Appendix — Burrus v. United Telephone Co. of Kansas
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL
TENTH CIRCUIT
No. 80-1741
JEWEL BURRUS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
UNITED TELEPHONE COMPANY OF KANSAS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
(D.C. No. 76-231-C2)
(Filed July 22, 1982)
Submitted on the briefs:
Richard H. Anton, Kansas City, Missouri, for Plaintiff-
Appellant.
J. Richard Smith, Overland Park, Kansas; and Arlyn D.
Haxton and John A. Verling, III, of Dietrich, Davis, Dicus,
Rowlands & Schmitt, Kansas City, Missouri, for Defendant-
Appellee.
A2
Before SETH, Chief Judge, LOGAN, and SEYMOUR, Cir-
cult Judges.
SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record,
this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that
oral argument would not be cf material assistance in the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a);
Tenth Cir. R. 10(e). The cause is therefore ordered sub-
mitted without oral argument.
Jewel Burrus brought this sex discrimination action
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e et seq., against United Telephone Company of Kan-
sas, Inc. (UTC). Burrus alleges that UTC engaged in un-
lawful employment discrimination by failing to promote
her because of her sex, and by retaliating against her after
she filed charges of discrimination.“ We affirm the trial
court’s holding that UTC did not violate Title VII.
1. The relevant statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), provides in
pertinent part:
„a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer—
or to te against any in-
dividual with respect to compensation, terms, con-
or privileges of because of such
$s race, color, sex, or national origin
pertinent
“(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
practice made an employment practice by this sub-
A3
I.
Background of Case
The facts relevant to Burrus Title VII action are as
follows. Burrus is an a nutant. She worked for the
American Telephone & Telegraph Company (AT&T) be-
tween 1948 and 1968. From June 1968 until February
1970, she was employed by United Systems Services, In-
corporated (USS). Thereafter, Burrus worked for defen-
dant UTC until she was terminated in 1976. Both USS and
UTC are wholly owned subsidiaries of United Telecom-
munications, Incorporated.
While employed by these companies, Burrus held
various positions and pursued her education. During her
last five years of employment with AT&T, she served as an
Accounting supervisor. Neither she nor anyone she super-
vised at AT&T had an accounting degree. Burrus’ job title
throughout her employment with defendant UTC was “ac-
countant,” although she did not obtain her Bachelor of
Science accounting degree until 1972.
UTC never promoted Burrus. UTC did, however,
promote some of her male and female contemporaries to
supervisory positions. Burrus claims that she was as well
qualified as the promoted males; that she had made known
her desire for promotion; and that UTC not only refused to
promote her, but closed out available positions by ap-
pointing males to them.
Because of the alleged discriminatory practices of UTC,
Burrus filed a charge of sex discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the
Kansas Commission on Civil Rights. Her retaliation claim
is based on an allegation that after she filed her charge,
UTC further restricted her growth opportunities and gen-
erally conspired to drive her from the firm.
Al
Both the EEOC and the Kansas Commission found no
probable cause to believe Burrus charges were true.
Burrus subsequently filed this lawsuit in federal court.
After a bench trial, the court held against Burrus on all
her claims. Burrus argues on appeal that the district court
erred: (1) by holding she was not discriminated against
because of her sex; (2) by finding UTC did not unlawfully
retaliate against her after she filed discrimination charges;
and (3) by finding Burrus’ statistical study to be without
probative value.
II.
Sex Discrimination
In holding that Burrus was not the victim of unlaw-
ful sex discrimination, the trial court found:
“The evidence in this case indicates that plaintiff
may have been technically as well qualified as some
of her male counterparts who were promoted. It also
shows that she was certainly not as technically quali-
fied as two of the males about whom she has com-
plained. More importantly, the evidence suggests that
plaintiff was indeed ill-qualified for promotion to a
supervisory position, in that she lacked the interper-
sonal skills necessary for such an advancement. Plain-
tiff remained unpromoted because she was uncom-
municative and unable to work effectively with
others.”
Rec., Vol. I, at 27. The court concluded that Is lince
. . . Plaintiff was not qualified for promotion by reason
of her general lack of interpersonal skills, it follows.
that the court must find as a matter of law that plaintiff
has not made out a prima facie claim of discrimination
in this case.” Id. at 29.
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Burrus argues that the district court erred in its find-
ings that Burrus was not qualified for promotion and thus
did not make out a prima facie case of promotion discrim-
ination. She also argues that the criteria used for promo-
tion were too subjective.
A Title VII disparate treatment action for promotion
discrimination proceeds in three stages. The plaintiff first
has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of em-
ployment discrimination under the standards set forth in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248 (1981). If the prima facie case is established,
the defendant must articulate a reason, using admissible
evidence, to explain why “the plaintiff was rejected, or
someone else preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason.” Texas Department of Community Affairs, 450
U.S. at 254. If such a reason is offered, in order to prevail
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s articu-
lated reason is a mere pretext for unlawful discrimination.
Id. at 256. Throughout these stages, the overall burden
of persuasion remains with the plaintiff. Id.
In this case, the trial court concluded that Burrus
had failed to establish a prima facie case because she
was not “qualified for promotion by reason of her general
lack of interpersonal skills,” rec., vol. I, at 29, even though
she “may have been technically as well qualified as some
of her male counterparts who were promoted.” Id. at 27.
The Ninth Circuit has recently considered at what
stage subjective qualifications are properly addressed in
the McDonnell Douglas three-step analysis. In Lynn v.
Regents of the University of California, 656 F.2d 1337,
1344 (9th Cir. 1981), the court concluded:
A6
“[O]bjective job qualifications are best treated at
step one and subjective criteria, along with any sup-
porting evidence, are best treated at the later stages
of the process. To do otherwise would in many in-
stances collapse the three step analysis into a single
initial step at which all issues would be resolved. This
would defeat the purpose underlying the McDonnell
Douglas process. See Sweeny, 439 U.S. at 24 n.1, 99
S. Ct. at 296 n.1.”
Id. (emphasis added). We agree with this analysis. Al-
though subjective evaluations play a legitimate part in
an employer’s determination whether an employee has
the ability to supervise others, Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d
1037, 1046 (10th Cir. 1981), it is also apparent that
“subjective decision making provides an opportunity for
unlawful discrimination.” Id.; Thornton v. Coffey, 618 F.2d
686, 691 (10th Cir. 1980); Abrams v. Johnson, 534 F.2d
1226, 1231 (6th Cir. 1976). In fact, the rejection of an
otherwise qualified individual on the basis of subjective
considerations entitles the plaintiff “to the benefit of an
inference of discrimination, which inference requires the
defendants to come forward and articulate legitimate rea-
sons for her non-selection.” Bauer, 647 F.2d at 1045; see
Texas Department of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. at 253.
If a plaintiff's failure to establish that she met the
employer’s subjective criteria could defeat her prima facie
case, the court would then not be required to consider
evidence of pretext. Thus the use of subjective criteria
could go unchallenged. This result is clearly at odds with
the mandate of McDonnell Douglas that a plaintiff be af-
forded a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate that
the stated reason for rejection was in fact pretext. 411
US. at 804; see also Texas Department of Community Af-
fairs, 450 U.S. at 255-56. Although the trial court in this
A7
case found that Burrus was objecti ely qualified for the
position, it improperly concluded on the basis of subjective
criteria that Burrus failed to establish a prima facie case.
The trial court went on to hold, however, that even
assuming the existence of a prima facie case based on
Burrus’ objective qualifications, the subjective evaluation
that she lacked the required ability to get along with
are clearly erroneous. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969); Williams v. Colorado
Springs, Colo. School District #11, 641 F.2d 835, 843
(1981). Trial court findings are not clearly erroneous
unless we are definitely and firmly convinced, after re-
viewing the record as a whole, that a mistake has been
made. id.
Where applicants for a position have objective quali-
fications that are equal, it is within the employer’s discre-
tion to choose among them so long as the decision is not
based on unlawful criteria. Texas Department of Com-
munity Affairs, 450 U.S. at 259. We have reviewed the
entire record in this case and we do not have a definite
A8
Retaliation
Burrus contends the district court erred in finding
that UTC did not retaliate against her because she filed
charges of sex discrimination. Burrus claims that pay
and promotional opportunities were denied her, and that
she ultimately was terminated in retaliation for her
charges.
The general approach to Title VII suits set out in
McDonnell Douglas and Texas Department of Community
Affairs is also applicable to retaliation claims. Grant v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 622 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1980);
Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292. 1296 (8th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 979 (1981); Mitchell v. Visser,
529 F. Supp. 1034, 1044 (D. Kan. 1981). A plaintiff must
first establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing
that: (1) she engaged in protected opposition to Title
VII discrimination or participated in a Title VII proceed-
ing; (2) she was disadvantaged by an action of her em-
ployer subsequent to or contemporaneously with such
opposition or participation; and (3) there is a causal con-
nection between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action. Smalley v. City of Eatonville, 640 F.2d
765, 769 (5th Cir. 1981); Gunther v. County of Washington,
623 F.2d 1303, 1314 (9th Cir. 1979) aff’d on other grounds,
452 U.S. 161 (1981); Grant, 622 F.2d at 46; Womack, 619
F.2d at 1296. The causal connection may be demon-
strated by evidence of circumstances that justify an in-
ference of retaliatory motive, such as protected conduct
closely followed by adverse action. See Grant, 622 F.2d
at 46; Womack, 619 F.2d at 1296 & n.6.
If a prima facie case is established, then the burden of
production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legiti-
A9
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.
Womack, 619 F.2d at 1296. The defendant need not
prove the “absence of retaliatory motive, but only produce
evidence that would dispel the inference of retaliation by
establishing the existence of a legitimate ~eason.” Id.,
see Texas Department of Community Affairs, 450 U.S.
254-55; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
577-78 (1978). If evidence of a legitimate reason is pro-
duced, the plaintiff may still prevail if she demonstrates
the articulated reason was a mere pretext for discrimina-
tion. The overall burden of persuasion remains on the
plaintiff. Texas Department of Community Affairs, 450
US. at 255-60.
Here, plaintiff was terminated in January 1976, al-
most three years after she filed her initial charge of gender
discrimination. The record supports the conclusion that
Burrus’ whole department was justifiably terminated, male
and female, because it was duplicating work done else-
where. Given the length of time between the filing of
charges and the termination, we agree with the trial court
that Burrus failed to establish a prima facie case of retal-
iation based on her termination.
The record also amply supports the trial court con-
clusion that even if Burrus made out a prima facie case
of retaliation based on unfavorable job evaluations and
lack of pay increases prior to termination, UTC offered
legitimate reasons for Burrus’ restricted opportunities
which she did not demonstrate were a mere pretext for
discrimination. See e.g., Gunther, 623 F.2d at 1314; Miller
v. Williams, 590 F.2d 317, 320 (9th Cir. 1979). Without
detailing all the evidence, we note testimony regarding
Burrus’ continuing attitudinal problems and her inability
to work with fellow employees. Thus, we must uphold
the trial court’s conclusion that UTC did not unlawfully
retaliate against Burrus.
Al0
IV.
Statistical Study
Burrus also argues that the district court erred in
holding that Burrus’ statistical evidence was without pro-
bative value. However, adequate evidence in the record
supports the trial court’s conclusion that the data base
of the study was defective because of its small size and
other factual inaccuracies.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
All
APPENDIX B
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 76-231-C2
JEWEL D. BURRUS,
Plaintiff,
VS.
UNITED TELEPHONE COMPANY
OF KANSAS, INC.,
Defendant.
(Filed June 19, 1980)
JOURNAL ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
This action came on to be tried before the Court,
and the evidence adduced by the parties and the argu-
ments of counsel having been heard, and thereupon, upon
consideration thereof, the Court having rendered and filed
an Opinion and made and filed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law dated June 10, 1980, it is hereby
Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that final judgment
be entered herein in favor of the defendant and against
plaintiff on the plaintiff's Complaint and that the same
is hereby dismissed with costs to the defendant.
/s/ Dale E. Saffels
United States District Judge
Dated: Jun 19 1980
APPROVED AS TO FORM THIS 17 DAY OF JUNE, 1980.
/s/ John McKay .
Attorney for Plaintiff
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 76-231-C2
JEWEL D. BURRUS,
Plaintiff,
VS.
UNITED TELEPHONE COMPANY
OF KANSAS, INC.,
Defendant.
(Filed June 10, 1980)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff filed this sex discrimination action pursuant
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§2000e, et seq. The parties tried the case to the court
between April 14 and April 17, 1980. The following
are the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law
with regard to that trial.
I. FINDINGS OF FACT
Plaintiff is a female accountant. Defendant employed
her between February, 1970, and January, 1976. United
Systems Services, Inc. employed plaintiff between June,
1968, and February, 1970. Defendant and United Systems
Services, Inc. are wholly-owned subsidiaries of United
Telecommunications, Inc., a holding company. During her
tenure with defendant, plaintiff advanced from a Job
Grade 9 to a Job Grade 12. Although she did not receive
her accounting degree until 1972, plaintiff’s job title with
defendant throughout her employment was “accountant.”
Defendant did not promote plaintiff during the term of
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her employment with defendant. Prior to her employ-
ment with United System Services, Inc., plaintiff worked
for the American Telephone and Telegraph Company be-
tween 1948 and 1968. During the last five years of her
time with A. T. & T., plaintiff served as an Accounting
Supervisor. While with A.T. & T., however, plaintiff
never had occasion to supervise anyone who possessed an
accounting degree. As previously mentioned, plaintiff
acquired her Bachelor of Science in Business Administra-
tion, with a major in Accounting, in 1972. While still
in the employ of defendant, plaintiff took certain course-
work toward a Master of Arts degree.
Plaintiff’s cause of action is premised upon the allega-
tions that defendant failed to promote plaintiff, and took
certain retaliatory actions against plaintiff, due to the fact
that defendant actively pursued a policy of sex discrim-
ination in employment. Plaintiff was specifically dis-
gruntled by the fact that certain of her male contem-
poraries were promoted to supervisory positions within
the defendant company. Plaintiff complains that she was
as well qualified as the males in question, that she had
made known her desire for promotion, and that defendant
not only refused to promote plaintiff, but also closed out
the available positions by appointing males to them. But
the evidence indicates, and the court so finds, that in all
cases detailed by plaintiff, the males about whom plaintiff
complains were at least as well qualified as plaintiff for
the supervisory positions in question. In fact, the court
finds that at least two of the males involved, Gary
Hamilton and Ronald Sondergard, were more qualified
than plaintiff for accounting supervision positions, by rea-
son of either experience or education or a combination
of the two.
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In consequence of the allegedly discriminatory deci-
sions of defendant in promoting certain males to super-
visory positions, plaintiff filed a charge of sex discrimina-
tion in March, 1973 with the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission and the Kansas Commission on Civil
Rights. Plaintiff claims that as a result of having filed
the charge in question, defendant retaliated against plain-
tiff by, among other things, further restricting her growth
opportunities and generally conspiring to drive her out
of the firm. Defendant’s failure to promote plaintiff, as
well as its alleged retaliation against her for the EEOC-
KCCR claim, form the basis of this action.
The court finds as a matter of fact that the ability
to get along and communicate with one’s peers, subor-
dinates and superiors is a crucial consideration in the
determination of whether a person is suitable for promo-
tion to a supervisory position in nearly any business
setting, and specifically in the context of plaintiff's em-
ployment with defendant. The court also finds that there
is no evidence, either documentary or testimonial, which
would tend to establish that plaintiff possesses this critical
quality. Indeed, with the exception of plaintiff's testi-
mony, all of the evidence in this case indicates either
directly or indirectly that plaintiff is uncommunicative
and generally lacking in interpersonal skills. The corrob-
orative testimony on this issue comes not only from
current employees of defendant who worked with plain-
tiff, but also from plaintiff's former supervisor, who is
no longer employed by defendant, and has instituted his
own litigation against defendant.
The evidence in this case indicates that plaintiff may
have been technically as well qualified as some of her
male counterparts who were promoted. It also shows that
she was certainly not as technically qualified as two of
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the males about whom she has complained. More impor-
tantly, the evidence suggests that plaintiff was indeed
ill-qualified for promotion to a supervisory position, in
that she lacked the interpersonal skills necessary for such
an advancement. Plaintiff remained unpromoted because
she was uncommunicative and unable to work effectively
with others.
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Title VII actions proceed in three stages. The plain-
tiff first has the burden of making a prima facie case
that the defendant has engaged in some discriminatory
practice. The defendant is next permitted to show that
the alleged discriminatory practices were undertaken for
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. Finally, the plain-
tiff may rebut defendant’s evidence with a showing that
the non-discriminatory reasons put forth by defendant for
its actions are in fact nothing more than a pretext for
discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973); and Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567 (1978).
A plaintiff may make out a prima facie claim of dis-
crimination by showing:
„ . (i) that he belongs to a . . minority; (ii) that he
applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite
his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after
his rejection, the position remained open and the em-
ployer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant’s qualifications. ...” McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, supra, at 802.
In this case, plaintiff has established that she had
made plain to defendant her desire to advance. She has
Als
also shown that she was not promoted, while her male
contemporaries were successful in achieving higher levels
in management. The critical question, then, is whether
plaintiff was qualified for the positions for which she
applied.
The case law makes it abundantly clear that a plain-
tiff fails to make a prima facie showing of discrimination
if plaintiff does not establish his or her qualification for
the job in question. Johnson v. Fulton Sylphon Division,
439 F.Supp. 658 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) [poor work record];
Thompson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 552 F.2d 220 (8th
Cir. 1977) [frequent absences]; Lim v. Citizens Savings
and Loan Assn., 430 F.Supp. 802 (N.D. Cal. 1976) [educa-
tion and experience]; United States v. University of Mary-
land, 438 F.Supp. 742 (D.Md. 1977) [lack of experience];
and Winfrey v. Metropolitan Utilities District, 467 F Supp.
56 (D.Neb. 1979) [errors on job]. More importantly, it
has been consistently held that an inability to get along
with one’s associates in a work environment will support
an employer’s decision either not to promote or to dis-
charge an employee. A prima facie case of discrimination
is not made out when such elements are present in a
case. Stevens v. Junior College District of St. Louis, 548
F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1977); Cedeck v. Hamilton Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Assn., 414 F.Supp. 495 (E.D.Mo. 1976);
Bradington v. International Business Machines Corp., 360
F.Supp. 845 (D.Md. 1973); Lindsey v. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co., 546 F.2d 1123 (Sth Cir. 1977); Morales
v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 467 F.Supp. 1031 (D. Minn.
1979); Mopkins v. St. Louis Die Casting Corp., 423 F.Supp.
132 (E.D.Mo. 1976), aff d. 569 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1978);
and Naraine v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 507 F.2d 590
(8th Cir. 1974). Since the court has already found as
a matter of fact that plaintiff was not qualified for pro-
motion by reason of her general lack of interpersonal
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skills, it follows from the above that the court must find
as a matter of law that plaintiff has not made out a prima
facie claim of discrimination in this case.
Even if the court were to assume arguendo that plain-
tiff had established a prima facie claim of discrimination
in this matter, the evidence adduced by defendant on the
subject of plaintiff's personality would constitute sufficient
grounds for negating the inference of discriminatory con-
duct raised by plaintiff. In this connection, it should be
noted that an employer may “articulate” a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for its conduct toward an employee
without having to actually prove the absence of discrim-
inatory motive; that is, the employer may meet his burden
by merely explaining what was done, as long as the actions
complained of were undertaken for non-discriminatory
reasons. Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978);
and Diggs v. Western Electric Co., 587 F.2d 1070 (10th
Cir. 1978). It has been held that a subjective analysis
of the personality characteristics of an employee may
represent a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for
the failure of an employer to hire or promote an individual.
Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th
Cir. 1978); Haire v. Calloway, 572 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1978);
and Williams v. Yazoo Valley-Minter City Oil Mill, Inc.,
469 F.Supp. 37 (N.D.Miss. 1978).
Some mention needs to be made of certain statistical
evidence introduced by plaintiff. Plaintiff's counsel as-
sembled certain data regarding the employees, male and
female, who composed the accounting department in which
plaintiff worked while in deiendant’s employ. The data
generally covered the time period during which plaintiff
worked for defendant. Plaintiff's statistical evidence is
based on fifty-five cases, each “case” representing a par-
ticular individual who worked contemporaneously with
Al8
plaintiff in defendant’s accounting department. Plaintiff
submitted this data to a statistical expert, who analyzed
during the period in question could only be explained
by the presence of sexual bias on the part of defendant.
The court finds as a matter of law that plaintiff's
statistical evidence is without probative value. The sta-
tistical evidence produced here has several weaknesses.
First, it is based on a study of only fifty-five persons. The
very size of the group studied detracts from the ultimate
value of the exercise. In addition, plaintiff made no at-
tempt to compare the employee group in question to the
other employee groups existing in defendant’s organization.
Neither did plaintiff relate her statistical evidence to
comparable evidence relevant to the Kansas City Metro-
politan area as a whole. It is generally recognized that
statistical evidence based on a small universe” has very
little probative value. EEOC v. North Hills Passavant
Hospital, 466 F.Supp. 783 (W.D.Pa. 1979); Mopkins v.
St. Louis Die Casting Corp., supra; Ochoa v. Monsanto
Company, 335 F.Supp. 53 (S.D.Tex. 1971), aff'd 473 F.2d
318 (5th Cir. 1973); and Friend v. Leidinger, 446 F.Supp.
361 (E.D.Va. 1977), affd 588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978).
Moreover, plaintiff's statistical evidence contains certain
inaccuracies, such as the multiple inclusion of some indi-
viduals (under different names) and the inclusion of
certain persons who were not members of the group in
question. Where questions exist as to the accuracy of
the elements which make up a statistical example, the
probative value of the evidence is undermined. United
States v. University of Maryland, supra; and Williams v.
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New Orleans Steamship Assn., 466 F.Supp. 662 (E.D.La.
1979). Finally, since this is an action by an individual
grievant, even if plaintiff's statistical evidence were found
to have probative value, it would tell the court very little
regarding defendant’s reasons for not having promoted
plaintiff. Terrell v. Feldstein Co., Inc., 468 F.2d 910 (5th
Cir. 1972); Johnson v. Fulton Sylphon Division, supra;
and Wilson v. Woodward Iron Co., 362 F.Supp. 886 (N.D.
Ala. 1973).
In conclusion, the Court finds as a matter of law that:
(a) Plaintiff has not proven any facts to support
her claim that defendant discriminated against her by
refusing to promote her because of her sex, in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq.
(b) Plaintiff has not proven any facts to support
her claim that defendant has discriminated against her
because of her sex by harrassing her in her employment,
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq.
(c) Plaintiff has not proven any facts to support
her claim that defendant retaliated against her because
she filed charges of sexual discrimination against defen-
dant, or because she had otherwise protested unlawful
employment practices by defendant, in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§2000e, et seq.
(d) Assuming without deciding that plaintiff had
made a prima facie case of sex discrimination or retaliation
against defendant, defendant articulated sufficient legit-
imate non-discriminatory reasons for its actions, thereby
shifting the burden to plaintiff to show that the proffered
justification was a pretext for discrimination. Plaintiff
A20
failed to establish that the justification was a pretext
for discrimination or that “but for” her sex or her having
filed a charge of discrimination, she would have been more
favorably treated by defendant.
Defendant is entitled to judgment in its favor against
plaintiff on plaintiff's complaint, and plaintiff is not en-
titled to relief against defendant on the claims alleged
in her complaint.
Defense counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate
Journal Entry of Judgment. Said Journal Entry of Judg-
ment is to be circulated to opposing counsel and presented
to the court for signature.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: This 10th day of June, 1989, at Kansas City,
Kansas.
/s/ Dale E. Saffels
Dale E. Saffels
United States District Judge
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