Appendix — Lightner v. Jones

Supreme Court brief1988

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

A-l

APPENDIX “A”

TRANSCRIPT IN PROCEEDINGS NO. 39951

FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

PARISH OF OUACHITA

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VS.

LOUISE P. BRADSHAW and THOMAS H. FERGUS

By the Court:

Let's take up first the sentencing matter. This is the

case of State versus Louise P. Bradshaw and Thomas H.

Fergus...No. 39,951. Mr. Fergus and Ms. Bradshaw, who is

now Mrs. Fergus, previously appeared before this Court

and entered a plea of guilty to the offense of attempted

distribution of marijuana. Since that time the Court

has...received a pre-sentence report prepared by the Divi-

sion of Probation and Parole setting forth the facts and cir-

cumstances of this offense and the prior history of conduct

of these two individuals, and on this date there was a mo-

tion to traverse certain assertions in that report and the

Court has heard testimony here today with respect to that.

This cffense involved the sale of some fifty (50) pounds of

marijuana which was brought here to this parish from

Texas, by these defendants....to be sold to an undercover

agent for the price of $14,750.00. The report reveals and

A-2

the testimony at the hearing today revealed that about two

weeks prior to this particular offense that these defendants

sold a pound of marijuana to the same narcotics officer in

Forney, Texas, and further that on at least one previous oc-

casion they had purchased a pound of marijuana, which

they shared with their friends. With respect to Ms. Brad-

shaw, or now Mrs. Fergus, she was convicted in Dallas

County, Texas in 1971 of possession of a narcotic, a felony

offense, and in 1972 was convicted of a worthless check of-

fense in the same county, and is thus ineligible for proba-

tion. In addition to the other transactions with marijuana,

the two defendants had also discussed with the undercover

officer and had agreed to a future sale of a similar quantity

of marijuana, that is approximately fifty (50) poun Any

sentence less than what this Court will impose here would

depricate the obvious seriousness of this offense. This

Court, of course, does not condone the sale of marijuana in

any quantity, but certainly in the quantity of this

magnitude. It can be expected that it has a definite impact

on this community. The Court must confess that it has

some difficulty in appreciating the rationale of one of the

defendants who stated this morning that her life was very

clean, when obviously this quantity of marijuana coming

into a community would cause the lives of any number of

individuals not to be, quote, clean, once this fifty (50)

pounds of marijuana left the control of these two defen-

dants, regardless of what their intentions may have been,

they had no control over what happened to it. Mr. Fergus

has admitted that his motive was simply profit, that this

was a business transaction. The Court also has some dif-

A-3

ticulty in understanding the rationale of Mrs. Fergus, while

she fastidiously avoided handling the marijuana, she very

reluctantly, according to her, agreed to handle the

$14,000.00 involved. In this matter, as to each defendant,

let the defendant be sentenced to serve a term of five (5)

years imprisonment at hard labor and remanded to the

custody of the Louisiana Department of Corrections, and

to pay a fine of $2,500.00 and costs, in default of payment

of fine and costs to serve one year in jail.

A-4

APPENDIX “B”

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

NO. 81-KA-2633

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VS.

THOMAS H. FERGUS AND

LOUISE P. BRADSHAW, A/K/A

LOUISE BRADSHAW FERGUS

AN APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDI-

CIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE PARISH

OF OUACHITA, STATE OF LOUISIANA, NO.

39951, THE HONORABLE LEMMIE O. HIGH-

TOWER

AUGUSTINE, Justice ad hoc*

Defendants Louise P. Bradshaw and Thomas H.

Fergus were charged by bill of information with having

violated La. R.S. 40:967, governing distribution of mari-

juana, a controlled dangerous substance.

At arraignment on January 28, 1981, both defen-

dants pleaded not guilty. Later, as a result of plea bargain-

Ciaccio and Augustine of the

g

i

3

A-5

marijuana. The trial judge scheduled a pre-sentence in-

vestigation as to each defendant, and on August 5, 1981,

upon review of the investigation reports, the trial court

sentenced each defendant to serve five years at hard labor

and to pay a fine of $2,500.00 and costs.

The operable facts in this case are as follows:

In December 1980, Detective Bryan Boney of the

West Monroe Police Department was told by a confidential

informant that a former friend had telephoned and in-

quired as to the informant’s interest in obtaining large

quantities of marijuana. On January 8, 1981 Detectives

Boney and Pat Stewart were introduced to the female

friend named Stormy over the telephone. During their

initial conversation, the central topic was the eventual sale

of marijuana. Discussion included prices, quantities and

grades of marijuana to be supplied to the officers by the

defendants within the near future. Further taped conversa-

tions became more detailed to include the various logistic

problems associated with the deal—transportation of the

marijuana from Dallas to Monroe, Louisiana; finance of the

venture, etc.

The January 8th conversation was not limited to

generalities, however, for it was there agreed that the next

day, January 9th, Officers Boney and Stewart were to travel

to Fourney, Texas, outside Dallas, to purchase one pound of

marijuana from the defendants as a show of good faith. The

January 9th transaction was perfected on schedule.

A-

Later, on January 20, 1981, having worked out

details of another transaction with the officers by

telephone, Fergus and Bradshaw travelled in two vehicles

from Fourney, Texas to West Monroe, Louisiana, to con-

clude the first of two scheduled deliveries. The terms of the

agreement had called for two separate shipments, each for

fifty pounds of marijuana, at the rate of $14,750.00 per

shipment. The second shipment was agreed to follow the

first by less than twenty-four hours.

Fergus and Bradshaw arrived in West Monroe at ap-

proximately 1:30 a.m. on January 21st. As pre-arranged,

Bradshaw checked in at a Roadway Inn Motel, while

Fergus drove around the vicinity in the marijuana-laden

automobile awaiting Bradshaw's C. B. radio communica-

tions. Finally, Bradshaw met Officer Pat Stewart in room

145 and the money changed hands. Stewart turned over

the agreed-upon $14,750.00; Bradshaw in turn called

Fergus on the C.B. and instructed him to deliver the fifty

pound shipment. When Fergus arrived minutes later, he

backed the car up to the motel room, opened the trunk and

showed Officer Stewart a number of large garbage bags

which contained the contraband. Stewart verified that it

was marijuana, then gave the signal to other policemen to

converge. The defendants were then arrested for distribu-

tion of marijuana.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1 & NO. 2

By these assignments, defendants urge that in sen-

A-7

tencing them, the trial judge failed to comply with the re-

quirements of Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, Art.

894.1 and that as a result, their sentences are excessive.

We shall treat these assignments together.

Art. 894.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

establishes sentencing guidelines which the trial courts of

this state are required to follow. paragraphs A and B

of that statute define the aggravating and mitigating fac-

tors which shape the trial court’s great sentencing discre-

tion. Paragraph C of the statute provides that the court

shall state for the record the consideration taken into ac-

count and the factual basis therefor in imposing sentence.

Appellants argue that the trial judge failed to ade-

quately consider several mitigating factors as to each

defendant, and failed to state for the record the factual

basis for the imposition of these sentences. Ultimately, it is

urged that che chief error of the sentencing procedure was

the trial court’s failure to particularize each defendant's

senter.ce. Appellants point to the fact that each defendant

received the same sentence although there were great dif-

ferences in their backgrounds, criminal histories, and their

degrees of participation in the offense now under our con-

sideration.

The record reveals that the trial court signed into the

record a full and detailed statement of the facts of this

case. The trial court also submitted to the record a printed

form entitled, ‘‘Statement of Considerations as to Sentence

A-8

of Imprisonment”. That form contains a listing of each of

the mitigating factors found in Paragraph B' of Art.

894.1. There is also a space provided where the trial judge

indicates his opinion as to the presence or absence of the

mitigating factors. Beneath the listing of those factors are

the trial court’s particular comments regarding mitigating

circumstances.

As to the defendant Thomas Fergus, the trial court

noted on the form its conclusion that there existed no

mitigating factors. In a footnote, the trial judge noted that

although Fergus had no prior criminal convictions, there

was certainly prior criminal conduct: About two weeks

prior to the instant offense, defendant and his co-defendant

sold a pound of marijuana to a narcotics officer in Fourney,

Texas, and on at least one previous occasion they had pur-

chased a pound of marijuana which they shared with their

friends. The court also specifically noted that Fergus and

Bradshaw had agreed to a future sale of a similar (approx-

imately fifty pounds) quantity of marijuana, and that a

lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the of-

fense, particularly considering that Fergus’ only motive

was quick profit. The record reveals that while it was Brad-

shaw who had a dealer’s expertise, it was Fergus’ avarice

which fueled the venture, though it caused great personal

friction with Bradshaw, whose resistance to the operation

met Fergus’ constant pressure to carry through with the

deal.

We now turn to the trial court’s procedure in sen-

A-9

tencing the defendant Bradshaw. The record contains a

form identical to that submitted for Fergus, as discussed

above. The trial judge found none of the mitigating factors

of Art. 894.1 (B) to be applicable, and as in the case of

Thomas Fergus, noted the sale of a pound of marijuana two

weeks prior to the instant offense and, before that, the pur-

chase of a pound of marijuana which was shared with the

couple’s friends. The court stated that a lesser sentence

would deprecate the seriousness of the offense, which itself

was only half of the operation—the second shipment hav-

ing been totally finalized except for delivery. The court

noted that defendant Bradshaw, unlike Fergus, had two

prior convictions, one for possession of narcotics.

We think the trial court’s sentencing procedure as to

each defendant adequately followed the guidelines of Art.

894.1. Although appellants object to the triai court’s use of

a printed form (described above), we fail to see the basis for

such an objection and regard it, together with the trial

court’s comments thereon, as evidence that the sentencing

judge considered each and every mitigating factor in

paragraph B of Art. 894.1. The court’s conclusion that

imprisonment was required as to each defendant was

grounded upon a statement that a lesser sentence would

deprecate the seriousness of the offense, this statement in

turn supported by reference to the rather large size of the

operation and its very noxious effect upon the community

in the event that it were carried through. Moreover, the

trial court noted that considerable leniency had already

been extended to each defendant through plea bargaining

A-10

which allowed them to plead guilty to attempted distribu-

tion.

The record adequately states the court’s sentencing

considerations, as well as the factual bases therefor. This

court has said that Article 894.1 does not require the trial

judge to set forth for the record all the factors listed in said

statute which were accorded weight by him in determining

to impose a sentence of imprisonment rather than grant

suspension of sentence or probation. State v. Jacobs, 383

So. 2d 342 (La. 1980). From this, it follows that the re-

quirements of Art. 894.1 are met if, on a printed form, the

trial court sets forth the lack of all mitigating factors, and

as to at least some of those factors, articulates his reasons.

We now consider whether the sentences in this case

are excessive. A sentencing judge is accorded great discre-

tion, and absent a finding by this court that the punish-

ment is grossly out of proportion to the offense, or a pur-

poseless imposition of pain and suffering, we will not

disturb the trial court’s decision. State v. Bonanno, 384

So.2d 355 (La. 1980); State v. Goode, 380 So. 2d 1361 (La.

1980); Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976).

As already noted, the defendants had already been

allowed a considerable degree of ieniency by virtue of their

plea bargain which reduced the charges. Ms. Bradshaw is

now a third felony offender whose expertise in narcotics

traffic was indispensible to the perfection of the deal by

which it was agreed to ship 100 pounds of marijuana for a

A-11

total price of almost 830,000.00. Thomas Fergus, though

lacking Bradshaw’s expertise, was no less involved in the

crime than she. In a sense, his culpability is even greater,

due to the relentless pressure he exerted upon Bradshaw to

carry through with the operation.

Given thai che facts of this case would have allowed

the State to have charged these defendants more heavily

than they were, and given that the defendants received

even further leniency by the plea bargain, we do not regard

either defendant’s sentence as excessive.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3

By this assignment of error, defendants contend that

the trial court erred in relying on prejudicially false infor-

mation contained in the pre-sentence investigation report.

The claimed falsehoods are, first, that it was Brad-

shaw, and not the informant, who had been the one to in-

itiate negotiations as to the drug deal, and second, that

Bradshaw was known in drug circles in the Dallas area.

Prior to sentencing, appellants filed a motion to

traverse the pre-sentence investigation report, and an

evidentiary hearing was subsequently held, as required by

State v. Bosworth, 360 fo. 2d 173 (La. 1978) and State v.

Lockwood, 399 So. 2d 190 (La. 1981).

At the hearing, all of the witnesses testified that

A-12

they had known the defendants for at least a year and had

socialized with them frequently. They stated that at no

time did they know defendant Bradshaw to be a member of

any drug circle. We hesitate to accord much weigh to these

statements: these witnesses could not have testified as to

whether Bradshaw was known in drug circles unless they

themselves were in drug circles. But notwithstanding that

observation, and assuming that Bradshaw was indeed a

foreigner to drug cliques, the sentence meted out to Brad-

shaw is supportable by the facts of record and is not ex-

cessive.

For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the trial

court fixing sentence as to each defendant is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

A-13

APPENDIX “C”

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

NEW ORLEANS, 70112

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE

NEWS RELEASE # 92

FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

On September 3, 1982, the following action was taken by

the Supreme Court of Louisiana, composed of Chief Justice

John A. Dixon, Jr., and Associate Justices Pascal F.

Calogero, Jr., Walter F. Marcus, Jr., James L. Dennie, Fred

A. Blanche, Jr., Jack Crozier Watson, and Harry T. Lem-

mon, in the cases listed below:

REHEARINGS DENIED:

81-KA-2683 State v. Louise Bradshaw & Thomas H.

Fergus

A-14

APPENDIX “D”

STATE OF LOUISIANA

PARISH OF OUACHITA

FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

STATE OF LOUISIANA FILED: August 12, 1981

VERSUS NO. 39,951

THOMAS H. FERGUS and

LOUISE P. BRADSHAW aka

LOUISE BRADSHAW FERGUS

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

NOW INTO COURT comes THOMAS H. FERGUS

and LOUISE P. BRADSHAW, aka LOUISE BRAD-

SHAW FERGUS, Defendants herein, and represented

through undersigned counsel and respectfully assign the

following errors for their appeal to the Louisiana Supreme

Court:

The District Court Judge, The Honorable Lemmie O.

Hightower, erred in imposing the maximum sentence of

five (5) years each at hard labor upon Defendants herein in

light of a generally favorable pre-sentence report, consider-

ing the nature of the offense, and further due to the fact

that evidence introduced at the Motion to Traverse Pre-

Sentence Report indicated, per deft v witnesses, (1) that

when Defendants and the State's reliable confidential in-

A-15

formant conversed regarding the delivery of drugs to

Ouachita Parish, Defendants did not have custody, control

or immediate access to the contraband involved in these

proceedings and in fact, Defendant, THOMAS H.

FERGUS, had to search for a considerable period of time

to locate same, and (2) pursuant to uncontradicted

testimony offered by Defendant, LOUISE P. BRAD-

SHAW aka LOUISE BRADSHAW FERGUS, it was the

reliable confidential informant who first suggested to

Defendants the particular drug purchase involved herein.

The sentence imposed is harsh and excessive and

therefore unconstitutional in that the sentence imposed

violates Article 1, Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution

of 1974 which provides that no laws shall subject any per-

son to euthenasis, to torture, or to cruel, excessive or

unusual punishment; that the sentence imposed of five (5)

years and $2,500.00 fines each and in default thereof a

sentence of one (1) year additional imprisonment each is

harsh and excessive as being in further violation of the

Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The District Court erred in its failure to fully comply

with LSA-C.Cr.P. Article 894.1 in the consideration and im-

position of sentence, particularly with the enumeration of

mitigating circumstances therein contained.

A-16

Respectfully submitted,

GUERRIERO, SMITH, HINGLE

I hereby certify that a copy of the above and forego-

ing Assignment of Errors has been served upon the

Honorable Lemmie O. Hightower, District Judge, and the

Honorable Lavelle Salomon, Assistant District Attorney

in and for Ouachita Parish, Louisiana, by placing same in

the United States Mail, postage prepaid.

Monroe, Louisiana, this 10 day of August, 1981.

J. RANDOLPH SMITH

A-17

STATE OF LOUISIANA

PARISH OF OUACHITA

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT

STATE UF LOUISIANA FILED: Sept. 16, 1981

VERSUS NO. 39,951

THOMAS H. FERGUS AND

LOUISE P. BRADSHAW aka

LOUISE BRADSHAW FERGUS DEPUTY CLERK

PER CURIAM TO

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NOS. 1, 2 AND 3

A statement of considerations as to sentence was fil-

ed of record, and also verbalized, at time of sentencing.

LEMMIE O. HIGHTOWER, JUDGE

A-18

APPENDIX “E”

STATE OF LOUISIANA

PARISH OF OUACHITA

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT

STATE OF LOUISIANA FILED: August 5, 1981

VERSUS NO. 39,951

LOUISE POWELL BRADSHAW DEPUTY CLERK

STATEMENT OF CONSIDERATIONS AS

TO SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT

Pursuant to Act No. 635 of 1977, the Court, in impos-

ing a sentence of imprisonment, has determined whether

the following mitigating grounds are present:

Present Not Present

1) The defendant's criminal con-

duct neither caused nor

threatened serious harm; ( ) (X)

en serious harm; ( ) (X)

3) The defendant acted under

strong provocation; { ) (X)

4) There was substantial

grounds tending to excuse or

justify the defendant’s

ing to establish a defense; ( ) (X)

A-19

5) The victim of the defendant's

criminal conduct induced or

facilitated its commission; ( ) (X)

6) The defendant has compen-

sated or will compensate the

victim for the damage or in-

jury that was sustained; ( ) (X)

7) The defendant has no history

of prior delinquency or crimi-

nal activity or has led a law-

abiding life for a substantial

period of time before commis-

sion of the instant crime; ( ) (X)*

8) The defendant's criminal con-

duct was the result of circum-

stances unlikely to recur; ( ) (X)

9) The character and attitudes of

the defendant indicate that he

is unlikely to commit another

crime; ( ) (X)

10) The defendant is particularly

likely to respond affirmatively

to probationary treatment;

and { ) (X)**

11) The imprisonment of the de-

fendant would entail excessive

hardship to himself or his

dependants. ( ) (X)

* About two weeks prior to the instant offense, defen-

dant and her co-defendant sold a pound of marijuana to a

narcotics officer in Forney, Texas, and on at least one pre-

A-20

vious occasion tliey had purchased a pound of marijuana

which they shared with their friends.

The Court also concludes as follows:

a) A lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness

of the offense, which involves the distribution of over fifty

(50) pounds of marijuana for profit (price: $14,750) after

transporting the substance to Monroe from the Dallas,

Texas area.

**Defendant and her co-defendant had discussed

with the undercover officer, and had agreed to, a future

sale of a similar (approximately 50 pounds) quantity of

marijuana.

b) Considerable leniency has already been extended

the defendant through plea bargaining which allowed her

to plead guilty to attempted distribution.

c) In 1971, the defendant was convicted in Dallas

County, Texas, of possession of a narcotic, a felony offense,

and in 1972, was convicted of a worthless check offense in

the same county, and thus is ineligible for probation.

Dated: August 5, 1981

SL LEMMIE O. HIGHTOWER

LEMMIE O. HIGHTOWER, JUDGE

A-21

APPENDIX “F”

STATE OF LOUISIANA

PARISH OF OUACHITA

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT

STATE OF LOUISIANA FILED: August 5, 1981

VERSUS NO. 39,951

THOMAS HAMILTON FERGUS DEPUTY CLERK

STATEMENT OF CONSIDERATIONS AS

TO SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT

Pursuant to Act No. 635 of 1977, the Court, in impos-

ing a sentence of imprisonment, has determined whether

the following mitigating grounds are present:

Present Not Present

1) The defendant's criminal con-

duct neither caused nor

threatened serious harm; ( ) (X)

2) The defendant did not con-

template that the criminal

conduct would cause or threat-

en serious harm; ( ) (X)

3) The defendant acted under

strong provocation; ( ) (X)

4) There was substantial

grounds tending to excuse or

justify the defendant’ 's

ing to establish a defense; ( ) (X)

A-22

5) The victim of the defendant's

criminal conduct induced or

facilitated its commission; ( ) (X)

6) The defendant has compen-

sated or will compensate the

victim for the damage or in-

jury that was sustained; ( ) (X)

7) The defendant has no history

of prior delinquency or crimi-

nal activity or has led a law-

abiding life for a substantial

period of time before commis-

sion of the instant crime; ( ) (X)*

8) The defendant’s criminal con-

duct was the result of circum-

stances unlikely to recur; “2 (X)

9) The character and attitudes of

the defendant indicate that he

is unlikely to commit another

crime; 3 (X)

10) The defendant is particularly

likely to respond affirmatively

to probationary treatment;

and ( ) (X)**

11) The imprisonment of the de-

fendant would entail excessive

hardship to himself or his

dependants. ( ) (X)

* About two weeks prior to the instant offense, defen-

dant and his co-defendant sold a pound of marijuana to a

narcotics officer in Forney, Texas, and on at least one pre-

A-23

vious occasion they had purchased a pound of marijuana

which they shared with their friends.

The Court also concludes as follows:

a) A lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness

of the offense, which involves the distribution of over fifty

(50) pounds of marijuana for profit (price: $14,750) after

transporting the substance to Monroe from the Dallas,

Texas area.

**Defendant and his co-defendant had discussed

with the undercover officer, and had agreed to, a future

sale of a similar (approximately 50 pounds) quantity of

marijuana.

b) Considerable 'eniency has already been extended

the defendant through plea bargaining which allowed him

to plead guilty to attempted distribution.

c) The above considerations outweigh the fact that

this is the first felony of which the defendant has been con-

victed.

Date:

/S/ LEMMIE O. HIGHTOWER

LEMMIE O. HIGHTOWER, JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.