Appendix — Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. City of Homestead

Supreme Court brief1983

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Text

NO. 82-

in the

Supreme Court

of the

United States

Oetober Term, 1982

„ BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE,

ted association, and

MERLIN'S MUSIC, INC., a Florida Corporation,

Petitioners,

vs.

THE CITY OF HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA,

A Florida Municipal Corporation,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ Of Certiorari

From The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Eleventh Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

App. 1

(

ORDINANCE NO. 80-04-28

AN EMERGENCY ORDINANCE OF THE

CITY OF HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA,

NECESSITATED BY CONSIDERATIONS OF

THE HEALTH, SAFETY, AND WELFARE

OF ITS CITIZENS AND INHABITANTS

AMENDING CHAPTER 29, CODE OF LAWS,

ENTITLED, “OFFENSES — MISCEL-

LANEOUS”, BY CREATING SECTIONS

29-58.1 THROUGH 29-58.5 TO PROHIBIT THE

DISPLAY OR SALE OF INSTRUMENTS,

SIMULATED DRUGS, SIMULATED

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES, OR OTHER

NARCOTIC PARAPHERNALIA, PROVIDING

A SEVERABILITY CLAUSE, AND

PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE.

WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of

Homestead, Florida, has become very concerned about

the increased use of illegal drugs and controlled substances

within the City; and,

WHEREAS, the sale, advertisement and distribution

of instruments, drug paraphernalia and simulated

controlled substances, contribute to an atmosphere of

community acceptance of illegal use of controlled

substances; and

WHEREAS, the City Council finds that it is in the

best interest of the health, safety and welfare, of the

citizens of the City to restrict access to such drug

paraphernalia;

App. 2

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE

CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF HOMESTEAD,

DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA:

Section 1: That Chapter 29, Code of Laws, entitled

“Offenses — Miscellaneous” be and is hereby amended

by creating Sections 29-58.1 through 29-58.5 to read

and provide as follows:

Sec. 29-58.1 Definitions.

A. “Controlled substance” means any drug or

substance as described and defined in Florida Statutes

Section 893.03, which is adopted by reference.

B. “Marijuana” means all parts of the plant of

the species Cannabis sativa, L., including all varieties

thereof, whether growing or not; the seeds thereof, the

resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every

compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or

preparation of the plant or its seeds or resin. It does

not include the mature stalks of the plant, fiber produced

from the stalks; oil or cake made from the seeds of the

plant; any other compound, manufacture, salt, derivative,

mixture, or preparation of the mature stalks (except

the resin extracted therefrom), fiber, oil, or cake; or the

sterilized seed of the plant which is incapable of

germination.

C. “Person” means any individual natural person,

corporation, government, or governmental subdivision

or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership or

association or any other legal entity.

D. The term “Drug Paraphernalia” means all

equipment, products and materials of any kind which

are used, intended for use, or designed for use in planting,

propagating, cultivaing, growing, harvesting,

manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing,

processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging,

repackaging, storing, containing, concealing, injecting,

ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the

human body a controlled substance in violation of this

ordinance, or of any section of Chapter 893, Florida

Statutes or Chapter 465, Florida Statutes. It includes,

but is not limited to:

1. Kits used, intended for use, or designed for

use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing

or harvesting of any species of plant which is a

controlled substance or from which a controlled

substance can be derived;

2. Kits used, intended for use, or designed for

use in manufacturing, compounding, converting,

producing, processing, or preparing controlled

substances, or planting, propagating, cultivating,

growing or harvesting of any species of plant which

is a controlled substance or from which a controlled

substance can be derived.

3. Isomerization devices used, intended for use,

or designed for use in increasing the potency of

any species of plant which is a controlled substance;

4. Testing equipment used, intended for use,

or designed for use in identifying, or in analyzing

the strength, effectiveness or purity of controlled

substances;

App. 4

5. Scales and balances used, intended for use,

or designed for use in weighing or measuring

controlled substances;

6. Diluents and adulterants, such as quinine

hydrochloride, mannitol, mannite, dextrose and

lactose, used, intended for use, or designed for use

in cutting controlled substances;

7. Separation gins and sifters used, intended

for use, or designed for use in removing twigs and

seeds from, or in otherwise cleaning or refining,

marijuana;

8. Blenders, bowls, containers, spoons and mixing

devices used, intended for use, or designed for use

in compounding controlled substances;

9. Capsules, balloons, envelopes and other

containers used, intended for use or designed for

use in packaging small quantities of controlled

substances;

10. Containers and other objects used, intended

for use, or designed for use in storing or concealing

controlled substances;

11. Hypodermic syringes, needles and other

objects used, intended for use, or designed for use

in parenterally injecting controlled substances into

the hu ian body;

12. Objects used, intended for use, or designed

for use in ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing

App. 5

marijuana, cocaine, hashish, or hashish oil into the

human body, such as:

(a) Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone,

plastic, or ceramic pipes with or without screens,

permanent screens, hashish heads, or punctured

metal bowls;

(b) Water pipes;

(ec) Carburetion tubes and devices;

(d) Smoking and carburetion masks;

(e) Roach clips: meaning objects used to

hold burning material, such as a marijuana

cigarette, that has become too small or too

short to be held in the hand;

(f) Miniature cocaine spoons, and cocaine

vials;

(g) Chamber pipes;

(h) Carburetor pipes;

(i) Electric pipes;

Air driven pipes;

*) Chilams;

) Bongs:

(m) lee pipes or chillers;

App. 6

E. In determining whether an object is drug

paraphernalia, in addition to all other logically relevant

factors, the following may be considered:

1. Statements by an owner or by anyone in

control of the object concerning its use;

2. Prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of

anyone in control of the object, under any State or

Federal law relating to any controlled substance;

3. The proximity of the object, in time and

space, to a direct violation of this ordinance;

4. The proximity of the object to controlled

substances;

5. The existence of any residue of controlled

substances on the object;

6. Direct or circumstantial evidence of the intent

of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object,

to deliver it to persons whom he knows, or should

reasonably know, intend to use the object to

facilitate a violation of this ordinance; the innocence

of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object,

as to a direct violation of this ordinance shall not

prevent a finding that the object is intended for

use, or designed for use as drug paraphernalia;

7. Instructions, oral or written, provided with

the object concerning its use;

8. Descriptive materials accompanying the object

which explain or depict its use;

App. 7

9. National and local advertising concerning

its use;

10. The manner in which the object is displayed

for sale;

11. Whether the owner, or anyone in control of

the object, is a legitimate supplier or like or related

items to the community, such as a licensed distributor

or dealer of tobacco products;

12. Direct or circumstantial evidence of the

ratio of sales of the object(s) to the total sales of

the business enterprise;

13. The existence and scope of legitimate uses

for the object in the community;

14. Expert testimony concerning its use.

Sec. 29-58.2 Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.

It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess

with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate,

cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound,

convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack,

repack, store, contain, conceai, inject, ingest, inhale, or

otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled

substance in violation of this ordinance.

Sec. 29-583 Manufacture or Delivery of Drug

Paraphernalia.

It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess

with intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to

App. 8

deliver, drug paraphernalia, knowing, or under

circumstances where one reasonably should know,

that it will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow,

harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce,

process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store,

contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise

introduce into the human body a controlled substance

in violation of this ordinance.

Sec. 29-58.4 Advertisement of Drug Paraphernalia.

It is unlawful for any person to place in any

newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication any

advertisement, knowing, or under circumstances where

one reasonable should know, that the purpose of the

advertisement, in whole or in part, is to promote the

sale of objects designed or intended for use as drug

paraphernalia.

Sec. 29-58.5 Penalty.

Any person who violates any term, condition, or

provision of Sec. 29-58.1 through 29-58.5 shall be liable,

upon conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction, to

a fine not to exceed Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), or

by imprisonment not to exceed ninety (90) days, or

both, at the discretion of the court. Each day of violation

of any term, provision, or condition of Secs. 29-58.1

through 29-58.5 shall constitute a separate and distinct

offense.

Section 2: It is the intention of the City Council

and it is hereby ordained that the provisions of this

ordinance shail become and be made a part of the Code

App. 9

of Laws of the City of Homestead, Florida, and the

sections of this ordinance may be renumbered to

accomplish such intention.

Section 3: If any word, phrase, clause, subsection

or section of this ordinance is for any reason held

unconstitutional or invalid, the invalidity thereof shall

not affect the validity of any remaining portions of this

ordinance.

Section 4: That all sections or parts of sections of

the Code of Laws, all ordinances or parts of ordinances,

and all resolutions or parts of resolutions, in conflict

herewith, be and the same are hereby repealed to the

extent of such conflict.

Section 5: That this ordinance shall take effect

upon becoming a law.

PASSED AND ADOPTED this 21st day of April,

1980.

/s/ {illegible}

Mayor-Councilman

APPROVED AS TO FORM

AND CORRECTNESS:

/s/ {illegible}

City Attorney

ATTEST:

/s/ {illegible}

City Clerk

(Deputy)

App. 10

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 80-1160-Civ-JCP

FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE,

an unincorporated association, and

MERLIN’S MUSIC, INC., a Florida corporation,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

THE CITY OF HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA, a Florida

municipal corporation, NICHOLAS R. SINCORE,

individually and as Mayor of the City of Homestead,

and WILLIAM F. DICKINSON, individually and

as Vice-Mayor of the City of Homestead, Florida

and RUTH L. CAMPBELL, WILLIAM M.

McCONNELL, WALTER C. RUTZKE, WILLIAM

TOMMY WILSON and IRVING PESKOE, all

individually as members of the City Council of the

City of Homestead, Florida,

Defendants.

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY

RELIEF AND COMPENSATORY AND

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

The Plaintiffs, FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR

FREE ENTERPRISE and MERLIN’S MUSIC, INC.,

by undersigned counsel, bring this action and state:

App. 11

Jurisdiction

Count I of this Complaint is an action for declaratory

relief, pursuant to 28 U.S. Code §2201, and preliminary

injunctive relief ancillary thereto. Jurisdiction is conferred

upon this Court by 28 U.S. Code §§ 1331 and 1343.

Count II of this Complaint is an action for

compensatory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant

to 42 U.S. Code §1983. Jurisdiction is conferred upon

this Court by 28 U.S. Code §1343.

Count III of this Complaint is an action for

compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorneys’

fees as against the individual defendants pursuant to

42 U.S. Code §1983. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this

Court by 28 U.S. Code §1343.

The actions of the Defendants have caused the

Plaintiffs herein to suffer a deprivation of rights

guaranteed under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well

as financial damages in excess of $10,000, exclusive of

interest and costs.

Parties

The Plaintiff FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR

FREE ENTERPRISE, is an unincorporated association

whose members engage in the wholesale and retail

distribution of certain items in interstate commerce,

throughout Florida in general and in the CITY OF

HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA, in specific.

App. 12

The Plaintiff MERLIN’S MUSIC, INC., is a Florida

corporation which operates a retail establishment at

797 N. E. Eighth Street, Homestead, Florida. The Plaintiff

MERLIN’S MUSIC, INC. sells items which constitute

a part of interstate commerce and which may or may

not be proscribed under Ordinance No. 80-04-28, enacted

by the Defendant CITY OF HOMESTEAD, on April

21, 1980.

The Defendant CITY OF HOMESTEAD, is a

incorporated municipality within the State of Florida.

On April 21, 1980, the CITY OF HOMESTEAD enacted

Ordinance No. 80-04-28, 2 true copy of which is attached

hereto and by reference made a part hereof.

The Defendant NICHOLAS R. SINCORE, is the

duly elected Mayor of the Defendant CITY OF

HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA, a municipal corporation

[hereinafter “HOMESTEAD”, and is a resident of Dade

County, Florida.

The Defendant WILLIAM F. DICKINSON, is the

duly elected Vice-Mayor of HOMESTEAD, and is a

resident of Dade County, Florida.

The Defendants, RUTH L. CAMPBELL, WILLIAM

„ MeCONNELL, WALTER C. RUTZKE, WILLIAM

TOMMY WILSON, and IRVING PESKOE, are duly

elected members of the City Council of HOMESTEAD,

and are residents of Dade County, Florida.

At all times material hereto, each and every

Defendant was acting “under color of [a] statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom or usage of . . .” the State of Florida.

App. 13

COUNT I

1. This is an action seeking declaratory relief

against the Defendant CITY OF HOMESTEAD,

FLORIDA, pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C. §2201.

2. The purpose and effect of Ordinance No. 80-04-28

is to prohibit possession, sale, or advertisement of certain

items described in the ordinance as “drug paraphernalia.”

This ordinance defines “drug paraphernalia,” inter alia,

as such innocuous and overridingly lawful items as

scales, spoons, bowls, containers, envelopes, and other

objects “intended” for the described, prohibited use.

3. Ordinance No. 80-04-28 prescribes a criminal

penalty for the possession, delivery or advertisement

of those items vaguely defined in the ordinance. Upon

conviction, any person who violates this ordinance may

be liable “to a fine not to exceed Five Hundred Dollars

($500.00), or by imprisonment not to exceed ninety (90)

days, or both. .. .”

4. The Plaintiffs are in the business of selling,

both at wholesale and retail, items of jewelry, smoking

accessories, and other articles which are or may be

proscribed by the vague and overbroad language of the

challenged ordinance. Plaintiffs are, therefore, precluded

from pursuing their lawful business by the enactment

and enforcement of this ordinance. Additionally, the

Plaintiffs are prohibited by the ordinance from advertising

or communicating to the public those items which the

Plaintiffs hold for resale.

5. The challenged ordinance violates the due

process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

App. 14

to the United States Constitution by virtue of both

vagueness and overbreadth in its language. The language

of the ordinance is overbroad in that it proscribes

activity which is constitutionally protected, and thus,

violates the Plaintiffs’ rights under the First Amendment

to the United States Constitution. Additionally, the

ordinance’s definitional sections are so broad as to

proscribe the possession and/or sale of items whose uses

are overwhelmingly legal, without any legitimate

relationship between this proscription and the health,

safety, welfare, or morals of the people of the CITY OF

HOMESTEAD.

6. The challenged ordinance is very vague in that

it does not provide the Plaintiffs, or any persons of

ordinary intelligence, with the requisite warning of

that conduct which will be considered illegal in order

that the Plaintiffs, and others, may conform their conduct

accordingly. Additionally, by failing to provide

ascertainable standards for the inclusion or exclusion of

items, the ordinance fails to provide sufficient guidelines

for its enforcement, promoting arbitrary and capricious

enforcement in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment

to the United States Constitution.

7. Ordinance No. 80-04-28 is unconstitutional in

that it creates an irrebuttable presumption that the

proscribed items described as “drug paraphernalia”

will be used for unlawful purposes. This presumption

is neither true in fact, nor supportable in law, and

therefore, violates the Plaintiffs’ right to due process

of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to

the United States Constitution.

App. 15

8. The challenged ordinance precludes

advertisement of items vaguely defined as “drug

paraphernalia” and therefore has a chilling effect

prohibited by, and is violative of, the First Amendment

rights of the Plaintiffs herein and the public at large.

9. The challenged ordinance constitutes an

i burden on interstate commerce in violation

of the Commerce Clause, Article I, Section 8 of the

United States Constitution, and constitutes a denial of

the Plaintiffs’ right to pursue their livelihood in a lawful

manner.

10. The Plaintiffs have fully and completely

complied with Ordinance No. 80-04-28 pending this action,

in order to avoid criminal prosecution. The Plaintiffs

have in the past, and are now, suffering irreparable

harm and injury through the expenditure of large sums

of money to separate, transport, and store those items

which may be proscribed; a loss of sales and income

due to the inability to sell their lawful merchandise;

and loss of customers due to the nonavailability of

these and other items which the Plaintiff has been

forced to remove from its inventory due to the vagueness

of the definitiona! sections of the challenged ordinance.

11. The Plaintiffs have in the past and continue

to suffer the substantial and real threat of imminent

prosecution through enforcement of the challenged

ordinance as against the Plaintiffs, their agents and

employees.

12. Lastly, Plaintiffs suffer a present inability to

exercise their rights guaranteed under the First

Amendment to the United States Constitution to

App. 16

communicate with present and prospective customers

concerning the items held for resale by the Plaintiffs,

such restriction of First Amendment activities being

irreparable harm and injury as a matter of law.

13. As an additional ground for the invalidity of

the challenged ordinance, the same was enacted as an

“emergency” ordinance, without providing either notice

to those whose businesses are affected or an opportunity

to be heard prior to the enactment and vigorous

enforcement of the ordinance. In fact, no emergency

exists, nor has it ever existed, and the procedure utilized

by THE CITY OF HOMESTEAD in enacting this

ordinance is void under the Florida and United States

Constitutions.

WHEREFORE, and by reason of the foregoing,

the Plaintiffs pray this Honorable Court will take

jurisdiction of the within cause and:

A. Issue an order declaring that Ordinance No.

80-04-28 is void and unenforceable as the same violates

the United States Constitution.

B. Issue a final order declaring the challenged

ordinance to be void and unenforceable.

C. Award Plaintiffs costs and attorneys’ fees in

this action.

D. Grant such other and further relief as the

Court deems just and equitable.

App. 17

COUNT II

14. This is an action for compensatory damages,

costs and attorneys’ fees by the Plaintiffs against the

Defendant CITY OF HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA, a

municipal corporation, and the individual Defendants

in their capacities as officers, agents, or officials of the

CITY OF HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA, a municipal

corporation, pursuant to 42 U.S. Code §1983.

15. The Plaintiffs reallege each and every allegation

set forth above, as if fully set forth herein.

16. As a result of the enactment and vigorous

enforcement of the challenged ordinance by the

Defendants, the wholesaler members of the Plaintiff

FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE

have suffered, and continue to suffer, the inability to

transact lawful business within the CITY OF

HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA. Additionally, the wholesaler

members of FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE

ENTERPRISE are being restrained from advertising

and/or offering their lawful wares for sale within the

CITY OF HOMESTEAD, all of which amounts to a loss

of profits in excess of $10,000, exclusive of interest and

costs.

17. The Plaintiff MERLIN’S MUSIC, INC., a

Florida corporation, has suffered severe financial damage

in excess of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, by

virtue of the following facts:

a. The Plaintiff MERLIN’S MUSIC, INC., a Florida

corporation [hereinafter “MERLIN’S”] has been forced

App. 18

to expend large amounts of money in removing, crating,

transporting, and storing items arguably within the

prohibition contained in the challenged ordinance, pending

the outcome of this litigation.

b. MERLIN'’S is unable to effect the sale of lawful

items to its customers, and therefore, has lost both its

customers and its revenues as a direct result of the

Defendants’ actions. MERLIN’S has suffered a loss of

net profits in excess of $10,000 as of June 1, 1980, and

continues to suffer lost profits in excess of $10,000 per

month as a result of the actions of the Defendants.

ec. MERLIN’S is presently unable to advertise

its wares for sale to its customers, and engage in other

activities protected by the First Amendment to the

United States Constitution, thus, aggrevating the loss

of business and net income identified above.

18. Both of the Plaintiffs have been forced to

retain undersigned counsel to represent them in this

cause, and have obligated themselves to pay a reasonable

fee for the services rendered. Additionally, each Plaintiff

has been forced to expend funds for court costs and

other expenses both reasonable and necessary to the

prosecution of this action.

WHEREFORE, and by reason of the foregoing,

the Plaintiffs pray this Honorable Court will take

jurisdiction of the within cause and set a prompt time

for final hearing, following which it will assess

compensatory damages against the Defendants, jointly

and severally, award costs, attorneys's fees and such

other and further relief as the Court deems just and

equitable.

App. 19

COUNT III

19. This is an action seeking compensatory and

punitive damages, costs and attorneys’ fees against

the individual Defendants NICHOLAS R. SINCORE,

WILLIAM F. DICKINSON, RUTH L. CAMPBELL,

WILLIAM McCONNELL, WALTER C. RUTZKE,

WILLIAM TOMMY WILSON and IRVING PESKOE,

pursuant to 42 U.S. Code §1983.

20. The Plaintiffs reallege each and every allegation

set forth above as if fully set forth herein.

21. Following the enactment of Ordinance No.

80-04-28, by the Defendants, acting as the City Council

for the CITY OF HOMESTEAD, a hearing was held on

the Plaintiffs’ Application for Preliminary Injunction.

Following that hearing, and after hearing argument of

counsel for the CITY OF HOMESTEAD, as well as

counsel for the Plaintiffs herein, the Court determined

that based upon the “case law and memorandum provided,

the Court finds that there is a substantial likelihood of

success on the merits for movant.” By this finding, the

Court indicated a substantial likelihood that the ordinance

here challenged would be found unconstitutional following

a trial on the merits.

22. Additionally, each individual Defendant was

afforded the opportunity to review decisions from ten

courts which have considered similar ordinances, each

of which court has found the ordinance to be

unconstitutional.

23. On Monday, June 2, 1980, the individual

Defendants were apprised that the Plaintiff MERLIN’S

App. 20

MUSIC, INC., a Florida corporation, and the Plaintiff

FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE,

were being deprived of their constitutionally protected

right to engage in their lawful business as a result of

the enforcement of this ordinance, and were further

apprised that the damages incurred as of the date of

that meeting were in excess of $10,000. Each Defendant

was additionally advised that the Plaintiffs’ damages

would continue each and every day that the ordinance

remained in effect and enforced by their direction,

notwithstanding the constitutional infirmity of the

ordinance.

24. Further, the individual Defendants were

apprised, both by counsel for the Plaintiffs and by

counsel for the CITY OF HOMESTEAD that the

ordinance was likely to be held unconstitutional.

25. Based upon the foregoing, and in malicious

disregard for the constitutional rights of the Plaintiffs,

the Defendants conspired and confederated together

to continue to enforce this void and unconstitutional

ordinance against the Plaintiffs, well-knowing that there

was no basis in law for that action. Further, the Defendants

specifically intended, by their actions, to impose the

financial harm upon the Plaintiffs as more fully set

forth in Count II of this Complaint.

26. These actions of the individual Defendants

were taken, not pursuant to any lawful duties imposed

upon them by virtue of their offices, but rather out of

personal animosity towards the Plaintiff MERLIN’S

MUSIC, INC. in specific and FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN

FOR FREE ENTERPRISE in general, and in complete

App. 21

disregard to their obligations to uphold the Constitution

of the United States of America.

27. The actions of the Defendants have resulted

in the financial harm set forth in Count II of this Complaint,

each and every item of which was well-known to the

individual Defendants, and specifically intended by them

in taking the actions identified above.

WHEREFORE, and by reason of the foregoing,

the Plaintiffs pray that this Honorable Court will take

jurisdiction of the within cause, grant compensatory

and punitive damages against the individual Defendants,

along with costs, attorneys’ fees and such other and

further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

SIMON, SCHINDLER & TRIPP,

P.A.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

1492 South Miami Avenue

Miami, Florida 33130

(305) 358-8611

By: /s/ Theodore L. Tripp, Jr.

THEODORE L. TRIPP, JR.

App. 22

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the

foregoing Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief

and Compensatory and Punitive Damages has been

hand delivered to Royall P. Terry, City Attorney, 790

North Homestead Boulevard, Homestead, Florida 33030,

this 5th day of June, 1980.

By: /s/ Theodore L. Tripp, Jr.

THEODORE L. TRIPP, JR.

App. 23

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 80-1160-Civ-JCP

FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE,

an unincorporated association, and

MERLIN'S MUSIC, INC., a Florida corporation,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

THE CITY OF HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA, a Florida

municipal corporation, NICHOLAS R. SINCORE,

individually and as Mayor of the City of Homestead,

Florida, and WILLIAM T. DICKINSON, individually

and as Vice-Mayor of the City of Homestead, Florida

and RUTH L. CAMPBELL, WILLIAM F.

McCONNELL, WILLIAM TOMMY WILSON,

WALTER RUTZKE, and IRVING PESKOE, all

individually and as Council of the City of Homestead,

Florida,

Defendants.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AS TO COUNT I, AND ESTABLISHING

LIABILITY AS TO COUNT Il

The Plaintiffs, FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR

FREE ENTERPRISE, an unincorporated association,

and MERLIN’S MUSIC, INC., a Florida corporation,

through undersigned counsel and pursuant to Rule 56,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, present this Motion

for Summary Judgment and state:

App. 24

1. The pleadings in this cause, specifically the

sworn Application for Preliminary Injunction previously

filed herein, affirmatively disclose that there is no dispute

as to the following material facts:

a. The Defendant CITY OF HOMESTEAD, is

a duly incorporated city in the State of Florida. On

April 21, 1980, the City Council for the CITY OF

HOMESTEAD enacted Ordinance No. 80-04-28 [a true

copy of which is attached hereto and by reference

made a part hereof]. The purpose and effect of such

ordinance is to prohibit the possession, delivery or

advertisement of certain items described in the ordinance

as “drug paraphernalia.” The ordinance defines as “drug

paraphernalia,” inter alia, scales, spoons, bowls, containers,

envelopes and other objects intended for the described

prohibited use. The challenged ordinance carries a criminal

penalty for the possession, delivery or advertisement

of those items vaguely defined in the ordinance. THE

CITY OF HOMESTEAD has declared its avowed

intention to vigorously enforce, and is in fact, vigorously

enforcing the challenged ordinance.

b. The Plaintiff FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR

FREE ENTERPRISE is an unincorporated association

of wholesalers and retail businessmen doing business

throughout Florida and in the CITY OF HOMESTEAD.

The wholesaler members of Plaintiff FLORIDA

BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE, are in

the business of selling to retail outlets merchandise

which may or may not be prohibited by the vague and

overbroad language of the challenged ordinance, and

are therefore deprived of their right to engage in a

lawful business. The members of the Plaintiff FLORIDA

BUSINESSMEN, who are in the retail business of

App. 25

selling objects arguably prohibited under the challenged

ordinance, are prohibited by the ordinance from obtaining,

advertising, or selling said merchandise, which severely

diminishes their income and viability of their businesses

and essentially curtails many of their retail business

establishments.

e. The Plaintiff MERLIN’S MUSIC, INC.

{hereinafter “THE STORE”) is in the business of selling

gift items. THE STORE is a small record shop located

in a shopping center at 797 N.E. Eighth Street,

Homestead, Florida. THE STORE carries records, posters,

and certain novelty items which may come within the

ambit of the challenged ordinance. The removal of the

latter items from Plaintiffs shop, in compliance with

the ordinance results in a substantial loss of income to

Plaintiff.

d. On May 14, 1980, the Plaintiffs filed a

Complaint in this Court seeking declaratory and injunctive

reliei challenging the constitutionality of Ordinance

No. 80-04-28, enacted and enforced by the CITY OF

HOMESTEAD.

e. The Plaintiffs are, and since the effective

date of enforcement have been, suffering substantial

harm through the loss of business and substantial income

as the direct result of the enactment and threat of

imminent enforcement of the challenged ordinance. THE

STORE has physically crated and removed a large

percentage of its inventory from the place of business,

because the language is so vague that Plaintiffs have

been forced to remove all merchandise which arguably

comes within the ambit of the ordinance. The Plaintiff

App. 26

THE STORE, for example, expended a great dea! oi

time, money, and effort to pack, move, and store all of

the containers, spoons, jewelry, scales, mirrors, and

bowls, among other items, which may arguably be

prohibited by the challenged ordinance, in order to

avoid criminal prosecution. All of the Plaintiffs continue

to suffer a substantial loss of income, business, and

customers due to compliance with the ordinance, which

may result in bankruptcy. Furthermore, the ordinance's

prohibition against advertising certain items constitutes

a denial of First Amendment rights which even for

minimal periods of time constitutes irreparable harm.

2. By reason of the authorities cited in the

accompanying Memorandum of Law, the challenged

ordinance is unconstitutional on its face, and the Defendant

CITY OF HOMESTEAD is liable for the damages incurred

by the enactment and enforcement thereof by the CITY

against the Plaintiffs, as a matter of law.

3. Based upon the foregoing facts, as to which

there is no dispute among the parties, the Plaintiffs

are entitled to a Summary Judgment as to the liability

of the Defendant CITY OF HOMESTEAD, as a matter

of law, for the damages incurred by the Plaintiffs as a

result of the enactment and enforcement of this ordinance

by the Defendant CITY OF HOMESTEAD.

WHEREFORE, and by reason of the foregoing,

the Plaintiffs pray this Honorable Court will enter an

Order on Counts I and II, pursuant to Rule 56(d), Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, establishing the liability of

the Defendant CITY OF HOMESTEAD, as a matter of

law, for any damages suffered by the Plaintiffs as a

result of the enactment and enforcement of this ordinance

App. 27

by the Defendant CITY OF HOMESTEAD, and declaring

the ordinance to be void and unconstitutional.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the

foregoing Motion for Summary Judgment As to Count

I, and Establishing Liability as to Count II has been

furnished by hand delivery to Royall P. Terry, Jr., City

Attorney, 790 North Homestead Boulevard, Homestead,

Florida 33030, this 5th day of June, 1980.

SIMON, SCHINDLER

& TRIPP, P.A.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

1492 South Miami Avenue

Miami, Florida 33130

(305) 358-8611

By:

THEODORE L. TRIPP, JR.

App. 28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA.

CASE NO. 80-1160-Civ-NCR

FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE

ENTERPRISE, ete., et. al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

THE CITY OF HOMESTEAD, etc., et al.,

Defendants.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants, by and through their undersigned

attorneys, and pursuant to Rule 56, Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, move for the entry of an order granting

Summary Judgment, and as grounds therefore would

state:

1) That Plaintiffs have filed a three count Amended

Complaint in this cause seeking (a) a declaratory judgment

ruling that Defendant, CITY OF HOMESTEAD’S,

Oridnance Number 80-04-28 is unconstitutional; (b)

compensatory damages for Defendant CITY OF

HOMESTEAD; and (c) compensatory and punitive

damages from the individual Defendant public officials.

2) That by reason of the authorities cited in the

accompanying Memorandum of Law, the challenged

ordinance is constitutional on its face.

App. 29

3) That there is no genuine issue of fact, and all

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a

matter of law.

WHEREFORE, Defendants request that the Court

enter summary judgment in favor of all Defendants

herein, pursuant to Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, upholding the constitutionality of CITY OF

HOMESTEAD Ordinance Number 80-04-28; Defendants

further move for the entry of an order taxing their

costs and attorneys fees against the Plaintiffs.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy

of the foregoing was mailed this 9th day of September,

1980, to: THEODORE L. TRIPP, JR., ESQUIRE,

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS, 1492 SOUTH MIAMI

AVENUE, MIAMI, FLORIDA 33130; ROYALL P. TERRY,

CITY ATTORNEY, 790 N. HOMESTEAD BLVD.,

HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA 33030.

KUVIN, KLINGENSMITH

& LEWIS, P.A.

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

7160 S.W. 62ND AVE.

P.O. BOX 431481

SO. MIAMI, FLORIDA 33143

(661-5008)

BY: /s/ [illegible]

FOR: H. JACK KINGENSMITH

App. 30

[Filed FEB 26, 1981]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

No. 80-1160-Civ-NCR

FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE,

an unincorporated association and

MERLIN’S MUSIC INC.,

Plaintiffs,

Vs.

THE CITY OF HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA, ete.,

Defendants

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

This cause came on for oral argument on defendant's

motion for summary judgement.

After a review of the record, and after considering

the arguments advanced by counsel at oral argument,

the Court is not persuaded that there are material

facts at issue in this cause of sufficient gravity to

warrant a finding that is not identical to Florida

Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. The City of Fort

Lauderdale, et al, No. 80-6157-Civ-NCR. Plaintiffs’

allegations of “selective enforcement,” “discriminatory

intent,” and “systematic design” to harass are simply

not supported in the record. Therefore the Drug

Paraphrenalia Ordinance, as construed in The City of

App. 31

Fort Lauderdale, is not repugnant to the United States

Constitution. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that summary judgement

is hereby entered for defendants as against plaintiffs.

DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of Feb, 1981.

si __{illegible]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

JUDGE

CC: Simon, Schindler & Tripp

1492 South Miami Ave.,

Miami, Fl. 33130

Kuvin, Klingensmith & Lewis

7160 S.W. 62nd Ave.

P.O. Box 431481

So. Miami, Fl. 33143

[Received MAR 4 1981]

App. 32

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 80-1160-Civ-NCR

FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE,

an unincorporated association and

MERLIN’S MUSIC, INC.

vs.

THE CITY OF HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA, ete.

THIS CAUSE is before the court on motion of plaintiff

to correct clerical error.

Upon consideration of the record, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that said motion is

hereby granted. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that the order granting

summary judgment in this cause where it refers to

Case No. 80-1657-Civ-NCR is hereby amended to provide

that the correct style of No. 80-6157-Civ-NCR is FLORIDA

BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE vs. THE

CITY OF HOLLYWOOD.

DONE AND ORDERED this 3 day of April, 1981.

/s/__{illegible]

U.S. District Judge

ee Simon, Schindler & Tripp

Kuvin, Klingensmith & Lewis PA

[Received APR 7 1981]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 80-6157-Civ-NCR

FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE,

an unincorporated association; and M. P. DERRICO

& SONS, FLORIDA, INC., a Florida corporation,

d/b/a DANDYLION HUT

Plaintiffs

vs.

THE CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, a Florida

municipal corporation Del 8

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

THIS CAUSE came on for oral argument on cross-

motions for summary judgment.

Plaintiffs commenced this action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. §1983 seeking a temporary restraining order,

preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction to

enjoin the enforcement of the City of Hollywood's

ordinance No. 0-80-15, amending Chapter 21 of the City

Code, which was enacted on February 20, 1980. Plaintiffs’

motion for a temporary restraining order was denied

and the application for a preliminary injunction was

consolidated with the trial on the merits on an expedited

basis, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(aX2). The parties

stipulated that there are no material facts at issue and

that the court need only resolve the legal issues presented.

App. 35

At the hearing on the merits the court requested and

received supplemental memoranda. After a review of

the record and after consideration of the arguments

advanced by counsel, the court enters this order as its

findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by

Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).

HOLLVYWOOD'S ORDINANCE

The city of Hollywood, Florida has recently enacted

ordinance 0-80-15 (hereinafter “the ordinance”),' which

has the avowed purpose of restricting public access to

drug paraphenalia. The ordinance is based upon the

“Model Drug Paraphernalia Act” (hereinafter M.D.P.A.)

drafted by the Drug Enforcement Administration of

the United States Department of Justice.

The ordinance prohibits the possession of drug

paraphernalia, Sec. 21-81, the manufacture or delivery

of drug paraphernalia, Sec. 21-82, and the placing of

advertisements promoting the sale of drug paraphernalia,

Sec. 21-83. Each violation of the ordinance is punishable

by a maximum fine of five hundred dollars ($500), or by

imprisonment not to exceed ninety (90) days, or both.

Because the ordinance seeks to restrict possession,

distribution, and advertisement of drug paraphernalia,

its definition of drug paraphernalia is critical. In pertinent

part it provides:

‘Holly wood's ordinance No. 0-8-15 is set out in the appendix of

this order.

App. 36

The term “Drug Paraphernalia” means all

equipment, products and materials of any kind

which are used, intended for use, or designed

for use in planting, propating, cultivating,

growing, harvesting, manufacturing,

converting, producing, processing,

preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging,

repackaging, storing, containing, concealing,

injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise

introducing into the human body a controlled

substance in violation of this ordinance. Section

21-80 (emphasis added).

Supplementing the definitional section is a seemingly

endless, but not exclusive, list of items covered by the

ordinance, Sec. 21-80 (AU) UA. Additionally, there

are fourteen factors which are set forth intended, along

with “other logically relevant factors”, to aid in the

determination of whether an object is drug paraphernalia

within the meaning of the ordinance. Sec. 21-80(B\1)— (14).

Section 21-82, which proscribes the manufacture

punish those acts where they are knowingly done.

Additionally, a violation of the ordinance has occurred

where one “reasonably should know” that an object

will be employed in the preparation, processing, or

consumption of a controlled substance, and a violation

has occurred where one has placed an advertisement in

the media, where one “reasonably should know that

the purpose of the advertisement . . . is to promote

the sale” of prohibited objects.

App. 37

THE CHALLENGES

Plaintiffs are individuals who own the Dandylion

Hut, a Hollywood business establishment which sells

prohibited objects, and Florida Businessmen for Free

Enterprise, an unincorporated association.

Plaintiffs attack the ordinance on three fronts;

they allege that the ordinance is vague, that it is

overbroad, and that it contravenes the First Amendment's

guaranty of freedom of speech. Defendant strenuously

argues that the ordinance is valid in its entirety, and

that it is not repugnant to any right secured by the

Constitution.

As a preliminary observation the court notes that

abstention is not appropriate in this cause in light of

the Fifth Cireuit's holding in High Ol’ Times Inc. u

Busbee, ___. F.2d ____ , No. 78-2192 (July 9, 1980). In

High Ol’ Times, the court concluded that the district

court had erred in abstaining from considering the

validity of the Georgia drug paraphernalia statute.

Here, as in High Ol’ Times, the issues “are all questions

of federal constitutional law; there are simply no difficult,

obscure, or unclear issues of state law.” Jd. at 7096. Nor

is there an “ongoing state scheme or regulatory program

involved here such that a federal ruling might engender

confusion . . . Id.

In recognition of the incidence of drug use and

dependence, particularly among the young, states and

individual communities have recently passed laws

endeavoring to stem the tide. Hollywood's ordinance is

typical in this respect. However, it is atypical in that it

App. 38

is based upon the M.D.P.A. drafted by the federal Drug

Enforcement Administration. The court will therefore

not essay at great length on the other types of ordinances

which have been challenged, except to note that they

have been invalidated generally for sweeping too broadly;?

a cannon is not sufferable where an arrow will suffice.

This opinion will scrutinize those cases in which

the M.D.P.A. or statutes very similar to the M.D.P.A.

have been construed in light of similar challenges. A

perusal of the relevant authority confirms this court's

initial analysis; the M.D.P.A., and therefore Hollywood's

ordinance when given the reasonable and proper

interpretation is not repugnant to the Due Process

Clause and the First Amendment.

In general, legislative enactments which are vague

do not provide notice to the ordinary person of what

conduct is proscribed, nor are law enforcement officers

provided with standards for enforcement. “First, because

we assume that man is free to steer between lawful

and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the

person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity

to know what is prohibited so that he may act

accordingly . . . . Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory

enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide

explicit standards for those who review them.” Grayned

v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109, 92 S.Ct.

2294-2298, 33 L.Ed. 2d 218, 222-223 (1972) (notes omitted).

*See generally, Knoedler v. Roxbury Township, 485 F.Supp.

990 (D.N.J. 1980); Banbu Sales, Inc. u Gekson, 474 F.Supp. 1297

(D.N.J. 1979); Music Stop, Inc. u City of Ferndale, ___. F.Supp.

__—(E.D. Mich. 1980).

App. 39

Additionally, overbreadth is also repugnant to the

constitution because it deters privileged activity. Id.

The Eighth Circuit applied the vagueness standards

as articulated in Grayned v. City of Rockford in Geiger

u City of Eagan, 618 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1980), and invalidated

an ordinance which prohibited possession and sale of

“drug-related devices.” Id. at 28. However, in a footnote,

the court noted that the M.D.P.A., as contrasted with

the invalidated ordinance, is a “properly drawn ordinance.”

Id. at 28, n.4. The court’s comments are, of course,

dicta; however, it illustrates the judicial recognition of

the narrowness of the M.D.P.A.

The M.D.P.A. has recently passed judicial muster

in Record Revolution, No. 6, Inc. u City of Parma, ___

F.Supp. ___, No. (80-35) (N. D. Ohio April 14, 1980).

There the court concluded that the statute was valid,

but it struck a portion of the complaint for vagueness.

It reasoned that the indicium, “whether the owner or

anyone in control of the object is a legitimate

supplier . .”, is vague because there “are no guidelines

as to what constitutes legitimacy.” However, this court

concludes that none of the indicia set forth in Section

21-80 (BX1)(14) are vague. The indicium directed to the

issue of “legitimacy” is supplemented by an example.

It is clear that this indicium attempts to distinguish

“head shops”, the subject of the ordinance, from other

retail establishments which might sell objects with

both innocent and prohibited uses. An ordinance need

not be drafted with absolute certainty; the appropriate

criteria is whether it is drafted so that its meaning is

reasonably apparent. Winters v. New York, 333 US.

507, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1945).

App. 40

As previously mentioned, two portions of the

ordinance (Section 21-82 and 21-83) proscribe conduct

where one actually knows or “reasonably should know”,

that a violation of the ordinance is ensuing. These

sections impose criminal penalties where there is actual

intent to commit the proscribed acts, as well as where

one ought to be aware that one is facilitating an act

proscribed by the ordinance. Although the courts in

Record Revolution No. 6 Inc. v. City of Parma, supra,

and Knoedler v. Roxbury Township, 485 F.Supp. 990

(D.N.J. 1980), invalidate portions of the ordinance imposing

a “reasonably should have known standard” this court

concludes that the standard is not unconstitutionally

vague. In World Imports, Inc. v. Woodbridge Township,

No. 80-1414 (D.N.J. June 20, 1980), the district court

considering an ordinance based on the M.D.P.A. reasoned

that “reasonably should know” standard does not

significantly differ from the actual knowledge standard.

The court considers this reasoning sound. When the

statute is applied there is really no difference between

the two standards.

The ordinance does present problems in its attempt

to define and apply intent. While it clearly prohibits

the manufacture, delivery, possession, and advertisement

of “drug paraphernalia”, the indicia set forth in section

21-80(BX1)}(14) could arguably support the interpretation

that a manufacturer who sells an object without intent

to commit the acts proscribed is subject to prosecution

if the shopowner or the purchaser intends it for use as

drug paraphernalia. A similar conclusion could be reached

with regard to the shopowner who sells an object without

intent to commit the acts proscribed. And further, an

innocent purchaser might be subject to prosecution for

App. 41

the acts and statements of those who distribute the

item. Similarly, a person using an item described in

section 21-80 (IK AY) without intent to use the item

as drug paraphernalia would be subject to prosecution.

These interpretations of the ordinance would not survive

judicial scrutiny.

The more reasonable and plausible meaning and

the one implicit in the ordinance, is that each defendant

charged with violating the ordinance must have general

criminal intent with respect to the offense alleged (as

previously discussed “reasonably should have known”

will suffice). As the court in Record Revolution No. 6,

Inc. u City of Parma, supra, stated:

There are three forms of state of mind on

which the definition of drug paraphernalia turns:

“{[Ajll equipment, products and materials of

any kind which are (1) used, (2) intended for

use; or (3) designed for use . . . in introducing

into the human body. controlled substances.

. . The court construes each of these three

elements as requiring the existence of general

criminal intent by the defendant. Thus the

criminal defendants voluntary and intentional

use of an item with illegal drugs makes it drug

paraphernalia within the meaning of the

ordinance. Similarly, if the defendant intends

an item for use with illegal drugs or designs

for that use the item is drug paraphernalia.

Adding the element of general intent not only

narrows the scope of the ordinance, it insures

that no one will be convicted because of mistake,

accident or other innocent reason. For example,

App. 42

if a person smokes marijuana from a pipe

believing it contains tobacco, he could not be

convicted of using drug paraphernalia. . . .

Similarly, if a person smokes tobacco in a

waterpipe which was designed for use with

drug paraphernalia because he did not intend

to use the pipe to ingest an illegal controlled

substance. Id. at 11.

This court is informed that the Sixth Circuit has

stayed the judgment in Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. u

City of Parma pending consideration of the appeal filed

by the plaintiffs in that case. Nevertheless, this court

considers the district court's findings and logic sound,

and it supports this court’s conclusions. Additionally,

the district court in World Imports, Inc. v. Woodbridge

Township, supra, reached precisely the same result.

PROHIBITION OF ADVERTISING

Plaintiffs have argued that the ordinance's alleged

overbreadth violates their First Amendment rights.

Initially, plaintiff suggests that symbolic speech is

prohibited by the ordinance. See generally, Tinker u

Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 21 L.Ed. 2d 731, 89 S.Ct. 733

(1969). As previously discussed, the court has concluded

that general criminal intent is required before it can be

said that a violation of the ordinance has occurred.

Therefore, one intending to promote and express a

political position does not have the requisite criminal

intent to commit a proscribed act.

Speech which does no more than “propose a

commercial transaction” is entitled to First Amendment

protection. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy u Virginia

App. 43

Citizens Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761, 96 S.Ct. 1817,

1825 (1976). However, speech which solicits illegal activity

is not protected. Pittsburgh Press Company u Pittsburgh

Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 93 S.Ct.

2553 (1978). The justification for protection of commercial

speech is that the free flow of commercia! information

benefits of the public. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy,

supra, clearly, however, the free flow of information

concerning drug paraphernalia has a potentially

deleterious effect upon the community. Having concluded

that the ordinance is valid and that the possession,

manufacture, and delivery of drug paraphernalia can

be proscribed, a logical corollary is that advertising

intended to “promote the sale of objects designe* or,

intended for use as drug paraphernalia” can be prohi ted.

App. 44

CONCLUSION

There can be little doubt that communities have a

valid interest in preventing the proliferation of drug

paraphernalia. This court believes and holds that the

Model Drug Paraphernalia Act adopted in the City of

Hollywood's Ordinance No. 0-80-15 as construed in this

order, validly serves the community's interest and does

not infringe upon rights secured by the Constitution.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AN ADJUDGED that defendant's

motion for summary judgment shall be and is hereby

granted.

DONE AND ORDERED this 29 day of August,

1980.

/s/ {illegible}

U S District Judge

attachment

ec- Simon, Schindler & Tripp

1492 South Miami Avenue

Miami, Florida 33130

ec- Sherman Bennett Mayor, Esq.

Suite 300

2450 Hollywood Bivd.

Hollywood, Florida 33020

App. 45

FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants,

u

The CITY OF HOLLYWOOD,

Defendant-A ppellee.

FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE,

an incorporated association, High Quality

Headquarters, Inc., a Florida Corp., Three Guys

Distributors, Inc., a Florida Corp., and Correct

Count Co., Inc., a New York Corp.,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants, Cross-Appellees,

U.

The STATE OF FLORIDA Jim Smith, as Attorney

General of the State of Florida, Kenneth Katsaris,

as a representative of the class of Defendants being

the sixty-seven duly elected Sheriffs of the State

of Florida, and Harry Morrison, etc.,

Defendants-A ppellees, Cross-Appellants.

Nos. 80-5769, 80-5813.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

April 23, 1982.

Consolidated appeals were taken by merchants

from a judgment of the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida, at Tallahassee,

App. 46

Lynn C. Higby, J., upholding state “head shop” law,

and a judgment of the United States District Court for

the Southern District of Florida, at Ft. Lauderdale,

Norman C. Roettger, Jr., J., upholding a similar ordinance.

The Court of Appeals, Hatchett, Circuit Judge, held,

inter alia, that: (1) the scope of advertising provisions

of state and city “head shop” laws, which forbid placing

in any publication “any advertisement, knowing, or

under circumstances where one reasonably should know,

that the purpose of the advertisement, in whole or in

part, is to promote the sale of objects designed or

intended for use as drug paraphernalia,” does not embrace

protected noncommercial speech; (2) the respective laws’

definition of drug paraphernalia as items “designed for

use” with controlled substances gave fair notice of

which items fall within the statutory prohibition; the

phrase “designed for use” refers to structural features

of objects deemed inherently fashioned for drug use,

the intent implicated is that of the designer, and such

intent is reflected by the objective physical characteristics

of the finished product; and (3) the phrase “reasonably

should know” in the respective laws was not impermissibly

vague.

Affirmed.

See also, Fifth Circuit, 648 F.2d 956.

1. Constitutional Law—82(4)

Reviewing court will sustain a facial overbreadth

challenge if the enactment reaches a substantia) amount

of constitutionally protected conduct engaged in by the

complainant or others.

App. 47

2. Drugs and Narcotics—46

Municipal Corporations —594(1)

Scope of the advertising provisions of state and

city “head shop” laws, which forbid placing in any

publication “any advertisement, knowing, or under

circumstances where one reasonably shouid know, that

the purpose of the advertisement, in whole or in part,

is to promote the sale of objects designed or intended

for use as drug paraphernalia,” does not embrace

protected non-commercial speech. West's F.S.A.

§893.147(4).

3. Constitutional Law—90.1(1)

Drugs and Narcotics—43

Municipal Corporations—594(1)

Insofar as any commercial speech interest was

implicated by the ban of state and city “head shop”

laws on advertisements promoting the sale of drug

paraphernalia, the enactments were directed towards

commercial activity promoting or encouraging illegal

drug use, speech that is not entitled to First Amendment

protection. West's F.S.A. §893.147(4); U.S. C. A. Const.

Amend. 14.

4. Constitutional Law—90.1(1)

Although speech which merely proposes a

transaction is entitled to First Amendment

protection, the government may regulate or ban entirely

App. 48

commercial speech related to illegal activity. U.S.C.A.

Const.Amend. 1.

5. Drugs and Narcotics—43

An enactment is not overbroad merely because it

may encompass “innocent” and “lawful” uses of items

as well as uses with illegal drugs.

6. Statutes—47

A law which does not impinge upon constitutionally

protected conduct and thus survives an overbreadth

claim may nevertheless suffer from vagueness.

7. Drugs and Narcotics—43

Municipal Corporations—594(2)

To succeed on their facial vagueness challenge to

state and city “head shop” laws, merchants had to

demonstrate that the statute and ordinance were

impermissibly vague in all of their applications. West's

F. S. A. §§ 893.145-893.147.

8. Constitutional Law — 2582)

Two basic requirements comprise the Fourteenth

Amendment due process guarantee against vague

statutes: laws must provide fair warning to persons of

ordinary intelligence of the persons covered and the

conduct prohibited, and must provide ascertainable

standards of guilt to protect against arbitrary, erratic

and discriminatory enforcement. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend.

14.

App. 49

9. Constitutional Law—60

Without sufficiently precise standards in statutes,

the legislature impermissibly delegates basic policy

decisions to the personal predilections of police,

prosecutors, and juries.

10. Criminal Law—13.1(1)

Statutes defining criminal offenses must be drawn

with a greater degree of precision.

11. Drugs and Narcotics—43

Municipal Corporations—594(1)

State and city “head shop” laws’ definition of drug

paraphernalia as items “designed for use” with controlled

substances gave fair notice of which items fall within

the statutory prohibition; the phrase refers to structural

features of objects deemed inherently fashioned for

drug use, the intent implicated is that of the designer,

and such intent is reflected by the objective physical

characteristics of the finished product. West's F.S.A.

§893.147(4).

12. Drugs and Narcotics—46

Municipal Corporations—594(1)

In respect to state and city “head shop” laws, the

three states of mind on which the definition of drug

paraphernalia relies, namely, “used,” “intended for use,”

or “designed for use,” require proof of general criminal

intent of the accused. West's F.S.A. §893.147(4).

App. 50

13. Drugs and Narcotics—43

Municipal Corporations—594(2)

In respect to state and city “head shop” laws

prohibiting the use, possession with intent to use, delivery,

possession with intent to deliver, and the manufacture

with intent to deliver drug paraphernalia “knowing or

under circumstances where one reasonably should know”

that the recipient will use the paraphernalia with

controlled substances, the phrase “reasonably should

know” is not impermissibly vague. West's F.S.A.

§893.147(4).

14. Criminal Law—568

Proof that a defendant reasonably should have

known something is established in substantially the

same manner as actual knowledge.

15. Constitutional Law—257.5

Municipal Corporations—121

While the risk of discriminatory enforcement

inherent in the “legitimate supplier” language of state

and city “head shop” laws is more than slight, merchants

could raise such due process claim only in a

postenforcement proceeding where they might attempt

to show that the ordinance and statute were being

enforced in an unconstitutional manner. West's F.S.A.

§893.146(10).

App. 51

16. Drugs and Narcotics—43

Municipal Corporations—594(2)

While merchants argued, in respect to state and

city “head shop” laws, that the “design for use” and

“reasonably should know” standards in the definition

of drug paraphernalia and the legitimate supplier indicium

were insufficiently explicit to prevent arbitrary

enforcement, the ordinance and statute were drafted

with sufficient specificity that this speculative danger

of discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement could not

render the laws void for vagueness. West's F.S.A.

§§ 893.145-893.147.

17. Constitutional Law—46(1)

A facial challenge to the constitutionality of the

subject drug paraphernalia enactments was not the

appropriate time for litigating claims of selective

enforcement; rather, such a claim could only be raised

in a postenforcement proceeding when the possibility

of selective enforcement had ripened into a prosecution.

Appeals from the United States District Court for

the Northern District of Florida.

Appeal from the United States District Court for

the Southern District of Florida.

Before THORNBERRY*, FAY and HATCHETT,

Circuit Judges.

*Honorable Homer Thornberry, U.S. Circuit Judge for the

Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.

App. 52

HATCHETT, Circuit Judge:

This consolidated appeal involves a review of the

constitutionality of drug paraphernalia laws enacted

by the State of Florida and the City of Hollywood to

curb the increased incidence of drug abuse. The District

Court for the Northern District of Florida upheld the

state “head shop” law, but declared unconstitutionally

vague and severed a portion of the statute prohibiting

mere possession of drug paraphernalia. The District

Court for the Southern District of Florida upheld a city

its possession, manufacture, or sale in Hollywood. We

affirm both decisions.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Proceedings Below

Appellants, Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise,

High Quality Headquarters, Inc., and Correct Count

Company, Inc. (hereinafter State Merchants), as

representatives of a plaintiff class of manufacturers,

distributors, and retailers of arguably vutlawed items,

sought injunctive and declaratory relief from enforcement

of Florida’s allegedly unconstitutionally vague and

overbroad “head shop” law. The United States District

Court for the Northern District of Florida granted the

state’s motion to dismiss and certified defendants Katsaris,

Sheriff of Leon County, and Morrison, State’s Attorney

for the Second Judicial Circuit of Florida, as

representatives of the defendant class solely for the

purpose of restraint by injunction. The court dec.ared

a provision of the statute unconstitutional, upheld the

App. 53

remainder and issued a stay and injunction pending

appeal prohibiting enforcement of the law in its entirety.

Appellants, Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise

and M. P. \’Errico & Sons, Florida, Inc. (hereinafter

Hollywood Merchants), sought declaratory and injunctive

relief in the District Court for the Southern District of

Florida from the enforcement of an allegedly

unconstitutionally vague and overbroad ordinance of

the City of Hollywood, Florida. The district court denied

the Hollywood Merchants’ motion for a temporary

restraining order, and pursuant to Rule 65(a\(2),

Fed.R.Civ.P., consolidated the hearing on the preliminary

injunction with the trial on the merits. On cross-motions

for summary judgment, the district court upheld the

ordinance under the fourteenth amendment due process

clause and the first amendment and denied the Hollywood

Merchants’ motion for a stay pending appeal. A panel

of the Fifth Circuit entered an injunction pending appeal

precluding enforcement of the ordinance.

B. The Drug Paraphernalia Laws

The state head shop law, Fla. Stat. §§ 893.145-.147

(Supp.1982), like its city ordinance counterpart, is modelled

after the Model Drug Paraphernalia Act (MDPA) (1975),

drafted by the Drug Enforcement Administration of

the United States Department of Justice. Sec Appendix

A (setting forth text of state statut). Unlike the

Hollywood ordinance and the MDPA, however, the state

law mandates consideration of thirteen factors in

determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia,

whereas consideration of these same factors in the

Hollywood ordinance and the MDPA is discretionary.

App. 54

Hollywood, Florida, Ordinance No. 0-80-15 (Feb.

20, 1980), prohibits the use, possession with intent to

use manufacture, delivery, and advertisement of drug

paraphernalia. See Appendix B (reprinting text of

ordinance). “Drug paraphernalia” is defined as all items

“used, intended for use, or designed for use” with

controlled substances. A non-exclusive list of items

within the ambit of the ordinance supplements the

definitional section. The ordinance also permits

consideration of fourteen factors in addition to “other

logically relevant factors” in determining whether an

object is drug paraphernalia. Section 21-82, which

proscribes the manufacture and delivery of drug

paraphernalia, and section 21-83, which proscribes the

advertisement of drug paraphernalia, punishes the

commission of those acts by one who knows or “reasonably

should know” that the object will be used with illicit

drugs or that the advertisement’'s purpose is to promote

the sale of prohibited drug paraphernalia.

II. ISSUES

We must consider (1) whether the definition of

“drug paraphernalia” and the prohibition against

advertising drug paraphernalia is unconstitutionally

overbroad; and (2) whether the definition of “drug

paraphernalia” and the scienter requirement in these

laws are impermissibly vague.**

**On cross appeal, the State argues that the District Court

for the Northern District of Florida abused its discretion in declining to

abstain or defer to state courts prior to declaring the provision

proscribing mere possession unconstitutional. The subsequent

amendment of Fla. Stat. §893.147(1) (Supp.1982) to prohibit possession

with intent to use drug paraphernalia renders this issue moot on

appeal.

App. 55

III. Overbreadth

The State and Hollywood Merchants argue that

the statute and ordinance are unconstitutionally overbroad

because of the broad definition of drug paraphernalia.

Specifically, they contend that the “designed for use”

standard sweeps into its proscription a myriad of

otherwise innocent and lawful objects. They also assert

that the “reasonably should know” standard of knowledge

is unconstitutional because it inhihits constitutionally

protected conduct. The Merchants further argue that

the ban against advertising drug paraphernalia

impermissibly infringes “protected commercial speech”

and “protected political speech“ debating drug

paraphernalia laws and the use of drugs.

III A reviewing court will sustain a facial

overbreadth challenge if the enactment reaches “a

substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct”

engaged in by the complainant or others. Village of

Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,

— ‘ 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1189 91, 71 L.Ed.2d

— 0982).

[2] Both the State and the Hollywood “head shop”

laws forbid placing in any publication “any advertisement,

knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably

should know, that the purpose of the advertisement, in

whole or in part, is to promote the sale of objects

or intended for use as drug paraphernalia.”

Fla.Stat. §893.147(4) (Supp.1982); Hollywood, Florida,

Ordinance No. 0-80-15, §21-83 (Feb. 20, 1980). We initially

consider whether this provision infringes upon the first

amendment rights of the Merchants or of others. This

section is narrowly drawn to prohibit advertising

App. 56

promoting the sale of “drug paraphernalia” within the

meaning of the head shop laws. It does not address

advertisements commenting upon the wisdom or efficiency

of these laws nor upon any other matter. This provision

does not regulate “speech as such, but simply regulates

the commercial marketing of items that . . may be

used for an illicit purpose.” Flipside, at 102 8. Ct.

at 1191. We therefore hold that the scope of the advertising

provisions does not embrace protected noncommercial

speech.

3. 4 Insofar as the ban implicates any commercial

speech interest, we note that the enactments here are

directed towards commercial activity promoting or

encouraging illegal drug use. Although speech which

merely “propose|s] a commercial transaction” is entitled

to first amendment protection, the government may

regulate or ban entirely commercial speech related to

illegal activity. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy u

Virginia Citizens Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761, 96 S.Ct.

1817, 1825, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976); Central Hudson Gas

& Electric Corp. u Public Service Commission, 447

U.S. 557, 563-64, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 2350-51, 65 L. Ed. 2d 341

(1980); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations

Commission, 413 U S. 376, 388, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 2560, 37

L.Ed.2d 669 (1973). The justification for protecting

commercial speech is that the free flow of information

in advertising benefits the public. Virginia State Board

of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 763-64, 96 S.Ct. 1826-27. As the

district court noted in the instant case, however,

the free flow of information concerning drug

paraphernalia has a potentially deleterious effect

upon the community. Having concluded that the

App. 57

ordinance is valid and that the possession,

manufacture, and delivery of drug paraphernalia

can be proscribed, a logical corollary is that

advertising intended to ‘promote the sale of objects

designed or intended for use as drug paraphernalia’

can be prohibited.

[5] Flipside also decided that an enactment is not

overbroad merely because it may encompass “innocent”

and “lawful” uses of items as well as uses with illegal

drugs. U.S. at n.9, 102 S.Ct. at 1192 n.9. The

Merchants’ assertion that they cannot ascertain whether

the statute and ordinance regulate items with some

lawful uses addresses vagueness. In Flipside, the Court

deemed such a complaint premature in a preenforcement

facial challenge. at n.9, 102 S.Ct. at 1192 n.9. The

Court also characterized the assertion that the provision

would inhibit innocent uses of covered items as a complaint

of denial of substantive due process, devoid of merit.

At — n.9, 102 S.Ct. at 1192 n.9. The Court stated: “A

retailer's right to sell smoking accessories, and

purchaser's right to buy and use them are entitled oniy

to minimal due process protection. . . . Regulation of

items that have some lawful as well as unlawful uses is

not an irrational means of discouraging drug use.” At

.—— 0.9, 102 8. Ct. at 1192 n.9 (citations omitted).

IV. VAGUENESS

16, 7] A law which does not impinge upon

constitutionally protected conduct and thus survives

an overbreadth claim may nevertheless suffer from

vagueness. To succeed on their facial vagueness challenge,

however, the Merchants must demonstrate that the

App. 58

statute and the ordinance are impermissibly vague in

all of their applications. Flipside, at 102 8. Ct. at

1191.

[8-10] Two basic requirements comprise the

fourteenth amendment due process guarantee against

vague statutes: Laws must provide fair warning to

persons of ordinary intelligence of the persons covered

and the conduct prohibited and must provide ascertainable

standards of guilt to protect against arbitrary, erratic,

and discriminatory enforcement. Grayned u City of

Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99,

33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972), Papachristou u City of Jacksonville,

405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed.2d 110

(1972). Without sufficiently precise standards in statutes,

the legislature impermissibly delegates basic policy

decisions to the personal predilections of police,

prosecutors, and juries. Smith u Goguen, 415 U.S. 566,

576, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1248, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1976). Further,

statutes defining criminal offenses must be drawn with

a greater degree of precision. Winters v. New York, 333

U.S. 507, 515, 68 S.Ct. 665, 670, 92 L.Ed. 840 (1945). The

State and Hollywood Merchants contend that certain

phraseology in the Hollywood ordinance and the Florida

statute violates theso constitutional criteria.

A. Fair Notice

1. “Designed for Use.”

{11] Quoting extensively from Indiana Chapter,

NORML v. Sendak, 631 F.2d 734 (7th Cir. 1980), the

Merchants argue that the definition of drug paraphernalia

as items “designed for use” with controlled substances

App. 59

fails to give fair notice of which items fall within the

statutory prohibition. Specifically, they assert that the

definition is unclear with respect to whether prohibited

devices must be suited solely for drug use or may

encompass multi-purpose objects which include legitimate

uses. The Merchants also criticize the phrase as

unconstitutionally ambiguous for failing to precisely

state who is intended as designer. The Merchants thus

argue that this language permits an accused to be

prosecuted and convicted based on the transferred

intent of another.

Like the trial courts in the instant cases, numerous

courts have upheld “designed for use” language against

similar challenges. See, e. g., The Casbah, Inc. u Thone,

651 F.2d 551, 559-60 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied.

U. 8... 8.Ct. __, 71 L.Ed.2d . 50 U.. L. W.

3713 (U.S. Mar. 8, 1982); Mid-Atlantic Accessories Trade

Association u Maryland, 500 F.Supp. 834, 844-45

(D.Md.1980); Delaware Accessories Trade Association

u Gebelein, 497 F.Supp. 289, 291-92 (D.Del.1980). The

United States Supreme Court recently decided that

“designed for use” language is not unconstitutionally

vague on its face. The Court held that this standard

encompasses items principally used with illegal drugs

as determined by the objective physical features of the

object in conjunction with the intent or plan of the

manufacturer. Flipside. U.S. at 102 8. Ct. at

1193 (1982). The Court stated that:

[A] business person of ordinary intelligence would

understand that this term refers to the design of

the manufacturer, not the intent of the retailer or

customer. It is also sufficiently clear that items

App. 60

which are principally used for nondrug purposes,

such as ordinary pipes, are not ‘designed for use’

with illegal drugs.

At — 102 8.Ct. at 1193.

{12} We therefore hold that the phrase “designed

for use” refers to structural features of objects deemed

inherently fashioned for drug use and that the intent

implicated is that of the designer (i.e., patent holder or

manufacturer). We further hold that the designer's intent

for a design is reflected by the objective physical

characteristics of the finished product. To ensure that

defendants will not be convicted based on the transferred

intent of others, we also note that the three states of

mind on which the definition of drug paraphernalia

relies —(1) “used,” (2) “intended for use,” or (3) “designed

for use“ —require proof of general criminal intent of

the accused. See, The Casbah, Inc. v. Thone, 651 F.2d

551, 559 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied. U.S. —__.,

—. §.Ct. __., 71 L.Ed.2d ___., 50 U.S. L. W. 3713 (U.S.

Mar. 8, 1982); Delaware Accessories Trade Association

u Gebelein, 497 F.Supp. 289, 292-93 (D.Del.1980); Record

Revolution No. 6, Inc. u City of Parma, 492 F.Supp.

1157, 1169-70 (N.D.Ohio), rev d. 638 F.2d 916, 928 & n. 14

(6th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 451 U.S. 103, 101

S.Ct. 2998, 69 L.Ed.2d 384 (1981).

2. “Reasonably Should Know.”

{13] The Hollywood and Florida Merchants also

argue that the “reasonably should know” language in

the sections defining substantive offenses is vague.

The Hollywood ordinance prohibits the use, possession

App. 61

with intent to use, the delivery, the possession with

intent to deliver, and the manufacture with intent to

deliver drug paraphernalia “knowing or under

Both laws further prohibit any advertising “under

circumstances where one reasonably should know” that

the purpose of the advertisement is to promote the

sale of objects designed or intended for use with drug

paraphernalia. Fla.Stat. §893.147(4) (Supp.1982);

Hollywood, Fla., Ordinance No. 0-80-15, §21-83 (Feb. 20,

1980). Both trial courts in the instant case held that the

“reasonably should know” language was constitutionally

permissible. The Hollywood and State Merchants argue,

however, that this constructive knowledge standard

lacks a specific intent requirement and thus fails to

give notice to innocent persons of what constitutes

prohibited conduct.

[14] We hold that the phrase “reasonably should

know” is not impermissibly vague and adopt the reasoning

advanced by the district courts. We note that proof

that a defendant reasonably should have known something

is established in substantially the same manner as

actual knowledge. “Even if someone testifies that he

told a defendant something, the defendant's knowledge

may be inferred only if the trier of fact proves that the

defendant heard, understood, and believ's what he

was told.” World Imports, Inc. u Woodbridge Township,

493 F.Supp. 428, 433 (D.N.J.1980).

Further support is found in the many statutes

imposing criminal liability under a “reasonably should

App. 62

know” standard and which have withstood constitutional

attack. See, e. g., The Casbah, Inc. u Thone, 651 F.2d at

561 n.13 (collecting federal statutes). Florida courts

alsc have construed this standard to require proof that

“the circumstances of the transaction were sufficiently

suspicious to put a person of ordinary intelligence and

caution on inquiry.” Hutton u State, 332 So.2d 686, 687

(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1976); B. S. W State, 2 461

(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1975).

We also hold that this standard is sufficiently certain

to provide fair notice to persons of ordinary intelligence

of its meaning and application. See Gorin u United

States, 312 U.S. 19, 27-28, 61 S.Ct. 429, 433-434, 85

L.Ed. 488 (1941); United States u Featherston, 461 F.2d

1119, 1121-22 (5th Cir. 1972). The “reasonably should

know” standard does not punish innocent or inadvertent

conduct but establishes a scienter requirement that

the defendant acted in bad faith, with intent or knowledge

that the recipient will use the paraphernalia with

controlled substances.

3. Factors Relevant to Determining Drug

Paraphernalia: “Legitimate Supplier”.

Section 21-80B in the ordinance and section 893.146

in the statute lists fourteen and thirteen indicia,

respectively, that law enforcement authorities must

consider in determining whether an object is “drug

paraphernalia.” In this appeal, the Merchants attack

only the factor of being “a legitimate supplier” as vague

and overbroad. The relevant provision states:

App. 63

In determining whether an object is drug

paraphernalia, in addition to all other logically

relevant factors, the following may be considered:

11. Whether the owner, or anyone in control of

the object, is a legitimate supplier of like or related

items to the commodity, such as a licensed distributor

or dealer of tobacco products... .

Hollywood, Fla, Ordinance No. 0-80-15, §21-80B(11) (Feb.

20, 1980) (emphasis added); accord Fla. Stat. §893.146(10)

(Supp. 1982).

The district court upheld this provision in the

Hollywood ordinance, stating that the “legitimate

supplier” guideline “is supplemented by an example. It

is clear that this indicium attempts to distinguish ‘head

shops,’ the subject of the ordinance, from other retail

establishments which might sell objects with both innocent

and prohibited uses.” The court in Record Revolution

No. 6 wu City of Parma, nowever, deleted this same

provision from the three ordinances reviewed for creating

a danger of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

638 F.2d 916 at 933 n.24. The district court therein

stated that the reference to “legitimate suppliers” is

imprecise and misleading because the ordinance applies

to all who use, distribute, or advertise even an innocent

item with the requisite intent. 492 F.Supp. 1157, 1171

(N.D.Ohio 1980).

[15] We agree that the risk of discriminatory

enforcement inherent in this language is more than

App. 64

slight. Nevertheless, we hold that appellants may raise

this due process claim only in a post-enforcement

proceeding where they may attempt to show that the

ordinance and the statute are being enforced in an

unconstitutional manner.

B. Adequacy of Standards for Enforcement

[16] The Merchants also assert that the “designed

for use” and “reasonably should know” standards in

the definition of drug paraphernalia and the legitimate

supplier indicium are insufficiently explicit to prevent

arbitrary enforcement. This imprecision, appellants argue,

will foster selective enforcement only against “head

shops” by police and prosecutors “who claim to know

drug paraphernalia when they see it, but cannot define

it any more precisely in advance.”

[17] We hold that the ordinance and statute here

were drafted with sufficient specificity that this

speculative danger of discriminatory and arbitrary

enforcement cannot render the ordinance void for

vagueness. The Merchants have introduced no evidence

indicative of discriminatory enforcement. A facial

challenge to the constitutionality of the subject drug

enactments is not the appropriate time

for litigating claims of selective enforcement. Regardless

of the risk of discriminatory enforcement, the Merchants

may raise this claim only in a post-enforcement proceeding

when the possibility of selective enforcement has

„„ „3 Flipside. U. 8.

— uu. 21 & 22, 102 S.Ct. at 1196 nn. 21 & 22. Such

. oes ae cm

due process implications only when bolstered by specific

applications of the drug paraphernalia laws.

App. 65

VI. CONCLUSION

We hold that these drug paraphernalia laws enacted

by the State of Florida and the City of Hollywood are

neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad.

We now dissolve all injunctions entered in these

consolidated cases.

AFFIRMED.

APPENDIX A

Fla. Stat. §§ 893.145-.147 (Supp.1982)

893.145 “Drug Paraphernalia” defined

The term “drug paraphernalia” means all equipment,

products and materials of any kind which are used,

intended for use, or designed for use in planting,

propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting,

concealing

ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the

human body a controlled substance in violation of this

chapter. Drug paraphernalia is deemed to be contraband

which shall be subject to civil forfeiture. The term

includes, but is not limited to:

(1) Kits used, intended for use, or designed for

use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, or

harvesting of any species of plant which is a controlled

substance or from which a controlled substance can be

derived.

App. 66

(2) Kits used, intended for use, or designed for

use in manufacturing, compounding, converting,

producing, processing, or preparing controlled substances.

(3) Isomerization devices used, intended for use,

or designed for use in increasing the potency of any

species of plant which is a controlled substance.

(4) Testing equipment used, intended for use, or

designed for use in identifying, or in analyzing the

strength, effectiveness, or purity of, controlled substances.

(5) Scales and balances used, intended for use, or

designed for use in weighing or measuring controlled

substances.

(6) Diluents and adulterants, such as quinine

hydrochloride, mannitol, mannite, dextrose, and lactose,

used, intended for use, or designed for use in cutting

controlled substances.

(7) Separation gins and sifters used, intended for

use, or designed for use in removing twigs and seeds

from, or in otherwise cleaning or refining, cannabis.

(8) Blenders, bowls, containers, spoons, and mixing

devices used, intended for use, or designed for use in

compounding controlled substances.

(9) Capsules, balloons, envelopes and other

containers used, intended for use, or designed for use

in packaging small quantities of controlled substances.

App. 67

(10) Containers and other objects used, intended

for use, or designed for use in storing or concealing

controlled substances.

(11) Hypodermic syringes, needles, and other

objects used, intended for use, or designed for use in

parenterally injecting controlled substances into the

human body.

(12) Objects used, intended for use, or designed

for use in ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing

cannabis, cocaine, hashish, or hashish oil into the human

body, such as:

(a) Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic,

or ceramic pipes, with or without screens, permanent

screens, hashish heads, or punctured metal bowls.

(b) Water pipes.

le) Carburetion tubes and devices.

(d) Smoking and carburetion masks.

(e) Roach clips: meaning objects used to holding

burning material, such as a cannabis cigarette, that has

become too small or too short to be held in the hand.

(f) Miniature cocaine spoons, and cocaine vials.

(g) Chamber pipes.

(h) Carburetor pipes.

(i) Electric pipes.

App. 68

(j) Air-driven pipes.

*) Chillums.

(l) Bongs.

(m) Ice pipes or chillers.

893.146 Determination of paraphernalia

In determining whether an object is drug

paraphernalia, a court or other authority or jury shall

consider, in addition to all other logically relevant factors,

the following:

(1) Statements by an owner or by anyone in contro!

of the object concerning its use.

(2) The proximity of the object, in time and space,

to a direct violation of this act.

(3) The proximity of the object to controlled

substances.

(4) The existence of any residue of controlled

substances on the object.

(5) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the intent

of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, to

deliver it to persons who he knows, or should reasonably

know, intend to use the object to facilitate a violation

of this act. The innocence of an owner, or of anyone in

control of the object, as a direct violation of this act

shall not prevent a finding that the object is intended

for use, or designed for use, as drug paraphernalia.

App. 69

(6) Instructions, oral or written, provided with

the object concerning its use.

(7) Descriptive materials accompanying the object

which explain or depict its use.

(8) Any advertising concerning its use.

(9) The manner in which the object is displayed

for sale.

(10) Whether the owner, or anyone in control of

the object, is a legitimate supplier of like or related

items to the community, such as a licensed distributor

of or dealer of tobacco products.

(11) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio

of sales of the object or objects to the total sales of the

business enterprise.

(12) The existence and scope of legitimate uses

for the object in the community.

(13) Expert testimony concerning its use.

893.147 Use, possession, manufacture, delivery, or

advertisement of drug paraphernalia

(1) Use or possession of drug paraphernalia. —It

is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with

intent to use, drug paraphernalia:

(a) To plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,

manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process,

prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, or

App. 70

conceal, a controlled substance in violation of this chapter;

or

(b) To inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce

into the human body a controlled substance in violation

of this chapter.

Any person who violates this section is guilty of a

misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided

in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(2) Manufacture or delivery of drug paraphernalia.

—It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with

intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver,

drug paraphernalia, knowing, or under circumstances

where one reasonably should know, that it will be used:

(a) To plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,

manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process,

prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, or

conceal a controlled substance in violation of this act;

or

(b) To inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce

into the human body a controlled subst. nce in violation

of this act.

Any person who violates this section is guilty of a

felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s.

775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(3) Delivery of drug paraphernalia to a minor.

— Any person 18 years of age or over who violates

subsection (2) by delivering drug paraphernalia to a

App. 71

person under 18 years of age is guilty of a felony of the

second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s.

775.083, or s. 775.084.

(4) Advertisement of drug paraphernalia. —It is

unlawful for any person to place in any newspaper,

magazine, handbill, or other publication any

advertisement, knowing, or under circumstances where

one reasonably should know, that the purpose of the

advertisement, in whole or in part, is to promote the

sale of objects designed or intended for use as drug

paraphernalia. Any person who violates this section is

guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable

as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

APPENDIX B

ORDINANCE NO. 0-80-15

AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF HOLLYWOOD,

FLORIDA, AMENDING CHAPTER 21, CODE OF

ORDINANCES, ENTITLED, “OFFENSES,

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS”, BY CREATING

SECTIONS 21.80 THROUGH 21-84 THEREOF, TO

PROHIBIT THE DISPLAY OR SALE OF

INSTRUMENTS, SIMULATED DRUGS,

SIMULATED CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES, OR

OTHER NARCOTIC PARAPHERNALIA,

PROVIDING A SEVERABILITY CLAUSE, AND

PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE

WHEREAS, the City Commission of the City of

Hollywood, Florida, has become very concerned about

the increased use of illegal drugs and controlled substances

within the City; and

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WHEREAS, the sale, advertisement and distribution

of instruments, drug paraphernalia and simulated

controlled substances, contribute to an atmosphere of

community acceptance of illegal use of controlled

substances: and

WHEREAS, the City Commission finds that it is

in the best interest of the health, safety and welfare, of

the citizens of the City to restrict access to such drug

paraphernalia;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE

CITY COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF HOLLYWOOD,

FLORIDA:

Section 1: That Chapter 21, Code of Ordinances,

entitled “Offenses, Miscellaneous Provisions” is amended

by creating Sections 21-89 through 21-84 to read and

provide as follows:

Sec. 21-80. Definitions.

A. The term “Drug Paraphernalia” means all

equipment, products and materials of any kind which

are used, intended for use, or designed for use, in

planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting,

manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing,

processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging,

repacking, storing, containing, concealing, injecting,

ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the

human body a controlled substance in violation of this

ordinance. It includes, but is not limited to:

1. Kits used, intended for use, or designed for

use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing or

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harvesting of any species of plant which is a controlled

substance or from which a controlled substance can be

derived;

2. Kits used, intended for use, or designed for

use in manufacturing, compounding, converting,

producing, processit.g, or preparing controlled substances;

3. Isomerization devices used, intended for use,

or designed for use in increasing the potency of any

species of plant which is a controlled substance.

4. Testing equipment used, intended for use, or

designed for use in identifying, or in analyzing the

strength, effectivevess or purity of controlled substances;

5. Scales and balances used, intended for use, or

designed for use in weighing or measuring controlled

substances;

6. Diluents and adulterants, such as quinine

hydrochloride, mannitol, mannite, dextrose and lactose,

used, intended for use, or designed for use in cutting

controlled substances;

7. Separation gins and sifters used, intended for

use, or designed for use in removing twigs and seeds

from, or in otherwise cleaning or refining, marijuana;

8. Blenders, bowls, containers, spoons and mixing

devices used, intended for use, or designed for use in

compounding controlled substances;

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9. Capsules, balloons, envelopes and other

containers used, intended for use, or designed for use

in packaging small quantities of controlled substances;

10. Containers and other objects used, intended

for use, or designed for use in storing or concealing

controlled substances;

11. Hypodermic syringes, needles and other objects

used, intended for use, or designed for use in parenterally

injecting controlled substances into the human body;

12. Objects used, intended for use, or designed

for use in ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing

marijuana, cocaine, hashish, or hashish oil into the human

body, such as:

(a) Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic,

or ceramic pipes with or without screens, permanent

screens, hashish heads, or punctured metal bowls;

(b) Water pipes;

(c) Carburetion tubes and devices;

(d) Smoking and carburetion masks;

(e) Roach clips: meaning objecis used to holding

burning material, such as a marijuana cigarette,

that has become too small or too short to be held in

the hand;

(f) Miniature cocaine spoons, and cocaine vials;

(g) Chamber pipes;

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(h) Carburetor pipes;

(i) Electric pipes;

Air driven pipes;

(k) Chillums;

) Bongs;

(m) lee pipes or chillers.

B. In determining whether an object is drug

in addition to all other logically relevant

factors, the following may be considered:

1. Statements by an owner or by anyone in control

of the object concerning its use;

2. Prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of

anyone in control of the object, under any State or

Federal law relating to any controlled substance;

3. The proximity of the object, in time and space,

to a direct violation of this ordinance;

4. The proximity of the object to controlled

substances;

5. The existence of any residue of controlled

substances on the object;

6. Direct or circumstantial evidence of the intent

of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, to

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deliver it to persons whom he knows, or should reasonably

know, intend to use the object to facilitate a violation

of this ordinance; the innocence of an owner, or of

anyone in control of the object, as to a direct violation

of this ordinance shall not prevent a finding that the

object is intended for use, or designed for use as drug

paraphernalia;

7. Instructions, oral or written, provided with

the object concerning its use;

9. National and local advertising concerning its

use;

10. The manner in which the object is displayed

for sale;

11. Whether the owner, or anyone in control of

the object, is a legitimate supplier of like or related

items to the community, such as a licensed distributor

or dealer of tobacco products;

12. Direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio

of sales of the object(s) to the total sales of the business

enterprise;

13. The existence and scope of legitimate uses

for the object in the community;

14. Expert testimony concerning its use.

Sec. 21-81. Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.

It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess

with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate,

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cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert,

store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise

introduce ‘ato the human body a controlled substance

in violat... of this ordinance.

Sec. 21-82. Manufacture or Delivery of Drug

Paraphernalia.

It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess

with intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to

deliver, drug paraphernalia, knowing, or under

circumstances where one reasonably should know, that

it will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow,

harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce,

Sec. 21-83. Advertisement of Drug Paraphernalia

It is unlawful for any person to place in any

the advertisement, in whole or in part, is to promote

the sale of objects designed or intended for use as drug

paraphernalia.

Sec. 21-84. Penalty

Any person who violates any term, condition, or

provision of Secs. 21-81 through 21-83 shall be liable,

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upon conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction, to

a fine not to exceed Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), or

by imprisonment not to exceed ninety (90) days, or

both, at the discretion of the court. Each day of violation

of any term, provision, or condition of Secs. 21-81 through

21-83 shall constitute a separate and distinct offense.

Section 2: lt is the intention of the City Commission

and it is hereby ordained that the provisions of this

ordinance shall become and be made a part of the Code

of Ordinances of the City of Hollywood, Florida, and

the sections of this ordinance may be renumbered to

accomplish such intention.

Section 3: If any word, phrase, clause, subsection

or section of this ordinance is for any reason held

unconstitutional or invalid, the invalidity thereof shall

not affect the validity of any remaining portions of this

ordinance.

Section 4: That all sections or parts of sections of

the Code of Ordinances, all ordinances or parts of

ordinances, and all resolutions or parts of resolutions,

in conflict herewith, be and the same are hereby repeaied

to the extent of such conflict.

Section 5: That this ordinance shall be in full

iorce and effect immediately upon its passage and

adoption.

App. 79

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

NO. 81-5701

Non-Argument Calendar

FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE,

an unincorporated association, and

MERLIN’S MUSIC, INC., a Florida Corporation,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants,

versus

THE CITY OF HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA,

A Florida Municipal Corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Florida

June 10, 1982

Before HILL, VANCE and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

AFFIRMED. See Florida Businessmen for Free

Enterprise, Inc. v. Florida, No. 80-5813 (11th Cir. Apr.

23, 1982); Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise,

Inc. v. City of Hollywood, No. 80-5769 (11th Cir. Apr. 23,

1982).

App. 80

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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