Appendix — Burrus v. United Telephone Co. of Kansas

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL

TENTH CIRCUIT

No. 80-1741

JEWEL BURRUS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v

UNITED TELEPHONE COMPANY OF KANSAS, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Kansas

(D.C. No. 76-231-C2)

(Filed July 22, 1982)

Submitted on the briefs:

Richard H. Anton, Kansas City, Missouri, for Plaintiff-

Appellant.

J. Richard Smith, Overland Park, Kansas; and Arlyn D.

Haxton and John A. Verling, III, of Dietrich, Davis, Dicus,

Rowlands & Schmitt, Kansas City, Missouri, for Defendant-

Appellee.

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Before SETH, Chief Judge, LOGAN, and SEYMOUR, Cir-

cult Judges.

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.

After examining the briefs and the appellate record,

this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that

oral argument would not be cf material assistance in the

determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a);

Tenth Cir. R. 10(e). The cause is therefore ordered sub-

mitted without oral argument.

Jewel Burrus brought this sex discrimination action

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e et seq., against United Telephone Company of Kan-

sas, Inc. (UTC). Burrus alleges that UTC engaged in un-

lawful employment discrimination by failing to promote

her because of her sex, and by retaliating against her after

she filed charges of discrimination.“ We affirm the trial

court’s holding that UTC did not violate Title VII.

1. The relevant statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), provides in

pertinent part:

„a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an

employer—

or to te against any in-

dividual with respect to compensation, terms, con-

or privileges of because of such

$s race, color, sex, or national origin

pertinent

“(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an

practice made an employment practice by this sub-

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I.

Background of Case

The facts relevant to Burrus Title VII action are as

follows. Burrus is an a nutant. She worked for the

American Telephone & Telegraph Company (AT&T) be-

tween 1948 and 1968. From June 1968 until February

1970, she was employed by United Systems Services, In-

corporated (USS). Thereafter, Burrus worked for defen-

dant UTC until she was terminated in 1976. Both USS and

UTC are wholly owned subsidiaries of United Telecom-

munications, Incorporated.

While employed by these companies, Burrus held

various positions and pursued her education. During her

last five years of employment with AT&T, she served as an

Accounting supervisor. Neither she nor anyone she super-

vised at AT&T had an accounting degree. Burrus’ job title

throughout her employment with defendant UTC was “ac-

countant,” although she did not obtain her Bachelor of

Science accounting degree until 1972.

UTC never promoted Burrus. UTC did, however,

promote some of her male and female contemporaries to

supervisory positions. Burrus claims that she was as well

qualified as the promoted males; that she had made known

her desire for promotion; and that UTC not only refused to

promote her, but closed out available positions by ap-

pointing males to them.

Because of the alleged discriminatory practices of UTC,

Burrus filed a charge of sex discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the

Kansas Commission on Civil Rights. Her retaliation claim

is based on an allegation that after she filed her charge,

UTC further restricted her growth opportunities and gen-

erally conspired to drive her from the firm.

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Both the EEOC and the Kansas Commission found no

probable cause to believe Burrus charges were true.

Burrus subsequently filed this lawsuit in federal court.

After a bench trial, the court held against Burrus on all

her claims. Burrus argues on appeal that the district court

erred: (1) by holding she was not discriminated against

because of her sex; (2) by finding UTC did not unlawfully

retaliate against her after she filed discrimination charges;

and (3) by finding Burrus’ statistical study to be without

probative value.

II.

Sex Discrimination

In holding that Burrus was not the victim of unlaw-

ful sex discrimination, the trial court found:

“The evidence in this case indicates that plaintiff

may have been technically as well qualified as some

of her male counterparts who were promoted. It also

shows that she was certainly not as technically quali-

fied as two of the males about whom she has com-

plained. More importantly, the evidence suggests that

plaintiff was indeed ill-qualified for promotion to a

supervisory position, in that she lacked the interper-

sonal skills necessary for such an advancement. Plain-

tiff remained unpromoted because she was uncom-

municative and unable to work effectively with

others.”

Rec., Vol. I, at 27. The court concluded that Is lince

. . . Plaintiff was not qualified for promotion by reason

of her general lack of interpersonal skills, it follows.

that the court must find as a matter of law that plaintiff

has not made out a prima facie claim of discrimination

in this case.” Id. at 29.

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Burrus argues that the district court erred in its find-

ings that Burrus was not qualified for promotion and thus

did not make out a prima facie case of promotion discrim-

ination. She also argues that the criteria used for promo-

tion were too subjective.

A Title VII disparate treatment action for promotion

discrimination proceeds in three stages. The plaintiff first

has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of em-

ployment discrimination under the standards set forth in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),

and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248 (1981). If the prima facie case is established,

the defendant must articulate a reason, using admissible

evidence, to explain why “the plaintiff was rejected, or

someone else preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason.” Texas Department of Community Affairs, 450

U.S. at 254. If such a reason is offered, in order to prevail

the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s articu-

lated reason is a mere pretext for unlawful discrimination.

Id. at 256. Throughout these stages, the overall burden

of persuasion remains with the plaintiff. Id.

In this case, the trial court concluded that Burrus

had failed to establish a prima facie case because she

was not “qualified for promotion by reason of her general

lack of interpersonal skills,” rec., vol. I, at 29, even though

she “may have been technically as well qualified as some

of her male counterparts who were promoted.” Id. at 27.

The Ninth Circuit has recently considered at what

stage subjective qualifications are properly addressed in

the McDonnell Douglas three-step analysis. In Lynn v.

Regents of the University of California, 656 F.2d 1337,

1344 (9th Cir. 1981), the court concluded:

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“[O]bjective job qualifications are best treated at

step one and subjective criteria, along with any sup-

porting evidence, are best treated at the later stages

of the process. To do otherwise would in many in-

stances collapse the three step analysis into a single

initial step at which all issues would be resolved. This

would defeat the purpose underlying the McDonnell

Douglas process. See Sweeny, 439 U.S. at 24 n.1, 99

S. Ct. at 296 n.1.”

Id. (emphasis added). We agree with this analysis. Al-

though subjective evaluations play a legitimate part in

an employer’s determination whether an employee has

the ability to supervise others, Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d

1037, 1046 (10th Cir. 1981), it is also apparent that

“subjective decision making provides an opportunity for

unlawful discrimination.” Id.; Thornton v. Coffey, 618 F.2d

686, 691 (10th Cir. 1980); Abrams v. Johnson, 534 F.2d

1226, 1231 (6th Cir. 1976). In fact, the rejection of an

otherwise qualified individual on the basis of subjective

considerations entitles the plaintiff “to the benefit of an

inference of discrimination, which inference requires the

defendants to come forward and articulate legitimate rea-

sons for her non-selection.” Bauer, 647 F.2d at 1045; see

Texas Department of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. at 253.

If a plaintiff's failure to establish that she met the

employer’s subjective criteria could defeat her prima facie

case, the court would then not be required to consider

evidence of pretext. Thus the use of subjective criteria

could go unchallenged. This result is clearly at odds with

the mandate of McDonnell Douglas that a plaintiff be af-

forded a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate that

the stated reason for rejection was in fact pretext. 411

US. at 804; see also Texas Department of Community Af-

fairs, 450 U.S. at 255-56. Although the trial court in this

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case found that Burrus was objecti ely qualified for the

position, it improperly concluded on the basis of subjective

criteria that Burrus failed to establish a prima facie case.

The trial court went on to hold, however, that even

assuming the existence of a prima facie case based on

Burrus’ objective qualifications, the subjective evaluation

that she lacked the required ability to get along with

are clearly erroneous. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine

Research, 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969); Williams v. Colorado

Springs, Colo. School District #11, 641 F.2d 835, 843

(1981). Trial court findings are not clearly erroneous

unless we are definitely and firmly convinced, after re-

viewing the record as a whole, that a mistake has been

made. id.

Where applicants for a position have objective quali-

fications that are equal, it is within the employer’s discre-

tion to choose among them so long as the decision is not

based on unlawful criteria. Texas Department of Com-

munity Affairs, 450 U.S. at 259. We have reviewed the

entire record in this case and we do not have a definite

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Retaliation

Burrus contends the district court erred in finding

that UTC did not retaliate against her because she filed

charges of sex discrimination. Burrus claims that pay

and promotional opportunities were denied her, and that

she ultimately was terminated in retaliation for her

charges.

The general approach to Title VII suits set out in

McDonnell Douglas and Texas Department of Community

Affairs is also applicable to retaliation claims. Grant v.

Bethlehem Steel Corp., 622 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1980);

Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292. 1296 (8th Cir. 1980),

cert. denied, 450 U.S. 979 (1981); Mitchell v. Visser,

529 F. Supp. 1034, 1044 (D. Kan. 1981). A plaintiff must

first establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing

that: (1) she engaged in protected opposition to Title

VII discrimination or participated in a Title VII proceed-

ing; (2) she was disadvantaged by an action of her em-

ployer subsequent to or contemporaneously with such

opposition or participation; and (3) there is a causal con-

nection between the protected activity and the adverse

employment action. Smalley v. City of Eatonville, 640 F.2d

765, 769 (5th Cir. 1981); Gunther v. County of Washington,

623 F.2d 1303, 1314 (9th Cir. 1979) aff’d on other grounds,

452 U.S. 161 (1981); Grant, 622 F.2d at 46; Womack, 619

F.2d at 1296. The causal connection may be demon-

strated by evidence of circumstances that justify an in-

ference of retaliatory motive, such as protected conduct

closely followed by adverse action. See Grant, 622 F.2d

at 46; Womack, 619 F.2d at 1296 & n.6.

If a prima facie case is established, then the burden of

production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legiti-

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mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.

Womack, 619 F.2d at 1296. The defendant need not

prove the “absence of retaliatory motive, but only produce

evidence that would dispel the inference of retaliation by

establishing the existence of a legitimate ~eason.” Id.,

see Texas Department of Community Affairs, 450 U.S.

254-55; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,

577-78 (1978). If evidence of a legitimate reason is pro-

duced, the plaintiff may still prevail if she demonstrates

the articulated reason was a mere pretext for discrimina-

tion. The overall burden of persuasion remains on the

plaintiff. Texas Department of Community Affairs, 450

US. at 255-60.

Here, plaintiff was terminated in January 1976, al-

most three years after she filed her initial charge of gender

discrimination. The record supports the conclusion that

Burrus’ whole department was justifiably terminated, male

and female, because it was duplicating work done else-

where. Given the length of time between the filing of

charges and the termination, we agree with the trial court

that Burrus failed to establish a prima facie case of retal-

iation based on her termination.

The record also amply supports the trial court con-

clusion that even if Burrus made out a prima facie case

of retaliation based on unfavorable job evaluations and

lack of pay increases prior to termination, UTC offered

legitimate reasons for Burrus’ restricted opportunities

which she did not demonstrate were a mere pretext for

discrimination. See e.g., Gunther, 623 F.2d at 1314; Miller

v. Williams, 590 F.2d 317, 320 (9th Cir. 1979). Without

detailing all the evidence, we note testimony regarding

Burrus’ continuing attitudinal problems and her inability

to work with fellow employees. Thus, we must uphold

the trial court’s conclusion that UTC did not unlawfully

retaliate against Burrus.

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IV.

Statistical Study

Burrus also argues that the district court erred in

holding that Burrus’ statistical evidence was without pro-

bative value. However, adequate evidence in the record

supports the trial court’s conclusion that the data base

of the study was defective because of its small size and

other factual inaccuracies.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

All

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 76-231-C2

JEWEL D. BURRUS,

Plaintiff,

VS.

UNITED TELEPHONE COMPANY

OF KANSAS, INC.,

Defendant.

(Filed June 19, 1980)

JOURNAL ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

This action came on to be tried before the Court,

and the evidence adduced by the parties and the argu-

ments of counsel having been heard, and thereupon, upon

consideration thereof, the Court having rendered and filed

an Opinion and made and filed Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law dated June 10, 1980, it is hereby

Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that final judgment

be entered herein in favor of the defendant and against

plaintiff on the plaintiff's Complaint and that the same

is hereby dismissed with costs to the defendant.

/s/ Dale E. Saffels

United States District Judge

Dated: Jun 19 1980

APPROVED AS TO FORM THIS 17 DAY OF JUNE, 1980.

/s/ John McKay .

Attorney for Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 76-231-C2

JEWEL D. BURRUS,

Plaintiff,

VS.

UNITED TELEPHONE COMPANY

OF KANSAS, INC.,

Defendant.

(Filed June 10, 1980)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff filed this sex discrimination action pursuant

to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§2000e, et seq. The parties tried the case to the court

between April 14 and April 17, 1980. The following

are the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law

with regard to that trial.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiff is a female accountant. Defendant employed

her between February, 1970, and January, 1976. United

Systems Services, Inc. employed plaintiff between June,

1968, and February, 1970. Defendant and United Systems

Services, Inc. are wholly-owned subsidiaries of United

Telecommunications, Inc., a holding company. During her

tenure with defendant, plaintiff advanced from a Job

Grade 9 to a Job Grade 12. Although she did not receive

her accounting degree until 1972, plaintiff’s job title with

defendant throughout her employment was “accountant.”

Defendant did not promote plaintiff during the term of

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her employment with defendant. Prior to her employ-

ment with United System Services, Inc., plaintiff worked

for the American Telephone and Telegraph Company be-

tween 1948 and 1968. During the last five years of her

time with A. T. & T., plaintiff served as an Accounting

Supervisor. While with A.T. & T., however, plaintiff

never had occasion to supervise anyone who possessed an

accounting degree. As previously mentioned, plaintiff

acquired her Bachelor of Science in Business Administra-

tion, with a major in Accounting, in 1972. While still

in the employ of defendant, plaintiff took certain course-

work toward a Master of Arts degree.

Plaintiff’s cause of action is premised upon the allega-

tions that defendant failed to promote plaintiff, and took

certain retaliatory actions against plaintiff, due to the fact

that defendant actively pursued a policy of sex discrim-

ination in employment. Plaintiff was specifically dis-

gruntled by the fact that certain of her male contem-

poraries were promoted to supervisory positions within

the defendant company. Plaintiff complains that she was

as well qualified as the males in question, that she had

made known her desire for promotion, and that defendant

not only refused to promote plaintiff, but also closed out

the available positions by appointing males to them. But

the evidence indicates, and the court so finds, that in all

cases detailed by plaintiff, the males about whom plaintiff

complains were at least as well qualified as plaintiff for

the supervisory positions in question. In fact, the court

finds that at least two of the males involved, Gary

Hamilton and Ronald Sondergard, were more qualified

than plaintiff for accounting supervision positions, by rea-

son of either experience or education or a combination

of the two.

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In consequence of the allegedly discriminatory deci-

sions of defendant in promoting certain males to super-

visory positions, plaintiff filed a charge of sex discrimina-

tion in March, 1973 with the Equal Employment Opportu-

nity Commission and the Kansas Commission on Civil

Rights. Plaintiff claims that as a result of having filed

the charge in question, defendant retaliated against plain-

tiff by, among other things, further restricting her growth

opportunities and generally conspiring to drive her out

of the firm. Defendant’s failure to promote plaintiff, as

well as its alleged retaliation against her for the EEOC-

KCCR claim, form the basis of this action.

The court finds as a matter of fact that the ability

to get along and communicate with one’s peers, subor-

dinates and superiors is a crucial consideration in the

determination of whether a person is suitable for promo-

tion to a supervisory position in nearly any business

setting, and specifically in the context of plaintiff's em-

ployment with defendant. The court also finds that there

is no evidence, either documentary or testimonial, which

would tend to establish that plaintiff possesses this critical

quality. Indeed, with the exception of plaintiff's testi-

mony, all of the evidence in this case indicates either

directly or indirectly that plaintiff is uncommunicative

and generally lacking in interpersonal skills. The corrob-

orative testimony on this issue comes not only from

current employees of defendant who worked with plain-

tiff, but also from plaintiff's former supervisor, who is

no longer employed by defendant, and has instituted his

own litigation against defendant.

The evidence in this case indicates that plaintiff may

have been technically as well qualified as some of her

male counterparts who were promoted. It also shows that

she was certainly not as technically qualified as two of

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the males about whom she has complained. More impor-

tantly, the evidence suggests that plaintiff was indeed

ill-qualified for promotion to a supervisory position, in

that she lacked the interpersonal skills necessary for such

an advancement. Plaintiff remained unpromoted because

she was uncommunicative and unable to work effectively

with others.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Title VII actions proceed in three stages. The plain-

tiff first has the burden of making a prima facie case

that the defendant has engaged in some discriminatory

practice. The defendant is next permitted to show that

the alleged discriminatory practices were undertaken for

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. Finally, the plain-

tiff may rebut defendant’s evidence with a showing that

the non-discriminatory reasons put forth by defendant for

its actions are in fact nothing more than a pretext for

discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

U.S. 792 (1973); and Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978).

A plaintiff may make out a prima facie claim of dis-

crimination by showing:

„ . (i) that he belongs to a . . minority; (ii) that he

applied and was qualified for a job for which the

employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite

his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after

his rejection, the position remained open and the em-

ployer continued to seek applicants from persons of

complainant’s qualifications. ...” McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, supra, at 802.

In this case, plaintiff has established that she had

made plain to defendant her desire to advance. She has

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also shown that she was not promoted, while her male

contemporaries were successful in achieving higher levels

in management. The critical question, then, is whether

plaintiff was qualified for the positions for which she

applied.

The case law makes it abundantly clear that a plain-

tiff fails to make a prima facie showing of discrimination

if plaintiff does not establish his or her qualification for

the job in question. Johnson v. Fulton Sylphon Division,

439 F.Supp. 658 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) [poor work record];

Thompson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 552 F.2d 220 (8th

Cir. 1977) [frequent absences]; Lim v. Citizens Savings

and Loan Assn., 430 F.Supp. 802 (N.D. Cal. 1976) [educa-

tion and experience]; United States v. University of Mary-

land, 438 F.Supp. 742 (D.Md. 1977) [lack of experience];

and Winfrey v. Metropolitan Utilities District, 467 F Supp.

56 (D.Neb. 1979) [errors on job]. More importantly, it

has been consistently held that an inability to get along

with one’s associates in a work environment will support

an employer’s decision either not to promote or to dis-

charge an employee. A prima facie case of discrimination

is not made out when such elements are present in a

case. Stevens v. Junior College District of St. Louis, 548

F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1977); Cedeck v. Hamilton Federal Sav-

ings and Loan Assn., 414 F.Supp. 495 (E.D.Mo. 1976);

Bradington v. International Business Machines Corp., 360

F.Supp. 845 (D.Md. 1973); Lindsey v. Southwestern Bell

Telephone Co., 546 F.2d 1123 (Sth Cir. 1977); Morales

v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 467 F.Supp. 1031 (D. Minn.

1979); Mopkins v. St. Louis Die Casting Corp., 423 F.Supp.

132 (E.D.Mo. 1976), aff d. 569 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1978);

and Naraine v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 507 F.2d 590

(8th Cir. 1974). Since the court has already found as

a matter of fact that plaintiff was not qualified for pro-

motion by reason of her general lack of interpersonal

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skills, it follows from the above that the court must find

as a matter of law that plaintiff has not made out a prima

facie claim of discrimination in this case.

Even if the court were to assume arguendo that plain-

tiff had established a prima facie claim of discrimination

in this matter, the evidence adduced by defendant on the

subject of plaintiff's personality would constitute sufficient

grounds for negating the inference of discriminatory con-

duct raised by plaintiff. In this connection, it should be

noted that an employer may “articulate” a legitimate, non-

discriminatory reason for its conduct toward an employee

without having to actually prove the absence of discrim-

inatory motive; that is, the employer may meet his burden

by merely explaining what was done, as long as the actions

complained of were undertaken for non-discriminatory

reasons. Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978);

and Diggs v. Western Electric Co., 587 F.2d 1070 (10th

Cir. 1978). It has been held that a subjective analysis

of the personality characteristics of an employee may

represent a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for

the failure of an employer to hire or promote an individual.

Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th

Cir. 1978); Haire v. Calloway, 572 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1978);

and Williams v. Yazoo Valley-Minter City Oil Mill, Inc.,

469 F.Supp. 37 (N.D.Miss. 1978).

Some mention needs to be made of certain statistical

evidence introduced by plaintiff. Plaintiff's counsel as-

sembled certain data regarding the employees, male and

female, who composed the accounting department in which

plaintiff worked while in deiendant’s employ. The data

generally covered the time period during which plaintiff

worked for defendant. Plaintiff's statistical evidence is

based on fifty-five cases, each “case” representing a par-

ticular individual who worked contemporaneously with

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plaintiff in defendant’s accounting department. Plaintiff

submitted this data to a statistical expert, who analyzed

during the period in question could only be explained

by the presence of sexual bias on the part of defendant.

The court finds as a matter of law that plaintiff's

statistical evidence is without probative value. The sta-

tistical evidence produced here has several weaknesses.

First, it is based on a study of only fifty-five persons. The

very size of the group studied detracts from the ultimate

value of the exercise. In addition, plaintiff made no at-

tempt to compare the employee group in question to the

other employee groups existing in defendant’s organization.

Neither did plaintiff relate her statistical evidence to

comparable evidence relevant to the Kansas City Metro-

politan area as a whole. It is generally recognized that

statistical evidence based on a small universe” has very

little probative value. EEOC v. North Hills Passavant

Hospital, 466 F.Supp. 783 (W.D.Pa. 1979); Mopkins v.

St. Louis Die Casting Corp., supra; Ochoa v. Monsanto

Company, 335 F.Supp. 53 (S.D.Tex. 1971), aff'd 473 F.2d

318 (5th Cir. 1973); and Friend v. Leidinger, 446 F.Supp.

361 (E.D.Va. 1977), affd 588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, plaintiff's statistical evidence contains certain

inaccuracies, such as the multiple inclusion of some indi-

viduals (under different names) and the inclusion of

certain persons who were not members of the group in

question. Where questions exist as to the accuracy of

the elements which make up a statistical example, the

probative value of the evidence is undermined. United

States v. University of Maryland, supra; and Williams v.

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New Orleans Steamship Assn., 466 F.Supp. 662 (E.D.La.

1979). Finally, since this is an action by an individual

grievant, even if plaintiff's statistical evidence were found

to have probative value, it would tell the court very little

regarding defendant’s reasons for not having promoted

plaintiff. Terrell v. Feldstein Co., Inc., 468 F.2d 910 (5th

Cir. 1972); Johnson v. Fulton Sylphon Division, supra;

and Wilson v. Woodward Iron Co., 362 F.Supp. 886 (N.D.

Ala. 1973).

In conclusion, the Court finds as a matter of law that:

(a) Plaintiff has not proven any facts to support

her claim that defendant discriminated against her by

refusing to promote her because of her sex, in violation

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq.

(b) Plaintiff has not proven any facts to support

her claim that defendant has discriminated against her

because of her sex by harrassing her in her employment,

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq.

(c) Plaintiff has not proven any facts to support

her claim that defendant retaliated against her because

she filed charges of sexual discrimination against defen-

dant, or because she had otherwise protested unlawful

employment practices by defendant, in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.

§2000e, et seq.

(d) Assuming without deciding that plaintiff had

made a prima facie case of sex discrimination or retaliation

against defendant, defendant articulated sufficient legit-

imate non-discriminatory reasons for its actions, thereby

shifting the burden to plaintiff to show that the proffered

justification was a pretext for discrimination. Plaintiff

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failed to establish that the justification was a pretext

for discrimination or that “but for” her sex or her having

filed a charge of discrimination, she would have been more

favorably treated by defendant.

Defendant is entitled to judgment in its favor against

plaintiff on plaintiff's complaint, and plaintiff is not en-

titled to relief against defendant on the claims alleged

in her complaint.

Defense counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate

Journal Entry of Judgment. Said Journal Entry of Judg-

ment is to be circulated to opposing counsel and presented

to the court for signature.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: This 10th day of June, 1989, at Kansas City,

Kansas.

/s/ Dale E. Saffels

Dale E. Saffels

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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