Opposition — Comeau v. City of Brookside Village

Supreme Court brief1982

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

HOMER N. COMEAU, ef ux.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

CITY OF BROOKSIDE VILLAGE, et ai.,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

WILLIAM E. KUHLMANN

Manley & Kuhimann, P.C.

3616 Preston Road

Pasadena, Texas 77505

(713) 947-1670

DAVID J. LaBREC, General Counsel

Texas Municipal League

1020 Southwest Tower

Austin, Texas 78701

(512) 478-6601

CHARLES S. RHYNE

Counsel of Record

THOMAS D. SILVERSTEIN

1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Suite 800

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 466-5420

Attorneys for Respondents

THE CASILLAS PRESS, INC. — 1717 K Street N.W. — Washington, D.C. — 223-1220

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...........:ccccceccccceesscceseeees i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............ccccescceecccceeeess iii

OPINIONS AND JUDGMENTS BELOW .............66.00555 2

EOS oivns Cicvescdcentdveccrssnsddcceveiccceasenee 2

CONSTITUTION, STATUTE AND ORDINANCES ............ 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE........ 2.66660 ccceceeeeeeeeeee 3

1. The City of Brookside Village. ............ 0.6600 ceeeees 2

Il. Actions Taken By the Comeaus................000eeeeee 5

Ill. Proceedings Below... .. 2.0.6... cccccceeeeeeeeeeeeeees 6

PEED Sevcvecddcccocccccdccedenceveccpedesoesvecoens 10

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION................. il

1. Petitioners Have Abandoned the Taking Issue, and, in

Any Event, Numerous Decisions of This Court Establish

that a Taking Has Not Occurred...............000seuee 11

Il. Ordinances 58 and 78 Are Valid Under the Due Process

and Equal Protection Clauses Because They Are

Reasonably Related to the Protection of the Public

Health, safety, Morals and General Welfare, and Peti-

tioners Have Failed To Meet Their Burden of Showing

NS cécdentedcavdxdebdedenunedheeossees Gecke st 16

Ill. Congress, Through the National Manufactured Housing

Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974, Has Not

Attempted To Pre-Empt the Power of States and Cities

To Legislate the Location of Mobile Homes ........... 27

et PPT TTETTTITITITIT TTT ree TTL Te 30

(ii)

Page

APPENDIX

A. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and

Orders of the District Court in Comeau v. City of

Brookside Village, No. 78-F2056 (Dist. Ct. Tex.) ........ la

1. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.. ....... la

0 SP Tere T CTT ee TTT ee da

3. Order Granting Temporary Injunction........... 7a

4. Temporary Restraining Order and Show Cause

Gl cadun heeds coldautiuesadbunégucuvesed . 10a

B. Constitution, Statute and Ordinances.............. 13a

Be Gs GE, GI, Tn a ccnwewctvcccccecccccces 13a

2. Section 5401 of the National Manufactured Hous-

ing Construction and Safety Standards Act of

1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5401-5426 (1976 & Supp V.

SD div on uadadd dheed debekas dcnenedd ueeéeuus . 13a

3. Brookside Village, Tex., Ordinance 78

SEAR A Oe re ts l4a

4. Brookside Village, Tex., Ordinance 58

i ih Ss casdwsbdinee 6aeasosensbue sass 17a

C. Opinion in Stewart v. Inhabitants of Durham, No.

81-252 (Maine Oct. 14, 1962)... .......... cee eees 60a

D. Article in Austin American Statesman,

(iii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Agin v. City of Tiburon,

BEF ae SPENDS oo Sac ciccscvctccccceecsesecess

Berman v. Parker,

pL ® 7 | PPPOTTTITTLTTIT TTT Tee eee

Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,

TED UB. TRO CTSED «ccc ccccccccccccccccsccscccces

Brown v. Board of Education,

DET TEE, GID IO oc ccc cccccesccccccccccscccece

Chicago and North Western Transportation Co. v.

Kalo Brick & Tile Co.,

SOU, FOE CITTED oc ccccccccccccccscsccseccccces

City of Brookside Village v. Comeau,

633 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1982), petition for

cert. filed sub nom. Comeau v. City of Brookside

Village, $1 U.S.L.W. 3, 341 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1982)

Ge BPG c cccvecccccnsescccascveccssccccceces

City of Colby v. Hurtt,

212 Kan. 113, 509 P.2d 1142 (1973) .............545-

City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.,

426 U.S. 668 (1976)... 2... cece cece en eeecewences

Comeau v. City of Brookside Village,

616 S.W. 2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981), rev'd sub

nom. City of Brookside Village v. Comeau,

633 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1982), petition for cert. filed

sub nom. Comeau v. City ef Brookside Village,

$1 U.S.L.W. 3, 341 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1982)

GRU HD coc ccrcccccccveccsntestsccesccccccccs

Page

(iv)

Comeau v. City of Brookside Village,

No. 78-F2046 (Dist. Ct. Tex. May 9, 1980)

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) ................. 7,8

Comeau v. City of Brookside Village,

No. 78-F2046 (Dist. Ct. Tex. Mar. 4, 1980)

(Judgment), rev'd, 616 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App.

1981), rev'd sub nom. City of Brookside Village v.

Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1982), petition for

cert. filed sub nom. Comeau v. City of Brookside

Village, 51 U.S.L.W. 3,341 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1982)

ED es on ce eee eEWRGes oa chdeetsseceadeases 7

Comeau v. City of Brookside Village,

No. 78-F2046 (Dist. Ct. Tex. Oct. 30, 1978)

(Order Granting Temporary Injunction) ..................+.- 7

Comeau v. City of Brookside Village,

No. 78-F2046 (Dist. Ct. Tex. Sept. 21, 1978)

(Temporary Restraining Order and Show Cause

BED 6 couvbchdomesel ew casebindkndecetcescvendesvecduaes 7

Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake,

91 Wash. 2d 19, 586 P.2d 860 (1978) .... 2... cece 26

Eisenstadt v. Baird,

GES UB. GIB TGIED oc ccc cccccccccccccccccescsccccceceucs 25

Ferguson v. Skrupa,

cn oeGc sc oucndeesbeoecovsceveves gna 21, 24

Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,

EES Gi cadéedbudsddgdens cdedsescéces 12-13, 21

Gravatt v. Borough of Latrobe,

44 Pa. Commw. Ct. 47, 404 A.2d 729 (1979) .... 0... ce eee ees 26

Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware,

I an os oan suc Seb Nbc bbenedaupeostonene 21

Maryland v. Louisiana,

SEs SEIN dnc dices degetsthuceecccodtcsscgee scout 28

(v)

Page

Matthews v. Fayette County,

233 Ga. 220, 210 S.E.2d 758 (1974) .. 2... 1 cece cece cece eees 26

McLaughlin v. Florida,

Ns cccaddddbebsébddedied cvetvosnceceta 17

Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,

SS dncccde 6oeuted 6666060866 véenedees 19, 20

Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,

EE EE SS ES Se oe Sm 21,24

Moore v. City of East Clevaland,

PED + ciuaniderebbsdsoosedéuncesccovcess 19, 20

National League of Cities v. Usery,

EE icc bud dmendetdadaddebeseocecenscocegee 29

Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of

New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) ................ 12, 13-14, 20, 29

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,

i end ccc ceebieesdnevedeseocceséveni 13

Robinson v. Township of Knoll,

410 Mich. 293, 302 N.W.2d 146 (1981) .... 2.2.6.6 ee cee eee 26

Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,

nd hee heeeuardteneedercseceusodn’ 17,19

State v. Larson,

292 Minn. 350, 195 N.W.2d 180 (1971) .... 2... 2... ee cece eee 26

Stewart v. Inhabitants of Durham,

EE, WO MUN cc ncdineneccvcencocceces 26

Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins,

Ds scdebacdobicddettab bane cooavecesee 21, 24

Town of Londonderry v. Faucher,

112 N.H. 454, 299 A.2d 581 (1972) ... 2... ccc cece eee 26

(vi)

Page

Townsend v. Yeomans,

oi nn dia skdéebensvdebdbeseete 21, 23, 24

United States v. Carolene Products Co.,

EE Se Cs rare sg cde nesbekeeedabed 17, 21

Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,

Pa deddatdabdsvtebddeescccotvecne 17, 18, 20, 29

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,

EET Per passim

Warth v. Seldin,

LE osc dubiutee éuehedececusntscnencesamaser 29

Welch v. Swasey,

PP pdasnbpsncdddadiutionchvchededasesenie 11-12

Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc.,

EE EE oink ou cow unde uetides cece sabébndssnetbeeds 19

Constitution:

PEL, Fé cbchscee cecheccecucéovcnecwesneemnn 19

EE Wg occ ddabecdctec ecédedacnescowons 11,14

DIL 1D cucssevenseséecs cocsduncecesouss 10, 29

eR GES BEET codavecicdeccccccccecosoncées passim

Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations:

Brookside Village, Tex., Ordinance 78 (Apr. 14, 1974) ....... passim

Brookside Village, Tex., Ordinance 58 (Aug. 6, 1970) ....... passim

Manufactured Home Construction and Safety Standards,

24 C.F.R. § 3280.1-3280.904 (1982), as amended at

IG res venakEaedcccvccddccicdsa passim

(vii)

Page

National Manufactured Housing Construction and

Safety Standards Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5401-5426

ELROD so sauiesGdowsdaccenasveccccccenss passim

US GUGG ke o ce 0 bbdudndtevdss od papWEab Reb cnr cdoawey 28

Texas Manufactured Housing Standards Act, Tex. Rev. Civ.

Stat. Ann. art. 5221f (Vernon 1971-1982 Supp.) ............ 9, 27

Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art 101 1c (Vernon 1963) ........... 24-25

Es TED 6 bc ccd dws benewsapsdecccncccceveuwss 2

te ED nso koe cdgeuddesean bese cesbedchivd oes 2

Legislative Materials:

Senate Report No. 693, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess.,

reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4273 .......... 28

Miscellaneous:

Austin American Statesman, Nov. 4, 1982 ...........666000005 26

Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce,

PHC80-V-45, 1980 Census of Population and

ED. 4) aiktise Wop b Psne UbEess ccntposinuenses 3

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

No. 82-689

HOMER N. COMEAU, ef ux.,

Petitioners,

v.

CITY OF BROOKSIDE VILLAGE, et ai.,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

Respondents City of Brookside Village (“Brookside” or

“City”), the mayor and the members of the city council, through

counsel, submit this opposition to the Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Texas (“Petition”) in the

above-captioned action.*

*In addition to petitioners Homer and Hazel Comeau and respon-

dent Brookside, the remaining parties are respondents, the mayor and

the members of the Brookside city council, who were made nominal

parties to this action. At the time the suit was filed, these individuals

were: Louis Boehm-Mayor; and Shirley Zamorsky, Frank Gonzales,

Stanley S. Chock, Boyd Christman, and Eugene Satterwhite-

councilmembers. At present, these officials are: Phillip W. Rutter-

Mayor; and Shirley Zamorsky, Sheryl Karolinski, Darvan Webb,

Jerry DeWeese, and Eugene Satterwhite — councilmembers. To the

extent that the present officials are different from the previous of-

ficials, the new officials are substituted for their predecessors pur-

suant to Rule 40.3 of this Court’s rules.

2

OPINIONS AND JUDGMENTS BELOW

The opinion of the Supreme Court of Texas is reported at 633

S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1982), and is reprinted in Appendix A to the

Petition. The opinion of the Civil Court of Appeals of Texas is

reported at 616 S.W. 2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) and is

reprinted in Appendix B to the Petition. The Judgment of the

District Court of Brazoria County, Texas, 149th Judicial

District is unreported and is reprinted in Appendix A to this op-

position, at 4a. The district court’s Findings of Fact and Conclu-

sions of Law is unreported and is reprinted in Appendix A to this

opposition, at la. The district court’s Temporary Restraining

Order and Show Cause Order and Order Granting Preliminary

Injunction also are unreported and are reprinted in Appendix A

to this opposition, at 10a and 7a respectively.

JURISDICTION

Petitioners incorrectly allege jurisdiction of this Court under

28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1) (1976). Section 1254(1) only pertains to

cases in the federal courts of appeals. If this Court has jurisdic-

tion, it may be based only on 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976).

CONSTITUTION, STATUTE

AND ORDINANCES

In addition to the constitutional and statutory provisions set

forth in the Petition, the tenth amendment to the Constitution,

section 5401 of the National Manufactured Housing Construc-

tion and Safety Standards Act of 1974, Brookside Ordinances

$8 and 78 are involved, and are reprinted in Appendix B to this

opposition, at 13a.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. The City of Brookside Village.

Brookside is an incorporated city of approximately two

square miles' with a population of about 1,400 persons’. The

City is a residential or “bedroom” community and has no in-

dustry.‘ The land surrounding and within Brookside is compos-

ed of gumbo and clay, both of which have poor absorption

capabilities.‘ In addition, the City is in a low elevation area,

and, as a result, is susceptible to flooding’®.

Brookside has no water or sewage system.’ Instead, these

facilities are provided by individual water wells and septic

tanks." Due to the cost of installing either a water or sewage

system, it is unlikely that Brookside ever will have such

systems.”

On October 6, 1970, Brookside’s Board of Aldermen enacted

‘Statement of Facts at 132, Comeau v. City of Brookside Village,

No 78-F2046 (Dist. Ct. Tex. Mar. 4, 1980) (trial testimony of Eston

Louis Boehm, Jr., Mayor of Brookside) [hereinafter cite «: S.F.).

*Bureau of The Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, PHC80-V- 45,

1980 Census of Population and Housing-Texas 34 (1981).

‘S.F., supra note |, at 132 (testimony of Mayor Boehm).

“City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790,793 (Tex.

1982), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Comeau v. City of Brookside

Village, 51 U.S.L.W. 3,341 (U.S. Sep. 28, 1982) (No. 82-689); S.F.,

supra note |, at 63 (testimony of Don Marshall Rives, building official

for Brookside).

°S.F., supra note |, at 26 (testimony of Mayor Boehm).

*Id. at 59 (testimony of Lloyd Yost, Superintendent of Brazoria

County Drainage District No. Four).

"City of Brookside Village v. Commeau, 633 S.W.2d at 793.

“Id.

“See S.F., supra note |, at 133-34 (testimony of Mayor Boehm).

4

Ordinance 58, which provided standards for mobile home

parks.'® Section I(N) defined a mobile home as:

a portable vehicle constructed on a chassis and which

has been designed so that it may be occupied and used

without a permanent foundation. For the purposes of

the Ordinance, a mobile home shall mean a single

family dwelling unit suitable for year-round occupan-

cy and which has provision for electrical and water

connections and which provides for waste disposal in

compliance with the Plumbing Code requirements for

dwellings.

To guard against flooding, erosion and other “adverse in-

fluences,” Ordinance 58 provided soil, ground cover and site

drainage requirements,'' In addition, the ordinance, inter

alia, set forth water supply, sewage disposal and fire protection

standards. '?

Subject to certain restrictions, ordinance No. 58 also allowed

mobile homes to be placed outside of mobile home parks. For

example, a single mobile home could be located outside a

mobile home park only if it were placed on a lot of at least nine

thousand (9,000) square feet.'¢

On April 14, 1974, Brookside’s city council enacted Or-

dinance 78, amending Ordinance 58, to limit the future location

of mobile homes in Brookside to mobile home parks.'* Mobile

homes previously installed in accordance with Ordinance 58

were allowed to remain in place and continue to be occupied. '*

'*Brookside Village, Tex., Ordinance 58 (Aug. 6, 1970).

"Id. § IX.

'24d.§§ X, XI, XVI.

'3fd.§ XVIII.

'*Id. § XVIUI(B).

'SBrookside Village, Tex., Ordinance 78, §§ I, II (Apr. 14, 1974).

‘S/d. § Ill.

$s

Among the stated reasons behind the enactment and continued

maintenance of Ordinance 78 were:

1) The higher incidence of fire among Brookside's

mobile homes, together with a restricted supply of

water and a small, volunteer fire department;'’

2) Concern for the placement of large numbers of

mobile homes on plots of land too small to accom-

area, in light of the poor absorbtion quality of the

soil;'* and

3) Aesthetic considerations'’ and the negative im-

pact of mobile homes on surrounding property

values, due in part, to the rapid rate of deteriora-

tion of mobile homes relative to site-built

houses. ?°

As of February 11, 1980, the date of the trial, there was one

mobile home park within Brookside and several mobile home

parks immediately outside of Brookside.?'

Il. Actions Taken by the Comeaus.

The Comeaus are the owners of a parcel of land located at

12700 Mykawa Road, Brookside, Texas.?? On or about July 10,

'"S.F., supra note 1, at 42-43, 48-49, 51 (testimony of Mayor

Boehm).

‘S/d. at 85-86 (testimony of city councilmember Frank Noe). The

ordinances of Brookside do not specify the size of land on which a

sité-built house must be placed. However, councilmember Noe

testified that the majority of site-built houses in Brookside are built on

plots of land of three-quarters to one acre, and that nine thousand

(9,000) square feet, the requisite size of plots for mobile homes outside

of mobile home parks, under Ordinance 58, § XVIII (B), was only

about one-quarter of an acre.

'*Id. at 27 (testimony of Mayor Boehm).

2"Id.at 79-80, 84-85 (testimony of Councilmember Noe).

2'Id. at 24 (testimony of Mayor Boehm).

22Agreed Order as to Stipulated Facts {Il (3) [hereinafter cited as

Stipulation}.

6

1978, more than four years after the enactment of Ordinance

78, petitioners applied to the city council for permission to place

a mobile home on their land.?* On or about August 3, 1978, the

city council advised petitioners of its denial of their request.’*

On or about September 7, 1978, petitioners purchased a mobile

home.?* Notwithstanding the council’s denial of their request,

and without applying for a permit to install a septic tank,’?* on

or about September 8, 1978, petitioners caused the above

mobile home to be transported to their property.’’ Thereafter,

petitioners took action to prevent the enforcement of Or-

dinances 58 and 78.

lll. Proceedings Below.

Petitioners instituted this action on September 8, 1978, by

filing in the District Court of Brazoria County, Texas, 149th

Judicial District, Plaintiffs’ Original Petition for Temporary

Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction and Other Relief

(“Complaint”). So that they could occupy their mobile home,

petitioners sought the issuance, without notice, of a temporary

restraining order enjoining Brookside and its agents from deny-

ing petitioners all permits and certificates necessary for the con-

nection of utilities.?* In the alternative, petitioners sought a

‘Plaintiffs’ Trial Brief at 1.

241d.

2*Stipulation, supra note 22, ¢ 11(2). Petitioners stipulated that the

structure which they purchased was a “mobile home.” S.F., supra note

a by plaintiffs’ counsel); Stipulation, supra note 22,

2°S.F., supra note 1, at 89 (testimony of Homer Comeau).

?’Stipulation, supra note 22, { II(2).

In addition to the mobile home, there is situated on petitioners’

land, a store and icehouse, in one building, and two trailers, one

twelve feet by fifty feet and the other twelve feet by sixty feet, whici:

Mr. Comeau brought onto petitioners’ land for use as storage sheds in

Mr. Comeau’s “trailer park.” S.F., supra note 1, at 90 (testimony of

Homer Comeau).

2*Compl. ad damnum clause.

>

temporary injunction requesting the same relief.?’ Finally, peti-

tioners sought a permanent injunction, a declaration that Or-

dinances 58 and 78 were unconstitutional as to their prohibition

“of the location of placement of a mobile home on private pro-

perty within the municipal limits of said City” and an

unspecified amount of monetary damages.*”

On September 21, 1978, the court issued a temporary restrain-

ing order enjoining and restraining Brookside and its agents

from denying petitioners the use and quiet possession of their

mobile home.*' Following a hearing on October 2, 1978, the

court converted the temporary retraining order into a temporary

injunction,’? which remained in effect through the trial.

Trial without jury was held on February 11, 1980, and, on

March 4, 1980, the court rendered its Judgment.*? The Judg-

ment upheld Ordinances 58 and 78, and, consequently, directed

petitioners to remove their mobile home from its unauthorized

location within sixty (60) days of the Judgment’s becoming

final. Following issuance of the Judgment, petitioners, on

March 4, 1980, filed a motion for a new trial.

At petitioners’ request, the court, on May 9, 1980, issued

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.**

"Id.

"Id.

‘'Comeau v. City of Brookside Village, No. 78-F2046 (Dist. Ct.

Tex. Sept. 21, 1978) (Temporary Restraining Order and Show Cause

Order).

"Comeau v. City of Brookside Village, No. 78-F2046 (Dist. Ct.

Tex. Oct. 30, 1978 (Order Granting Temporary Injunction).

Comeau v. City of Brookside Village, No. 78-F2046 (Dist. Ct.

Tex. Mar. 4, 1980), rev’d, 616 S.W. 2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981),

rev'd sub nom. City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W. 2d 790

(Tex. 1982), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Comeau v. City of

Brookside Village, 51 U.S.L.W. 3,341 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1982) (No.

82-689)

s v. City of Brookside Village, No. 78-F2046 (Dist. Ct.

Tex. May 9, 1980).

As fact, the court found: Ordinances 58 and 78 were duly

passed and in effect prior to the date petitioners purchased their

mobile home, which home met the definition of “mobile home”

in Ordinance 58; the lack of municipal water and sewage

systems in Brookside created a potential health hazard; Or-

dinances 58 and 78 bore a substantial relationship to the public

health, safety, morals and general welfare; and petitioners’

placement of their mobile home on their property violated Or-

dinances 58 and 78.*° As law, the court concluded that Or-

dinances 58 and 78 were not an abuse of discretion, were a valid

exercise of the city council’s police power, and, therefore, were

constitutional.**

On May 6, 1981, petitioners’ motion for a new trial was over-

ruled by operation of law, and petitioners thereafter filed an ap-

peal with the Court of Civil Appeals for the Fourteenth Supreme

Judicial District of Texas at Houston. The court of appeals

reversed the trial court’s decision holding Ordinances 58 and 78 to

be constitutional and directing petitioners to remove their mobile

home.*’ The court found that Brookside had not shown a threat

to public health to be present by the placement of petitioners’

mobile home outside of a mobile home park.** The court con-

cluded that there was no justification for treating mobile homes

differently from site-built houses, and that, therefore, Or-

dinances 58 and 78 were an invalid exercise of Brookside’s police

power.** The court of appeals denied respondents’ request for

Id. at 1.

1d. at 2.

‘Comeau v. City of Brookside Village, 616 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ.

App. 1981), rev'd sub nom. City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633

S.W. 2d 790 (Tex. 1982), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Comeau v.

City of Brookside Village, $1 U.S.L.W. 3,341 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1982)

(No. 82-689).

"Id. at 334.

3*Jd.

9

rehearing, and respondents then filed with the Supreme Court

of Texas an application for writ of error.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court

of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.*® The

court first outlined the standard of review applicable to a zoning

or other land use regulation and reiterated that such a regulation

is presumed valid and is upheld unless the party challenging the

regulation shows it to be arbitrary and unreasonable.‘' The

court recognized that passage of Ordinances 58 and 78 was

motivated by the considerations set forth at 5 supra, and

concluded that they bore “a substantial relationship to the

public health, safety, morals or general welfare” and were “not

clearly arbitrary and unreasonable.”*? Next, the court observed

that improvements had been made in the quality and ap-

pearance of mobile homes subsequent to passage of the Na-

tional Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Stan-

dards Act of 1974 (“NMHCSSA”),*? noted that a majority of

Brookside’s mobile homes were made prior to implementation

of federal standards for mobile homes, and concluded that, in

any event, any change in Brookside’s policy toward the location

of mobile homes should be made by the city council and not the

court.** Finally, the court held that Ordinances 58

and 78 were not in conflict with either the NMHCSSA or the

Texas Manufactured Housing Standards Act (“TMHSA”),**

and, therefore, were not pre-empted by either act.**

Petitioners moved the Texas Supreme Court for a rehearing,

but, on June 30, 1982, the court overruled the motion.

“"City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.

1982).

“Id. at 792-93.

“21d. at 793-94.

#942 U.S.C. §§ 5401-5426 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).

**633 S.W.2d at 795 & n.6.

**Tex Rev. Civ. Stat.Ann. art 5221f. (Vernon Supp. 1971-1982).

**633 S.W.2d at 796.

SUMMARY

The issues petitioners raise are neither novel nor unresolved

by this Court. Perhaps in recognition of this, petitioners have

abandoned entirely their first issue — whether Ordinances 58

and 78 have effected a taking of petitioners’ property. Even if

the Court, sua sponte, were to consider this issue, a multiplicity

of decisions of this Court establish that a taking has not occur-

red. Ordinances 58 and 78 were in effect prior to petitioners’

purchase of their mobile home. The ordinances limit only slight-

ly the uses of petitioners land, and certainly leave open

economically viable uses. Further, the ordinances advance

legitimate state interests, i.e. protection of the public health,

safety, morals and general welfare.

Ordinances 58 and 78 also do not violate the due process and

equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Mobile

homes are not the same as site-built houses. If they were, this

case would not have been brought. The city council did not ex-

clude mobile homes from Brookside, but, in recognition of the

differences between site-built houses and mobile homes, re-

quired mobile homes to be located in mobile home parks. Or-

dinances $8 and 78 are presumed valid, and petitioners have not

met their burden of showing that the ordinances are

unreasonable and arbitrary, and could not reasonably be related

to the public heaith, safety, morals or general welfare.

Finally, the NMHCSSA has not pre-empted Ordinances 58

and 78. The NMHCSSA provides construction and installation

standards for mobile homes, while Ordinances 58 and 78 pertain

to the location of mobile homes and the requirements for

mobile home parks. As such, the ordinances in no way conflict

with the NMHCSSA. Any other conclusion, particularly with

respect to the ordinances’ locational requirements, would result

in a violation of the tenth amendment to the Constitution by

allowing the federal government to displace the traditional

power of states and cities to control land use.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

1. Petitioners Have Abandoned the Taking Issue, and,

in Any Event, Numerous Decisions of This Court

Establish that a Taking Has Not Occurred.

The first issue raised in petitioners’ Questions Presented is

whether the ordinances of Brookside which limit the location of

mobile homes to mobile home parks deprive “Petitioners of the

Fourteenth Amendment’s right to aquire, enjoy, own and

dispose of property” — the taking issue.‘*’ Petitioners, how-

ever, fail to address this issue either in their Reasons for Granting

the Petition or anywhere else in the Petition. From this, one on-

ly can surmise that petitioners have abandoned their first issue.

This factor, alone, provides the Court with ample justification

for not considering petitioners’ first issue. Even if the Court

were to consider the taking issue, it is readily apparent from

numerous decisions by this Court that respondents have not

taken petitioners’ property.

Even before the seminal case upholding the zoning power of

states and cities, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,** this

Court upheld land use regulations against taking challenges

brought under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Con-

stitution. For example, in Welch v. Swasey,** this Court upheld

a Massachusetts law restricting the height of certain buildings

within Boston to 80 to 100 feet. In dismissing the taking argu-

ment, the Court concluded:

We are not prepared to hold that this limitation of

80 to 100 feet, while in fact a discrimination or

classification, is so unreasonable that it deprives the

owner of the property of its profitable use without

justification, and that he is therefore entitled under

the Constitution to compensation for such invasion

of his rights. The discrimination just made is, as we

*’Petition at i.

**272 U.S. 365 (1926).

*"214 U.S. 91 (1901).

12

think, reasonable, and is justified by the police

power.’

Subsequently, in Euclid, the Court again rejected a taking

argument, this time in the context of an ordinance establishing a

zoning plan for the Village of Euclid, Ohio, the effect of which,

it was alleged, was to destroy certain uses for which plaintiff

had purchased lands in Euclid. The Court held that the or-

dinance was a valid exercise of the city’s police powers.*'

Although the Court did not adcress specifically the taking issue,

but focused nrimarily on the due process and equal protection

aspects of the case, it is evident from the Court’s holding that it

concluded that the ordinance in issue had not effected a taking.*?

The opinion in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead*® offers a

sound explanation of why land use restrictions are not con-

sidered unconstitutional takings:

It is an oft-repeated truism that every regulation

necessarily speaks as a prohibition. If the ordinance is

otherwise a valid exercise of the town’s police powers,

the fact that it deprives the property of its most

beneficial use does not render it unconstitution-

al. . . . As pointed out in Mugler v. Kansas, [123 U.S.

623, 688 (1887)] . . . ‘A prohibition simply upon the

use of property for purposes that are declared, by

valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals,

or safety of the community, cannot in any just sense,

be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property

for the public benefit. Such legislation does not

disturb the owner in the control or use of his property

for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of

it, but is only a declaration by the State that its use by

**Id. at 107.

$1272 U.S. at 397.

*2See Agin v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980), Penn Ceni.

Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125, 133-34 (1978).

**369 U.S. 590 (1962).

13

any one, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial

to the public interest. . . . The power which the States

have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their

property as will be prejudicial to the health, the

morals, or the safety of the public, is not — and, con-

sistently with the existence and the safety of organized

society, cannot be — burdened with the condition

that the state must compensate such individual

owners for the pecuniary losses they may sustain, by

reason of their not being permitted, by a noxious use

of their property, to inflict injury upon the communi-

ty.’>4

This reasoning is preseiit in recent zoning ard other land use

cases wherein the Court repeatedly has decii....' io find a taking

based upon property use restrictions.

In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,**

‘Id. at 592-93.

Citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), the

Court recognized the possibility that, under certain, limited cir-

cumstances, a land use regulation could amount to a taking. At issue

in Mahon was a Pennsylvania statute, enacted after plaintiffs’ sale of

surface property to defendants, which prevented plaintiffs from min-

ing coal beneath defendants’ property, and thereby destroyed entirely

plaintiffs’ rights to their coal. 260 U.S. at 412, 414. Even in holding

that a taking had occured, the Court recognized that “government

hardly could go on if, to some extent, value incident to property could

not be diminished without paying for every change in the general law.

As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limita-

tion, and must yield to police power.” Jd. at 413. This quotation is

directly applicable to the instant suit. As discussed more fully at 21-22

infra, Ordinances 58 and 78 were enacted for the health, safety,

morals and general welfare of the citizens of Brookside, and, thus,

were a proper exercise of the city council’s police power. Further, as

discussed at 15 infra, the uses to which the petitioners’ property may

be put have not been eliminated, but only lessened slightly. Therefore,

even under Mahon, the ordinances have not effected a taking.

55438 U.S. 104 (1978).

14

plaintiffs challenged under the property provisions of the fifth

and fourteenth amendments a New York City law enacted to

protect historical landmarks from destruction or significant

alteration. Specifically, plaintiffs challenged a decision of the

Landmarks Preservation Commission denying approval of

plaintiffs’ plan for construction of a fifty (50)-story office

building over New York’s Grand Central Terminal, on the

grounds that such a building would destroy the Terminal’s

aesthetic features. In holding that the law had not effected a

taking, the Court reviewed the history of taking challenges

under the fifth amendment’s property clause,** and, inter alia,

observed:

In instances in which a state tribunal reasonably con-

cluded that the “health, safety, morals or general

welfare’ would be promoted by prohibiting particular

contemplated uses of land, this Court has upheld

land-use regulations that destroyed or ae af-

fected recognized real property interests. . . . Zoning

laws are, of course, the classic example, ... which

have been viewed as permissible governmental action

even when prohibiting the most beneficial use of pro-

perty.°

More recently, in Agin v. City of Tiburon,** the Court reaf-

firmed the principles set forth in the above cases. Plaintiffs pur-

chased for residential development five acres of land in

Tiburon, California. In consequence, and pursuant to state law,

the city enacted two zoning ordinances which restricted to be-

tween two and five the number of single-family residences plain-

tiffs would be allowed to construct on their land. Plaintiffs’

facial attack on the ordinances alleged tliat the ordinances had

taken their property in violation of the fifth and fourteenth

amendments. In again rejecting the taking argument, the Court

‘*The Court noted that the meaning of the fifth amendment’s pro-

perty clause had been made applicable to the States through the four-

teenth amendment. /d. at 122.

*"Id. at 125 (citations omitted).

"447 U.S. 255 (1980).

15

reasoned that a zoning law may effect a taking only if it “does

not substantially advance legitimate state interests . . . or denies

an owner economically viable use of his land. . . .”°” Neither of

these conditions is present in the instarit suit.

Ordinances 58 and 78 were in effect prior to the purchase of

petitioners’ mobile home. In addition, the city council had

denied petitioners’ request for permission to place a mobile

home on their land. Nevertheless, petitioners purchased a

mobile home,°*" and, in violation of the ordinances and the city

council’s decision, placed this mobile home on their property.

Petitioners, therefore, cannot complain, even if such a com-

plaint could have merit, that the ordinances deprived them of a

use of their property for which they could have had a reasonable

expectation at the time they purchased their mobile home.

Moreover, there are a variety of economically viable uses to

which petitioners’ property may be devoted. For example, there

already is a store on the premises.*' In addition, petitioners

assert that “the City ordinances will allow the Petitioners to

place a business or commercial venture (including a high densi-

ty, high rise apartment complex) on their property.”*? Indeed,

the only limitation at present on the uses of petitioners’ property

is the restriction against the placement thereon of a mobile

home. Under these circumstances, not even petitioners

legitimately could contend that Ordinances 58 and 78 leave them

without an economically viable use for their property.

5*Id. at 260.

*°The record does not reveal the exact date on which petitioners

purchased the land on which their mobile homes is situated. However,

it would appear that they bought the land in mid-1978, a short time

before they bought the mobile home but long after the effective dates

of the ordinances. This supposition is based on Mr. Comeau’s Af-

fidavit Supporting Temporary Order, wherein Mr. Coumeau stated

that he and his wife had purchased the land at 12700 Mykawa Road,

had sold their former residence and had to vacate its premises by

September 10, 1978.

*'S.F., supra note 1, at 90.

*2Peitition at 11.

16

Not only do the ordinances in question reserve to petitioners a

variety of uses for their property, but they also advance

legitimate state interests. As discussed more fully at 21-22 infra,

the limitation on the location of mobile homes was predicated

on considerations of the relative susceptibility to fire of mobile

homes, particularly in light of the availability of water and the

limited capabilities of the fire department, the absence of a

municipal sewage facility and aesthetics. This Court consistently

has held each of these concerns to be a valid state interest, which

warrants a city’s exercise of its police power. Ordinances 58 and

78, therefore, have not effected a taking of petitioners’ property

in violation of the fourteenth amendment."'

Il. Ovdinances 58 and 78 Are Valid Under the Due Pro-

cess and Equal Protection Clauses Because They Are

Reasonably Related to the Protection of the Public

Health, Safety, Morals and General Welfare, and

Petitioners Have Failed To Meet Their Burden of

The thrust of petitioners’ argument is that the ordinances re-

quiring mobile homes to be placed in mobile home parks violate

the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth

amendment because they do not “bear a substantial relationship

to public health, safety or general welfare but rather . . . [are]

arbitrary, unreasonable and irrationale [sic}].”°* Unable, how-

*3As noted at |! supra, as part of their taking issue, petitioners con-

tend that the ordinances deprive them of their right “to acquire . . .

own and dispose of property.” These contentions also are entirely

devoid of merit. That the ordinances have not deprived petitioners of

any right to acquire or own property is seen by the fact that, not-

withstanding the existence of the ordinances, petitioners purchased,

and own in fee simple, Comp 41, the land on which their mobile

home is situated. Further, there is no allegation that, as a result of the

ordinances, petitioners have been unable to sell their property.

**Petition at i. In their Questions Presented, petitioners only refer

to Ordinance 58 as dDeing violative of the due process and equal protec-

tion clauses. Presumably, petitioners meant Ordinance 58, as amend-

ed by Ordinance 78, because Ordinance 78 is the ordinance which ac-

tually limits the location of mobile homes to mobile home parks.

17

ever, to find zoning or other land use decisions from this Court

to support their position, petitioners attempt to equate mobile

home owners with black citizens in order to gain reliance on

such cases as Brown v. Board of Education**’ and McLaughlin

v. Florida** for their attack on Brookside’s mobile home ordi-

nances.*’ Not only does this approach trivialize these and other

cases which have marked significant gains for blacks and other

recognized minorities,** but it ignores decisions of the Court

$5347 U.S. 483 (1954).

$6379 U.S. 184 (1964).

*’Petition at 7-9, 18.

**While petitioners concede that mobile home owners are not a

“suspect classification,” Petition at 24, they contend that they are a

“discrete and insular minority,” Petition at 24-25. Petitioners support

this novel conclusion on the following phrase from United States v.

Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938): “whether prejudice against

discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends

seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily

to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a cor-

respondingly more searching judicial inquiry,” 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.

Petition at 20-21, 24-25. Petitioners took this phrase out of context,

and, in so doing, omitted the portion of the sentence which identified

the individuals who fell within the Court's classification of a discrete

and insular minority,” The portion of the sentence petitioners omitted

read: “Nor need we inquire into whether similar considerations enter

into the review of statutes directed at particular religions . . . or na-

tional . . . or racial minorities. . .” /d. (citations omitted). Because

petitioners are neither a “suspect classification” nor a “discrete and in-

sular minority,” Brookside’s ordinances are not subject to a standard

of review, for equal protection purposes, any stricter than the tradi-

tional reasonableness standard set forth in Euclid and its progeny.

Similarly, for due process purposes, petitioners neither have iden-

tified nor could identify any “fundamental right” which is in issue. In

Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), the Court iden-

tified the following “fundamental rights”: voting, the right of associa-

tion, the right of access to the courts and the right of privacy. 416 U.S.

at 7. The “fundamental right” to freedom of expression, see, ¢.g.,

Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981), also is not

in issue. Because “fundamental rights” are not involved, Brookside’s

mobile home ordinances are not subject to any strict standard of

review applicable where “fundamental rights” are involved.

which are directly on point, and resolve petitioners’ due process

and equal protections claims. As mentioned previously, Village

of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. is the leading case on the zoning

power of states and cities. In upholding this power, the Court

set forth the standards which govern zoning and other land use

regulations:

If these reasons... do not demonstrate the

wisdom and sound policy in all respects of those

restrictions which we have indicated as pertinent to

the inquiry, at least, the reasons are sufficiently

cogent to preclude us from saying, as it must be said

before the ordinance can be declared unconstitu-

tional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and

unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the

public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.°”

The Court also noted that, “{i}f the validity of the legislative

classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the

legislative judgment must be allowed to control.” ° Subsequent

cases have emphasized the breadth of this power.

In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, ' the Court upheld an

ordinance which restricted land use to single-family dwellings,

and defined “family” in such a way as to allow to live together

only persons related by blood, marriage or adoption or two

unrelated persons. The Court recognized that the ordinance, for

example, permitted a group of ten (10) related individuals to live

together but prohibited from living together a group of six (6)

unrelated individuals, but concluded that “every line drawn by a

legislature leaves some out that might well have been included.

That exercise of discretion, however, is a legislative, not a

judicial, function.” ?

**272 U.S. at 395.

"Id. at 388.

"416 U.S. 1 (1974).

"24d. at 8 (footnote omitted).

In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,* the Court

sustained a challenge, based on the first amendment and the due

process and equal protection clauses, to an ordinance requiring

adult motion picture theaters to be dispersed throughout

Detroit, rather than allowing them to be located in a concen-

trated area. In a comment which is germane to this case, the

Court observed:

[W]e have no doubt that the municipality may control

the location of theaters as well as the location of other

commercial establishments, either by confining them

to certain specified commercial zones or by requiring

that they be dispersed throughout the city. The mere

fact that the commercial exploitation of material pro-

tected by the First Amendment is subject to zoning

and other licensing requirements is not a sufficient

reason for invalidating these ordinances. *

Even in those rare instances in which the Court has held un-

constitutional zoning or other land use ordinances,’ it has

recognized that the power of states and cities in this area is

great. Recently, for example, in Schad v. Borough of Mount

Ephraim,’* the Court reiterated that “[t}he power of local

governments to zone and control land use is undoubtedly broad

and its proper exercise is an essential aspect of achieving a

satisfactory quality of life in both urban and rural

communities.”’" While the Court struck down the ordinances

involved in Schad and ordinances involved in a few other suits,

it did so not because the matters addressed by the legislation

were improper subjects of regulation, but because the legislation

19427 U.S. 50 (1976).

"41d. at 62 (emphasis adde“i).

"SE.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981);

Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); Moore v.

City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1976).

7452 U.S.61 (1981).

"Id. at 68.

20

infringed upon “fundamental rights”, e.g., freedom of expres-

sion * and sanctity of family life, * which rights, on balance,

outweighed the interests advanced by the legislation as drafted.

However, as discussed at 17 n. 68 supra, no “fundamental

rights” are at issue in this suit.

Among the specific concerns which the Court has held war-

rant the exercise of a legislatives body’s police power are the

danger of fire,“' the avoidance of aesthetic harm and the

preservation of property vaives*' and the elimination of un-

healthy places*?. This is not to suggest, however, that there is a

narrow range of concerns which justify action by a legislative

body. Rather, as the Court concluded in Berman v. Parker:**

The concept of the public welfare is broad and in-

clusive .. . The values it represents are spiritual as

well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is

within the power of the legislature to determine that

the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,

spacious as well as clean, well balanced as well as

carefully patrolled."

To the extent that a court reviews an action taken by a

te Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1982);

Schad.

”*Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1976). The Court

distinguished the ordinance involved in Village of Belle Terre from the

ordinance involved in Moore on the grounds that in Moore the or-

dinance prohibited certain related individuals from living together,

while in Village of Belle Terre the ordinance allowed all related in-

dividuals to live together. Jd. at 489-99.

**Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.

*' Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 129; Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33

(1954).

*2Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).

"9348 U.S. 26 (1954).

“Id. at 33.

21

legislative body, that body’s acts are presumed valid,** and

doubts are resolved in its favor**. Accordingly, the party

challenging a statute or ordinance has the burden of establishing

that, under no circumstances, may the considerations which led

to the legislature’s actions be conceived as true, and that,

therefore, the legislature has acted unreasonably and

arbitrarily... Further, because the legislature is presumed to

know the needs of the people,"" even if a court were to disagree

with the judgment of a legislature, it may not substitute its judg-

ment for that of the legislature.” When applied to the facts of

this case, the above holdings and their supporting rationales

resolve unequivocally that Ordinances 58 and 78 were a proper

exercise of the city council’s police power, and that the peti-

tioners have failed to meet their burden of showing that the

council acted unreasonably and arbitrarily.

Mobile homes are not the same as site-built houses. They are

subject to different construction standard. *” and, in Brook-

side’s experience, mobile homes have presented problems that

*sKassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 450 U.S.

662, 670 (1981); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 524

(1959); Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441, 450 (1937); see Min-

nesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981).

**Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.

*’Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464

(1981) (quoting Vance v. Bradley 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979)); Goidbiatt,

369 U.S. at 596; United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,

154 (1938).

**Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441, 451 (1937).

** Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 469

(1981); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963); Sunshine An-

thracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 394-95 (1940); Townsend

v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441, 451 (1937).

*°Site-built houses in Brookside must be constructed in accordance

with the Southern Standard Building Code, S.F., supra note 1, at 27

(testimony of Mayor Boehm), while, after 1976, mobile homes must

be constructed, in accordance with the NMHCSSA and the regula-

tions promulgated pursuant thereto, 24 C.F.R. § 3280.1-3280.904

(1982), as amended at 47 Fed. Reg. 28, 092 (1982).

22

site-built houses have not presented. Accordingly, without ex-

cluding mobile homes from Brookside, the city council has de-

termined that mobile homes only tnay be located in mobile

home parks.

As discussed at 5 supra, and as noted in the decision by

the Texas Supreme Court,’' among the considerations

behind Brookside’s locational requirements was the higher in-

cidence of fire among the mobile homes in Brookside. This

problem has been exacerbated because Brookside’s water is sup-

plied only by individual wells, and because Brookside only has a

small, volunteer fire department. As a result, the fire depart-

ment has been unsuccessful in fighting mobile home fires.”? Ad-

ditionally, the city council was concerned that, if mobile homes

could be located outside of mobile home parks, large numbers

of mobile homes, each requiring separate water and sewage

facilities, would be placed on plots of land too small adequately

to accommodate these facilities. By requiring mobile homes to be

located in mobile home parks, however, the possibility exists of

providing centralized water and sewage facilities for all of the

mobile homes in the respective mobile home parks.” Finally,

the city council determined that, largely due to their relatively

rapid rate of deterioration, mobile homes scattered throughout

Brookside would be aesthetically harmful and would lower pro-

perty values.

Petitioners do not claim that the above considerations are

beyond the scope of the public health, safety, morals or general

welfare, but, rather, contend that Ordinances 58 and 78 are

unrelated to these goals, and are, therefore, arbitrary and

unreasonable.”* With respect to the concerns for fire and the

lack of sewage facilities, petitioners support their argument by

contending that “no studies were performed, no experts

*'633 S.W. 2d at 793.

“§.F., supra note 1, at 48-49.

“See Ordinance 58, § 11(B)(4)(d).

“Petition at 10-11, 23.

solicited and no committees formed to review or evaluate the

problems prior to the enactment of the ordinances.””’ This

assertion, however, rings hollow in light of this Court's holdings

that the burden is on the party challenging an act to show that it

is unreasonable, arbitrary and not reasonably related to the

goals sought to be achieved. Further, in Townsend y.

Yeomans,** the Court concluded that “[t}here is no principle of

constitutional law which nullifies action taken by a legislature,

otherwise competent, in the absence of a special investiga-

tion... . Whether or not special inquiries should be made is a

matter for the legislative discretion.”*’ Additionally, even

assuming experts or special studies would have proven infor-

mative, petitioners offered no experts or studies of their own to

rebut the testimonies concerning the incidences of fire among

Brookside’s mobile homes or the absorption properties of

Brookside’s soil and the constraints thereby imposed.

With respect the aesthetic considerations, petitioners rely ex-

clusively on the testimony of only one person, Mayor Boehm,

who, according to petitioners, “had trouble differentiating be-

tween mobile homes and site-built structures in photographs.”"*

Apart from the inherent limitations of a two dimensional

representation of a three dimensional object, the photographs

bore no relation either to Brookside’s mobile homes or to its

site-built houses. Instead, petitioners used pictures of mobile

homes taken at the direction of the president and general

counsel of the Texas Manufactured Housing Association for in-

clusion in a booklet prepared by the Association.** In view of

the obvious interest of the Association in portraying mobile

homes in the most commercially advantageous light possible,

the usefulness of these pictures is, at best, dubious.

"id. at 10.

301 U.S, 441 (1997).

"ld, at 451.

**Petition at 21.

S.F., supra note |, at 118-19. The record does not reveal the

source of the pictures of the site-built houses.

24

Without providing any information as to cost or other conse-

quences, petitioners next attack Ordinances 58 and 78 by con-

tending that there were options available to the city council

other than the option of requiring mobile homes to be located in

mobile home parks.''' Even assuming the viability of these op-

tions, choices between options are the exclusive province of the

duly elected legislative body,''' which here has opted for requir-

ing mobile homes to be located in mobile home parks. Such a

determination, even where “fairly debatable,” must be upheld.'"’

Petitioners also attack Ordinances 58 and 78 because they are

the only zoning or land-use ordinances for Brookside,''' First,

petitioners claim that the ordinances are arbitrary and

unreasonable because, while prohibiting placement on their

land of a mobile home, the absence of other zoning restrictions

leaves open the possibility that petitioners could erect on their

land a high rise apartment complex or other commercial ven-

ture. There is, however, a simple explanation why Brookside

does not have a comprehensive zoning scheme. As discussed at

3 supra, Brookside is presently a “bedroom” community,

and has no industry. As a result, there has been no need for it

to zone for nonexistent property uses.

Second, petitioners claim that, under Tex. Rev. Civ.

Stat, Ann, art, 101 le (Vernon 1963), Ordinances 58 and 78 are

invalid because the Texas statute requires a comprehensive zon-

‘**Petition at 18-19, Among the options proposed by petitioners

was an ordinance “requiring all structures to be built with certain

kinds or types of exterior siding materials, roofing, etc. . .” /d. at 19.

One wonders if, following on petitioners’ suggestion, petitioners

would object to a requirement that the exteriors of all residences, in-

cluding mobile homes, be composed of brick.

'*' See, ¢.g., Minnesota v, Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,

469-70 (1981); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S, 726, 729 (1963); Sun-

shine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S, 381, 394-95 (1940);

Townsend, 901 U.S. at 451.

'*Buclid, 272 U.S. at 388,

‘Petition at 11, 17,

ing scheme or no scheme at all, Petitioners, however, ignore the

Texas Supreme Court's holding on this issue: “Because

Brookside Village, a general law city, has no comprehensive

zoning plan, the ordinances in question do not come under arti-

cle 101 1a, which embodies legislative authorization for zoning.

See Tex, Rev, Civ, Stat, Ann, art, 10lle. . . . A city, however,

may regulate land use under its general police power.”''* As this

Court repeatedly has held, the interpretation of state law by the

highest court of that state is controlling and binding upon this

Court,''’ Petitioners’ argument, therefore, must fail.

Petitioners next contend that Ordinances 58 and 78 deny

them equal protection because their mobile home, unlike earlier

mobile homes, was manufactured in accordance with the

Manufactured Home Construction and Safety Standards (the

“HUD regulations”)'"* it is entitled to the same treatment as

site-built houses.'"’ This argument was resolved as early as

Euclid wherein the Court observed:

The inclusion of a reasonable margin to insure effec-

tive enforcement will not put upon a law, otherwise

valid, the stamp of invalidity, Such laws may also

find their justification in the fact that, in some fields,

the bad fades into the good by such insensible degrees

that the two are not capable of being readily

distinguished and separated in terms of legislation. In

light of these considerations, we are not prepared to

say that the end in view was not sufficient to justify

the general rule of the ordinance, although some in-

dustries of an innocent character might fall within the

proscribed class.'"*

16633 S.W. 2d at 793 0.4,

'*B.g., City of Bastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc,, 426 U.S, 668,

674 n.9 (1976); Bisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 442 (1972).

124 C.F.R. § 3280. 1-3280.904 (1982), as amended at 47 Fed Reg.

28, 092 (1982).

'*'Petition at 5-6, 25,

1272 U.S. at 388-89,

This quotation is particularly appropriate to this case in view of

the fact that the majority of mobile homes in Brookside were

not manufactured in accordance with the HUD regulations,’ *

and, as discussed at 21 n. 90 supra, even those that were are not

subject to the same construction standards as site-built houses.

In any event, the Texas Supreme Court has set forth the proper

course to be followed for any change in Brookside’s policy

toward mobile homes: “It is possible that the general improve-

ment in appearance and quality of manufacture of mobile

homes will persuade municipalities to alter ordinances similar to

the one before us. Such changes, however, should be made

through the legislative, not judicial, process.”'''

The Brookside city council has not excluded mobile homes

from Brookside, but only has required them to be placed in

mobile home parks, Based on a variety of decisions by this

Court and the record below, there is no doubt that this require-

ment was based on concerns for the health, safety, morals and

general welfare of Brookside’s citizens.''' As such, the ordinances

‘City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 5.W. 2d at 795 n.6,

‘Jd. at 795.

As the Texas Supreme Court also noted, its decision upholding

locational restrictions on mobile homes is the majority rule. /d. at 794.

Most recently, for example, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court upheld

an ordinance requiring mobile homes to be placed in mobile home

parks, Stewart v. Inhabitants of Durham, No. 81-252 (Maine Oct. 14,

1982) (a copy of this decision is reprinted in Appendix C, at 60a.)

Numerous decisions of other state courts have upheld similar restric-

tions, E.w., Mathews v. Fayette County, 233 Ga. 220, 210 8.B.2d 758

(1974); City of Colby v. Hurtt, 212 Kan. 113, 509 P. 2d 1142 (1973);

State v. Larson, 292 Minn, 350, 195 N.W. 2d 180 (1972); Town of

Londonderry v, Faucher, 112 N.H, 454, 299 A.2d 581 (1972); Gravatt

v. Borough of Latrobe, 44 Pa, Commw, Ct. 47, 404 A.2d 729 (1979);

Duckworth v, City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wash. 2d 19, 586 P.2d 860

(1978). Contra Robinson Township of Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 302

N,W.2d 146 (1981),

'''That mobile homes continue to present safety problems not

presented by site-built houses is evident from a November 4, 1982 arti-

cle in the Austin American Stateman newspaper, a copy of which is

27

represent a proper exercise of the city council's police power.

Petitioners have failed to meet their heavy burden of showing

that the ordinances were unreasonable and arbitrary, and could

not be related reasonably to the public health, safety, morals or

general welfare.

lll. Congress, Through the National Manufactured

Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of

1974, Has Not Attempted To Pre-Empt the Power of

States and Cities To Legistate the Location of Mobile

Homes.

As their last gasp, petitioners contend that section 5403 of the

NMHCSSA has pre-empted Ordinances 58 and 78,''? This

argument is frivolous, as readily may be seen from even a cur-

sory review of the NMHCSSA and its legislative history, as well

as from consideration of the tenth amendment implications.

in Chicago and North Western Transportation Co, v. Kalo

Brick & Tile Co.,'"* the Court reiterated that “(p)re-emption of

state law by federal statute or regulation is not favored ‘in the

absence of persuasive reasons — either that the nature of the

regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion or that the

reprinted in Appendix D, at 70a, reporting a storm in Port Isabel and

South Padres Island, Texas, which uprooted and blew into canals a

total of approximately twenty-six (26) mobile homes.

''*Petition at i, 25-29. In their Questions Presented, petitioners

allege that the NMHCSSA has pre-empted state regulation of mobile

homes, but in their Reasons for Granting the Petition petitioners con-

any event, however, the Texas Supreme Court ruled thatthe entry of

an area of legislation did not pre-empt automatically a

city from legislating in that area, and that Ordinances 58 and 78 are

119450 U.S. 311 (1981),

Congress has unmistakably so ordained.’ "''* Even where a

federal statute or regulation pre-empts state law, it does so only

to the extent the state law is in conflict with the federal statute

or reguiation,''’

As set forth in the legislative history of the NMHCSSA, the

purposes to be served by the Act were “to reduce injuries,

deaths, insurance costs and property damage from mobile home

accidents and to improve the quality and durability of mobile

homes.”''* Accordingly, the HUD regulations were issued to set

construction and installation standards in order to improve the

quality of mobile homes relative to the quality of mobile homes

manufactured prior to implementation of the HUD regulations.

However, Ordinance 58 pertains only to mobile home parks and

the requirements therefor, and Ordinance 78, the ordinance

which is the specific subject of the instant suit, only per-

tains to the location of mobile homes. Therefore, Ordinance 58,

as amended by Ordinance 78, in no way conflicts with the

NMHCSSA or the HUD regulations, and petitioners point to

no provision indicating otherwise,''’

Petitioners, attempt to obfuscate the flaws in their argument

by contending that “the alleged public purpose goals of this City

have been pre-empted.”''" Even assuming this were a proper

application of the pre-emption standard, the NMHCSSA was

‘47d, at 317 (quoting Florida Lime & Advocado Growers v. Paul,

373 U.S, 132, 142 (1963).

''*Maryland v, Louisiana, 451 U.S, 725, 747 (1981).

16S, Rep. No, 693, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess, 143, reprinted in 1974 U.S,

Code Cong, & Ad, News 4273, 4408, See also 42 U.S.C, §5401 (Supp.

V 1981) (adopting almost word-for-word the legislative history's

declaration of purpose).

''’Bven if parts of Ordinance 58 could be seen as conflicting with

the NMHCSSA or the HUD regulations, that still would not provide a

basis for invalidating the locational requirements of Ordinance 78,

particularly since Ordinance 58, § XXIV(C) specifically provides for

the severability of any provision held to be invalid.

''*Petition at 28 (emphasis added),

not an attempt to make mobile homes the equivalent of site-

built houses, Rather, Congress simply was seeking to upgrade

the quality of mobile homes, The Brookside city council was

motivated by concerns for the differences betwen mobile homes

and site-built houses, and not the differences between pre- HUD

regulation and post-HUD regulation mobile homes.

Equally important to the pre-emption issue are the implica-

tions of petitioners’ argument on the tenth amendment to the

Constitution, As discussed previously, the sole portion of the

ordinances with which petitioners are concerned is the require-

ment that mobile homes be located in mobile home parks, In

National League of Cities v, Usery,''" the Court held thai the

federal government could not “operate to directly displace the

States’ freedom to structure integral operations of traditional

governmental functions.”'*" No one seriously may doubt that

zoning or other land-use planning is an area of traditional state

and local government function,'*' To suggest, therefore, that

Congress may pre-empt a city's zoning or other land-use deter-

minations is to suggest that Congress may displace a traditional

state and local government function, There is no basis what-

soever for petitioners’ suggestion that Congress, through the

NMHCSSA, sought to wield its power in such a fashion.

The NMHCSSA has not pre-empted either the ordinance pro-

viding for the location of mobile homes or the ordinance setting

forth the requirements for mobile home parks.

19426 U.S, 833 (1976),

Jd, at 852,

'*)Warth v, Seldin, 422 U.S, 490, 508 n, 18 (1975); see Penn Cen-

tral, 438 U.S. at 129; Village of Belle Terre, 416 U.S, at 8-9; Buclid,

272 U.S. at 386-90,

30

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the writ should be denied.

Respectfully Submitted,

WILLIAM E. KUHLMANN

Manley & Kuhimann, P.C.

3616 Preston Road

Pasadena, Texas 77505

(713) 947-1670

DAVID J. LaBREC, General Counsel

Texas Municipal League

1020 Southwest Tower

Austin, Texas 78701

(512) 478-6601

CHARLES S. RHYNE

Counsel of Record

THOMAS D. SILVERSTEIN

1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Suite 800

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 466-5420

Attorneys for Respondents

APPENDIX A

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment

and Orders of the District Court in Comeau v. City of

Brookside Village, No. 78-F2046 (Dist. Ct. Tex.).

1. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

No. 78-F2046

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

BRAZORIA COUNTY, TEXAS

300TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

HOMER N. COMEAU and HAZEL A. COMEAU

vs.

CITY OF BROOKSIDE VILLAGE, ET AL..,

FILED

MAY 9, 1980

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The above captioned cause came on for trial before the

Court without a jury on February 11, 1980. All parties and

their attorneys were present. After considering the

pleadings, the evidence and the argument of counsel, the

Court, in response to a request from Plaintiffs, HOMER

N. COMEAU and HAZEL A. COMEAU, makes its find-

ings of fact and conclusions of law as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Ordinance 58 and Ordinance 78 of the City of

Brookside Village were duly passed and in ef-

fect prior to Plaintiffs’ purchase of their

mobile home.

2a

Plaintiffs’ Fairway Doublewide mobile home

is a mobile home as defined in the city or-

dinances of Brookside Village.

Plaintiffs’ placement of their mobile home on

their property within the limits of the City of

Brookside Village was a violation of Or-

dinances 58 and 78 of the City of Brookside

Village.

The City of Brookside Village has no public

sewage system.

Water is supplied to Brookside Village by

means of private water wells.

The lack of municipal water and sewage

systems creates a potential health hazard for

Brookside Village.

Ordinances 58 and 78 of the City of Brookside

Village bear a substantial relationship to the

public health, safety and welfare of the

residents of Brookside Village.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Ordinances 58 and 78 of the City of Brookside

Village are valid city ordinances.

Ordinances 58 and 78 of the City of Brookside

Village are constitutional.

Ordinance 58 and 78 of the City of Brookside

Village do not represent an abuse of municipal

Ordinances 58 and 78 of the City of Brookside

3a

Village represent a valid exercise of the police

power of municipalities.

Signed this 9th day of May, 1980.

Tom Kenyon

Judge

2. Judgment.

No. 78-F-2046

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

BRAZORIA COUNTY, TEXAS

300TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

HOMER N. COMEAU and HAZEL A. COMEAU

vs.

CITY OF BROOKSIDE VILLAGE, ET AL.,

FILED

MARCH 4, 1980

JUDGMENT

On the 11th day of February, 1980, came on to be heard

the above entitled and numbered cause and HOMER N.

COMEAU appeared in person for the Plaintiffs and by his

attorney of record and announced ready for trial, and

THE CITY OF BROOKSIDE VILLAGE, Defendant ap-

peared through its Mayor Louis Boehm and by its attorney

of record and announced ready for trial and no jury hav-

ing been demanded, ail matters of fact and things in con-

troversy were submitted to the Court.

The Court, after hearing the evidence and arguments of

counsel, is of the opinion that the City Ordinance No. 58

and City Ordinance No. 78 of Defendant, CITY OF

BROOKSIDE VILLAGE, are constitutional, and further

the Plaintiffs should remove their mobile home from its

unauthorized location.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that City Ordinance No. 58 and City Or-

Sa

dinance No. 78 of Defendant, CITY OF BROOKSIDE

VILLAGE, are constitutional;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and

DECREED that Plaintiffs take nothing by this suit and

that Defendants be in all things discharged; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and

DECREED by the Court that Plaintiffs remove their

mobile home from its unauthorized location within 60

days from the date this Court’s judgment becomes final.

All costs of court are taxed against the Plaintiffs for

which let execution issue. All other relief not expressly

granted herein is denied.

SIGNED this 4th day of March, 1980.

Tom Kenyon

Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM

AND SUBSTANCE:

By: /s/ William E. Kuhiman

William E. Kuhlman

3616 Preston Road

Pasadena, Texas 77505

947-1670

State Bar No.: 11756500

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

6a

APPROVED AS TO FORM ONLY:

/s/ John A. Wright, Jr.

John A. Wright, Jr.

777 South Post Oak Road

Suite 990

Houston, Texas 77056

871-9542

State Bar No.: 22043500

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS

7a

3. Order Granting Temporary Injunction.

No, 78-F2046

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

BRAZORIA COUNTY, TEXAS

300TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

HOMER N. COMEBAU and HAZEL A, COMEAU

vs.

CITY OF BROOKSIDE VILLAGE, ET AL.,

FILED

OCTOBER 3, 1978

ORDER GRANTING TEMPORARY INJUNCTION

On October 2, 1978, the Court heard and considered the

application of HOMER N. COMEAU and HAZEL A.

COMEAU, Plaintiffs, for a Temporary Injunction upon

their verified petition, to which was attached a sworn af-

fidavit in support of the Plaintiffs’ allegations, and the

Plaintiffs having appeared in person and by their attorney

and the Defendant, after due notice, by and through their

attorney of record, and the Court, having heard and con-

sidered the evidence and argument of counsel:

The Court finds and concludes that HOMER N, COM-

EAU and HAZEL A. COMEAU, Plaintiffs herein, will

probably prevail on the trial of this cause; that the CITY

OF BROOKSIDE VILLAGE, Defendant herein, has prior

to the granting of this Temporary Injunction issued cita-

tions against Plaintiffs in regard to their possession, use or

occupancy of their manufactured home on certain real

property owned by Plaintiffs, located at 12700 Mykawa

Road in the City of Brookside Village, and have also ex-

pressed their intention to have the manufactured home of

Plaintiffs removed from within the boundaries of the City

of Brookside Village.

That if Defendant carries out said intention, they will

thereby alter the status quo and tend to make ineffectual a

judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, in that Plaintiffs will be

put to unnecessary expense, and further, Plaintiffs’ pro-

perty will be made ineffectual for its intended use as a

homestead,

And that unless Defendant is deterred from carrying out

said intention, Plaintiffs will be without adequate remedy

at law in that irreparable injury and harm will occur to

Plaintiffs, their family and their homestead, by the denial

of their use of said property for its intended purposes.

IT 1S, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the City of

Brookside Village, its agents and employees, Defendants

herein, be, and they hereby are, commanded forthwith to

desist and refrain from the issuance of any citations or

other legal notices which are intended to act as a punitive

measure against Plaintiffs in regard to their posession, use

or occupancy of their manufactured home on their real

property located at 12700 Mykawa Road in the City of

Brookside Village:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that said Defendants

herein, be, and they are, commanded forthwith to desist

and refrain from denying Plaintiffs the use and quiet

possession of their manufactured home located on their

real property at 12700 Mykawa Road in the City of

Brookside Village.

The clerk shall forthwith, on the filing by Plaintiffs of

the bond hereinafter required, and on approving the same

according to law, issue a Temporary Injunction in comfor-

mity with the law and the terms of this order.

This order shall not be effective unless and until Plain-

tiffs execute and file with the clerk a bond, in comformity

with the law, in the amount of One Thousand Dollars

($1,000.00),

Sign this 30th day of October, 1978,

/s/ G.P. Hardy

JUDGE PRESIDING

10a

3. Temporary Restraining Order and Show Cause Order,

No, 78-F2046

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

BRAZORIA COUNTY, TEXAS

149TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

HOMER N. COMEAU and HAZEL A. COMEAU

Plaintiffs

vs.

CITY OF BROOKSIDE VILLAGE, ET AL.,

Defendants

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

AND SHOW CAUSE ORDER

The hereinabove entitled and numbered cause, and the

Plaintiffs’ Application for a Temporary Restraining

Order, without notice, was presented to and heard by the

Court on the date set forth hereinbelow. The Plaintiffs ap-

pearing by ond through their attorney, John A. Wright,

Jr., and the Court, having considered the verified

pleadings and the Affidavit of the Plaintiffs, finds that

Plaintiffs are entitled to a Temporary Restraining Order,

pending a hearing on the Application for a Temporary In-

junction, for the reason that Plaintiffs show probable

cause and irreparable harm and injury for which there is

no adequate remedy at law; the Court further finds that a

bond in the amount of ONE THOUSAND AND NO/100

($1,000.00) DOLLARS will fully and adequately protect

the rights and interest of Defendants until said hearing. It

is therefore,

ORDERED, on Plaintiffs executing and filing with the

Clerk of this Court, a good and sufficient bond in the sum

of ONE THOUSAND AND NO/100 ($1,000.00)

DOLLARS conditioned that Plaintiffs will pay to Defen-

dants any and all damages sustained if it shall be determin-

ed that Defendants have been wrongfully restrained pen-

ding the hearing on Application for Temporary Injunc-

tion, that Defendant City of Brookside Village, and its

agents and employees, are enjoined and restrained from

denying Plaintiffs the use and quiet possession of their

manufactured home located on their real property at

12700 Mykawa Road in the City of Bookside Village, and

it is further

ORDERED, that the City of Brookside Village, and its

agents and employees, cease the issuance of any citations

or other legal notices which are intended to act as a

punitive measure against Plaintiffs in regard to their

posession, use or occupancy of their manufactured home

on their real property located at 12700 Mykawa Road in

the City of Brookside Village, and if [sic] is further

ORDERED, that Defendants be directed to appear

before this Court in the 149th District Courtroom in the

County of Brazoria, Texas, at 9:00 o'clock, a.m. on Oc-

tober, 22nd, 1978, then and there to show cause, if any

there be, why a temporary injunction should not issue

against them enjoining and restraining Defendants from

denying Plaintiffs the use and quiet possession of their

manufactured home located on their real property at

12700 Mykawa Road in the City of Brookside Village, and

further enjoining and restraining from denying, and re-

12a

quiring Defendants to issue to Plaintiffs all permits and

certificates which may be required and necessary for

Plaintiffs to obtain utility building services at 12700

Mykawa Road, City of Brookside Village, Texas, and to

occupy said premises until the final hearing or other

disposition of this cause.

SIGNED on September 21, 1978, at 1:30 o'clock a.m.

/s/ Paul Ferguson

JUDGE PRESIDING

Entered on , 1978,

13a

APPENDIX B

Constitution, Statute and Ordinances.

1. U.S, Const. amend, X.

The powers not delegated to the United States by the

Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserv-

ed to the States respectively, or to the people.

2. Section 5401 of the National Manufactured Housing

Construction and Safety Standards Oct of 1974, 42

U.S.C. §§ 5401-5426 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).

§ 5401. Congressional declaration of purposes

The Congress declares that the purposes of this chapter

are to reduce the number of personal injuries and deaths

and the amount of insurance costs and property damage

resulting from manufactured home accidents and to im-

prove the quality and durability of manufactured homes.

Therefore, the Congress determines that it is necessary to

establish Federal construction and safety standards for

manufactured homes and to authorize manufactured

home safety research and development.

4a

3. Brookside Village, Tex., Ordinance 78 (Apr. 18, 1974).

ORDINANCE NO. 78

AN ORDINANCE AMENDING ORDINANCE NO. 58;

REGULATING THE PARKING OF MOBILE HOMES;

REGULATING THE CHANGE OR REPLACEMENT OF MOBILE

HOMES; PROVIDING FOR EMERGENCY USE OF MOBILE

HOMES; REQUIRING PERMITS FOR SUCH EMERGENCY

USE; PROVIDING FOR A PENALTY FOR VIOLATION

HEREOF; AND PROVIDING FOR AN EFFECTIVE DATE

HEREOF.

BE IT ORDAINED by the Board of Aldermen of

Brookside Village, Texas;

Section 1. Subsections B and C of Section XVIII of Or-

dinance No. 58 is hereby deleted in its entirety, and is

hereby amended to include the following provisions as set

out herein.

Section Il. Parking of mobile homes, camper buses,

motor homes and camper trailers, for use as a residence,

outside of a mobile home park shall be prohibited.

Section III. Mobile homes heretofore installed in com-

pliance with the Ordinances of Brookside Village may re-

main in place, and continue to be used or occupied. Ex-

change, replacement, alteration, relocation or additions to

mobile homes within Brookside Village is hereby pro-

hibited, unless such move, replacement, alteration, reloca-

tion or addition is to or in a licensed mobile home park.

Section IV. The Board of Aldermen of Brookside

Village, by a majority vote of its five (5) members, may

grant to individuals the temporary use of mobile home,

motor homes, camper busses, or camper trailers in the

event of an emergency. An emergency shall only be loss of

a permanent dwelling due to fire, flood or any other

natural disaster. In the event any such application for

emergency temporary use of said mobile homes, motor

homes, camper busses or camper trailers is granted by the

Board of Aldermen, no such temporary use shall begin un-

til:

A.

Section [V] VI. An existing mobile home that is destroyed

by fire, explosion, flood, or other natural disaster, may be

replaced, if such replacement is of the same size, length,

1Sa

A permit fee, to be established by the Board of

Aidermen, is paid by the applicant.

A determination of the period of time such

emergency use may continue, but in no event

shall such period exceed thirty (30) days.

However, each applicant may have his

emergency permit extended for additional thir-

ty (30) days periods. No permit shall be ex-

tended, or renewed, more than five times. All

such extensions shall require a majority vote of

the five (5) member Board of Aldermen.

The Board of Aldermen shall only grant an

emergency permit for the express purpose of

occupying a mobile home, motor home,

camper bus or camper trailer as a residence,

only while repairing, remodeling or replacing a

permanent residence.

Any such emergency permit granted shall re-

quire the applicant to locate his temporary

mobile home, motor home, camper bus or

camper trailer upon the same lot, or parcel of

real estate, as the permanent residence that is

being repaired, remodeled or replaced.

width and weight as the one destroyed.

16a

Section [VI] V. This Ordinance shall become effective

from and after the date of its passage, and after all ap-

plicable laws of the State of Texas, if any, have been com-

plied with.

Section [VII] VI. Any person violating this Ordinance is

guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be fined

not less than Ten Dollars ($10.00) and not more than One

Hundred-Dollars ($100.00). Each day a violation of this

Ordinance continues shall be a separate offense.

Passed and approved this 18th day of April, 1974.

George Carter

MAY’ *

ATTEST:

/s/ Aurora C. Rodriguez

CITY SECRETARY

17a

4. Brookside Village, Tex., Ordinance 58 (Aug. 6, 1970).

ORDINANCE NO. 58

AN ORDINANCE OF BROOKSIDE VILLAGE, TEXAS, FOR THE

PURPOSE OF REGULATING THE CONSTRUCTION. OPERA-

TION AND MAINTENANCE OF MOBILE HOME PARKS IN

THE VILLAGE OF BROOKSIDE; REQUIRING A CONSTRUC-

TION PERMIT FOR THE CONTRUCTION, ALTERNATION OR

EXTENSION OF MOBILE HOME PARKS AND PROVIDING

FOR INSPECTIONS AND FEES; REQUIRING A LICENSE FOR

THE OPERATION OF A MOBILE HOME PARK AND PRO-

VIDING FOR INSPECTIONS AND FEES; REQUIRING THAT

AN ANNUAL, A SEMI-ANNUAL OR A TEMPORARY PARKING

PERMIT BE OBTAINED FOR ANY MOBILE HOME OR

TRAVEL TRAILER OCCUPYING A STAND IN A MOBILE

HOME PARK AND PROVIDING FOR INSPECTIONS AND

FEES; PROVIDING FOR APPEALS; ESTABLISHING STAN-

DARDS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION, OPERATION AND

MAINTENANCE OF MOBILE HOME PARKS; PROVIDING

THAT OWNERS OR OPERATORS OF EXISTING MOBILE

HOME PARKS SHALL BE PERMITTED A PERIOD OF TIME AS

HEREIN PROVIDED TO OPERATE A MOBILE HOME PARK

WITHOUT OBTAINING A LICENSE: REGULATING MOBILE

HOMES AND TRAVEL TRAILERS OUTSIDE OF MOBILE

HOME PARKS: CONTAINING A REPEALING CLAUSE AND A

SEVERABILITY CLAUSE: CONTAINING A PENALTY PROVI-

SION AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE.

BE IT ORDAINED BY THE BOARD OF ALDERMEN

OF BROOKSIDE VILLAGE, TEXAS:

MOBILE HOME PARKS

I. DEFINITIONS — The following terms, phrases and

words as used in this Ordinance shall have the follow-

ing respective definitions:

A. Annual parking permit means a permit required for

any mobile home or travel trailer which is occupying a

stand in a mobile home park and which permit is valid

for the period from January 1 through December 31

of the year of issuance.

Board means the Board of Aldermen.

Building Official is the Village Inspector or duly

authorized representative.

. Cash means United States currency or coin or a

cashier’s check or certified check or a postal money

order.

City means Brookside Village, Texas.

Construction permit means the permit required for

the construction, alteration or extension of any

mobile home park in the City.

. Construction permitee means the person to whom a

construction permit has been issued.

. Current parking permit means the person to whom a

construction permit has been issued.

Expandable room means an enclosed or a semi-

enclosed room or roofed portion which expands out-

ward from the basic mobile home by means of rollers,

hinges or other devices or arrangements, but which is

designed as a structural portion of the mobile home

and which is carried on, or within, the mobile home

while travelling. Also includes permanent additions to

mobile homes.

Health Officer means the Village or County

Sanitarian.

Label means a metal inspection label or plate which

has been permanently affixed by the manufacturer or

by an approved testing agency to a mobile home or

travel trailer or to equipment used in connection

therewith and which contains a serial number, if re-

19a

quired, the specifications of the vehicle or the equip-

ment to which it is attached and which refers to any

standards that have been met in the construction of

such vehicle or equipment.

License means a mobile home park operator’s license.

M. Licensee means the person to whom a mobile home

park operator’s license has been issued.

. Mobile Home means a portable vehicle constructed

on a chassis and which has been designed so that it

may be occupied and used without a permanent foun-

dation. For the purpose of this Ordinance, a mobile

home shall mean a single family dwelling unit suitable

for year-round occupancy and which has provision

for electrical and water connections and which pro-

vides for waste disposal in compliance with the Plum-

bing Code requirements for dwellings. Such vehicle

shall be eligible for registration and licensing by the

State of Texas for operation on the public streets and

highways, and be fourteen (14) feet in length or

longer.

. Mobile home lot means a parcel or tract of land for

the placement of a single mobile home and the ex-

clusive use of its occupants and which is located in a

mobile home subdivision approved by the Planning

Commission of the Village. This is to be distinguished

from a mobile home stand and site located within a

mobile home park.

. Mobile home stand means that part of a mobile home

park which has been improved for the placement of

the mobile home including all required appurtenant

structures and having provision for available utility

connections.

20a

Occupant means the person or persons who occupy a

mobile home or travel trailer in a mobile home park.

Owner means the owner or lessee, whether one or

more, of the premises on which a mobile home park is

operated when such person is not a licensee.

Overnight parking means the use of a mobile home

park for a period not to exceed seven (7) days by a

travel trailer or mobile home, provided that if said use

exceeds seven (7) days, a valid annual, semi-annual,

or temporary parking permit is required and the

beginning date shall be the initial date of occupancy

of the mobile home park. No permit or fee shall be re-

quired by the Village for the temporary use of a

mobile home park for a period of seven (7) days or

less.

Parking permit shall mean an annual or semi-annual

parking permit.

Person means a natural person, his heirs, executors,

administrators or assigns, and shall also include a

firm, partnership, or corporation, its successors or

assigns, or the agent of any of the aforesaid.

. Semi-annual parking permit means a permit required

for any mobile home or travel trailer which has been

placed upon a stand in a mobile home park and which

is valid for the period from January | through June

30 or for the period from July 1 through December 31

of the year of issuance.

. Service building means a structure housing toilet

facilities, lavatories, bathing facilities, and such other

facilities, as may be required or permitted under the

provisions of this Ordinance and which is used in con-

nection with the operation of a mobile home park.

Zia

Y. Sewer connection means the connection consisting of

the pipes, fittings and appurtenances from the drain

outlet of the mobile home or travel trailer to the inlet

of the corresponding sewer riser pipe or the sewerage

system serving the mobile home park.

Z. Sewer riser means that portion of the pipe of the

sewer lateral which extends vertically to the ground

elevation and terminates at each mobile home stand.

AA. Temporary parking permit means a permit which

may be used in lieu of an annual or semi-annual

parking permit and which is valid for thirty (30)

days from the date of issuance.

BB. Travel trailer means a portable vehicle built on a

chassis and designed as a temporary dwelling for

travel, recreation and vacation use and which has

been permanently identified by the manufacturer.

When such a vehicle has been equipped by the

manufacturer for use on public streets and

highways, the body of such vehicle shall not ex-

ceed eight (8) feet in width, but may be of any

length, provided its gross weight does not exceed

4,500 pounds, or a travel trailer may be of any

height, provided its length does not exceed four-

teen (14) feet, exclusive of the tongue. The term

travel trailer shall also be deemed to include all

other portable contrivances other than mobile

homes used or intended to be used generally for

living and sleeping quarters and which may be

moved under its own power, towed, or

transported by another vehicle.

CC. Utilities means the telephone, water, sewage, gas

or electrical distribution system, which are

DD.

22a

available for connection to mobile homes or travel

trailers in mobile home parks.

Utility connection means the connection of

available utilities in a mobile home park to a

mobile home or travel trailer placed on a mobile

home stand in a mobile home park.

Vehicle means a mobile home or a travel trailer

unless the context in which the word is used in-

dicates that another meaning is intended.

Water connection means the connection of the

pipes, fittings and appurtenances from the water

riser pipe to the water inlet pipe for the water

distribution system of a mobile home or travel

trailer.

Il. CONSTRUCTION PERMIT REQUIRED FOR

MOBILE HOME PARK

A.

It shall be unlawful for any person to construct,

alter or extend any mobile home park within the

corporate limits of the Village of Brookside,

unless he shall first have obtained a mobile home

park construction permit therefor from the

Village.

Application for such permit shall be made to the

Planning Commission in triplicate and the follow-

ing information and items shall be furnished:

1. Name and address of applicant.

2. Interest of the applicant in the mobile home

park.

3. Location and legal description of the mobile

home park.

4. Complete engineering plans and specifications

in triplicate for the proposed park showing:

Cc.

23a

a. The area and dimensions of the trace of

land.

b. A plat or map of the proposed mobile home

park showing the number, location and size

of all mobile home sites, stands, locations

and widths of roadways and walkways, ser-

vice buildings and other proposed structures.

c. The location of water and sewer lines and

riser pipes. '

d. Plans and specifications for the water sup-

ply, including fire plugs, and refuse and

sewage disposal facilities.

e. Plans and specifications for all buildings to

be constructed within the mobile home park.

f. The location and details of lighting and elec-

trical systems.

g. Surface drainage plan.

A separate permit shall be required for the

building, electrical, plumbing and driveway-

sidewalk and other permits when required.

Any person who has been denied a mobile home

park permit, may appeal such denial by following

the same procedure provided for an appeal from a

license denial, revocation or suspension by the

Building Official.

A.

It shall be unlawful to establish, maintain or

operate a mobile home park without first securing

a mobile home park operator’s license therefor.

As an exception to the requirement for a license,

Cc.

24a

and as limited hereinafter, the owner or operator

of an existing mobile home park will be permitted

to continue operation of such park for a period of

six (6) months from the effective date of this Or-

dinance without obtaining a license therefor upon

the following conditions:

1. He shall make application for a license, paying

the required fee therefor within ninety (90) days

from the effective date of this Ordinance.

2. Upon receipt of his application, an investiga-

tion and inspection will be made of the existing

mobile home park.

3. The applicant will not be required to make any

modifications or changes in his existing mobile

home park if the variance from the re-

quirements of this ordinance is not dangerous

to life, health and safety of the public.

4. The Building Official shall furnish to the appli-

cant, in writing, a list of any necessary changes

or modifications in the existing mobile home

park, and it shall be the duty of the applicant to

commence making such changes in good faith.

For good cause, the Building Official may extend the

period for completion of such necessary changes or

modifictions for one additional period of six (6) mon-

ths, but in no event will an existing mobile home park

be permitted to continue operations, if, at the end of

one (1) year from the effective date of this Ordinance,

the owner thereof has not obtained a mobile home

park license. The owner or operator of an existing

mobile home park license. The owner or operator of

an existing mobile home park shall be entitled to ap-

25a

peal any required changes or modifications and any

denial of an extension of time for such changes or

modifications to the Planning Commission by follow-

ing the procedure that is provided for appeals for

license denials, revocations or suspension by the

Building Official, but the Planning Commission shall

have no authority to extend the period for completion

beyond one (1) year from the effective date of this Or-

dinance.

. It shall be unlawful for any mobile home park owner

or operator to continue operating any mobile home

park unless he shall have made application for a

mobile home park operator's license as provided

herein within ninety (90) days from the effective date

hereof.

It shall be unlawful for any mobile home park occu-

pant to continue occupying a mobile home or a travel

trailer located in a mobile home park which has not

been duly licensed by the Village or the owner or

operator which has not, within ninety (90) days from

the effective date of this Ordinance, made application

for a mobile home park operator's license. A ten-day

written notice of such failure of the owner or operator

of an existing mobile home park shall be given to the

occupants of such moi ile home park and the failure,

refusal or neglect of sich occupant or occupants to

remove their mobile home or travel trailer therefrom,

or to cease occupying such mobile home or travel

trailer within said ten-day period, shall constitute an

offense.

Licenses shall be valid for a period of one (1) year

beginning on July 1 of each year and shall be

renewable annually during the month of June. A non-

26a

refundable license application investigation fee of

$25.00 shall accompany each application for license,

provided such investigation fee will be allowed as a

credit upon the license if it is granted, The license fee

and annual license renewal fee shall be determined by

the following fee schedule:

2 through 15 mobile home stands $ 25.00

16 through 40 mobile home stands $ 50.00

41 through 60 mobile home stands $ 75.00

61 through 80 mobile home stands $100.00

Each stand in excess of 80 $ 1.00 each

. PERMITS

It shall be unlawful for any person to occupy a mobile

home or travel trailer in a mobile home park without

first securing a parking permit therefor except that no

permit will be required for the use of a mobile home

park for a period of seven (7) days or less.

It shall be unlawful for any person to occupy a mobile

home or travel trailer in a mobile home park unless

such vehicle has first been connected to the approved

utilities exclusive of telephones available in such park.

It shall be unlawful for the occupant of a mobile

home or travel trailer to connect or permit such vehi-

cle to be connected to the available utilities in a

mobile home park or for such vehicle to remain so

connected, without first securing a parking permit ex-

cept that no permit will be required for the use of a

mobile home park for a period of seven (7) days or

less.

27a

It shall be the responsibility of a mobile home

park licensse, his agents or employees, to notify

the Village of Brookside, in writing, when any

mobile home or travel trailer is to be connected to

the available utilities in the mobile home park

operated by the licensee. Failure to perform such

notification shall constitute a misdemeanor under

the terms of this Ordinance.

An arinual parking permit shall be valid for the

period from January | through December 31 of

the year of issuance. A semi-annual parking per-

mit shall be valid for the period from January |

through June 30, or July 1 through December 31

of the year of issuance. An annual or a semi-

annual parking permit may be issued only by the

Village and such permits may not be issued by

licensees or mobile home dealers. Application for

an annual parking permit or a semi-annual park-

ing permit shall be made to the Building Official.

A cash fee of $18.00 shall be paid for an annual

permit and no proration shall be allowed for an

elapsed period of time in the year of issunce. A

cash fee of $10.00 shall be paid for a semi-annual

parking permit. Applications may be made by

mail to the Building Official.

A temporary parking permit may be used in lieu

of an annual or semi-annual parking permit and it

shall be valid for a period of thirty (30) days from

the date of issuance. A temporary parking permit

may be obtained from the Building Official, in the

same manner as an annual or semi-annual parking

permit upon payment of a $5.00 cash fee.

28a

A parking permit may be assigned in connection

with the sale, lease, or renting of a mobile home or

travel trailer or a permit holder may transfer a

parking permit from one vehicle to another. Ap-

plication for such assignment or transfer shall be

made to the Building Official who shall furnish

the necessary forms. A service charge of $2.00 will

be made for each transfer or assignment. This

provision is not to be construed as requiring an

assignment of a parking permit from the seller in

whose name the parking permit has been issued to

the purchaser, provided the seller has delivered to

the purchaser his receipt for such parking permit.

If the Building Official is furnished satisfactory

proof that a parking permit which has been issued

has been lost, destroyed or defaced, he may issue a

replacement permit for the unexpired term of such

permit, upon payment of a service charge of

$2.00. The Building Official may prescribe such

forms and requirements as he may, from time to

time, find necessary ‘0 insure that no replacement

parking permit is improperly issued.

The Building Official is hereby authorized to

prescribe the form of parking permits and to re-

quire that additional relevant information be fur-

nished, either in the application for parking per-

mits, upon the face or back of the parking permit,

or upon the receipt there>’, The Building Official

is further hereby authorized to designate the place

on or within a mobile home or travel trailer, that a

parking permit shall be affixed or replaced and the

failure, refusal or neglect of a parking permit

holder to comply with this requirement, shall con-

stitute an offense and the Building Official is

hereby authorized to disconnect or cause to be

disconnected the available utilities in a mobil

home park from such vehicle.

V. INSPECTION OF MORILE HOME PARK

A.

The inspecting authority shall make such inspec-

tion as necessary to insure compliance with the

provisions of this Ordinance, semiannually, on

the first day of January and the first day of July

each year, or as soon thereafter as possible.

By the acceptance of the license, the licensee shall

be deemed to authorize the inspection of a mobile

home park at all reasonable hours. Such hours

shall usually be during normal working hours and

failure to permit such inspection shall be a ground

for suspension and/or revocation of the license.

Where there is reason to believe a violation may

exist before or after the hours of normal inspec-

tion, the Building Official may authorize special

inspections at any time; provided, however,

nothing herein shall prohibit inspection for valid

parking permits at any time.

Failure or refusal of a mobile home park occupant

to permit inspection by the inspecting authority,

or to permit the licensee to make necessary repairs

or alterations in compliance with the requirements

of the inspecting authority shall constitute a

ground for disconnection of the utilities serving

such mobile home. The mobile home occupant

shall have the right to appeal any decision, order

or action of the Building Official or the inspecting

30a

authority by following the same procedure provid-

ed for appeals from license denials, suspensions or

revocations by the Building Official.

VI. WRITTEN NOTICES OF VIOLATIONS TO BE

CUMULATIVE OF PENAL PROVISIONS

A.

The inspecting authority may issue written notice

of violations to the licensee or his agent, or to any

owner or operator for a mobile home park

operating without a license during the first year

from the effective date of this Ordinance, or to

any mobile home park occupant, setting out the

particular violation and setting out a time for

making the necessary correction or repair.

The person receiving such a notice shall have the

right of appeal from license denials, suspensions

or revocations by the Building Official.

The provision for written notices shall be

cumulative of the penal provisions hereinafter

provided and the issuance of a written notice shall

not prevent the filing of a criminal charge for

violation of the provisions of this Ordinance.

VII. APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF BUILDING

A.

OFFICIAL, ETC.

Any person whose application for a license has

been denied by the Building Official, shall have

the right to appeal such decision to the Board of

Aldermen, by mailing postpaid or delivering to

the Village Secretary, City Hall, Brookside

Village, Texas, written notice of appeal within ten

(10) days after he has been notified of such denial.

3la

The Building Official shall have authority to sus-

pend or revoke licenses or to order utility discon-

nections for the following violations of the provi-

sions of this Ordinance:

1. A license may be suspended for any period of

time up to six (6) months for a violation affect-

ing the health, safety or welfare of occupants of

a mobile home or of other persons or property.

2. A license may be revoked for a violation which

is dangerous to life.

3. For a violation of the provisions of this Or-

dinance not deemed to require a license suspen-

sion or revocation, the utility connection servic-

ing any stand or stands, or any structure in a

mobile home park, may be disconnected or

caused to be disconnected, provided a utility

disconnection may be ordered in connection

with a license suspension or revocation as to all

or any part of a mobile home park if necessary

to protect life or property.

After the period of suspension, a suspended

license will be reinstated by the Building Official

upon a showing or ability and willingness by the

licensee to comply with the provisions of this Or-

dinance :

A person whose license has been revoked, may ap-

ply for a new license six (6) months after such

revocation by making a new application and pay-

ing the required fee therefor. Before granting such

new license, the Building Official shall require the

applicant to show ability and willingness to comp-

ly with the provisions of this Ordinance.

E.

32a

No sale, transfer or assignment of a revoked

license or of a license during the period of suspen-

sion will be recognized by the Village, provided a

person whose license has been suspended or

revoked, may sell, transfer or assign his interest in

the premises, if any, to another person who may

then make application for a license to operate the

mobile home park. If it is shown by the applicant

that he has had no responsible connection with the

mobile home park, he will be eligible for the

granting of a new license and if a new license is

granted, the new licensee may commence to

operate the mobile home park upon issuance of

the license.

Where a person whose license has been suspended

or revoked, has no interest in the premises other

than by agreement with the owner or owners of

the premises, such person may advise the Village

in writing of his withdrawal from any further con-

nection with the mobile home park. In this event,

and if it be shown that the owner or owners had

no responsibie connection with the actual opera-

tion and maintenance of the mobile home park, a

new application may be made by any person other

than the person whose license was suspended or

revoked and if the new license is granted, the new

licensee may commence to operate the mobile

home park upon issuance of the license.

Appeals:

1. Any license revocation or suspension, or any

order for a utility disconnection, or any deci-

sion, order or action taken by the Building Of-

ficial may be appealed by any person affectd by

33a

the decision, order or action to the Board by fil-

ing written notice of appeal within ten (10) days

from the date of notice of such action, by mail-

ing postpaid or delivering such notice to the

Village Secretary, Brookside Village, Texas.

2. Upon written appeal as described in VII. G. 1,

has been made within ten (10) days, a license

suspension or revocation, or any decision or ac-

tion by the Building Official, will be held in

abeyance and such person will be given a hear-

ing before the Board, provided any utility

disconnection shall not be reconnected unless

authorized by the Board after hearing.

VIII. MOBILE HOME REVIEW BOARD

A.

The Board of Aldermen is hereby designated to be

the Mobile Homes Review Board.

The Fire Marshal, Electrical Inspector and the

Chief Building Inspector are designated as exof-

ficio members.

Appeals to the Board shall be set for hearing

within fifteen (15) days from the date notice of ap-

peal was received by the Chairman, whenever

possible. Such hearings may be continued from

time to time until completed, but a final decision

shall be made within thirty (30) days from the date

notice of appeal was received by the Chairman,

unless by consent or request of the person appeal-

ing, a hearing is set for or continued beyond such

thirty (30) day period.

The Board shall have authority to affirm, modify

or reverse the decision of or action of the Building

34a

Official. The Building Official, a licensee, or any

person who appeals a decision or action of the

Building Official, may appeal a decision or action

of the Board to the Village Council by mailing

postpaid or delivering to the Village Secretary

written notice of appeal address to the Mayor and

the Village Council, City Hall, Brookside Village,

Texas, within ten (10) days after he has been

notified of the decision of the Board.

A license suspension, revocation, utility discon-

nection order, or other decision or action of the

Building Official, which has been upheld by the

Board, shall be immediately effective, subject

however, to the right of the person affected

thereby, to appeal to the Village Council as pro-

vided above. The decision of the Village Council

on any appeals from the Board to the Village

Council, shall be final.

IX. ENVIRONMENTAL, OPEN SPACE AND

ACCESS REQUIREMENTS

A.

General Requirements: Condition of soil, ground

water level, drainage and topography shall not

create hazards to the property or the health or

safety of the occupants. The site shall not be ex-

posed to objectionable adverse influences and no

portion subject to unpredictable and/or sudden

flooding, subsidence or erosion shall be used for

any purpose which would expose persons or pro-

perty to hazards.

Soil and Ground Cover Requirements: Exposed

ground surfaces in all parts of every mobile home

park shall be paved, or covered with stone screen-

J

35a

ings, or other solid material, or protected with a

vegetative growth that is capable of preventing

soil erosion and of eliminating objectionable dust.

Site Drainage Requirements: The ground surface

in all parts of every mobile home park shall be

graded and equipped iv drain all surface water in

a safe, 2fficient manner.

Park Areas for Non-resident uses

1. Mobile homes shall be separated from each

other and from other buildings and stri .. "res

by at least ten (10) feet on the sides and ena-to-

end clearance of ten (10) feet.

2. Nothing contained in this section shall be

deemed to prohibit the sale of a mobile home

located on a mobile home stand and connected

to the utilities.

Required Separation between mobile homes in

mobile home parks

1 Mobile homes shall be separated from each

other and from other buildings and structures

by at least ten (10) feet on the sides and end-to-

end clearance of ten (10) feet.

2. An accessory structure which has a horizontal

area exceeding twenty-five (25) square feet, is

attached to a mobile home or located within ten

(10) feet of its window, and has an opaque top

or roof that is higher than the nearest window,

shall, for purposes of all separation re-

quirements, be considered to be part of the

mobile home.

36a

F. Required recreation areas.

1. In all parks accommodating or designed to ac-

commodate twenty-five (25) or more mobile

homes, there shall be not less than one (1)

recreation area which shall be easily accessible

to all park residents.

2. The size of such recreation areas shall be based

upon a minimum of 200 square feet for each

mobile home stand. No outdoor recreation area

shall contain less than 2,500 square feet.

3. All mobile home parks shall provide screening

such as fences or natural growth along the pro-

perty boundary line separating the park and ad-

jacent land.

4. The minimum lot size shall be forty (40) feet by

seventy-five (75) feet.

G. Required Lot size, setbacks, ruffer strips and

screening in mobile home parks.

1. All mobile homes shall be located at least twenty-

five (25) feet from any boundary line abutting

upon a public street or highway and at least five

(5) feet from interior property boundary lines.

2. There shall be a minimum distance of ten (10) feet

between individual mobile homes and four (4) feet

from adjoining pavement of a park street, or com-

mon parking area, or other common areas.

3. All mobile home parks shall provide screening

such as fences or natural growth along the proper-

ty boundary line separating the park and adjacent

land.

37a

The minimum lot size shall be forty (40) feet by

seventy-five (75) feet.

Park street system.

1. General Requirements: All movile home parks

shall be provided with safe and convenient

vehicular access from abutting public streets or

roads to the internal parking area or mobile

home stand. Alignment and gradient shall be

properly adapted to topography.

2. Access: Access to mobile home parks shall be

designed to minimize congestion and hazards at

the entrance or exit and allow free movement of

traffic on adjacent streets. The entrance road

connecting the park streets with the public

streets or roads shall have a minimum road

pavement width of 34 feet, where parking is

permitted on both sides, or a minimum road

pavement width of twenty-seven (27) feet where

parking is limited to one side. Where the

primary entrance road is more than 100 feet

long and does not provide access to abutting

mobile home lots within such distance, the

minimum road pavement width may be 24 feet,

provided parking is prohibited at both sides.

3. Internal Streets: Surfaced roadways shall be of

adequate width to accommodate anticipated

traffic, and in any case shall meet the following

minimum requirements:

a. All streets, except minor streets, shall be not

less than 24 feet in width.

b. Minor streets, when parking is prohibited,

38a

shall not be less than 20 feet in width. Such a

street will be acceptable ony if it is less than

500 feet long and serves fewer than 25 mobile

homes, provided, such street may exceedd

500 feet if it is a one-way street and provides

access to abutting mobile home sites on one

side only.

Dead-end streets shall not exceed 1,000 feet

in length. Such street shall be provided with

a turn-around at the closed end and having

an outside roadway diameter of at least 75

feet.

4. Required Illumination of Park Street Systems:

All mobile homes shall be furnished with

lighting units so spaced and equipped with

luminaries placed at such mounting heights as

will provide the following average maintained

levels of illumination for the safe movement of

pedestrians and vehicles at night:

All parts of the park street system shall

average 0.6 foot-candles and no part shall

have less than 0.1 foot-candles.

. Potentially hazardous locations, such as ma-

jor street intersections and steps or stepped

ramps shall be individually illuminated and

shall have a minimum of 0.3 foot-candles. -

5. Street Construction and Design Standards

Pavement: All streets shall be paved and well

drained under normal use and weather con-

ditions. Pavement edges shall be protected to

prevent raveling of the wearing surface and

shifting of the pavement base. Street sur-

39a

faces shall be maintained free of dust,

cracks, holes and other hazards.

b. Grades: Grades of all streets shall be suffi-

cient to insure adequate surface drainage,

but shall be not more than eight (8%) per-

cent. Short runs with a maximum grade of

twelve (12%) percent may be permitted, pro-

vided traffic safety is assured by appropriate

paving, adequate leveling areas and

avoidance of lateral curves.

c. Intersections: Within 100 feet of an intersec-

tion, streets shall be approximately right

angles. A distance of at least 150 feet shall be

maintained between center lines of offset in-

tersecting streets. Intersections of more than

two(2) streets at one (1) Point shall be avoid-

ed.

d. Minimum standards for paving streets is six-

inch (6”) cement, limestone or stabilized shell

sealed and topped with one-and-one-half

inch asphalt.

I. Required Off-Street Parking Areas

1. Off-street parking areas shall be provided in all

mobile home parks for the use of park oc-

cupants and guests. Such areas shall be fur-

nished at the rate of not less than two (2) spaces

for each mobile home stand, each space to be

accessible without moving another car.

2. Required car parking spaces shall be so located

as to provide convenient access to the mobile

home, but shall not exceed a distance of forty

40a

(40) feet from the mobile home that it is in-

tended to serve.

J. Walks

1. General Requirements: All parks shall be pro-

vided with safe, convenient all-season pe-

destrian access walks of adequate width for

the intended use, constructed of durable

material (asphalt, concrete, or other masonary

construction approved by the Building

Official), and convenient to maintain, and such

walk shall be placed between individual mobile

homes, the park streets and all community

facilities provided for park residents. Sudden

changes in alignment and gradient shall be

avoided. Shell walk are unacceptable.

2. Common Walk System: A common walk system

shall be provided and maintained between loca-

tions where pedestrian traffic is concentrated.

Such common walks shall have a minimum of

three (3) feet, and meet the requirements of J. 1.

above.

3. Individual Walks: All mobile home stands

shall be connected by individual walks to a

common walk, or paved street, or to a paved

driveway or parking space which is connected

to a paved street. Such individual walks shall

have a minimum width of two (2) feet and

otherwise meet to requirements of J. 1. above.

K. Mobile Home Stands

1. The area of the mobile home stand shall be im-

proved to provide en adequate foundation for

4la

the placement and tie-down of the mobile

home, thereby securing the superstructure

against uplift, sliding, rotation and overturn-

ing.

2. The mobile home stand shall not heave, shift or

settle unevenly under the weight of the mobile

home due to inadequate drainage, vibration or

other forces acting on the superstructure.

3. Mobile home stands shall be constructed of

reinforced concrete and plan shall be subject to

approval of the Village Engineer.

X. WATER SUPPLY

A. General Requirements

1. An accessible, adequate, safe, and potable sup-

ply of water shall be provided in each mobile

home park. Where a public supply of water of

satisfactory quantity, quality, and pressure is

available, connection shall be made thereto and

its supply used exclusively.

2. When a satisfactory public water supply is not

available, a private water supply system may be

developed and used as approved by the Village.

B. Source of Supply

1. The water supply shall be capable of supplying

a minimum of 150 gallons per day per mobile

home.

2. Every well or suction line of the water supply

system shall be located and constructed in such

a manner that neither underground nor surface

contamination will reach the water supply from

42a

any source. The following minimum distances

between wells and various sources of con-

tamination shall be required:

Contamination Source Well or Suction Line

Building Sewer 50 feet

Septic Tank 50 feet

Disposal Field 100 feet

3. No well casings, pumping machinery or suction

pipes shall be placed in any pit, room or space

extending below ground level nor in any room

or space above ground which is walled in or

otherwise enclosed, unless such rooms, whether

above or below ground, have free drainage by

gravity to the surface of the ground.

4. The treatment of a private water supply shall be

in accordance with applicable laws and regula-

tions.

Water Storage Facilities

1. All water storage reservoirs shall be covered,

watertight and constructed of impervious

material. Overflows and vents of such reser-

voirs shall be effectively screened. Manholes

shall be constructed with overlapping covers, so

as to prevent the entrance of contaminated

material.

2. Reservoir overflow pipes shall discharge

through an acceptable air gap.

Water Distribution System

1. The water supply system of a mobile home park

43a

shall be connected by pipes or other approved

material to all mobile homes, buildings, and

other facilities requiring water.

2. All water piping, fixtures and other equipment

shall be constructed and maintained in accor-

dance with the requirements of the Building

Code and shall be of a type and in a location ap-

proved by the inspecting authority.

3. The water piping system shall not be connected

with nonpotable or questionable water supplies

and shall be protected against the hazards of

backflow, back siphonage or cross connection.

4. The system shall be so designed and maintained

as to provide a pressure of not less than twenty

(20) pounds per square inch, under normal

operating conditions at service buildings and

other locations requiring potable water supply.

5. The system shall be a looped system in order to

better maintain water pressure.

Individual Water-Riser Pipes and Connections

1. The individual water riser pipes shall be located

within the confined area of the mobile home

stand at a point where the water connection will

approximate a vertical position.

Water riser pipes shall extend at least four (4) in-

ches above ground elevation. The pipe shall be

not less than three-quarter inch in diameter.

The water outlet shall be capped when a mobile

home does not occupy the stand.

d4a

3. Adequate provision shall be made to prevent

freezing service lines. Valves and riser pipes

shall be protected from heaving and/or thawing

actions of the ground. Surface drainage shall be

diverted from the location of the riser pipe.

4.A shut-off valve shall be provided near the

water riser on each mobile home stand.

5. Underground stop waste valves shall not be in-

stalled on any water service.

Fire Plugs - Fire plugs shall be placed on at least

six (6) inch lines and all mobile home stands must

be within 400 feet of the nearest plug, if a public

water supply system is available. This requirement

shall not apply if a private water system services

said park, or if a public water supply source is not

available.

XI. SEWAGE DISPOSAL

A.

General - An adequate and safe sewerage system,

shall be provided in mobile home parks. Such

system shall be designed, constructed and main-

tained in accordance with Village ordinances and

the Village of Brookside Building Code. All sewer

lines shall be connected to the Village of

Brookside sewer lines, if such sewer lines are

availablle.

Sewer Lines - All sewer lines shall be located in

trenches of sufficient depth to be free of breakage

from traffic or other movements and shall be

separated from the park water supply system at a

safe distance as provided by State law and or-

dinance of the Village. Sewers shall be at a grade

which will insure adequate flow as provided in the

4Sa

Building Code. All sewer lines shall be constructed

of approved materials, shall be adequately vented,

and shall have watertight joints.

Individual Sewer Connections

1. Each mobile home stand shall be provided with

at least one four-inch diameter sewer riser pipe.

The sewer riser pipe shall be so located on each

stand that the sewer connection to the mobile

home drain outlet will approximate a vertical

position. Each mobile home stand shall be pro-

vided with a four-inch P-trap for the mobile

home sewer connection and be properly vented.

2.The sewer connection shall have an inside

diameter not less than three (3) inches, and the

slope of any portion thereof shall be at least

one-fourth inch per foot. The sewer connection

shall consist of one (1) pipe line only without

any branch fittings. All joints shall be water-

tight.

3. All materials used for sewer connections shall

be semi-rigid, corrosive resistant, non-

absorbent and durable. The inner surface shall

be smooth.

4. Provision shall be made for capping the sewer

riser pipe when a mobile home does not occupy

the lot. Surface drainage shall be diverted away

from the riser. The rim of the riser pipe shall ex-

tend at least four (4) inches above ground eleva-

tion.

46a

5. Sewer lines laid on Village easements of right-

of-way shall conform to all Village codes and

ordinances.

Sewerage Treatment and/or Discharge

1. Where the sewer lines of a mobile home park

are not connected to a public sewer, all propos-

ed sewage disposal facilities shall be approved

by the inspecting authority prior tu construc-

tion.

2. Effluents from sewage treatment facilities shall

not be discharged into any waters of the State

except in compliance with the applicable law.

XII. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

A.

General Requirements - Each park shall contain

oti dtessainel aid isting of wiring,

fixtures, equipment and appurtenances which

shall be installed and maintained in accordance

with the Building Code and the National Electrical

Code governing such systems.

Individual Electrical Connections

1. Each mobile home stand shall be provided with

an approved disconnecting device and overcur-

rent protective equipment. The minimum ser-

vice per outlet shall be 120/240 volts AC, 50

amperes. A minimum of 50 amperes per mobile

home stand shall be used for calculating the

2. Outlet receptacles at each mobile home stand

shall be located not more than 25 feet from the

overcurrent protective devices in the mobile

home and a three-pole four-wire grounding type

47a

shall be used. Receptacles shall be of weather-

proof construction and configurations shall be

in accordance with American Standard Outlet

Receptacle C-73.

3. The mobile home shall be connected to the

outlet receptacle by an approved type of flexible

cable with connectors and a male attachment

plug.

4. Where the connected load of the mobile home is

more than fifty (50) amperes either a second

outlet receptacle shall be installed or electrical

service shall be provided by means of per-

manently installed conductors. Except that a

single providing more than fifty (50) amperes

may be used subject to the express approval of

the electrical inspector who will ascertain the

safety and capability of the receptacle.

5. All exposed noncurrent carrying metal parts of

mobile homes and all other equipment shall be

grounded by means of an approved grounding

conductor with branch circuit conductors or

other approved method of grounded metallic

wiring. The neutral conductor shall not be used

as an equipment ground for mobile homes or

other equipment.

Structural Requirements for Buildings

1. A permanent type management office shall be

constructed at each licensed mobile home park.

Construction standards for this office shall

comply with the Village of Brookside Building

Code. All other permanent type structures, ex-

cept building housing sanitary facilities, shall be

at the option of the licensee.

48a

2. All portions of a structure shall be properly pro-

tected from damage by ordinary uses and by

decay, corrosion, termites, and other destruc-

tive elements. Exterior exposed portions of such

materials shall be constructed and protected as

to prevent entrance or penetration of moisture

and weather.

3. All rooms containing sanitary or laundry

facilities shall have:

a. Sound resistant walls extending to the ceiling

between male and female sanitary facilities.

Walls and partitions around showers,

bathtubs, lavatories and other plumbing fix-

tures shall be constructed of dense, non-

absorbent, waterproof material or covered

with moisture resistant material.

b. At least one (1) window or skylight facing

directly to the outdoors. The minimum ag-

gregate gross area of windows for each re-

quired room shall be not less than ten per-

cent (10%) of the floor area served by them.

c. At least one (1) window which can be easily

opened, or a mechanical device which will

adequately ventilate the room.

4. Toilets shall be located in separate compart-

ments equipped with self-closing doors. Shower

stalls shall be of the individual type. The rooms

shall be screened to prevent direct view of the

interior when the exterior doors are open.

49a

XIII. SERVICE BUILDING AND OTHER

A.

COMMUNITY SERVICE FACILITIES

The requirements of this section shall apply to ser-

vice buildings recreation buildings and other com-

munity service facilities when constructed.

1. Management ofices, repair shops and storage

areas.

2. Sanitary facilities.

3. Laundry facilities

4. Indoor recreation areas.

5. Commercial uses supply goods or services for

the exclusive use of park occupants.

Mobile home parks shall have not less than one (1)

flush toilet and one (1) lavatory for men and one

(1) flush toilet and one (1) lavatory for women.

The building or buildings containing such com-

munity sanitary facilities shall be accessible to all

mobile homes.

1. IMumination levels shall be maintained as

follows:

a. General seeing tasks - five (5) footcandles.

b. Laundry room work area - forty (40) foot-

candles.

c. Toilet room, in front of mirrors - forty (40)

footcandles.

2. Hot and cold weter shall be furnished to every

lavatory, sink, .athtub, shower and laundry

fixture, and cold water shall be furnished to

every water closet and urinal.

Barbacue Pits, Fireplaces, Stoves and Incinerators

1.Cooking shelters, barbacue pits, fireplaces,

wood-burning stoves and incinerators shall be

50a

so located, constructed, maintained and used as

to minimize fire hazards and smoke nuisance

both on the property on which used and on

neighboring property.

2.No open fire shall be permitted except in

facilities provided. No open fire shall be left

unattended. No fuel shall be used and no

material burned which emits dense smoke or

objectionable odors.

XIV. REFUSE HANDLING

The storage, collection and disposal of refuse in the

mobile home parks shall be so conducted as to create no

health hazards, rodent harborage, insect breeding areas,

accident or fire hazards or air pollution (see Village Or-

dinances for specific requirements).

XV. FUEL SUPPLY AND STORAGE

A. Natural Gas System

1. Natural gas piping systems shall be installed and

maintained in accordance with the Building

Code and other regulations governing such

systems.

2. Each mobile home stand provided with piped

gas shall have an approved manual shut-off

valve installed upstream of the gas outlet. The

outlet shall be equipped with an approved cap

to prevent accidental discharge of gas when the

outlet is not in use.

B. Liquefied Petroleum Gas Systems

1. Liquefied petroleum gas systems shall be in-

Sla

stalled and maintained in accordance with ap-

plicable laws, ordinances and regulations gover-

ning such systems.

2. Bulk storage and distribution system plans shall

be submitted to the Fire Marshal for approval.

Fuel Oil Supply Systems

1. All fuel oil supply systems shall be installed and

maintained in accordance with applicable laws,

ordinances and regulations governing such

systems.

2. Storage tanks located in areas subject to traffic

shall be protected against physical damage.

XVI. FIRE PROTECTION

A.

Mobile home parks shall be kept free of litter,

rubbish and other flammable materials.

Portable fire extinguishers of a type approved by

the Fire Marshal shall be kept in service buildings

and all other locations designated by the Fire Mar-

shal or fire inspectors and such extinguisher shall

be maintained in good operating condition.

Fires shall be made only in stoves, incinerators

and other equipment intended for such purposes.

Fire hydrants shall be located within 400 feet of

any mobile home service building or other struc-

ture in the park, on line not less than six (6)

inches. Fire hydrant locations shall be determined

by the Fire Marshal.

52a

XVII. MISCELLANEOUS PARK REQUIREMENTS

A.

Responsibilities of the Mobile Home Park

Licensee

! the person to whom a license for a mobile home

park has been issued shall be responible for

operation of such park in compliance with the

provisions of this chapter and he shall provide

adequate supervision to maintain such park, its

facilities and equipment in good repair and in a

clean and sanitary condition.

2. The licensee shall be responsible for notifying

park occupants of the applicable provisions of

this Ordinance.

3. The licensee shall be responsible for supervising

the placement of mobile homes c~. mobile home

stands within the mobile home park. The

licensee shall be responsible for maintaining a

register containing the names of all park oc-

cupants. Such register shall be available to any

authorized person inspecting the park for the

enforcement of this Ordinance, or any other

ordinances of the Village of Brookside.

Responbilities of Park Occupants

1. Mobile home park occupants shall comply with

all applicable provisions of this Ordinance and

such occupant shall maintain his mobile home,

mobile home stand, mobile home site and ap-

purtenances and equipment in good repair and

in a clean and sanitary condition.

2.The mobile home park occupant shall be

responsible for the proper placement of his

XVIII.

53a

mobile home on the mobile home stand and for

proper installation of all utility connections.

A mobile home shall not be occupied for dwelling

purposes unless it is properly placed on a mobile

home stand and connected to water, sewerage,

and electrical utilities, and other services where

required for health and safety of the occupants.

PARKING OF MOBILE HOMES OUTSIDE OF

LICENSED MOBILE HOME PARK

No mobile home shall be parked in violation of

any enforceable deed restriction or covenant.

A mobile home may be parked on a vacant lot, or

plot, outside a mobile home subdivision as de-

fined in “DEFINITIONS” (and no other), provid-

ed the lot, or plot has 9,000 square feet of land.

The mobile home shall set back a minimum of 25

feet from any public street right-of-way line and

seven and one-half (7-1/2) feet from any side or

back lot line, or in accordance with subdivision

Not more than one (1) mobile home shall be

parked on a vacant iot or plot without first obtain-

ing a mobile home park license. Such lot or plot

shall contain a minimum of 9,000 square feet.

Any mobile home placed on such a lot, or plot,

shall meet the minimum standards for plumbing,

heating, and electrical systems outlined or referred

to in this Ordinance.

A mobile home may be parked adjacent to a

residence, or place of business, provided a spacing

of ten (10) feet from the nearest building, on the

S4a

same property, is maintained and seven and one-

half (7-1/2) feet from any interior property lines,

or not less than twenty-five (25) feet set-back from

a street. Not more than one (1) mobile home shall

be parked on the same lot, or plot, with a

residence, or commercial building, without first

obtaining a mobile home park license. No mobile

home shall be parked adjacent to a residence or

place of business, where such placement would

create a hazard to life, safety or health.

All occupied mobile homes located outside a

mobile home park or mobile home sales park for

more than 48 hours, shall be connected to all re-

quired utilities, and permits obtained from the

Building Official for a foundation, driveway,

plumbing and electricity.

Mobile homes located outside mobile home parks

will be connected by separate and individual water

and sewer taps to city services where such services

are available.

Parking permit fees for singie mobile homes

located outside mobile home parks shall be the

same as fees for mobile homes inside the mobile

home parks, except that a license fee will not be

required.

The Building Official may permit the temporary

parking of a mobile home in a location outside an

approved and licensed mobile home park for a

period in excess of 48 hours, provided such loca-

tion shall not create a health, traffic, or other

hazard, and provided such mobile home shall not

be occupied.

XIX.

55a

All mobile homes, both existing and new, and all

parts thereof, shall be maintained in a safe and

sanitary condition. All devices, or safeguards,

which are required by this Ordinance and other

regulations, pamphlets, or data made a part

hereof when installed, repaired, or altered, shall

be maintained in good working order. The owner

or occupant, shall be responsible for the

maintenance of the mobile home.

It shall be unlawful to occupy a mobile home as

any type occupancy other than as a private dwell-

ing, provided, however, a mobile home may be

parked at a constructing site for use as a field of-

fice for a period not exceeding the period of con-

struction and not more than one (1) mobile home

may be used for demonstration and office at a

mobile home sales park.

MEANS OF EGRESS

A. Every mobile home shall be provided with at

least two (2) exit doors. Such doors shall be

located remote from each other. Screen

doors shall be on the hinged type, opening

outwardly from the inside. Escape doors

suitably designed as an emergency exit-way,

and releasing to the outside, may be pro-

vided as a substitute for one (1) exit door

when length of the mobile will not permit use

of a regular exist door.

B. Locking Mechanism, when provided on

doors and screen doors, shall be of a type

which permits opening from the inside by the

XXII.

S6a

simple operation of a knob, or lever, or by

pressure against the door or screen door.

Each mobile home must have minimum space of

200 square feet floor area, and qualify under Sec-

tion I. O. herein (DEFINITIONS).

No travel trailer shall be used as nor occupied as a

permanent type residence except in a mobile home

park. Travel trailers so occupied shall comply with

American Standard Association Pamphlet A

110.2-1963 Plumbing, Heating and Electrical

Systems in Travel Trailers.

XXII. LIGHT AND VENTILATION

A.

No mobile home shall be used or occupied without

proper light and ventilation. All habitable rooms

(including rooms with combined functions) shall

be provided with natural light openings by means

of fixed, or openable windows, glazed doors, or

openable roof, or fixed roof panels. The light

opening size required in each such room shall not

be less than ten percent (10%) of the floor area of

the room, combined rooms, or space. Exception:

In lieu of natural light, artificial light may be pro-

vided in kitchens, laundry rooms, and other

rooms approved by the Building Official.

Bathrooms, toilet compartments, and kitchens

may use mechanical ventilation systems in lieu of

natural ventilation. The system shall have a

capacity to provide a minimum of twelve (12) air

changes per hour in the area occupied by such

rooms. The mechanical ventilation system shall

discharge to the outside air. All rooms used for

XXIV.

57a

sleeping purposes shall be provided natural ven-

tilation by means of openings in the interior walls,

or roof. The natural ventilator shall have no less

than four percent (4%) of the floor area of the

room, combined room or space, or three (3)

square feet, whichever is greater

VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES

Any person violating any of the provisions of this

Ordinance shall be deemed guilty of a misde-

meanor, and each such person shall be deemed

guilty of a separate offense for each and every

day, or portion thereof, during which any viola-

tion of any of the provisions of this Ordinance is

committed, continued, or permitted, and upon

conviction of any such violation such person shall

be punished by a fine of not more than one (1)

hundred dollars (100.00)

All Ordinances or parts of Ordinances in conflict

herewith are hereby repealed to the extent of such

conflict only.

If any provision, section, subsection, sentence,

clause or phrase of this Ordinance, or the applica-

tion of same to any person or set of circumstances

is for any reason held to be unconstitutional, void,

or invalid, the validity of the remaining portions

of this Ordinance or their application to othe” per-

sons or sets of circumstances shall nci be affected

hereby, it being the intent of the Village Council in

adopting this Ordinance that no portion thereof

or provisions or regulation contained herein shall

become inoperative or fail by reason of an un-

constitutionality and all provisions of this Or-

dinance are declared to be reasonable.

58a

The provisions of this Ordinance requiring park-

ing permits for mobile homes in mobile home

parks shall become effective on the date last

shown below.

The Council of Brookside Village hereby finds

and determines that for the purpose of protecting

the health, safety and welfare of the people of the

Village of Brookside Village, and particularly the

people who reside in and occupy mobile home

travel trailers in mobile home parks, and for the

purpose of providing the inspection necessary to

accomplish this, this Ordinance and the regula-

tions, standards, and sanctions herein established,

and the construction permits, mobile home park

licenses, parking permits, and the fees provided

therefor, are necessary to accomplish such pur-

poses.

. This Ordinance shall take effect from and after

ten (10) days from its passage by the Village Coun-

cil. The Village Council. The Village Secretary is

hereby directed to give notice hereof, by causing

the caption of this Ordinance to be published in

the official newspaper of the Village of Brookside,

at least twice within ten (10) days after the passage

of this Ordinance.

59a

PASSED AND APPROVED THIS 6 day of

August, 1970.

ATTEST:

/s/ N. Zainfeld, Jr.

/s/ Mrs. Shirley M. Zamorsky

Mayor - Brookside Village

Village Secretary

60a

APPENDIX C

Opinion in Stewart v. Inhabitants of Durham,

No. 81-252 (Maine Oct. 14, 1982).

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

Reporter of Decisions

Decision No. 3066

Law Docket No. Law-81-252

KENNETH STEWART et ai.

v.

INHABITANTS OF TOWN OF DURHAM et a.

Argued September 7, 1982

Decided October 14, 1982

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and GODFREY, NICHOLS,

ROBERTS, CARTER, VIOLETTE, and WATHEN, JJ.

McKUSICK, C.J.

Defendant Town of Durham' appeals from an order of

the Superior Court (Androscoggin County) enjoining the

Town from enforcing its mobile home ordinance against

the Stewarts. The Superior Court held that the ordinance,

which excludes from the Town all mobile homes except

those located in duly licensed mobile home parks, is un-

constitutional in its entirety because of its broad “grand-

father clause.” In so doing, the Superior Court accepted

the interpretation of that grandfather clause adopted by

Durham officials. We conclude that the proper legal con-

struction of the grandfather clause saves it and the rest of

the ordinance from constitutional attack, and we therefore

reverse the Superior Court’s order.

'The building inspector and the members of the Durham Zoning

Board of Appeals also were named as defendants and now join in the

Town's appeal.

Gla

In 1972, the Town of Durham adopted a comprehensive

plan as a guide to the community’s future development. At

its annual town meeting, held on March 6, 1976, the Town

adopted a mobile home ordinance. Section 6(c) of that or-

dinance states, “No person shall maintain and occupy a

mobile home in the Town of Durham except in a duly

licensed mobile home park.” Section 4 of the ordinance,

iis grandfather clause, provides:

The provisions of this ordinance shall not apply

to occupied mobile homes lawfully existing

within the Town of Durham . . . nor shall it ap-

ply to the replacement of lawfully existing mobile

home.

Appellees Kenneth and Nancy Stewart own a piece of

land in Durham. Their lot is not within a mobile home

park. In August, 1980, they applied for a building permit

to move their mobile home onto their Durham land from

its location in a Brunswick mobile home park. Their ap-

plication was denied by Durham’s building inspector and

then by the Town’s zoning board of appeals. The Stewarts

thereupon sought relief in the Superior Court. The

evidence produced there shows that ever since its enact-

ment, the ordinance’s grandfather clause has been applied

broadly by the Durham selectmen and building inspector.

Specifically, those town officials have interpreted the

clause to allow the owner of a mobile home lawfully in

Durham before the ordinance took effect 1) to keep his

home where it was, 2) to replace it with a new mobile home

on the same lot, 3) to sell it, together with the lot, to a new

owner, or 4) to move it to another lot in Durham, nct

previously the site of a mobile home (providing that the

new location otherwise met the requirements for residen-

tial use).

62a

Before the Superior Court the Stewarts argued, among

other things, that Durham’s mobile home ordinance is in-

consistent with the Town’s comprehensive plan? and

violative of the equal protection and due process clauses of

the United States and Maine Constitutions.* The court re-

jected their first argument, but held that the broadly con-

strued grandfather clause rendered the ordinance un-

constitutional, and enjoined the Town from enforcing the

ordinance so as to prevent the Stewarts from moving their

mobile home onto their lot in Durham. The Town has ap-

pealed the Superior Court’s decision on the constitutional

issue, and the Stewards have cross-appealed on the com-

prehensive plan question. We sustain the Town’s appeal

and deny the Stewart’s cross-appeal.

1. CONSTRUING THE ORDINANCE

In holding that the Durham mobile home ordinance is

unconstitutional because of the breadth of its grandfather

clase, the Superior Court implicitly accepted the inter-

pretation given to that clause by Durham’s selectmen and

building inspector. In so doing, the court made an error of

law. See LaPointe v. City of Saco, Me., 419 A.2d 1013,

1015 (1980) (meaning of terms in a zoning ordinance is a

question of law for the court). It is true that contem-

poraneous construction of a law by its drafters or ad-

ministrators is not to be lightly disregarded by a court. See

Kelley v. Halperin, Me., 390 A.2A 1078, 1080 (1978).

However, against that traditional rule of construction we

must weigh two countervailing considerations: the fact

230 M.R.S.A. § 4962(1)(A) (1978) requires that a town’s zoning or-

dinances be “pursuant to and consistent with a comprehensive plan

adopted by its legislative body.”

4U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Me. Const. art. I, § 6-A.

ss

63a

that the plain language of the grandfather clause and the

context in which it must be read support a narrower con-

struction of its terms more readily than the expanded in-

terpretation accepted by the Superior Court, and our con-

clusion that a narrow construction will enable us to avoid

the constitutiona! difficulties identified below. An admin-

istrative construction of an ordinance or statute is never

conclusive upon a court. See State v. York Utitlities Co.,

142 Me. 40, 44, 45 A.2d 634, 635-36 (1946). We decline to

adopt the administrative construction put upon the grand-

father clause in Durham’s mobile home ordinance.

The grandfather clause exempts “occupied mobile

homes lawfully existing within the Town of Durham” and

the “replacement” of such homes from the requirement

that mobile homes be confined to licensed mobile home

parks. An “occupied mobile home” is a home actually be-

ing lived in — a home “settled” on a given piece of land,

with the usual water, sewer, and electrical hookups. An

“occupied mobile,” in fact, is best thought of as being in-

tegrated with the lot on which it is located. Words used in

a statute are to be given their plain and natural meaning

whenever possible. See Town of Arundel v. Swain, Me.,

374 A.2d 317, 320 (1977). The terms used in the Durham

grandfather clause, given their plain and natural meaning,

call for an interpretation significantly narrower than that

accepted by the Superior Court. The wording of the clause

suggests that the owner of a mobile home occupied lawful-

ly in Durham before the ordinance took effect should be

allowed to keep it, to replace it with anew mobile home on

the same lot, or to transfer it, together with its lot, to a

new owner (as it is the home itself, not the owner, that is

“grandfathered”), but not to move it to another lot within

Durham’s borders.

64a

Looking beyond the wording of the grandfather clause

itself, we note that a narrow construction of the clause is

consistent with the overall purpose of the mobile home or-

dinance, while the broad reading tends to undermine that

purpose. Applied as the Durham officials have applied it,

the clause virtually guarantees that the number of mobile

homes in Durham outside mobile home parks will never

drop below the number of nonconforming uses in 1976,

when the ordinance was enacted. Moreover, if all of the

grandfathered mobile homes could without restriction be

moved about within the geographical limits of Durham,

there is a potential for further erosion of property values

and of the Town’s aesthetic character. Those possible con-

sequences run counter to the acknowledged goals of the

ordinance as a whole,‘ to preserve the aesthetic character

of Durham and to protect property values. Each section of

an ordinance should be read so as to harmonize with the

entire legislative scheme of which it is a part. See Seven

Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation Commis-

sion, Me., ___ A.2d____, ____ (September 17, 1982, slip

op. at 6-7). Construing the grandfather clause to permit

the maintenance, replacement, or sale of existing mobile

homes only at their original locations in Durham best con-

forms to the objective of the ordinance as a whole to

restrict mobile homes to mobile home parks after March

6, 1976.

We adopt this construction of the grandfather clause

not only because it is the most plausible reading of the

clause but also because it avoids the serious constitutional

questions presented by the town officials’ interpretation.

“Courts must construe legislative enactments so as to

avoid a danger of unconstitutionality ... The cardinal

“See the discussion in part Il of this opinion.

6Sa

principle of statutory construction is to save, not to

destroy.” State v. Davenport, Me., 326 A.2d 1, 5-6 (1974).

See also 82 Am.Jur.2d, Zoning & Planning§ 68, at 500

(1976) (“where a zoning ordinance is susceptible of two

different reasonable constructions, one of which will

render the ordinance valid and the other render it invalid,

the court will adopt the one which renders it valid.”). This

principle of statutory construction is fully consistent with

the general rule that the courts are to give effect io

legislative intent, see State v. Hussey, Me., 381 A.2d 665,

666 (1978), as it cannot be assumed that the drafters of the

Durham mobile home ordinance intended their product to

violate the constitution. In Clardy v. Town of Livermore,

Me., 403 A.2d 779 (1979), we interpreted a Livermore or-

dinance differently from the way it had been interpreted

by town officials in order to avoid the decision of a con-

stitutional question altogether. Here, we adopt a different

construction in order to avoid a close constitutional ques-

tion, although we cannot entirely escape a discussion of

the due process and equal protection issues raised by the

Stewards.

Il. The Constitutional Questions

Properly construed, the grandfather clause to Durham’s

muster. Under the due process clauses of the federal and

state constitutions, a town ordinance must “bear a

reasonable relationship to the public health, safety,

morals, or general welfare,” and “must not be

unreasonable, arbitrary, or discriminatory based upon the

reasonably foreseeable future development of the com-

munity.” Warren v. Municipal Officers of Gorham, Me.,

431 A.2d 624, 627 (1981). Furthermore, according to War-

ren, aesthetic consideration, fear of deterioration in the

66a

value of neighboring properties, and concern over an

adverse impact on the town’s tax base are legitimate

reasons “which do properly relate to the public health,

safety, morals or general welfare.” 431 A.2d at 628. Those

are the same three reasons that the Superior Court found

were in fact Durham’s proposed justifications for its

mobile home ordinance. °*

In light of the listed purposes, the grandfather clause in

the Durham ordinance is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or

discriminatory. Rather, it strikes a rational balance bet-

ween speedy achievement of the Town’s legitimate plan-

ning goals and the interest of those town residents who

moved mobile homes into Durham before the ordinance

was enacted. The grandfather clause,which is properly

read only to allow such residents to remain in their existing

mobile homes at their 1976 locations, replace them, or

transfer them, preserves the bulk of the rights anticipated

by such residents when they purchased their mobile

homes, while ensuring that over time, by attrition, the

nonconforming uses will be reduced in number. Some

form of a grandfather clause is probably required to save

the entire ordinance from a constitutional challenge under

‘Witnesses in the Superior Court testified that town officials, in

drafting the mobile home ordinance, were concerned about the

“aesthetic contrast” between the Town's traditional older homes and

the metallic, box-shaped, flat-roofed mobile homes. There was also

expert testimony that the presence of mobile homes tended to depress

the value of the traditional homes on nearby or adjoining lots. Finally,

there was evidence that the Town’s planning board took into con-

sideration the fact that an occupied mobile home requires approx-

imately the same level of municipal services as a site-built home while

generating less tax revenuc due to its lower market value.

67a

the takings clause.* Thus, such a clause is not merely

rationally related to the Town’s goals, but is probably .

necessary to effect those goals, as a mobile home or-

dinance vulnerable to a challenge under the takings clause

is of no use whatever in implementing the Town’s ultimate

planning scheme.

Under the equal protection clauses of the federal and

state constitutions, once a legislative classification has

been found not to “[trammel] fundamental personal

rights” or be “drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions

such as race, religion, or alienage,” New Orleans v. Dukes,

427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976), it need only be shown to be ra-

tionally related to a legitimate public purpose.

A classification . . . must be natural and

reasonable and based upon an actual difference

in the classes bearing some substantial relation-

ship to the public purpose sought to be ac-

complished by the discrimination in rights and

burdens. If a classification, though necessarily

discriminatory, stands these tests, it is not a

denial or equal protection of the laws.

Wright v. Michaud, 160 Me. 164, 171, 200 A.2d 543, 547

(1964).

No fundamental right or inherently suspect distinction

is implicated by Durham’s decision to grant a limited ex-

emption from the terms of its mobile home ordinance for

prior nonconforming uses. The remaining “rational rela-

tionship” test is easily met by the Durham ordinance,

*U.S. Const. amend. V (applicable to the states through amend.

XIV); Me. Const. art. 1, § 21. A provision “for the continuance of the

nonconforming use . . . is ordinarily included in zoning and police

power ordinances because of hardship and [the] doubtful constitu-

tionality of compelling immediate cessation of nonconforming uses.”

Town of Windham v. Sprague, Me., 219 A.2d 548, 550 (1966).

68a

grandfather clause and ali, for the same reasons discussed

in the due process context above. The exemption for prior

nonconforming uses is rationally related to the Town’s

aesthetic, property-value, and tax-base goals, as it saves

the entire ordinance from a serious takings clause question

while allowing the Town to proceed consistently towards

its objective of confining mobile homes to duly licensed

mobile home parks.

Ill. The Comprehensive Plan

The Superior Court held that Durham’s mobile home

ordinance, taken in its entirety, is consistent with the

Town’s 1972 comprehensive plan. Whether or not the re-

quirements of 30 M.R.S.A. § 4962 apply to the ordinance

in question here,’ we have no doubt that the Superior

Court’s conclusion was warranted by the evidence before

it. The comprehensive plan itself indicates that Durham’s

planning board and residents were concerned with preserv-

ing the Town’s rural character and protecting the tax base

— concerns overlapping considerably with those underly-

ing the mobile home ordinance. Most significantly, the

"We assume without deciding that Durham’s mobile home legisla-

' tion is truly a “zoning” ordinance as defined by 30 M.R.S.A.

§ 4962(1)(H) (1978) (“the division of a municipality into districts and

the prescription and reasonable application of different regulations in

each district”). But cf. Benjamin v. Houle, Me., 431 A.2d 48 (1981)

(Auburn ordinance prohibiting the removal of gravel from any land in

the city characterized as “a general and uniform citywide regulation”

and not a zoning ordinance at all); Town of Boothbay v. Nat’l Adver-

tising Co., Me., 347 A.2d 419 (1975) (Boothbay ordinance regulating

all off-premises billboards in the town by same standard treated as an

exercise of the town’s police powers). It is here argued that Durham's

mobile home ordinance is a zoning ordinance rather than a uniform

town-wide regulation because it implicity creates a new division or

zone — mobile home parks — in addition to the two zones (“rural”

and “resource protection”) already created by Durham’s land use or-

dinance.

69a

comprehensive plan specifically states, “the Planning

Board approves of locating mobile homes in parks design-

ed to be harmonoius with the general character of the

Town.” We would be hard pressed to conceive of any

stronger evidence that the mobile home ordinance in this

case is consistent with Durham’s comprehensive plan.

IV. Conclusion

At oral argument, counsel for appellants Kenneth and

Nancy Stewart expressly waived all claims that anything in

the Durham mobile home ordinance other than its grand-

father clause renders it unconstitutional. Accordingly, our

decision on the two issues presented to us concludes this

case in favor of the Town. The entry shall be:

Appeal sustained.

Cross-appeal denied.

Remanded to the Superior Court

for entry of judgment for defen-

dants and further proceedings con-

sistent with the opinion herein.

70a

APPENDIX D

Article in Austin American Statesman,

Nov. 4, 1982

17 INJURED AS BIG WINDS BATTER COAST

PORT ISABEL (AP) — Residents and vacationers

sorted through wreckage left by a violent storm that sur-

prised this Texas coastal community early Wednesday, in-

juring at least 17 people and leaving some homeless.

“I thought the building was just going to go crashing,”

said Sheila Kilgore of St. Louis, who was on her first

business trip to Texas when the storm hit. She said eerie

sounds jolted her awake in her hotel room in nearby South

Padre Island.

Winds were clocked at 84mph at Port Isabel and 81 mph

on Padre Island. Five people were hospitalized and at least

12 others were inured as the winds tossed more than 12

mobile homes into a canal, uprooting palm and mesquite

trees and causing some flooding.

Kilgore said she selected an island hotel while in the area

on business because “everybody told me Padre Island was

a nice place to stay.”

After the storm, however, she moved to a hotel in Harl-

ingen about 40 miles inland from the island.

Kilgore said she was awakened in the middle of the night

by what sounded like a woman’s scream.

The sound turned out to be the wind wailing through

her balcony door. The hotel began to shake and the lights

went out, she said.

“I thought the building was just going to come crashing

down,” she said. “Now that I look back on it, it seems kind

of funny.”

Tila

Three women and one man were admitted to Valley

Community Hospital in Brownsville. The woman, who

had a shoulder injury, was listed in stable condition while

the men, with back injuries, were reported in guarded con-

dition.

One man was admitted to Valley Baptist Medical Center

with broken ribs. He was in fair condition.

Twelve people were treated and discharged from the two

hospitals.

The sudden storm blew roofs off homes and damaged

condominiums, said South Padre Island Mayor Minnie

Solomonson. Recreational vehicles were destroyed or

overturned and power lines brought down. Some debris-

filled streets in Port Isabel were impassable and about 14

mobile homes in one park were thrown into a canal.

Airplanes at area airports were also were d

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