Appendix — Gabriel v. Missouri Pacific Railroad
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JUDGMENT ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT DATED JUNE 30, 1982
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 81-2676
JAMES C. GABRIEL,
Appellant
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., et al.
(Civil No. 78-1476 - D.N.J. - Newark)
Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6)
June 16, 1982
BEFORE: SEITZ, Chief Judge, HIGGINBOTHAM, and
BECKER, Circuit Judges.
After consideration of the contentions raised by appellant,
it is
ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that the judgment of the
district court be and is hereby affirmed.
Costs taxed against appellant.
By the Court,
s/ Seitz
Chief Judge
ATTEST:
Dated: June 30, 1982 _°/ ‘Sally Mrvos
Sally Mrvos, Clerk
la
APPENDIX
ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT DATED JULY 27, 1982
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 81-2676
JAMES C. GABRIEL,
Appellant
v.
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD CO., ET AL.,
(Civil No. 78-1476 - D.N.J. - Newark)
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING
Present: SEITZ, Chief Judge, ALDISERT, ADAMS, GIBBONS,
HUNTER, WEIS, GARTH, HIGGINBOTHAM, SLOVITER,
and BECKER, Circuit Judges.
The petition for rehearing filed by appellant in the above
entitled case having been submitted to the judges who participated
in the decision of this court and to all the other available circuit
judges of the circuit in regular active service, and no judge who
concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing, and a
majority of the circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service
not having voted for rehearing by the court in banc, the petition
for rehearing is denied.
By the Court,
s/ Seitz
Chief Judge
2a
ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY DATED JULY 22, 1981
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY
Civ. No. 78-1476
JAMES C. GABRIEL, Pro Se,
Plaintiff,
~against-
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY OF MISSOURI,
MISSOURI PACIFIC CORPORATION, M. M. HENNELLY,
JOHN H. LLOYD, D. B. JENKS and THOMAS J. O’LEARY,
Defendants.
FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Plaintiff's motion, dated June 15, 1981, his 4th motion for
reconsideration of Judge Sarokin’s Order of April 7, 1981, was
reassigned to the undersigned by Order of the Court, inasmuch
as plaintiff, after Judge Sarokin had denied his three previous
motions for reconsideration of the April Order, filed with the
instant motion a claim against Judge Sarokin for an alleged
deprivation of rights in the amount of $35,000,000.
Judge Sarokin’s Order adopted, as the Opinion of the Court,
Magistrate Perretti’s Report and Recommendation filed December
31, 1980 (hereinafter ‘‘Report’’). That Report, containing findings
3a
Order
of fact anu conclusions of law, is incorporated herein with the
same force and effect as if set forth in full.
Plaintiff has appeared pro se throughout. At oral argument
it was stated by defendants’ counsel, and not denied by plaintiff,
that his stock involved in this action has a present market value
of $2,200,000, and accumulated dividends (which plaintiff has
not collected) aggregating $1,100,000.
I have reviewed the extended file in this matter, and heard
full oral argument on July 13, 1981. I make the following findings
of fact and conclusions of law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff owns what was formerly Class B stock of
defendant Missouri Pacific Railroad Company (MoPac). He filed
this complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief on July 3,
1978. Jurisdiction was based on diversity.
2. Plaintiff demanded declaratory relief on four issues, (1)
declaring tha the B stock (allegedly owned by plaintiff) was
entitled to vote as a class, (2) fixing the valuation of the B shares
according to a formula contained in a certain agreed systems plan,
(3) interpreting a certain opinion of the United States Supreme
Court as being controlling in the instant matter and (4) declaring
that the Interstate Commerce Commission Act may not be used
to defraud the holders of class B stock in MoPac.
3. By a recapitalization plan of MoPac consummated in
January 1974, each share of Class B stock owned by plaintiff
and others was converted into new common stock. The
recapitalization was made pursuant to:
da
Order
a. A judgment of the United States District Court
approving the transaction in a class action in which plaintiff
actively participated (Leighton, Ex. A); Levin v. Mississippi River
Corporation, 59 F .R.D. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), “‘affirmed on Judge
Weinfeld’s opinion below’’ (Ex. B), sub nom. Wesson v.
Mississippi River Corporation, 486 F. 2d 1398 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. den. sub. nom. Wesson v. Levin, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973),
rehearing denied 415 U.S. 937 (1974). See Report, pp. 16-18.
b. An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission
authorizing the recapitalization, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §20a (Ex.
C), in a litigated proceeding in which plaintiff actively participated.
Missouri Pac. R. Co. Securities, 3471 1.C.C. 377 (1973), rehearing
denied (Ex. D), petition for finding that an issue of general
transportation importance is involved denied (Ex. E). That order
was affirmed (Ex. F) sub. nom. Gabriel v. United States, 416
F. Supp. 810 (D. N.J. 1973 [three-Judge Court, Hunter C.J.,
Whipple & Fisher, D. JJ., opinion by Fisher, !.]), reargument
denied (Ex. G), reconsideration denied (Ex. H} ~~ sgument denied
(Exh. I), reargument denied (Ex. J). This Court’s order (Ex. F)
was affirmed. 429 U.S. 1011 (1976), rehearing denied, ibid. 1124
(1977). The Commission’s order was also affirmed, sub. nom.
Gillespie v. United States, {unreported}, Civil Action No.
74-239-C(2) (E.D. Mo. 1974 [three-Judge Court, Webster, C.J.,
Wangelin and Regan, D. JJ.}). (Ex. K). See Report, pp. 18-20.
4. Defendants moved to dismiss this claim for declaratory
judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b), on the ground that
the foregoing District Court judgment and the Interstate
Commerce Commission Order are res judicata (Report p. 3). The
Report says (p. 21):
Sa
Order
**It is clear beyond argument that all of the issues
in this complaint which related to the 1974
italization are res judicata’;
See fuller discussion at pp. 15-21.
5. Plaintiff's other claim sought to enjoin defendants
temporarily and permanently, from taking any further steps for
approval or consummation of the September 1, 1977 ‘Plan and
Joint Agreement of Merger, Consolidation and Recapitalization
of MoPac’”’ (Prayer for Relief, paragraph 1; see Report py 2).
The Plan filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant
49 U.S.C. § 20a, sought approval of the exchange of stock of
defendant Missouri Pacific Corporation for all of the outstanding
minority shares of MoPac (Report pp. 6-8).
6. Defendants moved to dismiss this claim, pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. p. 12(b)(1), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, on
remedies (Report p. 3). The Report recommended that dismissal
be granted on this ground (pp. 10, 24; see fuller discussion at
pp. 8-15).
7. Defendants also moved to enjoin plaintiff permanently
from instituting proceedings against defendants on the facts alleged
in the complaint, on the ground that any such proceedings would
be vexacious (Report p. 3). The Report recommended granting
such an injunction (P. 24; see fuller discussion at pp. 21-24).
8. Plaintiff filed exceptions (90 pages), supplemented by
numerous exhibits (47 pages).
9. On March 6, 1981, Judge Sarokin ordered:
6a
Order
**1. The Report and Recommendation of
Magistrate Perretti filed December 31, 1980 be and
the same hereby is adopted as the Opinion of this
court.
2. For the reasons stated therein, the complaint
in the above matter is DISMISSED, with prejudice
and without costs.’’
10. On March 23, plaintiff moved for reconsideration, to
set aside the foregoing Order. Defendants cross moved for
reconsideration, to amend the Order to provide injunctive relief
against instituting further suits in the Federal Court with respect
to the 1974 recapitalization.
11. On April 1, plaintiff filed a second motion for
reconsideration, to set aside the March 6th Order, and to transfer
this JURY TRIAL to the Southern District of New York “‘if your
Honor cannot have this JURY TRIAL tried in this New Jersey
Court.”
12. On April 6, Judge Sarokin sent the following letter to
the parties:
**Plaintiff Gabriel has moved for reconsideration
of the dismissal of the above-entitled matter dated
March 9, 1981. Having read all of the papers
submitted on behalf of all the parties in this matter,
the court finds no new issues or law which would
mandate reconsideration. Plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration is, therefore, denied.
Defendant has requested that the court enter an
injunction against the plaintiff, enjoining him from
7a
Order
instituting any suit in the federal court against any
of the defendants or any other corporate officers
or agents regarding any matter alleged in the
complaint in the above-entitled matter which deals
with the 1974 recapitalization. Authority for such
an injunction may be found in Montana v. United
States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-4 (1979).
Injunctive relief is a proper remedy under the
circumstances of this action. Actions that are
repetitious or that are intended to harass, as is the
case here, must be enjoined. The plaintiff Gabriel
is, therefore, enjoined from further litigation based
upon the facts alleged in Gabriel v. Missouri Pacific
Railroad, Civil No. 78-1476 in this or any other
federal court against any of the defendants or other
corporate officers or agents. The defendant will
submit an appropriate order.’’
13. On April 7, Judge Sarokin signed the Order which is
the subject of the instant motion for reconsideration. That Order
reads:
**1. The Report and Recommendation of
Magistrate Perretti filed December 31, 1980 be and
the same hereby is adopted as the Opinion of this
Court.
2. For the reasons stated therein:
a. The complaint in the above matter is
DISMISSED, with prejudice and without costs;
b. Plaintiff is permanently enjoined from
instituting any suit in the Federal Court against
any of these defendants or any other corporate
8a
Order
officers or agents regarding any matter alleged in
the complaint that deals with the 1974
recapitalization.’’
14. On April 10, plaintiff filed a third motion for
reconsideration, to set aside the March 6th Order. On April 20,
Judge Sarokin wrote to the parties:
‘For the reasons heretofore expressed and there
being no additiona! facts or law presented,
plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is denied.’’
15. On April 18, plaintiff filed his first. motion for
reconsideration to set aside the April 7th Order (33 pages).
16. On May 11, Judge Sarokin wrote to plaintiff, with the
original to the Clerk and cupy to defendants’ attorneys, as follows:
**I have reviewed your motion for reconsideration
and reargument and said motion is denied. You
are directed to file no further motions for
reconsideration or reargument in this matter. You
may pursue an appeal if you deem it appropriate.
Thank you.”’
17. On May 19, plaintiff filed a second motion for
reconsideration, to set aside the April 7th Order. This was couched
in the form of a motion to set aside the May | Ith Order, denying
his motion for reconsideration and reargument of his complaint
(31 pages).
18. On June 5, plaintiff filed a third motion for
reconsideration, to set aside the April 7th Order. This was couched
9a
Order
in the form of a motion to set aside the May 11th Order, which
had denied his motion for reconsideration and reargument of the
April 7th Order (15 pages).
19. On June 9, Judge Sarokin signed an Order in the form
of a letter to the parties. This reads:
**The court has reviewed plaintiff’s further motion
for reconsideration, and said motion is denied.
Plaintiff is ordered and directed not to file any
further motions for reconsideration and
reargument in this matter. If plaintiff violates the
order of the court in this regard, the court will
entertain an appropriate motion for counsel fees
or other sanctions.”’
20. On June 23, plaintiff filed a fourth motion for
reconsideration, to set aside the April 7th Order. This was couched
in the form of a motion to set aside the June 9th Order, which
denied reconsideration and reargument of the April 7th Order
(21 pages). The caption reads in part:
“THE HON. SAROKIN COURT HAS NO
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DEPRIVE ME
OF MY JURY TRIAL CASE, THE COURT
ACTING ON ITS OWN WITHOUT A JURY OF
MY PEERS TO OVERSEE THE HON.
SAROKIN COURT’S ACTION. THEREFORE
1 AM HOLDING THE HON. SAROKIN COURT
LIABLE FOR SUM OF $35,000,000 DAMAGES
THAT A JURY WOULD HAVE BEEN
INSTRUMENTAL IN HELPING PLAINTIFF
GET FROM DEFENDANTS BY DIRECTING
THE 1.C.C. TO EVALUATE PLAINTIFF'S
10a
Order
MOPAC CLASS B SHARES UNDER DUE
PROCESS OF LAW UNDER A SECTION 19a
(49 U.S.C. Sect. 19a) PROCEEDINGS, WHICH
THE MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD CO.
WOULD HAVE HONORED WITH NE Ww
RAILROAD STOCKS.
21. At the oral argument on the morning of July 13, the
Court made the following rulings:
**I’ve gone over the materials you submitted. I see
no basis at all for granting your motion for
reconsideration and, accordingly, your motion for
reconsideration is denied *** Let me tell you that
as well, that when this order is prepared we will
put a stop to this. The clerk is directed not to take
any more papers from you in this matter. And I
will tell you this, that I want this order prepared
to that effect. And this is not a threat but, on the
other hand, I do have to counsel you this, that
I don’t have my orders flaunted lightly, and if I
have to impose sanctions, I will.’’
“With respect to any case in which you would have
a jury trial, if on the papers you don’t have a basis
in law for going to the jury, you don’t go to the
jury. That’s the first point. Secondly, you complain
about the magistrate having prepared a report and
recommendation. That’s pursuant to statute.”’
22. On the afternoon of July 13, plaintiff submitted a paper
stating:
Order
‘*Plaintiff pro se has been obeying and following
Rule 12-I . . . The Hon. Frederick B. Lacey Court
cannot punish me for following Rule 12-I. I have
a right to follow Rule 12-1. That is my
Constitutional right. I have a constitutional right
to protect my property according to the Sth and
14th Amendments of the United States
Constitution.”’
23. The same document contains a notice to the Clerk,
quoting Rule 12-I, and concluding ‘‘According to Rule 12-I of
the above Rules, I have a right to file a motion for reargument
within 14 days after the filing of the Court’s Order. I have a right
to do this.”’
24. On July 15, plaintiff submitted a paper repeating the
language of Rule 12-1, and repeating the foregoing arguments.
25. Plaintiff was a party of record in the Interstate Commerce
proceeding which his complaint seeks to enjoin (Report, pp. 8-9).
Since the filing of the complaint, on September 25, 1978, the
Commission approved the Recapitalization Plan, and denied
rehearing on March 8, 1979 (Report, p. 11). ‘‘Although plaintiff
dropped out of the ICC proceedings, his brother, Napoleon,
remained as a party of record and continued to flog the same
issues in his petition for administrative review.’’ (Report, p. 21).
This petition was filed in the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, where Napoleon Gabriel was acting pro se.
26. On March 6, 1981, the Court of Appeals entered an Order
assigning the cause to a panel, and dispensing with oral argument.
This Order was signed by the Clerk by direction of the Court.
12a
Order
27. On March 25, 1981, the Court of Appeals rendered a
judgment from which the following is quoted:
**Petitioners have engaged for several years in a
quest to receive more for their Class B stock than
they were allotted in the 1974 recapitalization of
Missouri Pacific Railroad Company. They have
presented and re-presented their claim in several
contexts and forums. We have reviewed the
ponderous papers filed by the parties and the prior
adjudications in point. Based on this review, we
find the Commission’s conclusion irresistible.
The matters petitioners would raise yet again have
by several courts and by the Commission itself in
earlier proceedings. No new issue of substance
appears in the briefs before us. While we do not
on this occasion enter a coercive order against
petitioners, cf. James C. Gabriel v. Missouri
Pacific Railroad, Civil No. 78-1476 (D.N.J. March
6, 1981) (adopting December 31, 1980 Magistrate’s
Report and Recommendation), we cannot conceive
a case more appropriately subject to the law of
res judicata. ‘Finality . . . is the service rendered
by the courts through the operation of the law of
res judicata.’ Restatement (Second) of Judgments,
Introduction at 13 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980). By
this order we perform that service.
On consideration of the foregoing, it is ORDERED
and ADJUDGED by this court that the order of
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Order
the Interstate Commerce Commission sought to
be reviewed herein is hereby affirmed.
Per Curiam
For the Court
George A. Fisher, Clerk’’
28. On April 2, the Court of Appeals made an Order denying
the motion of petitioners to be permitted to file additional evidence
to correct the record.
29. On April 24, the Court of Appeals filed the following
Order:
‘*Petitioners’ suggestions for rehearing en banc in
each of these consolidated cases have been
circulated to the full Court and no judge of the
Court has requested the taking of a vote thereon.
On consideration of the foregoing, it is
ORDERED by the Court, en banc that the
aforesaid suggestions are denied.
Per Curiam
FOR THE COURT:
George A. Fisher,
Clerk’
30. On June 2, he Court of Appeals filed the following
Order:
4a
Order
**The motion of appellant [Napoleon] Gabriel for
reconsideration of the Court’s order of April 24,
1981 denying the petition for rehearing en banc
has been circulated to the full Court. The Court
is of the unanimous opinion that the motion for
reconsideration is not an authorized nor proper
submission and it is therefore,
ORDERED by the Court en banc that the Clerk
is directed to return the motion for reconsideration
unfiled.
Per Curiam
FOR THE COURT:
George A. Fisher, Clerk’’
31. On June 15, petitioner Napoleon Gabriel submitted to
the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the June
2 Order, on the following ground:
“THERE WERE NO _ PERSONAL
SIGNATURES AFFIXED BY THE COURT’S
JUDGES ON ORDERS, DECISION AND
JUDGMENT ON THIS CASE, MAKING THEM
NOT LEGAL-NUL AND VOID. DUE PROCESS
EVALUATION ARE RIGHTS SECURED TO
PETITIONER BY U.S. CONSTITUTION. I
EXPECT HON. JUDGES TO LIVE UP TO
THEIR OATH OF OFFICE.”
30. On June 29, petitioner Napoleon Gabriel submitted to
the Court of Appeals a second motion for reconsideration of the
June Order on the ground that the Clerk had no right to sign
Sa
Order
the Order of March 6th dispensing with oral argument. The Motion
continued:
**Because of the above reasons, and other reasons
too numerous to mention, the above captioned
cases have not been terminated, but they are still
alive in this Court. I am holding the Clerk of this
Court personally responsible for $25,000,000
MoPac Class B values.’’
33. The two foregoing motions of petitioner Napoleon
Gabriel, while stamped ‘‘Received’’ according to the usual practice
of the Clerk’s Office, were neither docketed nor submitted to
the Court.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Rule 12(1) authorizes a single motion for reargument; it
does not permit more than one.
2. This Rule cannot be circumvented by plaintiff’s procedure
of moving to seconsider an Order, and upon denial of that motion,
moving to reconsider the Order of Denial.
3. Plaintiff’s motion of June 15, 1981, repeated on June 23,
1981, being the fourth motion to reconsider Judge Sarokin’s Order
of Dismissal April 7, 1981, should be dismissed as not authorized
by the Rules.
4. If plaintiff’s foregoing motions were subject to
consideration on the merits they would have to be denied,
inasmuch as they do not set forth any relevant matters or
controlling decisions which the Court has overlooked.
oe
16a
Order
5. The actions of plaintiff and of his brother described in
the Findings of Fact and in the Report, establish the strong
probability that plaintiff may continue to bombard this Court
and defendants with additional repetitive papers. The Court has
jurisdiction to direct the Clerk to refuse to accept, docket or submit
to the Court any further papers in this action, except for a Notice
of Appeal.
6. The above described actions of plaintiff and his brother
establish the strong probability that plaintiff may institute suit
for substantial damages against Judge Sarokin, and against the
Clerk and his subordinates. The Court has jurisdiction to enjoin
such frivolous and vexacious litigation, intended to harass those
persons in the performance of their official duties, and using the
courts as a stage for plaintiff's vendetta of harassment and abuse,
with the result of burdening the heavy case loads of the courts
and obstructing the application of justice in more meritorious
cases (see Report, pp. 22-23).
It is therefore, on the 22 day of July, 1981
ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff's motions to reconsider Judge Sarokin’s Order
of April 7, 1981 are dismissed.
2. Plaintiff's motions to reconsider Judge Sarokin’s Order
of April 7, 1981 are denied on the merits.
3. The Clerk of this Court is directed not to accept, nor to
docket, nor to submit to the Court any further papers in this
case, except for Notice of Appeal.
17a
Order
4. Plaintiff is permanently enjoined from instituting suit in
any court against Judge Sarokin, the Clerk of this Court, or any
of his subordinates, in respect of any matters involved in this
action.
s/ Frederick B. Lacey
Frederick B. Lacey
United States District Court Judge
All of the foregoing is based upon the determination of the
Court as set forth in the hearing of the oral argument on July
13, 1981.
s/ Frederick B. Lacey
Frederick B. Lacey
United States District Court Judge
ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY DATED APRIL 7, 1981
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civil No. 78-1476
JAMES C. GABRIEL,
Plaintiff,
v.
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY OF MISSOURI,
et al.,
Defendants.
It is on this 7 day of April 1981, ORDERED:
1. The Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Perretti
filed December 31, 1980 be and the same hereby is adopted as
the Opinion of this Court.
2. For the reasons stated therein:
a. The complaint in the above matter is DISMISSED, with
prejudice and without costs;
b. Plaintiff is permanently enjoined from instituting any
suit in the Federal Court against any of these defendants or any
Order
other corporate officers or agents regarding any matter alleged
in the complaint that deals with the 1974 recapitalization.
s/ H. Lee Sarokin
H. LEE SAROKIN
United States District Judge
20a
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE
PERRETTI DATED DECEMBER 30, 1981
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civil No. 78-1476
Hon. H. Lee Sarokin
JAMES C. GABRIEL,
Plaintiff,
v.
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY OF MISSOURI,
MISSOURI PACIFIC CORPORATION, M. M. HENELLY,
JOHN H. LLOYD, D. B. JENKS AND THOMAS H. O’ LEARY
Defendants.
According to the complaint in this action, the plaintiff is
a stockholder in the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, which
will be called MoPac. MoPac’s application to the Interstate
Commerce Commission for approval of a plan of merger and
an exchange of stock has been approved by that agency and the
plaintiff disagrees with the order of the Commission.
Named as defendants in this case are MoPac, the Missouri
Pacific Corporation, a Delaware holding company, and two
officers of each of those corporations.
Plaintiff claims that jurisdiction is based on diversity of
citizenship, the amount in controversy exceeding $10,000.00.
Plaintiff is a citizen of the state of New Jersey. Defendant MoPac
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Report and Recommendation
is a corporation of the state of Missouri with its principal place
of business in that state and defendant Missouri Pacific
Corporation is a Delaware corporation having its principal place
of business in Missouri. The individual defendants are said to
be citizens of the state of Missouri as well.
At the time of the filing of the complaint MoPac’s application
to the ICC had not yet been ruled upon by the Commission but
its application was pending. Plaintiff demanded that this court
enjoin the defendants from processing any further steps before
the ICC in consummation of the merger and recapitalization of
MoPac which had been voted upon by that corporation’s
stockholders. In addition, the plaintiff demanded declaratory relief
on four issues, (1) declaring that the B stock (allegedly owned
by plaintiff) was entitled to vote as a class, (2) fixing the valuation
of the B shares according to a formula contained in a certain
agreed systems plan, (3) interpreting a certain opinion of the United
States Supreme Court as being controlling in the instant matter
and (4) declaring that the Interstate Commerce Commission Act
may not be used to defraud the holders of class B stock in MoPac.
During the pendency of this action the Interstate Commerce
Commission has ruled on MoPac’s application and has approved
it and the Commission’s order is now on appeal before the Court
of Appeals in the District of Columbia pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§2321. A letter memorandum from plaintiff dated December 13,
1980, ignores the fact that the ICC proceedings have already been
terminated. This lapse is symptomatic of the problems posed by
plaintiff’s entire case. It is apparent that plaintiff does not accept
the occurrences of the past 25 years which have related to the
interest which he holds in the Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.
Plaintiff attacks the merger plan almost entirely on the basis of
a misinterpretation of past events which will be elaborated upon
in this report. The plaintiff does allege, however, with specific
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Report and Recommendation
application to the plan of merger, that the exchange of stock would
not reflect the real value of the MoPac shares. Plaintiff further
alleges in a most conclusory manner that the ICC makes its
decisions strictly on the basis of the applications made by the
carriers without considering the testimony and briefs of objecting
stockholders. In support of this position the plaintiff attaches
to his complaint an extract from a book entitled, The
Superlawyers, by Joseph C. Gulden.
Defendants have moved pursuant to Rule 12(b) Fed. R. Civ.
P. to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, for lack of
jurisdiction of the person of the individual defendants and
Missouri Pacific Corporation and on the ground that the plaintiff's
claims are barred by res judicata. Defendant also seeks to enjoin
plaintiff permanently from instituting proceedings against
defendants on the facts alleged in the complaint on the ground
that any such proceedings would be vexatious. The parties having
presented matters outside the pleadings, the motions are treated
as for summary judgment. The original motion was filed on
August 25, 1978 and the plaintiff has continued to present material
until December of 1980. Plaintiff has been afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present his position and no further material in
connection with the motion will be received.
Although the complaint has 33 pages, the plaintiff's
allegations may be briefly summarized. Plaintiff claims thai the
Missczri Pacific Railroad Company was reorganized after
bankruptcy and its reorganization was approved by the Interstate
Commerce Commission on July 29, 1954 in an order at 290 ICC
477. He calls the reorganization the ‘‘ Agreed System Plan’’. Under
the agreed system plan two classes of stock were set up. A non-
cumulative preferred class A with voting rights and a class B,
common stock, with very limited voting rights. Plaintiff calls the
class B Shares ‘“‘Equity Bearing MoPac Common’’. He says,
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Report and Recommendation
correctly, that under the agreed system plan a majority vote of
each class was required for approval of any plan of
recapitalization. The complaint further alleges that the principa!
stockholder of MoPac class A was the Mississippi River Fuel
Corporation. In 1966 Mississippi River Fuel voted its A shares
to merge MoPac with the Texas and Pacific Railway and to issue
a single class of shaves of new stock in the merged railway. The
complaint points out that this effort resulted in the case of Levin
v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp. 386 U.S. 162 (1967), in which
the Supreme Court held that the plan of merger could not be
effectuated without the approval of each class of stock as was
required by MoPac’s Articles of Association and the laws of the
state of Missouri (thereafter the MoPac-Texas Pacific merger was
abandoned by the two railroads).
The Mississippi River Fuel Corporation changed its name
to Mississippi River Corporation and continued as the owner of
the majority of the outstanding Class A stock of MoPac. The
majority holder of the B stock was the Allegheny Cory . *tion.
Plaintiff alleges that Allegheny was a motor carrier unuer the
jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission which had
ordered it to divest itself of its class B shares in the rail carrier
MoPac. The complaint indicates that Allegheny’s class B MoPac
shares were actually controlled by the ICC. However, a copy of
an ICC report furnished by plaintiff, Allegheny/Jones Motor Co.,
109 MCC 333, indicates that Allegheny’s MoPac shares were held
under a trusteeship which had been previously ordered by the
commission.
According to the complaint, a class action was certified on
October 9, 1968 by Hon. F. P. Bryan in the Southern District
of New York. The suit alleged that the class B dividends were
too low and that the directors of MoPac were favoring the class
A stockholders to the benefit of Mississippi River Corporation.
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Allegheny Company was a class representative. The suit resulted
in a settlement which the plaintiff did not approve. The complaint
alleges “‘It is unconstitutional, against due process, to hold
dissenters in a Class Action’’. The complaint further alleges that
the settlement was contrary to agreed system plan. According to
the complaint, the settlement involved an agreement between
Allegheny and MoPac for the transfer of the Allegheny class B
shares to the Mississippi River Corporation at an agreed value.
The settlement agreement was put to a vote of the stockholders
voting by classes. The plaintiff complains that the proxy statement
did not reveal that Allegheny had important financial reasons for
wishing to dispose of its class B common shares, that is to say,
the Jones Motor Company matter was not explained in the proxy
statement. Plaintiff cast his class B shares against the plan but
the majority of both classes voted for a recapitalization which
involved a conversion of the class A preferred into a new MoPac
common and the elimination of class voting. The recapitalization
was also the subject of an application for approval by the ICC
which was granted in December, 1973. Omitted from the complaint
is all reference to the case of Gabriel v. United States, 416 Fed.
Supp. 810 (D.N.J. 1976), an appeal to a three judge court to set
aside and annul the order of the ICC which approved the
recapitalization and authorized the issuance of the securities in
accordance with the plan. Gabriel v. United States will be discussed
in connection with a review of the defendants’ position in this
matter.
The allegations of the complaint skip to events which occurred
in 1977. Mississippi River Corporation had changed its name to
Missouri Pacific Corp. which is said to be a Delaware holding
company owning 92.3% of the shares of MoPac. The old
Allegheny class B shares had been exchanged for MoPac common
under the 1973 recapitalization plan and had been sold to Missouri
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Pacific Corp. in accordance with the settlement worked out in
Levin v. Mississippi River Corporation, the class action. The
plaintiff had not surrendered his class B shares and makes the
following allegation in his complaint:
The fact of the matter is that Class B as of today
controls the MoPac veto according to the U.S.
Supreme Court Decision: Levin v. Miss, 386 US
162, 170 (1967) a “‘Plan’’ may not be adopted
without the consent of at least a majority of
CLASS B.
Plaintiff CLASS B MoPac stockholder has been
and is presently being severely damaged by
Defendants who are working in concert to take
away his Class B values and transfer them to MPC
to enrich themselves ... .
According to the complaint, MoPac and Missouri Pacific
Corporation proposed in 1977 to merge MoPac into Missouri
Pacific Corporation. Each share of MoPac common which was
issued in the 1973 recapitalization would be exchanged for .95
share of Missouri Pacific Corporation stock. Plaintiff alleges that
this plan is unfair in that it undervalues the class B shares which
he holds. In addition, he alleges that the holding company which
has power to elect the MoPac board of directors ‘‘is using that
power to the detriment of all the MoPac shares, including the
Class B MoPac Common shares. MPC is misusing [the ICC
proceeding] to try to take over all remaining MoPac shares.”’
Plaintiff charges that Missouri Pacific Corp. wili receive
**enormous financial benefits’’ from the merger the purpose of
which is a “‘conspiracy to defraud the Class B equity bearing
MoPac Common stockhoiders.”’
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According to the complaint the plaintiff attended a special
meeting of the stockholders of MoPac held on December 9, 1977
for the purpose of voting on the plan of merger. The complaint
states that there remain 1,015 shares of class B which had not
been exchanged. Plaintiff voted 76% of these shares against the
proposal. He alleges that this constitutes a veto of the plan since
**The law requires the assent of the majority of the MoPac
shareholders on a separate Class vote basis’’.
Defendants, according to the complaint, are ‘pretending
Class B MoPac equity bearing Common shares which are the
sesiduary Geneiislasies of the Mlssourl Pacific RR properties don't
exist ....’’. The plaintiff’s purported veto, having been
diareggeiied Wy the defendants, an application was made to the
ICC on December 20, 1977 for approval of the plan of merger
and the issuance of new stock in exchange for the MoPac shares.
Plaintiff contends that the exchange ratio is unfair as to him
because it undervalues his class B stock. He argues that this is
so because the 1973 recapitalization in its turn undervalued the
class B stock. The complaint goes on to say that the class B stock
must be evaluated ‘‘at their real true value’’ based on an appraisal
of the assets of MoPac including its land holdings and its mineral
rights. In this connection the plaintiff alleges that the defendants
are attempting to conceal the fact that the corporation is the owner
of extensive land which was granted to it in the 1800's.
In order to forestall action by the ICC on the defendants’
application, action which plaintiff believes would be favorable
to MoPac, his complain: seeks to enjoin the defendants from
taking further steps to obtain approval of the plan. As has been
seen, the plaintiff also seeks declaratory judgment.
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SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Plaintiff claims that the jurisdiction of this court is based
on diversity of citizenship and his prayer is for relief against the
named defendants. The effect of the relief sought, if granted,
would be to enjoin a proceeding pending before the ICC and to
give a court’s adjudication of matters pending before that
commission. The circumstances which existed when plaintiff filed
his complaint are established by the exhibits offered by defendants
in support of their motion. A decision of the Interstate Commerce
Commission dated May 9, 1978 in connection with the Missouri
Pacific Railroad Company merger, ordered that the proceeding
would be handled under a modified procedure which set up a
time-table for the filing of written submissions and the
determination of the matter on the papers submitted. Plaintiff,
James C. Gabriel, was a party of record in that proceeding. The
decision of May 12, 1978 contains the following:
Certain of the commentators allege that the
proposed merger and consolidation will diminish
the value of their Class B common shares of
Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, a Missouri
corporation (MoPac), and that the plan is for
various other reasons contrary to the public
interest. The primary contention relates to
questions exhaustively examined in prior
proceedings. In 1973, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York
approved a settlement agreement in an action
originally directed at MoPac’s dividend policy with
respect to the Class B stock. Levin v. Mississippi
River Corporation, 59 F.R.D. 353 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd mem. sub nom. Wesson v. Mississippi River
Corporation, 486 F.2d 1398 (2d Cir), cert denied,
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414 U.S. 1112 (1973), reh. denied, 415 U.S. 939
(1974). The railroad then sought Commission
authority to issue certain new types of stock to
effectuate the settlement agreement and the
recapitalization plan which it encompassed. The
Commission determined, and the reviewing courts
agreed, that the offer of exchange for Class B stock
represented the fair value of those securities, and
that the plan was reasonable to all parties and in
the public interest. Missouri Pac.R. Co., Securities,
347 1.C.C. 377, 411, 417 (1973), aff’d sub non.
Gabriel v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 810 (D.
N.J.) aff'd, 429 U.S. 1011 (1976), reh. denied, 429
U.S. 1124 (1977); Commission decision also aff'd
sub nom. Labelle Gillespie v. United States, Civil
Action No. 74-239-C(2) (E.D. Mo. 1974).
Unwilling to accept the finality of those
determinations, the noted commentators have
never exchanged their old Class B shares for the
presently-outstanding MoPac Common Stock, and
would now have us reconsider the recapitalization
proceedings. The Commission and the courts have
fully reviewed and approved the recapitalization,
however, and the matter is now res judicata. We
cannot permit the holders of unexchanged Class
B stock to use the occasion of our review of the
instant proposals as a vehicle for re-examination
of issues finally determined in previous
proceedings, and we will not entertain arguments
directed at the fairness or propriety of the prior
recapitalization.
It must be concluded that the plaintiff filed this action as
a direct response to the Commission’s decision of May 12, 1978.
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No matter how it is designated in the complaint, the action is
nothing other than an attempt to appeal the May 12, 1978 ruling
of the Commission. It is obvious that the ruling was not a final
order of the Commission. Apparently plaintiff determined not
to go forward before the Commission on the Commission’s terms.
It is settled law that a court cannot enjoin administrative
action until administrative remedies have been exhausted. Meyers
v. Bethlehem Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
In Meyers, the district court, enjoined the National Labor
Relations Board from holding a hearing on a complaint of unfair
labor practices at Bethlehem’s Fore River Plant. Bethiehem’s
contention was that the plant’s operations did not involve interstate
or foreign commerce; and therefore that the hearings would be
futile, and their holding would cause bad labor relations, impaired
efficiency, and substantial expenses. (327 U.S. at 47-8).
In reversing the court said, per Brandeis, J. (327 U.S. at 50-1):
The contention is at war with the long settled
rule of judicial administration that no one is
entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or
threatened injury until the prescribed
administrative remedy has been exhausted. That
rule has been repeatedly acted on in cases where,
as here, the contention is made that the
administrative body lacked power over the subject
matter.
Obviously, the rule requiring exhaustion of
the administrative remedy cannot be circumvented
by asserting that the charge on which the complaint
rests is groundless and that the mere holding of
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the prescribed administrative hearing would result
in irreparable damage. (fns. omitted).
“If it be the policy of the law that the Labor Board cannot
be enjoined from conducting a hearing on the complaint made,
it would not seem proper that this policy could be nullified and
evaded by permitting an injunction prohibiting the defendants
from originating the complaint which would be the subject of
hearing by the Labor Board.’’ Burlington Mills Corp. v. Textile
Workers Union, 44 F. Supp. 699, 702 (W.D. Va. 1941). See to
the same effect Capital Transit Co. v. Safeway Trails, 201 F.2d
708 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
There is no doubt that the Interstate Commerce Commission
has exclusive jurisdiction over the applications presented to it by
MoPac. Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S. 182 (1948). Upon
a final ruling by the Commission, a party aggrieved may obtain
judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. §702 in the Court of Appeals, 28 U.S.C. §2321.
Since the filing of the complaint in this court, the ICC has
issued its final order on the application. The ICC decision is dated
September 25, 1978 and the petitions for administrative review
by the Commission were denied on March 8, 1979. One of the
petitioners for review was plaintiff's brother, Napoleon C. Gabriel.
Napoleon’s assault upon the Commission’s decision was based
upon the argument that class B stockholders were not bound by
the 1974 recapitalization of MoPac. Napoleon demanded that his
class B common stock be evaluated according to the terms of
the 1956 agreed systems plan. It can be seen that his position
before the ICC is identical to that taken by his brother, the plaintiff
in this matter.
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Because of the passage of time, the facts to which the plaintiff
addresses himself have changed. While he originally sought to
enjoin defendants from processing their application before the
ICC, that application has now been approved. The plaintiff's
prayers for declaratory relief are now directed at a final order
of the Commission. The declaratory relief, if granted, would
reverse not only the Commission’s decision of May 12, 1978, but
also the final decision of September 25, 1978 and the denial of
petition for administrative review dated March 8, 1979. Judicial
review of the Commission’s orders is provided for in 28 U.S.C.
§2321 which reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Except as otherwise provided by an Act of
Congress, a proceeding to enjoin or suspend, in
whole or in part, a rule, regulation, or order of
the Interstate Commerce Commission shall be
brought in the Court of Appeals as provided by
and in the manner prescribed in Chapter 158 of
this title.
The jurisdiction of the court of appeals to review actions of the
Interstate Commerce Commission is established by 28 U.S.C.
§2352, the relevant portions of which read as follows:
The court of appeals has exclusive jurisdiction
to enjoin, set aside, suspend. . . , or to determine
the validity of - ...
All rules, regulations, or final orders of the
Interstate Commerce Conumission made reviewable
by § 2321 of this title. . . . Jurisdiction is invoked
by filing a petition as provided by Section 2344
of this title.
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28 U.S.C. §2344 provides that the action for review shall be against
the United States. 28 U.S.C. §2322 also provides that “‘All actions
specified in § 2321 of this title shall be brought by or against
the United States’’. The relief which plaintiff seeks and the
application for merger which was pending before the Interstate
Commerce Commission do not involve in any way any order of
the Interstate Commerce Commission for the payment of money
or the collection of fines, penalties and forfeitures. Thus, 28 U.S.C.
§1336(A) and 28 U.S.C. §1398 are inapplicable.
One of the primary objectives of the Congress in providing
for judicial review of Interstate Commerce Commission orders
by the court of appeals was to prevent a multiplicity of suits
relating to the same subject matter. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1569,
93d Cong. 2d Sess. reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7025. To permit this plaintiff to disregard the statutory
method of securing review of the Commission’s orders by invoking
this court’s jurisdiction under the guise of a diversity case would
vitiate the congressional plan and objective. Entertaining the suit
under diversity jurisdiction would encourage the bringing of
multiple suits challenging a single ICC order in different locations
intent ‘‘to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the court of appeals in
which the agency record is first filed .. .”’ Id. at 7033.
A district court has no subject matter jurisdiction in this case
because ‘‘exclusive jurisdiction over this action is vested in the
court of appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§2321 and 2342.”’
Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. U.S., 446 F. Supp. 721,
724 (D. Del. 1978), ‘“‘orders other than those involving monetary
matters are of course now subject to review only by the Courts
of Appeals under [28 U.S.C. §2321]”’, Queker State Oil Refining
Corp. v. U.S., 465 F. Supp. 75, 76 (W.D. Pa., 1979).
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State of Minn., by Spannaus v. O’Neal, 472 F. Supp. 905
(D. Minn. 1979), involves an attempt to bypass the provisions
of 28 U.S.C. §2321 and §2342 by invoking the jurisdiction of
the district court under the guise of a petition for mandamus.
In the Spannaus case there were pending before the ICC,
applications by varicus railroad companies to abandon certain
lines within the state of Minnesota. The ICC made an
environmental evaluation of each proposed abandonment and
concluded that inasmuch as the abandonments did not constitute
major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, no environmental impact statement would
be required. The Commission had not issued a decision on the
merits in any of the abandonment proceedings when plaintiff
petitioned for the writ. The court relied on Meyers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., supra, in holding: ‘“‘Judicial review of
administrative agency decisions must be postponed until available
administrative remedies have been exhausted.’’ 472 F. Supp. at
907. The court concluded as follows at 472 F. Supp. at 908:
In any event, even if judicial review were
available at this time, exclusive jurisdiction would
lie in the court of appeals, not this court, 28 U.S.C.
§§232i, 2342. Where exclusive jurisdiction is
mandated by statute, as it is here, plaintiff cannot
by-pass the procedure which Congress has provided
by labeling its requested relief “‘mandamus.’’ North
American Van Lines v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, 386 F. Supp. 665, 681 (N.D. Ind.
1974). Where a statute specifically provides for
exclusive jurisdiction in one court, as 28 U.S.C.
§2342 does, this specific grant of jurisdiction takes
precedence over a general grant of jurisdiction, /7T
v. Vencap, Lid., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975);
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Report and Recommendation
Cook, Inc. v. United States, 394 F .2d 84 (7th Cir.
1968).
An identical view of the law is stated in B.F. Goodrich
Company v. Northwest Industries, Inc., 424 F.2d 1349 (3rd Cir.
1970), a case which arose under the since-repealed three judge
court method of review of ICC orders. Goodrich sought in effect
to enforce section 5(2) of the Interstate Commerce Act (now 49
U.S.C. §11343), by an action in the district court requesting an
injunction restraining Industries from acquiring Goodrich stock
without first obtaining Commission approval. Goodrich had
sought the same relief by intervening in a merger proceeding before
the Commission, in which Industries was a party. The Commission
had denied the relief sought by Goodrich.
It was held at 424 F.2d at 1352-4:
We agree that the District Court had no
jurisdiction over the Goodrich complaint. The
complaint was in substance a collateral attack on
an order of the Commission and an attack on such
an order may be brought only before a three judge
court. . . . Venner v. Michigan Central Railroad
Co., 271 U.S. 127.
The statutory procedure for review is
applicable although an order is not directly
attacked—so long as the practical effect of a
successful suit would contradict or countermand
a Commission order. Venner v. Michigan Central
Railroad, supra.
The above language is directly applicable to plaintiff's
complaint. Since the complaint was filed, the Commission has
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entered an order authorizing elimination of the interest in Missouri
Pacific Railroad Company of the minority shareholders (including
this plaintiff).
It is respectfully recommended that the complaint be dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
THE VEXATIOUS NATURE OF THE COMPLAINT
The issues raised in the complaint, the demand for relief and
the arguments of the plaintiff in support of his position have been
summarized in the discussion of the contents of plaintiff's
complaint. Plaintiff has presented the identical matters to a variety
of forums over the course of the years. None of the forums have
been receptive to the plaintiff's claims and the repetitive and
vexatious nature of his claims have been called to his attention
on past occasions. He, however, persists in pursuing issues which
have been repeatedly decided against him.
The issues presented by the plaintiff in this case were first
dealt with and disposed of in Levin v. Mississippi River
Corporation, 59 F.R.D. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), Aff’d. sub nom
Wesson v. Mississippi River Corporation, 486 F.2d 1398 (2nd Cir
1973) cert. denied, sub nom Wesson v. Levin, 414 U.S. 1112 1973,
rehearing denied, 415 U.S. 937 (1974). Under MoPac’s 1956
reorganization plan, the Class A stockholders had voting control
while the Class B stockholders had the residual equity and a veto
power over mergers, consolidations and reorganizations. ‘‘In
practical terms, the ‘ingenious’ solution envisioned under the 1956
reorganization created a basic conflict between the two classes,
with the equity ownership principally in the B stock, but with
effective operating control in the A stock.”’ 59 F.R.D. at 358.
The situation led to the Lzvin case which was certified as a class
action by Hon. Frederick P. Bryan. The class was certified within
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the provisions of Rule 23(a)(b)(1) and (2) Fed. R. Civ. P. and
the members of the class were all Class B stockholders. A copy
of the order has been submitted in support of this motion.
According to the plaintiff's complaint he opted out of the class
action. However the privilege of being excluded from the judgment
only exists in actions brought under Rule 23(b\(3), Wright and
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil §1787.
The Levin case was vigorously and exhaustively litigated. A
chronology of the proceedings in that case will demonstrate the
plaintiff's persistence in the face of warnings from the courts.
A final judgment approving the settlement was entered May 2,
1973. The judgment was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals and within the same year the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari. While the matter was on appeal, a motion
was made to the District Court to set aside the judgment. The
motion raised the Allegheny/Jones matter. It was denied on
December 5, 1973, the district court holding that the subject had
been cons'dcred in the original hearing to approve the judgment.
In early 1974 the Supreme Court denied a rehearing of its denial
of certification.
After the denial of the rehearing by the Supreme Court there
was a motion to vavate the final judgment. This motion attacked
the class certification. It was denied on April 8, 1974. The denial
was affirmed by the Second Circuit on December 18, 1974.
Certification was denied in 421 U.S. 915 (1975). A rehearing was
denied, 421 U.S. 1006 (1975) and a second petition for rehearing
was rejected by the Clerk of the Supreme Court. While this was
going on, plaintiff moved in the district court to set aside the
judgment and the motion was denied on March 21, 1975. The
denia! was affirmed by the Second Circuit November 18, 1975,
which contains the following warning to plaintiff: ‘‘Although at
this time we will not act pursuant to appellees’ suggestion that
37a
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costs be imposed upon Gabriel under FRAP 38, further appeais
of this nature in a matter already so thoroughly litigated may
justify the imposition of such a sarction.”’
Even while the appeal to the circuit was pending, plaintiff
made a second motion to the district court to set aside the judgment
which was denied June 3, 1975. The opinion states, ‘‘Petitioner
Gabriel’s motion to re-open is hereby denied. Court finds motion |
vexatious and orders movant to pay $100.00 counsel fees... .”’
Plaintiff returned to the court of appeals and requested an
extension of time to file a petition for a rehearing en banc of
the circuit’s affirmance on November 18, 1975 of the denial of
plaintiff's motion to set aside the judgment. The motion for
extention of time was denied on December 16, 1975. Plaintiff’s
motion to reconsider the motion to extend the time was denied
on January 7, 1976. Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider the motion
to reconsider the motion to extend the time was denied on February
2, 1976. The order stated, ‘‘this court will not consider any further
motions for reconsideration in this appeal.”’
While thus engaged in the Levin case, plaintiff was also busy
elsewhere. MoPac, having settled the Levin case, proceeded in
accordance with the settlement agreement to file its application
with the Interstate Commerce Commission for authority to issue
shares which would enable it to effectuate the plan of
recapitalization which was the heart of the settlement agreement.
Plaintiff appeared in that proceeding as a party of record. The
report of the Commission dated December 6, 1973, 347 ICC 377
reveals that the Commission considered the reasonableness of the
plan of recapitalization as it applied to the Class B stock. Expert
testimony was presented in support of the plan and ten Class B
shareholders including this plaintiff offered testimony to the
contrary. The issues presented by the objectors included their
Report and Recommendation
demand that the value of the B shares be measured by book value
in accordance with their view of the requirements of the 1954
reorganization plan. The Class B objectors presented the argument
that the class action in the Southern District was illegal and that
the class voting rights which were established in the 1954
reorganization plan were immutable. The objectors argued that
the vote of the MoPac stockholders which adopted the plan of
recapitalization was invalid because of misrepresentations in the
proxy statement. The alleged misrepresentations relate to the
Allegheny/Jones matter. The objectors also alleged ill-defined
improper conduct by the directors and generalized conspiracy and
fraud. The Commission found all of the objectors’ contentions
to be without merit. The Commission ruled that the 1954
reorganization was not an ‘‘immutable contract for all time’’ and
pointed out that the 1954 reorganization plan itself recognized
the possibility of a change in the relationship between the two
classes of stock.
Plaintiff moved for reconsideration which was denied. The
motion for reconsideration was based upon plaintiff’s argument
that the Levin case was an illegal proceeding. Plaintiff’s next
petition which sought a finding that an issue of general
transportation importance was involved was denied in March,
1974.
Seeking review of the action of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, plaintiff commenced suit in this district in the case
entitled Gabriel v. United States, Civil No. 74-471, filed April
3, 1974. After a multiplicity of motions in which plaintiff sought
unsuccessfully to compel the joinder of the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice as a party plaintiff, the case was decided in an opinion by Hon.
Clarkson S. Fisher, writing for a three judge court, on April 20,
1976. Gabriel v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 810 (D.N.J. 1976).
39a
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to those dealt with by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Interestingly enough, while plaintiff’s suit against the United States
was pending here in this district, an identical suit, Gillespie v.
U.S.A., was brought in the Eastern District of Missouri. The case
is entitled Gillespie v. United States, Civil No. 74-239-C(2). The
three judge court in an opinion by Hon. John K. Regan disposed
of the identical issues presented in Gabriel v. United States, 416
F. Supp. at 814 n.2.
Plaintiff made repeated efforts to convince the three judge
court in this district to reconsider its order affirming the decision
of the Interstate Commerce Commission. A motion for reargument
was denied un May 29, 1976. A Letter-Opinion dated June 9,
1976 reads as follows: ‘‘The Court is in receipt of yet another
motion for reconsideration of the Court’s judgment. After
consultation with the other two members of the Court, I am
authorized tu. advise all parties that the motion is denied.’’
Plaintiff's motion for reargument was denied on June 21, 1976
and another motion for reargument was denied on the following
day.
After spending four years litigating the identical issues more
or less simultaneously in three separate actions in a variety of
foruins and losing consistently, plaintiff attempted to take another
bite from the apple when MoPac presented its plan for merger
to the ICC. An extract from the ICC opinion of May 12, 1978
which deals with plaintiff’s attempt to reopen the issues is quoted
on page 8 of this report. It was at that point that plaintiff began
this suit. Although plaintiff dropped out of the ICC proceedings,
his brother, Napoleon, remained as a party of record and
continued to flog the same issues in his petition for administrative
review. it is clear beyond argument that all of the issues in this
complaint which relate to the 1974 recapitalization are res
adjudicata. The Supreme Court has recently restated the purposes
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underlying the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel
as follows:
To preclude parties from contesting matters that
they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
protects their adversaries from the expense and
vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves
judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial
action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent
decisions. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147,
153-4 (1979).
Each of these purposes is implicated in Gabriel’s attempt to
circumvent prior rulings and to undermine proceedings currently
underway in the Court of Appeals. Kane v. City of New York,
468 F. Supp. 586, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Plaintiff’s deliberate course of conduct over the past years
in pursuing repeated baseless proceedings, all stemming from an
identical fact situation demonstrates complete lack of good faith.
Gabriel’s pattern of copying or paraphrasing one complaint and
motion from another and his pas’ behavior of proceeding
simultaneously in multiple suits in a variety of forums can show
only this plaintiff’s wish to harass the defendant by the abuse
of legal process.
Particularly appropriate to this case are the words of Hill
v. Estelle, 423 F. Supp. 690, 695 (S.D. Tex. 1976):
It ... is within this Court’s inherent power under
28 U.S.C. §1651(a) to enjoin litigants who are using
the courts as a stage for their vendetta of
harassment and abuse.
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The court commented thai a complaint, inflated with reference
to law, cannot “‘camouflage the duplicitous and duplicative
nature’ of the ciaim.
... [T]he timing of the ... filing, the superficial
changes in form between the ... complaints and
the substantially idential nature of the complaints
lead to the inexorable conclusion that plaintiffs
maliciously have filed a complaint as to previously
litigated matter in order to abuse the judicial
process with the resultant effect of burdening the
Court’s already heavy caseload and obstructing the
application of justice in more meritorious causes.
423 F. Supp. at 695.
Gambocz v. Yelencsics, 468 F.2d 837 (3rd Cir. 1972) involves
a situation in which plaintiff's first suit was dismissed with
prejudice on defendant’s motion, the dismissal was affirmed on
appeal and, while a petition for rehearing was still pending, a
second suit was filed. It was held: ‘‘Injunctive relief was a proper
remedy under the circumstances’’. 468 F.2d at 842. The court
observed that res judicata barred a relitigation of the same subject.
Browning Deben‘ure Holders Com. v. DASA Corp., 605 F.2d
35 (2nd Cir. 1979) holds that where an action is repetitious or
intended to harass, a district court in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction and pursuant to the Ali Writs Statute, may enjoin
plaintiff from further litigation based on facts previously alleged.
As noted in Kane v. City of New York, 468 F. Supp. at 590:
It is true that litigious affinity alone does not
support the grant of an injunction, for ‘access to
the Courts is one of the cherished freedoms of our
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system of government.’ But when it becomes clear
that the courts are being used as a vehicle for
harassment by a ‘knowledgeable and articulate
experienced pro se litigant’ who asserts the same
claims repeatedly in slightly altered guise, the
issuance of an injunction is warranted. (footnotes
omitted)
In Rudnicki v. McCormack, 210 F. Supp. 905, 910 (D. Mass.
1962), apneal dismissed, 372 U.S. 226 (1963), it was said
The English Courts have not hesitated to
exercise the power thus vested in them by
restraining what Professor Chafee refers to as
‘pertinacious litigants’ from abusing the process
of the courts by the repeated institution of frivolous
litigation.
The courts of the United States have also acted
to enjoin a litigant from subjecting another to
repeated, baseless and vexatious suits on the same
subject matter, recognizing without question that
such a course of conduct is a sufficient ground
for the issuance of an injunction.
The historical background of the power is stated in Higgins
v. California Prune & Apricot Growers, 282 F.2d 550, 557 (2nd
Cir. 1922):
It is elementary that these [equity] courts will
interfere by injunction to prevent an inequitable
43a
Report and Recommendation
use of legal processes, and their power to do so
has been established since the decision of the Earl
of Oxford’s Case, 1 Ch. R. 1 determined the
controversy between Lord Chancellor Ellesmere
and Lord Chief Justice Coke in the times of
Charles I.... In Story’s Equity Jurisprudence (14th
Ed.) §1226, it is said: ‘Another class of cases to
which the process of injunction is most beneficially
applied is to suppress undue and vexatious
litigation.’
It is submitted that an injunction is necessary in this case
to insure the finality of judgments entered in this and other courts.
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Although raised in the motion, the issue of personal
jurisdiction over the defendants has not been briefed. The
marshal’s returns of service on the individual defendants indicate
that they were not served in the manner provided by Rule 4(d)(1)
or 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. Service on the individuals was made at a
business address on persons connected with the business enterprise.
Purported service on the New Jersey Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles is, of course, no service in this case.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated it is respectfully recommended that
the complaint be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
It is respectfully recommended that plaintiff be permanently
enjoined from instituting any suit in the federal court against any
of these defendants or any other corporate officers or agents
Ada
Report and Recommendation
regarding any matter alleged in the complaint that deals with the
1974 recapitalization.
Respectfully submitted,
s/ Serena Perretti
SERENA PERRETTI
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE
Dated: December 30, 1980
ORIGINAL TO THE CLERK
xc: .Hon. H. Lee Sarokin
James C. Gabriel, P.O. Box 94, Sea Girt, N.J. 08750
-Leon Leighton, Esq., 25 Hadden Road, Scarsdale, N.Y. 08750
45a
EXHIBITS
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT LeVASSEUR
STATE OF CONNECTICUT )
COUNTY OF NEW HAVEN )
Robert LeVasseur, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. At the time I intervened in 1968 as a plaintiff in a class
action commenced by Betty Levin on December 29, 1967 in the
United States District Court, Southern District of New York, Case
#CIV 5095 (Edward Weinfeld), Levin vs Mississippi River Corp.
59 F.R.D. 353 (1973) I was the owner of 336 shares of Missouri
Pacific Railroad Company Class B stock and 3000 shares of Class
A stock of said railroad.
Dated: March 16, 1981
Waterbury, Connecticut
s/ Robert LeVasseur
Robert LeVasseur
VERIFICATION
STATE OF CONNECTICUT )
COUNTY OF NEW HAVEN )
ROBERT LeVASSEUR, being duly sworn, deposes and says
that he fas read the foregoing AFFIDAVIT and knows the
contents thereof; that the same is true to the deponent’s own
knowledge, except as to matters therein stated to be alleged on
information and belief, and that as to these matters deponent
believes it to be true.
46a
Exhibits
Be it remembered that on this 16th day of March, 1981
personally appeared before me, a notary public of Connecticut,
ROBERT LeVASSEUR, to me known and known to me to be
the individual described herein and who has sworn to and executed
the foregoing AFFIDAVIT, and he acknowledges to me that he
executed the same.
Respectfully submitted,
s/ John J. Pacowta
My Commission Expires 4/85
I hereby certify that this
AFFIDAVIT is a TRUE COPY
of the original.
s/ Edwin G. Fisher
Notary Public of New Jersey
My Commission Expires Jan. 28, 1982
_—
“ page . 999
JAHES Ce. CABRIEL
ROD} COX 16
COLTS NECK NJ O7722
PLEASE SIGH, DATE AND RETUNN YOUR PROXY PROMPTLY IN THE ENCLOCCD ERVELOPE
‘be J Pie teats The underijnsd ackacwh.bjcs e-sipt of
Fal Ae © copy of the Huise of such wewliy ead
C BLLELL the ectouipenyi..y Proxy Staa...at
Dato’ 1973
p , 6 ‘
“1199.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.