Supplemental Appendix — Hartigan v. General Electric Co.
Supreme Court brief1983
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No. 82-648
ALEXANDER * STEVAS.
CLERK |
IN THE |
Supreme Court of the United States
OctToser Term, 1982
Mew HARTIG AN
FYRONE-C—FAHNER, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF IL-
LINOIS, CHARLES P. ZALAR, STATE’S ATTORNEY OF
GRUNDY COUNTY, and PHILIP GUSTAFSON, DIREC-
TOR OF THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR
SAFETY,
Petitioners,
v.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY and
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY,
Respondents.
SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Tyrone C. FAHNER
Attorney General of Illinois
CuirrorD L. WEAVER
Special ome ng ey omy General
Representi Fahner,
Charles P. hi ~ Philip Gustafson
Ross, Harpies, O’Keere, BABCOCK
& PARSONS
One IBM Plaza, Suite 3100
Chicago, Illinois 60611
(312) 467-9300
Attorneys for Petitioners
Piper WENTZ ROTHSCHILD
One IBM Plaza, Suite 3100
Chicago, Illinois 60611
(312) 467-9300
Of Counsel
SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX
Appendix 6—Memorandum Opinion and
Order of the United States
District Court, Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois in General Elec-
tric Co., et al. v. Tyrone C.
Fahner, et al., No. 80 C 6835,
filed October 12, 1981.............. Supp. App. |
IN THE UNrteD States District Court
For the Northern District of Illinois
Eastern Division
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY and SOUTH- )
ERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY,
Plaintiffs,
TYRONE C. FAHNER, Attorney General of the
State of illinois, CHARLES R. ZALER, State's
Attorney for Grundy County, lilinois, and PHIL-
IP GUSTAFSON, Director of the Illinois
Department of Nuclear Safety.
Defendants. -
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ex rel. |
TYRONE C. FAHNER, Attorney “.eneral of the
State of Iilinois,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY and SOUTH-
ERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY,
r = Ne. 80 C 6835
+ Ne. 81 C 461
Defendants. |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
These cases involve challenges to the constitutionality and
enforcement of a provision of the Illinois Spent Fuel Act,
Ill.Rev. Stat. ch. 11%, § 230-22 (Supp.
provides that:
1981). This provision
No person may dispose of, store, or accept any spent
nuclear fuel which was used in
any power generating
facility located outside this State, or transport into this
State for disposal or storage any spent nuclear fuel which
was used in any power generating facility located outside
this State, unless the state of origin of such spent nuclear
2
fuel has a facility, which is not part of a power generating
facility, for the disposal or storage of spent nuclear fuel
substantially like that of this State and has entered into a
reciprocity agreement with this State. The determination
as to whether the state of origin has a disposal or storage
facility for spent nuclear fuel substantially like that of this
State is to be made by the Director of the Department of
Nuclear Safety and all reciprocity agreements must be
approved by a majority of the members of both Houses of
the General Assembly and approved and signed by the
Governor.
General Electric Company (“GE”) and Southern California
Edison (“SCE”) are plaintiffs in case number 80 C 6835 and
defendants in case number 81 C 461. They are opposed in each
instance by Illinois Attorney General Tyrone Fahner. Addi-
tionally, the State of Illinois is a plaintiff in 80 C 461, while
Charles R. Zaler, State’s Attorney for Grundy County, and
Philip Gustafson, Director of the Illinois Department of Nucle-
ar Safety (collectively referred to as the “State”), are named as
defendants in 80 C 6835.
GE operates a storage facility for spent nuclear fuel in
Morris, Grundy County, Illinois. SCE ships spent nuclear fuel
from its San Onofre, California nuclear plant to Morris for
storage. GE and SCE challenge the constitutionality of the
Spent Fuel Act as violative of the Supremacy Clause and the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The cases are currently
before the court on the motion of GE and SCE for summary
judgment in case number 80 C 6835 and for declaratory relief
in case number 81 C 461.
3
L
GE and SCE' base their contention that the Spent Fuel Act
is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause on the grounds,
inter alia, that state regulation of the transportation and storage
of spent nuclear fuel has been preempted by a federal statutory
and regulatory scheme.
The doctrine of federal preemption originates in Article VI
of the Constitution, the Supremacy Clawse, which provides that:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States shall
be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the the Supreme
Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
When a state’s right to exercise its authority is challenged
under the Supremacy Clause, a federal court must commence
its analysis, with the position that “the historic powers of the
States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). See Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). The court must
then determine whether Congress either explicitly or implicitly
prohibited the states from regulating the matters at issue. See
Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conserv, &
Develop. Comm'n, 472 F.Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
Express preemption occurs when Congress has expressly
provided that a federal regulation is intended to be exclusive,
either in a federal statute or in the legislative history regarding
that statute. Railway Employees’ Dept. v. Hanson, 35\ U.S. 225
(1956). Implied preemption can occur in several ways, in-
cluding situations where a scheme of pervasive federal regu-
‘GE and SCF are joined in their motions by the United States as
amicus curiae. Tne State of Illinois is joined by the Citizens for a
Better Environment as ami.us curiae in opposition to the motions for
summary judgment and declaratory relief.
4
lation exists supporting a reasonable inference that Congress
did not intend for the states to supplement the regulatory
scheme or where an Act or Congress deals with an area of
dominant federal interest so that it is reasonable to assume that
state regulation of the same area is precluded. Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
In an earlier opinion, General Electric Co. v. Fahner, No.
80 C 6835 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 1981), this court rejected the
State of Illinois’ argument that the Spent Fuel Act is not
preempted by federal law. In both instances, the state referred
to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95,
amending the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§7401-642 (Supp.
1980), and accompanying legislative history, see, e.g., House
Conf. Rep. No. 95-564 ( Aug. 3, 1977), 1977 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 1523, as support for its position. While these
provisions deal with state authority to regulate radioactive air
pollutants, they are, in the wider scheme, but exceptions to the
comprehensive federal plan for the regulation of nuclear fuel as
originally set forth in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended. See, e.g., Pacific Legal Foundation v. Energy Re-
sources Conserv. & Develop. Comm'n, 472 F.Supp. 191, 198 n. 5
(S.D. Cal. 1979). The passage of the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1977 does not give rise to an inference that Congress
intended for the states to supplement existing laws governing
the storage and transportation of spent nuclear fuel.
The Atomic Energy Act created a pervasive regulatory
scheme with exclusive authority vested in the Atomic Energy
Commission (“AEC”).2 Northern States Power Co. v. Min-
nesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd. mem., 405 U.S.
1035 (1972). Congress intended the mandate to the NRC to
include the authority to license and otherwise regulate the use,
2 The AEC was subsequently abolished by the Energy Reorgani-
zation Act of 1974. The AEC’s licensing and related regulatory
functions were transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(“NRC”). 42 U.S.C. § 5841( f)( 1976).
5
possession and transfer of radioactive material. This grant of
authority extends, by clear implication, to spent nuclear fuel as
well.?
Procedures exist, however, for the “discontinuance” by the
NRC and the “assumption” by the states of certain regulatory
responsibilities that are otherwise exclusively vested with the
NRC. Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2021.
This occurs only after the state has entered into a “section 274
Agreement” with the NRC. The State of Illinois has not
entered into such an agreement.
While a Section 274 Agreement would allow for a partial
divestment of authority and control from the NRC, the states
are also expressly prohibited from assuming control over
specific aspects of the nuciear regulatory scheme. Thus, even if
Illinois had entered into a Section 274 Agreement, it could not
regulate production and utilization facilities. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021(c). In conjunction with the retention of these areas of
authority, the NRC promulgated regulations that expressly
preserve exclusive licensing and regulatory authority over the
“transfer, storage or disposal of radioactive waste material
resulting from the separation in a production facility of special
nuclear material from irradiated reactor fuel.” 10 C.F.R.
§ 150.15(a)(4) (1980).
Moreover, several courts, beginning with Northern States
Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd
mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972) have held that state regulation of
nuclear waste is preempted by federal law. See generally Train
v. Colorado Pub. Int. Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. |, 14-18
3 The NRC’s authority is based on the fact that spent nuclear fuel
constitutes “byproduct material,” which is, in turn, defined as “radio-
active material... yielded in..the process of... urilizing special
nuclear material.” 42 U.S.C. §2014(¢). The ownership, custody,
handling and disposal of byproduct material is regulated by the NRC
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 2111-114 and regulations promulgated
thereunder.
6
(1976); Washington Building & Construction Trades Council v.
Spellman, No. L-81-154 (E.D. Wash. June 26, 1981) slip op. at
5-7; State of Illinois v. Kerr-McGee, No. 80 C 2776 (N.D. Il.
Jan. 8, 1981).
For the aforementioned reasons, this court holds that the
Illinois Spent Fuel Act, inasmuch as it seeks to restrict the
shipping and storage of spent nuclear fuel brought into Illinois,
asserts state jurisdiction over an area of regulation preempted
by an exclusive federal regulatory scheme. The Spent Fuel Act,
therefore, is unconstitutional as violative of the Supremacy
Clause.
IL.
Next, GE and SCE contend that the Spent Fuel Act
imposes an impermissible burden on interstate commerce in
violation of the Commerce Clause, Article I, section 8 of the
Constitution. The state asserts, on the other hand, that the Act
comes within the quarantine exception to the Commerce Clause
and, thus, is not unconstitutional.
The Commerce Clause provides, in part, that “Congress
shall have Power ... To Regulate Commerce ... among the
several States ....” This has been interpreted as reflecting “a
central concern of the Framers . . . that in order to succeed, the
new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward econom-
ic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies
and later among the States under the Articles of Con-
federation.” Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 ( 1979).
At the outset, there is no question but that the movement
of nuclear waste in interstate commerce fits within the definition
of “commerce” for constitutional purposes. Washington Build-
ing & Construction Trades Council v. Spellman, No. C 81 190,
(E.D. Wash. June 26, 1981) slip op. at 8. See Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (1978). Many areas of potential
7
federal regulation have escaped congressional attention by
virtue of their local character. Id. at 623, citing South Carolina
State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185
(1938). A statute is nor in violation of the Commerce Clause as
long as it serves a legitimate state interest and it is applied in a
nondiscriminatory manner. Raymond Motor Transportation,
Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978). In those situations,
however, the court must make a “delicate adjustment” of the
conflicting state and federal claims.” Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371 (1976), quoting H.P.
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 US. 525, 553 (1949),
( Black, J. dissenting).
The criteria for making this determination are set forth in
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). See
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). Pike
focuses, generally, on three areas: |) whether the state law
regulates evenhandedly; 2) whether it effectuates a legitimate
local public interest; and 3) whether it has a minimal effect on
interstate commerce. Pike, supra at 142.
Applying the Pike test, the court finds that the Spent Fuel
Act regulates, not evenhandedly but discriminatorily, in its
effect on interstate commerce. The Act prohibits the importa-
tion of spent nuclear fuel for disposal or storage in any off-site
nuclear storage facility in Illinois unless a similar facility and
reciprocal agreement exists with the state of origin. The Act is
per se discriminatory. The Illinois legislature was aware of the
fact that the Morris plant is the only off-site nuclear storage
facility of its kind in the country. See Memorandum of General
Electric Company and Southern California Edison Company in
Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment at 26 n.* and
**. Reciprocity, therefore, is impossible and, as such, the Act
totally bans the importation for storage on the storage of spent
nuclear fuel from outside of Illinois. See generally Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 US. 366 (1976).
Where, as is the case here, a state “overtly blocks the flow of
interstate commerce at state’s borders,” Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978), the court need not proceed
further under the Pike test as the statute is clearly in violation of
the Commerce Clause. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp., _.. U.S. ——, 49 U.S.L.W. 4328 ( Mar. 24, 1981).
Finally, the court must address the state’s assertion that the
Spent Fuel Act comes within the ambit of the quarantine
exception to the Commerce Clause. This argument is premised
on the fact that some state regulations, even though they
facially discriminate against interstate commerce, have been
upheld because they represent “a legitimate attempt to protect
the people of the State.” Siigh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 59-60
(1915). See Clason v. Indiana, 306 U.S. 439 (1939); Asdeil v.
Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908).
The same argument, however, was offered, and rejected,
by the Supreme Court in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 US.
417 (1978). In Philadelphia, the Court distinguished the
quarantine cases from the case at hand, which involved a New
Jersey statute that prohibited the importation of most “solid or
liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the
territorial limits of the State...” id. at 621, for the reason that
the prohibition did not discriminate against interstate com-
merce, “but simply prevented traffic in noxious articles what-
ever their origin.” Jd. at 629.
The Court distinguished further the fact that no claim had
been made that the very movement of waste into or through the
state endangered health. /d. The transportation and storage of
nuclear waste, of course, does pose a danger to the health of
Illinois residents. But the inheren: danger applies equally to all
people. As the Court found in Philadelphia, there is no basis to
distinguish between the danger to Illinois residents and that
affecting the residents of the other fo:cy-nine states. “If one is
inherently harmful, so is the other.” Jd. The Spent Fuel Act,
like the New Jersey statute, attempts to block the importation
for storage and the storage of spent nuclear fuel in an off-site
9
facility “is an obvious effort to saddle those outside the State
with the entire burden. . . .” Jd. The Commerce Clause protects
against the “efforts by one State to isolate itself in the stream of
interstate commerce from a problem shared by all.” Jd.
In conclusion, this court holds that the Spent Fuel Act
violates both the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution. The statute is void and unenforceable. The
motions of GE and SCE for summary judgment in case number
80 C 6835 and for declaratory judgment in case number 81 C
461 are hereby granted. Both cases are dismissed.
ENTER:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE
DATED: October 12, 1981
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