Supplemental Appendix — Hartigan v. General Electric Co.

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No. 82-648

ALEXANDER * STEVAS.

CLERK |

IN THE |

Supreme Court of the United States

OctToser Term, 1982

Mew HARTIG AN

FYRONE-C—FAHNER, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF IL-

LINOIS, CHARLES P. ZALAR, STATE’S ATTORNEY OF

GRUNDY COUNTY, and PHILIP GUSTAFSON, DIREC-

TOR OF THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR

SAFETY,

Petitioners,

v.

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY and

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY,

Respondents.

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Tyrone C. FAHNER

Attorney General of Illinois

CuirrorD L. WEAVER

Special ome ng ey omy General

Representi Fahner,

Charles P. hi ~ Philip Gustafson

Ross, Harpies, O’Keere, BABCOCK

& PARSONS

One IBM Plaza, Suite 3100

Chicago, Illinois 60611

(312) 467-9300

Attorneys for Petitioners

Piper WENTZ ROTHSCHILD

One IBM Plaza, Suite 3100

Chicago, Illinois 60611

(312) 467-9300

Of Counsel

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX

Appendix 6—Memorandum Opinion and

Order of the United States

District Court, Northern Dis-

trict of Illinois in General Elec-

tric Co., et al. v. Tyrone C.

Fahner, et al., No. 80 C 6835,

filed October 12, 1981.............. Supp. App. |

IN THE UNrteD States District Court

For the Northern District of Illinois

Eastern Division

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY and SOUTH- )

ERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY,

Plaintiffs,

TYRONE C. FAHNER, Attorney General of the

State of illinois, CHARLES R. ZALER, State's

Attorney for Grundy County, lilinois, and PHIL-

IP GUSTAFSON, Director of the Illinois

Department of Nuclear Safety.

Defendants. -

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ex rel. |

TYRONE C. FAHNER, Attorney “.eneral of the

State of Iilinois,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY and SOUTH-

ERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY,

r = Ne. 80 C 6835

+ Ne. 81 C 461

Defendants. |

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER

These cases involve challenges to the constitutionality and

enforcement of a provision of the Illinois Spent Fuel Act,

Ill.Rev. Stat. ch. 11%, § 230-22 (Supp.

provides that:

1981). This provision

No person may dispose of, store, or accept any spent

nuclear fuel which was used in

any power generating

facility located outside this State, or transport into this

State for disposal or storage any spent nuclear fuel which

was used in any power generating facility located outside

this State, unless the state of origin of such spent nuclear

2

fuel has a facility, which is not part of a power generating

facility, for the disposal or storage of spent nuclear fuel

substantially like that of this State and has entered into a

reciprocity agreement with this State. The determination

as to whether the state of origin has a disposal or storage

facility for spent nuclear fuel substantially like that of this

State is to be made by the Director of the Department of

Nuclear Safety and all reciprocity agreements must be

approved by a majority of the members of both Houses of

the General Assembly and approved and signed by the

Governor.

General Electric Company (“GE”) and Southern California

Edison (“SCE”) are plaintiffs in case number 80 C 6835 and

defendants in case number 81 C 461. They are opposed in each

instance by Illinois Attorney General Tyrone Fahner. Addi-

tionally, the State of Illinois is a plaintiff in 80 C 461, while

Charles R. Zaler, State’s Attorney for Grundy County, and

Philip Gustafson, Director of the Illinois Department of Nucle-

ar Safety (collectively referred to as the “State”), are named as

defendants in 80 C 6835.

GE operates a storage facility for spent nuclear fuel in

Morris, Grundy County, Illinois. SCE ships spent nuclear fuel

from its San Onofre, California nuclear plant to Morris for

storage. GE and SCE challenge the constitutionality of the

Spent Fuel Act as violative of the Supremacy Clause and the

Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The cases are currently

before the court on the motion of GE and SCE for summary

judgment in case number 80 C 6835 and for declaratory relief

in case number 81 C 461.

3

L

GE and SCE' base their contention that the Spent Fuel Act

is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause on the grounds,

inter alia, that state regulation of the transportation and storage

of spent nuclear fuel has been preempted by a federal statutory

and regulatory scheme.

The doctrine of federal preemption originates in Article VI

of the Constitution, the Supremacy Clawse, which provides that:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States shall

be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the the Supreme

Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws

of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

When a state’s right to exercise its authority is challenged

under the Supremacy Clause, a federal court must commence

its analysis, with the position that “the historic powers of the

States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that

was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Rice v. Santa

Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). See Ray v.

Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). The court must

then determine whether Congress either explicitly or implicitly

prohibited the states from regulating the matters at issue. See

Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conserv, &

Develop. Comm'n, 472 F.Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 1979).

Express preemption occurs when Congress has expressly

provided that a federal regulation is intended to be exclusive,

either in a federal statute or in the legislative history regarding

that statute. Railway Employees’ Dept. v. Hanson, 35\ U.S. 225

(1956). Implied preemption can occur in several ways, in-

cluding situations where a scheme of pervasive federal regu-

‘GE and SCF are joined in their motions by the United States as

amicus curiae. Tne State of Illinois is joined by the Citizens for a

Better Environment as ami.us curiae in opposition to the motions for

summary judgment and declaratory relief.

4

lation exists supporting a reasonable inference that Congress

did not intend for the states to supplement the regulatory

scheme or where an Act or Congress deals with an area of

dominant federal interest so that it is reasonable to assume that

state regulation of the same area is precluded. Rice v. Santa Fe

Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).

In an earlier opinion, General Electric Co. v. Fahner, No.

80 C 6835 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 1981), this court rejected the

State of Illinois’ argument that the Spent Fuel Act is not

preempted by federal law. In both instances, the state referred

to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95,

amending the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§7401-642 (Supp.

1980), and accompanying legislative history, see, e.g., House

Conf. Rep. No. 95-564 ( Aug. 3, 1977), 1977 U.S. Code Cong.

& Ad. News 1523, as support for its position. While these

provisions deal with state authority to regulate radioactive air

pollutants, they are, in the wider scheme, but exceptions to the

comprehensive federal plan for the regulation of nuclear fuel as

originally set forth in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as

amended. See, e.g., Pacific Legal Foundation v. Energy Re-

sources Conserv. & Develop. Comm'n, 472 F.Supp. 191, 198 n. 5

(S.D. Cal. 1979). The passage of the Clean Air Act Amend-

ments of 1977 does not give rise to an inference that Congress

intended for the states to supplement existing laws governing

the storage and transportation of spent nuclear fuel.

The Atomic Energy Act created a pervasive regulatory

scheme with exclusive authority vested in the Atomic Energy

Commission (“AEC”).2 Northern States Power Co. v. Min-

nesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd. mem., 405 U.S.

1035 (1972). Congress intended the mandate to the NRC to

include the authority to license and otherwise regulate the use,

2 The AEC was subsequently abolished by the Energy Reorgani-

zation Act of 1974. The AEC’s licensing and related regulatory

functions were transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(“NRC”). 42 U.S.C. § 5841( f)( 1976).

5

possession and transfer of radioactive material. This grant of

authority extends, by clear implication, to spent nuclear fuel as

well.?

Procedures exist, however, for the “discontinuance” by the

NRC and the “assumption” by the states of certain regulatory

responsibilities that are otherwise exclusively vested with the

NRC. Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2021.

This occurs only after the state has entered into a “section 274

Agreement” with the NRC. The State of Illinois has not

entered into such an agreement.

While a Section 274 Agreement would allow for a partial

divestment of authority and control from the NRC, the states

are also expressly prohibited from assuming control over

specific aspects of the nuciear regulatory scheme. Thus, even if

Illinois had entered into a Section 274 Agreement, it could not

regulate production and utilization facilities. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2021(c). In conjunction with the retention of these areas of

authority, the NRC promulgated regulations that expressly

preserve exclusive licensing and regulatory authority over the

“transfer, storage or disposal of radioactive waste material

resulting from the separation in a production facility of special

nuclear material from irradiated reactor fuel.” 10 C.F.R.

§ 150.15(a)(4) (1980).

Moreover, several courts, beginning with Northern States

Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd

mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972) have held that state regulation of

nuclear waste is preempted by federal law. See generally Train

v. Colorado Pub. Int. Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. |, 14-18

3 The NRC’s authority is based on the fact that spent nuclear fuel

constitutes “byproduct material,” which is, in turn, defined as “radio-

active material... yielded in..the process of... urilizing special

nuclear material.” 42 U.S.C. §2014(¢). The ownership, custody,

handling and disposal of byproduct material is regulated by the NRC

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 2111-114 and regulations promulgated

thereunder.

6

(1976); Washington Building & Construction Trades Council v.

Spellman, No. L-81-154 (E.D. Wash. June 26, 1981) slip op. at

5-7; State of Illinois v. Kerr-McGee, No. 80 C 2776 (N.D. Il.

Jan. 8, 1981).

For the aforementioned reasons, this court holds that the

Illinois Spent Fuel Act, inasmuch as it seeks to restrict the

shipping and storage of spent nuclear fuel brought into Illinois,

asserts state jurisdiction over an area of regulation preempted

by an exclusive federal regulatory scheme. The Spent Fuel Act,

therefore, is unconstitutional as violative of the Supremacy

Clause.

IL.

Next, GE and SCE contend that the Spent Fuel Act

imposes an impermissible burden on interstate commerce in

violation of the Commerce Clause, Article I, section 8 of the

Constitution. The state asserts, on the other hand, that the Act

comes within the quarantine exception to the Commerce Clause

and, thus, is not unconstitutional.

The Commerce Clause provides, in part, that “Congress

shall have Power ... To Regulate Commerce ... among the

several States ....” This has been interpreted as reflecting “a

central concern of the Framers . . . that in order to succeed, the

new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward econom-

ic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies

and later among the States under the Articles of Con-

federation.” Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 ( 1979).

At the outset, there is no question but that the movement

of nuclear waste in interstate commerce fits within the definition

of “commerce” for constitutional purposes. Washington Build-

ing & Construction Trades Council v. Spellman, No. C 81 190,

(E.D. Wash. June 26, 1981) slip op. at 8. See Philadelphia v.

New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (1978). Many areas of potential

7

federal regulation have escaped congressional attention by

virtue of their local character. Id. at 623, citing South Carolina

State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185

(1938). A statute is nor in violation of the Commerce Clause as

long as it serves a legitimate state interest and it is applied in a

nondiscriminatory manner. Raymond Motor Transportation,

Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978). In those situations,

however, the court must make a “delicate adjustment” of the

conflicting state and federal claims.” Great Atlantic & Pacific

Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371 (1976), quoting H.P.

Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 US. 525, 553 (1949),

( Black, J. dissenting).

The criteria for making this determination are set forth in

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). See

Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). Pike

focuses, generally, on three areas: |) whether the state law

regulates evenhandedly; 2) whether it effectuates a legitimate

local public interest; and 3) whether it has a minimal effect on

interstate commerce. Pike, supra at 142.

Applying the Pike test, the court finds that the Spent Fuel

Act regulates, not evenhandedly but discriminatorily, in its

effect on interstate commerce. The Act prohibits the importa-

tion of spent nuclear fuel for disposal or storage in any off-site

nuclear storage facility in Illinois unless a similar facility and

reciprocal agreement exists with the state of origin. The Act is

per se discriminatory. The Illinois legislature was aware of the

fact that the Morris plant is the only off-site nuclear storage

facility of its kind in the country. See Memorandum of General

Electric Company and Southern California Edison Company in

Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment at 26 n.* and

**. Reciprocity, therefore, is impossible and, as such, the Act

totally bans the importation for storage on the storage of spent

nuclear fuel from outside of Illinois. See generally Great

Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 US. 366 (1976).

Where, as is the case here, a state “overtly blocks the flow of

interstate commerce at state’s borders,” Philadelphia v. New

Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978), the court need not proceed

further under the Pike test as the statute is clearly in violation of

the Commerce Clause. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways

Corp., _.. U.S. ——, 49 U.S.L.W. 4328 ( Mar. 24, 1981).

Finally, the court must address the state’s assertion that the

Spent Fuel Act comes within the ambit of the quarantine

exception to the Commerce Clause. This argument is premised

on the fact that some state regulations, even though they

facially discriminate against interstate commerce, have been

upheld because they represent “a legitimate attempt to protect

the people of the State.” Siigh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 59-60

(1915). See Clason v. Indiana, 306 U.S. 439 (1939); Asdeil v.

Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908).

The same argument, however, was offered, and rejected,

by the Supreme Court in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 US.

417 (1978). In Philadelphia, the Court distinguished the

quarantine cases from the case at hand, which involved a New

Jersey statute that prohibited the importation of most “solid or

liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the

territorial limits of the State...” id. at 621, for the reason that

the prohibition did not discriminate against interstate com-

merce, “but simply prevented traffic in noxious articles what-

ever their origin.” Jd. at 629.

The Court distinguished further the fact that no claim had

been made that the very movement of waste into or through the

state endangered health. /d. The transportation and storage of

nuclear waste, of course, does pose a danger to the health of

Illinois residents. But the inheren: danger applies equally to all

people. As the Court found in Philadelphia, there is no basis to

distinguish between the danger to Illinois residents and that

affecting the residents of the other fo:cy-nine states. “If one is

inherently harmful, so is the other.” Jd. The Spent Fuel Act,

like the New Jersey statute, attempts to block the importation

for storage and the storage of spent nuclear fuel in an off-site

9

facility “is an obvious effort to saddle those outside the State

with the entire burden. . . .” Jd. The Commerce Clause protects

against the “efforts by one State to isolate itself in the stream of

interstate commerce from a problem shared by all.” Jd.

In conclusion, this court holds that the Spent Fuel Act

violates both the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause

of the Constitution. The statute is void and unenforceable. The

motions of GE and SCE for summary judgment in case number

80 C 6835 and for declaratory judgment in case number 81 C

461 are hereby granted. Both cases are dismissed.

ENTER:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

JUDGE

DATED: October 12, 1981

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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