Appendix — Gabriel v. Missouri Pacific Railroad

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JUDGMENT ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT DATED JUNE 30, 1982

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 81-2676

JAMES C. GABRIEL,

Appellant

Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., et al.

(Civil No. 78-1476 - D.N.J. - Newark)

Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6)

June 16, 1982

BEFORE: SEITZ, Chief Judge, HIGGINBOTHAM, and

BECKER, Circuit Judges.

After consideration of the contentions raised by appellant,

it is

ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that the judgment of the

district court be and is hereby affirmed.

Costs taxed against appellant.

By the Court,

s/ Seitz

Chief Judge

ATTEST:

Dated: June 30, 1982 _°/ ‘Sally Mrvos

Sally Mrvos, Clerk

la

APPENDIX

ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT DATED JULY 27, 1982

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 81-2676

JAMES C. GABRIEL,

Appellant

v.

MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD CO., ET AL.,

(Civil No. 78-1476 - D.N.J. - Newark)

SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING

Present: SEITZ, Chief Judge, ALDISERT, ADAMS, GIBBONS,

HUNTER, WEIS, GARTH, HIGGINBOTHAM, SLOVITER,

and BECKER, Circuit Judges.

The petition for rehearing filed by appellant in the above

entitled case having been submitted to the judges who participated

in the decision of this court and to all the other available circuit

judges of the circuit in regular active service, and no judge who

concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing, and a

majority of the circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service

not having voted for rehearing by the court in banc, the petition

for rehearing is denied.

By the Court,

s/ Seitz

Chief Judge

2a

ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY DATED JULY 22, 1981

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

Civ. No. 78-1476

JAMES C. GABRIEL, Pro Se,

Plaintiff,

~against-

MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY OF MISSOURI,

MISSOURI PACIFIC CORPORATION, M. M. HENNELLY,

JOHN H. LLOYD, D. B. JENKS and THOMAS J. O’LEARY,

Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff's motion, dated June 15, 1981, his 4th motion for

reconsideration of Judge Sarokin’s Order of April 7, 1981, was

reassigned to the undersigned by Order of the Court, inasmuch

as plaintiff, after Judge Sarokin had denied his three previous

motions for reconsideration of the April Order, filed with the

instant motion a claim against Judge Sarokin for an alleged

deprivation of rights in the amount of $35,000,000.

Judge Sarokin’s Order adopted, as the Opinion of the Court,

Magistrate Perretti’s Report and Recommendation filed December

31, 1980 (hereinafter ‘‘Report’’). That Report, containing findings

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Order

of fact anu conclusions of law, is incorporated herein with the

same force and effect as if set forth in full.

Plaintiff has appeared pro se throughout. At oral argument

it was stated by defendants’ counsel, and not denied by plaintiff,

that his stock involved in this action has a present market value

of $2,200,000, and accumulated dividends (which plaintiff has

not collected) aggregating $1,100,000.

I have reviewed the extended file in this matter, and heard

full oral argument on July 13, 1981. I make the following findings

of fact and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Plaintiff owns what was formerly Class B stock of

defendant Missouri Pacific Railroad Company (MoPac). He filed

this complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief on July 3,

1978. Jurisdiction was based on diversity.

2. Plaintiff demanded declaratory relief on four issues, (1)

declaring tha the B stock (allegedly owned by plaintiff) was

entitled to vote as a class, (2) fixing the valuation of the B shares

according to a formula contained in a certain agreed systems plan,

(3) interpreting a certain opinion of the United States Supreme

Court as being controlling in the instant matter and (4) declaring

that the Interstate Commerce Commission Act may not be used

to defraud the holders of class B stock in MoPac.

3. By a recapitalization plan of MoPac consummated in

January 1974, each share of Class B stock owned by plaintiff

and others was converted into new common stock. The

recapitalization was made pursuant to:

da

Order

a. A judgment of the United States District Court

approving the transaction in a class action in which plaintiff

actively participated (Leighton, Ex. A); Levin v. Mississippi River

Corporation, 59 F .R.D. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), “‘affirmed on Judge

Weinfeld’s opinion below’’ (Ex. B), sub nom. Wesson v.

Mississippi River Corporation, 486 F. 2d 1398 (2d Cir. 1973),

cert. den. sub. nom. Wesson v. Levin, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973),

rehearing denied 415 U.S. 937 (1974). See Report, pp. 16-18.

b. An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission

authorizing the recapitalization, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §20a (Ex.

C), in a litigated proceeding in which plaintiff actively participated.

Missouri Pac. R. Co. Securities, 3471 1.C.C. 377 (1973), rehearing

denied (Ex. D), petition for finding that an issue of general

transportation importance is involved denied (Ex. E). That order

was affirmed (Ex. F) sub. nom. Gabriel v. United States, 416

F. Supp. 810 (D. N.J. 1973 [three-Judge Court, Hunter C.J.,

Whipple & Fisher, D. JJ., opinion by Fisher, !.]), reargument

denied (Ex. G), reconsideration denied (Ex. H} ~~ sgument denied

(Exh. I), reargument denied (Ex. J). This Court’s order (Ex. F)

was affirmed. 429 U.S. 1011 (1976), rehearing denied, ibid. 1124

(1977). The Commission’s order was also affirmed, sub. nom.

Gillespie v. United States, {unreported}, Civil Action No.

74-239-C(2) (E.D. Mo. 1974 [three-Judge Court, Webster, C.J.,

Wangelin and Regan, D. JJ.}). (Ex. K). See Report, pp. 18-20.

4. Defendants moved to dismiss this claim for declaratory

judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b), on the ground that

the foregoing District Court judgment and the Interstate

Commerce Commission Order are res judicata (Report p. 3). The

Report says (p. 21):

Sa

Order

**It is clear beyond argument that all of the issues

in this complaint which related to the 1974

italization are res judicata’;

See fuller discussion at pp. 15-21.

5. Plaintiff's other claim sought to enjoin defendants

temporarily and permanently, from taking any further steps for

approval or consummation of the September 1, 1977 ‘Plan and

Joint Agreement of Merger, Consolidation and Recapitalization

of MoPac’”’ (Prayer for Relief, paragraph 1; see Report py 2).

The Plan filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant

49 U.S.C. § 20a, sought approval of the exchange of stock of

defendant Missouri Pacific Corporation for all of the outstanding

minority shares of MoPac (Report pp. 6-8).

6. Defendants moved to dismiss this claim, pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. p. 12(b)(1), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, on

remedies (Report p. 3). The Report recommended that dismissal

be granted on this ground (pp. 10, 24; see fuller discussion at

pp. 8-15).

7. Defendants also moved to enjoin plaintiff permanently

from instituting proceedings against defendants on the facts alleged

in the complaint, on the ground that any such proceedings would

be vexacious (Report p. 3). The Report recommended granting

such an injunction (P. 24; see fuller discussion at pp. 21-24).

8. Plaintiff filed exceptions (90 pages), supplemented by

numerous exhibits (47 pages).

9. On March 6, 1981, Judge Sarokin ordered:

6a

Order

**1. The Report and Recommendation of

Magistrate Perretti filed December 31, 1980 be and

the same hereby is adopted as the Opinion of this

court.

2. For the reasons stated therein, the complaint

in the above matter is DISMISSED, with prejudice

and without costs.’’

10. On March 23, plaintiff moved for reconsideration, to

set aside the foregoing Order. Defendants cross moved for

reconsideration, to amend the Order to provide injunctive relief

against instituting further suits in the Federal Court with respect

to the 1974 recapitalization.

11. On April 1, plaintiff filed a second motion for

reconsideration, to set aside the March 6th Order, and to transfer

this JURY TRIAL to the Southern District of New York “‘if your

Honor cannot have this JURY TRIAL tried in this New Jersey

Court.”

12. On April 6, Judge Sarokin sent the following letter to

the parties:

**Plaintiff Gabriel has moved for reconsideration

of the dismissal of the above-entitled matter dated

March 9, 1981. Having read all of the papers

submitted on behalf of all the parties in this matter,

the court finds no new issues or law which would

mandate reconsideration. Plaintiff's motion for

reconsideration is, therefore, denied.

Defendant has requested that the court enter an

injunction against the plaintiff, enjoining him from

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Order

instituting any suit in the federal court against any

of the defendants or any other corporate officers

or agents regarding any matter alleged in the

complaint in the above-entitled matter which deals

with the 1974 recapitalization. Authority for such

an injunction may be found in Montana v. United

States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-4 (1979).

Injunctive relief is a proper remedy under the

circumstances of this action. Actions that are

repetitious or that are intended to harass, as is the

case here, must be enjoined. The plaintiff Gabriel

is, therefore, enjoined from further litigation based

upon the facts alleged in Gabriel v. Missouri Pacific

Railroad, Civil No. 78-1476 in this or any other

federal court against any of the defendants or other

corporate officers or agents. The defendant will

submit an appropriate order.’’

13. On April 7, Judge Sarokin signed the Order which is

the subject of the instant motion for reconsideration. That Order

reads:

**1. The Report and Recommendation of

Magistrate Perretti filed December 31, 1980 be and

the same hereby is adopted as the Opinion of this

Court.

2. For the reasons stated therein:

a. The complaint in the above matter is

DISMISSED, with prejudice and without costs;

b. Plaintiff is permanently enjoined from

instituting any suit in the Federal Court against

any of these defendants or any other corporate

8a

Order

officers or agents regarding any matter alleged in

the complaint that deals with the 1974

recapitalization.’’

14. On April 10, plaintiff filed a third motion for

reconsideration, to set aside the March 6th Order. On April 20,

Judge Sarokin wrote to the parties:

‘For the reasons heretofore expressed and there

being no additiona! facts or law presented,

plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is denied.’’

15. On April 18, plaintiff filed his first. motion for

reconsideration to set aside the April 7th Order (33 pages).

16. On May 11, Judge Sarokin wrote to plaintiff, with the

original to the Clerk and cupy to defendants’ attorneys, as follows:

**I have reviewed your motion for reconsideration

and reargument and said motion is denied. You

are directed to file no further motions for

reconsideration or reargument in this matter. You

may pursue an appeal if you deem it appropriate.

Thank you.”’

17. On May 19, plaintiff filed a second motion for

reconsideration, to set aside the April 7th Order. This was couched

in the form of a motion to set aside the May | Ith Order, denying

his motion for reconsideration and reargument of his complaint

(31 pages).

18. On June 5, plaintiff filed a third motion for

reconsideration, to set aside the April 7th Order. This was couched

9a

Order

in the form of a motion to set aside the May 11th Order, which

had denied his motion for reconsideration and reargument of the

April 7th Order (15 pages).

19. On June 9, Judge Sarokin signed an Order in the form

of a letter to the parties. This reads:

**The court has reviewed plaintiff’s further motion

for reconsideration, and said motion is denied.

Plaintiff is ordered and directed not to file any

further motions for reconsideration and

reargument in this matter. If plaintiff violates the

order of the court in this regard, the court will

entertain an appropriate motion for counsel fees

or other sanctions.”’

20. On June 23, plaintiff filed a fourth motion for

reconsideration, to set aside the April 7th Order. This was couched

in the form of a motion to set aside the June 9th Order, which

denied reconsideration and reargument of the April 7th Order

(21 pages). The caption reads in part:

“THE HON. SAROKIN COURT HAS NO

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DEPRIVE ME

OF MY JURY TRIAL CASE, THE COURT

ACTING ON ITS OWN WITHOUT A JURY OF

MY PEERS TO OVERSEE THE HON.

SAROKIN COURT’S ACTION. THEREFORE

1 AM HOLDING THE HON. SAROKIN COURT

LIABLE FOR SUM OF $35,000,000 DAMAGES

THAT A JURY WOULD HAVE BEEN

INSTRUMENTAL IN HELPING PLAINTIFF

GET FROM DEFENDANTS BY DIRECTING

THE 1.C.C. TO EVALUATE PLAINTIFF'S

10a

Order

MOPAC CLASS B SHARES UNDER DUE

PROCESS OF LAW UNDER A SECTION 19a

(49 U.S.C. Sect. 19a) PROCEEDINGS, WHICH

THE MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD CO.

WOULD HAVE HONORED WITH NE Ww

RAILROAD STOCKS.

21. At the oral argument on the morning of July 13, the

Court made the following rulings:

**I’ve gone over the materials you submitted. I see

no basis at all for granting your motion for

reconsideration and, accordingly, your motion for

reconsideration is denied *** Let me tell you that

as well, that when this order is prepared we will

put a stop to this. The clerk is directed not to take

any more papers from you in this matter. And I

will tell you this, that I want this order prepared

to that effect. And this is not a threat but, on the

other hand, I do have to counsel you this, that

I don’t have my orders flaunted lightly, and if I

have to impose sanctions, I will.’’

“With respect to any case in which you would have

a jury trial, if on the papers you don’t have a basis

in law for going to the jury, you don’t go to the

jury. That’s the first point. Secondly, you complain

about the magistrate having prepared a report and

recommendation. That’s pursuant to statute.”’

22. On the afternoon of July 13, plaintiff submitted a paper

stating:

Order

‘*Plaintiff pro se has been obeying and following

Rule 12-I . . . The Hon. Frederick B. Lacey Court

cannot punish me for following Rule 12-I. I have

a right to follow Rule 12-1. That is my

Constitutional right. I have a constitutional right

to protect my property according to the Sth and

14th Amendments of the United States

Constitution.”’

23. The same document contains a notice to the Clerk,

quoting Rule 12-I, and concluding ‘‘According to Rule 12-I of

the above Rules, I have a right to file a motion for reargument

within 14 days after the filing of the Court’s Order. I have a right

to do this.”’

24. On July 15, plaintiff submitted a paper repeating the

language of Rule 12-1, and repeating the foregoing arguments.

25. Plaintiff was a party of record in the Interstate Commerce

proceeding which his complaint seeks to enjoin (Report, pp. 8-9).

Since the filing of the complaint, on September 25, 1978, the

Commission approved the Recapitalization Plan, and denied

rehearing on March 8, 1979 (Report, p. 11). ‘‘Although plaintiff

dropped out of the ICC proceedings, his brother, Napoleon,

remained as a party of record and continued to flog the same

issues in his petition for administrative review.’’ (Report, p. 21).

This petition was filed in the Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia, where Napoleon Gabriel was acting pro se.

26. On March 6, 1981, the Court of Appeals entered an Order

assigning the cause to a panel, and dispensing with oral argument.

This Order was signed by the Clerk by direction of the Court.

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Order

27. On March 25, 1981, the Court of Appeals rendered a

judgment from which the following is quoted:

**Petitioners have engaged for several years in a

quest to receive more for their Class B stock than

they were allotted in the 1974 recapitalization of

Missouri Pacific Railroad Company. They have

presented and re-presented their claim in several

contexts and forums. We have reviewed the

ponderous papers filed by the parties and the prior

adjudications in point. Based on this review, we

find the Commission’s conclusion irresistible.

The matters petitioners would raise yet again have

by several courts and by the Commission itself in

earlier proceedings. No new issue of substance

appears in the briefs before us. While we do not

on this occasion enter a coercive order against

petitioners, cf. James C. Gabriel v. Missouri

Pacific Railroad, Civil No. 78-1476 (D.N.J. March

6, 1981) (adopting December 31, 1980 Magistrate’s

Report and Recommendation), we cannot conceive

a case more appropriately subject to the law of

res judicata. ‘Finality . . . is the service rendered

by the courts through the operation of the law of

res judicata.’ Restatement (Second) of Judgments,

Introduction at 13 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980). By

this order we perform that service.

On consideration of the foregoing, it is ORDERED

and ADJUDGED by this court that the order of

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Order

the Interstate Commerce Commission sought to

be reviewed herein is hereby affirmed.

Per Curiam

For the Court

George A. Fisher, Clerk’’

28. On April 2, the Court of Appeals made an Order denying

the motion of petitioners to be permitted to file additional evidence

to correct the record.

29. On April 24, the Court of Appeals filed the following

Order:

‘*Petitioners’ suggestions for rehearing en banc in

each of these consolidated cases have been

circulated to the full Court and no judge of the

Court has requested the taking of a vote thereon.

On consideration of the foregoing, it is

ORDERED by the Court, en banc that the

aforesaid suggestions are denied.

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

George A. Fisher,

Clerk’

30. On June 2, he Court of Appeals filed the following

Order:

4a

Order

**The motion of appellant [Napoleon] Gabriel for

reconsideration of the Court’s order of April 24,

1981 denying the petition for rehearing en banc

has been circulated to the full Court. The Court

is of the unanimous opinion that the motion for

reconsideration is not an authorized nor proper

submission and it is therefore,

ORDERED by the Court en banc that the Clerk

is directed to return the motion for reconsideration

unfiled.

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

George A. Fisher, Clerk’’

31. On June 15, petitioner Napoleon Gabriel submitted to

the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the June

2 Order, on the following ground:

“THERE WERE NO _ PERSONAL

SIGNATURES AFFIXED BY THE COURT’S

JUDGES ON ORDERS, DECISION AND

JUDGMENT ON THIS CASE, MAKING THEM

NOT LEGAL-NUL AND VOID. DUE PROCESS

EVALUATION ARE RIGHTS SECURED TO

PETITIONER BY U.S. CONSTITUTION. I

EXPECT HON. JUDGES TO LIVE UP TO

THEIR OATH OF OFFICE.”

30. On June 29, petitioner Napoleon Gabriel submitted to

the Court of Appeals a second motion for reconsideration of the

June Order on the ground that the Clerk had no right to sign

Sa

Order

the Order of March 6th dispensing with oral argument. The Motion

continued:

**Because of the above reasons, and other reasons

too numerous to mention, the above captioned

cases have not been terminated, but they are still

alive in this Court. I am holding the Clerk of this

Court personally responsible for $25,000,000

MoPac Class B values.’’

33. The two foregoing motions of petitioner Napoleon

Gabriel, while stamped ‘‘Received’’ according to the usual practice

of the Clerk’s Office, were neither docketed nor submitted to

the Court.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Rule 12(1) authorizes a single motion for reargument; it

does not permit more than one.

2. This Rule cannot be circumvented by plaintiff’s procedure

of moving to seconsider an Order, and upon denial of that motion,

moving to reconsider the Order of Denial.

3. Plaintiff’s motion of June 15, 1981, repeated on June 23,

1981, being the fourth motion to reconsider Judge Sarokin’s Order

of Dismissal April 7, 1981, should be dismissed as not authorized

by the Rules.

4. If plaintiff’s foregoing motions were subject to

consideration on the merits they would have to be denied,

inasmuch as they do not set forth any relevant matters or

controlling decisions which the Court has overlooked.

oe

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Order

5. The actions of plaintiff and of his brother described in

the Findings of Fact and in the Report, establish the strong

probability that plaintiff may continue to bombard this Court

and defendants with additional repetitive papers. The Court has

jurisdiction to direct the Clerk to refuse to accept, docket or submit

to the Court any further papers in this action, except for a Notice

of Appeal.

6. The above described actions of plaintiff and his brother

establish the strong probability that plaintiff may institute suit

for substantial damages against Judge Sarokin, and against the

Clerk and his subordinates. The Court has jurisdiction to enjoin

such frivolous and vexacious litigation, intended to harass those

persons in the performance of their official duties, and using the

courts as a stage for plaintiff's vendetta of harassment and abuse,

with the result of burdening the heavy case loads of the courts

and obstructing the application of justice in more meritorious

cases (see Report, pp. 22-23).

It is therefore, on the 22 day of July, 1981

ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff's motions to reconsider Judge Sarokin’s Order

of April 7, 1981 are dismissed.

2. Plaintiff's motions to reconsider Judge Sarokin’s Order

of April 7, 1981 are denied on the merits.

3. The Clerk of this Court is directed not to accept, nor to

docket, nor to submit to the Court any further papers in this

case, except for Notice of Appeal.

17a

Order

4. Plaintiff is permanently enjoined from instituting suit in

any court against Judge Sarokin, the Clerk of this Court, or any

of his subordinates, in respect of any matters involved in this

action.

s/ Frederick B. Lacey

Frederick B. Lacey

United States District Court Judge

All of the foregoing is based upon the determination of the

Court as set forth in the hearing of the oral argument on July

13, 1981.

s/ Frederick B. Lacey

Frederick B. Lacey

United States District Court Judge

ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY DATED APRIL 7, 1981

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Civil No. 78-1476

JAMES C. GABRIEL,

Plaintiff,

v.

MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY OF MISSOURI,

et al.,

Defendants.

It is on this 7 day of April 1981, ORDERED:

1. The Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Perretti

filed December 31, 1980 be and the same hereby is adopted as

the Opinion of this Court.

2. For the reasons stated therein:

a. The complaint in the above matter is DISMISSED, with

prejudice and without costs;

b. Plaintiff is permanently enjoined from instituting any

suit in the Federal Court against any of these defendants or any

Order

other corporate officers or agents regarding any matter alleged

in the complaint that deals with the 1974 recapitalization.

s/ H. Lee Sarokin

H. LEE SAROKIN

United States District Judge

20a

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE

PERRETTI DATED DECEMBER 30, 1981

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Civil No. 78-1476

Hon. H. Lee Sarokin

JAMES C. GABRIEL,

Plaintiff,

v.

MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY OF MISSOURI,

MISSOURI PACIFIC CORPORATION, M. M. HENELLY,

JOHN H. LLOYD, D. B. JENKS AND THOMAS H. O’ LEARY

Defendants.

According to the complaint in this action, the plaintiff is

a stockholder in the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, which

will be called MoPac. MoPac’s application to the Interstate

Commerce Commission for approval of a plan of merger and

an exchange of stock has been approved by that agency and the

plaintiff disagrees with the order of the Commission.

Named as defendants in this case are MoPac, the Missouri

Pacific Corporation, a Delaware holding company, and two

officers of each of those corporations.

Plaintiff claims that jurisdiction is based on diversity of

citizenship, the amount in controversy exceeding $10,000.00.

Plaintiff is a citizen of the state of New Jersey. Defendant MoPac

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Report and Recommendation

is a corporation of the state of Missouri with its principal place

of business in that state and defendant Missouri Pacific

Corporation is a Delaware corporation having its principal place

of business in Missouri. The individual defendants are said to

be citizens of the state of Missouri as well.

At the time of the filing of the complaint MoPac’s application

to the ICC had not yet been ruled upon by the Commission but

its application was pending. Plaintiff demanded that this court

enjoin the defendants from processing any further steps before

the ICC in consummation of the merger and recapitalization of

MoPac which had been voted upon by that corporation’s

stockholders. In addition, the plaintiff demanded declaratory relief

on four issues, (1) declaring that the B stock (allegedly owned

by plaintiff) was entitled to vote as a class, (2) fixing the valuation

of the B shares according to a formula contained in a certain

agreed systems plan, (3) interpreting a certain opinion of the United

States Supreme Court as being controlling in the instant matter

and (4) declaring that the Interstate Commerce Commission Act

may not be used to defraud the holders of class B stock in MoPac.

During the pendency of this action the Interstate Commerce

Commission has ruled on MoPac’s application and has approved

it and the Commission’s order is now on appeal before the Court

of Appeals in the District of Columbia pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§2321. A letter memorandum from plaintiff dated December 13,

1980, ignores the fact that the ICC proceedings have already been

terminated. This lapse is symptomatic of the problems posed by

plaintiff’s entire case. It is apparent that plaintiff does not accept

the occurrences of the past 25 years which have related to the

interest which he holds in the Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.

Plaintiff attacks the merger plan almost entirely on the basis of

a misinterpretation of past events which will be elaborated upon

in this report. The plaintiff does allege, however, with specific

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Report and Recommendation

application to the plan of merger, that the exchange of stock would

not reflect the real value of the MoPac shares. Plaintiff further

alleges in a most conclusory manner that the ICC makes its

decisions strictly on the basis of the applications made by the

carriers without considering the testimony and briefs of objecting

stockholders. In support of this position the plaintiff attaches

to his complaint an extract from a book entitled, The

Superlawyers, by Joseph C. Gulden.

Defendants have moved pursuant to Rule 12(b) Fed. R. Civ.

P. to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, for lack of

jurisdiction of the person of the individual defendants and

Missouri Pacific Corporation and on the ground that the plaintiff's

claims are barred by res judicata. Defendant also seeks to enjoin

plaintiff permanently from instituting proceedings against

defendants on the facts alleged in the complaint on the ground

that any such proceedings would be vexatious. The parties having

presented matters outside the pleadings, the motions are treated

as for summary judgment. The original motion was filed on

August 25, 1978 and the plaintiff has continued to present material

until December of 1980. Plaintiff has been afforded a reasonable

opportunity to present his position and no further material in

connection with the motion will be received.

Although the complaint has 33 pages, the plaintiff's

allegations may be briefly summarized. Plaintiff claims thai the

Missczri Pacific Railroad Company was reorganized after

bankruptcy and its reorganization was approved by the Interstate

Commerce Commission on July 29, 1954 in an order at 290 ICC

477. He calls the reorganization the ‘‘ Agreed System Plan’’. Under

the agreed system plan two classes of stock were set up. A non-

cumulative preferred class A with voting rights and a class B,

common stock, with very limited voting rights. Plaintiff calls the

class B Shares ‘“‘Equity Bearing MoPac Common’’. He says,

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Report and Recommendation

correctly, that under the agreed system plan a majority vote of

each class was required for approval of any plan of

recapitalization. The complaint further alleges that the principa!

stockholder of MoPac class A was the Mississippi River Fuel

Corporation. In 1966 Mississippi River Fuel voted its A shares

to merge MoPac with the Texas and Pacific Railway and to issue

a single class of shaves of new stock in the merged railway. The

complaint points out that this effort resulted in the case of Levin

v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp. 386 U.S. 162 (1967), in which

the Supreme Court held that the plan of merger could not be

effectuated without the approval of each class of stock as was

required by MoPac’s Articles of Association and the laws of the

state of Missouri (thereafter the MoPac-Texas Pacific merger was

abandoned by the two railroads).

The Mississippi River Fuel Corporation changed its name

to Mississippi River Corporation and continued as the owner of

the majority of the outstanding Class A stock of MoPac. The

majority holder of the B stock was the Allegheny Cory . *tion.

Plaintiff alleges that Allegheny was a motor carrier unuer the

jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission which had

ordered it to divest itself of its class B shares in the rail carrier

MoPac. The complaint indicates that Allegheny’s class B MoPac

shares were actually controlled by the ICC. However, a copy of

an ICC report furnished by plaintiff, Allegheny/Jones Motor Co.,

109 MCC 333, indicates that Allegheny’s MoPac shares were held

under a trusteeship which had been previously ordered by the

commission.

According to the complaint, a class action was certified on

October 9, 1968 by Hon. F. P. Bryan in the Southern District

of New York. The suit alleged that the class B dividends were

too low and that the directors of MoPac were favoring the class

A stockholders to the benefit of Mississippi River Corporation.

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Allegheny Company was a class representative. The suit resulted

in a settlement which the plaintiff did not approve. The complaint

alleges “‘It is unconstitutional, against due process, to hold

dissenters in a Class Action’’. The complaint further alleges that

the settlement was contrary to agreed system plan. According to

the complaint, the settlement involved an agreement between

Allegheny and MoPac for the transfer of the Allegheny class B

shares to the Mississippi River Corporation at an agreed value.

The settlement agreement was put to a vote of the stockholders

voting by classes. The plaintiff complains that the proxy statement

did not reveal that Allegheny had important financial reasons for

wishing to dispose of its class B common shares, that is to say,

the Jones Motor Company matter was not explained in the proxy

statement. Plaintiff cast his class B shares against the plan but

the majority of both classes voted for a recapitalization which

involved a conversion of the class A preferred into a new MoPac

common and the elimination of class voting. The recapitalization

was also the subject of an application for approval by the ICC

which was granted in December, 1973. Omitted from the complaint

is all reference to the case of Gabriel v. United States, 416 Fed.

Supp. 810 (D.N.J. 1976), an appeal to a three judge court to set

aside and annul the order of the ICC which approved the

recapitalization and authorized the issuance of the securities in

accordance with the plan. Gabriel v. United States will be discussed

in connection with a review of the defendants’ position in this

matter.

The allegations of the complaint skip to events which occurred

in 1977. Mississippi River Corporation had changed its name to

Missouri Pacific Corp. which is said to be a Delaware holding

company owning 92.3% of the shares of MoPac. The old

Allegheny class B shares had been exchanged for MoPac common

under the 1973 recapitalization plan and had been sold to Missouri

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Pacific Corp. in accordance with the settlement worked out in

Levin v. Mississippi River Corporation, the class action. The

plaintiff had not surrendered his class B shares and makes the

following allegation in his complaint:

The fact of the matter is that Class B as of today

controls the MoPac veto according to the U.S.

Supreme Court Decision: Levin v. Miss, 386 US

162, 170 (1967) a “‘Plan’’ may not be adopted

without the consent of at least a majority of

CLASS B.

Plaintiff CLASS B MoPac stockholder has been

and is presently being severely damaged by

Defendants who are working in concert to take

away his Class B values and transfer them to MPC

to enrich themselves ... .

According to the complaint, MoPac and Missouri Pacific

Corporation proposed in 1977 to merge MoPac into Missouri

Pacific Corporation. Each share of MoPac common which was

issued in the 1973 recapitalization would be exchanged for .95

share of Missouri Pacific Corporation stock. Plaintiff alleges that

this plan is unfair in that it undervalues the class B shares which

he holds. In addition, he alleges that the holding company which

has power to elect the MoPac board of directors ‘‘is using that

power to the detriment of all the MoPac shares, including the

Class B MoPac Common shares. MPC is misusing [the ICC

proceeding] to try to take over all remaining MoPac shares.”’

Plaintiff charges that Missouri Pacific Corp. wili receive

**enormous financial benefits’’ from the merger the purpose of

which is a “‘conspiracy to defraud the Class B equity bearing

MoPac Common stockhoiders.”’

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Report and Recommendation

According to the complaint the plaintiff attended a special

meeting of the stockholders of MoPac held on December 9, 1977

for the purpose of voting on the plan of merger. The complaint

states that there remain 1,015 shares of class B which had not

been exchanged. Plaintiff voted 76% of these shares against the

proposal. He alleges that this constitutes a veto of the plan since

**The law requires the assent of the majority of the MoPac

shareholders on a separate Class vote basis’’.

Defendants, according to the complaint, are ‘pretending

Class B MoPac equity bearing Common shares which are the

sesiduary Geneiislasies of the Mlssourl Pacific RR properties don't

exist ....’’. The plaintiff’s purported veto, having been

diareggeiied Wy the defendants, an application was made to the

ICC on December 20, 1977 for approval of the plan of merger

and the issuance of new stock in exchange for the MoPac shares.

Plaintiff contends that the exchange ratio is unfair as to him

because it undervalues his class B stock. He argues that this is

so because the 1973 recapitalization in its turn undervalued the

class B stock. The complaint goes on to say that the class B stock

must be evaluated ‘‘at their real true value’’ based on an appraisal

of the assets of MoPac including its land holdings and its mineral

rights. In this connection the plaintiff alleges that the defendants

are attempting to conceal the fact that the corporation is the owner

of extensive land which was granted to it in the 1800's.

In order to forestall action by the ICC on the defendants’

application, action which plaintiff believes would be favorable

to MoPac, his complain: seeks to enjoin the defendants from

taking further steps to obtain approval of the plan. As has been

seen, the plaintiff also seeks declaratory judgment.

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SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Plaintiff claims that the jurisdiction of this court is based

on diversity of citizenship and his prayer is for relief against the

named defendants. The effect of the relief sought, if granted,

would be to enjoin a proceeding pending before the ICC and to

give a court’s adjudication of matters pending before that

commission. The circumstances which existed when plaintiff filed

his complaint are established by the exhibits offered by defendants

in support of their motion. A decision of the Interstate Commerce

Commission dated May 9, 1978 in connection with the Missouri

Pacific Railroad Company merger, ordered that the proceeding

would be handled under a modified procedure which set up a

time-table for the filing of written submissions and the

determination of the matter on the papers submitted. Plaintiff,

James C. Gabriel, was a party of record in that proceeding. The

decision of May 12, 1978 contains the following:

Certain of the commentators allege that the

proposed merger and consolidation will diminish

the value of their Class B common shares of

Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, a Missouri

corporation (MoPac), and that the plan is for

various other reasons contrary to the public

interest. The primary contention relates to

questions exhaustively examined in prior

proceedings. In 1973, the United States District

Court for the Southern District of New York

approved a settlement agreement in an action

originally directed at MoPac’s dividend policy with

respect to the Class B stock. Levin v. Mississippi

River Corporation, 59 F.R.D. 353 (S.D.N.Y.),

aff'd mem. sub nom. Wesson v. Mississippi River

Corporation, 486 F.2d 1398 (2d Cir), cert denied,

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414 U.S. 1112 (1973), reh. denied, 415 U.S. 939

(1974). The railroad then sought Commission

authority to issue certain new types of stock to

effectuate the settlement agreement and the

recapitalization plan which it encompassed. The

Commission determined, and the reviewing courts

agreed, that the offer of exchange for Class B stock

represented the fair value of those securities, and

that the plan was reasonable to all parties and in

the public interest. Missouri Pac.R. Co., Securities,

347 1.C.C. 377, 411, 417 (1973), aff’d sub non.

Gabriel v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 810 (D.

N.J.) aff'd, 429 U.S. 1011 (1976), reh. denied, 429

U.S. 1124 (1977); Commission decision also aff'd

sub nom. Labelle Gillespie v. United States, Civil

Action No. 74-239-C(2) (E.D. Mo. 1974).

Unwilling to accept the finality of those

determinations, the noted commentators have

never exchanged their old Class B shares for the

presently-outstanding MoPac Common Stock, and

would now have us reconsider the recapitalization

proceedings. The Commission and the courts have

fully reviewed and approved the recapitalization,

however, and the matter is now res judicata. We

cannot permit the holders of unexchanged Class

B stock to use the occasion of our review of the

instant proposals as a vehicle for re-examination

of issues finally determined in previous

proceedings, and we will not entertain arguments

directed at the fairness or propriety of the prior

recapitalization.

It must be concluded that the plaintiff filed this action as

a direct response to the Commission’s decision of May 12, 1978.

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No matter how it is designated in the complaint, the action is

nothing other than an attempt to appeal the May 12, 1978 ruling

of the Commission. It is obvious that the ruling was not a final

order of the Commission. Apparently plaintiff determined not

to go forward before the Commission on the Commission’s terms.

It is settled law that a court cannot enjoin administrative

action until administrative remedies have been exhausted. Meyers

v. Bethlehem Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).

In Meyers, the district court, enjoined the National Labor

Relations Board from holding a hearing on a complaint of unfair

labor practices at Bethlehem’s Fore River Plant. Bethiehem’s

contention was that the plant’s operations did not involve interstate

or foreign commerce; and therefore that the hearings would be

futile, and their holding would cause bad labor relations, impaired

efficiency, and substantial expenses. (327 U.S. at 47-8).

In reversing the court said, per Brandeis, J. (327 U.S. at 50-1):

The contention is at war with the long settled

rule of judicial administration that no one is

entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or

threatened injury until the prescribed

administrative remedy has been exhausted. That

rule has been repeatedly acted on in cases where,

as here, the contention is made that the

administrative body lacked power over the subject

matter.

Obviously, the rule requiring exhaustion of

the administrative remedy cannot be circumvented

by asserting that the charge on which the complaint

rests is groundless and that the mere holding of

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the prescribed administrative hearing would result

in irreparable damage. (fns. omitted).

“If it be the policy of the law that the Labor Board cannot

be enjoined from conducting a hearing on the complaint made,

it would not seem proper that this policy could be nullified and

evaded by permitting an injunction prohibiting the defendants

from originating the complaint which would be the subject of

hearing by the Labor Board.’’ Burlington Mills Corp. v. Textile

Workers Union, 44 F. Supp. 699, 702 (W.D. Va. 1941). See to

the same effect Capital Transit Co. v. Safeway Trails, 201 F.2d

708 (D.C. Cir. 1953).

There is no doubt that the Interstate Commerce Commission

has exclusive jurisdiction over the applications presented to it by

MoPac. Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S. 182 (1948). Upon

a final ruling by the Commission, a party aggrieved may obtain

judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5

U.S.C. §702 in the Court of Appeals, 28 U.S.C. §2321.

Since the filing of the complaint in this court, the ICC has

issued its final order on the application. The ICC decision is dated

September 25, 1978 and the petitions for administrative review

by the Commission were denied on March 8, 1979. One of the

petitioners for review was plaintiff's brother, Napoleon C. Gabriel.

Napoleon’s assault upon the Commission’s decision was based

upon the argument that class B stockholders were not bound by

the 1974 recapitalization of MoPac. Napoleon demanded that his

class B common stock be evaluated according to the terms of

the 1956 agreed systems plan. It can be seen that his position

before the ICC is identical to that taken by his brother, the plaintiff

in this matter.

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Because of the passage of time, the facts to which the plaintiff

addresses himself have changed. While he originally sought to

enjoin defendants from processing their application before the

ICC, that application has now been approved. The plaintiff's

prayers for declaratory relief are now directed at a final order

of the Commission. The declaratory relief, if granted, would

reverse not only the Commission’s decision of May 12, 1978, but

also the final decision of September 25, 1978 and the denial of

petition for administrative review dated March 8, 1979. Judicial

review of the Commission’s orders is provided for in 28 U.S.C.

§2321 which reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

Except as otherwise provided by an Act of

Congress, a proceeding to enjoin or suspend, in

whole or in part, a rule, regulation, or order of

the Interstate Commerce Commission shall be

brought in the Court of Appeals as provided by

and in the manner prescribed in Chapter 158 of

this title.

The jurisdiction of the court of appeals to review actions of the

Interstate Commerce Commission is established by 28 U.S.C.

§2352, the relevant portions of which read as follows:

The court of appeals has exclusive jurisdiction

to enjoin, set aside, suspend. . . , or to determine

the validity of - ...

All rules, regulations, or final orders of the

Interstate Commerce Conumission made reviewable

by § 2321 of this title. . . . Jurisdiction is invoked

by filing a petition as provided by Section 2344

of this title.

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28 U.S.C. §2344 provides that the action for review shall be against

the United States. 28 U.S.C. §2322 also provides that “‘All actions

specified in § 2321 of this title shall be brought by or against

the United States’’. The relief which plaintiff seeks and the

application for merger which was pending before the Interstate

Commerce Commission do not involve in any way any order of

the Interstate Commerce Commission for the payment of money

or the collection of fines, penalties and forfeitures. Thus, 28 U.S.C.

§1336(A) and 28 U.S.C. §1398 are inapplicable.

One of the primary objectives of the Congress in providing

for judicial review of Interstate Commerce Commission orders

by the court of appeals was to prevent a multiplicity of suits

relating to the same subject matter. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1569,

93d Cong. 2d Sess. reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &

AD. NEWS 7025. To permit this plaintiff to disregard the statutory

method of securing review of the Commission’s orders by invoking

this court’s jurisdiction under the guise of a diversity case would

vitiate the congressional plan and objective. Entertaining the suit

under diversity jurisdiction would encourage the bringing of

multiple suits challenging a single ICC order in different locations

intent ‘‘to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the court of appeals in

which the agency record is first filed .. .”’ Id. at 7033.

A district court has no subject matter jurisdiction in this case

because ‘‘exclusive jurisdiction over this action is vested in the

court of appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§2321 and 2342.”’

Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. U.S., 446 F. Supp. 721,

724 (D. Del. 1978), ‘“‘orders other than those involving monetary

matters are of course now subject to review only by the Courts

of Appeals under [28 U.S.C. §2321]”’, Queker State Oil Refining

Corp. v. U.S., 465 F. Supp. 75, 76 (W.D. Pa., 1979).

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State of Minn., by Spannaus v. O’Neal, 472 F. Supp. 905

(D. Minn. 1979), involves an attempt to bypass the provisions

of 28 U.S.C. §2321 and §2342 by invoking the jurisdiction of

the district court under the guise of a petition for mandamus.

In the Spannaus case there were pending before the ICC,

applications by varicus railroad companies to abandon certain

lines within the state of Minnesota. The ICC made an

environmental evaluation of each proposed abandonment and

concluded that inasmuch as the abandonments did not constitute

major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the

human environment, no environmental impact statement would

be required. The Commission had not issued a decision on the

merits in any of the abandonment proceedings when plaintiff

petitioned for the writ. The court relied on Meyers v. Bethlehem

Shipbuilding Corp., supra, in holding: ‘“‘Judicial review of

administrative agency decisions must be postponed until available

administrative remedies have been exhausted.’’ 472 F. Supp. at

907. The court concluded as follows at 472 F. Supp. at 908:

In any event, even if judicial review were

available at this time, exclusive jurisdiction would

lie in the court of appeals, not this court, 28 U.S.C.

§§232i, 2342. Where exclusive jurisdiction is

mandated by statute, as it is here, plaintiff cannot

by-pass the procedure which Congress has provided

by labeling its requested relief “‘mandamus.’’ North

American Van Lines v. Interstate Commerce

Commission, 386 F. Supp. 665, 681 (N.D. Ind.

1974). Where a statute specifically provides for

exclusive jurisdiction in one court, as 28 U.S.C.

§2342 does, this specific grant of jurisdiction takes

precedence over a general grant of jurisdiction, /7T

v. Vencap, Lid., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975);

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Cook, Inc. v. United States, 394 F .2d 84 (7th Cir.

1968).

An identical view of the law is stated in B.F. Goodrich

Company v. Northwest Industries, Inc., 424 F.2d 1349 (3rd Cir.

1970), a case which arose under the since-repealed three judge

court method of review of ICC orders. Goodrich sought in effect

to enforce section 5(2) of the Interstate Commerce Act (now 49

U.S.C. §11343), by an action in the district court requesting an

injunction restraining Industries from acquiring Goodrich stock

without first obtaining Commission approval. Goodrich had

sought the same relief by intervening in a merger proceeding before

the Commission, in which Industries was a party. The Commission

had denied the relief sought by Goodrich.

It was held at 424 F.2d at 1352-4:

We agree that the District Court had no

jurisdiction over the Goodrich complaint. The

complaint was in substance a collateral attack on

an order of the Commission and an attack on such

an order may be brought only before a three judge

court. . . . Venner v. Michigan Central Railroad

Co., 271 U.S. 127.

The statutory procedure for review is

applicable although an order is not directly

attacked—so long as the practical effect of a

successful suit would contradict or countermand

a Commission order. Venner v. Michigan Central

Railroad, supra.

The above language is directly applicable to plaintiff's

complaint. Since the complaint was filed, the Commission has

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entered an order authorizing elimination of the interest in Missouri

Pacific Railroad Company of the minority shareholders (including

this plaintiff).

It is respectfully recommended that the complaint be dismissed

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

THE VEXATIOUS NATURE OF THE COMPLAINT

The issues raised in the complaint, the demand for relief and

the arguments of the plaintiff in support of his position have been

summarized in the discussion of the contents of plaintiff's

complaint. Plaintiff has presented the identical matters to a variety

of forums over the course of the years. None of the forums have

been receptive to the plaintiff's claims and the repetitive and

vexatious nature of his claims have been called to his attention

on past occasions. He, however, persists in pursuing issues which

have been repeatedly decided against him.

The issues presented by the plaintiff in this case were first

dealt with and disposed of in Levin v. Mississippi River

Corporation, 59 F.R.D. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), Aff’d. sub nom

Wesson v. Mississippi River Corporation, 486 F.2d 1398 (2nd Cir

1973) cert. denied, sub nom Wesson v. Levin, 414 U.S. 1112 1973,

rehearing denied, 415 U.S. 937 (1974). Under MoPac’s 1956

reorganization plan, the Class A stockholders had voting control

while the Class B stockholders had the residual equity and a veto

power over mergers, consolidations and reorganizations. ‘‘In

practical terms, the ‘ingenious’ solution envisioned under the 1956

reorganization created a basic conflict between the two classes,

with the equity ownership principally in the B stock, but with

effective operating control in the A stock.”’ 59 F.R.D. at 358.

The situation led to the Lzvin case which was certified as a class

action by Hon. Frederick P. Bryan. The class was certified within

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the provisions of Rule 23(a)(b)(1) and (2) Fed. R. Civ. P. and

the members of the class were all Class B stockholders. A copy

of the order has been submitted in support of this motion.

According to the plaintiff's complaint he opted out of the class

action. However the privilege of being excluded from the judgment

only exists in actions brought under Rule 23(b\(3), Wright and

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil §1787.

The Levin case was vigorously and exhaustively litigated. A

chronology of the proceedings in that case will demonstrate the

plaintiff's persistence in the face of warnings from the courts.

A final judgment approving the settlement was entered May 2,

1973. The judgment was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court

of Appeals and within the same year the United States Supreme

Court denied certiorari. While the matter was on appeal, a motion

was made to the District Court to set aside the judgment. The

motion raised the Allegheny/Jones matter. It was denied on

December 5, 1973, the district court holding that the subject had

been cons'dcred in the original hearing to approve the judgment.

In early 1974 the Supreme Court denied a rehearing of its denial

of certification.

After the denial of the rehearing by the Supreme Court there

was a motion to vavate the final judgment. This motion attacked

the class certification. It was denied on April 8, 1974. The denial

was affirmed by the Second Circuit on December 18, 1974.

Certification was denied in 421 U.S. 915 (1975). A rehearing was

denied, 421 U.S. 1006 (1975) and a second petition for rehearing

was rejected by the Clerk of the Supreme Court. While this was

going on, plaintiff moved in the district court to set aside the

judgment and the motion was denied on March 21, 1975. The

denia! was affirmed by the Second Circuit November 18, 1975,

which contains the following warning to plaintiff: ‘‘Although at

this time we will not act pursuant to appellees’ suggestion that

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costs be imposed upon Gabriel under FRAP 38, further appeais

of this nature in a matter already so thoroughly litigated may

justify the imposition of such a sarction.”’

Even while the appeal to the circuit was pending, plaintiff

made a second motion to the district court to set aside the judgment

which was denied June 3, 1975. The opinion states, ‘‘Petitioner

Gabriel’s motion to re-open is hereby denied. Court finds motion |

vexatious and orders movant to pay $100.00 counsel fees... .”’

Plaintiff returned to the court of appeals and requested an

extension of time to file a petition for a rehearing en banc of

the circuit’s affirmance on November 18, 1975 of the denial of

plaintiff's motion to set aside the judgment. The motion for

extention of time was denied on December 16, 1975. Plaintiff’s

motion to reconsider the motion to extend the time was denied

on January 7, 1976. Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider the motion

to reconsider the motion to extend the time was denied on February

2, 1976. The order stated, ‘‘this court will not consider any further

motions for reconsideration in this appeal.”’

While thus engaged in the Levin case, plaintiff was also busy

elsewhere. MoPac, having settled the Levin case, proceeded in

accordance with the settlement agreement to file its application

with the Interstate Commerce Commission for authority to issue

shares which would enable it to effectuate the plan of

recapitalization which was the heart of the settlement agreement.

Plaintiff appeared in that proceeding as a party of record. The

report of the Commission dated December 6, 1973, 347 ICC 377

reveals that the Commission considered the reasonableness of the

plan of recapitalization as it applied to the Class B stock. Expert

testimony was presented in support of the plan and ten Class B

shareholders including this plaintiff offered testimony to the

contrary. The issues presented by the objectors included their

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demand that the value of the B shares be measured by book value

in accordance with their view of the requirements of the 1954

reorganization plan. The Class B objectors presented the argument

that the class action in the Southern District was illegal and that

the class voting rights which were established in the 1954

reorganization plan were immutable. The objectors argued that

the vote of the MoPac stockholders which adopted the plan of

recapitalization was invalid because of misrepresentations in the

proxy statement. The alleged misrepresentations relate to the

Allegheny/Jones matter. The objectors also alleged ill-defined

improper conduct by the directors and generalized conspiracy and

fraud. The Commission found all of the objectors’ contentions

to be without merit. The Commission ruled that the 1954

reorganization was not an ‘‘immutable contract for all time’’ and

pointed out that the 1954 reorganization plan itself recognized

the possibility of a change in the relationship between the two

classes of stock.

Plaintiff moved for reconsideration which was denied. The

motion for reconsideration was based upon plaintiff’s argument

that the Levin case was an illegal proceeding. Plaintiff’s next

petition which sought a finding that an issue of general

transportation importance was involved was denied in March,

1974.

Seeking review of the action of the Interstate Commerce

Commission, plaintiff commenced suit in this district in the case

entitled Gabriel v. United States, Civil No. 74-471, filed April

3, 1974. After a multiplicity of motions in which plaintiff sought

unsuccessfully to compel the joinder of the Internal Revenue Serv-

ice as a party plaintiff, the case was decided in an opinion by Hon.

Clarkson S. Fisher, writing for a three judge court, on April 20,

1976. Gabriel v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 810 (D.N.J. 1976).

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to those dealt with by the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Interestingly enough, while plaintiff’s suit against the United States

was pending here in this district, an identical suit, Gillespie v.

U.S.A., was brought in the Eastern District of Missouri. The case

is entitled Gillespie v. United States, Civil No. 74-239-C(2). The

three judge court in an opinion by Hon. John K. Regan disposed

of the identical issues presented in Gabriel v. United States, 416

F. Supp. at 814 n.2.

Plaintiff made repeated efforts to convince the three judge

court in this district to reconsider its order affirming the decision

of the Interstate Commerce Commission. A motion for reargument

was denied un May 29, 1976. A Letter-Opinion dated June 9,

1976 reads as follows: ‘‘The Court is in receipt of yet another

motion for reconsideration of the Court’s judgment. After

consultation with the other two members of the Court, I am

authorized tu. advise all parties that the motion is denied.’’

Plaintiff's motion for reargument was denied on June 21, 1976

and another motion for reargument was denied on the following

day.

After spending four years litigating the identical issues more

or less simultaneously in three separate actions in a variety of

foruins and losing consistently, plaintiff attempted to take another

bite from the apple when MoPac presented its plan for merger

to the ICC. An extract from the ICC opinion of May 12, 1978

which deals with plaintiff’s attempt to reopen the issues is quoted

on page 8 of this report. It was at that point that plaintiff began

this suit. Although plaintiff dropped out of the ICC proceedings,

his brother, Napoleon, remained as a party of record and

continued to flog the same issues in his petition for administrative

review. it is clear beyond argument that all of the issues in this

complaint which relate to the 1974 recapitalization are res

adjudicata. The Supreme Court has recently restated the purposes

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underlying the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel

as follows:

To preclude parties from contesting matters that

they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate

protects their adversaries from the expense and

vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves

judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial

action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent

decisions. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147,

153-4 (1979).

Each of these purposes is implicated in Gabriel’s attempt to

circumvent prior rulings and to undermine proceedings currently

underway in the Court of Appeals. Kane v. City of New York,

468 F. Supp. 586, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).

Plaintiff’s deliberate course of conduct over the past years

in pursuing repeated baseless proceedings, all stemming from an

identical fact situation demonstrates complete lack of good faith.

Gabriel’s pattern of copying or paraphrasing one complaint and

motion from another and his pas’ behavior of proceeding

simultaneously in multiple suits in a variety of forums can show

only this plaintiff’s wish to harass the defendant by the abuse

of legal process.

Particularly appropriate to this case are the words of Hill

v. Estelle, 423 F. Supp. 690, 695 (S.D. Tex. 1976):

It ... is within this Court’s inherent power under

28 U.S.C. §1651(a) to enjoin litigants who are using

the courts as a stage for their vendetta of

harassment and abuse.

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The court commented thai a complaint, inflated with reference

to law, cannot “‘camouflage the duplicitous and duplicative

nature’ of the ciaim.

... [T]he timing of the ... filing, the superficial

changes in form between the ... complaints and

the substantially idential nature of the complaints

lead to the inexorable conclusion that plaintiffs

maliciously have filed a complaint as to previously

litigated matter in order to abuse the judicial

process with the resultant effect of burdening the

Court’s already heavy caseload and obstructing the

application of justice in more meritorious causes.

423 F. Supp. at 695.

Gambocz v. Yelencsics, 468 F.2d 837 (3rd Cir. 1972) involves

a situation in which plaintiff's first suit was dismissed with

prejudice on defendant’s motion, the dismissal was affirmed on

appeal and, while a petition for rehearing was still pending, a

second suit was filed. It was held: ‘‘Injunctive relief was a proper

remedy under the circumstances’’. 468 F.2d at 842. The court

observed that res judicata barred a relitigation of the same subject.

Browning Deben‘ure Holders Com. v. DASA Corp., 605 F.2d

35 (2nd Cir. 1979) holds that where an action is repetitious or

intended to harass, a district court in the exercise of its equity

jurisdiction and pursuant to the Ali Writs Statute, may enjoin

plaintiff from further litigation based on facts previously alleged.

As noted in Kane v. City of New York, 468 F. Supp. at 590:

It is true that litigious affinity alone does not

support the grant of an injunction, for ‘access to

the Courts is one of the cherished freedoms of our

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system of government.’ But when it becomes clear

that the courts are being used as a vehicle for

harassment by a ‘knowledgeable and articulate

experienced pro se litigant’ who asserts the same

claims repeatedly in slightly altered guise, the

issuance of an injunction is warranted. (footnotes

omitted)

In Rudnicki v. McCormack, 210 F. Supp. 905, 910 (D. Mass.

1962), apneal dismissed, 372 U.S. 226 (1963), it was said

The English Courts have not hesitated to

exercise the power thus vested in them by

restraining what Professor Chafee refers to as

‘pertinacious litigants’ from abusing the process

of the courts by the repeated institution of frivolous

litigation.

The courts of the United States have also acted

to enjoin a litigant from subjecting another to

repeated, baseless and vexatious suits on the same

subject matter, recognizing without question that

such a course of conduct is a sufficient ground

for the issuance of an injunction.

The historical background of the power is stated in Higgins

v. California Prune & Apricot Growers, 282 F.2d 550, 557 (2nd

Cir. 1922):

It is elementary that these [equity] courts will

interfere by injunction to prevent an inequitable

43a

Report and Recommendation

use of legal processes, and their power to do so

has been established since the decision of the Earl

of Oxford’s Case, 1 Ch. R. 1 determined the

controversy between Lord Chancellor Ellesmere

and Lord Chief Justice Coke in the times of

Charles I.... In Story’s Equity Jurisprudence (14th

Ed.) §1226, it is said: ‘Another class of cases to

which the process of injunction is most beneficially

applied is to suppress undue and vexatious

litigation.’

It is submitted that an injunction is necessary in this case

to insure the finality of judgments entered in this and other courts.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION

Although raised in the motion, the issue of personal

jurisdiction over the defendants has not been briefed. The

marshal’s returns of service on the individual defendants indicate

that they were not served in the manner provided by Rule 4(d)(1)

or 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. Service on the individuals was made at a

business address on persons connected with the business enterprise.

Purported service on the New Jersey Commissioner of Motor

Vehicles is, of course, no service in this case.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated it is respectfully recommended that

the complaint be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

It is respectfully recommended that plaintiff be permanently

enjoined from instituting any suit in the federal court against any

of these defendants or any other corporate officers or agents

Ada

Report and Recommendation

regarding any matter alleged in the complaint that deals with the

1974 recapitalization.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Serena Perretti

SERENA PERRETTI

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

Dated: December 30, 1980

ORIGINAL TO THE CLERK

xc: .Hon. H. Lee Sarokin

James C. Gabriel, P.O. Box 94, Sea Girt, N.J. 08750

-Leon Leighton, Esq., 25 Hadden Road, Scarsdale, N.Y. 08750

45a

EXHIBITS

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT LeVASSEUR

STATE OF CONNECTICUT )

COUNTY OF NEW HAVEN )

Robert LeVasseur, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

1. At the time I intervened in 1968 as a plaintiff in a class

action commenced by Betty Levin on December 29, 1967 in the

United States District Court, Southern District of New York, Case

#CIV 5095 (Edward Weinfeld), Levin vs Mississippi River Corp.

59 F.R.D. 353 (1973) I was the owner of 336 shares of Missouri

Pacific Railroad Company Class B stock and 3000 shares of Class

A stock of said railroad.

Dated: March 16, 1981

Waterbury, Connecticut

s/ Robert LeVasseur

Robert LeVasseur

VERIFICATION

STATE OF CONNECTICUT )

COUNTY OF NEW HAVEN )

ROBERT LeVASSEUR, being duly sworn, deposes and says

that he fas read the foregoing AFFIDAVIT and knows the

contents thereof; that the same is true to the deponent’s own

knowledge, except as to matters therein stated to be alleged on

information and belief, and that as to these matters deponent

believes it to be true.

46a

Exhibits

Be it remembered that on this 16th day of March, 1981

personally appeared before me, a notary public of Connecticut,

ROBERT LeVASSEUR, to me known and known to me to be

the individual described herein and who has sworn to and executed

the foregoing AFFIDAVIT, and he acknowledges to me that he

executed the same.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ John J. Pacowta

My Commission Expires 4/85

I hereby certify that this

AFFIDAVIT is a TRUE COPY

of the original.

s/ Edwin G. Fisher

Notary Public of New Jersey

My Commission Expires Jan. 28, 1982

_—

“ page . 999

JAHES Ce. CABRIEL

ROD} COX 16

COLTS NECK NJ O7722

PLEASE SIGH, DATE AND RETUNN YOUR PROXY PROMPTLY IN THE ENCLOCCD ERVELOPE

‘be J Pie teats The underijnsd ackacwh.bjcs e-sipt of

Fal Ae © copy of the Huise of such wewliy ead

C BLLELL the ectouipenyi..y Proxy Staa...at

Dato’ 1973

p , 6 ‘

“1199.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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