’ theory that he was off on a
frolic of his own. Indeed, in his summation, Cotler’s
counsel argued that none of the money went to any of
the co-defendants. In light of the overwhelming evi-
dence against Cotler, putting as much distance between
him and the defendant union officials was probably the
best strategy to avoid conviction.
Cotler relies on United States v. Crawford, 581 F.2d
489, 491 (5th Cir. 1978), to support his contention that
antagonistic defenses can prejudice co-defendants to
such a degree that they are denied a fair trial. But, as the
court in Crawford noted, such defenses must conflict “to
the point of being irreconcilable and mutually exclu-
sive.” Id. (citations omitted). That is just not the situa-
tion here. In United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 530
(3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 846 (1971), we rejected
a similar argument saying, “the mere presence of hostil-
ity among defendants” is insufficient to require separate
trials. That is especially true in this case, where the hos-
tility exhibited at the trial, if accepted by the jury, would
be advantageous to the co-defendants.
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Opinion of United States Court of Appeals
B.
Provenzano takes a different tack on the severance
issue. He contends that if there had been separate pro-
ceedings, Cotler would have testified. The fact that the
trials were joined, and that Cotler exercised his right not
to testify, Provenzano argues, amounted to an infring-
ment on his rights of confrontation and compulsory
process. At an earlier stage in the joint trial, Cotler’s
attorney did represent to the court that if there were sep-
arate trials, Cotler would take the stand at the request of
any defendant. Counsel apparently later had second
thoughts on this matter and declined to proceed nonjury
as to Cotler’s own case. Provenzano reasons that if
Cotler had been tried first, there would have been no
fifth amendment problem thereafter. But a defendant
cannot compel a co-defendant to testify even if their
trials are severed, United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d at
149, 156 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 434 US. 862 (1977).
We are not persuaded by Provenzano’ 8 contention
—— 2 —+
„reren „ Ape
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Opinion of United States Court of Appeals
In United States v. Boscia, 573 F.2d 827, 832 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 911 (1978), we outlined four
factors that a district court should consider in deciding
whether a severance should be granted:
1. The likelihood of co-defendant testifying;
2. The degree to which such testimony would be
exculpatory;
3. The degree to which the testifying co-defendant
could be impeached;
4. Judicial economy.
It is apparent that on the record of this case items one
and four have not been satisfied.
At one point, it a that Cotler would testify if
— gee n
on of a suggestion that Cotler proceed non indi
— uncertainty that he actually would — 14 wit-
ness stand if a severance had been granted. Although
Cotler’s counsel did indicate that his client’s testimony
would be exculpatory in nature for Provenzano, Cotler
would also be subject to impeachment, particularly if he
had been tried first and convicted. Finally, judicial econ-
omy concerns were present, and in a case of this nature,
it is preferable to have all of the parties tried together so
that the full extent of the conspiracy may be developed.
See United States v. Rosa, 560 at 156; United States v.
Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 1981); United
States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 858 (1975); United States v. Somers, 496 F. 2d
723, 731 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 832 (1974).
We similarly find no merit to Cotler’s contention
that there was a misjoinder under Fed. R. Crim. P. 8.
record does not support — 24
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Opinion of United States Court of Appeals
it is foreclosed by United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d at
729, where we rejected the position that is asserted here.
Thus, neither defendant has demonstrated any abuse of
discretion by the trial court. We therefore find no error in
the district court’s refusal to sever the cases.
II. THE RICO COUNT
Provenzano argues that the government failed to
prove that a nexus existed between the enterprise — Lo-
cal 560 — and the pattern of racketeering activity. Ac-
cording to his theory, the statute is not satisfied unless it
is shown that the enterprise was advanced or benefitted
by the pattern of racketeering activity. He contends that
even though the record would establish that he person-
ally profited from payoffs, ti aterests of the union
were not advanced. Thus, his actions in fact worked to
the detriment of the union and were contrary to the
obligations of his office.
The statute, 18 U.S.C. §1962(c) provides in perti-
nent part:
“It shall be unlawful for any person employed by
any enterprise the activities of which af.
fect interstate commerce, to conduct or partici-
pate, . in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity... .”
Defendant relies upon United States v. Webster,
639 F.2d 174, cert. denied. US. (1981).
There, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit at first held that the statute does not extend to a
“situation where the racketeering activities are ad-
vanced through the assistance of the enterprise.” Id. at
184. The court focused on the word “through” in the
Note, 12 Seton Hali L.Rev. 116 (1981). Nor did the court
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Opinion of United States Court of Appeals
find any evidence of congressional! intent to reach cases
where “the racketeering activity made use of the re-
sources of the enterprise but did not provide the enter-
prise with any benefit. Id. at 184.
The panel later modified its original opinion, how-
ever, finding instead that the proper question should
have been whether the affairs of the enterprise “were
conducted through the pattern of racketeering activity,
not whether they were benefitted or advanced or wheth-
er profit to the [enterprise] resulted.” 669 F.2d 185, 186-
87 (4th Cir.), cert. denied. U.S» (1982).
We agree with the Fourth Circuit’s latter interpreta-
tion of the relevant statutory language. The record here
demonstrates that, by accepting bribes in exchange for
allowing violations of the collective bargaining agree-
ments to be overlooked, Provenzano was conducting his
union office through racketeering activity. The fact that
the union was harmed rather than benefitted does not
remove the conduct from RICO’s ambit.
A similar situation is presented when public offi-
cials accept bribes in the course of their duties. Thus, in
United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978), the convictions of
state officials who participated in a cigarette smuggling
conspiracy to the detriment of the “enterprise,” the state
itself, were affirmed. Similarly, convictions pheld
in United States v. Salvitti, 451 F.Supp. 195(E.D. Pa.),
citer of Redevelopment, Antherity of Philadelphia ~
rector o t ty i *
of bribes); United States v. Vignola, 464
F.Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 605 F.2d 1199 (ad
Cir. 1979) (Traffic Court judge — acceptance of bribes).
Although these cases did not state that there can be cul-
pabilitywithout benefit to the enterprise, that premise is
implicit in the convictions which were affirmed.
In United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981), the defendant,
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Opinion of United States Court of Appeals
a union officer, received illegal iabor payoffs. The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that one conducts
the activities of an enterprise through a pattern of racke-
teering when:
“(1) One is enabled to commit the predicate
offenses solely by virtue of his position in the
enterprise or involvement in or control over the
affairs of the enterprise; or
(2) the predicate offenses are related to the activi-
ties of that enterprise.”
Id. at 54. It is only when the predicate acts are
unrelated to the enterprise or the actor’s association
with it that the nexus element is missing, and con-
sequently there is no RICO violation. That is clearly
and Vignoli. See also B. Tarlow, Rico: The New Dar-
ling of the Prosecutor’s Nursery, 49 FORD. L.REV.
165, 228-34 ((1980). Accordingly, the trial judge
did not err in submitting the RICO counts to the
III. GRAND JURY ISSUES
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Appendix A
Opinion of United States Court of Appeals
for indictment had attended every session of the grand
jury.
A
The district court accepted the response of the
government that the first grand jury heard testimony
from 19 individuals. The second grand jury heard
testimony from 51 people, two of whom had also
appeared before the first grand jury. The testimony of a
third prior witness was read in full to the indicting jury.
No summaries were used before the second grand jury,
but it had the o unity to review all of the testimony
received by the Because not all of the witnesses
to the use of summaries. The Glstrict court sscannlond
that abuse could occur through the use of successive
grand juries, but did not find any to exist in this case.
We have indicated our concern with the practice of
having a number of grand juries hear testimony which
the indicting grand jury ultimately uses as a basis for
indictment. See United States v. Helstoski, 635 F.2d 200,
202 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1980). We do not think that in this
4 —
addition, extensive proceedings before the indicting
C
to
— called before the the indicting jury, it ‘on not
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Appendix 4
Opinion of United States Court of Appeals
appear that the government was being “selective” when
it chose to limit the number of witnesses from the first to
appear before the second. We conclude, therefore, that
the trial judge properly determined that defendants had
not demonstrated particularized need for breaching
grand jury secrecy.
B.
A more difficult question is presented by the other
complaint against the grand jury — that not all who
voted for the indictment had attended all of the 23
sessions. The district judge examined the voting tallies
and attendance records in camera, and found that out of
the twelve votes necessary under Fed R. Crim. P 6(f),
three of the voting jurors attended every session, four
missed one session each, three were absent from two
sessions each, and two jurors were not present three
sessions each.
Although there was not a perfect attendance record
for the twelve voting jurors, the district judge, relying on
United States v. Leverage Funding Systems, Inc. 637
F. 2d 645 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981),
held that neither the Fifth Amendment nor the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure imposed such a
requirement. As long as a quorum was present at every
session and at least twelve jurors voted to indict, both
the Constitution and the rules were satisfied. The court
did concede that there may be a situation where a grand
juror missed so much of the evidence that the Fifth
Amendment would not permit his vote to be counted, but
found no such demonstration had been made here. As
an additional reason for denying the defendant's
motion, the court pointed out the undesirability of
holding “preliminary” trials to determine the
competency and adequacy of the evidence before the
grand jury
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Opinion of United States Court of Appeals
The necessity for insuring that the grand jury
be informed of all the evidence cannot be ignored.
As the Supreme Court said in Wood v. Georgia, 370
U.S. 375, 390 (1962), the grand jury] has been re-
garded as a primary security to the innocent against
hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution.” It is
that body which determines whether “a charge is
founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimi-
dating power or by malice and personal ill will.” We
have rejected the proposition that the grand jury is
simply a prosecutor’s tool and have noted its consti-
tutional role as a shield against unjustified charges.
See United States v. Goldstein, 502 F.2d 526 (3d Cir.
1974) (in banc); United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807
(3d Cir. 1979); In re: Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield),
486 F. 2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973). Yet it is clear that the criminal
process must not be bogged down by extensive pretrial
review of grand jury activity. United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338 (1974); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S.
359 (1956).
The district court’s opinion in United States v.
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Opinion of United States Court of Appeals
believed that this duty could be performed even if a
grand juror was absent during the presentation of some
exculpatory evidence.
The Second Circuit in United States ex rel. McCann
v. Thompson, 144 F.2d 604 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 323
U.S. 790 (1944), expounded the approach later adopted
by the Ninth Circuit, observing that since it is quite re-
mote that exculpatory evidence would be presented to a
grand jury, it is unlikely that a defendant would be
harmed by the absence of a grand juror. The absentee
would merely not have heard all of the inculpatory evi-
dence. The court in United States v. Colasurdo, 453
F.2d 585, 596 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917
(1972), reaffirmed this position, adding that to permit a
review of attendance from voting records “would bog
down the courts in a morass, a veritable jungle of specu-
lation and conjecture.”
United States v. Lang, 644 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. (1981), said that the
requirements of Rule 6 belied any intention of imposing
a perfect attendance requirement, for the rule only man-
dates that a quorum be present at every session. The
court also noted that Congress had acted to extend
grand jury terms to allow adequate investigations of
complex criminal activity. To invalidate indictments be-
cause of jury attendance would frustrate that congres-
sional intent. Jd. at 1238.
The reasons advanced by the appellate courts which
have considered the problem are weighty ones but, nev-
ertheless, leave us somewhat uneasy. It is indeed specu-
lative to consider what bit of evidence might have per-
suaded a grand juror to vote for or against an indict-
ment. But the grand juror’s judgment is what the Con-
stitution requires, and the defendant is entitled to an
informed determination of probable cause.
We recognize the practical problems created by the
very nature of the grand jury’s investigative role. Not all
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Opinion of United States Court of Appeals
the evidence can be presented at one time — one wit-
ness’ testimony may lead in turn to an investigation
that extends over a period of time. Some witnesses may
be unavailable at a given point and other circumstances
may hinder prompt expedition. The longer the period of
service, the more absences may be expected.
The provisions of Rule 6(e (I), which require the
recordation of grand jury proceedings, aid us in reach-
ing agreement with the solution proposed by the Lang
court. As its opinion observed, “[p}rosecutors can insure
that the perception of fairness, as well as its substance,
are maintained by giving replacement and absent grand
jurors the opportunity to review transcripts . . of missed
sessions. That should go a long way to ameliorate the
concerns raised here.” 644 F.2d at 1239.' If a review of
the transcripts should raise questions in a juror’s mind
which could be resolved by recalling a witness, that al-
ternative would be available. Following this procedure
would insure that each grand juror is fully informed of
the evidence which has been presented.
It would have been better to utilize such a practice
in this case, but we cannot say that failure to do so viti-
ates the indictments. We rely on the judgment of the
district judge who had the opportunity to review the
grand jury records in camera. The grand jury here had
23 separate sessions, and although the number of ab-
sences may border the limits of acceptability, it does not
reach the point where we must say that the defendant’s
rights have been violated. As we note above, furnishing
transcripts to absent jurors is a practical way to avoid
attacks on grand jury voting in the future.
In view of all the circumstances here, we conclude
that the district court did not err in its refusal to unseal
the grand jury records.
1. Although the court approved the summaries as an alterna-
tive, we do not recommend their use unless for some valid reason
transcripts are not available.
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Opinion of United States Court of Appeals
IV. PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
Before trial, Provenzano’s attorney submitted a mo-
tion requesting psychiatric examinations of government
witnesses Ralph Picardo and Joseph Szapor. Support-
ing the motion was an affidavit which stated that
Picardo had been branded a “liar,” a little crazy”, “off-
the-wall”, and “a pathological liar,” by a number of
government witnesses in an earlier unrelated trial. In
addition, after his conviction in February of 1975 for
murder, Picardo was confined for psychiatric examina-
tion at the New Jersey State Prison at Trenton. As to
Szapor, the defense recited a number of bizarre actions
and an allegation that drugs prescribed for treatment
—— pain may have affected his competency and credi-
ility.
The trial judge refused to order the examinations,
finding that the attacks posed a credibility issue for jury
resolution. Cotler now asserts that the denial of his mo-
tion was an abuse of discretion. The defendant concedes
that the question of credibility is ultimately one for the
jury, but argues that the opinion of a psychiatrist would
be helpful in the deliverations.
We note that both witnesses were extensively cross-
examined. As a result, the jury heard about Picardo’s
murder conviction and his cocaine and marijuana use,
that he used relatives without their knowledge to further
his criminal schemes, and that he believed self-preserva-
tion was “the name of the game.” The record also
demonstrates his incentive to furnish information to the
federal authorities in order to avoid state prosecution.
The cross-examination of Szapor was so effective
that the trial judge commented that the witness’s credi-
bility was “certainly placed in doubt not only by the evi-
dence offered by the defendants, but certainly as a result
of his cross-examination. . . .” Thus, the evidence be-
fore the jury provided ample information for its task of
evaluating the truthfulness of the two witnesses.
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Opinion of United States Court of Appeals
We find no abuse of discretion in the judge’s refusal
to order the psychiatric examinations. In United States
v. Pacelli, 521 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 911 (1976), the court said that the question is
within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be
disturbed unless it is plainly in error. We adopt that
standard also.
Even if the examination had been ordered, it is
doubtful at best that psychiatric testimony would have
been appropriate here. The use of such evidence at trial
to attack or support a witness’s credibility has not been
generally favored. In United States v. Barnard, 490 F. 2d
907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959
(1974), the court emphasized the jury’s responsibility to
assess credibility. Doubting that psychiatrists have
more expertise in this field than juries, the court pointed
out that such expert testimony might cause jurors to
surrender their common sense in weighing the evidence
and could produce a trial within a trial. The court con-
cluded that this type of testimony should only be re-
ceived in unusual cases. Jd. at 913. The record in this
case did not establish anything so out of the ordinary as
to require — or indeed justify — the use of psychiatric
te stimony. The eccentric behavior that might have been
deemed significant by a psychiatrist was fully explored
bei ore the jury. See also, United States v. Jackson, 576
F. 2d 46, 48-49 (5th Cir. 1978); United States u. Russo, 442
F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1023 (1972).
V. OTHER MATTERS
Cotler also contends that the affidavits supporting
the issurance of warrants for wiretapping and searches
were inadequate. In particular, one affidavit is alleged
to contain 26 pages of irrelevant and prejudicial mate-
rial. When that material is deleted, however, adequate
probable cause is demonstrated. See United States v.
Sterling, 369 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1966). We are not per-
suaded that the alleged prejudicial aspects unduly in-
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Opinion of United States Court of Appeals
fluenced the judge who issued the warrants. The de-
fendant’s contention that the evidence should have been
suppressed was properly rejected by the trial court.
Finally, defendant Cotler asserts that his right to
privacy was violated by the consensual recordings made
by witness Szapor. We find no merit to this contention.
See, e.g., United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 51-52
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975).
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will
be affirmed.
A True Copy:
Teste:
Clerk of the United States
Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
20a
Appendix B
Order of United States Court of Appeals
on Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for
Rehearing In Banc
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 81-2411
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
1
NUNZIO PROVENZANO,
Appellant.
Sur Petition For Rehearing
Present: SEITZ, Chief Judge, ALDISERT, ADAMS,
GIBBONS, HUNTER, WEIS, GARTH,
HIGGINBOTHAM, SLOVITER and BECKER,
Circuit Judges, and CONABOY, District Judge.*
The petition for rehearing filed by
Nunzio Provenzano, Appellant
in the above entitled case having been submitted to the
judges who participated in the decision of this court
and to all the other available circuit judges of the
circuit in regular active service, and no judge who con-
curred in the decision having asked for rehearing, and a
majority of the circuit judges of the circuit in regular
*The Honorable Richard P. Conaboy, United States District
Judge for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designa-
tion.
the
ls
tion for
hied
is de
of
Ages
rehearing
is
oi:
ath
as i
8 =
ss 225
*
3
acti
court in
By the Court,
Judge
Dated:
22a
Appendix C
Letter of United States District Court
dated March 3, 1981
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Chambers of
H. Lee Sarokin, Judge
March 3, 1981
To All Counsel:
Re: U.S.A. v. Provenzano, et al.
Criminal No. 80-315
Gentlemen:
The following supplements and clarifies my ruling
from the bench on February 23, 1981 on defendants’
motion for disclosure of the transcripts of the grand jury
proceedings as well as the grand jury attendance rec-
ords and vote tallies. These motions are denied.
The motion for disclosure of the transcripts is based
upon the presentation of evidence by the government
23a
Appendix C
Letter of United States District Court
dated March 3, 1981
The defendants contend that the prosecutorial
decision to withhold from the second grand jury the
testimony of the other 16 witnesses violated the de-
fendants’ Fifth Amendment rights to be indicted by an
unbiased grand jury, or, alternatively, that the court
should exercise its supervisory powers to correct this
abuse of the grand jury process.
Insofar as the motion seeks disclosure of the tran-
scripts, it is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e) (3) (C) (ii).
The rule gives to the court discretion to release the
transcripts if and when a defendant demonstrates a
particularized need for the information which outweighs
the policies underlying the general rule of secrecy. See
United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677
(1058).
The court in this case has no reason to disbelieve the
representation of Mr. Weisenbeck that no summaries of
testimony were presented to the indicting grand jury.
Therefore, the defendants have not demonstrated a real
though this practice can be abused, see United States v.
Carcaise, 442 F.Supp. 1209 (M.D. Fla. 1978), the circum-
stances involved herein do not suggest that such abuse
24a
Appendix C
Letter of United States District Court
dated March 3, 1981
grand jurors voting for the indictment who were present
at every session of the grand jury. In fact, in order to
have the requisite number of qualified jurors voting for
the indictment,* it is necessary to include jurors who
missed as many as three out of the 23 sessions.** The
attendance records would give to the defendants no
further useful information.
The question then, is whether the indictment is
defective because several of the grand jurors missed
several sessions. Resolution of this issue is difficult, as
evidenced by the opinions of the district court and court
of appeals in United States v. Leverage Funding Sys-
tems, 478 F.Supp. 799 (C.D. Cal. 1079), rev'd, No. 79-1677
(9th Cir., filed Oct. 3, 1980).
A per se rule requiring dismissal of an indictment
whenever less than 12 grand jurors are present at every
session is neither constitutionally required nor practic-
able. United States ex rel McCann v. Thompson, 144
F.2d 604 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 323 US. 790 (1944).
jury”, Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956),
and is therefore rejected as a means to resolve the
*Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 (f) provides that laln indictment may found
only upon the concurrence of 12 or more
**To reach the required number of grand jurors, it is necessary
session, jurors who
f
i
1
f
ö
:
r
25a
Appendix C
Letter of United States District Court
dated March 3, 1981
The court accepts the view of the Ninth Circuit that
neither the Fifth Amendment nor the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure requires that at least 12 voting
grand jurors hear all the evidence in a case. It is
sufficient that the grand jury returning the indictment
consisted of between 16 and 23 grand jurors, that a
quorum was present at every session, and that at least
12 jurors voted to indict. The court can conceive of situa-
tions in which a grand juror missed so much of the
evidence that if he or she was permitted to vote for an
indictment, the Fifth Amendment rights of an accused
would be violated. No such demonstration has been
made in this case. The defendants’ motion for release
of the attendance records or for dismissal of the indict-
ment is therefore denied.
Very truly yours,
H. LEE SAROKIN
US.DJ.
Appendix D
Affidavit of Thomas L. Weisenbeck in
to Motions For Disclosure
of Grand Jury Transcripts
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v
NUNZIO PROVENZANO
SALVATORE PROVENZANO
MICHAEL SCIARRA and
IRVING COTLER,
Defendants
Criminal No. 80-315
Affide vit
STATE OF NEW JERSEY)
COUNTY OF ESSEX)
THOMAS L. WEISENBECK, upon his oath, de-
poses and says:
1. I am a Special Attorney in the United States
Department of Justice, assigned to the Newark Strike
Force and am familiar with the facts hereinafter stated.
2. I was assigned to investigate the within matter
during February, 1979. The April 13, 1978 Grand Jury
began hearing testimony and reviewing documents on
April 26, 1979, after the completion of Title III surveil-
lance and the execution of search warrants. This Grand
Jury heard testimony from 19 individuals and received
documents on ten separate days commencing April 26,
1979 and terminating on November 15, 1979.
3. The October 18, 1979 Grand Jury began hearing
testimony and receiving documents on November 8,
1979, and continued to do so through and including
27a
Appendix D
Affidavit of Thomas L. Weisenbeck in
Response to Motions For Disclosure
of Grand Jury Transcripts
September 4, 1980. During that period of time, this
Grand Jury heard testimony from 51 individuals and
received documents on 23 separate occasions.
4. Of the 19 witnesses who appeared before the April
13, 1978 Grand Jury, only 3 witnesses gave testimony
which was significant enough to re-present to the
October 18, 1979 Grand Jury. In those three instances,
two witnesses appeared before the October 18, 1979
Grand Jury, listened to their earlier testimony, affirmed
that testimony and were then available for -further
questioning by the Grand Jury. In the third instance,
the former testimony of that witness was read in full to
the October 18, 1979 Grand Jury. No summaries of
grand jury testimonies were ever given to the October
18, 1979 Grand Jury. Additionally, the October 18, 1979
Grand Jury was given the opportunity to review all
testimony and documents received by the April 13,
1978 Grand Jury.
5. „ Oat Oe eae ee
tion to extend the term of the April 13, 1978 Jury,
it was anticipated that this investigation had been su
stantially completed. Given that perspective, it would
have been an inefficient use of Grand Jury time to re-
present to a second Grand Jury all of the testimony and
documents previously heard by the former Grand Jury
and then only supplement such material with a rela-
tively smaller amount of information. However, shortly
after the Application of the United States was granted
extending the term of the April 13, 1978 Grand Jury,
new information came to light which vastly expanded
the scope of the existing investigation. At that time,
a decision was made to present all new information to
the October 18, 1979 Grand Jury and where
su certain witnesses to this new Grand Jury that
previously testified and re-present all previously
subpoenaed documents.
28a
Appendix D
Affidavit of Thomas L. Weisenbeck in
Response to Motions For Disclosure
of Grand Jury Transcripts
6. This Affidavit is made in response to the motion
by defense for disclosure of transcripts of Grand Jury
proceedings and Grand Jury attendance records and
vote tallies.
THOMAS L. WEISENBECK
Special Attorney
Notarized:
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.