Appendix — O'Connor v. Nevada

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DENNIS O’CONNOR,

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) No, 81-5423

vs, ) (D.C. No. CV-80-76,

) RDF)

STATE OF NEVADA, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees. )

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Roger D. Foley, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 5, 1982

BEFORE: WALLACE and CANBY, Curcuit Judges, and

EAST,* District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

O’Connor appeals a dismissal of his civil rights actions

brought against the State of Nevada, several of its agencies,

Churchill County District Attorney Hill, and Fallon Munici-

pal Court Judge Teurman. O’Connor alleged various viola-

tions of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§§

1983, 1985 and 1986, as well as various constitutional amen-

dments and provisions. The district court granted motions to

dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(1) and (6) as to all

defendants. The essential facts can be found in the district

court’s opinion. O’Connor v. State of Nevada, 507 F. Supp.

$46 (D. Nev. 1981) (O’Connor). We affirm.

As to the dismissal of suit against Judge Teurman and

District Attorney Hill, we agree with the district court that

Judge Teurman, as a witness in a state judicial proceeding,

and District Attorney Hill, as a state prosecutor, are both

2a

absolutely immune from civil rights suits. O’Connor, supra,

507 F. Supp. at 548-50. O’Connor also suggests that besides

Judge Teurman’s participation as a witness in the state judi-

cial proceeding, his handling of O’Connor’s prior municipal

court action violated his constitutional rights. Clearly,

though, Judge Teurman is immune from civil rights suits for

judicial acts not taken in the absence of all jurisdiction.

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978); Rankin v.

Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451

U.S. 939 (1981).

O’Connor alleged that the State of Nevada denied him

his rights under the seventh and fourteenth amendments by

requiring a deposit for a civil jury trial pursuant to Rule 38

of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure. O’Connor sought

injunctive relief and damages for these alleged constitutional

violations. The district judge dismissed the action on the

basis that the seventh amendment right to jury trial in civil

cases does not apply in state court. O’Connor, supra, 507 S.

Supp. at 548.

It was error for the district court to decide this issue. It

is clear that under the eleventh amendment a state or its

agencies cannot be sued in federal court without its consent.

Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); Mills Music,

Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979). Nevada has

explicitly refused to waive its immunity to suit under the

eleventh amendment. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.031(3). The

Supreme Court has made it clear that section 1983 does not

constitute an abrogation of the eleventh amendment im-

munity of the states. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338-41

(1979). The district court should have dismissed the claims

against the State on the basis of the eleventh amendment.

The district court also granted a motion to dismiss on

behalf of the State Bar of Nevada. The district court

reasoned that the state bar is the investigative arm of the

Supreme Court of Nevada, charged with investigating and

disciplining the legal profession of the state, and as such an

3a

agency, it too is immune from suit in federal court under the

eleventh amendment. O’Connor, supra, 507 F. Supp. at 550.

We agree. Ginter v. State Bar of Nevada, 625 F.2d 829 (9th

Cir. 1980) (per curiam).

The Supreme Court of Nevada and the Third Judicial

District Court of Nevada, as agencies of the state, were also

properly dismissed from suit on eleventh amendment groun-

ds. O’Connor, supra, 507 F. Supp. at.550-51.

AFFIRMED.

* Honorable William G. eee ee ee en Se Dis-

trict of Oregon, sitting by designation.

4a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

DENNIS L. O’CONNOR,

)

Plaintiff,

we. ) Civil LV 80-76 RDF

STATE OF NEVADA, et al.,

Defendants. )

ORDER RE MOTIONS

Plaintiff’s pro se complaint alleges that various agencies

and public officials of the State of Nevada, the City of Fal-

Jurisdiction of this Court arises under Title 28, U.S.C. §

1331 and Title 28, U.S.C., § 1343. Plaintiff institutes this ac-

tion under Title 42, U.S.C., §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, and Ar-

ticle I, Section 9, and the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

MOTIONS BEFORE THIS COURT

Defendants State Bar of Nevada, the Nevada Supreme

Court, the Third Judicial District Court of Nevada, Church-

ill County District Attorney John Hill, and Fallon Municipal

Court Judge William Teurman filed motions to dismiss for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pur-

suant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. De-

fendant State of Nevada filed a motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)

and Rule 12(b)(6), FRCP. Plaintiff filed a motion to strike

defendant State of Nevada’s motion to dismiss.

Defendants Nevada Supreme Court, the Third Judicial

District Court, and the State Bar of Nevada have also filed

Sa

motions for a protective order to stay discovery. In return,

the plaintiff has filed a motion to compel responses to in-

terrogatories from defendants Nevada Supreme Court, the

Third Judicial District Court, and the State Bar of Nevada.

Plaintiff has also filed a motion to enlarge the time for

notice of discovery.

This Court recognizes that pro se complaints are to be

held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings draf-

ted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct.

594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), reh. denied, 405 U.S. 948, 92

S.Ct. 963, 30 L.Ed.2d 819 (1973). Also, that pleadings in

civil rights suits are to be liberally construed. Roberts v.

Acres, 495 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1974). This Court will not give a

complete factual summary because not all of the defendents

have filed motions with this Court. Instead, the relevant

alleged facts will be given concerning each motion.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT

STATE OF NEVADA’S MOTION TO DISMISS

The plaintiff moved, pursuant to Rule 12(f) and Rule 8,

FRCP, to strike defendant State of Nevada’s motion to

dismiss allegedly because the case authority relied upon by

the State of Nevada to support its motion had recently been

overturned by the United States Supreme Court. However, a

Rule 12(f) motion to strike only concerns striking matters

from pleadings and a motion to dismiss is not a pleading.

C.F. Hanraty v. Ostertag, 470 F.2d 1096 (10th Cir. 1972);

Rule 7(a), FRCP. Therefore, the plaintiff’s motion to strike

is hereby denied.

MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY

DEFENDANT STATE OF NEVADA

Plaintiff alleges that defendant State of Nevada denied

him his rights under the Seventh and Fourteenth Amen-

dments by requiring a deposit for a civil jury trial pursuant

to Rule 38 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff

6a

prays for an order to show cause why the State of Nevada

should not honor the Seventh Amendment to the United

States Constitution and for $500,000 in general damages and

$500,000 in punitive damages. Defendant State of Nevada

moves for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction and pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is a basic tenet of constitutional law that the Seventh

Amendment guaranty of a jury trial in civil cases is not an

element of due process applicable to the state courts through

the Fourteenth Amendment. Woods v. Holy Cross Hospital,

$91 F.2d 1164 at 1171 (Sth Cir. 1979), n.12 Olesen v. Trust

Company of Chicago, 2A5 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1957).. The

motion to dismiss of the State of Nevada is hereby granted.

MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY

DEFENDANT JUDGE WILLIAM TEURMAN

Plaintiff alleges in his fourth, fifth, eighth and tenth

causes of action that Judge William Teurman conspired with

the City of Fallon and the Third District Court to deny him

his Sixth, Eighth, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights. Plaintiff prays for a judgment of $500,000 in general

damages and $500,000 in punitive damages.

The factual basis for his claims is somewhat confusing.

Plaintiff was apparently arrested on August 2, 1978, by

police officers of the City of Fallon. Plaintiff was later con-

victed in Fallon Municipal Court where Judge Teurman was

presiding. Plaintiff exercised his right of appeal by having a

trial de novo in the Third District Court. NRS 177.015.

Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated

when Judge Teurman appeared as a witness for the prosecu-

tion.

Judge Teurman filed a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to

Rule 12(6)(6), FRCP. Courts have held that witnesses in

state judicial proceedings are to be given absolute immunity

7a

from suits under the Civil Rights Acts or under a Bivens type

remedy.' Myers v. Bull, 599 F.2d 863 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.

denied, 444 U.S. 901, 100 S.Ct. 213 (1980); Blevins v. Ford,

$72 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir. 1978); Burke v. Miller, 580

F.2d 108, 109-10 (4th Cir. 1978); Taylor v. Nichols, 558

F.2d 561, 564 (10th Cir. 1977); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535

F.2d 830, 836-37 (3rd Cir. 1976). Therefore, defendant

Judge Teurman’s motion to dismiss is hereby granted.

DEFENDANT JOHN HILL’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff alleges that Churchill County District Attorney

John Hill wilfully and negligently failed to investigate two

criminal complaints filed by the plaintiff and his wife against

the Fallon City Attorney and the stenographer of the Third

District Court of Nevada for obstruction of justice. Plaintiff

alleges that John Hill is conspiring to deny plaintiff his Four-

teenth Amendment right to due process and equal protection

of the laws. Plaintiff prays for $500,000 in general damages,

$500,000 in punitive damages, and an order to show cause

why the District Attorney should not conduct an investiga-

tion of the charges filed by the plaintiff. Defendant District

Attorney John Hill filed a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6), FRCP.

It has long been held that a prosecutor is absolutely im-

mune from civil rights suits for activities allegedly committed

while in the course and scope of his employment and duties

as a prosecuting attorney. Jmbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.

409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). The question of

whether the failure to initiate prosecution could lead to

award of damages in a civil rights action was specifically ad-

dressed in Raitport v. Provident Nat. Bank, 451 F. Supp.

$22, 528 (E.D. Pa. 1978). The Court held:

“*[T]hat the decision to approve or disapprove a pri-

vate criminal complaint fits squarely within the

broader function of ‘initiating a prosecution,’ and

—

8a

therefore it cannot subjeci 2 prosecutor to civil liabil-

ity for damages under section 1983 . . . It would be

anomalous to hold that because /*abier spoke only of

‘initiating a prosecution,’ the prosecutor who ap-

proves a complaint is subject so civil liability for dam-

ages . . . Just as the prosecutor who initiates a crimi-

nal case requires protection from the defendant who

‘transform{s] his resentment at being prosecuted into

the ascription of improper and malicious actions to

the State’s advocate.’ Jmbler, supra, 424 U.S. at 425, ©

96 S. Ct. at 992, so the prosecutor who concludes

that prosecution is unwarranted requires protection

from the complainant whose excessive zeal for invok-

ing the criminal process blinds him to any aspects of

the case that counsel against prosecution.”’ Id.

Therefore, plaintiff’s civil rights claims against District At-

torney John Hill are dismissed as to damages.

The prayer for equitable relief presents a more difficult

question. It has long been held that prosecutors are natural

targets for injunctive suits since they are state officers who

are threatening to enforce and who are enforcing the law.

Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54

(1975); Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1975). How-

ever, this case does not involve a situation in which a

prosecutor is threatening to enforce an unconstitutional stat-

ute. Instead, the plaintiff is asking this Court to order the

Churchill County District Attorney to conduct an in-

vestigation.

It has been held that federal district courts cannot order

a United States Attorney to conduct an investigation or initi-

ate a prosecution because it would violate the doctrine of

separation of powers. Ross v. United States Attorney’s Of-

fice, $11 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 831

(1975); Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v.

Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2nd Cir. 1975); United States v.

Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (Sth Cir. 1965), cert denied, 85 S.Ct. 1767

9a

(1965). The same considerations would seem to apply to this

Court’s power to order a district attorney to conduct an in-

vestigation under the doctrine of federalism. This matter was

addressed in the case of Jnmates of Attica Correctional Fa-

cility v. Rockefeller, supra. In Altica, a civil Aghts action

was instituted in order to compel federal and stuie officials

to investigate and prosecute persons who allegedly violated

certain federal and state criminal statutes. The Court granted

the defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), FR-

CP. The Court stated:

“In the absence of statutorily defined standards

governing reviewability, or regulatory or statutory

policies of prosecution, the problems inherent in the

task of supervising prosecutorial decisions do not

lend themselves to resolution by the judiciary. The re-

viewing courts would be placed in the undesirable

and injudicious posture of becoming ‘superprosecu-

tors.’ . . . Such interference with the normal opera-

tions of criminal investigations, in turn, based solely

upon allegations of criminal conduct, raises serious

questions of potential abuse by persons seeking to

have other persons prosecuted.”’ Id. at 380.

For these reasons, then, the defendant District Attorney

John Hill’s motion to dismiss is also granted as to the claim

for equitable relief.

MOTIONS TO DISMISS FILED BY THE STATE BAR

OF NEV.14DA AND THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT

Plaintiff alleges in his twelfth cause of action that the

State Bar of Nevada and the Nevada Supreme Court denied

the plaintiff due process and equal protection of the law un-

der the Fourteenth Amendment because they allegedly failed

to investigate certain complaints that the plaintiff filed. The

factual basis of the allegations is unclear from the plaintiff's

complaint. Plaintiff prays for $500,000 in general damages,

$500,000 in punitive damages, ai.d an order to show cause

;

10a

why the defendants should not conduct an investigation.

Defendant State Bar of Nevada filed a motion to dismiss

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), FRCP. Defendant Supreme

Court of Nevada has also filed a motion to dismiss pursuant

to Rule 12(6)(6), FRCP, and a motion to quash service pur-

suant to Rule 12(b)(5).

The State Bar of Nevada is the investigative arm of the

“persons” subject to suit under Title 42, U.S.C., § 1983 et

seq. Ci v. Supreme Court, Colorado, 465 F.2d

993 (10th Cir. 1972); Harris v. Louisiana State Supreme

Court, 334 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. La. 1971); Fox v. Juvenile

Court, 321 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Pa. 1970). The United States

Supreme Court has recently ruled that municipalities are

““persons”” subject to suit under the Civil Rights Acts.

Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New

York, 463 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1979).

However, the Supreme Court has specifically reasserted its

position that the State and its agencies are not “‘persons”’

subject to suit under the Civil Rights Acts. Quern v. Jordan,

440 U.S. 332, 338-40, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358, 365-66

lla

However, plaintiff has also asserted Title 28, U.S.C. §

1331 as a jurisdictional basis for this suit. Defendants State

Bar of Nevada and the Nevada Supreme Court argue that

the Eleventh Amendment bars the plaintiff’s claims for

damages and injunctive relief. It is clear that under the Elev-

enth Amendment a state or its agencies cannot be sued

without their consent. Alabama v. Pugh, 328 U.S. 781, 782,

98 S.Ct. 3057, 57 L.Ed.2d 1114, 1116 (1978); Hans v.

Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890);

Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979).

Nevada has explicitly refused to waive its immunity to suit

under the Eleventh Amendment, Nrs 41.031(3). In Ex Parte

Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), it

was held that suits against state officials to enjoin violations

of constitutional rights were not forbidden by the Eleventh

Amendment. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct.

1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974); Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional

Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1977). The State Bar

of Nevada and the Nevada Supreme Court, however, are not

state officials but are arms of the state itself. It is this Court’s

opinion that the State Bar of Nevada and the Nevada

Supreme Court do not fal) within the exception stated in Ex

Parte Youg, supra, and are accordingly dismissed from the

suit.

MOTION TO DISMISS ON BEHALF OF THIRD

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF NEVADA

Plaintiff alleges that the defendant Third Judicial

District Court violated plaintiff’s civil rights as set forth in

title 42, U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, and the First, Four-

th, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution. The alleged violations are said to have

occurred when plaintiff had a trial de novo in the Third Dis-

trict Court concerning his conviction in the municipal court.

Plaintiff alleges that there was malicious prosecution

because of a conflict of interest on the part of the prosecu-

tt)

&)

12a

tor, that he was denied his right to confront witnesses when

Judge William Teurman testified and that he was found

guilty under an ordinance which had not yet been adopted.

Plaintiff also alleges that the Court allowed the transcript to

be altered in another civil trial to which he was a party and

that the Court improperly granted summary judgment in still

another civil action. Again, the factual basis for these allega-

tions are unclear. Plaintiff prays for $500,000 in general

damages, $500,000 in punitive damages, and an order ex-

punging plaintiff’s criminal conviction and returning his

fine, plus interest. Defendant Third Judicial District Court

has filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), FR-

CP.

The Third Judicial District Court, a part of the Judicial

Branch of the state, is also a creature of the Nevada Consti-

tution, article 6. Neither a state or its agencies are “‘persons’”’

subject to suit under the Civil Rights Acts. Quern v. Jordan,

supra; Alabama v. Pugh, supra; Coopersmith v. Supreme

Court, supra; Quadra v. Superior Court of San Francisco,

378 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal. 1974). Therefore, plaintiff's

Plaintiff also has asserted Title 28, U.S.C., § 1331 asa

jurisdictional basis for this suit. :

For the same reasons given above as to the State Bar of

Nevada and the Nevada Supreme Court, this motion to

dismiss is granted.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ENLARGE TIME FOR

COMPLETION OF DISCOVERY

Plaintiff filed a motion to enlarge the time for comple-

tion of discovery. The original date set for such discovery

was July 6, 1980. Plaintiff requested this Court to extend

that time an additional six months or until January 6, 1981.

The defendants have not filed a responsive memorandum in

opposition to this motion as required by Local Rule 16(c).

13a

For this reason, plus the multiplicity of defendants, this

Court grants the plaintiff's motion and the new date for

completion of discovery to April 1, 1981.

DISCOVERY MOTIONS

Since this Court has dismissed the State Bar of Nevada

and the Nevada Supreme Court from this action, the defend-

ants’ motions for a protective order and the plaintiff’s

motion to compel responses to interrogatories are rendered

moot.

Since this Court has dismissed the Third Judicial

District Court of Nevada from this action, the defendant’s

motion for a protective order and the plaintiff’s motion to

compel responses to interrogatories are rendered moot.

DATED: January 26, 1982.

Roger D. Foley

District Judge

' Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29

L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).

«0?

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DENNIS L. O’CONNOR, |

Plaintiff/Appellant, )

a ) No. 81-5423

} DC CV 80-0076 RDF

)

)

ORDER ON MOTION FOR STAY OF MANDATE

(Rule 41(b) Fed.R.App.P.)

Upon due consideration of appellant motion for stay of

the mandate of this Court in the above cause pending the

filing, consideration and disposition by the Supreme Court

of the United States of a petition for writ of certiorari, such

petition to be filed in the Clerk’s Office of the Supreme

Court of the United States on or before October 14, 1982,

IT IS ORDERED that the motion for stay of mandate

be, and the same is hereby granted.*

Wallace

United States Circuit Judge

* In the event that the motion for stay of mandate and the petition for

writ of certiorari are granted, then this stay will continue pending the

final disposition of the case by the Supreme Court of the United States.

Sa

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,

STATUTES, AND RULES

Article VI, Paragrah (2), United States Constitution:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States

which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties

made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the

United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and

the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing

in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary

notwithstanding.

Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches

and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall

issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-

mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,

and the persons or things to be seized.

Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution:

In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the

right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the

State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-

ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by

law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the ac-

cusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to

have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his

favor, and to have the assistance of counse) for his defense.

Seventh Amendment, United States Constitution:

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy

shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be

preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-

examined in any Court of the United States, than according

to the rules of the common law.

>

"a

”

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Eleventh Amendment, United States Constitution:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be

construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced

or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of

another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign

State.

Fourteenth Amem » nt, United States Constitution; Sec-

tion 1:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States,

and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the

United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state

shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the

privileges or immunities of citizens of the United Staves; nor

shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or proper-

ty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Article I, Section 2, Nevada State Constitution:

All political power is inherent in the people. Govern-

ment is instituted for the protection, security and benefit of

the people; and they have the right to alter or reform the

same whenever the public good may require it. But the

paramount allegiance of every citizen is due to the federal

government, in the exercise of all its constitutional powers,

as the same has been, or may be, defined by the supreme

court of the United States, and no power exists in the people

of this or any other state of the federal union to dissolve

their connection therewith, or perform any act tending to

impair, subvert, or resist the supreme authority of the

government of the United States. The Constitution of the

United States confers full power on the federal government

to maintain and perpetuate its existence, and whensoever

any portion of the states, or people thereof, attempt to

secede from the federal union, or forcibly resist the

execution of its laws, the federal government may, by

warrant of the constitution, emnloy armed force in com-

pelling the obedience to its authority.

17a

Article V1, Secticn 6, Nevada State Constitution:

The district courts in the several judicial districts of this

state shall have original jurisdiction in all cases in equity;

also, in all cases at law which involve the title or right of pos-

session to, or the possession of real property or mining

claims, or the legality of any tax impost, assessment, toll or

municipal fine, and in all other cases in which the demand

(exclusive of interest) or the value of the property in con-

troversy exceeds three hundred dollars, . . . They shall also

have final appellate ‘jurisdiction in cases arising in justices

courts and such other inferior tribunals as may be

established by iaw.

Article VIII, Section 1, Nevada State Constitution:

The legislature shall pass no special act in any manner

relating to corporate powers except for municipal purposes;

but corporations may be formed under general laws, and all

such laws may, from time to time, be altered or repealed.

Article VIII, Section 9, Nevada State Constitution:

The state shall not donate or loan money or its credit,

subscribe to or be interested in the stock of any company, as-

sociation, or corporation, except corporations formed for

educational or charitable purposes.

Article IX, Section 4, Nevada State Constitution:

The state shall never assume the debts of any county,

town, city, or other corporation whatever, unless such debts

have been created to repel invasion, suprress insurrection, or

to provide for the public defense.

Nevada Revised Statutes:

NRS 7.275 State Bar of Nevada: Continuation as public

corporation; powers; rules of supreme court. (NRS, Vol. 1,

p. 201 (1981) .)

1. The State Bar of Nevada, a public corporation

heretofore, created by statute, is hereby continued unde~ the

exclusive jurisdiction and control of the supreme court.

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2. The State Bar of Nevada has perpetual succession

and a seal and it may sue and be sued.

Nevada Supreme Court Rules:

Rule 76. State Bar of Nevada: Public corporation;

powers. (2.) The state bar has perpetual succession and a seal

and it may sue and be sued ... (NRS, Vol. 1, p. 346

(1979). )

Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure:

46(b) (as revised in 1981) Appearances in Proper Per-

son. With leave of the Supreme Court, a party may file, in

preper person, written briefs and papers submitted in accor-

dance with these rules, NRS, Vol. 2, p. 1433 (1981).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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